Luca Casartelli PDF Winter School (1)

8/8/2019 Luca Casartelli PDF Winter School (1)

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Winter School: Universit Vita-Salute San Raffaele, MilanLuca Casartelli, Ph.D. Universit de Genve26-27-28 January [email protected]

The man is world-forming:Heideggers considerations towards

a phenomenology of action

1) In the first part of this paper I will show some phenomenological considerationsabout the role of the action:

the action has to be primarily described in a phenomenological way in order to be clarified. I will repropose

some examples of Gallagher&Zahavis book in order to show the genesis and the original field of the common

matters of phenomenologically different actions.

In order to explain phenomenologically the human acting, it is necessary to clarify the role of the practical

action. At the beginning of the chapter entitled Action and agency, Gallagher&Zahavi write:

Our way of being in the world, according to many phenomenologists, is characterizes primarily in terms of practical

action [...] In our everyday lives we are pragmatists. To put it differently, our primary way of encountering worldly

entities is by using them rather than by theorizing about them or perceiving them in a detached manner.1

In this way, as Whitehead did, I can affirm that we are where we are able to produce effects. A simple thing

is not simplya thing among the others things: it is handling, it is ready-to-hand because we take care of

things. For example, there is the knife used to cut a slice of cake, the knife that killed a man, the knife that

was sold in Milan, etc. Our world is a practical world; it is the world that we use, modify, handle; in this world

we move, we live: we are beings-in-the-world and we relate to things in different ways. Ph enomenologically

we have to underline the importance of the object-as-intended, namely the object as experienced2 .

Furthermore, the spatiality of the lifeworld is also structured by contexts of use. If our lifeworld had been

captured by a geometrical spatiality, we would have had different experience of it. Measured in centimeters, I

am much closer to the glasses I am wearing than to the computer screen I am looking at, or the phone that I

am using is nearer than the person I am talking to. Instead, in the phenomenological approach (namely

speaking in terms of meaningor significance) the relations are reverse. Thanks to Heidegger, we can say

that an objectively long distance on an easily travelled way can be much shorter than an objectively

shorter distance on a difficult way. In the everyday life we habitually use this type of reasoning when we takethe longer (but faster) road by car. So we can say that our first relationship with the world (with the things and

with the space) is a practical one. Now, I want to discuss howwe can distinguish phenomenologically the

experiencethat usually the natural attitude of cognitives science consider superimposable. What can we say

about the experience? How can we phenomenologically argue about it? The natural attitude asserts that

there is a neutral view capable of showing the real things, without the mutable outcomes of the first-person

perspective. On the contrary Gallagher&Zahavi:

Some people mistake phenomenology for a subjective account of experience; but a subjective account of experience

should be distinguished from an account of subjective experience. In a similar way, some people confuse an objective

Luca Casartelli Universit de Genve

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1 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, Ed.Routledge, New York 2008, p.153.2

Phenomenologists call the act-object relation the correlation structure of intentionality. Husserl distinguished the object as

experienced(noema), the mental act that intends the object(noesi), and the object-that-is-intended(object itself).


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The Gallagher&Zahavis analysis leads us to propose some considerations about the importance of

phenomenological attitude regarding the issue of action and human acting6. In fact we cannot limit ourselves

to the natural attitude if we want to clarify phenomena as they appear to us. The phenomenological attitude

demands to attend to the world strictly as it appears, namely the world as it is phenomenally manifested. This

purpose allows us to differentiate the several degrees of the act: the common sense speaks about action

as a simple and non-problematical thing. Phenomenologically, we have to seethe phenomena and I will try

to present some phenomenological considerations about the acting to disclose the intentional subjects

genuine experience.

2) In the second part of the paper I will pose some considerations about the wide experiential field where we

can distinguish an extensive range between reflex movements and intentional actions, between the

worldlessness and the world-formation. This commitment allows us to explicate the basis of the research

work about the phenomenology of action. I suggest some considerations starting from Gallagher&Zahavi s

book [A], and then I will approach Heideggers reflections [B].

[A] The difference between movementand actionand some reflections about notion of agency

A phenomenological attitude asks to attend to the world strictly as it appears; a phenomenological

perspective about action problem involves a reflective approach about first-order and high-order experience.

With Gallagher&Zahavi we can say:

So what is that makes a movement an action? Before we answer that, lets take a closer look at the different kinds of

movements that can be discerned in the range between reflex movement and intentional action. There are some

movements that are neither reflex nor intentional.7

In The Phenomenological Mind we can find widely developed analysis about movements that are neither

reflex nor intentional. The first class of movements is called subintentional, and it refers to

OShaughnesseys analysis. When I am listening to someone telling an exciting story my foot may be tapping

with enjoyment or anticipation. Obviously, it is neither a reflex movement nor an intentional action on my part;

it has no goal and there is nothing that may support the idea of intentional action. In a second time,

according to Gallagher&Zahavi, we can speak about what they call movements with organizing intention.

These are intentional movements even though we cannot say that they are part of the proper description of

the full-blown intentional act. The example of the friends visit may clarify this situation: in fact I have to get

up out of my chair, walk across the room and then twist the doorknob. All such movements are included in a

specific purpose: to open the door and to let my friend in. In a certain way they are organized by the

intentional action, even if in a narrow sense they are not intentional movements; for this reason, if you stop

me before I reach the door and ask me what and why I am doing it, I would surely say that I have to open the

door to welcome my friend with open arms. There is one other class of movements located, say

Gallagher&Zahavi, between subintentional movements and intentional movements. Rowlands calls these

preintentional movements, but we may call them prenoetic movements because they happen without our

knowledge or awareness. Nevertheless many situations are very doubtful; the pianist example shows how


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6 The phenomenological description is a very important element of phenomenological attitude; phenomenology is a methodology that

uses examples to clarify the experiential givenness, and these examples express the phenomena as they appear to us. There is a

famous Husserls anecdote that speaks about the optical misunderstanding of manikin: I watch someone in the corner of the road, I

think that he is a man, but it is wrong: it is a mannequin. These descriptions permit us to understand whatand howa phenomenologicalattitude has to explain the experience. A genuine description of the subjective experience is the element that permits us to disclose a

new perspective about world, beyond natural ingenuity. This paper tries to help to disclos e a new phenomenological attitude about

action and human act.7 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.155.


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many difficulties we find trying to clarify about the intentionality or non-intentionality of a movement.

Rowlands suggests other examples of preintentional movements, hoping to enlighten the problem: saccadic

eye movements. Quoting Yarbus works, he shows how saccadic movements serve and subtend intentional

action: in fact saccades are specified by the task one is engaged in8 . These elements suggested in the

Gallagher&Zahavi book help us to understand our topic but they are not resolutive because they do not hit

the point9.

The history of philosophy, in fact, could show us this issue and help us to approach it in a more basic way.

Plato knew very well the Socrates dilemma about his imprisonment and all Socrates moral doubts;

everybody remembers the tragic end of the philosopher, but in the same time nobody thinks that Socrates

legs, conducting him to the prison, caused his death. We believe that Socrates (Socrates selfhood?

Socrates soul? Socrates brain?) decided not to escape from his condemnation, and for this reason his legs

conducted him to the prison. It was not the movement of his legs to bring him to die, but it was Socrates

himself that decided not to escape from death. It would be also very interesting to remember the Husserl s

analysis of Ideen II10 ; we can find an important distinction between motivation and natural causality.

These arguments offer again the idea that it is different to explain an action from a perspective of motivation

or natural causality. At the same time it is a paradigmatic example of phenomenological attitude toexperience, with it we can genuinely describe the openness to the world. When we ask about a human

comportment, we do not research a physical or motor answer but we refer to another type of explanation.

Quoting The Phenomenological Mind:

This implies that to understand an action is to know not what caused it in a purely physical sense, but rather what

motivated or justified it, either in general or in the eyes of the agent.11

So we have to say that in the Gallagher&Zahavi distinction between movementand actionwe find again an

essential point of a phenomenology of human acting. This simple example reminds us an important

consideration of the issue, and it links our research about action and movement to a more general and

fundamental part of human act. These Gallagher&Zahavi considerations can help us to propose a

phenomenology of action analyzing severals degrees of consciousness of human act. We have to distinguish

movements and actions because in a specific way we have to underline the elements of human act and his

specific peculiarities. The main issue that we have to approach is well expressed by the philosophers:

For a movement to be an action it has to be goal-directed and intentional. A movement that is a reflex, or passive, or

subintentional, or preintentional is not an action, although it might be interpreted as an action from the outside, that is,

by some other person.12

The idea that some external observers could misunderstand the genuine development of phenomena issuggested by Carlo Sini, an interesting and original italian philosopher. He presents the misapprehensions

about the dogs experience observed from a human perspective:


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8 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.156: If you are asked to view a certain group of people with the task of

judging how old the people are, versus remembering the clothing they are wearing, versus locating them vis viscertain objects in the

room, etc., it turns out that your eyes saccade differently for each task. These different ways of scanning the environment relative to task

are not reflex, although they are automatic and non-conscious. As a result, the eye movement happens in a way that totally escapes my

awarenessso that if you stopped and asked me whether I knew that my eyes were moving this way or that, and whether I intended

them to move in such ways, I would certainly say no.9 Comparatively, in an approach more strictly phenomenological we can obviously remind the Merleau-Pontys analysis about

phenomenology of action.10

E.Husserl, Idee zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie, vol.II, Kuwer Academic Publishers B.V.,1952, Italian version edited by E. Filippini, Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia fenomenologica, vol.II, Torino 2002,

Einaudi. From here Ideen II.11 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, Ivi, p.157.12 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, Ivi, p.156.


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Proposing another example: my dog dreams. You can understand how -while it is sleeping- he whimpers and whines,

how he roughs out some woofs and then he suffocates them; in the same way a dormant man speaking in his sleep

pronounces little bit of words. We ascertain these elements. Nonetheless we can suppose to have to explain it. We

would say, presumably, something like: in the dogs head many images happen; for example the dog imagines to see

the neighbors' cat. The image starts emotional and muscle reactions, held down by the sleep. They are psychical

events that fire embryonal vocal and behavioral answers. These answers about the dog s experience appears to us in

the external reality, and in this way we ascertain them. [...]

Nonetheless, it is important to explain genuinely the givenness of experience, and Sini comments in

this way:

It is different from what we thought about; the evidences -which we refer to- have to be genuinely and fully described

without neglecting any parts. When we try to do it the situation changes considerably, so we will see some things that at

first were unperceived. [...] To conclude: the phenomenon observed is not the psychic experience that the dog can do,

but it is vice versa the fact that -for us- something is assuming the sense of psychic experience.13

It is very important to emphasize this significative reference because it opens the perspective to the animal

the reign; this ouverture will be more interesting when, in the following part of the paper, we will present

Heideggers position. At the same time, in a different but non-contrasting way, Gallagher&Zahavi speak

about the purchase of a dress: Why did you buy that dress?. The answer, obviously, cannot be simply that

the neurons in prefrontal cortex has fired; neither could it be that the hand has taken the money from the

wallet, or that the seller has made a wonderful packet. We have to expect something of a personal

explanation, where we give some good (or even not so good) reasons that we can count as motivation for

acting as we do. They say that no amount of neurophysiology could permit us to find an answer explaining

this kind of issue, in the same way no amount of neuroscience will explain why Neville Chamberlain after the

Munich Agreement in 1938 declared that the peace had now been preserved.

Nevertheless, we have to return to the distinction between actionand movement to try to advance in ourproject of phenomenology of action. Quoting again The Phenomenological Mind:

What makes a movement intentional- what makes it an action? What does it mean to have an intention to act? We said:

all intentional movements -all actions- are goal directed. So to have an intention to act means that we have some kind of

goal in mind. But this raises other questions. Where precisely do we locate the goal? [...] But are we assuming too much

when we talk in this ordinary way about action? The assumption is that action is intentional if I am acting with a goal in

mind, or, to say it another way, if I am in some sense deciding to act for a reason.14

We can say that the main question is: What makes a movement an action?. The answer - in

Gallagher&Zahavi perspective -it is connected to the intentionality and the finalist element. A simple example

could clarify this philosophical position: imagining to have an handgun, and suppose my finger slipping on

the trigger; an external observer might suggest that I committed an act of murder if the bullet, unluckily, kills

someone. Admitting that I could claim that I did not do it intentionally, I could be convicted of accidental

homicide or manslaughter, but not murder. If my defending counsel should failed, I would be convicted for a

movement rather than for an action. Therefore -in Gallagher&Zahavi perspective- there is not an

unintentional action, although there could be unintentional movement or unintentional consequences of my

action. Moreover, we have said that some intentional movements are goal-directed (and we call them the

actions); so to have the intention to act signifies to have some aims in the mind. Now we have to ask:

where can we place the aim? In Thors example Gallagher&Zahavi try to clarify that the most appropriate

question about the goal of the action lies somewhere between Why are you pressing your hand against the


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13 C.Sini, La mente e il corpo: filosofia e psicologia, Jaka Book, Milano 2004, p.27-29.14 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.157.


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arm of that chair? and What do you ultimately want from life?; on the contrary the most appropriate answer

lies somewhere between Because I am getting up and Because I want to be happy. In fact the more

distant someone gets from actual movement -say the philosophers- the less satisfying the answer is as an

answer to the question. For these reasons we become to think that to understand an action we have to know

not what caused it in a purely physical sense, but rather what motivated or justified it, either in general or in

the eyes of the agent. We have been brought in this direction by Husserls analysis of Ideen IIand also by

Socrates anecdote.

Another very important element in the research about the phenomenology of act is the concept of agency. In

a general way I can say that the sense of agency is the experience that I am the one who is causing or

generating the action15. Nonetheless several theories and brain-imaging experiments show that there is not

consensus about how to define the sense of agency. Elizabeth Pacheries position distinguishes future-

directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions; it is a very interesting perspective

and it could be very useful to explain the doubts about the role of the action16. To get over the difficulties and

the misunderstandings, I will go back to phenomenology quoting Gallagher:

In some cases the sense of agency in construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked tothe intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-oder cognitive processes, for others it is a

feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of the sense of

agency.17

However, over the doubts and over the multiple perspectives that we can engage, we can confide us to The

Phenomenological Mindanalysis; in this way we can say:

In its proper sense, we understand agency to depend on the agents consciousness of agency. That is, if someone

intentionally causes something to happen, that person is not an agent (even if they are a cause) if they do not know that

they have intentionally caused it to happen.18

In other words, if someone or something (or some animals) causes something to happen, that person or

thing (or animal) is not the agent (even if they might be the cause) if they do not know in some way that they

have caused it to happen. So, if an action is something goal-directed and with an intentional reference ( If

there is deliberation and decision to do something, then it seems a clear-cut case of intentional action), then

someone has agencywhen he knows to be the agent of the action. The main point of the argumentation is

this one: we can phenomenologically describe an action without sense of agency, namely an action

(therefore something goal-directed and intentional) without the agent s awareness to be an agent. Agency

concerns something about awareness to be the actor of an action. In the Gallagher&Zahavis perspective an

action can be realized by an actor that has not awareness to be the actor, a lthough this actor has carried out

the action following an aim and involving an intentional reference. In other words: we can understand that

agency depends on the agents consciousness of agency. In The Phenomenological Mind

Gallagher&Zahavi try to clarify the concept of agency distinguishing two ways in which the notion enters into

intentional action: an experiential sense of agencyand an attribution of agency. The former accompanies the

action at the pre-reflective level, that is the first-order level of consciousness; this is the level at which I have

a sense that I am moving, even if I am not aware of the exact details of my movement. The latter is

connected to the questions about my action. If someone asks me whether I did something (Did you drink a

cup of coffee this morning?) I can respond positively or negatively. I thereby attribute a certain action to


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15 S.Gallagher (in press), Multiple aspects in the sense of agency, New Ideas in Psychology, p.4.16 S.Gallagher, ivi, p.3.17 S.Gallageher, The Natural Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy Compass 2, 2007, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p.1.18 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, p.158.


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myself. I might make attribution on the basis of memory, but the memory would not be there if originally I did

not have an experiential sense of agency for the action. Quoting Gallagher we can add:

The subject reflectively realizes and is able to report that he is the cause of his movement or thinking. For example, he

can say I am causing this action.19

It is evident, in this moment, that the experiential sense of agency is more basic than the attribution of

agency, which depends on it. Many considerations may be propose about the notion of agency, and recent

significant research in a number of disciplines focus on it. Nonetheless the consensus is difficult. We do not

want to continue these analysis even if their development could show us more particulars of the issue.

Briefly we have to underline some elements about Gallagher&Zahavi s position: presenting a

phenomenology of actionthey distinguish a simple movementfrom a true action(that is intentionaland goal-

directed). Besides this characterization we can discern other differentiations going around the notion of

agency. These arguments permit us to be genuinely loyal towards the phenomena as they appears to us in

the world; we are doing phenomenology in the moment when we see the phenomena without hypothetical

building and artificial constructions of thought. Its time to pass to Heideggers reflection.

[B] Heideggers considerations about phenomenology of action.

[B1] The stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-forming.

We can extrapolate some very interesting analysis about phenomenology of actionin Heideggers 1929-30

lecture course presented at University of Freiburg 20. The English translation is realized by William McNeill

and Nicholas Walker and it is edited in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,

Solitude (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Usa 1995)21. In this course we can find

three fundamental theses about the relationship with the world: the first one affirms that the stone is

worldless; the second one that the animal is poor in worldand the last one that the man is world-forming.Obviously we have to clarify these argumentations in order to connect them to Gallagher&Zahavis

phenomenology of action. The different manners to rapport to the world depend on the different nature of the

beings, vivant or material thing, human (Dasein) or animal. We can approach this theme making reference to

some of Heidegger considerations:

The stone is without world. The stone is lying on the path, for example. We can say that the stone is exerting a certain

pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is touching the earth. But what we call touching here is not a form of

touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like thatrelationship which the lizard has to the stone on

which it lies basking in the sun. And touching implied in both these cases is above all not the same as thattouch which

we experience when we rest our hand upon the head of another human being. The lying upon..., the touching involved

in our three examples is fundamental different in each case.22


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19 S.Gallagher, Sense of Agency and High-Order Cognition: Levels of explanation for schizophrenia, European Society for Philosophy

and Psicology, July 2002, Lyon, p.34.20 Properly, Heidegger does not speak about action and he does not use the expression phenomenology of action. Nevertheless, I

am convinced that Heideggers onticalanalysis about world can be connected with the Gallagher&Zahavis perspective about action.

Obviously, it would be necessary to ask whyHeidegger does not approach directly a phenomenology of action. We can hypothesize to

find the answer in the ontological field. I have to thank C.Di Martino and F.P.De Sanctis for their interesting comments about Heideggers

perspective.21

M. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt Endlichkeit Einsamkeit, Frankfurt am Main 1983, Vittorio KlostermannVerlag, Italian version edited by P.Coriando, Concetti fondamentali di metafisica. Mondo Finitezza - Solitudine, Il Melangolo, Genova

1999; English version edited by W.McNeill and N.Walker, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, Indiana

University Press, Bloomington Indiana 1995.22 M. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, 47 p.196-197.


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Indeed we can say that the stone lies upon the earth, but does not touch it. If we throw the stone into the

river, then it will lie wherever it falls. The stone follows the circumstances, crops up here or there, amongst

and amidst a host of other things; nevertheless everything around the stone remains essentially inaccessible

to the stone itself. The stone is worldless: it signifies that the worldlessness can be characterized as not

having access to beings. The stone lies on the path, it rests on the path without be aware of lying on the path

and without intending to lie on the path. We can find very different situations with animals: in Heideggers

analysis the animal is poor in world:

The lizard basking in the sun on its warm stone does not merely crop up in the world. It has sought out this stone and is

accustomed to doing so. If we now remove the lizard from its stone, it does not simply lie wherever we have put it but

starts looking for its stone again, irrespective of whether or not it actually finds it. The lizard basks in the sun. At least

this is how we describe what it is doing, although it is doubtful whether it really comports itself in the same way as we do

when we lie out in the sun, i.e, whether the sun is accessible to it assun, whether the lizard is capable of experiencing

the rock asrock. Yet the lizards relation to the sun and to warmth is different from that of the warm stone simply lying

present at hand in the sun.23

It is true -and Heidegger exposes it very clearly- that the lizard cannot propose a mineralogical analysis

about rocks; then, the sun where the rock is warming is not given for the lizard assun; at the same time we

cannot say that the lizard is amongstthe other material things (the rock, the tree, the bush, etc.). Heidegger

suggests that what we identify as the rock and the sun arejust lizard-things for the lizard. When we expose

the example about the lizard lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word rock in order to indicate that

whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some wayfor the lizard, nevertheless the lizard does not

know the rock as rock. Indeed, if we observe philosophically the empirical experiences of positive science,

we can find some important elements that permit us to understand the typical dealing withthe world of the

lizard. It is not simply lyingon the rock: the lizard is not put on the rock in the same way the stone is put on

the path, because if someone moves it far from the rock the lizard will try to reach the warm rock again. In

this way the lizard is not simply subsisting nearby the rock and amongst the other things because it has aspecial relation with the rock, with the sun and with all the material things. Another consideration can help us

to clarify the specific set of relationships between animals and material things. We observe a beetle crawling

up a blade of grass: we are tempted to say that it is a blade of grass as such but if we observe the

phenomena as they appear to us, we have to say that the blade of grass is simply a beetle-path on which the

beetle specifically seeks beetle-nourishment, and not just any edible matter in general. So we have to

suggest some observations: the animal can surely deal with something, and these relationships are not

casual but they are connected with the structural nature of the animals. In this way, quoting Heidegger:

The animals way of being, which we call life, is not without accessto what is around it and about it, to that amongst

which it appears as a living being. It is because of this that claim arises that the animal has an environmental world of its

own within which it moves. Through-out the course of its life the animal is confined to its environmental world, immured

as it were within a fixed sphere that is incapable of further expansion or contraction.24

These reflections bring us to consider the animal poverty in world in the sense of hasand does not have

world. The issue is very hard to explain because we meet two apparently conflicting propositions. We can

follow again Heideggers words:

If by world we understand beings in their accessibility in each case, if such accessibility of beings is a fundamental

character of the concept of world, and if being a living being means having access to other beings, then the animal

stands on the side of man. Man and animals alike have world. On the other hand, if the intermediate thesis concerning


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23 M. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, 47 p.197.24 M.Heidegger, Ivi, 47 p.198.


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the animals poverty in world is justified and poverty represents deprivation and deprivation in turn means not having

something, then the animal stands on the side of the stone. The animal thus reveals itself as a being which both has

does not have world. This is contradictory and thus logically impossible. But metaphysics and everything essential has a

logic quite different from that of sound common understanding.25

The ambiguity about animals hasand does not have worldcan be clarified only if we arrive to present a

meaningful interpretation of the concept of world. If we use the term world as the totality of beings we

meet innumerable contradictions and ambiguities; the clarification of the notion of world involves the

presentation of the third thesis: the man is world-forming. I will anticipate Heideggers clarification about

world and then I will explain it using comparatively the third thesis about world-formation:

The naive concept of world is understood in such a way that world basically signifies beings, quite undifferentiated with

respect to life or existence, but simply beings. In characterizing the way and manner in which the animal lives we then

saw that if we can speak meaningfully of the world and world-formation of man, then world must signify something like

the accessibility of beings. But we also saw in turn that with this characterization we get caught up in an essential

difficulty and ambiguity. If we determine world in this way, then we can also say in a certain sense that the animal has a

world, namely has access to something that we, for our part, experience as beings. But then we discovered that while

the animal does have access to something, it does not have access to beings as such. From this it follows that worldproperly means accessibility of beings as such. Yet this accessibility is grounded upon a manifestness of beings as

such. Finally, it was revealed that this is not a manifestness of just any kind whatsoever, but rather manifestness of

beings as such as a whole.26

We can underline four principal steps in this Heideggers argumentation about the concept of world: first, he

naively considers the world as the totality of beings; then, he tries to attribute to the concept of world the

sense of accessibility of beings. Nonetheless he has to continue the research because it is not adequate;

so he underlines the necessity to explain the world as the accessibility of beings and as the accessibility of

beings as such. Finally, he finds that it is still not enough so he considers the world as the manifestness of

beings as such as a whole. The third thesis, the man is world-forming, allows us to open the perspective

towards the last section of Heideggers phenomenology of action and explains the manifestness of beings

as such as a whole.

Presenting again reflexively the four steps, we can clarify some important elements. We have presented the

thesis about poverty of world between the other two, which asserts that the stone is worldless and that man

is world-forming. Navely, we could say referring to the first of the four steps: poor in world implies poverty as

opposed to richness; so, in a certain way, poverty implies less as opposed to more. In this first sense, the

animal has less in respect of what is accessible for it, in respect of whatever as an animal can deal with: the

man seems to be richer because his world is greater in range and far more extensive in its penetrability,

constantly extendable not only in its range but also more deeply penetrable. This explication has the

suspiciously self-evident clarity that disappears as soon as we continue the research and it refers to thewrong supposition where the world is considered as the whole of beings. With Heidegger we can observe:

For we immediately find ourselves in the greatest perplexity over the question concerning greater or lesser

completeness in each case with respect to the accessibility of beings, as soon as we compare the discriminatory

capacity of a falcons eye with that of the human eye or the canine sense of smell with our own, for example. However

ready we are to rank man as a higher being with respect to the animal, such an assessment is deeply questionable,

especially when we consider that man can sink lower than any animal. No animal can become depraved in the same

way as man.[...] Thus it should be clear from everything we have said that from the outset this talk of poverty in world

and world-formation must not be taken as a hierarchical evaluation.27.


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25 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, 48 p.199.26 M.Heidegger, Ivi, 68 p.284.27 M.Heidegger, Ivi, 46 p.194.


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So the first step proposes to consider the world making reference to the accessibility of beings. In this way

the man is richer than the animal because his rapport with the world is more profound and deeper about

beings. In this first sense the man would be richer of world than the animal; nonetheless Heidegger has

suggested that this richness is very doubtful, and the experience shows us the erroneousness of this

position. The second and the third passage try to fix the attention on a very important point: the accessibility

ofbeingsand in a particular way the accessibility ofbeings as such. Indeed usually we useand we deal with

the beings: we take a pen, we grasp it, we write with it, etc. We can as well say that an animal also usesand

deals withsome beings: my dog looks for his bone to gnaw it, the bee tries to find its apiary, etc. Nonetheless

neither the dog nor the bee has the being as such, that is the bone as such and the apiary as such: they use

the beings, they have some kind of relationship with the beings but they have not the access of beings as

such, they cannot recognize the being as such. Here, we meet an important point of Heideggers theory: the

accessibility of beings as such is the specific structure of the metaphysic practice. Indeed the peculiarity of

metaphysic action is the possibility to be in relation and to be positioned face to face with the beings as such.

An example that will be developed in details in the next part of the paper is that of the cat and the mouse; the

cat could be interested in the mouse or desire to catch it and then eat it. The cat observes the mouse only

inside a practical situation, only inside a situation of (its) life. Contrary the man could have another differentexperience: he can fear the mouse, he can be worried about its presence but he can think about the mouse

as such too, independently and separately from every practical connection. The reifying practice of

metaphysic human language brings us to see, to observe, to deal with things as things, thing as such.

Contrarily the animal can only be inserted in a practical situation with (a lot of) things: properly we cannot say

that the cat looks for the mouse, but we have to show how the cat is behaving with respect tothe mouse;

the mouse for the cat is not a mouse but it is cat-food, cat-enemy-to-hunt. The last step in Heidegger s

argumentation tries to explain that the world, for the Dasein, is not a manifestness of just any kind

whatsoever, but rather manifestness of beings as such as a whole; therefore as a whole signifies in the

form of the whole. So we can conclude quoting Heidegger again:

We shall now describe the site of the problem in a preliminary fashion by explaining in general what we mean by world-

formation. According to our thesis, world belongs to world-formation. [...] For it is not the case that man first exists and

then also one day decides amongst other things to form a world. Rather world-formation is something that occurs, and

only on this ground can a human being exist in the first place. Man as man is world-forming. This does not mean that

the human being running around in the street as it were is world-forming, but that the Da-sein inman is world-forming.

We are deliberately employing the expression world-formation in a ambiguous manner. The Dasein in man forms

world: 1) it brings it forth; 2) it gives an image or view of the world, it sets it forth; 3) it constitutes the world, contains and

embraces it.28

We have been obliged to limit our considerations in this paper trying to show all implications and difficulties

that we always meet when we present a phenomenology of action. Heideggers analysis permit us to pose

the guiding-problem of acting from a different perspective. We can suggest some other elements before

proposing the comparison between Gallagher&Zahavis position and the Heideggers.

[B2] The humans comportmentand the animals behavior: some comparative considerations about captivation, driveand

action.

Heideggers phenomenology of action tries to distinguish specifically human comportments from animal

behaviors. Phenomenologically, it is necessary to separate physical identitiesof phenomenologically different

experiences, for example when we observe a dog and a man crossing a river (the former behaves itself

towards the river, the latter has the comportments connected to the particular situation). Following

Heideggers example we can easily understand the issue:


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28 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, 68 p.285.


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When we observe that the stone gets warm in the sun, the leaf flies about in the wind, the worm flees from the mole, the

dog snaps at the fly, we can certainly say that in all these cases we are concerned with processes, with unfolding

events, with a series of stages in these movements. But we can also easily see that this way of looking at the events

misses the decisive thing in the case of animals: the specific character of the worm s movement as escape, the specific

character of the moles movement as pursuit. We cannot explain escaping and pursuing simply by applying theoretical

mathematics or mechanics, however complex. Here a quite primordial kind of movement reveals itself. The escaping

worm does not merely appear within the context of a sequence of movements which begin with the mole. Rather the

worm is escaping from the latter. This is not simply an event, but rather the escaping worm behavesas fleeing in a

particular way with respect tothe mole. And the mole for its part behaves with respect tothe worm by pursuing it. Thus

we shall describe seeing, hearing, and so forth, and also assimilation and reproduction, as a form of behaviour, as a

form of self-like behaviour[Sichbenehmen]. A stone cannot behave in this way. Yet the human being can, he or she can

behave well or behave badly. But ourbehaviour -in this proper sense- can only be described in this way because it is a

comportment, because the specific manner of being which belongs to man is quite different and involves not behaviour

but comporting oneself toward...The specific mannerin which man iswe shall call comportmentand the specific manner

in which the animal iswe shall call behaviour.29

Phenomenologically the decisive thing that we have to present in Heidegger s example is the escape of the

worm and the pursuit of the mole. Readapting a famous J.H.Meads example, we can show the different

experience that we describe about a man and a dog facing a river30: both of them want to cross the river

because they are hungry, and on the other part of the river they see steaks and cakes. Not finding bridges or

different ways to cross the river, the man decides to cross it swimming while grasping a tree trunk: he arrives

to the other side. The dog, seeing a tree trunk and grasping it too, manages to cross the river. The common

sense could say: both of them (the man and the dog) have crossed the river grasping a tree trunk. In fact,

this affirmation appears quite simple and obvious, but phenomenologically we can underline some important

differences: genuinely we have to say that the man has seen a trunk and then he has thought that with it he

could cross the river. He has considered a lot of possibilities (to try to find another way to cross, to look for a

bridge, to build a small boat, etc.) and then he has chosen the trunk; he can choose the trunk as a possibilityto save himself because he has the accessibility to the trunk as trunk, so he can evaluate that possibility

comparatively with others. From another perspective we can say: contrasting a lot of alternatives he

imagines the consequences and the probability of success about each solution, and evaluating all those

givens he takes the trunk. Having the accessibility to the trunk as trunk the man can anticipate the outcomes

of such solution and he can take an aware choice. Differently the dog has not the trunk as trunk or the trunk

as such, so the dog grasps the trunk to cross the river, cest tout. With this affirmation we want to say that the

dog has an objective (the steak) and an intentional means (the trunk); its action is only apparently

characterized by these elements: I want to explain that the most important thing to underline in the crossing

of the dog is the hunger that pushes it to the steak. With Heidegger I could say: the dog behaves with

respect to the steak crossing the river and reaching it. If the dog had not been hungry, it would not have

crossed the river and it would not have considered this possibility (differently the man can consider

everything without the impetus to do it). In this sense the behaviourof the animal is not a doing and acting,

as in human comportment, but a driven performing[Treiben]. Returning to Heidegger:

Rather behaviouris precisely an intrinsic retentionand intrinsic absorption, althoughno reflection is involved. Behaviour

as a manner of being in general is only possible on the basis of animal s absorptionin itself [Eingenommenheit in sich].

We shall describe the specific way in which the animal remains with itself -which has nothing to do with the selfhood of

the human being comporting him- or herself as a person- this way in which the animal is absorbed in itself, and which


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29 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, 58 p.237.30 G.H.Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Ed. by Charles W. Morris. University of Chicago, Chicago 1934; Italian version by R. Tettucci,

Mente, S e Societ, Giunti-Barbera, Firenze 1966.
http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_W._Morrishttp://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_W._Morris


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makes possible behaviour of any and every kind, as captivation[Benommenheit]. The animal can only behave insofar

as it is essentially captivated.31

These considerations try to show us that there are two different kinds of experience: the first one is the

human experience of comportment that conduct us to action. It is the kind of experience that involves the

accessibility to the beings as beings, the beings as such. The second one is the animal experience of

captivationthat brings them to have behaviors; this one is linked with the animal capacityand it is limited toits disinhibiting ring. Indeed the animal s specific manner of beings is the openness of captivation: the typical

animal behaviour is encircled by its ring constituted by the reciprocal drives. In another way: the animal

cannot anticipate the consequence of its drives before realizing them, so it is brought to realize everything

that its disinhibiting ring suggests. The dog is hungry and it sees a steak: it has an objective and it organizes

itself to solve (intentionally) the problem. If the food is its objective, then the trunk is the instrument to realize

its objective. Differently the man has a scenery in front of him: he is hungry, so he needs something to eat.

On the other side of the river he sees a steak, he would like to eat it so he starts to consider numerous

possible ways to reach it. The solution that he decides to take depends on his personal attitude to danger,

his intelligence, his capacity to discover new ways, etc. He has a plan, a strategy. If the dog and the man

take the same solution(to grasp a trunk and to cross the river) we have to underline that phenomenologically

their experiences are not equivalents. The dog behaves taking the trunk and crossing the river, on the

contrary the man comports taking the trunk and crossing the river. The possibility to value the scenery is

structurally closed to the animal, so in this sense we can speak about animal captivation as an essential

moment of animality.

There is another important consideration that suggests the specificity genre of human experience compared

with the animals; we quote Heidegger again:

We usually employ the world captivation to describe a particular state of mind in human beings, one which can persist

for a greater or lesser period of time. We use it then to refer to that intermediate state somewhere between

consciousness and unconsciousness. In this sense we can say that captivation is also a psychiatric concept. From

everything we have said so far it should by now be obvious that in talking of captivation as the essential structure of the

animal there can be no question of simply transferring this state known to us from our own human experience into the

animal as a permanent trait of the latter. We certainly cannot think of the animal as a permanent trait of the latter. We

certainly cannot think of the animal as permanently captivated, in distinction from human beings- which would mean that

in principle the animal might also be free of this state. We do not understand the term captivation to mean simply an

enduring state present within the animal but rather an essential moment of animalityas such. Even if in elucidating the

essence of this captivation we orient ourselves in a certain way with reference to the human state in question, we must

nevertheless draw the specific content of this structure from out of animality itself. That means that we must delimit the

essence of captivation with a view to animal behaviour as such. Yet behaviour itself is grasped as that specific manner

of being which belongs to being capable, i.e., to instinctual and subservient intrinsic self-diverting and self-proposing.32 .

The principal point of this argumentation speaks about the essentiality of the structure of captivation into the

animal in opposition to the human possibility to behave. Indeed the dog cannot choose to take the trunk

because the dogs disinhibiting ringleads it towards the steak through the trunk. Differently the man has the

openness of scenery, and he can consider a multiplicity of alternatives (connecting to the personal history,

the social commitment, the cultural context, etc.); nonetheless sometimes we could observe a man taking

suddenly the trunk, without an aware reflection about the different possibilities. The common sense usually

makes reference to instinct, that is something approximately nearer to animal behaviour then human

comportment. So we have to consider the human possibility not to act but to behave. This possibility,

obviously, has to be understood phenomenologically: if the man takes suddenly the trunk to cross the river


12

31 M.Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic: World, Finitude, Solitude, 58 p.238-239.32 M.Heidegger, Ivi, 58 p.239.


13/16

without consciousness reflection about the alternatives, we have to speak about a particular kind of action. It

is not, we can say it definitely, a reflection so fast that the interval is not clearly observable; we cannot refer

to an hypothetical unconscious reference that could explicit the hidden motivation to act: in the human

comportment it is phenomenologically very difficult to find some unconscious reasons (if phenomenology is

the science of phenomena that appear, how could we justify any unconscious manifestations of the

consciousness?). So when we speak about human instinctwe have to intend instinct. In this sense the man

has the possibility to stop himself and to anticipate the possible consequences of his actions, but sometimes

he can not-use this essential openness to comportment. In other words: we can thematically look for the

best solution making hypothesis and anticipating the consequences but we can give up all these elements

and let ourselves go also to the openness of instinctual(disinhibiting ring). Resuming: if the animal is obliged

to follow its disinhibiting ring so it cannot value the scenery, the man can stop and value the different

solutions or he can behave instinctuallywithout using his structurally accessibility to the beings as such. A

gloss to this thesis: it is very doubtful that I can pensivelydecide to behave instinctually, namely thoughtfully

choose to not reflectand act. Sometimes I behave instinctually, cest tout. Nevertheless the possibility to be

open to the scenery subsists in man, vice versa in the animal this chance is structurally forbidden.

3) A synergetic attempt to propose a genuinely phenomenology of action: a comparison between Heideggers

thought and the Gallagher&Zahavis perspective.

Considering the analysis suggested in this paper, it appears lawful to propose a comparison between

Heideggers perspective and Gallagher&Zahavis position that we can find in The Phenomenological Mind.

This attempt conducts us to outline a genuine phenomenology of action that tries to distinguish three

different degrees of experience. So I can synthesize the issue proposing three parallelisms: the

worldlessness of the stone in Heideggers perspective could be connected with the oriented-towards-

something character of experience which Gallagher&Zahavi speak of; the poverty in world of animal

(behaviour) with the notion of action; lastly, the world-formation of the man (comportment) with the action

withsense of agency. Schematically we can outline this plan:


13

GALLAGHER&ZAHAVI

A) Oriented-towards-something character

B) Action

C) Action with Sense of Agency

HEIDEGGER

Worldlessness of the stone

Poverty in world of animal

(Behaviour)

World-formation of the man(Comportment)


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We can suggest some considerations about these three attempts of comparison:

A) In Gallagher&Zahavis perspective we can distinguish different kinds of movement that properly

we cannot name action even if they are directed to something (so in a certain sense we could speak

about intentional reference) and even if they produce some consequences. The philosophers speak

about a hurricane: it surely causes some modifications on the earth. It operates on the trees and on

the plants (intentional character) but it does not actin respect to trees and plants. In this sense, with

movementand intentionalityI mean the oriented-towards-something character of experience.

In Heideggers 1929-30 course we find the treatment of the worldlessness of the stone: it permits to

explain how a stone, a tree or a leaf lies on the path. They are directed-towards-something (the path)

but they cannot be aware of it and they cannot try to reach it: the stone cannot strive to lie in the river,

it falls into the river. For this reason its touching the path is essentially different from the animal or

human experience of touching.

Obviously, in a strictly phenomenological way, it is very hard to speak about the intentionalityof a thing

(the stone, the hurricane, etc). Phenomenologically, the intentionality is a feature of consciousness

(the most important feature); so -considering that the material things have not any consciousness- it isimpossible to speak about it. For this reason I have always tried to underline the difficult statute of the

intentional character for the things; my purpose is simply to show the oriented-towards-something

character (in a broad sense an intentional reference) of displacement movements33.

B) In The Phenomenological Mind the philosophers speak about a particular kind of action completed

by an agent even if he is not aware to be the agent of that action. They call it an action without sense

of agency for the agent. In this sense there is a real intentional reference inserted in a finalistic

purpose, even if there is not explicit awareness of these elements. When I get up to open the door

because my friend is arriving, I flex my legs and I grasp the arms of the chair (to get up) without

awareness of this specific act (even though I know the final goal: to go to the door and open it); so this

is an action (because it is goal-directed and intentional) but I do not have consciousness to be the

agent of this action. In my opinion, in The Phenomenological Mind, it is not clear enough how it is

possible to explain an action without sense of agency; someone could sugges t some hypothetical

solutions: a prereflexive sense of agency that then will become reflexive, or an unconscious sense

of agency, or an instinctual sense of agency. Nonetheless these solutions appear to me very

complicated and not exhaustive.

The Heidegger positions seem more structured: the animal is the living being properly characterized

by an haveand does not have world (the animal is poor in world): an animal has the accessibility to

the beings in an intentional manner (the dog making for the steak) and he is guided by aims (to eat thesteak), but at the same time it does not know the steak as such, he sees and he wants the steak as

dog-nourishment. Briefly: while it is certain that all instinctual behaviour is a relating to..., it is just as

surely the case that in all its behaviour the animal is incapable of ever properly attending to something

as such. The dog makes some actions but it is not aware of being the agent of these actions, so it

does not have the sense of agency. Developing Heideggers perspective, it seems that also man

sometimes acts in the same way as an animal: sometimes man acts without sense of agency, that is

he acts without considering the typically human openness to beings as beings. This explication allows


14

33This is a very important passage: I want to refer to the directed-towards-something character that we can observe in the

displacement of things. How can I name this oriented-towards-something character? I can speak about pseudo-intentionalcharacter or

about intentionalcharacter or about character in a certain sense intentional. The idea is always the same: there is an oriented-

towards-something character that we can observe in the natural displacements of natural things.


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us to give light to some controversial human experiences and it gives a plausible explanation to the

question about the action without sense of agency, which Gallagher&Zahavi write about.

C) In Gallagher&Zahavi perspective, the high-order phenomenal experience appears limited to human

activity: differently from the first-order experience that can involve non-conscious and sub-personal

processes, the human high-order experience presents to us an intentional horizon structure in the

sense that it aims at or intends something beyond itself ; furthermore it is goal-directed and the

awareness about these elements is called agency. Stricto sensu, we can speak about actiononly for

the human experience, that is an intentional and goal-directed experience acted by an agent aware of

being the agent of this action.

In Heideggers perspective - coherently with a typical metaphysic theoretical prejudice - only the

Dasein is world-forming, and he is separated from the other beings from an absolute oppositional

limit(Derrida). We can find some interesting critical analysis about Heideggers position in the Jacques

Derridas book Lanimal que donc je suis34. The French philosopher tries to show how animals, like

men, can suffer; this element would cancel the supposed structural difference between humans and

what-the-humans-call-animals. Moreover Heidegger does not distinguish the internal cases inside theanimal reign (creating what Derrida explained with a jeu de mot: Animauxversus Ani-mot ). It is

very clear in Heideggers perspective the purpose to manifest the human superiority, coherently with

his metaphysic commitment: we can say that the animalist care does not worry Heidegger simply

because it was not an element of his discussion. Nevertheless, the Derridas position is more complex

but -I think- not resolutive35.

I think that the comparison between these three levels of experience in Heideggers perspective and in

Gallagher&Zahavis position is definitely convincing. We have to clarify how some apparently equivalent

movements (at the level of sensory-motor processes and body schematic processes) are

phenomenologically different. Proposing an attitudinal change we have to diverge from a reductive

materialism and we have to return to the things themselvesto attend to the world strictly as it appears. If we

want to clarify our experiences we have to reflectively dwell and refrain from naturalistic approaches;

following this way, I want to propose some conclusive considerations. In the analysis suggested, it clearly

appears the attempt to explain and to discern the difficulties connected to the role of action and the agent s

awareness to be an agent. So in this perspective I have tried to present an attempt of phenomenological

reflection about acting forward an outline of a phenomenology of action. What I have sought to do, it is not a

rereading of The Phenomenological Mind through the Heideggers thought or vice versa. Rather, I have

researched for a phenomenology of action as the attempt to return retrospectively to the phenomena of our

experiences as they appear, showing the genesis of our beliefs and ingenuities. Historiographically it ispossible to ask whether a synergetic approach to phenomenology of action from Heidegger s and

Gallagher&Zahavi s perspective is plausible. I think so, and I can support my thesis quoting

Gallagher&Zahavi:

Perhaps the best answer is to say that in our book have been keen to advocate an open-ended pluralistic methodology

rather than a very orthodox and rigorous phenomenological methodology.36


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34J.Derrida, Lanimal que donc je suis, Ed.Galile, Paris 2006; English translation by D.Wills: The Animal That Therefore I Am,

Fordham University Press, New York 2008.35 We can find some interesting analysis about Derridas position in C. Di Martino, Luomo e lanimale, la morte e la parola, in AA.VV, Ai

limiti del mondo, Dedalo, Bari 2002. Comparing the Heideggers and the Derridas position, reflecting about Derridas lecture of The

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysic, Di Martino underlines some undesirable outcomes of the Lanimal que donc je suis.36 D.Zahavi and S.Gallagher, Reply: a phenomenology with legs and brains, Special Issue II,, 2008, p. 90


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On the other hand, I want to remember the importance of empirical findings of positive sciences and the role

that they have assumed in our attempt to present a phenomenology of action; quoting Gallagher&Zahavi

again:

Finally, one can also point out that the phenomenological approach that we promote in our book is anything but arm-

chair, since what we are concerned to show is that phenomenology can get up and walk into the lab, and can even

work even work the scanning machine. Weve tried to show that phenomenology has both legs and brains.37

I would like to conclude underlining the significance of action in the phenomenological topic in general:

Now, lets dig a little deeper, philosophically. And lets note that a consideration of human action will illustrate how the

different themes we are considering in this book are interconnected, since to understand the phenomenology of action,

it will be necessary to draw on our previous discussions of the phenomenology of pre-reflective consciousness,

temporality, embodiment, perception, and intentionality (just as we will also have to return to and amplify our treatment

of action in our subsequent chapters on sociality and selfhood).38

Concluding my paper about the phenomenology of action, I would like to stress that further research would

obviously be needed; my purpose was very simple: proposing two genuine phenomenological approaches to

action and compare the different positions about this topic, trying to connect the elements and suggesting

some conclusions. I think that Heideggers elaboration about the worldlessness of world, about poverty in

world of animal (behaviour) and about the world-formation of Dasein (comportment) can bring to mind

Gallagher&Zahavis distinction about oriented-towards-something movements, action, and action with sense

of agency. In this sense I have tried to reflect about act, action, agent and about the agents awareness to be

an agent towards a phenomenology of action, towards a phenomenological clarification of our experience.


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37 D.Zahavi and S.Gallagher, The Phenomenological Mind, p. 87.38 S.Gallagher and D.Zahavi, Ivi, p.157.

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