LOVED AND HATED Commonalities and Differences between the Slovak and Hungarian Far Right

Editors:

Sergej Danilov

Tomá! Nociar

Published by:

Institute for Intercultural Dialogue / Inštitút pre medzikultúrny dialóg

Rumančeková 40,

821 01, Bratislava,

www.ipmd.sk

Edited by (Slovak and English):

Sergej Danilov, Tomáš Nociar

Translated by:

Lucia Faltinová

Proofread by:

András Zágoni-Bogsch

Designed by:

Marián Ondrašák

Printed by:

Polyprint.sk

Copyright © 2012 by Institute for Intercultural Dialogue

Photos: Internet

ISBN 978-80-970915-1-4

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 4

1. What is the far right? (Theoretical perspective) ............................................................ 5

2. The Slovak perspective ..................................................................................................... 7

2.1! Ideological and organizational characteristics of the Slovak far right ................. 7!2.1.1 Political parties ....................................................................................................... 7

2.1.2 Civic associations ................................................................................................... 9

2.1.3 Non-registered groups .......................................................................................... 11

2.2! Anti-Hungarian rhetoric of the Slovak far right ................................................... 11!

3. The Hungarian perspective ............................................................................................ 15

3.1! Ideological and organizational characteristics of the Hungarian far right ........ 15!

3.1.1 Political parties ..................................................................................................... 15

3.1.2 Civic associations ................................................................................................. 17

3.1.3 Non-registered groups .......................................................................................... 19

3.2! Anti-Slovak rhetoric of the Hungarian far right ................................................... 20!

4. Commonalities between the Slovak and Hungarian far right .................................... 22

4.1! Cooperation and joint activities of the Slovak and Hungarian far right ............ 22!

4.2! The foreign policy orientation of the far right ....................................................... 23!

4.3! Anti-Semitism ........................................................................................................... 25!

4.4! Football hooligans and their ties to the far right ................................................... 27!

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 30

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................. 32

APPENDIX A: Categorization of the far right subjects (tables) ................................ 32

APPENDIX B: Photographs .......................................................................................... 34

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ..................................................................................................... 36

4

INTRODUCTION

The issue of the far right concerns the entire European continent. In this context, the

Slovak Republic and Hungary, two neighboring states in Central Europe, offer an interesting

example. It is largely due to the traditionally problematic relations between the two countries.

This undoubtedly fuels the far right organizations and enhances their potential for success. The

Slovak National Party serves here as an example as one of the most successful among the far right

parties in Europe, given its former presence in the parliament and the government. The same

applies to Jobbik that is currently one of the strongest far right groups of all. Additional

phenomena, namely such organizations as the Hungarian Guard and the Slovak Togetherness

deserve a mention, as they became publicly known through their uniforms and marches. By

influencing both the national and foreign policy, these organizations are capable of making media

headlines but also of further fuelling the already heated relations between the two states. All this

is happening after both countries joined the process of European integration that had been seen,

inter alia, as a tool for reducing nationally-based tensions.

This publication, Loved and Hated - Commonalities and Differences between the Slovak

and Hungarian Far Right intends to shed further light on the issue of the far right in both

countries. The authors approached the topic through the lens of the complex Slovak–Hungarian

relations. Thus, in addition to describing individual agents and defining commonalities and

differences between them, the publication, as the title suggests, also intends to highlight two

different approaches of these organizations to the issue of mutual relations. The part that maps

joint activities offers less-known, yet more interesting contribution to the theme. The chapters

focusing on the mutual rhetoric of hate are not only informative, but offer potential help to further

understanding of Slovak–Hungarian relations, the troubled periods of which are used (though not

exclusively) by the far right groups to generate ethnic tensions and increase their own popularity.

These chapters (in form of an appeal) are thus addressed particularly to politicians and state

bodies in both countries to whom the parliamentary representation of the far right political parties

should serve as a warning.

Tomáš Nociar

5

1. What is the far right? (Theoretical perspective) (Tomá! Nociar)

The term far right comes from political science that offers two theories on the subject.

The first is the theory of ‘party families’ where one of such ‘families’ is the far right ‘party

family’. Such parties share ideological foundations defined by nationalism, xenophobia, welfare

chauvinism and faith in law and order.1 The second theory, on extremism, understands the far

right as a summary notion that contains right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism. The

theory derives from the position which the subject concerned holds towards democracy that also

represents the dividing line between right-wing radicalism and extremism.

A model of radicalism and extremism

Far left Far right

Left%wing*extremism*

Left%wing*radicalism* Democratic*centre* Right%wing*

radicalism*Right%wing*extremism*

Spectrum of constitutional conformity

Right-wing radicalism is represented by positions and views that are critical of the

democratic system and call for its modification, though not for its elimination. In terms of the

composition of right-wing radicalism, one can speak of a conglomerate of nationalistic,

traditionally conservative, authoritarian and reactionary, yet sometimes also liberal and plebiscite

positions.2

Unlike radicalism, right-wing extremism is not only critical of the democratic

constitution, but does call for its replacement with an authoritarian form of government. Typical

features of right-wing extremism include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and

1 MUDDE, C.: Extreme-right Parties in Eastern Europe. In Patterns of prejudice, Institute for Jewish Policy Research, vol. 34, no 1, 2000. See also KOPEČEK, P.: The Far right in Europe. In: Central European Political Studies Review, vol. IX, part 4, pp. 280-293. 2 KUPKA, P., LARYŠ, M., SMOLÍK, J.: Krajní pravice ve vybraných zemích střední a východní Evropy. Brno: Muni Press, 2009. 272 pp.

6

emphasis on a strong state.3 The ideological streams of contemporary right-wing extremism

include neo-Fascism and neo-Nazism.

Yet not all far right groupings can be defined on the basis of their attitudes to democracy.

In some, any criticism of democratic institutions may be altogether absent, yet they are still

labeled as far right. This is given by their rhetoric and ideology which, aside from the criticism of

democracy, embraces the traditional far right themes. Such groups are then characterized on the

basis of their political style and represent ultra right-wing populism.

The primary common feature of far right actors is thus a common ideology whose carriers,

however, do not necessary have to be political parties. Therefore, the organizational structure is an

additional typological sign of the far right groupings. It differentiates individual groupings into:

• political parties,

• civic associations,

• and informal groups (often operating on the basis of leaderless resistance or as a

subculture).

Ideological characteristics and the organizational structure are thus the two key defining

features for further specification of the individual groups within the Slovak and Hungarian far

right.

3 MUDDE, C.: The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester University Press, 2000. 224 pp.

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2. The Slovak perspective

2.1 Ideological! and! organizational! characteristics! of! the! Slovak! far!

right!(Dušan'Mikušovič)!

Slovak far right subjects can be divided according to their agenda into two key streams:

• the ultranationalist stream – characterized by strong ties to the clerico-fascist nature of the

wartime Slovak State, specific with its anti-Semitism that draws from local traditions, but

especially by strong chauvinism aimed particularly against Hungarians,

• the neo-Nazi stream – defined by its identification with the German Third Reich and the

politics of German national socialism, including the principle of Arian supremacy that

involves deeply ingrained anti-Semitism and enduring Holocaust denial.

2.1.1 Political+parties+

The Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) is traditionally the strongest

political party that emerged on the Slovak far right. The party has been present in the political

system since 1990. Except for the period between 2002 and 2006, it had a stable parliamentary

presence. In 1992–1994, 1994–1998 and 2006–2010 it was even part of the governing coalition.

In the parliamentary elections held in March 2012 the SNS gained 4.55 % of votes and thus failed

to pass the 5 % electoral threshold required to secure a place in the parliament. The few decimal

points required were taken away by the former SNS deputy leader Anna Belousovová, who ran in

the elections as the leader of a newly formed party, Nation and Justice. The SNS is led by

a nationalist populist, Ján Slota.

The inclusion of the SNS among the far right parties is based on its position within the

Slovak system of political parties. It is not a result of the party’s conflict with the principle of

democratic constitution. The party leaders draw attention with attacks particularly against the

Hungarian minority and the Roma which can be deemed racist. The sharp anti-Roma and anti-

Hungarian pitch also appears in the SNS electoral campaigns and increases in intensity whenever

the party intends to position itself vis-à-vis other parties (see examples in Appendix B-1). The SNS

8

accentuates an alleged sense of threat coming from Hungary and attacks against ethnic Hungarian

political parties in Slovakia. Prior to the early elections in March 2012, the tensions in Slovak–

Hungarian relations did not resonate in the public as strongly as it had been the case in 2010. This

tendency was also indicated by the SNS electoral campaign where toying with the ‘Hungarian

card’ wasn’t as aggressive as it had been in the past. The emphasis on negative developments in

the Euro zone along with attacks on the Roma minority were of equal strength, if not even more

prominent in the rhetoric of SNS and on their billboards.

In the 1990s and even in 2000, the SNS had sympathies by part of the neo-Nazi skinheads.

This has been proved during a police action in Papradno in 2001, when an SNS membership card

had been found in possession of one of the participants at neo-Nazi musical gathering. Over time,

however, the most radical streams of the Slovak far right shifted sympathy toward other

organizations, particularly the Slovak Togetherness and its political wing, the Peoples Party – Our

Slovakia.

Despite the verbal statements of some SNS leaders (especially anti-Hungarian and anti-

Roma statements by the leader Ján Slota), the party cannot be included among the extremist

formations, as it does not, in its agenda and practical activities, present itself as a counter pole to

the democratic constitution. Its political style and rhetoric permit, however, to define the SNS as

ultra right-wing populist party.

Nation and Justice (Národ a spravodlivosť, NaS) is a recent formation that emerged after

the split of an SNS wing led by the deputy leader Anna Belousovová. Though there is a chance

that the NaS will present a milder alternative to SNS, it emerged mainly due to personal rather

than program differences. Although polls estimated NaS gain between 1 and 2 %, it ended up with

mere 0.64 % of votes in the March 2012 elections.

Peoples Party – Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko, ĽS-NS) emerged as

the political wing of the strongest extra-parliamentary stream of the Slovak far right, a movement

surrounding the civic association Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť). The ĽS-NS,

however, is the second political project of the movement. The first, a party called the Slovak

Togetherness – National Party (Slovenská pospolitosť – Národná strana) was dismantled as a

result of the ruling of the Supreme Court in 2006 which decided that, in its agenda, the party

denied equal electoral right to minorities. The ĽS-NS successfully exploited the troubled

coexistence of the majority population and the Roma in Eastern and Central Slovakia to gain

supporters. The party’s activities are defined by a sharp anti-Roma pitch. ĽS-NS organizes

marches of right-wing extremists into Roma settlements and towns, where it verbally attacks the

Roma, labeling them asocial Gypsy parasites. In the 2010 elections, the party led by Marián

9

Kotleba gained 1.33 % votes. Yet the electoral result eventually turned out somewhat better than

in the 2010 elections, with the ĽS-NS gaining 1.58 % of votes in 2012.

The Slovak Peoples Party (Slovenská ľudová strana, SĽS) is currently a marginal

organization with a clear reference to the clerico-fascist wartime Slovak State. In 2006, the party

became more visible by offering the leading positions on its ballot to the parliamentary elections

to the former members of the Slovak Togetherness – National Party, after the party had been

dismantled by the Supreme Court. The SĽS thus actually took over the latter’s political agenda

(even calling it the agenda of the Slovak Togetherness), but removed the passages that led to the

ban the party by the Supreme Court. The cooperation, particularly the aforementioned date of the

foundation of the party, identical with the date of the foundation of the Hlinka’s Slovak Peoples

Party which was banned after World War II, and the mention of the estates state that is in conflict

with the democratic constitution, were all arguments that set the ground for the Prosecutor

General to file an appeal in 2009 for the dissolution of the Slovak Peoples Party. Nonetheless, the

proceedings had been stopped in 2011. The party has not run in the 2012 elections.

The Slovak National Unity (Slovenská národná jednota, SNJ) enjoyed the peak of its

political success in the 1990s, when the radical rhetoric of its leader Stanislav Pánis attracted

young right-wing radicals. The party first attempted to register as the Hlinka’s Slovak Peoples

Party – The National Union Party, by which it intended to identify with the legacy of the wartime

Slovak state. The Ministry of Interior, however, did not accept the proposed title. Today the party

is quite insignificant and focuses on organizing activities to commemorate the leaders of the

Hlinka’s Slovak Peoples Party. It uncritically advocates the wartime Slovak State and its

protagonists, publicizes Christian values, has adopted sharp anti-Hungarian rhetoric. It does not

shy away from anti-Semitism and racist statements. Despite the past differences, the party has

been seeking partners among other nationalistic groups since 2000. The party has been involved

in a number of coalitions with the SNS. It wasn’t running in the 2012 early elections, though its

leader Stanislav Pánis ran on the SNS ballot on the 150th place.

2.1.2 Civic+associations+

The Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť, SP) remains the best known among the

civic associations of the Slovak far right. It has become the synonym for the Slovak right-wing

extremism as such. It won its position within the spectrum in 2002 by having organized, for

example, fire-torch marches and commemorative festivals in Slovak towns as its members

10

marched dressed in dark blue uniforms. The SP continued to attract attention by trying to enter the

political arena. Founded as early as 1995 the SP managed to gain hegemony over the Slovak

extra-parliamentary far right between 2004 and 2005. It initiated the foundation of the later

dismantled Slovak Togetherness – National Party, and subsequent cooperation with the Slovak

Peoples Party and now the Peoples Party – Our Slovakia serves as its political wing.

The views and program aims of the SP push the group beyond constitutional conformity.

The SP thus became a popular media subject, but also attracted the attention of the bodies that are

part of the anti-extremist policy of the state. In 2008 the Ministry of Interior dissolved the SP by

arguing that its activity was unconstitutional. The dissolution, however, was overruled by the

Slovak Supreme Court in 2009 on the grounds of procedural and formal flaws.

The SP ideology mixes traditional themes that range from extreme nationalism, racism,

anti-Semitism, through the legacy of the wartime Slovak state, to neo-Fascism and, in some cases,

even neo-Nazism.

New Free Slovakia (Nové slobodné Slovensko, NSS) started as a civic association in

Prešov in 2000. It used to be one of the closest allies of the Slovak Togetherness. A former bass

guitarist of a neo-Nazi music formation Doctor Martens Skinheads, Radovan Novotný, is the

group’s most prominent person. The NSS worked with the Slovak Togetherness in founding the

SP-NS, however the leaders of the two groups later ended up in conflict. The NSS eventually

gave up its political ambitions and currently declares its aim to educate members who might once

enter the political contest.

NSS views endow a traditional far right agenda. Even though the association is careful not

to openly publicize anti-democratic positions, its uncritical admiration of the nondemocratic

regime of the wartime Slovak State, the leader’s past and the cooperation with the extremist SP-

NS, particularly through the personal connection, clearly indicates extremist positions within

NSS.

The Slovak Renascence Movement (Slovenské hnutie obrody, SHO) was founded in

2005 as a civic association based in Nitra. Its leader is Róbert Švec. In the past, it drew public

attention by organizing a petition for a ban on the Hungarian Coalition Party (Strana maďarskej

koalície) that was signed by over 5 thousand people within three months. The association

organizes commemorative events on the anniversary of either birth or passing of Slovak historical

leaders and the representatives of the wartime Slovak State. It is strongly Eurosceptic. In some

instances it speaks of the danger of freemason loges and a Jewish global reign. Yet it is far more

cautious than the other far right groups. The SHO leans towards cooperation with similar

organizations in Slavic countries.

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2.1.3 Non5registered+groups+

After 2008, autonomous nationalist groups appeared in the Slovak political field based on

the strategy of leaderless resistance that has been adopted by the Slovak right-wing extremists

from Germany and the Czech Republic. The National Resistance Nitra (Národný Odpor Nitra)

was the first group of the kind to emerge in Slovakia. Founded in 2005, it set its key aim to

implement the ideas of national socialism. Locally organized groups of the National Resistance

subsequently emerged in Bratislava and Trnava and, in 2008, additional groups had been formed

on similar principles – National Resistance Trenčín, cells of Autonomous Nationalists

(Autonómni nacionalisti) in a number of Slovak regions and Resistance Komárno.

Kysuce Defiance (Kysucký Vzdor) is a specific example of a non-registered cell. This

small group is linked to setting fire to an accommodation building used by the Roma in 2007.

Today it presents itself through defense training given to its members.

2.2 Anti9Hungarian!rhetoric!of!the!Slovak!far!right4!(Tomáš'Nociar)!

Nationalism as one of the constituent elements of the far right ideology has been

manifested over time in Slovakia through anti-Hungarian rhetoric. This is particularly related to

the fact that the Hungarian national minority represents the largest ethnic minority in Slovakia.5 It

is also linked to the problematic aspects of the common history of Hungarians and Slovaks. The

following part shall not assess the degree of rationality or any justification of arguments. It will

however show that the positions expose biased criticism and a hateful perspective on everything

related to the Hungarian people. Such rhetoric is typical for the majority of the Slovak far right

scene, but translates simultaneously into the anti-Hungarian sentiment within the wider society.

The Slovak far right spectrum is not entirely united in the use of anti-Hungarian rhetoric.

Based on the rhetoric, the entities can be divided into those that employ such rhetoric and those

where it is absent. It is affected by the inclination of a concrete entity towards either radical

4 This part is based on a text analysis of political agendas, websites and over 100 printed materials of various content, extent and impact from a range of the Slovak far right groups that has been published between 1992 and 2011. It includes formal and informal groups such as political parties, civic associations and subcultures. The political impact of individual texts was not subject to the analysis. 5 According to the 2011 census, 458 467 (8.5 %) people identified with the Hungarian nationality. The 2011 Population and Housing Census Results [Table 11: Population by nationality – 2011, 2001, 1991]. At: www.portal.statistics.sk/files/table-11.pdf (30. 4. 2012).

12

nationalism or racism. Some groups use a combination of both. If a group leans more towards

racism (either according to the traditional biological or to the cultural sense), it logically

eliminates the nationalist element from the rhetoric. Nationalism is then considered to be a barrier

to unification on racial grounds. Such groups thus altogether refrain from or tend to subject the

theme to the racial element. This can be indentified through an analysis of Slovak neo-Nazi zines6

of informal groups, such as the currently declining skinhead subculture. Their printed material

contains relatively few statements on the subject of ‘Magyardom’ in comparison with anti-Semitic

and anti-Roma positions. Yet, unlike the ultranationalist organizations whose all statements are

negative, these groups are sometimes also critical of the anti-Hungarian rhetoric which they

interpret as a barrier to the unification of either the European nations or of the ‘white race’. The

political impact of such positions, however, is less than marginal.

In terms of the most relevant ultranationalist stream within the Slovak far right, it is the

generator of strong anti-Hungarian sentiments. Specific examples of anti-Hungarian rhetoric can

be divided into historical and contemporary criticism, with the later being amended with

contemporary cases.7 Individual groups of arguments are interconnected and create a mosaic used

in the anti-Hungarian campaign. The argument of territorial claims is the core common feature.

Historical criticism reflects problematic historical periods from the perspective of

nationalistic positions. It can be divided into three principal periods. The first refers to the Great

Moravia and focuses on the arrival of Magyars to Central Europe. It depicts them as barbarian

occupants. The second period refers to the era from the second half of the 19th century to the

beginning of World War I. The criticism focuses particularly on the period of Magyarization8 and

negatively depicts historical leaders such as Lajos Kossúth or Sándor Petőfi. The third phase is the

period from the end of WWI to the beginning of the Communist regime in the Eastern bloc. The

criticism focuses, for instance, on the Hungarian attempts to revise the Trianon Peace Treaty, on

the occupation of a part of Slovakia by the Hungarian Republic of Councils, on János Esterházy,

the Vienna Arbitrage, the Small War, or on the attempts to revise the Beneš Decrees. Hungarian

historiography is also presented as mythologizing, misleading or revisionist.

Contemporary criticism (post-1989) focuses particularly on the alleged Hungarian

territorial claims in Slovakia and other neighboring countries. According to these views, Hungary

6 Zine or fanzine is a magazine, brochure or self-published material that is normally published by an individual alone or a small group. 7 Such examples include the polemics and the cases such as that of Hedviga Malinová, the Hungarian village of Pilisszentkereszt (Mlynky), the language law or the placement of the set of statues of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Komárno. 8 Starting in the late 18th century, Magyarization was a process of forced imposition of linguistic and cultural values on the non-Magyar nations within the Greater Hungary.

13

poses a threat to the territorial integrity of Slovakia. Hungarian political elites along with the

ethnic Hungarian parties in Slovakia (particularly the Hungarian Coalition Party, plus in the new

context and to a lesser degree Most-Híd; from among the political elites namely Miklós Duray,

Pál Csáky and Béla Bugár) allegedly serve Hungarian plans to revise the Treaty of Trianon and to

annex the Slovak territory (the so called Felvidék)9 as a tool of recreating the Greater Hungary.

They are depicted as anti-Slovak, irredentist and revisionist chauvinists who aim to achieve

political autonomy of Southern Slovakia. Efforts to achieve cultural autonomy and an attempt to

create the so called Komárno Zhupa (regional district) during the public administration reform are

presented as a direct means of achieving political autonomy. In addition to the alleged lack of

loyalty among the Hungarian minority and particularly its political leaders of which they are often

accused, arguments against the legitimacy of their political activities10 point out to the alleged

absence of reciprocity in political representation of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary. The criticism also

targets the state of national rights of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary and their alleged focused

assimilation. It presents the Hungarian far right groups, mostly Jobbik, the Hungarian Guard or

the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement as a direct threat to national security.

Below are a few illustrative examples of the anti-Hungarian rhetoric:

“The general support to Hungary by the European Union and the USA has historic and

ethnic roots in the end of the 18th century when the aggressive Hungarian chauvinism and forced

Magyarization were triggered by the Freemasonry movement.”11

“The threat to Slovakia by the Hungarian chauvinists is proved not only by the politics of

the SMK, but also by the support to these chauvinistic efforts by the Hungarian government. If we

want to preserve Slovakia at least the way we know it today, we must resolutely act against the

attempts to renew the Greater Hungary as soon as possible, else it might be too late. The SP-NS

thus calls for the renewal of the Slovak Army and home guards, the National Guard.”12

9 Felvidék is a Hungarian word referring to a part of Slovak territory. 10 Such objections appear at communal, parliamentary as well as governmental level of their activity. 11 Maďarsko ako trójsky kôň západu v Strednej Európe. In: Hlas NSS, January, February 2005, p. 4. At: www.nss.sk/hlasns/hlas08.pdf (30. 4. 2012). 12 Rozhovor s Vodcom Slovenskej pospolitosti – národnej strany. In: Hlas národnej stráže, March 2005, p. 8. At: www.pospolitost.org/tlacoviny/hlasns/HlasNS-9.pdf (30. 4. 2012).

14

“As Hungary has been the prime enemy of our statehood in the past and today, the Slovak

Army shall meticulously guard our southern border and prevent any attempts of the Hungarian

chauvinists who call for the renewal of Greater Hungary.”13

“The SMK leader Pál Csáky and his fellows are already subjects of the politicians and

political parties in Hungary. Their shared values are based on the principles of revanchism and

chauvinism. The ‘trauma’ of Trianon probably forces them to use their headquarters in Budapest

to influence the developments wherever the borders of the jail of the nations reached to.”14

“Instead of the compulsory school visits to the concentration camps in order to prevent

repeating the horrors of the Holocaust, it would be better to introduce compulsory reading of the

book by Jerguš Ferko Hungarian Self-Delusion.”15

“The aforementioned and other steps by the SNS in this area are not accidental or

primary. They are merely a reaction to the activities of Hungarian politicians here and abroad

who, in the interest of power and political ambitions, turn the citizens of the Slovak Republic of

Hungarian nationality into hostages of their chauvinistic and revisionist interests. The SNS shall

always firmly stand against this.”16

13 Ľudový program Slovenskej pospolitosti – Národnej strany, 2005, p. 6. At: www.pospolitost.org/SP/programspns.pdf (30. 4. 2012). 14 Vec verejná. In: Právo Národa, November 2008, p. 1. At: www.sho.sk/archiv/images/pn/pravo-naroda-2008-11-november.pdf (30. 4. 2012). 15 Komárňanský protest proti soche Štefana. In: Slovenská národná jednota, August 2009, p. 2. At: www.narod.sk/images/sloven/sloven-0908.pdf (30. 4. 2012). 16 Volebný program SNS, 2010, p. 7. At: www.sns.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Volebny_program_20101.pdf (30. 4. 2012).

15

3. The Hungarian perspective

3.1 Ideological! and! organizational! characteristics! of! the!Hungarian!

far!right!(Attila'Juhász–Péter'Krekó)!

Like in most other countries, the far right is not united in Hungary either. The far right

organizations may be divided into three different, yet partly overlapping categories, based on their

political relevance:

• politically relevant parties aiming to function within the confines of the political system,

• movements and groups often related to parties with differing levels of relevance,

• marginal neo-Nazi and Hungarist17 organizations looking to distance themselves from the

rest of the far right.

The three groups of organizations share racism, anti-Semitism, anti-globalism, anti-

capitalist beliefs and mystic-organic ultranationalism as a common ground in their ideological

portfolios.

3.1.1 Political+parties+

Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) is a far right

political party. The predecessor of Jobbik was an organization mainly assembling students, called

Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség (Rightist Youth Community), which in 2003 was formed into a

political party. Jobbik failed to achieve success at the 2006 elections, whereas the party ran as an

ally of MIÉP, yet it became notably stronger afterwards. At the European Parliament elections in

2009, Jobbik secured 3 mandates having received over 427 000 votes (14.77 %), whereas in the

general elections a year later in 2010, it passed the parliamentary threshold as the third most

17 Hungarists are the ideological followers of Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of the Hungarian (Nazi-like) arrowcross movement before and during WWII.

16

popular party, boasting more than 855 000 votes. In the recent past, Jobbik has succeeded to

increase support and achieved a higher level of popularity than in the April 2010 general

elections. Currently more than 20 % of committed voters with party preferences would vote for

Jobbik, compared to the 16.67 % of votes that the party received in the 2010 elections. With such

popularity, Jobbik is now one of the strongest parties in the European far right, whereas it is

definitely more radical than other parties carrying the same political label in Western Europe. The

more radical stance is visible not only in the ideology of the party, but was in the support and

initiation of the formation of The Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda), currently a banned

paramilitary organization. The Guard was Jobbik’s most efficient instrument for mobilization and

recruitment, and it was one of the main factors behind the success of Jobbik. The ideology

embraced by Jobbik is essentially anti-liberal. It refutes the liberal interpretation of human rights,

and remains ethnocentric, irredentist, homophobic and anti-Semitic. In its economic policies, the

party opposes free-market liberalism, whereas in terms of foreign policy, it may be willing to

relinquish Western orientation and approach Eastern partners instead (notably Iran and Turkey).

Hungarian Party of Justice and Life (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) was

established in 1993 by the well-known playwright István Csurka and a group of politicians who

followed him after he was expelled from MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum). MIÉP claimed

that the first freely elected government after the change of the political regime did not leave any

room for the advocates of popular and nationalist views in its leadership, failed to demand

accountability from the leaders of the Socialist regime, relinquished the overall revision of the

Treaty of Trianon, and nevertheless made no attempt to have the crippling foreign debts

accumulated during the Socialist governance cancelled. MIÉP defined its stance as radical,

national(ist), conservative and anti-globalist. The largest success of the party came in 1998, when

MIÉP passed the parliamentary threshold having received almost 250 000 votes (5.5 %). In the

2002 elections the party received fewer votes (4.37 %) and thus dropped out of the parliament. As

of today, MIÉP has become irrelevant, lost its place in the limelight entirely and practically

vanished from the political spectrum as a result of Jobbik’s growth. This has been visible in the

2006 election results when MIÉP received 2.2 % of votes and especially in 2010 when it received

only 0.03 % of votes. The recent death of István Csurka is likely to further affect its weakening.

17

3.1.2 Civic+associations+

Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom,

HVIM) is an irredentist, ultranationalist, anti-Semitic youth organization, founded in 2001 by

László Toroczkai, who engages today in politics representing Jobbik at the county level. The

honorary leader of the organization is György Gyula Zagyva, Member of Parliament on the

Jobbik caucus. The main goals of the organization are territorial revision, i.e. restoring the pre-

Trianon borders of Hungary. As an ally of Jobbik, HVIM is eager to create a network of sub-

organizations of different size throughout the Carpathian Basin, whilst retaining the original

nature of the movement. These local and regional groups actively organize youth events, thereby

attempting to promote the ideology of the far right.

New Hungarian Guard (Új Magyar Gárda) is one of the organizations that succeeded the

Hungarian Guard Movement founded by Jobbik in 2007 that was subsequently dissolved by the

Budapest Tribunal in 2009. The proclaimed aim of the movement is physical, spiritual and mental

self-defense of the Hungarians. Similar to its predecessor, the New Hungarian Guard is an

organization of paramilitary nature in its appearance. The black and white uniform featuring

Árpád-stripes worn by its members prompts many to draw comparisons with WWII-era party

militia. The movement – together with the rest of the successors of the previously dissolved

Magyar Gárda – has gained popularity by spreading anti-Roma views and promising public

security. According to its founding declaration, the organization is willing to be the spine and a

part of the National Guard, which is yet to be established. The movement is further willing to

actively promote and organize social and charity missions, engage in catastrophe management and

civil protection along with strengthening national self-defense and addressing public safety

matters. The greatest risk posed by the organization is that it effectively challenges the state

monopoly on force.

For a Better Future Civic Guard Association (Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület) is an

organization that bears strong ties to Jobbik and disseminates anti-Roma messages. It has

managed to assume a leading position among regional, self-recruiting civil guard organizations.

As a result of the association that was officially registered in 2010, the organization could gain

leverage at the national level as well. It regards crime prevention as its primary objective. It is to

be carried out by groups formed by voluntary uniformed guards. The members of the organization

gained public attention when they started patrolling the streets of Gyöngyöspata in 2011. The

greatest risk posed by the organization is that it effectively challenges the state monopoly on

force.

18

Protective Hungarian Guard Movement (Őrző Magyar Gárda Mozgalom) is one of the

successor organizations of the Jobbik-bound Hungarian Guard Movement, dissolved in 2009.

Subsequent to the decision of the court to ban the organization, the movement split into two parts:

first, the above mentioned New Hungarian Guard Movement was formed, with stronger ties to

Jobbik and a reasonably larger number of members; and second, the other wing of the Guard

movement (i.e. the Protective Guard Movement) was re-organized under the leadership of István

Dósa. The latter organization, that decided to turn against Jobbik, highlighted military and

physical training as one of the main objectives of its existence, whilst retaining independence

from parties and state borders. Subsequently, the movement went on to break into minor cells. Yet

in 2010, Gyula Keserű, the commander of the Gyula Gömbös battalion of the Guard in the Tolna

County, took the matter of re-organizing the movement in hand by assembling individually

functioning groups in counties and by expressing leadership. The captains appointed

consecutively elected Keserű to be the new captain-in-chief of the Protective Hungarian Guard

Movement.

National Guard Troops (Nemzeti Őrsereg), originally the National Guard Troops Civic

Guard and The Association for the Protection of Tradition (Nemzeti Őrsereg Hagyományőrző és

Polgárőr Egyesület), was established in 2007 in North-Eastern Hungary. The anti-Roma

association is an ally of Jobbik and considers itself to be a successor of the National Guard Troops

(Nemzeti Őrsereg) that famously demanded the revolutionary ‘12 points’ in 1848, and of the

National Guard Troops (Nemzetőrsereg) that participated in the revolution of 1956. The principal

foundation of their efforts is to strengthen the national thought without developing links to any

political party. Yet several of the association’s followers are members of Jobbik. In 2008, the

National Guard Troops increased international tension with Slovakia by organizing a visit of its

uniformed members to the Slovak town Kráľovský Chlmec (see Appendix B-2-D). In 2009, the

establishment of a novel territorial organization structure was launched within the association,

reminiscent to the late gendarmerie. Their appearance indeed reminds of military organizations:

they wear uniforms at their events, march in formations and use command words. Nonetheless,

they do not use weapons or tools otherwise applicable as weapons. The greatest risk posed by the

organization is that it effectively challenges the state monopoly at the local level.

Hungarian National Front Line (Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal, MNA) is a neo-Nazi

organization founded in 1989 in the city of Győr. It considers itself to be the sole genuine

successor of Hungarism that was formerly founded and represented by Ferenc Szálasi. The

original name of the organization was Hungarian National Socialist Action Groups (Magyar

Nemzetiszocialista Akciócsoportok). From 1995 onwards, the exclusive leader of the organization

has been István Györkös. It wasn’t before 2009 that MNA appeared in front of the wider public as

19

the organization that created the Popular Action Groups along with the United Hungary

Movement and website jovonk.info. The association considers the military training of its

members as highly important. Its members are trained by former and current soldiers. They

participate in training sessions and hiking trips on a weekly basis, whereas military camps are

organized annually, most of which are closed to the public. As a result of the rivalry familiar to

the organizations of the far right, MNA found itself completely isolated from all the other neo-

Nazi organizations that have practically ostracized the association.

3.1.3 Non5registered+groups+

Pax Hungarica is a legally unauthorized movement which was re-established in 2008

after a tribunal banned the movement from functioning as an association in 2005, along with the

Prosecutor’s Office banning its predecessor organization, Blood and Honor Cultural Association

(Vér és Becsület Kulturális Egyesület), an organization which had been present since the change

of the political regime in 1989-90. The current leader of the movement is Endre János Domokos,

formerly the leader of the banned Blood and Honor Cultural Association. The ideology embraced

by the organization is a collection of Hungarist and national socialist ideas as explained by Ferenc

Szálasi. The association spreads its propaganda on the streets by distributing flyers and other

promotion material by its members in both uniforms and casual wear, along with other followers.

Strictly according to the Hungarist traditions, the organization operates through a rigid hierarchy,

even its uniforms are identical with those used by party officials of the Arrow-Cross Party in

Hungary between the two World Wars.

Army of Outlaws (Betyársereg) is an informal alliance of various far right groups

considering themselves outlaws. According to their declared principles, they do not accept

“double standards, repression, the rule of foreign aliens, as [they] were born free as sons of the

peoples of the plains and so [they] remain even in slavery”.18 The organization founded by László

Toroczkai first emerged in public during the summer of 2008. In the absence of a center or

headquarters, the group with a membership of 60 to 80 people retains contact through meetings.

The organization does not have a formal leader either, yet the most prominent personality is Zsolt

Tyirityán, a former convict whose actions fuelling hatred and violence earned him public

prominence on several occasions in 2011. It was Tyirityán who caused the organization to get into

18 Kik vagyunk? At: www.betyarsereg.hu/kik-vagyunk (30. 4. 2012).

20

confrontations with Jobbik as well, hence the party called upon its members to leave the Army of

Outlaws.

3.2 Anti9Slovak!rhetoric!of!the!Hungarian!far!right!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!(Attila'Juhász–Péter'Krekó)!

The discourse on the far right surrounding Slovakia and the Slovak people is

unambiguously determined by historical events and, in the first place, by the Treaty of Trianon. In

this respect, there is no major difference regarding the relations with neighboring countries such

as Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. Yet the development after the fall of the communist regimes has

fuelled negative attitudes toward Slovakia. During the 1980s, village destructions in Transylvania

provided ground for hostile relations with Romania, whereas current conflicts have contributed to

the emergence of Slovakia for the Hungarian far right as the most likely target among the

neighboring countries.

The situation has shifted direction after the 2010 elections. The radical opinions regarding

Slovakia changed since Jobbik had become a parliamentary force and the stance and the attitudes

of the Hungarian far right regarding Slovakia have become part of mainstream political debates.

Nevertheless, the alternative stream outside the parliament and the confines of the political system

remained intact, and the position of Jobbik towards these attitudes is ambivalent. Jobbik

represents the radical stance in the parliament echoing somewhat similar rhetoric to those in the

alternative stream, whereas the party is ever-present at the key events of the Hungarian far right

(e.g. Magyar Sziget). Meanwhile, Jobbik maintains relations with extra-parliamentary

organizations that hold more radical ideas than Jobbik on issues that are important to the far right,

e.g. about Slovakia. György Gyula Zagyva, member of Jobbik’s parliamentary caucus is the

honorary president of the HVIM, whereas László Toroczkai, public figure notorious for various

performances carried out in Slovakia, is member representing Jobbik in the Csongrád County

Assembly. Hence Jobbik has both direct and indirect relations with organizations and people on

the brink of legality or beyond, such as the Army of Outlaws, an organization that proclaimed its

readiness for physical resistance, or György Budaházy, symbolic figure on the radical right who is

subject to several criminal trials.

All things considered, Slovakia has emerged as the number one enemy for the Hungarian

far right among the surrounding countries during the past couple of years, while the significance

of Romania has decreased in this respect and that of Serbia slightly increased. Statehood and

21

territorial issues, and related matters bearing negative consequences on Hungarian communities

have nonetheless retained their place in the center of the far right ideologies.

In the Hungarian nationalist discourse, Slovakia is depicted as a young state, one that

behaves like a problematic adolescent: frustrated, aggressive, neurotic, with (justified) inferiority

complex – for example, during the lowest point of the Hungarian-Slovak conflict the Weekly

Demokrata printed T-shirts featuring number 18 in a red circle with a statement “I’m older than

Slovakia” (see Appendix B-2-C). According to the interpretation of the Hungarian far right, the

Slovaks stole the Hungarian territory (because of Trianon every third Hungarian lives outside the

borders), and now deny that the territory of Slovakia used to belong to Hungary, whereas the

Slovaks created a state having ‘stolen’ the Hungarian symbols (e.g. the flag), and having rewritten

history in order to create some kind of makeshift, fake national identity. In sum, according to the

far right discourse, Slovakia is practically a non-existent state, an inherent part of the Greater

Hungary. The reason for the Slovak ‘aggression’ is that the Slovaks are envious of the 1000-year-

old history of Hungary.

The term most frequently used for the description of the Slovak people by the Hungarian

radical right is ‘tót’, an otherwise rather common surname. Its pejorative connotation has been

constantly strengthened by the negative subtext underlying in its usage in the past years. However,

in the communication of Jobbik and HVIM, there is a distinction between ‘tót chauvinists’,

‘Slovak bandits’ and the Slovak people in general, referring to the former two as enemies. The

2006 demonstration of László Toroczkai was admittedly based on the notion that the two nations

were victims of a background conspiracy aimed at generating ill-filling and hostility between the

two, what perfectly matches the conspiracy theories on the far right (“1100 years of peace and

coexistence. Who wants to disregard it?”).19

The Slovak language law, along with the measures implemented against dual citizenship,

bilingual local signs and a number of violent conflicts such as the aggression against a Hungarian

university student in Nitra are issues where not only the far right is issuing reactions. Yet these are

issues that make rivalry between extremist groups in the two countries even fiercer, ruling out all

forms of cooperation against a potentially common opponent or enemy. Extremist movements and

organizations that are potentially able to find common ground, such as the skinheads and neo-

Nazis are marginal factors on the Hungarian far right, since nostalgia for the World War II also

focuses on restoring the original territorial integrity of the country, just like almost all other topics

on the far right.

19 Öt év kitiltás után ismét Felvidéken. At: www.toroczkailaszlo.hu/?q=node/247 (30. 4. 2012).

22

4. Commonalities between the Slovak and Hungarian

far right

4.1 Cooperation!and!joint!activities!of!the!Slovak!and!Hungarian!far!

right!(Tomáš'Nociar)!

Even though animosity is characteristic for the most part of the spectrum of both the

Slovak and Hungarian far right, there are also cases of cooperation, joint activities and mutual

contacts. They are typical for the groups with more extreme political profiles (right-wing

extremist end of the far right spectrum) that lean towards racism. The cooperation often involves

organizing joint events (mostly concerts of neo-Nazi music formations), or mutual support and

attendance at demonstrations and marches (see examples in Appendix B-3). The Slovak entities

that took part in the preparation of such events include the Autonomous Nationalists and the

Slovak Togetherness that has dropped its earlier anti-Hungarian rhetoric. This type of joint events

is often defined as standing ‘against chauvinism’. The March against Chauvinism held in October

2010 illustrates the case. It was held under the auspices of the Slovak Togetherness and the

Hungarian National Front Line. A year earlier, in February 2009, representatives of the

Autonomous Nationalists supported the Day of Honor held in Budapest. It was a gathering of

right-wing extremists with a Europe-wide significance. A month later, on the 14th of March (the

anniversary of the foundation of the wartime Slovak state) the representatives of the Hungarian

National Front Line and of the Blood and Honor Hungaria arrived in the Slovak capital to support

the traditional march of the right-wing extremists. Nevertheless, similar events tend to be more of

an exception than a rule.

A number of quotes from an interview with the leader of the Slovak Togetherness

published in 2009 at a Hungarian neo-Nazi portal bloodandhonour.hu illustrate these views. The

SP leader stated, for instance, that the shared view on history and the admission of mistakes is of

major importance. He suggests that the two nations ought to strive for coexistence, given their

23

closeness not merely in terms of history, but also genetics.20 Mutual cooperation was also called

for in the speech by an SP activist in Komárno in 2010:

“We, the Slovak patriots, together with our Hungarian colleagues came here today to

demonstrate that cooperation between our nations is possible and very important. ... Our

traditional cultures are being replaced by uncurbed materialism and multiculture. It is thus

imperative that the Slovaks and Hungarians stand in resistance. Common European resistance! ...

Both nations are being terrorized by Gipsy parasites. We have to start defending ourselves.

Together rather than alone, we shall be able to better defend ourselves. Let’s fight for better

future of our nations. Slovaks and Hungarians together and no more against each other!”21

4.2 The! foreign!policy! orientation!of! the! far! right! (Sergej'Danilov,'Attila'Juhász–Péter'Krekó)+

The USA, Israel, the EU along with NATO are frequent targets of the far right entities in

both countries. Whilst they hold strong anti-Western and anti-European attitudes, they still aim to

strengthen relations with nondemocratic or semi-democratic regimes.

Far right organizations in Slovakia and Hungary openly sympathize in particular with

Russia. At the partisan level, Jobbik and the Slovak National Party keen to emphasize Russia’s

might and economic significance, and the importance of good relations. Other entities are open

about their admiration for Russian nationalist forces.

Among the far right groups in Slovakia, it is currently the Slovak Renascence Movement

that subscribes to the ideas of pan-Slavism22 and to Russia as such. It is connected with a range of

pan-Slavic unions and fora at home and abroad. Its members were previously arrested in Serbia

during a demonstration of the far right. The sympathizers of the movement, fearing a lack of

readiness to respond to aggression participate in martial arts defense exercises called the Russian

20 Interview vodcu Slovenskej Pospolitosti pre maďarskú pobočku Blood and Honour. At (registration required): www.security-society.org/?q=node/2865 (30. 4. 2012). 21 Pochod proti šovinizmu – Prejav aktivistu SP Jakuba Škrabáka v Komárne október 2010. At: www.pospolitost.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/pochod-proti-sovinizmu-prejav-aktivistu-sp-komarno-oktober-2010/ (30. 4. 2012). 22 Pan-Slavism is political thought that calls for greater co-operation among Slavonic nations and in some cases even for unity within a common state.

24

Combat Style, where they put themselves on display with a modification of the national flag of

the Russian Empire.23

The former deputy leader of the Slovak National Party, Anna Belousovová also tried to

keep cordial relations with Russia. In the name of the then President Medvedev she received an

award by the Speaker of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov in Moscow in 2009. Belousovová was

member of the Board of the Slovak–Russian Society until December 2011. Three former high

profile representatives of the SNS are still members of its Board. The Society claims that it “seeks

a connection between the advancements of the European integration and the traditional Slovak

Russophillia”.24 For instance, in January 2012 the Slovak National Party declared its intention to

fully support the wide gage track project.25

Positive attitude towards Russia is also apparent among the Hungarian far right. Jobbik’s

drift toward Russia became increasingly evident after the end of Russia’s border war with

Georgia. A fundamental part of the party’s economic platform is to open Hungary to the eastern

markets and to sell Hungarian products to Russia, China, even Iran, instead of the European

Union. The party’s energy-policy ideas show similar tendencies: Jobbik claims to believe in the

importance of increasing Hungary’s energy-independence, which they intend to achieve by

expanding the capacity of the Hungarian nuclear power plant at Paks. They would presumably

turn to Russia for help with the project. In terms of natural gas, Jobbik prefers Russia’s South

Stream pipeline to the EU Nabucco, arguing that the South Stream is the only pipeline with a

credible plan. According to Jobbik, Hungary needs to commit itself to the Russian project.

Another example of Jobbik’s sympathies towards Russia is the participation of its leader

Gábor Vona at a conference on retaining national traditions that was held in Moscow, where he

stated: “The way I see it, Europe does not exist without Russia, our continent has no future

without Russia”.26

23 The official national flag of the Russian Empire from 1858 to 1883. Flag is used by the Russian nationalists today. SHO used its colours at a military exercise in Modra in January 2012. At: www.sho.sk/clanok/789/branci-v-modre (30 .4. 2012). 24 Webpage of the Slovak-Russian Society. At: www.srspol.sk/ (30. 4.2012). 25 The wide gage track is used in the countries of the former Soviet Union. In Slovakia, political disputes have been held over the benefits of the project for years. 26 Orosz befolyás a Jobbikban, avagy Putyin tartja pórázon Vonáékat? At: www.jobbik.net/index.php?q=node/6320 (30 .4. 2012).

25

4.3 Anti9Semitism!(Attila'Juhász–Péter'Krekó,'Dušan'Mikušovič)!

In connection with Jews and Israel, the Slovak far right is traditionally reserved, or even

displays an attitude of hate. Whilst the agenda of the Slovak National Party tends to omit the issue

of Jews (it used to develop an anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma agenda instead), anti-Semitism is

evidently present within the more radical ranks on the scene. During the 1990s, it was particularly

within the skinhead subculture that a pattern of hatred against Jews emerged, which was adopted

from the German and Czech far right organizations. The pattern also included Holocaust denial27

and conspiracy theories.

The emergence of groups such as the Slovak Togetherness on the far right brought along

anti-Semitism that drew from local traditions and appeared in their agenda. It includes, in

particular, the justification of the deportations of Jews to the concentration camps during the

wartime Slovak state (plus the particular personal role played in this era by President Jozef Tiso),

as well as the repeated demonization of the role of Jews in Slovakia’s social life throughout

history. The Slovak Togetherness developed a habit of voicing anti-Jewish statements originally

linked to the 19th century historical leaders such as Svetozár Hurban Vajanský or Ľudovít Štúr.28

The statements were used to prove that anti-Semitism which led to the deportations was a

consequence of the past behavior of the Jews towards Slovaks. In 2010 a view emerged within the

far right suggesting that the so called right-wing Jews held anti-Roma sentiments. The theory

claims that, to such Jews, the Roma are the same issue as the Palestinians are in Israel:

“Does the Zionist establishment of the right-wing Jews not need someone like Marián

Kotleba through whom they would interpret to the remaining part of the Goyim the following: Let

us bring order to the Gypsies, as it is us who pays for them?”29

In addition to anti-Semitism or the criticism of Israel, there are also anti-Muslim initiatives

among the far right. Denial of multiculturalism and immigration is also strongly evident. In 2011,

the Slovak National Party wanted to pass a law that would ban minarets. The party also speaks of

27 For instance, the leader of the Slovak National Unity Stanislav Pánis stated for a Norwegian television that it was technically impossible for the Nazis to exterminate 6 million Jews. 28 Štúr’s popular statement depicts Jews as a nation that ruthlessly sucked the poor peoples for their own benefit and tried to destroy them morally, mercilessly depriving them of property. See Ľudový program Slovenskej pospolitosti – Národnej strany, 2005, p. 10. At: www.pospolitost.org/SP/programspns.pdf (30. 4. 2012). 29 Kotlebizmus zabijákom prvej ponovembrovej generácie? At: www.beo.sk/domace-udalosti/1176-kotlebizmus-zabijakom-prvej-ponovembrovej-generacie#vojna-ciganom (30. 4. 2012).

26

stopping the Islamization of Europe.30 Its leader Ján Slota is known for the following statement:

“we shall awaken when Muslims start cutting our throats”.31

Due to their harsh anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism (the downfall of the Hungarian

currency Forint in December 2011 was attributed to the Israeli–American lobby), most far right

actors in Hungary (and especially Jobbik) are openly pro-Palestinian and pro-Muslim. It is the

difference from a number of Western European far right parties, even though it might be in part

caused by the absence of a sizeable Muslim minority in Hungary. In the rhetoric of the Hungarian

far right, Israel poses a permanent threat to Hungary as it wishes to occupy its soil and colonize

the country financially, culturally and politically as well.

Jobbik burst onto the political scene with anti-Roma rhetoric and the slogan of ‘Gypsy

crime’. It is important to note that capitalizing on and strengthening the anti-Roma sentiment is by

far the most significant and socially most dangerous aspect of Jobbik’s politics. Yet the ideology

of Jobbik and the new organizations formed along the Guard model combine anti-Roma prejudice

with traditional, classic anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. In their view, Jews and Israel

deliberately stoke the fire of the Roma–non-Roma confrontation to realize their ‘colonizing’,

‘conquering’ schemes. According to Jobbik’s ideology, Jews and Israel are ultimately responsible

for the Roma problem. József Bíber, former leader of the party, expressed the view in no

uncertain terms in 2008: “What is Gypsy crime? Let’s not deceive ourselves: it’s a biological

weapon in the hands of Zionists”.32 The Roma in equation are no more than a subconscious tool of

Jewish conspiracy aimed at subjugating Hungary, as is illustrated by the remark made in 2009 by

Csanád Szegedi, current deputy leader of the party: “Our money is being used to fund Gypsy

breeding under state supervision”.33

Below are a few statements by far right representatives about the Gyöngyöspata affair34:

30 Deputy leader of the Slovak National Party A. Danko opened the issue on his blog after his meeting with the deputy leader of the Free Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) Johann Gudenus in January 2012. SNS a FPŐ: Stop islamizácii! At: www.andrejdanko.blog.sme.sk/c/286031/SNS-a-FP-Stop-islamizacii.html (30. 4. 2012). 31 SNS našla ďalšiu hrozbu: minarety. At: www.sme.sk/c/6038438/sns-nasla-dalsiu-hrozbu-minarety.html (30. 4. 2012). 32 A cigánybűnözés a cionizmus biológiai fegyvere. At: www.jobbsajoszentpeter.eoldal.hu/cikkek/ebredj-s-vigyazz_/a-ciganybunozes-a-cionizmus-biologiai-fegyvere.html (30. 4. 2012). 33 Jobbik needs Jews to run the world. At: www.budapesttimes.hu/2011/05/15/jobbik-needs-jews-to-run-the-world/ (30. 4. 2012). 34 An affair in 2011 when the For a Better Future Civic Guard Association, close to Jobbik, was patrolling in order to defend the majority against the ‘Roma crime’ what ended in violent clashes between them and the Roma.

27

“The time has come to state it clearly: Israel is bent on conquering Hungary. This is a

fact; as evidence, it is enough to look at the all but total monopoly of Israeli investments and real

estate developments. And the Gypsies are a kind of biological weapon in this strategy. They are

used as a means against the Hungarians just as, to use a simple analogy, a snow plough is

hitched to a truck.”35

“We are now witnessing here what happened in the US in the 1960s; various Zionist

circles incite the Gypsies against the majority population, just as they did in the 1960s among the

blacks in the US. And, as a result of this goading the Gypsies, an alien race, try to occupy the

living space against which we have to react in the spirit of healthy self-protection.”36

4.4 Football!hooligans!and!their!ties!to!the!far!right37!(Sergej'Danilov)!

Extremism among football hooligans, or rather their extremist behavior, has to be seen

within the context of their politicization. In Slovakia it primarily involves manifestations of

racism, anti-Semitism, national chauvinism and neo-Nazism. It does not mean, however, that such

hooligan groups are automatically extremist, though some of their members have ties to different

far right groups (they participate in marches, protests and gatherings) or sympathize with them. In

addition to hooliganism, these individuals commit crimes with extremist underscore (e.g. sieg

heiling or disseminating racist and neo-Nazi slogans and symbols).

It was already during the Communist regime that some manifestations of vulgar

nationalism appeared at the stadia between fans of Czech, Slovak and Hungarian nationality.38

After 1989, however, the nationalist sentiments gained full momentum. In 1992, the lottery draw

to host the European Champion Clubs’ Cup brought together Slovan Bratislava and Ferencváros

Budapest. The tension in Bratislava led to violent conflicts between the fans and resulted in police

intervention in the sector of the Ferencváros fans.

35 Lóránt Hegedüs, Member of Parliament for Jobbik, 1 May 2011. Országhódító zsidók állnak a cigánytenyésztés mögött. At: szentkoronaradio.com/belfold/2011_05_03_orszaghodito-zsidok-allnak-a-ciganytenyesztes-mogott (30. 4. 2012). 36 Zsolt Tyirityán, leader of the Army of Outlaws, active in Gyöngyöspata, 15 April 2011. Interjú a betyárvezérrel. At: betyarsereg.hu/koezlemeny (30. 4. 2012). 37 The chapter is based also on personal interview with a source close to the fans of DAC Dunajská Streda. 38 Mutual animosity is illustrated by such slogans as “Inter Nitra Dunajská – the Hungarian rat pack”, “Hit the Slovak over the head”, “The Czechs on foot to Prague” used in the 1980s, though the nationalist sentiments intensified after the fall of the Communist regime.

28

Today nationalist sentiments in the Slovak football grow in intensity particularly during

the matches of DAC Dunajská Streda (DAC). The club is based on a territory with a significant

proportion of the Hungarian minority. The DAC has been the symbol of the minority since the

Communist regime. Members of the Hungarian minority identify with the club in terms of

language, culture and history with the aid of symbols, chants and partnerships with Hungarian

groups of fans. The wider circle of ultra fans of the DAC represents some 400 people, 200 of

whom regularly attend home matches. Some are sympathizers of the Hungarian far right (Jobbik,

HVIM). During the matches they display anti-Slovak, autonomist, chauvinistic and revisionist

banners and reach for similar themed shouts.39

The more radical wing of the DAC fans includes sympathizers with HVIM. The primary

interest of these individuals is not football, but mainly exercising political influence on the public

opinion to support to their cause at stadia. Some individuals who identify with the DAC fans try

to promote the messages of HVIM through the internet.

DAC matches with Slovan Bratislava and Spartak Trnava all too often end up in the heat

of mutual nationalistic tensions and are highly risky. The atmosphere during the matches can be

explained as a vulgar culmination of the consequences of ethnic tensions that grew in Slovakia

under national-populist governments, the most recent of which was the cabinet led by Róbert Fico

(2006–2010). The tensions between Slovakia and Hungary intensified in November 2008

following a match between DAC and Slovan. Slovak police took action only in the sector of the

local ultras. That is also why the DAC fans still consider the action to be an unfair attack based on

their Hungarian ethnicity. The police never revealed a video recording that would show what gave

the impulse to the tough repressive action.

Subsequent legislative initiative by Rafael Rafaj, Member of Parliament for SNS, did not

alleviate the sense of injustice among the DAC supporters from the Hungarian minority. In

response to Rafaj’s initiative, the parliament passed a regulation (supported by all parties except

for the Hungarian Coalition Party) that banned the display of foreign national symbols and flags at

the Slovak football stadia.

The Hungarian Guard blocked the Slovak-Hungarian border in a number of towns as part

of a protest event organized by Jobbik in November 2008. Its representatives also criticized

foreign policy of their own government for its inability to solve the action of the Slovak police at

39 Report on the manifests of racism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, neo-Nazism and other forms of intolerance in football stadia in the years 2008 and 2009. At: futbal.rasizmus.sk/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Report-v2.pdf (30. 4. 2012).

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the stadium that was attended by numerous groups of radicals from Hungary. It also called for a

boycott of Slovak products sold in Hungary.

An international incident occurred in May 2010, when a court in Hungary convicted

eleven hooligans of Slovan Bratislava. To attend the Slovak Cup final in Michalovce they

travelled on a motorway in Hungary. At a resting place they sprayed swastikas and a slogan

“Death to Jobbik”.40

The tensions in Slovak–Hungarian relations eased after the election of Prime Minister

Iveta Radičová´s government in summer 2010, yet mutual nationalist vulgarism remains present

at the football stadia.

40 The Hungarian police arrested 111 fans. A court in the town of Encs convicted 11 of them. V Maďarsku odsúdili slovenských futbalových fanušíkov. At: www.topky.sk/cl/10/726804/V-Madarsku-odsudili-slovenskych-futbalovych-fanusikov (30. 4. 2012).

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CONCLUSION

Commonalities between the Slovak and Hungarian far right are evident especially when it

comes to the ideology, presentation and organization of individual entities. Differences are instead

in their origins and popularity. From the ideological vantage point, there are entities that represent

two principal directions in both countries: first, there is the more relevant ultranationalist direction

and, second, there is the more marginal, neo-Nazi orientation. The carriers of the former include

mainly political parties and civic groups. The latter was dominated by the currently declining

skinhead subculture that is being replaced by informal, yet more organized groups and some

registered civic associations. In terms of the origin and inspiration of these informal organizations,

the first difference becomes apparent. Whilst in Slovakia the emergence of such entities is directly

inspired by the trends from Germany and the Czech Republic (such as the National Resistance

and Autonomous Nationalists), such cross-border inspiration is virtually absent in Hungary, where

domestic nationalist and fascist traditions play the key role.

Some parallels can be noted in the presentation of individual entities. In addition to highly

similar ideological foundations, they often act virtually identically. A number of examples

illustrate the point. The first is related to the current core of the far right rhetoric – its anti-Roma

agenda. The term ‘Gypsy criminality’, first introduced in the Hungarian far right discourse, is

currently also used across the entire Slovak far right spectrum. The second example is the building

of crosses that earned Jobbik publicity in Hungary in 2003. The Slovak National Party opted for a

similar type of presentation in 2008. The third, best known example is related to the paramilitary

presentation of some groups. The Slovak Togetherness gained visibility through uniformed

marches in 2002. In Hungary, the Hungarian Guard and similar entities emerged in 2007. Yet

there is a difference here as well: whilst the Slovak Togetherness founded its political party in

Slovakia, it was Jobbik in Hungary that founded the Hungarian Guard.

An additional difference lays in the causes of different popularity of the far right players in

both countries today. Whilst in Hungary the far right and particularly Jobbik managed to gain

increasing in public support by using the socio-political climate of the time that was marked by

strong polarization of the main political camps, in Slovakia the far right parties hold on to their

standard popularity that oscillates around the parliamentary electoral threshold. In Hungary, the

representatives of the far right managed to create an image of sufficiently educated leaders with

a concrete agenda who are capable of addressing and solving the needs of their electorate. The

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politicians of the far right in Slovakia so far significantly lag behind in regard to their ideological

profile and intellectual capacity.

It will be interesting to follow the means by which the far right will present itself in the

future, whether its public support will grow or decline, and to what extent the trends will affect

Slovak–Hungarian relations.

Tomáš Nociar

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APPENDIX A

Categorization!of!the!far!right!subjects!in!Slovakia!

Type of organization:

Far right type:

Inclination towards:

Relation to democracy: Risk: Scope:

Slovak National Party

political party populist nationalism accepts political national

Nation and Justice

political party populist nationalism accepts political national

Peoples Party - Our Slovakia

political party radical nationalism accepts political national

Slovak Peoples Party

political party radical nationalism critical ideological multi-

regional

Slovak National Unity

political party radical nationalism critical ideological multi-

regional

Slovak Togetherness

civic association extremist nationalism/

neo-Nazism hostile ideological multi-regional

New Free Slovakia

civic association radical nationalism/

neo-Nazism critical ideological local

Slovak Renascence Movement

civic association radical nationalism critical ideological multi-

regional

National Resistance informal extremist neo-Nazism hostile violent local

Autonomous Nationalists informal extremist neo-Nazism hostile ideological multi-

regional

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APPENDIX A

Categorization!of!the!far!right!subjects!in!Hungary!

Type of organization:

Far right type: Ideology: Relation to

democracy: Risk: Scope:

Movement for a Better Hungary

(Jobbik)

political party radical

ultranationalist ethnocentrist (anti-Roma) anti-Semitic

ambivalent political national

Hungarian Party of Justice and

Life

political party populist ultranationalist

anti-Semitic accepts ideological national

Sixty-Four Counties Youth

Movement

civic association radical

ultranationalist irredentist

anti-Semitic critical political/

violent national*

New Hungarian Guard

civic association radical

ultranationalist ethnocentrist anti-Semitic

critical political multi-regional

For a Better Future Civic

Guard Association

civic association radical

ultranationalist ethnocentrist anti-Semitic

critical violent multi-regional

Protective Hungarian Guard

Movement

civic association radical

ultranationalist ethnocentrist anti-Semitic

critical violent multi-regional

National Guard Troops

civic association radical

ultranationalist ethnocentrist anti-Semitic

critical ideological/violent regional

Hungarian National Front

Line

civic association extremist neo-Nazi

(hungarist) hostile violent multi-regional

Pax Hungarica informal extremist neo-Nazi (hungarist) hostile ideological multi-

regional

Army of Outlaws informal radical ultranationalist ethnocentrist anti-Semitic

critical violent regional

* with international branches

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sergej Danilov – Milena Jesenska Visiting fellow in Vienna at Institute of Human Sciences.

Published author of a number of articles on topics related to political extremism and football

hooliganism. He has contributed to several studies since 2007.

Attila Juhász – Senior analyst, Political Capital Institute in Budapest. His main research interests

are radical right movements and migration policy. He has been doing research on the radical right

scence in Hungary since 2006. Author of more than 30 public analyses dedicated to this issue.

Péter Krekó – Director, Political Capital Institute in Budapest, assistant professor at ELTE

University of Sciences. His main research interests are radical right political movements and

conspiracy theories as ideological mobilizing tool in hand of these organizations. He has been

involved in the research of this topic since 2008. Author of more than 20 public studies and

analyses in the topic.

Dušan Mikušovič – Published author of studies on extra-parliamentary far right in Slovakia and

Slovak Togetherness in the past and present.

Tomáš Nociar – PhD student at Department of Political Science at Comenius University in

Bratislava. His current research interest is in the ideology of Slovak and Hungarian far right. He

has been researching political extremism, radicalism and politically motivated violence since

2007.