LTD Compilation of Case Digests - 2015

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest Wigmore – II SR Edition

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SPS DALION V. CA (1990)

Petitioners: Spouses Dalion Respondents: CA and Sabesaje, Jr.

Ponente: Medialdea, J. Doctrine: A contract of sale is a consensual contract,

which means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity.

Short version: A land was registered in Dalion’s name. He allegedly sold this to Sabesaje. Da lion denies the sale ever ha ened (saying his signature was forged) and also

says that assuming the signature was valid, sale is still invalid because it was not executed in a public document. SC says Dalion’s argument is wrong. In a contract of sale,

no articular form is re uired. A land in Southern eyte was declared in the name of

Segundo Dalion. Sa esa e sued to recover ownershi this land based on a private document of absolute sale, allegedly executed by Segundo Dalion.

Dalion, however, denied the sale, saying that:

he document wa s fictitious

His signature was a forgery, and

hat the land is con ugal ro erty, which he and his wife ac uired in from Saturnina Sa esa e

as evidenced y the scritura de enta A soluta.

he s ouses denied the claims of Sa esa e that after e ecuting a deed of sale over the arcel of land, they had leaded with Sabesaje to be allowed to administer the

land because Dalion did not have livelihood. S ouses Dalion admitted, however, administering

arcels of land in Southern eyte, which elonged to eonardo Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956.

The Dalions never received their agreed 10% and 15% commission on the sales of co ra and a aca.

Sabesaje's suit, they say, was intended merely to harass and forestall Dalion s threat to sue for these un aid

commissions. C decided in favor of Sabesaje and ordered the Dalions

to deliver the parcel of land in a u lic document. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Was the contract of sale valid? YES Is a public document needed for transfer of ownership?

NO HELD:

RATIO:

RE: VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT People who witnessed the execution of the deed positive ly testified on its authenticity.

hey stated that it had een e ecuted and signed y the signatories.

RE: PUBLIC DOCUMENT The provision of NCC 1358 on the necessity of a public

document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforcea ility.

hat this e em odied in a u lic instrument is not a re uirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a arcel of land

Dalion argued:

hat the sale is invalid ecause it is em odied in a rivate document.

That acts and contracts which have for their

o ect the creation, transmission, modification or e tinction of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument." (NCC 1358

par. 1) A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means

that the sale is erfected y mere consent.

o articular form is re uired for its validity.

on erfection of the contract, the arties may reci rocally demand erformance CC ,

CC , i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of ownershi of the o ect of the sale, and the vendor may re uire the vendee to ay the thing sold

CC . he trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to

deliver to Sa esa e the arcel of land and to e ecute corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document.

nder CC , when the sale is made through a u lic instrument, the e ecution is e uivalent to the delivery of

the thing.

Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive. Thus delivery of a arcel of land may

e done y lacing the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive).

(ADDITIONAL:The authenticity of the signature of Dalion

was proven by the testimony of several witness including the person who made the deed of sale. Dalion never presented any evidence or witness to prove his claim of

forgery. Dallion’s claim that the sale is invalid ecause it was not

made in a public document is of no merit. This argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or

enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. Sale is perfected upon meeting of the

minds of both parties.)

LEE TEK SHENG VS. CA FACTS:

After his mother’s death, etitioner eoncio ee ek Sheng filed a complaint against his father (private

respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents.

The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land registered in etitioner’s name are con ugal ro erties.

The PR contends that the lots were registered under eoncio’s name only as a trustee ecause during the registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family.


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Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case

and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner – the conjugal regime.

To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.

Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice

was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation. CA affirmed the

decision. Hence this petition. Petitioner’s contention: he resolution of an incidental

motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a

partition case and that it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago.

Private res ondent’s contention: he evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a ro ate or land registration roceedings when the court’s

jurisdiction is limited. ISSUE: WON the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is

valid. HELD: Yes.

Petitioner’s claim is not legally tenable. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor

can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that

ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the

certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.

Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as

evidence of such ownership although both are interchangea ly used. In this case, contrary to etitioner’s fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private

res ondent. What the latter dis utes is the former’s claim of sole ownershi . hus, although etitioner’s certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after

issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership.

A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds: (1) If the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the

title of the adverse party (2) When the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.

Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case.

It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis endens is only for the ur ose of announcing “to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,

serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he

gam les on the result of the litigation over said ro erty.”

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless

ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which

requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is

proper.

REPUBLIC VS CA These two cases are about the cancellation and

annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.

2 lots of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at

Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in

Pasig, Rizal. They were not destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding cancelled titles for those two lots are intact in the registry of deeds.

The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street,

Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot

No. 915. She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she could not specify, was "N.A." or not available. The petition was

sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino.

On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies

thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners. The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal

were not served with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.

State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of court.

Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition.

He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The

transfer certi ficate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner

of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition.

The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It

became final and executory. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued

to Laborada on August 14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R).


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Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos.

915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan. The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on

October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada. In another and later case, one Francisco S. Bombast,

single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the

aforementioned Lot No. 918. She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged

that the title was "N.A" or not available. She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second

petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16, 1967, before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was

not explained. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on

January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in

Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners. But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing were served upon the registers of

deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of the title was

really missing. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador.

It was not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon; Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.

The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez

who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and

Bombast. The technical description of the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution

of the title. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to

reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer Certificate of Title No. N.A.

4(R). Five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title,

Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa

Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of Title No.

34146R was issued to Deo. On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos

Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation.

On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles

and the titles issued subsequent thereto. Judge Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to

whom the two cases for cancellation were assigned,

issued restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction regarding Lots Nos.

915 and 918. The respondents in the two cases, through a common

lawyer, filed separate answers containing mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the

issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation

and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.

On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the two cases

holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering

Corporation were purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and annullable.

Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in conformity with

law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the originals before the

reconstitution". The State appealed. CA affirmed RTC and held that the reconstitution can no

longer be set aside and that i f there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as the party that made possible the

reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the registration of

any other person as owner of such land". ISSUE: W/N the reconstituted titles were valid

HELD: NO

We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with

judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles.

In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the

usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable value.

The crucial and decisive fact is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of

Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the war.

That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification

of the judicial process. One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and

then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted


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titles.

The existence of the two titles of the Government ipso facto nulli fied the reconstitution proceedings and signified

that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceit ful

and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.

Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are

missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates

of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The reconstitution proceedings are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the

purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all.

As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).

To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized

as an instrument for landgrabbing or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and

to impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that

it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That

circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that

Lot 918 is owned by the State. Republic is held as the owner.

MARIA CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS VS RAFAEL

ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

1) Maria Consuelo applied for a registration of title of 4 parcels of land in 1906. (under torrens system)

2) The only one of said parcels to which attention need

be given in the present appeal is Parcel A. 3) The adjoining owners of the land were informed of

such application, but no one went to question it so

they were declared in default. 4) The same application was published in two

newspapers.

5) The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde &

Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the land in question. The

record further shows that said notice had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.

6) The City of Manila questioned in court the borders of Parcel A. The Court ordered the correction but none was executed.

7) The court approved the application and Consuelo was given the titles.

8) In 1912, the City of Manila applied for the correction of

the title because it covered a public road. 9) It was also in 1912 the Consuelo went to court to ask

for a correction of the title because there were 2

buildings which were not included in the title, although it was in the application.

10) She sold the same to Masonic Temple Assoc.

11) During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, owners of the adjoining land, appeared in court questioning the title.

12) The Court granted the motions of the City of Manila and Consuelo.

ISSUE: Whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property

under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration.

HELD: NO Personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had

been given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.

The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a certi ficate showing that that notice had been

issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears

and answer within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the

application ( petition) be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice "To all whom it may

concern," all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles,

but may require other and further proof." The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary

to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under

the Torrens system. The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of

section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated

in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in

the application, notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern. '"

It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices.

(Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such a manner and to such

persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give motive to any person of the

pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens system.

Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered damages for the


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failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law.

His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the

applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate

or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the present case five years and a half had

transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the

slightes degree. The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No.

496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants

within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. (ADDITIONAL: notice was served to the heirs of Enriquez:

Records show that the counsel of Enriquez received a notice. Even if it is denied by the party, personal notification is not a requirement of the law. Registration is

a proceeding in rem and not in personam. It is the only practical way that allows the Torrens system to fulfill its purpose.)

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY

(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System

of Registration)

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land

where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of

Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stonewall and the strip of

land where it stands. Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its

improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same

registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at

the time of registration, in the certi ficate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,

without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

TIBURCIO VS PHHC

FACTS:

Tiburcio et al filed an action alleging that for many years

prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of the

land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying

the land ta es thereon; that in defendant Peo le’s Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that its title embraces practically all of

laintiffs’ ro erty, while the other defendant University of the Philippines began also asserting title thereto claiming that its title covers the remaining portion; that PHHC are

not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice of i urcio et al’s actual ossession and claim of ownership thereof; and that the inclusion their property within the

technical oundaries set out in PHHC and P’s titles was a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants’ predecessors -in-interest exercised dominical rights over

their property. (Plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died

intestate in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been in actual, open,

notorious and exclusive possession of the land as owners pro-indiviso; that sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is

embraced and covered by their respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership

of plaintiffs and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.)

It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of

defendant’s redecessor-in- interest. It further appears that sometime in Peo le’s Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of

land embracing ractically all of etitioners’ ro erty, while defendant University of the Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of land which

embraces the remainder of the property.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ right to file the present action has prescribed; YES W/N they are guilty of laches; YES

HELD: PHHC and UP own the subject property; Petitioners guilty of laches-assuming arguendo that their action

for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. It is, therefore, clear that the land in question has been

registered in the name of defendant’s redecessor-in-interest since 1914 under the Torrens system and that notwithstanding what they now claim that the original title

lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they (Petitioners) have never taken any step to nulli fy said title until 1957 when they instituted the

present action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years

before they woke up to invoke what they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the name of defendants’

predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and

jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the ground of


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fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value has

acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496) On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration

of the one-year period within which to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38,

Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to

the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside the

decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated.

There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property said defendant knew of any defect in

the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to defendant University of the Philippines. Said defendants

are therefore, presumed to be purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the law.

The foregoing finds support in the following well -settled principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not

required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of

the register or the certi ficate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system”.

Assuming arguendo that laintiffs’ action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed, their right however to bring the

instant action may be considered barred by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after t itle to the property had been issued under the Torrens system. It

appears that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when

they brought the present action.virtua1aw library Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in

dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their

contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases had been tried by the same court and

notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, the same is not

absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. "In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of

proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in controversy.

Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the

case under consideration." Petitioners do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino

Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration of the same parcel of land

which application was denied by the court. It appears that in that registration case the o ositors were the Peo le’s

Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and

the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason

and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two cases there is not only identity of subject-matter but identity of parties and causes

of action. Indeed, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

TRADERS ROYAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA CAPAY, ET AL

FACTS: A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by

Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they

did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book.

Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in RB’s name

without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for

want of consideration and thus cancelled RB’s title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sol d the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the

subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court.

Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim

over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the

land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays. Issue:

• Who has the better right over the land in dispute? • Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling: The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real

properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely

rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained

the property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not

annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the

declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect.

However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already been passed to

purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus,


7

TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value

of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

LACBAYAN VS. SAMOY

FACTS: Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy

(respondent) had an illicit relationship. During their relationship, they, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. The

company acquired five parcels of land were registered in etitioner and res ondent’s names, allegedly as husband and wife. When their relationship turned sour, they

decided to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.

Initially, res ondent agreed to etitioner’s ro osal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three

other properties will go to respondent. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, Samoy refused.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties.

Petitioner’s contention: She claimed that they started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the

benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.

Res ondent’s contention: He urchased the ro erties using his own personal funds.

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

ISSUES: 1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership.

2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack?

HELD:

1. No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for

partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally

resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does

not even have any right ful interest over the subject properties.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,

basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.

2. No.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the

certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to

by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certi ficate of

title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certi ficate, or

that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.

Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.

Other topic: Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-

ownership over the subject realties. YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to

the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement

she intentionally refused to sign. Moreover, to follow etitioner’s argument would e to allow

respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties.

LU VS MANIPON

-Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA-

FACTS: On 5/9/81 Juan Peralta executed a deed of sale by

installment in favor of Spouses Manipon which he agreed to sell by installment to said spouses 350 sq. meters of the 2078 sq. meter lot he owned. This said DOS was not

registered with the RD. On 6/10/81, Juan Peralta mortgaged the lot to Thrift

Savings and Loan Association (TSLAI) but he failed to pay the loan he obtained for which the mortgage was constituted so it was judicially foreclosed and sold to

TSLAIN for P62, 789.18 who was the highest bidder. TSLAI then sold the same for P80,000.00 to the petitioner who caused the subdivision of the said lot into 5 lots (one

of which was Lot 5582-B-7-D which was sold to respondents. This said lot is now covered by TCT No 171497) On 7/30/83, Juan Peralta executed a DOS in

favor of respondents after the couple paid a total amount of P8K for the subject lot, but said DOS was not registered.

On 1/22/90 petitioner wrote respondents regarding the resence of the latter’s house which was eing occu ied

by them and efforts were made to settle the dispute but to no avail. On 2/26/90, petitioner commenced the action alleging that he is the owner of the lot in question which

was being occupied by respondents and further claims his ownership was confirmed by the RTC of Urdaneta and for


8

reasons unknown to him, respondents constructed a

house thereon on 1/22/90. In answer, respondents claim that petitioner is a buyer in

bad faith because he knew for a fact that they already bought Lot 5582-B-7-D from the original owner of said lot and have been residing since 1981 even before he bought

the 2078 sq. meter lot. They also claimed that petitioner had knowledge of their claim because when the whole lot was foreclosed, they shared the same dilemma with

petitioner who also bought a lot with the 2078 sq.meter lot of Juan Peralta.

The trial court ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith, which was affirmed by the CA

ISSUES: Who has better right over disputed property? Was petitioner a buyer in bad faith? What should be the purchase price of the disputed lot?

HELD: Petitioner claims that from the time they fully paid for the lot until they received a notice to vacate, they did

not do anything to perfect their title and are now estopped for questioning his ownership over it. The court has held that in estoppel, a person who by deed or conduct induces

another to act in a particular manner is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that causes loss or injury to another. This is not

applicable to the present case as respondents exercised dominion over the [property by occupying and building a house on it.

Registration is not the equivalent of a title, it only gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It

was not established as a means of acquiring title to private land because it merely confirms but does not confer ownership. Preferential right of the first registrant of real

property in case of double sale is always qualified by good faith under Art 1544 of the civil code. A holder in bad faith of a certi ficate of title is not entitled to the protection of the

law, for it cannot be used as shield for fraud. When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a

party cannot base his preference of title thereon, because the law will not protect anything done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the registration futile. Thus, if a vendee

registers the sale in his favor after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party, or that another person claims said

property under a previous sale, or that the property is in the possession of one who is not a vendor, or that there were flaws and defects in the vendor’s title, or that this

was in dispute, the registration will constitute x x x bad faith, and will not confer upon him any preferential right. The situation will be the same as if there had been no

registration, and the vendee who first took possession of the real property in good faith shall be preferred. Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent purchaser in good faith so

respondents have a better right to the property. It seems that the main reason why petitioner bought the entire lot from TSLAI was his fear of losing the 350 sq.m.

lot he bought sometime in 1981 which also forms part of Lot 5582 B-7, having been aware of the defects in the title of TSLAI is concerned he cannot now claim to be a

purchaser in good faith even if he traces his ownership to TSLAI who was a purchaser in good faith- the latter not being aware of the sale that transpired between

respondents and Juan Peralta before subject lot was sold in a public auction. Even assuming that petitioner was not aware of the sale between Peralta and respondents, he

cannot be considered a buyer in good faith as he has ersonal knowledge of res ondents’ occu ation of lot, this

should have put him on guard. The purchaser may not be

required to go beyond the title to determine the condition of property but a purchaser cannot also ignore facts which would put a reasonable man on his guard and claim he

acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.

On bad faith: Petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad faith. He alleges that the only reason he spoke to the respondents before he bought the foreclosed land was to

invite them to share in the purchase price, but they turned him down.

Petitioner’s contention is untena le. He might have had good intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that makes one an innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith

or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it, at the time of the urchase or efore any notice of some other erson’s

claim on or interest in it. Petitioner’s contention is untena le. He might have had

good intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that makes one an innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys

property and pays a full and fair price for it, at the time of the urchase or efore any notice of some other erson’s claim on or interest in it.

Purchase Price: The CA modification exempting respondents from paying petitioner is flawed, because the

RTC had ordered Juan Peralta to refund the P18,000 paid to him by petitioner as the purchase price of the disputed lot. Thus, the trial court correctly ordered (1) respondents

to pay petitioner P13,051.50 plus legal interest for Lot 5582-B-7-D and (2) the third-party defendant Peralta to refund to respondents the P18,000 they had paid for the

lot. The CA ruling would unjustly enrich respondents, who would receive double compensation

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY

(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System

of Registration)

FACTS: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land

where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of

Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stonewall and the strip of

land where it stands. ISSUE: Who should be the owner of a land and its

improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

HELD: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same

registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at

the time of registration, in the certi ficate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the


9

law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,

without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

CAPITOL SUBDIVISIONS VS. PROVINCE OF NEGROS

ORIENTAL 7 SCRA 60 (1963)

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name

of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the

purchase price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,

Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including

said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the

Bank. In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son

of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full

payment. Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under

his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of

title covering Lot 378 was issued. It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the

Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by

the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a

caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale

1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.

Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation.

Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of

the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never

transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment

purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.

HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the

expropriation had not been consummated. First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the

expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour

of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention

of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which

would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have een e ro riated without the Bank’s knowledge and

participation. Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising

to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros

Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

LAKBAYAN VS SAMOYE

FACTS: Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy

(respondent) had an illicit relationship. During their relationship, they, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. The

company acquired five parcels of land were registered in etitioner and res ondent’s names, allegedly as hus and


10

and wife. When their relationship turned sour, they

decided to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.

Initially, res ondent agreed to etitioner’s ro osal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three

other properties will go to respondent. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, Samoy refused.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties.

Petitioner’s contention: She claimed that they started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the

benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.

Res ondent’s contention: He urchased the ro erties using his own personal funds.

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

ISSUES: 1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership.

2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack?

HELD:

1. No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for

partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally

resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does

not even have any right ful interest over the subject properties.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,

basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.

2. No.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the

certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to

by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certi ficate of

title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certi ficate, or

that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property

subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.

Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.

Other topic: Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-

ownership over the subject realties. YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to

the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement

she intentionally refused to sign. Moreover, to follow etitioner’s argument would e to allow

respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties.

RICARDO CHENG vs RAMON GENATO and SPS. DA

JOSE G.R. NO. 129760, December 29, 1998

FACTS:

Ramon Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

September 6, 1989: Genato entered into an agreement with the Da Jose Spouses over said land. The agreement culminated in the execution

of a contract to sell gor which the purchase price was P80.00 per sq.m. It was in a public instrument and contained the sti ulation that: “after 3 days,

after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of documents… vendee shall pay the vendor the full payment of the

urchase rice.”

The Da Jose Spouses asked for an extension of 30 days when it failed to verify the said titles on the condition that a new set of documents be

made seven days after.

Pending effectivity of said extension period, and without due notice to Spouses Da Jose, Genato

executed an affidavit to annul the Contract to Sell. This was not annotated at the back of his titles right away.

October 24, 1989: Ricardo Cheng went to Genato’s residence and e ressed interest in buying the subject properties. Genato showed

Cheng the copies of his titles and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose Spouses. He likewise showed Cheng the

affidavit to annul contract to sell.

Despite these, Cheng still issued a check for P50,000 upon the assurance that the previous contract will be annulled.

The Da Jose Spouses met Genato at the Office of the Resgistry of Deeds by coincidence, and were later shocked of Genato’s decision to annul the

contract and protested regarding the matter. They reminded Genato that the 30 day extension period was still in effect and they are willing to pay the

downpayment.

Genato later continued with their contract, informed Cheng of hi decision and returned to the

latter, the downpayment paid. Cheng however contended that their contract to sell said property had already been perfected.

ISSUES:


11

1. W/N the contact to sell between Genato and

Spouses Da Jose was validly rescinded. 2. W/N Cheng’s own contract with Genato was

not just a contract to sell but of a conditional contract of sale.

HELD: 1. NO.

In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not

a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code

cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet

expired. The contention of the Da Jose spouses that no further condition was agreed when they were granted the 30-day

extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell should be upheld. Also, Genato could have sent at least a notice of such fact, and

there being no stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his titles and make it available to other would be buyers, it

bolstered that there was no default on the part of the Da Jose Spouses. Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or written, to the Da Jose spouses for his

decision to rescind their contract. In many cases.

2. IT WAS A CONTRACT TO SELL.

The Court ruled that if it was assumed that the receipt is to

be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell

between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded — a condition never met, as Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed

himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier contract with the Da Jose spouses.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein respondents first in time, it was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a

second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had

chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes

unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.

NB: "Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense,

and cancellation, annotation, and even marginal notes. In

its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of

ownership and other real rights.

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG vs CA

G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998

FACTS:

After his mother’s death, etitioner eoncio ee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father

(private respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents.

The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels

of land registered in etitioner’s name are con ugal properties.

The PR contends that the lots were registered under eoncio’s name only as a trustee ecause

during the registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family.

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner – the conjugal regime.

To protect the interest of the conjugal regime

during the pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.

Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was denied by RTC on the

grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of

the court pending litigation. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.

Petitioner’s contention: he resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh out the issue

of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case and that it would amount to a collateral attack of his t itle obtained more than 28 years ago.

Private res ondent’s contention: he evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings when the court’s urisdiction is limited.

ISSUE: W/N the notice of lis pendens would amount to a collateral attack of Leoncio’s title obtained more than 28 years ago. NO (W/N annotation of a notice of

lis pendens is valid. YES.) HELD:

The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of

land. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of

title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership

is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive

evidence of ownership. Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the

best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are

interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to etitioner’s fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private res ondent. What the latter dis utes is the former’s claim

of sole ownershi . hus, although etitioner’s certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar

private respondent from questioning his ownership. A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two

grounds: (1) i f the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party


12

(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title

of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case.

It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis endens is only for the ur ose of announcing “to the

whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he

gambles on the result of the litigation over said ro erty.” On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon

in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property. For purposes of annotating

a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an action for partition is one

case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.

REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO

G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006

FACTS:

December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application covering a parcel of land situated at

Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This application was approved and Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued subsequent thereto.

Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of

facts and/or omission of material facts. This was however dismissed by the Director of lands and further affirmed by then Minister of Natural

Resources.

Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and relocation survey found out that 83 sq. m. of the titled property of Guerrero is under actual physical

possession of Marcelo Bustamante, husband of Angeluna. Thus, upon the directive of the Office of The President, the Director of Lands instituted a

petition for the amendment of plan and technical description.

Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to

dismiss but however was dismissed thereafter. However, the RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero stating that the Republic failed to prove its

allegation that Guerrero obtained the sales patent and certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation. RTC also ruled that the original

certificate of title in the name of Guerrero acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of 1 year from the entry of the decree of

registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and

convincing evidence that Guerrero procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through fraud and misrepresentation.

2. W/N Guerrero’s title acquired the characteristic of indefeasibility.

HELD: 1. NO.

the property in question, while once part of the lands of the

public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the operation of

the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official

certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what

the law warrants or reserves. Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of

Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person

whose name appears thereon. However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen

or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. However, the Republic in this case failed to prove that there is actual and extrinsic fraud to justify a review of the

decree. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certi ficate of

title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such

fraud. 2. Y S. Guerrero’s title, having een registered

under the Torrens system, was vested with th garment of indefeasibility.

NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their

indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he

should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that i f this were permitted,

public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of

ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the

Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to

lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should

not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the a sence of

proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as

to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certi ficate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.

Otherwise, the integrity of the

Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their

duties.

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY

G.R. NO. L-8936, October 2, 1915


13

FACTS:

Legarda and Saleeby are owners of adjoining lands in Manila.

There exists a stone wall between said lots.

In 1906, the said wall and the land where it stands was registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda.

In 1912, Saleeby also applied for registration of

his lot which included the same stone wall and strip of land where it stands. This was later granted and title was issued in favor of Saleeby.

ISSUE: Who should be the owner of the land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons.

HELD: Act 496 providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system actually provides for no remedy. However,

the rule is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties. In view

of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we

think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present.

A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can ot be defeated by

prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

NB: The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the

title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it

would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid

the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it cannot be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial. It is clothed with all the

forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration

is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of

registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the

world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The

registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee

simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its

owner. The certi ficate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,

should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct

proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in

registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the

lapse of the period prescribed by law.

BARANDA VS GUSTILO

GR 81163, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot

No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.

The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued

in the names of petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.

The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor

on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517.

The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently

acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.

Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by Perez and others so a motion for

reconsideration was filed.

Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution of judgement in the resolutions

issued by the courts.

In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the same properties. (NOTE: This time

three cases na ang involve excluding the case at bar.)

The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once

cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once

cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.

In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting

Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of

petitioners.

However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in

the new certificate of title.

This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certi ficates.

Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for

reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.


14

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of

Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

HELD:

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately

register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is not

registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right

to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,

mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with

reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the

Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in nature

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting

Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens

annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the

Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of

Presidential Decree No. 1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of

ROD

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and

unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the

function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.

ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from

Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo,

married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to

secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds:

That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal

property;

That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both

spouses sign the document; but

Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of

the whole property without violating the existing law.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel

the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court,

declaring that “the Mandamus does not lie… ecause the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act ” dismissed the etition, with costs against the

petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified

in refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

HELD:

No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the

law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.

Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.

A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of

whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any

deed or other instrument presented to him for registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who

shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubt ful question.

THIRD DIVISION JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. SHIRLEY B.

NUEGA, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 193038, MARCH 11, 2015

THE FACTS: In 1988, when Shirley and Rogelio were still engaged, Shirley (respondent, then working as a domestic helper in

Israel, sent money to Rogelio, upon his request, for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina which they will use


15

as their residence when they eventually marry each

other. On September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the house and lot. Upon her arrival in 1989, Shirley settled the balance of the equity through SSS financing and paid the

succeeding monthly amortisation. On October 31, 1989, TCT No. 171963 was issued by the Registry of Deeds in Rogelio’s name. They were married in 1990 and lived on

the same property. Shirley then returned to Israel for work; thereat, she received information that Rogelio brought home another woman in the conjugal house, and

she also learned that Rogelio introduced the woman as her wife. She then filed two cases against Rogelio, one for Concubinage, and one for Legal Separation and

Liquidation of Property; the latter she withdrew but later re-filed on January 29, 1993. In between, she learned of Rogelio’s intention to sell the ro erty. She thus advised

the interested buyers, including Josephine Nobleza of the pendency of the cases she filed against Rogelio. Still, Rogelio sold the property to Josephine Nobleza

(petitioner) thru a Deed of Absolute Sale on December 29, 2, without Shirley’s consent in the deed. In a Decision rendered on May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City

rendered a decision granting the petition for legal separation and the dissolution of the community property of Shirley and Rogelio. On August 27, 1996, Shirley filed

a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and REconveyance against Josephine before the RTC to reconvey the property the latter bought from Rogelio. After trial, the

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Shirley, rescinding the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 between Rogelio and Josephine, and for Josephine to

reconvey the property to Shirley. Josephine appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter affirmed with modification the RTC judgment. Hence, Josephine sought

recourse with the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

THE ISSUE: Whether or not Josephine is a buyer in good faith of the property.

THE RULING: We deny the petition.

Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full and

fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some other person in the property.

1 It is the party who claims to

be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith.

2 To successfully

invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is that first and foremost, the “ uyer in good faith” must have shown rudence and due diligence in the

exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her rights and interests

against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The prudence required of a buyer in good faith is “not that of a erson with training in law, ut rather

that of an average man who ‘weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is

nil. ” 3

A buyer in good faith does his homework and verifies that the particulars are in order such as the title, the parties, the mode of transfer and the provisions in the

deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence can be shown by making an ocular

inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership

with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type of ownership, and the

capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is

secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation,

and weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances like what any prudent man in a similar situation would do.

4

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good faith of the subject property which is titled under the name of the seller Rogelio A. Nuega alone as evidenced

by TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724.

5 Petitioner argues, among

others, that since she has examined the TCT over the

subject property and found the property to have been registered under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is an innocent urchaser for value and “she is not re uired to

go beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of the subject property at the time of the consummation of the sale and at the date of the sale. ”

6

We disagree with petitioner.

A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant

to the sale. In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses

Bandong, 7

petitioners therein – as does petitioner herein – were also harping that due to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there was nothing in the TCT of the property

in litigation that should have aroused the uyer’s sus icion as to put her on guard that there was a defect in the title of therein seller. The Court held in the Spouses Raymundo

case that the buyer therein could not hide behind the cloak of being an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the

land purchased is the seller. The Court ruled in this case that the buyer was not an innocent purchaser for value due to the following attendant circumstances, viz.:

In the present case, we are not convinced by the etitioners’ incessant assertion that Jocelyn is an innocent

purchaser for value. To begin with, she is a grandniece of Eulalia and resides in the same locality where the latter lives and conducts her principal business. It is therefore

impossible for her not to acquire knowledge of her grand aunt’s usiness ractice of re uiring her biyaheros to surrender the titles to their properties and to sign the

corresponding deeds of sale over said properties in her favor, as security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on guard for any possible abuses that Eulalia may commit

with the titles and the deeds of sale in her possession. 8

Similarly, in the case of Arrofo v. Quiño,

9 the Court held

that while “the law does not re uire a erson dealing with registered land to inquire further than what the Torrens itle on its face indicates,” the rule is not

absolute. 10

Thus, finding that the buyer therein failed to take the necessary precaution required of a prudent man, the Court held that Arrofo was not an innocent purchaser

for value, viz.: In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to act as a prudent buyer. True, she asked her daughter to

verify from the Register of Deeds if the title to the Property is free from encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that


16

the Property is within the neighborhood and that she

conducted an ocular inspection of the Property. She saw the house constructed on the Property. Yet, Arrofo did not even bother to inquire about the occupants of the house.

Arrofo also admitted that at the time of the sale, Myrna was occupying a room in her house as her lessee. The fact that Myrna was renting a room from Arrofo yet selling

a land with a house should have put Arrofo on her guard. She knew that Myrna was not occupying the house. Hence, someone else must have been occupying the

house. Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the

house, and if a lessee, who received the rentals from such lessee. Such inquiry would have led Arrofo to discover that the lessee was paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and

Myrna, who claimed to own the Property. 11

An analogous situation obtains in the case at bar.

The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the seller Rogelio himself who was therein also

descri ed as “single”. However, as in the cases of Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are circumstances critical to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the

ruling of both the appellate and lower courts that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.

First, etitioner’s sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirley’s house – the subject property – in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City.

Had petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of the subject property. Had petitioner been more vigilant,

she could have inquired with such facility – considering that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa Village where the property is located – i f there was any person

other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the subject property.

To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village – including etitioner’s sister – not to engage in any deal with Rogelio

relative to the purchase of the subject property because of the cases she had filed against Rogelio. Petitioner denies that respondent had given such warning to her neighbors,

which includes her sister, therefore arguing that such warning could not e construed as “notice” on her art that there is a person other than the seller himself who has any

right or interest in the subject property. Nonetheless, des ite etitioner’s adamant denial, oth courts a quo gave probative value to the testimony of respondent, and

the instant petition failed to present any convincing evidence for this Court to reverse such factual finding. To be sure, it is not within our province to second-guess the

courts a quo, and the re-determination of this factual issue is beyond the reach of a petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law may be reviewed.

12

Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale also pose question on the claim of petitioner

that she is a buyer in good faith. As correctly observed by both courts a quo, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated on December 29, 1992. However, the

Community Tax Certificates of the witnesses therein were dated January 2 and 20, 1993.

13 While this irregularity is

not a direct proof of the intent of the parties to the sale to

make it appear that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on December 29, 1992 – or before Shirley filed the petition for legal separation on January 29, 1993 – it is

circumstantial and relevant to the claim of herein petitioner as an innocent purchaser for value.

That is not all. In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992,

the civil status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while etitioner as uyer was indicated as “single,” viz.:

ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with postal address at 2-A-2 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred

to as the VENDOR And JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen,

single and with postal address at No. L-2-A-3 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE.

14

It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly claimed that Rogelio is “single” under C o. 3

and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724, his civil status as seller was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale – further creating a cloud on the claim of

petitioner that she is an innocent purchaser for value. As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did

not err when it modified the decision of the trial court and declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in its entirety.

The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the subject property is Rogelio alone, respondent

was able to prove at the trial court that she contributed in the payment of the purchase price of the subject property. This fact was also settled with finality by the RTC of Pasig

City, Branch 70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case for legal separation and liquidation of property docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510. The pertinent portion of the

decision reads: xxx Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the

parties prior to their marriage forms part of their community property regime, xxx

From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial contribution for the purchase of the house and lot covered by TCT 171963. Thus, the present lot which forms part of

their community property should be divided equally between them upon the grant of the instant petition for legal separation. Having established by preponderance of

evidence the fact of her hus and’s guilt in contracting a subsequent marriage xxx, Shirley alone should be entitled to the net profits earned by the absolute community

property. 15

However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not

remised on roof of res ondent’s financial contri ution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is

community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.

Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides: Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall

consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.

Under the first exception are properties enumerated in


17

Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous

title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the

community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community

property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and

the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. As held in Quiao v. Quiao:

16

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever

property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common

mass of the cou le’s ro erties. And when the cou le’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,

equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of

the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that

only Rogelio’s name a ears in the C as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.

Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and without the consent of

herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 – or during the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage.

Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is void, viz.:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In

case of disagreement, the hus and’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years

from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise

unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of

disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or

encumbrance shall be void. However, the t ransaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be

perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

17

It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the

written consent of respondent or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.

As correctly explained by the appellate court:

In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject property to defendant-appellant Josefina on 29

Decem er 2 or during the e istence of Rogelio’s marriage to plaintiff-appellee Shirley, without the consent of the latter. The subject property forms part of Rogelio

and Shirley’s a solute community of ro erty. hus, the trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale null and void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the

one-half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-appellee Shirley. In absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property,

such sale is void. The consent of both the husband Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void

including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio who contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the Deed of Absolute

Sale x x x entered into by and between defendant-appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29 December 1992, during the subsisting marriage between

plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was without the written consent of Shirley, the said Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in

declaring the said Deed of Absolute Sale as void only insofar as the 1/2 portion pertaining to the share of Shirley is concerned.

18

Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with petitioner and

acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the

reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the a solute community of ro erty shall only e “lia le for

x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have een enefited .” As correctly stated

by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent cannot be made to

reimburse any amount to petitioner. 19

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2010 and July 21, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70235 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS:

The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed

an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 having an area of 33,950 hectares.


18

Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry.

The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their

respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato

Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded —

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;

2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;

3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and

4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.

The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged

as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees.

In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have the March 5, 1981 decision annulled as being

patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that —

1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration;

2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement;

3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but

was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;

4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.

The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General 's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land. According to them,

as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:

1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;

2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;

3) the pre-war certi fication of the National Library dated

August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was

registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;

4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496

(the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the

presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents have registrable rights over Lot 7454. No

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not otherwise

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, it is that all applicants in land registration proceeding s have the

burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and

convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory

information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.

The applicant must present competent and persuasive

proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.

In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal

document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a

certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela

issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.

But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that

Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish

regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.


19

The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest

Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the

judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to

the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON PASAHOL

G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First

Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and

adverse possession by them tacked on to their predecessors -in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years.

Petitioners ' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an

ongoing cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was declared public land by CFI Bataan.

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision which granted the private

respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its registration in the names of the respondents.

In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the

decision of the appellate court as being contrary to law on the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural and alienable land of the public domain and that the same

can be subject to acquisitive prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and uninterrupted possession.

The petitioner maintains that unless the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Natural

Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable, its status as military reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of

physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change it to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the Public Land Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a bona

fide claim of ownership as to entitle them to registration and title over the subject land. NO

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the fact remains that the

subject land has not yet been released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and still has to be reclassified as alienable public land with the

approval of the President of the Philippines as required by the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275.

Therefore, the SC cannot sustain the appellate court's

ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same as alienable and disposable land of the

public domain. A proposal cannot take the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling

would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the public domain.

It was ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, (129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that:

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the

Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to

disposition, This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 &

10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such

patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979])

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicant may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

MATEO CARINO (PLAINTIFF IN ERROR) VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (DEFENDANT IN

ERROR) 212 US 449, 41 PHIL G.R. No. L-2746 December 6,

1906

JUSTICE HOLMES

HOW IT REACHED THE COURT:

Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was the government of the United States appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the

property for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was

brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30

years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived

upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. There was no

document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all


20

lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with

permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he

filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.

PREMILINARY ISSUES.

That even if Carino was able to have a title over the land, he could not have it registered because Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in the Phili ine Commission’s

act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE

PUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS...). But that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that

he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if

ownership can be maintained

MAIN ISSUE: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Government’s argument: S ain had title to all the land in the Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued by

Spain that required registration within a limited time. Carino’s land wasn’t registered and so in effect it ecame public land.

HELD: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.

USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it

does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would

not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.

Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property

and rights acquired there by the US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the

constitution, it rovides that “ no law shall e enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any

erson therein the e ual rotection of the laws”. It would be hard to elieve that that “any erson” didn’t include the inha itants of Benguet. or it meant “ ro erty” to refer

only to those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of registration) many of the people of the land may have not even heard of.

Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that

this section refers to those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who

had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?

In cases like this one, the presumption would and should

be against the government. As far back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be

proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights

ac uired y them “for the enefit of the inha itants

thereof”.

The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irres ective of any royal grant. hey didn’t

intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of rescri tion was admitted: that if they weren’t a le to produce title deeds, it is sufficient i f they show ancient

possession, as a valid title by prescription.

Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else lose

his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occu ied royal lands. I doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal

land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove

possession for the necessary time. There were indications that registration was e ected ut it didn’t mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the

proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.

“Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of

what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. “

Judgment reversed.

LEE HONG KOK V. DAVID (1972) G.R. NO. L-30389 DECEMBER 27, 1972

FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his

miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the

Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.

On the basis of the order of award of the Director

of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510

was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.

Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character for

having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)

The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case

ISSUES: W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for

nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate

http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/05/jurisprudence-gr-no-l-30389-december-27.html

http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/land-titles-and-deeds/1508-sales-patent-on-public-agricultural-lands.html

http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/land-titles-and-deeds/1508-sales-patent-on-public-agricultural-lands.html


21

of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the

grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are

void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their

private property. Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by

private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government

Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a

force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of 5 years.

Imperium v. Dominium

Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of

sovereignty

Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it

may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS: There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which

declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the

Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest

land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition

insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

ISSUE: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of the private person.

HELD: The opposition of the Director of Forestry was

strengthened by the appellate court 's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a

license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that

the same could not be done because it was classified as u lic forest”.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because

loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.

"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or

sea water may also be classified as forest land. The possession of forestlands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question

never ceased to be classified as forestland of public domain.

CRUZ VS DENR, G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ V. DEPT. OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 3 or the Indigenous Peo le’s Rights

Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful de rivation of the State’s ownershi over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural

resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the

indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encom assing definition of “ancestral

domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since

there was no ma ority vote, Cruz’s etition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources – somehow

against the regalian doctrine.

MATEO CARINO (PLAINTIFF IN ERROR) VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (DEFENDANT IN

ERROR)

212 US 449, 41 PHIL G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

JUSTICE HOLMES

HOW IT REACHED THE COURT:

Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it

was

the government of the United states appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property

for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was brought to the US

Supreme court by writ of error.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30

years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived

upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. There was no

document of title issued for the land when he applied for


22

registration. The government contends that the land in

question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription

against the Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was

only granted a possessory title.

PREMILINARY ISSUES.

That even if Carino was able to have a title over the land,

he could not have it registered because Benguet was one of the e cluded rovinces in the Phili ine Commission’s act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS...). But

that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that he could register the land under Philippine Commissions

Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if ownership can be maintained

MAIN ISSUE: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Government’s argument: S ain had title to all the land in

the Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued by Spain that required registration within a limited time.

Carino’s land wasn’t registered and so in effect it ecame public land.

HELD: No. Law and justice require that the applicant

should be granted title to his land.

USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost

all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted to anyone in the province the registration

of their lands.

Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the US would be for the

benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the constitution, it rovides that “ no law shall e enacted in

said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any erson therein the e ual rotection of the laws”. It would

e hard to elieve that that “any erson” didn’t include the inha itants of Benguet. or it meant “ ro erty” to refer only to those lands which had become such under a

ceremony (of registration) many of the people of the land may have not even heard of.

Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the

Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to those cases where the land was

admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still

remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?

In cases like this one, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far back as memory goes,

the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be

proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with

the Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights ac uired y them “for the enefit of the inha itants thereof”.

The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. hey didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle

of rescri tion was admitted: that if they weren’t a le to produce title deeds, it is sufficient i f they show ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.

Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but

only those who wrongfully occu ied royal lands. I doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully

occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications

that registration was e ected ut it didn’t mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.

“Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom

he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. “

Judgment reversed.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND TABANGAO REALTY TUESDAY, JULY 1, 2014

FACTS: On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an

application for Original Registration of Title over three parcels of land.

Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the

corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous

owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to

the whole world and in the concept of an owner. Tabangao Realty alleged that the plant of the Liquefied

Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it (applicant). {There is a lease contract between LPG and

Tabangao} Should the property registration decree invoked not be

allowed, the applicant in the alternative applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus alleged that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been

in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years.

Geron a ango’s witness testified that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is authorized to

acquire land by purchase and develop, subdivide, sell,


23

mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or

otherwise, real estate of all kinds. He also testified that the subject properties in this case

were purchased by Tabangao Realty as evidenced by Deed of Sale and that the taxes of the properties were properly paid by the corporation.

Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the ownership, possession and the status of

the lots subject of the application. Loida Maglinao (from the Bureau of Forest Development)

testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain and no forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest

Development. RTC and CA granted the petition of Tabangao. Hence, this

appeal by the Republic. ISSUE: WON Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title

over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.

HELD: NO. The ruling of the CA was erroneous. There is a presumption that all lands belong to the public

domain of the State An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee

simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant,

except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been

part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.

The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the

parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529

(Property Registration Decree) is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court.

The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary

application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or

ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."

There is no sufficient evidence that Tabangao Realty was in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lands for 30 years.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest.

"The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual

evidence of possession." "Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his

own property."

In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly

established by competent evidence. Hence, the application for registration of the properties

must be denied. (Ruled in favor of the Republic.)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. AVELINO R. DELA

PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, AND GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, REPRESENTED BY

JOSE R. DELA PAZ

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Respondents filed a case to register a parcel of land

covering almost 25,800 square kilometres situated in Taguig. They alleged that they came into the possession of the land thru their parents who have been continuous,

uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since 1987. The Republic (Petitioner) opposed the application on the ground that

they have not been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner, but the RTC ruled in favour of the Respondents.

The Republic interposed an Appeal to the CA, but it was also denied, the court reasoning that Respondents have established their right to the parcel of land.

Petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the continuous, uninterrupted, open,

public and adverse possession was sufficiently established by evidence.

2. Whether the land is part of the alienable part of public domain.

HELD: No. It has not been sufficiently established.

Civil Law: Land Registration

1st Issue: Respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of

the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under abona fideclaim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondents have not presented tangible proof to establish this kind of possession. At best, they have only

given a tax declaration on 1949, but this is merely indicia of ownership.

2nd Issue: To overcome this presumption,incontrovertibleevidence

must be established that thelandsubject of theapplication (or claim) isalienable ordisposable. To support this, Respondents have merely relied on the survey plan of a

geodetic engineer. This is insufficient under the law. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the


24

proper government agency to establish that the subject

land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

Petition GRANTED. The registration is DENIED.

NTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO

V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering

lands in the provinces Nueva ecija, Bulacan, and in cities including Quezon City.

This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided by the SC were consolidated. The first case was a complaint for recovery of possession and damages

against Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the complaint, it was alleged that the defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon

City titles to a portions of the claimed estate. In the end, the lower courts ruled in favor of Ocampo - Dela Cruz, declaring that the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot

be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.

The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. This involves a prayer to be declared as

administrator. This case eventually ended in the same manner as the first case - the Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and of no legal force, therefore the lands

covered by the Titulo are not within the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands covered or claimed under such title are not included in the estate of the deceased.

HELD: The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by the title of the defendants under the Torrens system. It is

settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which tool effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish

titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6mos from date of effectivity of the said decree.

Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said decree should have been presented during trial.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE

CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First

Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by

ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister,

respondents-appellees. G.R. No. L-55289. June 29, 1982

FACTS:

In 1933, Iglesia ni Cristo, private respondent, a

corporation sole duly existing under Philippine laws, acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez, who had possessed the property since

1933 and had declared the same for tax purposes. On September 13, 1977, private respondent filed an

application for registration of the two lots pursuant to

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging that it and its predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed

the application on the ground that the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain and that the land

applied for is a public land. After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of private respondent. Hence, this appeal by the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Iglesia ni Cristo may acquire or hold lands of public domain.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Constitution

prohibits a corporation sole or a juridical person like the Iglesia Ni Cristo from acquiring or holding lands of the public domain; that said church is not entitled to avail of

the benefits of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons; and that the subject lots are not private lands because possession

by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest has not been since time immemorial and because land registration proceeding under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law

presupposes that the land is public.

The provision in the Constitution that "No private

corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; Art. XIV, Sec. II of the Constitution is not

the decisive consideration for the denial of the registration in favor of appellee. It is the view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the enactment

of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference. (being) forever . . . allowed." Here the Iglesia

Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a

chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads to the conclusion that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally

requires that when two provisions in the Constitution maybe relevant to a certain factual situation, it calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing

the registration.

NEW REGENT SERVICES V. TANJUATCO April 16, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent

Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba. NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Cuevas, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of

two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 2,

1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares of stock in the corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau

of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights

from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Titles were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco. NRSI anchors


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its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of

accretion. It submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco.

ISSUES:

1) W/N the complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity

of contract, reconveyance and damages against Tanjuanco may prosper

2) W/n NRSI has claim over the subject property base on

the right of accretion 3) W/N Cuevas is an innocent purchaser in good faith

RULINGS:

1) No.

An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful

and legal owner.22

In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically

the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another erson’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;

(2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means;

(3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed after the certi ficate of title had already

become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.

Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.

2) No.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article

45731

of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and

imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and

(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion

must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.

Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said

parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River

Bed, which under Article 502 (1) of the Civil Code rightly

pertains to the public dominion. The Certification issued by the forester confirms that said lands were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable lands certified and

declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.

3) Yes.

an uatco’s titles were derived from Original Certificates

of Title in the name of no less than the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, we cannot validly and fairly rule that in relying upon said title, Tanjuatco acted in bad faith. A

person dealing with registered land may safely rely upon the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the

certificate to determine the condition of the property. This applies even more particularly when the seller happens to be the Republic, against which, no improper motive can be

ascribed. The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without

notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the

claims or interest of some other person in the property.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME

114 SCRA 799

JUNE 29, 1982

FACTS: The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who

had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3rd of July 1947, the original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation

of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the following contentions:

1. The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of

acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable.

2. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their

imperfect title to the land ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply for a judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title.

2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized. 3. Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is contingent on the judicial

confirmation of title. RULING: 1. NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the

Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973

Constitution prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_168800_2009.html#fnt22

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_168800_2009.html#fnt31


26

persons and citizens of the Philippines are allowed to

apply for confirmation under the PLA. 2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the

necessary condition of possession by the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2) the judicial confirmation of the title by the Court of First

Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with the decision, but accepted that a conversion indeed took place. Note: J. Teehankee dissented and traced the line of

jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to Herico which maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectively happens by the operation of law, ipso jure, as soon as it

can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for the confirmation of the grant have been met. According to his reasoning, upon the fulfillment of the

aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of an imperfect title is only a formality.

DIRECTOR OF LAND VS IAC AND ACME

FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by

Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land. The possession of the Infiels, members of Dumagat tribes,

over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse

andpublic from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the

possession is already considered from time immemorial. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of

the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. Acme Plywood &

Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements. The ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the

government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela. Acme donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES

2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in

order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and

had become private property, at least by presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the

lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the

title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already

private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded

that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in

excess of 1,024 hectares.

VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO vs. the RELIGIOUS OF THE

VIRGIN MARY (Feb. 28, 1989)

FACTS

A cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and adjudication of title to a large tract of land situated in the

City of Iligan. Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably

presented an answer to the petition. She alleged that she was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries comprehended in the cadastral

proceeding. As owner, she had been in possession of both lots for fi fteen (15) years, and her predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60) years. Title to the same parcels of land was

however claimed by the Religious of the Virgin Mary. In its answer, it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as owner

thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of its predecessors was immemorial.

The Cadastral Court rendered judgment, declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth sold the lot to the Religious of the Virgin

Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12, 1956. De Ocsio now asserts that as the private respondent is a

religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural

persons. ISSUE

Whether or not the contention was correct. HELD

No. Private respondent, a religious corporation, may obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.

Open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private

property, and a juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name.

In this case, a private corporation had purchased the land originally of the public domain from parties who had, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,

possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. It had thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

The prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf of private corporations do not apply to public lands already

converted to private ownership by natural persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her predecessors -in-interest

having possessed Lot No. 1272 for the period and under the conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of


27

ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of the

property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary, confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is, under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.

REPUBLIC VS JUANITO MANIMTIM (G.R. No. 169599 March 16, 2011)

FACTS: Respondents filed with the RTC two applications for registration and confirmation of their title over two (2)

parcels of land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City. The respondents alleged that they are the owners pro indiviso and in fee simple of the subject parcels of land;

that they have acquired the subject parcels of land by purchase or assignment of rights; and that they have been in actual, open, public, and continuous possession of the

subject land under claim of title exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants by themselves and through their predecessors -in-interest since time

immemorial. In support of their applications, the respondents submitted blueprint plans of Lot 3857 and Lot 3858, technical descriptions, certifications in lieu of lost

geodetic engineers certificates, declarations of real property tax, official receipts of payment of taxes, real property tax certifications, and deeds of absolute sale.

The OSG opposed the petition, alleging, among others, that the respondents have not proven actual, open, public,

and continuous possession of the land from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Moldex Realty also opposed, stating that a part of one of the parcels of the land overlapped with lands it

owned. The RTC handed down its Judgment granting the

respondents application for registration ofthe first lot but deferred the approval of registration of the second lot pending the segregation of 4,243 square meter portion

thereof which was found to belong to Moldex. It rendered an amended judgment later, granting registration of the second lot. The OSG and Moldex appealed with the CA,

which reinstated the earlier RTC decision. The OSG appealed.

ISSUE: W/N the respondents had a valid claim over the two parcels of land (NO)

HELD: The following are the requisites required by law for the registration of land.

Applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of

Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of

the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the

same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive

and convincing evidence. The respondents best evidence to prove possession and

ownership over the subject property were the tax declarations issued in their names. Unfortunately, these tax declarations together with their unsubstantiated

general statements and mere xerox copies of deeds of sale are not enough to prove their right ful claim.

Well settled is the rule that declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to

possess land when not supported by any other evidence.

The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-

interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

REPUBLIC VS TEODORO RIZALVO (G.R. No 172011 March 7, 2011)

FACTS: On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land

registration court, an application for the registration of a parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706, located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he

is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and that he is

currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment

of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.

On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment

receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging

to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.

The Land Investigator/ Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union thereafter certified

that the subject parcel of land was within the alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was in actual occupation and possession of the land.

The MTC, acting as a land registration court, approved the application for registration, which the OSG appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession (OCENPO) of the land in question in the manner and length of time

required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. (NO)

HELD:

Requisites for the registration of a title: Under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,

applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the

applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona

fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The

certification and report dated July 17, 2001submitted by Special Investigator Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of


28

San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land

area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone.

Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient

testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the

land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent any showing that the lower courts committed error.

However, the third requirement has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership

and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo.

He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078 for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. What is required by law is

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945or earlier.

Under Section 14(2) applicant is likewise not entitled to registration of title through prescription, since the 30-year

period will only commence from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of

the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. There was no such declaration in this case.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS HON. SALVADOR REYES AND PIDC AND TAMAYO (GR No L-27594

November 28, 1975)

FACTS: Applicant Alipio Alinsunurin sought the registration of title under Act 496 a vast tract of land,

containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less, situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva Ecija.

On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines

opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of

the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the

military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237.

In 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties, requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered

as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the property

It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime and upon his death in 1900, he

transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized

portions for pasture, until her death sometime i n 1944.

The lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel

of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor of Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation (2/3 of the land was adjudicated

to PIDC), and the remaining 1/3 portion to Tamayo. ISSUE: W/N PIDC or its predecessors-in-interest have

been in OCENPO of the subject property (NO) HELD: The applicant relies on a purported titulo de

informacion posesoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla. However, neither the original of the said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy

thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document.

Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds, on the basis of the "List of Possessory Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the

corresponding supporting documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla does not appear among those listed as holders of informacion

posesoria titles. There is another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of the applicant. The alleged informacion posesoria covers an area of "seis mil

quiñiones, poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land

in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in excess of one thousand (1,000)

hectares Also under Spanish law, in order that an informacion

posesoria may be considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the holder thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally converted into a registration of ownership

because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has been in open possession of

the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the date of such registration; that such conversion be announced by means of a

proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the registration of possession into a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the

proper record thereof in the Registry." Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9,

1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such

inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither applicant Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the

latter's predecessors-in-interest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation" of the property in question, "under a bona fide

claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title."

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not

constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to


29

give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While

grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without

substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.

The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the

possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the

same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS TESALONA (GR No. 66130

September 8, 1994) FACTS:

On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia Tesalona filed an application for registration of five (5) parcels of

land with the CFI of Quezon, Gumaca Branch. They alleged that they acquired the lands through succession from their mother Magdalena.

They said that their great grand mother Maria Rosita Lorenzo acquired 7.4343 hectares of land located in

Quezon under a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894.

The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition to the application alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-

in-interest had sufficient title of the land applied for nor had they been in possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the

application and that the same is public land. Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition

even as he supported the government's contention that the lands applied for are part of the public domain. Tan averred that he had possessed the land as lessee for a

period of more than thirty five (35) years. She said that the lands were converted into fishponds and had been subject of a sales application sometime in 1963. 11 The

application to purchase filed by Constancio is still pending before the Bureau of Lands.

Lower court decision: After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants and declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as

owned by the government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constancio dela Pena Tan, pending the approval of his sales application.

The CA ruled that lots 1-5 should be registered under the names of esalona’s si lings.

The Director of lands filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2. (NO)

HELD: Submission of tracing cloth plan is mandatory which the

Tesalonas were not able to comply.

To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land

applied for was not submitted in evidence by private respondents. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a

statutory requirement of mandatory character. While a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 as surveyed

for the Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented before the trial court, the same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law.

The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate copy of their application for registration of land title were

under the custody of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at that time. But such does not relieve the private respondents of their duty to ret rieve the said tracing cloth

plan and submit it before the court. In the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, this Court

clearly declared that if the original tracing plan was forwarded to the LRC, "the applicants may easily ret rieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence."

This was not done. Assuming that the same was in their possession during the trial, private respondents should have made it available to the trial court for verification.

The proofs presented by Tesalona’s were uestiona le and the basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein

private respondents, is a Spanish title, a possessory information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13,

1894 for 1.0481 hectares. But private respondents did not submit the original of the possessory information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a

Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896.

Also… this art of the Court’s decision is more connected with the topic of OCENPO)

Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees.

This belies the contention of herein private respondents that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and, thereafter, to palay and other seasonal crops. Being

swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like, these lots may very well be considered and classified as forest lands. In the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v.

Director of Forestry we declared that: “A forested area classified as forest land of the u lic

domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be

covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way place. Swampy areas

covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brack ish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal

nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation

to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of im erfect title do not a ly.”

Moreover, well -entrenched is the rule that possession of

forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be


30

issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens System, nullifies the title.

IGNACIO PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (January 21, 1997)

FACTS: On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, issued Executive Order No. 40 which

reserved for provincial park purposes a land situated in the Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay

ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo. Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land to

his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed

a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Titles.

On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued

Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and

administration of a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and,

therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).

On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed

a civil case for the annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged original certi ficate of

titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.

HELD: No. The OCT and the subsequest TCTs are not valid.

The lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.

There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show

that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. Moreover, as part of the

reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not

registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF

APPEALS (March 16, 1987)

FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was

declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.

On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry

as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097 to perfect their

rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose

possession of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners

thereof for more than 30 years. The petition was approved and the Commissioner of Land

Registration was directed to issue the corresponding decrees of registration of said land.

On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the

corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are portions of the public

domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not have

a registerable title to the land subject matter of the proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lots claimed by respondents

could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the Public Land Act, as amended.

HELD: No. It cannot be claimed by the respondents.

Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. They are

incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of

registration, nulli fies the title. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.

Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified

for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession

and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, which includes the lots

claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an


31

agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.

REPUBLIC vs. DE GUZMAN (Feb. 28, 2000)

FACTS Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent

Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De

Guzman. The Republic now raised the issue in a petition that the

trial court erred in not declaring that the de Guzman have not overthrown the presumption that the lands are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the

Philippines and that they have fulfilled the time required by law to justify confirmation of an imperfect title.

It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private

respondents only in 1991. Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26)

years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29and R.A. No. 6940.

In finding that private respondents' possession of the

subject property complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned out that —

(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965, however,

records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitaño, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it

and planting various crops thereon. It follows that appellees ' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro

Ermitaño's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the time required by law to justify confirmation of an imperfect tile is satisfied in this case.

HELD: No. It is not satisfied.

In the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared alienable in

1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It cannot be registered and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not

convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable

land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement.

The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not

apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their predecessors -in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three

(63) years at the time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact

remains that from the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26)

years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the

possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by

prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,

however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership.

VICTORIA V REPUBLIC

FACTS: On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana

Victoria applied for registration under the law of a 1,729-square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of that city. The Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondent Republic of the Philippines, opposed the application in the usual form.

The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is inside the alienable and

disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her

predecessors -in-interest have been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early

1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years.

On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision granting the application for registration and finding that Victoria.

The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief that Victoria failed to

present evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and that she failed to establish the kind of possession required for registration.

Victoria in her reply attached to her brief a Certification dated November 6, 2006 issued by the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Ca reversed Me C’s decision.

ISSUE:


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1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and

2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.

RULING: Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree has

three requisites for registration of title: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themsel ves or through

their predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona

fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public

Land Act. There are no material differences between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the

registration of such lands of the public domain. To prove that the land subject of the application for

registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an

administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government

that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of

the pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by

the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as

proclaimed by the President. Besides, the record shows that the subject property was

covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get

titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public

domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.

SOUTH CITY HOMES V REPUBLIC

The subject of this dispute (lot No.5005) is a strip of land between two lots owned by the petitioner.

The record shows that Lot 2381 was purchased on installment basis by Basilia Dimaranan, and Lot 2386 was

acquired under similar condition by Fernando Guico, both from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau of Landsin the year 1910. Eight (8) years thereafter, installment-payment

for Lot 2386 was completed in favor of Basilia Dimaranan. On the other hand, Lot 2381 was on September 12, 1911 assigned to Bartolome Peña who continued and

completed the installment payments culminating into the issuance in his name of Patent No. 19138 on September 26,1919. From Bartolome Pena, Lot 2381 was acquired by

Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. and the title was transferred to his name (Exh. "F") while Lot 2386 was acquired by the

Garcias (Exh. "J-2") On August 27,1981, Lot 2386-A was

sold by the Garcias to the applicant South City Homes, Inc. (Exh. "J"). Lot 2381 was on February 25,1977 sold by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. to Koo Jun Eng (Exh. "G") who in

turn assigned the property to the applicant in February of 1981 (Exh. "H"). 4

It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should

be registered in its name for either of two reasons. The

first is that the disputed strip of land really formed part of Lots 2381 and 2386-A but was omitted therefrom only because of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral

surveys. The second is that it had acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by itself and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.

For its part, the Republic of the Philippines argues that the elongated piece of land between the two lots now owned by the petitioner used to be a canal which could not have

been appropriated by the purchasers of the adjacent lots or their successors-in-interest. Neither could it be deemed included in the lots now owned by the petitioner because

their respective technical descriptions indicate otherwise. Prescription is also not applicable because the petitioner has not established the requisite possession of the lot, as

to manner and length, to justify judicial confirmation of title in its name.

The parties also differ on the nature of the disputed lot. The petitioner insists it is patrimonial property of the State,

being part of the so-called Friar Lands, while the Republic maintains it is part of the public domain and cannot therefore be acquired by a private corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner own Lot 5005.

RULING:

To argue that Lot No. 5005 is really a part of the other two

lots owned by the petitioner is to oppose the obvious. What is obvious is the technical descriptions of the two lots whose areas do not include the strip of land between

them. The petitioner points to the original survey of the lands in 1906 which states that the two lots adjoin each other, without mention of what is now Lot No. 5005. But it

forgets that it has itself suggested that the old surveys were inaccurate, which could explain the omission.

If it is true that there was no canal between the two lots at the time of their survey, then the disputed strip of land

should have been included as part of either of the two adjoining lots. It was not. The petitioner itself insists that the canal, if there ever was one, had disappeared after it

had been filled with silt and dirt. The result was the segregation of a third and separate lot, now known as Lot No. 5005. Notably, the area of that dried-up canal is not

negligible as to come under what the petitioner calls the allowable margin of error in the original survey.

As we have already rejected the contention that the third lot was part of the other two lots, the petitioner must fall

back on its claim of acquisitive prescription over it as a separate lot. Its submission is that its possession of the lot dates back to "time immemorial," by which tired phrase it

is intended to convey the idea that the start of such possession can no longer be recollected. Indeed, it can be. The petitioner's possession does not in fact go back to


33

"time immemorial," but only to the recent remembered past.

It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the Civil Code:

In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less, than that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession.

This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be limited only to that of the successor-in-interest; and in the case of the herein petitioner, it should begin

from 1981 when it acquired the two adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of the other two.

It follows that when the application for registration of the lot

in the name of the petitioner was filed in 1983, the applicant had been in possession of the property for less than three years. This was far too short of the prescriptive

period required for acquisition of immovable property, which is ten years if the possession is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public.

The weakness of the petitioner's position prevents this

Court from affirming the claim to the lot in question either as part of the two other lots or by virtue of acquisitive prescription. And having made this ruling, we find it

unnecessary to determine whether the land is patrimonial in nature or part of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

CHING V CA

FACTS: By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal

address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed cancelled.

On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston,

Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for

administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a

newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after

presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on

January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).

Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit

against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City

docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.).

Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137

(not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in

private respondent 's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of

Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the

defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to

Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic

Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period

within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25,

1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the

complaint to be duly substantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro

Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff;

sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T.

No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby

ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella

Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

OF PROPERTY AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.

RULING:

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in

accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not

have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held


34

Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed

land for 19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a

reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality.

Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility

of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act

496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or

title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title.

REPUBLIC V CA AND SPS LAPINA

FACT: On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area

of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born

Filipino citizens. On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for

registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and

have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private

respondents' title to the lots. In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents'

application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality.

ISSUE: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a

citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

RULING: In the case at bar, private respondents were

undoubtedly natural -born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the

possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under

the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have

constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private

respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations

qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above

quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural -born citizen of the

Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:

Sec. 2. Any natural -born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who

has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one

thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of

married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the t ransferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or

rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the

present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above

were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The

parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part


35

of the public domain. They are already private in character

since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June

12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a

maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a

private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private

respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were

formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,

Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors -in-interest

over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as

compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix

of the estate. On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of

partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two arts. One art shall go to the widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other art

or “free ortion” shall go to Jorge and Ro erto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad. ” Furthermore, one third /3 of the free portion is charged with the widow‟s usufruct and the

remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski.

Respondents opposed such partition, arguing that the granting of a usufruct in favor of Wanda is invalid because it violates the constitutional prohibition on aliens owning

property in the Philippines (Sec. 5, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution).

ISSUE: W/n the granting of usufruct to Wanda is valid.

HELD: YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID Art XIII, Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary

succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the

public domain in the Philippines. The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the

Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary

succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.

Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying

money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alien may be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the

Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real

right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the

Constitution.

PHIL. BANKING CORP. V. LUI SHE

FACTS: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila.

The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had

been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, having a monthly rental of P2,620.

On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90

years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with, but she was taken cared of by Wong.

"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November

15, 1957, a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50

years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was

amended so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360.

On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000.

The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and

another fixing the term of the option at 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect

the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various

contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October 21,

1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong

was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant

in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the

Philippine Banking Corporation. Justina Santos maintaine

AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN


36

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Date: 05 January 1998

Section 1. Tit le. - This Act shall be known and cited as

"The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987."

Sec. 2. Law Governing Elect ions. - The first local

elections under the new Constitution and all subsequent

elections and plebiscites shall be governed by this Act and

by the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise

known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,

and other election laws not inconsistent with this Act.

Sec. 3. Voters in Cit ies. - The registered voters of a

highly urbanized city shall not vote in the election for

provincial officials of the province in which it is located. No

component city shall be declared or classified as a highly

urbanized city within sixty (60) days prior to a local

election.

The registered voters of a component city shall be entitled

to vote in the election for provincial officials of the

province of which it is a part, unless its charter provides

otherwise.

Sec. 4. Cert ificates of Candidacy; Certified Lists of

Candidates. - The certificates of candidacy shall be filed

in twelve legible signed copies with the offices mentioned

in Section 75 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. In cities with

more than one election registrar, the Commission on

Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, shall

designate the election registrar who shall receive the

certificates of candidacy.

In lieu of the additional copies of the certificate of

candidacy equal to twice the number of polling places

which a candidate is required to file under said Section 75,

the Commission shall cause to be printed certified lists of

candidates containing the names of all registered

candidates for each office to be voted for in each

province, city or municipality immediately followed by the

nickname or stage name of each candidate duly registered

in his certificate of candidacy and his political party

affiliation, if any. Said list shall be posted inside each

voting booth during the voting period.

Whenever practicable, the board of inspectors shall cause

said list of candidates to be written clearly and legibly on

the blackboard or on manila paper for posting at a

conspicuous place inside the polling place.

The names of all registered candidates immediately

followed by the nickname or stage name shall also be

printed in the election returns and tally sheets.

Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance

Candidates. -

a. A verified petition to declare a duly registered

candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section

69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed

personally or through duly authorized

representative with the Commission by any

registered candidate for the same office within

five (5) days from the last day for the filing of

certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not

be allowed.

b. Within three (3) days from the fil ing of the

petition, the Commission shall issue summons to

the respondent candidate together with a copy of

the petition and its enclosures, if any.

c. The respondent shall be given three (3) days from

receipt of the summons within which to file his

verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the

petition, serving copy thereof upon the petitioner.

Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as

affirmative defenses.

d. The Commission may designate any of its officials

who are lawyers to hear the case and receive

evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in

nature. In lieu of oral testimonies, the parties

may be required to submit position papers

together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and

other documentary evidence. The hearing officer

shall immediately submit to the Commission his

findings, reports, and recommendations within

five (5) days from the completion of such

submission of evidence. The Commission shall

render its decision within five (5) days from

receipt thereof.

e. The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission

shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy

thereof by the parties, be final and executory

unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

f. The Commission shall within twenty-four hours,

through the fastest available means, disseminate

its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court

to the city or municipal election registrars, boards

of election inspectors and the general public in the

political subdivision concerned.

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any

candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for

him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is

not declared by final judgment before an election to be

disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning

number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission

shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,

inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or

any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order

the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate

whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy. - The procedure hereinabove

provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or

cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Sec. 8. Representatives of Parties During Printing

of Returns and Ballots. - The registered political parties

or coalitions of parties, or their components should there

be any dissolution or division of said coalition, whose

candidates obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the

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37

total votes cast in the next preceding senatorial election

shall each have a watcher and/or representative in the

procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in

the printing of election returns and official ballots and in

the printing, numbering, storage, and distribution thereof.

Sec. 9. Public Forum. - The Commission shall encourage

nonpolitical, nonpartisan private or civic organizations to

initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public fora

at which all registered candidates for the same office may

simultaneously and personally participate to present,

explain, and/or debate on their campaign platforms and

programs and other like issues. The Commission shall

promulgate the rules and regulations for the holding of

such fora to assure its nonpartisan character and the

equality of access thereto by all candidates.

Sec. 10. Common Poster Areas. - The Commission

shall designate common poster areas in strategic public

places such as markets, barangay centers and the like

wherein candidates can post, display, or exhibit election

propaganda to announce or further their candidacy.

Whenever feasible common billboards may be installed by

the Commission and/or nonpartisan private or civic

organizations which the Commission may authorize

whenever available, after due notice and hearing, in

strategic places where it may be readily seen or read, with

the heaviest pedestrian and/or vehicular traffic in the city

or municipality.

The space in such common poster areas or billboards shall

be allocated free of charge, if feasible, equitably and

impartially among the candidates in the province, city or

municipality.

Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. -

In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited

under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be

unlawful:

a. to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or

publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any

place, whether private or public, except in the

common poster areas and/or billboards provided

in the immediately preceding section, at the

candidate's own residence, or at the campaign

headquarters of the candidate or political party:

Provided, That such posters or election

propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet

by three (3) feet in area: Provided, further, That

at the site of and on the occasion of a public

meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2)

and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet

each may be displayed five (5) days before the

date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed

within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting

or rally; and

b. for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or

television station, or other mass media, or any

person making use of the mass media to sell or to

give free of charge print space or air time for

campaign or other political purposes except to the

Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media

columnist, commentator, announcer or personality

who is a candidate for any elective public office

shall take a leave of absence from his work as

such during the campaign period.

Sec. 12. Official Watchers. - Every registered political

party, coalition of political parties, and every candidate

shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling

place: Provided, That candidates for members of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod or

Sangguniang Bayan or for city or municipal councilors

belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be

entitled only to one watcher. There shall also be

recognized two principal watchers, one representing the

ruling coalition and the other the dominant opposition

coalition, who shall sit as observers in the proceedings of

the board. The principal watcher shall be designated on

the basis of the recommendation of the ruling coalition,

represented by the political party of the incumbent elected

district representative, and of the dominant opposition

coalition, represented by the political party which

performed best or which polled at least ten percent (10%)

of the votes in the last national election.

A duly signed appointment of a watcher shall entitle him

to recognition by the board of election inspectors and the

exercise of his rights and discharge of his duties as such:

Provided, however, That only one watcher of each of

those authorized to appoint them can stay at any time

inside the polling place.

The watchers shall be permitted full and unimpeded

access to the proceedings so that they can read the

names of those written on the ballots being counted with

unaided natural vision, consistent with good order in the

polling place.

In addition to their rights and duties under Section 179 of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the two principal watchers

representing the ruling coalition and the dominant

opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if available affix

their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns

for that precinct. If both or either of them is not available,

unwilling or should they refuse to do so, any watcher

present preferably with political affiliation or alignment

compatible with that of the absent or unwilling watcher,

may be required by the board of election inspectors to do

so.

Sec. 13. Board of Election Inspectors. -The board of

election inspectors to be constituted by the Commission

under Section 164 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be

composed of a chairman and two (2) members, one of

whom shall be designated as poll clerk, all of whom shall

be public school teachers, giving preference to those with

permanent appointments. In case there are not enough

public school teachers, teachers in private schools,

employees in the civil service, or other citizens of known

probity and competence who are regis tered voters of the

city or municipality may be appointed for election duty.

Sec. 14. Per Diems Of Boards of Election Inspectors

and Other Personnel. - The chairman and the members

of the boards of election inspectors shall each be paid a





38

per diem of One hundred pesos (P100.00) on each

registration or revision day and Two hundred pesos

(P200.00) on election day.

Support personnel from the Department of Education,

Culture and Sports shall each receive a per diem of P50.00

during election day. Supervisors, principals and other

administrators of the Department of Education, Culture

and Sports, who may be required by the Commission to

perform election duties shall each be entitled to a per

diem of P100.00.

Provincial, city and municipal treasurers shall each receive

a per diem of P200.00 on election day.

Sec. 15. Signatures of Chairman and Poll Clerk at

the Rack of Every Ballot. - In addition to the

preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated

in Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the chairman

and the poll clerk of the board of election inspectors shall

affix their signatures at the back of each and every official

ballot to be used during the voting. A certification to that

effect must be entered in the minutes of the voting.

Sec. 16. Certificate of Votes. - After the counting of

the votes cast in the precinct and announcement of the

results of the election, and before leaving the polling

place, the board of election inspectors shall issue a

certificate of votes upon request of the duly accredited

watchers. The certificate shall contain the number of votes

obtained by each candidate written in words and figures,

the number of the precinct, the name o f the city or

municipality and province, the total number of voters who

voted in the precinct, and the date and time issued, and

shall be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the

board.

Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The

provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall be

admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration,

falsification or any anomaly committed in the election

returns concerned, when duly authenticated by testimonial

or documentary evidence presented to the board of

canvassers by at least two members of the board of

election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided.

That failure to present any certificate of votes shall not be

a bar to the presentation of other evidence to impugn the

authenticity of the election returns.

Sec. 18. Transfer of Counting of Votes to Safer

Place. - If on account of imminent danger of violence,

terrorism, disorder or similar causes, it becomes necessary

to transfer the counting of votes to a safer place, the

board of inspectors may effect such transfer by unanimous

approval by the board and concurrence by the majority of

the watchers present. This fact shall be recorded in the

minutes of voting and the members of the board and the

watchers shall manifest their approval or concurrence by

affixing their signatures therein. The Commission shall

issue rules and guidelines on the matter to secure the

safety of the members of the board, the watchers, and all

election documents and paraphernalia.

Sec. 19. Number of Copies of Elect ion Returns and

their Distribution. - The election returns required

under Section 212 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be

prepared in sextuplicate. The first copy shall be delivered

to the city or municipal board of canvassers as a body for

its use in the city or municipal canvass. The second copy

shall be delivered to the election registrar of the city or

municipality for transmittal to the provincial board of

canvassers for its use in the provincial canvass. The third

copy shall likewise be delivered to the election registrar for

transmittal to the Commission. The fourth copy, to be

known as advance election returns, shall be delivered to

the city or municipal treasurer who, in the presence of the

election registrar or his authorized representative, shall

immediately and publicly open the same and post the

votes therein in an election board, sufficiently large to

enable the public to read them, built on a public place

preferably within the immediate vicinity of the city hall or

municipal building. The fifth copy shall be deposited in the

compartment of the ballot box for valid ballots. The sixth

copy shall be delivered to the city or municipal trial judge

or municipal circuit trial judge, as the case may be, or in

his absence to any official who may be designated by the

Commission for safekeeping. Said copy may be opened

during the canvass upon order of the board of canvassers

for purposes of comparison with other copies of the

returns whose authenticity is in question.

The city or municipal treasurer shall issue certified copy of

any election returns in his possession upon request of any

interested party and payment of the fees required by

existing ordinances.

The Commission shall promulgate rules for the speedy and

safe delivery or preservation of the election returns.

Sec. 20. Boards of Canvassers. - There shall be a

board of canvassers for each province, city and

municipality as follows:

a. Provincial Board of Canvassers. - The

provincial board of canvassers shall be composed

of the provincial election supervisor or a lawyer in

the regional office of the Commission, as

chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman,

and the provincial superintendent of schools, as

member.

b. City Board of Canvassers. - The city board of

canvassers shall be composed of the city election

registrar or a lawyer of the Commission, as

chairman, the city fiscal, as vice-chairman, and

the city superintendent of schools, as member. In

cities with more than one election registrar, the

Commission shall designate the election registrar

who shall act as chairman.

c. Municipal Board of Canvassers. - The

municipal board of canvassers shall be composed

of the election registrar or a representative of the

Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer,

as vice-chairman, and the most senior district

school supervisor or in his absence a principal of

the school district or the elementary school, as

member.

The proceedings of the board of canvassers shall be open

and public.


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39

Sec. 21. Substitution of Chairman and Members of

the Board of Canvassers. - In case of non-availability,

absence, disqualification due to relationship, or incapacity

for any cause of the chairman, the Commission shall

appoint as substitute, a ranking lawyer of the Commission.

With respect to the other members of the board, the

Commission shall appoint as substitute the following in the

order named: the Provincial Auditor, the Registrar of

Deeds, the Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and any other available

appointive provincial official in the case of the provincial

board of canvassers; the officials in the city corresponding

to those enumerated, in the case of the city board of

canvassers; and the Municipal Administrator, the Municipal

Assessor, the Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive

Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, or any other available

appointive municipal officials, in the case of the municipal

board of canvassers.

Sec. 22. Canvassing Committees. - The board of

canvassers may constitute such number of canvassing

committees as may be necessary to enable the board to

complete the canvass within the period prescribed under

Section 231 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881: Provided, That

each committee shall be composed of three members,

each member to be designated by the chairman and

members of the board and that all candidates shall be

notified in writing, before the election, of the number of

committees to be constituted so that they can designate

their watchers in each committee. The committees shall

be under the direct supervision and control of the board.

Sec. 23. Notice of Meetings of the Board. - At least

five (5) days before the initial meeting of the board of

canvassers, the chairman of the board shall give written

notice to all members thereof and to each candidate and

political party presenting candidates for election in the

political subdivision concerned of the date, time and place

of the meeting. Similar notice shall also be given for

subsequent meetings unless notice has been given in open

session of the board. Proof of service of notice to each

member, candidate and political party shall be attached to

and shall form part of the records of the proceedings. If

notice is given in open session, such fact shall be recorded

in the minutes of the proceedings.

Sec. 24. Proceedings of the Board. - The board of

canvassers shall have full authority to keep order within

the canvassing room or hall and its premises and enforce

obedience to its lawful orders. If any person shall refuse

to obey any lawful order of the board or shall so conduct

himself in such disorder manner as to disturb or interrupt

its proceedings, the board may order any peace officer to

take such person into custody until the adjournment of the

meeting.

Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During

the Canvass. - Any registered political party, coalition of

parties, through their representatives, and any candidate

has the right to be present and to counsel during the

canvass of the election returns: Provided, That only one

counsel may argue for each political party or candidate.

They shall have the right to examine the returns being

canvassed without touching them, make their

observations thereon, and file their challenges in

accordance with the rules and regulations of the

Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by the

board of canvassers.

Sec. 26. COMELEC Hearings and Proceedings. - In all

hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Commission,

including preliminary investigations of election offenses,

no person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be

excused from attending and testifying or from producing

books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other

records on the ground that the testimony or evidence,

documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to

incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: Provided,

That no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or on

account of any matter concerning which he is compelled,

after having claimed the privilege against self-

incrimination, to testify and produce evidence,

documentary or otherwise.

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, the

Commission may grant immunity from criminal

prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose

possession and production of documents or other

evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any

hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the

Commission or under its authority in the performance or in

the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory

objectives. The immunity granted under this and the

immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the

witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false

testimony.

Sec. 27. Election Offenses. - In addition to the

prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in

Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as

amended, the following shall be guilty of an election

offense:

a. Any person who causes the printing of official

ballots and election returns by any printing

establishment which is not under contract with the

Commission on Elections and any printing

establishment which undertakes such

unauthorized printing.

b. Any member of the board of election inspectors or

board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or

decreases the votes received by a candidate in

any election or any member of the board who

refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to

credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered

votes.

c. Any member of the board of election inspectors

who refuses to issue to duly accredited watchers

the certificate of votes provided in Section

16 hereof.

d. Any person who violates Section 11 hereof

regarding prohibited forms of election

propaganda.

e. Any chairman of the board of canvassers who fails

to give notice of meetings to other members of



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40

the board, candidate or political party as required

under Section 23 hereof.

f. Any person declared a nuisance candidate as

defined under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg.

881, or is otherwise disqualified, by final and

executory judgment, who continues to

misrepresent himself, or holds himself out, as a

candidate, such as by continuing to campaign

thereafter, and/or other public officer or private

individual, who knowingly induces or abets such

misrepresentation, by commission or omission,

shall be guilty of an election offense and subject

to the penalty provided in Section 264 of the same

Code.

Sec. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-

Selling. - The presentation of a complaint for violations of

paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses

at testing to the offer or promise by or of the voter's

acceptance of money or other consideration from the

relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be

sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately

conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly

authorized legal officers, under Section 68 or Section 265

of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Proof that at least one voter in different precincts

representing at least twenty percent (20%) of the total

precincts in any municipality, city or province has been

offered, promised or given money, valuable consideration

or other expenditure by a candidate's relatives, leaders

and/or sympathizers for the purpose of promoting the

election of such candidate, shall constitute a disputable

presumption of a conspiracy under paragraph (b)

of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Where such proof affects at least twenty percent (20%) of

the precincts of the municipality, city or province to which

the public office aspired for by the favored candidate

relates, the same shall constitute a disputable

presumption of the involvement of such candidate and of

his principal campaign managers in each of the

municipalities concerned, in the conspiracy.

The giver, offeror, and promisor as well as the solicitor,

acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in

paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any

person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who

voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any

violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding

shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the

offenses with reference to which his information and

testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing

herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution

for perjury or false testimony.

Sec. 29. Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre-

elections Acts. - If it should no longer be reasonably

possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by

law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix

other periods and dates in order to ensure

accomplishment of the activities so voters shall not be

deprived of their right of suffrage.

Sec. 30. Effect ivity of Regulations and Orders of the

Commission. - The rules and regulations promulgated by

the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after

their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two

(2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the

Philippines.

Orders and directives issued by the Commission shall be

furnished by personal delivery to all parties concerned

within forty-eight (48) hours from date of issuance and

shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof unless a

later date is expressly specified in such orders or

directives.

Sec. 31. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders,

rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent

herewith are deemed repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 32. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any

section or provision of this Act, or any part thereof, or the

application of such section, provision or portion is declared

invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder thereof shall not

be affected by such declaration.

Sec. 33. Effect ivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its

approval.

Approved: January 5, 1988. d — now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation

— that the lease contract should have been annulled along with the four other contracts because it lacks mutuality, among others.

Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is

claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the cont ract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left

to the will of one of them." ISSUE: Was the contract between Wong and Justina

Santos enforceable? HELD: No. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot

be sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period was valid, so was an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is

granted Philippine citizenship. But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an

option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it became clear that

the arrangement was a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divested himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus

fruendi and jus abutendi ) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi ) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It was just as if today the possession is

transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien.

And yet this was just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow

concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.













41

The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the

land subject-matter of the contracts was ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

REPUBLIC V. QUASHA FACTS: Respondent William H. Quasha, an American

citizen, acquired by purchase a parcel of land with permanent improvements thereon locates at 22 Molave Place, Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of

Rizal. The said property had an area of 2,616 sq. m., described in and covered by TCT No. 36862. Quasha filed this petition claiming that his ownership of the properties in

question, made possible through the Parity Amendment between the USA and the Philippines which grants to US citizens the right to acquire lands in the Philippines,

continues notwithstanding the termination of the effectivity of the Amendment.

Petitioner Republic, on the other hand, contended that the land acquired by respondent is a private agricultural land, and that Quasha’s ac uisition of such violates Sec. , Art.

XIII of the (1935) Constitution. Such argument is based upon the express provision in the Parity Amendment which only extended the right of aliens to acquire and utilize

lands only to public lands (agricultural, timber and mineral lands of public domain). Despite such argument, the CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Quasha,

holding that his acquisition of the said private agricultural land is valid.

ISSUE: W/n res ondent’s ac uisition of the ro erty in question is valid despite his status as an alien.

HELD: No. The Court, upon examination of the Parity Amendment, found that the same only establishes an express exception on two provision of the (1935)

Constitution, to wit: (a) Sec. 1, Art. XIII, regarding disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of agricultural, timber and mineral lands of public domain and

other natural resources of the Philippines; and (b) Sec. 8, Art. XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. Moreover, the Court reiterated that in cases of laws such as the

Parity Amendment, the same shall be given a strict construction. Since the said Amendment merely extended the right in question to Americans with respect to public

lands, the said Amendment could not be further construed to mean that they can also do the same to private lands such as the property in question.

Furthermore, Quasha’s argument that S citizens are always qualified to acquire lands via the 1935 Constitution

is untenable, for that a provision of the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 17), which is re-enforced by Sec. 127 of the Public Land Act of 1936 (CA

141) provides that such rights of non-Filipinos only exist during the existence of the Commonwealth and before the Republic of the Philippines is established. Therefore, it

is clear that US citizens can only acquire and utilize lands of public domain via the implementation of the Parity Amendment.

HULST V. PR BUILDERS FACTS: Petitioner Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his

spouse, both Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with respondent PR Builders, Inc., for the purchase of

a 210-s . m. residential unit in res ondent’s townhouse

project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney’s fees efore the Housing and Land

se Regulatory Board H RB u on res ondent’s failure to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995. The complaint was then decided in favor of

Hulst, which was followed upon by a Writ of Execution issued on August 21, 1997.

Pursuant to a subsequent Alias Writ of Execution, the Sherrif levied on res ondent’s arcels of land. he respondent then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of

Levy on the ground that the Sherrif made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P 6,500 per sq. m. is P 83,616,000 which is

over and above the judgment award. The said levy was then set aside pursuant to an Order.

ISSUE: W/n petitioner should be entitled to recovery despite the Contract to Sell he entered into with respondent is void for violating the Constitutional

prohibition against aliens owning real property in the Philippines.

HELD: Yes. Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits aliens from owning lands in the Philippines, thus the Contract to Sell between Hulst and PR Builders is void

pursuant to Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code. However, void contracts such as the one in the present case are subject to exceptions, in the case at bar being

provided in Article 1414 of the Civil Code. Such exception allows a party to recover whatever he lost provided that the illegal purpose of the void contract has not yet been

accomplished. It is important to take note that the contract in question is a

Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale. Therefore ownership is not transferred to the alien (Hulst) yet, and as an effect no illegal purpose has been accomplished.

Article 1414 therefore finds application in the instant case. In view of this, petitioner is entitled to recover what he has

paid, but only with respect to the amount of P 3,187,500 which was the purchase price paid to PR Builders. Petitioner is not entitled to damages, interests, and

attorney’s fees since the contract which is the source of such is void. In addition, he is required to return to respondent the excess of what he received from the levy

pursuant to the principle against unjust enrichment.

FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO vs. JOAQUIN TENG

QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN,

ROSARIO TAN HUA ING, and TO O. HIAP FACTS:

Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's action for annulment of contract with damages.In 1938, petitioner

Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein respondents — his widow, To O.

Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons,

Joaquin, became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale, whereby

the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.


42

On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the

heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.

ISSUE: Whether the heirs are not allowed to inherit the land owned by Tan Tai because the sale of the land to him

violated the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. HELD: Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an

answer to the complaint, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of

(a) Lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto with the vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine citizen;

(b) Laches; and (c) Acquisitive prescription.

The court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two grounds invoked by the movants.Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the

sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property, of respondent

Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own land. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer

owned by a disqualified vendee. Laches also militates against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale only on

July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the cited Sarsosa case applies with equal force to the petitioner.

it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction of inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred

from asserting her claim to the litigated property. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the right ful owner of the property.The appealed order is affirmed.

ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,

Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated

as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee

Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring

ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land.

Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.

RULING:

The sale of the land in question was consummated

sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save i n cases of

hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this

case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to ac uire and own such land. “If land is invalidly

transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the

transferee is rendered valid.” SC sets aside the order of reconstitution of title.

MATHEWS VS TAYLOR

FACTS: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A.

Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from

Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The

sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Ben amin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the

property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of

Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Ben amin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special

Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect

to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the

Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner

thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by

Joselyn without his Ben amin’s consent, Ben amin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.

Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and cou led with the fact that he was Joselyn’s hus and; any

transaction involving said property required his consent. ISSUE: W/N an alien husband can nullify a lease contract

entered into by his Filipina wife bought during their marriage. NO

HELD: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized

exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through

another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional


43

provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a

particular pro erty e declared as art of their father’s estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another; that an

im lied trust e declared in their aliens’ favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring

private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated

“vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said ro erty, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Ben amin’s claim that he rovided the funds for

such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and

no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to

question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of

conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,

this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the

Constitution does not permit him to have.

KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS G.R. NO. L-630.

NOVEMBER 15, 1947

FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December

1941. The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the

grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land,

being an alien. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in

the Philippines. HELD: No. Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about

the conservation and utilization of natural resources. The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and

fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that

in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.

Hence, “ u lic agricultural land” was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands (except by

hereditary succession). (ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION PARA MAS

MAINTINDIHAN) The Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of

land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for

agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the

fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and

that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be

presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well -known classification and its

technical meaning then prevailing. Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing

in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the

adoption of the Constitution. It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No.

141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,

industrial and for other purposes. Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution

classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of

Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,

therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that

the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our

Supreme Court in much subsequent case. Residential, commercial, or industrial lots forming part of

the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity; therefore, they must be classified as

agricultural. It is thus clear that the three great departments of the

Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that

agricultural lands include residential lots. Scope of Private Agricultural Lands

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to

individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into

aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming

private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to

insure the policy of nationalization c ontained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It

must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same


44

persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or

hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The subject matter of both sections is the same, namely,

the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to

"agricultural land under section 5. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as

not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses

for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,

industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are

not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General 's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied

in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests,

and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that

nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)

Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death

or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time

we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of

foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Approval of R.A. No. 133

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private

real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a

consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residential or

commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the

constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have

been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress

that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the

constitutional prohibition. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely

excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the

Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary

rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino

citizenship is not impossible to acquire. For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution

aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLAR vs VICTORIANO T. CUENCO,

G.R. No. L-33048. April 16, 1982

FACTS: The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern

side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province).

The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio

Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, who were Filipino citizens.

Epifania who was then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po who later took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits of the property.

Ong King Po later litigated the property to Victoriano Cuenco, a naturalized Filipino who immediately took

possession of the property. Epifania later usurped the controverted property who later

sold one-half of the property to Pacita Vallar. Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the

property as it was only to evidence her indebtedness to Ong King Po.

Cuenco then filed a case for Forcible Entry against Epifania before the MTC which was later dismissed since the question of possession could not be properly

determined without first settling the issue on ownership. Cuenco later filed a case in the CFI for recovery of

possession and ownership of the said land. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Epifania and Vallar.

The CA later reversed the Decision decreeing instead that Cuenco was the owner of the litigated property.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property? CUENCO.

HELD: No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed to aliens.

There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning, because it was a

contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.

Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land.


45

But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property

is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own

the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.

While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is

likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred

from asserting her claim to the litigated property. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the right ful

owner of the property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALVES

G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989

FACTS:

The case principally concerns Chua Kim Uy @ Teng Be, who became a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1977.

Chua Kim was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. When Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, his adopted son Chua

Kim, took possession of the properties acquired by him in 1934.

Chua Kim filed a petition for the issuance of confirmation and registration of title of the lots to his name. His petition was granted by the CFI of Quezon.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged the correctness of the Order and

appealed it to the Court of Appeals. However, CA affirmed R C’s ruling. Hence this appeal.

Respondent contended that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to his taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January

7, 1977, at a time when he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines (ART XIII, SEC. 5, 1935 Constitution; ART. XIV, Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution);

hence, his asserted titles are null and void. ISSUE: WON the registration of the lots under the name of

Chua Kim was valid. YES HELD:

Conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization is valid

Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding

the title to the property in controversy, in line with this Court's rulings relative to persons similarly situated.

In Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547, for instance, the ruling was as follows:

...The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was

constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing

petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the

hands of a qualified person. The lots in question were conveyed to Gregorio Reyes

Uy Un in December 1934, so 1935 constitution is not applicable Plainly, the conveyances were made before the 1935

Constitution went into effect, i.e., at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by aliens.

Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not

at all affected either: by the principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935

Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in the country, since that constitutional principle has no ret rospective application, or

by his and his successor's omission to procure the registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of

the Constitution. Chua Kim acquired the lots through succession in

1946 Since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso,

Quezon, in 1946, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner, as the putative heir of his adoptive father without protest

whatever from any person. Note: Chua Kim because a naturalized Filipino citizen only

on January 1977. It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the

property in concept of owner, and his status as adopted son of Gregorio Reyes, that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI at

Calauag, Quezon, at the instance of the original parties thereto, 22 and his participation in the Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. As already

mentioned, that compromise agreement, approved by judgment rendered on July 29, 1970, implicity recognized Chua Kim's title to the lands in question.

SOCORRO VASQUEZ vs.LI SENG GIAP and LI SENG GIAP & SONS

CASE: G.R. No. L-3676, January 31, 1955

FACTS: Vasquez sold and t ransferred to Li Seng Giap, then

Chinese citizen, a parcel of land together with a house in Tondo, Manila.

In 1940: Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese citizens, the property, together with the

improvements thereon, and duly registered under a TCT. Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on

1941, Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67 per cent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and

duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own, acquire or dispose of real properties.


46

Vasquez filed an action to rescind the sale on the ground

that the Li Seng Giap was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands.

The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with cost against Vasquez.

ISSUE: WON Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is allowed to acquire the property. YES.

HELD: The subsequent naturalization of Giap and transfer to a Filipino corporation cured the defect.

The majority of the Court has ruled that in Sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and

the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.

Vasquez argued that if at the time of the conveyance of the real property Giap was incapable of holding title to

such real estate, the contract of sale was null or void and may be annulled, and his subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the

conveyance to make it lawful and valid. However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only

agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or

purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The

title to the parcel of land of the Giap, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also

be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos.

Action for annulment not Rescission The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the

old Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II,

on nullity of contracts, based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages.

ONG CHING PO versus COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN

G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994

FACTS: Spouses Soledad Parian and Ong Yee bought a parcel of

land in Fundidor Street, San Nicolas from Ong Joi Jong. The transfer was in a notarized Deed of Sale and was also registered (Exhibit A). Subsequently, Ong Yee died.

Soledad filed unlawful detainer against her brother-in-law Ong Ching Po contending that she entrusted the

administration of the house to Ong Ching Po while the spouses were residing in Ilo-ilo but when her husband Ong Yee died, she asked Ong Ching Po to leave the house.

On the other hand, Ong Ching Po filed an action of reconveyance and damages against Soledad contending

that he has the right over the land becaus e Ong Joi Jong sold it to him. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit B) presented by

Ong Ching Po says that the reason why the title is

constituted in the name of Soledad was that Ong Ching Po was not yet a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE: Which of the two Deed of Sales has more probative value? (Soledad Parian’s or Ong Ching Po’s)

HELD: It is the Deed of Sale in favor of Soledad Parian that must be given value. We cannot go along with the claim that

petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was

disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real

property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

On the other hand, the Deed of Sale presented by Soledad Parian is duly notarized document.

Other issues: Was the sale made with due consideration? Yes it

appears that the price for the land was paid out of Soledad Parian and Ong Yee’s con ugal funds. Such transaction is a common practice in Filipino-family affairs.

Was there delivery? Yes. Even though there was no physical possession of the spouses because they were

residing in Ilo-ilo, under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the

delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of

German descent. He is an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started

engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without

obtaining a divorce.

Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night

spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met respondent Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City.

Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where

she found employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. Alfred followed Ederlina to the Philippines where they cohabited together in a common-law relationship.

During the period of their common-law relationship, Alfred acquired in the Philippines real and personal properties valued more or less at P724,000.00.


47

Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified

from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear in the deeds of sale as the buyer of the real properties, as well as in the title covering

the same.

Alfred and Ederlina's relationship deteriorated. Alfred wrote Ederlina's father complaining that Ederlina had

taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased

with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during

their coverture.

Alfred filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance,

declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ederlina.

Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to recover the property.

HELD:

No. The Supreme affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals. According to the Court, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty

than the respondent. Petitioner is fully aware that he wasdisqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the properties in

question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, he had the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof.

Being a party to an illegal contract, petitioner cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out because one who loses his money or property

by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To allow petitioner to recover the

properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.

MULLER v. MULLER G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a

house owned y res ondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.

By this time, respondent had inherited the house in

Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a

house amounting to P2,300,000.00.

The Antipolo property was registered in the name of

petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.

Due to incom ati ilities and res ondent’s alleged

womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for

separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision

which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and

ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo

property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot rec over his funds because the

property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which

rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,

and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered etitioner’s ownershi over the ro erty in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of

Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of

the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.

HELD:

No. Respondent was aware of the constitutional

prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said

prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust

was created and resulted by operation of law in view of etitioner’s marriage to res ondent. Save for the e ce tion provided in cases of hereditary success ion, res ondent’s

disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in t rust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an

existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the

constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has

been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks

equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of

equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Further, the distinction made between transfer of

ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile


48

e ercise on res ondent’s art. To allow reimbursement

would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.

DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS

vs. HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983

FACTS:

Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap who was then a Chinese national. After the lapse of nearly fi fteen years

from and after the execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen and allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines.

On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major portion of a lot which he acquired by purchase under the

deed of sale in favor of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the naturalization of his

father Donato Reyes Yap.

Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of respondent Jose A. Rico, son of maximino Rico, sold

the remaining portion of that lot to the petitioner who had his rights.

Donato Reyes Yap, has been in possession of the lots in

question since 1939, openly, publicly, continuously, and adversely in the concept of owner until the present time.

ISSUE: WON the sale of residential lot in question to a

Chinese national is null and void in spite of the fact that the vendee had been a naturalized born Filipino citizen.

HELD:

The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally

qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of

a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons:

... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural

but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be

thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.

VICENTE GODINEZ vs. FONG PAK LUEN G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983

FACTS:

The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to defendant Fong Pak Luen.

Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant

Trinidad S. Navata.

Navata was aware of and with full knowledge that Fong

Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not

acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non-existent.

The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of

Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale

executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that

under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of

action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year period provided by law.

The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but was denied.

ISSUE: WON the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.

HELD:

No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no

necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or

merely prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument

based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.

As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property.

Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.

LEE VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. 128195

October 3, 2001 FACTS:

Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.

In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of

title of the lot. (Alleging that the transfer certi ficate of title issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed during World War II.)

Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun


49

Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the

lot. The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or destroyed

certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description.

Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the RTC decision alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since

their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.

CA declared the reconstitution void. Hence this petition.

Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their

predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong. They also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the

land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void;

otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.

ISSUES: WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the

Philippines. NO WON the reconstitution was valid. NO

HELD: Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee Liong

was disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the

effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.

Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire

private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction. It was still

contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain.

The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the

Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not

barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State.

The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the

land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently

their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino

citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands

of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy

violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.

“If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and

the title of the transferee is rendered valid. ” Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified

Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands

has been achieved. Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the

original certi ficate of title must e ased on an owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.

Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and

technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely nothing

to support it is void. As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the

re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed

title. Any change in the ownership of the property must be the

subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

The SC Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the CA.

JG SUMMIT V. CA

G.R. No. 124293 January 31, 2005

FACTS: January 27, 1997 - the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government

corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the construction, operation and

management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc. (SNS) which subsequently became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, the

NIDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330 million for the capitalization of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40% respectively.

One of its salient features is the grant to the parties of the right of first refusal should either of them decide to

sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture. November 25, 1986 - NIDC transferred all its rights, title

and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank (PNB).


50

As a result of a quasi-reorganization of PHILSECO to settle its huge obligations to PNB, the National Government's shareholdings in PHILSECO increased to

97.41% thereby reducing KAWASAKI's shareholdings to 2.59%. After a series of negotiations between the APT and

KAWASAKI, they agreed that the latter's right of first refusal under the JVA be "exchanged" for the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest bid for the said shares.

They further agreed that KAWASAKI would be entitled to name a company in which it was a stockholder, which could exercise the right to top.

On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI informed APT that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to

top. JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, one of the bidders objected to this right to top agreement.

CONTENTION OF JG SUMMIT: That a shipyard like PHILSECO is a public utility whose

capitalization must be sixty percent (60%) Filipino-owned.

Consequently, the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the sale of the 87.67% equity of the National Government

in PHILSECO is illegal — not only because it violates the rules on competitive bidding — but more so, because it allows foreign corporations to own more than 40%

equity in the shipyard. ISSUE:

WON KAWASAKI had a valid right of first refusal over PHILSECO shares under the JVA, considering that PHILSECO owned land until the time of the bidding and

KAWASAKI already held % of PHI S CO’s e uity. YES!

HELD: The right of first refusal is a property right of PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI and NIDC, under

the terms of their JVA. This right allows them to purchase the shares of their co-shareholder before they are offered to a third party. The agreement of co-shareholders to

mutually grant this right to each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino

corporations. As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if PHILSECO still owns

land, the right of first refusal can be validly assigned to a qualified Filipino entity in order to maintain the 60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by itself, does not amount to a violation

of the Anti-Dummy Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent intent. The transfer could be made either to a nominee or such other party which the holder of the right of first refusal

feels it can comfortably do business with. Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings,

in which case KAWASAKI, in exercising its right of first refusal, can e ceed % of PHI S CO’s e uity. In fact, it can even be said that if the foreign shareholdings of a

landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign stockholders’ ownershi of the shares which is adversely affected but the capacity of the corporation to own land–

that is, the corporation becomes disqualified to own land. This finds support under the basic corporate law principle that the corporation and its stockholders are separate

juridical entities.

In this vein, the right of first refusal over shares pertains to

the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains to the corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their

right of first refusal. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares

in a landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.

REGISTER OF DEEDS RIZAL VS. UNG SUI SI TEMPLE G.R. No. L-6776

May 21, 1955

FACTS: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to

accept for record a deed of donation executed in due form by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal in favor of the

unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese

nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.

When elevated, the lower court upheld the decision by saying that appearing from the record that UNG SIU SI

TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that

in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to

corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and

the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for

registration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose

founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.

HELD: NO. The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious

associations. The Constitution provides that “Save in cases of

hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold

lands of the u lic domain in the Phili ines.” Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2

of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum

of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).

The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations


51

allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural

resources shall be controlled by Filipinos. The fact that the appellant religious organization has

no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the

sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by

Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. To permit

religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings

in this country.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO VS.

LRC

G.R. NO. L-8451 DECEMBER 20, 1957

FACTS: Mateo Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of Davao City, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in Davao City

in favour of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. (RCAAD Inc.). RCAAD, Inc. is a corporation sole organized in accordance with Philippine laws, with

Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian national, as actual incumbent (or administrator).

The Register of Deeds (ROD) Davao required the said corporation to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members thereof are Filipino Citizens for

purposes of registration. In the required affidavit, RCAADI Inc. said that the totality of the Catholic Population of Davao would become the owner of the property bought to

be registered. ROD eing dou t ful as to the ‘registera ility’ of the

land, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commission (LRC).

After proper hearing, LRC rendered a resolution holding that the vendee RCAADI Inc. was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of

conformity to the constitutional requirement of at least 60% of the capital, property, or assets belonging to a Filipino Citizen, as postulated under Sections 1 and 5 of Article 8

of the Constitution. That it is not owned by the Filipino Citizens but rather the only incumbent Msgr. Thibault who is a Canadian Citizen, hence, the denial of

registration of the subject property to ROD Davao. A motion for reconsideration was filed but later denied.

Subsequently, an action for mandamus before the SC is filed.

RCAAD Inc. alleges that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner is qualified to acquire private lands for the

establishment and maintenance of places of worship. That by acquiring private lands, the petitioner is not considered the owner but rather a mere administrator.

That there are more than 80% of Filipino Citizens who are Roman Catholic in Davao as er the Bureau of Census’ records which signifies that the mentioned constitutional

requirement has been fully satisfied.

On the other hand, respondent averred that though the

petitioner does not own the land, yet he has control over the same. With full power to administer, alienate, encumber, and sell or dispose of thereby exercising all

rights of ownership on the property. Also, respondents say that a conglomeration of people cannot just be pointed out as the recipient beneficiaries of the Catholic

Church. This set-up, according to the petitioners, falls short of trust.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner RCAADI Inc. is qualified to own private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution? YES

HELD: Under the circumstances of the present case, it is

safe to state that even before the establishment of the Phil. Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole (special form of corporation usually

associated with clergy)then organized and registered had by express provision of law, the Corporation Law or Public Act No. 1459, the necessary power and qualification to

purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry. A corporation sole is created not only to administer church

properties but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office.

That the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church of the Constitution has no nationality and did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided

that 60% of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino Citizens.

Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended for corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not be regulated or restricted by said provision.

Corporation soles cannot be considered aliens because they have no nationality at all. In determining, therefore,

whether the constitutional provision requiring 60 % Filipino capital is applicable to corporations sole, the nationality of the constituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of

the actual incumbent of the parish, must be taken into consideration. In the case at bar, even i f the question of nationality be considered, the aforementioned

constitutional requirement is fully met and satisfied considering that the corporation sole in question (RCAAD Inc.) is composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.

With these, the LRC resolution which holds that the petitioner corporation sole is not qualified to acquire

private land is hereby reversed. The ROD is ordered to register the deed of sale subject of the litigation.

UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES,

as owner of BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL vs. HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, as

Presiding Judge of the CFI of Davao del Norte, and

MELENCIO B. DELENA and MAURO GEMENTIZA as Co-Executors of the Testate Estate of DAVID,

Jacobson, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:


52

David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a

resident of the Philippines for more than thirty years and up to the time of his death in 1970. He left a will in which he "devised and bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial

Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under Philippine law in 1948. This corporation was the

registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan Davao del Norte, with a total area of about 445 hectares acquired by virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 1953.

Judge Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the ground that it was in effect an alienation of private

agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the Constitution of 1935. The finding was that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by the

United Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM) which was a non-stock corporation organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state

legislature of Massachussets . The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of

the 1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners, including Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands in this country except only by hereditary succession.

United Church came to this Court, contending that the constitutional provisions were not applicable because the

object of the legacy was not land but shares of stocks. Moreover, even assuming that what was really involved was a transfer of land, the petitioner was nonetheless

qualified to acquire it under the provisions of the Parity Amendment and the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the legacy was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution and did not come under any of the allowed exceptions. During the

protracted exchange of pleadings among the parties, however, certain events transpired to considerably change the original situation and, consequently, also the position

of government. The documents submitted in this case that at the time the

will was executed in 1966, the land on which the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was situated was already registered in the name of the Mindanao District

Conference, an affiliate of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (PUCC).

It was this non-stock corporation,

organized in 1949 under Philippine law with a 100%

Filipino membership, that owned and was operating the Hospital at the time of Jacobson's death. Later, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself incorporated as a

charitable institution, with Filipinos constituting the majority of its membership, and on December 16,1970, became the successor-in-interest of the UCCP to the devised

parcel of land. To prove these Brokenshire presented the articles of

incorporation of the UCCP and the Hospital and their corresponding certificates of registration issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the licenses issued

by the Board of Medical Sciences for the operation of the Hospital to the UCCP from 1968 to 1972 and to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. from 1973 to 1974,

and the certi ficate of title over the subject land in the name of the "Mindanao District Conference, commonly known as the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital."

These facts were not brought earlier to the attention of the probate court by the former counsel of the Hospital, Atty.

Juan V. Faune for reasons that do not appear in the record. It was for such omission (the new counsel would

call it "misrepresentation") that Atty. Faune was replaced

by Atty. Rodolfo D. de la Cruz, who disavowed his predecessor's representations. At any rate, the above-stated documents have now made it clear that the United

Church for Christ in the Philippines and not the United Church Board for World Ministries was the owner o f the Hospital at the time of the execution of the win in 1966 and

of the testator's death in 1970. It is also not disputed that such ownership passed to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital itself upon its incorporation in 1970 when it thus

became the proper party-in-interest to claim the property directly devised by Jacobson to it.

ISSUE: May Brokenshire be registered as the owner? YES

HELD: Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will

and that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in the will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire

Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a ctitizen,

the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, where a

Filipino citizen sold her land to an alien who later sold it to a Filipino, we held that the invalidity of the initial transfer to the alien was corrected by the subsequent transfer of the

property to a citizen. A similar ruling was made in Godinez v. Fong Pak

Luen, involving a similar set of facts, where we also cited

Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap, and Herrera v. Luy King

Guan. In Yap v. Maravillas,

we validated the sale of

agricultural land to an alien who, after the purchase, was naturalized as a Filipino and so became qualified to acquire it. The facts were slightly different in De Castro v.

Teng, where, upon the death of an alien who had purchased a residential lot, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial partition of his estate and transferred the land

to one of his sons who was a naturalized Filipino. We also sustained the sale.

WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is hereby substituted for the United Church Board for World Ministries as petitioner in this case and DECLARED to be

qualified to accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson. The petition as thus modified is GRANTED. The order of the respondent judge dated December 9, 1971, and his

Resolution dated December 9, 1971, are SET ASIDE. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA,

ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ

CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased)

represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and

children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y. GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon

City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief,


53

Division of Original Registration, Land Registration

Commission, Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondents. PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that

12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Jose Gomez et al – her heirs. The heirs

agreed to divide the property among them. After notice and publication, and there being no opposition

to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision ad udicating the su ect lots in Gomez et al’s favor. he

decision became final and executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) to issue the corresponding decrees of registration

over the lots adjudicated. GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and

petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under

the law, land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverio’s recommendation.

Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has

become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certi ficate of

title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not to set aside the lower court’s initial

ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had became final and executory. YES

2. Whether or not the respondents Acting Land

Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but to

issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so

being purely ministerial. NO HELD:

1. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after

the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the

Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the

decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

2. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land

registration officials to issue the decree is purely

ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the

data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point

in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree,

it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the

court. They are specifically called u on to “e tend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration roceedings .”

REPUBLIC V NILLAS G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007

FACTS: On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of

Negros Oriental rendered a decision, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who

had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,

upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration.

One of these lots was adjudicated to

Eugenia Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion.

illas’ arents, Sera ion and Josefina A. A ierra, y way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, acquired the said lot through

various purchases they effected from the Eugenia and her heirs between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale

all in favor of the Spouses Abierra. In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from her parents through a

Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision, no decree of registration has ever been issued. Thus, Nillas sought the

revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration.

On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the

Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision. On appeal, the

Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by

motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases.

In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land

registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of

action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion

within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.

ISSUE:


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WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a

judgment in a land registration case. NO (What is the nature of duty to issue Decree? Ministerial.)

HELD: NO, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and instead affirmed the assailed rulings of the lower courts.

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary

proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in

ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land,

consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating

such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and

the LRA to issue, the decree of registration. The Republic observes that the Property Registration

Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory

fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied

in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place.

Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever

is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on

the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court

(that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the

decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and

thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the

land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and

definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had

attained finality would simply frustrate such goal. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property

Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective,

the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or

enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within

which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or

enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission;

failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom

the land is ordered to be registered. Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for

pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that arred su se uent attacks to the ad udicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic submits that

said decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We dou t that a final decision’s status as res

judicata is the impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case

altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Re u lic’s arguments on this oint do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still

susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and

the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas

needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in

the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors -in interest. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and

the Republic does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL

SANTOS, JR., petitioners,

vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent. PANGANIBAN, J:

FACTS: Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which

was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.

However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.

The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued.

Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as

a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by


55

the petitioners, it would result in the duplication of titles

over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus

to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certi ficate of title? NO

HELD: NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no

jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land

would be null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to

register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of

registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the

LRA to issue a decree of registration. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the

judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held inValmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable:

Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done

before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,

the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227,

234: Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of

registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires

trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions

can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final

decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such

duties (Administrative Code, section 177). Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared

by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that

said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function

and not an administrative one . Indeed, it is well -settled that the issuance of such decree

is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only

when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and

complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear

legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical

questions will be dis regarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.

A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot

be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. The court has to decide a question according

to its own judgment and understanding of the law. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree

of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with

finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of

this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the

court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such

report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of

registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.

HEIRS OF MANUEL ROXAS VS CA

FACTS: Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration

of two parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by

Zenaida Melliza as vendor who bought the property from Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26,

1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.

Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna while Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not

notified because she was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly.

After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case.

On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon

but no decision has been made. February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Consequently

RTC issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after it ordered the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon dismissed.


56

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being

asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed

a petition for review before the RTC to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging that her

signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant,

occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing

RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud and dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. CA affirmed the findings of

R C, ruling that Ro as’ failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a

judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun Corporation to warrant the reopening and the setting aside

of the registration decree? HELD:

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by Roxas.

Actual Fraud; Defined.

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or

positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is

construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual

design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts

constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case

to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the

controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of

registration reopened and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional

omission of fact required by law.

Intentional Omission of Name

In the corporation's application for registration filed with the RTC only the following names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found that

the some words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid.

However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differently-

worded application for the petition to review the application of the Ro as’ where in instead of PRO I CIA ROAD, the name ROXAS appeared.The discrepancy which is

unexplained appears intentional. It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead

the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed

the basis for the LRA in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full

names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Maguesun

Corporation failed to comply with this requirement.

Possession in OCENO

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that the subject

land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Maguesun Corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of

such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned

the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants

could have been made facilely. Maguesun Corporation intentional concealment and

re resentation of Ro as’ interest in the su ect lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of

registration.

Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas Mention of the late President 's name as well as that of Trinidad was made principally in the Formal Offer of

Exhibits for Maguesun Corporations tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the

application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the

application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their

opposition or claims.

Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing

While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an

indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible"

so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected,

the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.

Forgery and Discrepancies

A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed


57

attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of

respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun

Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.

The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents executed by

Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the penmanship

of elderly persons. The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to

the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities

are too glaring to have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning

herself and her family. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

HEIRS OF ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997

FACTS:

On July 2, 1990, Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an

Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale

dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property

from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990

and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.

Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds

Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to 3 parties on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was

not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made. After an Order of general default

was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that

the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered

thereon. Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional

Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration.

Consequently, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration

Case applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon

Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.

Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun

Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, and that her

family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they

applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and

that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents

to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant,

occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial

Hearing. As a result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petion for review of the registration may be granted.

HELD:

YES. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and

codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible

until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the

decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Absence, minority or other disability of any person

affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of

land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a

valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed

within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or

concealment of a material fact. 19

Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even

though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.


58

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is

regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated

therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining

not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of

registration reopened and reviewed. The " fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional

omission of fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been

controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the

original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.

Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property.

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun Corporation also

declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property.

Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud

justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving

their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.

TIONGCO vs. DE LA MERCED G.R. No. L-24426 July 25, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioner Tiongco and the other claimants of the lots in

question were deprived of their rights without due process of law, through the fraudulent machinations of deputy clerk of court Pascual Cando. There was in that case a

pronouncement by this Court, that even if a decree in a cadastral proceeding is infected with nullity in view of a clear denial of procedural due process, still an innocent

purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is protected. The best that could be is to stress what was considered its obiter aspect. That does

not suffice, for the reference to the rights vested in an innocent purchaser for value is based on express statutory language, allowing the filing of a petition for review within

one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

ISSUE:

Whether under the circumstance of there being an

innocent purchaser for value, there could still be a review of a decree of registration?

HELD:

No. A decree of registration secured through fraud is valid, although annulable, upon petition filed within one (1) year

after entry of the decree, in the absence of an innocent purchaser for value, whereas a decision rendered without notice to the parties of record is void for lack of due

process .... Indeed, acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain o f nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same

flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary not withstanding." Nonetheless, the next paragraph was explicit on the point that the

reopening on the ground of fraud was predicated on "no innocent purchaser for value [being] injured thereby." Thus: "Now then, if a decree issued in pursuance of

a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within (1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same, if entered in compliance with a

decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, for want of due process, may be reviewed, set aside and cancelled upon petition filed within the same period, provided that no innocent purchaser for value will be injured thereby.

ESCONDE vs.DELFIN G.R. No. L-67583, July 31, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the "Application for Registration of Title". The application was

granted in a "Decision", and private respondent received copy thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by an OCT .On February 13, 1978 said private

respondent Ramon filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde.The petitions filed a motion to quash which was then denied.

On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to

private respondent and the same was granted in the Order of November 21, 1983.

Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash

and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil action for reconveyance.

ISSUE: May the action for reconveryance prosper?

HELD:

An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable

remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer

or reconvey the land to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens


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System from bringing an action, after one year from the

issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set

aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil

action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the right ful owner.

Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As earlier stated, there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of

title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within

which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner.

Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyance had already

prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to

have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title.

MARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998

FACTS:

During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and

Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1)

Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.

Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No. 47572,

1wherein the constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole

ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350

2 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.

Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr.

executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1)

petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a result of the donation,

TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in private respondents' name.

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned

about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective shares

over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners' demands.

In view of the private respondents' indifference,

petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial court alleging that both the

"Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents.

In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of limitations since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.

HELD:

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are

her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire

property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.

As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or

another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of

certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. Constructive t rusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.

They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in equity and good

conscience, to hold. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of Appeals?

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance

based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive

period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or

approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

ARGUELLES VS TIMBANCAYA

FACTS: Defendant Guillermo Timbancaya appeals

directly and on purely questions of law the decision of Palawan CFI. The trial court ruled that the property,

su ect of laintiff’s action for reconveyance and y virtue of a compromise agreement and judgment in Special Proceedings No. 211, was owned jointly one-half thereof

by Caridad Arguelles and the other half by Guillermo and Alberto Timbancaya.

During the special proceedings for Intestate Estate of Jose Arguelles, the court rendered a decision, in conformity with

a compromise agreement, adjudicating one half of the land


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to Arguelles and the other half to the im ancaya’s. It also

ordered both parties to pay for the coconut trees planted in their respective portions of the land, which they relinquish in favor of the other.

Contrary to the agreement and judgment in the special

proceedings however, Timbancaya was able to have the original certificate of title cancelled and have a new CT issued in his favor covering the whole land (June 5, 1961),

des ite Arguelles’ actual open and continuous possession of one half of the property even before the filing of the special proceedings.

Upon knowing the issuance of the TCT, Arguelles filed the

instant case for reconveyance (April 30, 1965). Timbancaya, for his part, alleges that Arguelles has no right to the property in question because she is not an heir

of the estate of the late Jose Arguelles despite the decision in the special proceedings.

ISSUE: W/N TCT had already become indefeasible, since almost four years have lapsed before action was filed

RULING: No. The rule that a decree of registration once

issued becomes final and incontrovertible 1 year after its issuance is not relevant to the case at bar.

Arguelles does not question the validity of the OCT but instead seeks the annulment of the TCT, which was

issued to Timbancaya after the judgment by compromise and based on his misrepresentation in the Register of Deeds. Timbancaya had claimed that he and his brother

are the e clusive owners of the ro erty as the “only legitimate children and surviving heirs of (their) parents Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes”—a

representation contrary to his previous admissions that “they are not the legitimate children of the deceased Spouses Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the

sons of Rufina de los Reyes with her first husband, Joa uin im ancaya.”

In this case, the action to annul the title or action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 55 of Act 496, which

rovides that “in all cases of registration rocured y fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice,

however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.” his remedy is distinct from that authorized by Section 38, which has for its purpose the

reopening of the decree of title, on the ground of fraud, within 1 year from its issuance. Judgment appealed from affirmed.

MAMUYAC VS ABENA

FACTS: Gregoria PIMENTEL was the owner of the 2

parcels of land in LA UNION she sold and conveyed on June 1, 1926, to Pedro ABENA. On January 27, 1927, Pimentel again sold and conveyed the same parcels to

Tiburcio MAMUYAC. The document of sale, in favor of Abena was duly

inscribed in the registry of property of the province on January 31, 1927, and from April, 1927, said parcels of land were declared for taxation in the name said Abena.

The document executed in favor of the Mamuyac on January 27, 1927, was neither inscribed in the registry of

property nor were the parcels of the land declared for

taxation in the name of the latter. Mamuyac instituted an action against Abena for the

recovery of the parcels of land but both trial court and CA favored Abena.

ISSUE: Who has better rights over the property. HOLDING: ABENA.

Alleged Contract of Mortgage in favor of Mamuyac Mamuyac contends that he has a better right over the

parcels of land involved because of possession claimed by him by virtue of an alleged private contract of mortgageexecuted in his favor on January 4, 1935. It is

sufficient answer to this contention that "in order that a mortgage may be deemed to be legally constituted, it is indispensable that the instrument in which it appears be a

public document and be recorded in the property register. Therefore, a mortgage in legal form was not constituted by said private document." Even were we to accord validity to

the mortgage, article 1473 of the Civil Code, invoked by him, applies only to the determination of presence between sale and sale.

Mamuyac’s alleged possession vs. Abena’s registered Deed of Sale

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, thatMamuyachad been in possession of said properties by reason of the alleged contract of mortgage executed in his

favor, on January 4, 1925, and were to accord legal effect to the document of sale of January 27, 1927, which was not recorded in the registry of property, still his right cannot

prevail over that of Abena who had duly registered his deed of sale. No actual delivery to Abena

Mamuyac’s contention that A ena s ownershi and preference over the property in question is not complete because of lack of material delivery of the possession to

him by the vendor is not well taken, for the reason that the execution of the public document of sale in favor of Abenais equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold.

CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES F. ARAGON vs. EMILIA E. DE LEGARE and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This is an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale and conveyance covering a parcel of land, together with

the improvements existing thereon, situated in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, and for damages.

Emilia E. de Legare, was the owner of a parcel of land, together with a residential house erected thereon, situated

at No. 146 Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal, her ownership being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253, issued by the Office of the

Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. This property was mortgage to a secure a loan in favor of Tomas Soriano which is properly annotated in the title.

At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953, while in her house an unknown man intruded into the

room, approached the plaintiff, covered her mouth, and, pressing a knife on her side, demanded that she give him P10,000.00 if she did not like to be killed. John Legare her


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adopted son concluded that, that man was a huk afraid of

their lives John had Emilia and their maid signed a piece of document. John said that the document is a letter concerning some compensation she was to recei ve from

the Veterans Administration. Since she could not read though she can wife signed the said paper and so as their made. After which John instructed them to pack up their

things and that they will live in a hotel for the meantime for safety reason.

After a month of staying in a hotel she Emilia decide to go back to her house and only to find out that there were already people living there.

It turned out that John had sold the property to herein petitioners. The piece of paper that she signed was a deed

of sale in favour of John. John had the title transferred to his name and

subsequently transferred to herein petitioner with full knowledge of the encumbrances and only after john had the title transferred to his name then the petitioner paid for

the purchase price. ISSUE:

Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value of the properties here contested? Yes

RULING: A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other persons has a

right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other

persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another.

It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no one would have questioned its authenticity

since it was duly acknowledged before a notary public. Moreover, even if the petitioners had the opportunity to compare the signature of the respondent on the deed of

conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the effort, nonetheless, would have been in vain since the respondent's signature on the document was admittedly

hers. Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the respondent, during the whole period of the negotiation, was nowhere available to confirm or deny the execution of

the deed. She was then in hiding, or, hidden, at the Windsor Hotel in Manila.

The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves could hardly have been wanting. The records show that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed

of sale in favor of John W. Legare and the fact that John had then in his possession the corresponding certi ficate of title of the registered owner. They demanded more. They

insisted that the sale in favor of John W. Legare be first registered and that the transfer in their favor be thereafter likewise registered. It was only after all these were

complied with that they paid the purchase price. In other words, the petitioner spouses relied not really on the documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on

the registerability of those documents. This in Our view, satisfies the measure of good faith contemplated by law.

Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which

he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a

nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands v. Addison,

49 Phil. 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of valid title. One such instance is

where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an

innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).

Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein respondent is herself not entirely free from blame. We note

that when John presented to her the document which turned out to be a bed of conveyance in his favor, she readily affixed her signature thereto upon the simple

representation of John that it was a document pertaining to her claim with the U.S. Veterans Administration. She could have asked her maid to read the contents of the same for

her and yet she did not. These, we believe, amount to a lack of prudence and precaution on the part of Mrs. Emilia de Legare.

GLORIA R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMY V. SUZARA and MANUEL R.

VIZCONDE, respondents.

FACTS: Gloria R. Cruz was the owner of Lot 10, BLK. 565, PSD-

38911, with an area of 747.7 square meters, together with the improvements thereon, situated at 22 Bituan St., Bgy. Doña Imelda, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 242553 in

her name; in 1977 she and respondent Romeo V. Suzara lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage; in September 1982, solely out of love and

affection for Suzara, she executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 10 in favor of Suzara without any monetary consideration; thereafter, Suzara registered the document

in his favor and used the property as collateral for a bank loan P350,000.00; he however failed to pay the loan so that after four (4) years the mortgage was foreclosed. She

paid the bank P40,638.88 to restructure the loan resulting in the extension of the redemption period to two (2) years. However, without her knowledge and before the expiration

of the extended period, Suzara redeemed the property. She tried to talk to him but he avoided her. Finally, to protect her interest, she executed an Affidavit of Adverse

Claim which she filed with the Register the Deeds of Quezon City asserting that her sale in favor of Suzara was null and void for lack of consideration and being contrary

to law and public policy. Moreover, the said property was already been sold by Suzara to Manuel Vizconde.

Petitioner contends that she and respondent Suzara were common-law husband and wife, the sale between them was void and inexistent, citing Art. 1490 of the Civil Code.

She argues that the consideration of "love, affection and accommodation" for the sale was not a valid cause for the conveyance of the property as there was no price paid in

money or its equivalent, and since her sale to Suzara was null and void the issue of its illegality cannot be waived or ratified; resultantly, the sale by Suzara to his co-

respondent Vizconde must also be declared null and void the latter being a purchaser in bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vizconde is a buyer in bad faith.

RULING: We cannot sustain petitioner. Although under Art. 1490 the


62

husband and wife cannot sell property to one another as a

rule which, for policy consideration and the dictates of morality require that the prohibition apply to common-law relationships, 4 petitioner can no longer seek

reconveyance of the property to her as it has already been acquired by respondent Vizconde in good faith and for value from her own transferee.

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certi ficate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the

property the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. 7 The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public

confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has

been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of the law. 8 Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the

certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. 9 Even if a decree in a

registration proceeding is infected with nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is protected. A purchaser in

good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at

the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person.

We cannot grant petitioner's prayer to have respondent Vizconde's certificate of title declared null and void. Neither can we order the reconveyance of the property to

petitioner. Vizconde being a purchaser of registered land for value in good faith holds an indefeasible title to the land. This is without prejudice however to any appropriate

remedy petitioner may take against her erstwhile common-law husband, respondent Suzara.

SPS. SONYA & ISMAEL MATHAY, JR. vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. TEODULFO & SYLVIA ATANGAN, SPS. AGUSTINA & AMOR POBLETE, SPS.

EDUARDO & FELICISIMA TIRONA

FACTS: A. Civil Case No. TM-175 (Spouses Atangan vs. Spouses

Mathay and RegisterDeeds of Cavite)- Involves two parcels of land (Lot No 2186-A and Lot No.

2186-C)covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT No. T-195350 and TCTNo. 195351) issued in the name of Spouses Atangan-

Sps. Atangan alleges that they are owners of two (2) parcels of landpurchased from Spouses Tomas Lucido

and Eustaquia Villanueva as evidenced by the deed of sale and by the Transfer Certificates issued. They immediately took possession of the same and paid the

corresponding realty taxes. Atagan alleges that the vendees’ titles were transferred to

them by virtue of a decision on the Civil case (Lucido vs Batallones and Petronilla Quimio, Director of Lands, and Registers of Deeds of Cavite).Batallones and Quimio, on

the other hand are the vendees of the lands from the Bureau of Lands.-

Sale of the parcel of lands in favor of the heirs of

Batallones and Quimio was evidenced by Deed of Conveyance duly issued by the Bureau of Lands

Sps. Atagan further alleges that Mathays (defendant) have enclosed a portion of said property with a fence without their consent.

The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses

Atagan asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a product of forgery because it was based on an alleged transferred certificate in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo

Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in question. Upon investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were falsified and forged.

Atagan therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have no basis in law and that the same was illegally

procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled and the Mathays have no righto take possession of the property in question. They also demand moral,

irre ara le damages and attorney’s fee for the same. B. Civil Case No. TM-180 (Spouses Poblete vs. Spouses

Mathay and the Registerof Deeds of Cavite)- Involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Juana

Batallones and Gaudencio Quimio which was allegedly sold to S ouses Po lete as er “Deed of Conditional Sale”

Spouses Poblete alleges that they are registered owners of a parcel of land having purchased the same from Juan Battallones and Gaudencio for themselves and on behalf

of their co-heirs as evidenced by Deed of Sale. The spouses took possession of the land and alleges that the defendants (Spouses Mathay) have enclosed a portion of

the said property with a fence without the consent and against the will of the plaintiffs.

The vendees whose titles were transferred in favor of the plaintiffs have obtained the title by virtue of the decision by the court on the civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Onate

Batallones and Petronilla Q.Quimio, Director of Lands, the Register of Deeds of Cavite). The heirs of Onofre Batallones and Modesta Quimio are the vendees of the

land form the Bureau of Lands as evidenced by a Certification issued by the Record Officer of the District Land Office.

The sale of the subject parcel of land from the Bureau of Lands in favor of the heirs of Batallones and Quimio was

also evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance duly issued by the Bureau of Lands.-

The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses Poblete asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a

product of forgery because it was based on an alleged transferred certificate in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in

question. Upon investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were falsified and forged.

Spouses Poblete therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have no basis in law and that the same was illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should

be cancelled and the Mathays have no right to take possession of the property in question. They alsodemand moral, irre ara le damages and attorney’s fee for the

same.


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C. Civil Case No. TM-206 (Spouses Tirona vs. Spouses

Mathay, et. al)- Spouses Motas bought a parcel of land (Lot 2186-B)

covered by a Transfer of Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite from David Quimio as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. They were issued by a Transfer

Certificate (TCT No. T-203730). Vendors David Quimio, Sr., et. al, are the previous

registered owners of the said land as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No.T-192530). They obtained rights and interest thereon from their

predecessors who were vendees from the Bureau of Lands which was then confirmed in a decision on a Civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Batallones and Petonila

Quimio)- The subject land was subdivided into eight lots as

evidenced by a Subdivision Plans. The subdivided lots were bought by the Spouses from Motas in good faith, and were therefore issued with Transfer Certificates of Title.

Spouses Tirona are the one paying the corresponding real property taxes thereon and were issued with

corresponding tax declaration. They allege that the defendants (Spouses Mathay) have enclosed among others the property in question with a fence and took

physical possession thereof without their knowledge and consent

The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses Tirona asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was

a product of forgery and falsification because it was based on an alleged transferred certi ficate in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have no right whatsoever

on the real estate in question. Upon investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were falsified and forged.

Spouses Tirona therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have no basis in law and that the same was

illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled and the Mathays have no right to take possession of the property in question. They also demand

moral, irre ara le damages and attorney’s fee for the same.

The lower court decided for the defendant spouses Mathay and against the plaintiffs in the three consolidated cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of

the plaintiff-appellants. Thus, the appeal. ISSUES:

WON Spouses Mathay can be considered buyers in good faith.

WON Spouses-private respondents own the individual properties in question

HELD: Spouses Mathay cannot be considered as purchasers in

good faith because prior to the fencing of the subject land, neither they nor their predecessors-in-interest (Banayo and Pugay) ever possessed the same. At the same time

the property was sold to petitioners (Mathays), the private respondents were not only in actual possession of the same but also built their houses thereon, cultivated it and

were in full enjoyment of the produce and fruits gathered therefrom. Although it is a well-settled principle that the

person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond

the certificate of title, there are still circumstances which would put party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him. It is expected from

the purchaser of a valued price of a land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, in concept of owner. Failure of a prospective buyer to take

such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a “ urchaser in good faith.” In

addition, before the fence around subject property was erected, private respondent communicated their objection to the fencing of the area by petitioners but they were

ignored by the Mathays, who continued enclosing the premises under controversy in the present of armed men employed by them.

2. The Spouses-Private respondents are the valid owners of the individual properties in question because all the

su se uent certi ficates of title including the etitioner’s titles are void for the same were forged and falsified. It was further proved that the titles issued to Mathays are

void forth allegedly Sales Certificate executed by Tomas Lucido in favour of Pedro Pugay was not signed by the said Tomas Lucido. Neither does it bear the signature of

the latter. It further proved that the deeds showed by Banayo and Pugay were not for the individual property in question. The circumstances surrounding the execution of

the Deed of Absolute Sale by Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay in favor of the spouses Sonya Mathay and Ismael Mathay further showed that it did not comply with the legal

formalities and was not duly notarized. Furthermore, the residence certificates of vendors Banayo and Pugay appeared to be of dubious source. The Spouses Mathay

utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving the sustainability of their posture of them being buyers in good faith. Furthermore, the title of Pedro Banayo and Pablo

Pugay relied upon by them has been shown by preponderance of evidence to be the product of forgery. Petition is DISMISSED for the lack of merit, and the

Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substi tuting by his heirs, namely, BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUIS

CESAR DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED(nee MACATANGAY) and MARIA OLIVIA M. PAREDES vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM (GSIS) and SPOUSES VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT

FACTS: This case involves five registered parcels of land located

within the Antonio Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 (subject properties). These lots were originally owned by, and titled in the name

of, Jose C. Zulueta (Zulueta), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26105 which contains several lots other than the subject properties within the Antonio

Subdivision. Later, the Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots

contained in TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including the subject properties. Upon consolidation of GSISs

ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled, and TCT No. 23554 was issued in GSISs name.

Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor,


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Francisco Dela Merced (Dela Merced), later on substituted

by his heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8) on the ground that

he, not the Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor and Milagros Manlongat, who were claiming Lot 6, Block 2

by virtue of a sale executed by the GSIS in their daughters (Elizabeth Manlongat) favor. Dela Merced argued that, due to the nullity of GSISs foreclosure over the subject

properties, it had no ownership right that could be transferred to Elizabeth Manlongat.

After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in the petitioners favor and nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part of

its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of the Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution which GSIS opposed on the basis of

Section 39 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291 which allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court

processes. A writ of execution was finally issued, however, first by the RTC and then by the CA. The GSIS filed a petition for review before the SC which was denied by the

latter. After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption,

petitioners encountered more problems with the execution of the Decision. According to the RD of Pasig City, Policarpio Espenesin, he could not cancel the titles of

GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 because it no longer had title over these two lots and had already conveyed the same to two other persons. Hence, the RD claimed that the writ of

execution must first be modified to include the cancellation of derivative titles of the GSIS title.

ISSUES: I. Whether the GSIS can still raise the issue of exemption

II. Whether a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat can be enforced against their successors-

in-interest or holders of derivative titles III. Whether an order to cancel title to a particular property

includes an order to provide technical descriptions and segregate it from its mother title

HELD: (1) The issue of GSISs alleged exemption under RA 8291

had been finally decided against when this Court denied GSISs petition for review. GSISs attempt to resurrect the same issue by interjecting the same in this proceeding is

barred by the principle of "law of the case," which states that "determinations of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages

where such determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort."

(2) A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest

over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is not disputed that petitioners caused the

annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554 of the lots in question. The current holders of the derivative titles to these lots were aware of such annotation when the

individual titles were issued to them. Ineluctably, both were bound by the outcome of the litigation.

(3) The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is for the RD to cancel GSISs titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8, inter alia. Whether these titles

are individual or contained in a mother title is of no consequence. The RD has to cause their cancellation. If the cancellation can only be carried out by requiring GSIS

or the Bureau of Lands to provide the necessary information, then they can be compelled to do so. Otherwise, the Courts decision would be rendered

inefficacious, and GSIS would retain ostensible ownership over the lots by the simple expedience that they are included in a mother title, instead of individual titles. That

result is manifestly contrary to the Courts ruling and would subvert the very purpose of bringing this case for a complete resolution.

HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY (HBSTC) V. CA

(AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)

FACTS: Each of private respondents entered into separate contracts to sell with TransAmerican Sales and

osition ransAmerican through the latter’s Owner/General Manager, Engr. Jesus Garcia, involving certain portions of land covered by Transfer Certificate of

Title (TCT) No. 19155, located at No. 45 Gen. Lim Street, Heroes Hill, Quezon City, together with one unit three-storey townhouse to be built on each portion, as follows:

Respondent Pablo N. Arevalo purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 5 for the amount of

P750,000.00 on August 21, 1988 and had already fully paid the purchase price on September 3, 1988;

Respondent Alfredo Lim purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 1 for the amount of P800,000.00 on December 22, 1988 and fully paid

the same upon execution of the agreement on the same day;

Respondent Francisco A. Uy purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 6 on October 29, 1988 in the amount of P800,000.00 payable in

installments and had allegedly made a total payment of P581,507.41. He ordered to stop the payment of all [postdated] checks from September 1990 to

November 1995 on the ground of non-completion of his unit and had later learned of the foreclosure of the property;

Respondent spouses Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. and Lilian Soriano purchased the portion of land

denominated as Unit No. 3 on February 15, 1990 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 and had allegedly made a payment of P669,960.00. They had stopped

paying because of non-completion of the project and had later learned of the foreclosure of the property;

Respondents Alfredo Lim and Santos Lim purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 7 for P700,000.00 on October 1988 and had been fully

paid as of March 18, 1989; Santos Lim subsequently sold and assigned his share of the property to private respondent Felisa Chi Lim on May 12, 1989.

It is stipulated in their respective contracts that their individual townhouses will be fully completed and

constructed as per plans and specifications and the respective titles thereto shall be delivered and transferred


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to private respondents free from all liens and

encumbrances upon their full payment of the purchase price. However, despite repeated demands, Garcia/TransAmerican failed to comply with their

undertakings. On May 30, 1989, Engr. Garcia and his wife Lorelie Garcia

obtained from petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) a loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and

without the prior approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), the spouses mortgaged eight lots covered by TCT Nos. 3349 to 3356 as collateral.

Petitioner registered its mortgage on these titles without any other encumbrance or lien annotated therein. The proceeds of the loan were intended for the development of

the lots into an eight-unit townhouse project. However, five out of these eight titles turned out to be private respondents’ townhouses subject of the contracts to

sell with Garcia/TransAmerican. When the loan became due, Garcia failed to pay his

obligation to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure8 on the subject lots and being the highest bidder in the public auction, a certi ficate of sale

in its favor was issued by the sheriff on February 26, 1990. Su se uently, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and annotated on the titles of the subject lots in

the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On November 8, 1990, private respondents filed a

complaint with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA), HLURB, against Garcia/TransAmerican as seller/developer of the property

and petitioner, as indispensable party, for non-delivery of titles and non-completion of the subdivision project. They prayed for the completion of the units, annulment of the

mortgage in favor of petitioner, release of the mortgage on the lots with fully paid owners and delivery of their titles, and for petitioner to compute individual loan values of

amortizing respondents and to accept payments from them and damages.

Petitioner filed its Answer contending that private respondents have no cause of action against it; that at the time of the loan application and execution of the

promissory note and real estate mortgage by Garcia, there were no known individual buyers of the subject land nor annotation of any contracts, liens or

encumbrances of third persons on the titles of the subject lots; that the loan was granted and released without notifying HLURB as it was not necessary.

The OAALA rendered its decision in favor of private respondents, ruling that the mortgage is unenforceable

and ordering the cancellation of the annotations of the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner. The OAALA likewise ordered the delivery of the TCTs that cover the

rivate res ondents’ townhouses. Petitioner a ealed the said decision but the same was affirmed.

In this present Petition, HBSTC contends that, granting arguendo that the mortgage is unenforceable, it is not obliged to go beyond the certificates of title registered and

had every reason to rely on the correctness and validity of those titles.

ISSUE: W/n a mortgagee is obliged to look beyond the certificate of title prior to entering into the transaction in question.

HELD: Yes. While the cases cited by petitioner held that

the mortgagee is not under obligation to look beyond the certificate of title when on its face, it was free from lien or encumbrances, the mortgagees therein were considered

in good faith as they were totally innocent and free from negligence or wrongdoing in the transaction. In this case, petitioner knew that the loan it was extending to

Garcia/TransAmerican was for the purpose of the development of the eight -unit townhouses.

Petitioner’s insistence that rior to the a roval of the loan, it undertook a thorough check on the property and found the titles free from liens and encumbrances would not

suffice. It was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the status of the lots which includes verification on whether Garcia had secured the authority from the HLURB to

mortgage the subject lots. Petitioner failed to do so. We likewise find petitioner negligent in failing to even ascertain from Garcia if there are buyers of the lots who turned out

to e rivate res ondents. Petitioner’s want of knowledge due to its negligence takes the place of registration, thus it is presumed to know the rights of respondents over the lot.

The conversion of the status of petitioner from mortgagee to buyer-owner will not lessen the importance of such knowledge. Neither will the conversion set aside the

consequence of its negligence as a mortgagee. Judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of

banks to investigate, examine and assess the real estate offered as security for the application of a loan. We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Bank cannot

barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to

verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.

DOMINGO REALTY, INC. AND AYALA STEEL

MANUFACTURING CO., INC. V. CA AND ANTONIO M. ACERO

(VELASCO, JR., J.)

FACTS: Petitioner Domingo Realty filed a complaint against private respondent Acero for recovery of

possession of three parcels of land located in Cupang, Muntinlupa. Acero allegedly constructed a factory building for hollow locks on a ortion of these lands. In Acero’s

answer, he claimed that he merely leased the land from David Victorio who in turn assailed the validity of etitioner’s C s y claiming that he and his

predecessors -in-interest had been in possession of the property for more than 70 years and that the TCTs emanated from spurious deeds of sale.

A Compromise Agreement was eventually executed by the parties-in-interest which prompted the RTC to adopt the

same in its Decision. Petitioner, in order to implement the Decision, filed a motion asking permission to conduct a re-survey of the subject properties, which was granted in an

Order dated Jan. 22, 1988. Acero subsequently filed a motion to nullify the said Agreement, claiming that the re-survey would violate the Agreement since the whole area

he occupied will be adjudged as owned by petitioner. The same was denied. The results of the re-survey showed that the land occupied by the factory of Acero is covered

by the TCTs of petitioner. Petitioners (with Ayala Steel being the transferee) filed a motion for execution on Dec. 10, 1991 which was approved on Jan. 15, 1992.


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Aggrieved, respondent moved for the annulment of the

Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution on the ground that the survey plan (results of the re-survey by petitioners) violated the Compromise Agreement in such a

way that he will be forced to vacate the whole of the property he was occupying instead of vacating only a portion of the same (since the compromise agreement was

only as to a portion of the land occupied by him which 2000 sqm more or less). The same was denied.

In the CA, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and the annulment of the RTC Order granting the execution of the judgment. The CA ruled in favor of him,

holding that his belief that he would only be vacating a portion of the property he was occupying was a mistake that is a basis for the nullification of the compromise

agreement. ISSUE: W/n the compromise agreement should be set

aside on the ground of mistake. HELD: No. it is presumed that the parties to a contract

know and understand the import of their agreement. Thus, civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino opined that:

To invalidate consent, the error must be excusable. It must be real error, and not one that could have been avoided by the

party alleging it. The error must arise from facts unknown to him. He cannot allege an error which refers to a fact

known to him, or which he should have known by ordinary diligent examination of the facts. An error so patent and obvious

that nobody could have made it, or one which could have been avoided by ordinary prudence, cannot be invoked by

the one who made it in order to annul his contract. A mistake that is caused by manifest negligence cannot invalidate a

juridical act. (Emphasis supplied.) Prior to the execution of the Compromise Agreement,

respondent Acero was already aware of the technical description of the titled lots of petitioner Domingo Realty and more so, of the boundaries and area of the lot he

leased from David Victorio. Before consenting to the agreement, he could have simply hired a geodetic engineer to conduct a verification survey and determine

the actual encroachment of the area he was leasing on the titled lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had he undertaken such a precautionary measure, he would have known that

the entire area he was occupying intruded into the titled lot of petitioners and possibly, he would not have signed the agreement.

In this factual milieu, respondent Acero could have easily averted the alleged mistake in the contract; but through

palpable neglect, he failed to undertake the measures expected of a person of ordinary prudence. Without doubt, this kind of mistake cannot be resorted to by respondent

Acero as a ground to nulli fy an otherwise clear, legal, and valid agreement, even though the document may become adverse and even ruinous to his business.

Moreover, respondent failed to state in the Compromise Agreement that he intended to vacate only a portion of the

property he was leasing. Such provision being beneficial to respondent, he, in the exercise of the proper diligence required, should have made sure that such matter was

specified in the Compromise Agreement. Respondent Acero’s failure to have the said sti ulation incor orated in

the Compromise Agreement is negligence on his part and

insufficient to abrogate said agreement.

DBP V. THE ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA

ECIJA

(NARVASA, J.)

FACTS: On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the

Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented for registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its favor of two parcels of land

covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034, both in the names of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had

acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP paid

the requisite registration fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of title

could not, however be effected because the originals of those certificates were found to be missing from the files of the Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and

could not be located. On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to reconstitute said certi ficates,

and reconstitution was ordered by that court in a decision rendered on June 15, 1982. For reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted only

on June 19, 1984. On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the

reconstituted titles of the certi ficate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper

action to take on the solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta raising two questions: (a) whether the certificate of sale could be

registered using the old Entry No. 8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June

19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered affirmatively, whether he could sign the proposed annotation, having assumed his duties only in July 1982.

The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had been rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility

of accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For said certi ficate of sale to be

admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be re-entered now that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second

query as having been rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first. Aggrieved, DBP appealed the resolution to the CA.

ISSUE: W/n the refusal of the ROD to annotate the reconstituted titles is proper.

HELD: No. The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a reading of the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529,

and particularly of the provision therein referring to the Register's act of making a primary entry as ".. .a preliminary process in registration...," as depriving of any

effect a primary entry without a corresponding annotation thereof on the certificate of title to which the instrument subject of said entry refers.


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That view fails to find support from a consideration of

entire context of said Section 56 which in another part also provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "... shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted ...,"

and, at the very least, gives such entry from the moment of its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice of the existence the instrument on entered. Such effect (of

registration) clearly attaches to the mere making of the entry without regard to the subsequent step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on

the certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the annotation, "... when made ... shall bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be

said to contemplate unspecified intervals of t ime occurring between the making of a primary entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the certi ficate of title without

robbing the entry of the effect of being equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed resolution that annotation must annotation entry

immediately or in short order justified by the language of Section 56.

Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between primary entry and proposed annotation in this case has not been of DBP's making. Though it was under

no necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was an

involuntary transaction, and the record is silent as to whether it presented them or not, there is nonetheless every probability that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the

lands covered by those titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions that the owner's duplicates of the encumbered titles are yielded into the custody of the

mortgage until the mortgage is discharged. Moreover, the certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's duplicates, and again it is to be presumed that said

duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings.

It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on its face. 11 DBP, therefore, complied with all

that was required of it for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made

contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping.

If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents.

It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry

fees as the appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which through no fault on its part, had to be deferred until the originals of the certificates of title

were found or reconstituted.

FLOR MARTINEZ V. ERNESTO G. GARCIA AND

EDILBERTO M. BRUA

(PERALTA, J.)

FACTS: Respondent Brua was the registered owner of a

parcel of land located in Mandaluyong, Rizal covered by TCT No. 346026. The same property was mortgaged several times, as evidenced by annotations found at the

back of its TCT. On Oct. 22, 1991, Brua sold the property in the amount of P 705K to Garcia, as partial payment of

the former’s mortgage inde tedness to the latter. Garcia

then registered the said deed with the ROD of Rizal and TCT No. 5204 was issued in Garcia and his wi fe’s name. However, the several annotations at the back of the

previous title were carried over, such as Entry no. 2881 showing a notice of levy on execution in favor of petitioner Flor Martinez.

It appeared that the annotations found at the back of the title of the subject property in favor of petitioner, i.e.,

Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy, Notice of Levy on Execution, and Certificate of Sale, were all made in connection with petitioner's action for Collection of Sum of

Money, in which a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, where the RTC ordered respondent Brua to pay the former the amount of P244,594.10, representing the

value of the dishonored checks plus 12% interest per annum as damages and the premium paid by petitioner for the attachment bond. The decision became final and

executory as respondent Brua failed to appeal the same, and a notice of levy on execution was issued. A public auction was subsequently conducted, where the subject

property was awarded to petitioner as the sole bidder in the amount of P10,000.00, and a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.

On February 9, 1994, respondents Garcia and Brua filed with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 267, an Action to Quiet

Title, initially against petitioner due to the encumbrances/liens annotated on respondent Garcia's new title. They contended that these encumbrances/liens

were registered subsequent to the annotation of respondent Garcia's adverse claim made in 1980, and prayed that these be canceled. Subsequently, the

complaint was amended to include Pilipinas Bank as an additional defendant. Petitioner and Pilipinas Bank filed their respective Answers thereto.

he R C dismissed Garcia’s action. In so ruling, the R C found that the adverse claim which respondent Garcia

caused to be annotated on the previous title of the subject property, i.e, TCT No. 346026, on June 23, 1980 was predicated on his interest as a mortgagee of a loan of

P150,000.00, which he extended to respondent Brua; that respondent Garcia's adverse interest was merely that of a second mortgagee, as he was not yet the purchaser of the

subject property as of said date; that when the judicial liens, i.e., Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy and Notice of Levy on Execution, were caused to be registered

by petitioner on respondent Brua's title on January 8, 1981 and July 8, 1998, respectively, by virtue of petitioner being adjudged judgment creditor by Branch 60 of RTC Makati,

respondent Garcia's claim became inferior to that of petitioner.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA said that a subsequent sale of property covered by a certificate of title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and

annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale; that while one who buys a property from the registered owner need not have to look behind the title, he is

nevertheless bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon; and, thus, one who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses

consequent to such failure. ISSUE: W/n petitioner has a better right with respect to the

property in question. HELD: No. Petitioner contends that the adverse claim of

respondent Garcia inscribed on the title of the subject property is but a notice that the latter has an interest


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adverse to respondent Brua's title, to the extent of

P150,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage, and such adverse claim cannot be considered superior to that of a final sale conducted by the sheriff by virtue of a court

judgment that has attained finality. Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons. The levy on execution shall

create a lien in favor of the judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment obligor in such property at the

time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing.

Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied upon. He merely obtains a lien. Such levy on execution is subject and subordinate to

all valid claims and liens existing against the property at the time the execution lien attached, such as real estate mortgages.

Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the deed of mortgage executed by respondent Brua in his

favor, was annotated on respondent Brua's title registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853. The adverse claim was already existing

when the Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner, was inscribed on July 11, 1988 and September 2, 1988, respectively; and,

hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to constitute constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy on

Execution on the title of the subject property, she was charged with the knowledge that the subject property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered

by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA when it held that the

notice of levy and subsequent sale of the subject property could not prevail over respondent Garcia's existing adverse claim inscribed on respondent Brua's certi ficate of

title. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed

to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or

Act No. 496 (now P.D. No.1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an

interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof.

Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person

has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some

other person in the property. Here, petitioner admitted on cross-examination that when she registered her notice of attachment in 1981 and the levy on execution on July 11,

1988, she already saw respondent Garcia's adverse claim inscribed on respondent Brua's title on June 23, 1980.

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