Looking for Leadership in the European Union

Review by Craig Parsons

Department of Political Science, University of Oregon

Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration. Edited by Derek Beach and ColetteMazzucelli. London: Palgrave, 2007. 304 pp., $74.95 (ISBN: 1-4039-9820-5).

In Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration, Derek Beach and ColetteMazzucelli have assembled a lineup of very well-informed studies that analyzerecent treaty negotiations in the European Union (EU). Focused on the lastthree rounds of EU reform (the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, the Nice Treatyof 2001, and the failed Constitutional Treaty in 2004), they will be of great usefor EU observers trying to understand the complex bargaining that has takenplace during the past decade.

In theoretical terms, Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration tries tograsp the role of leadership in these negotiations. Noting the paucity of sophisti-cated theorizing about leadership in the EU context (and arguably elsewhere),Beach and Mazzucelli propose a ‘‘leadership model’’ as a bridge between theintergovernmental and institutionalist (or neofunctionalist, in some variants) tra-ditions in EU studies (p. 2). Intergovernmentalism posits that EU treaty bargainscan be understood as direct, efficient bargains between distinct and rationalnational governments (Moravcsik 1998). Institutionalists argue, in various ways,that EU institutions and agents alter national bargaining over the treaties, deliv-ering outcomes that are different from what states would reach on their own(Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet 1998). The leadership model, write Beach and Maz-zucelli, explains ‘‘why different actors are able to provide guidance and leader-ship in European Union treaty reform negotiations’’ (p. 2).

Beach and Mazzucelli define leadership as ‘‘any action undertaken by an actorin order to attempt to solve collective action problems through the use of leader-ship resources’’ (p. 2). Demand for leadership in the EU rises, they theorize, asbargaining involves more players and more complex issues. Collective actionproblems and informational asymmetries multiply. They suggest that actors cansupply leadership to the extent that they command leadership resources: mate-rial resources, information of expertise, reputation, or ‘‘internal capacity’’(meaning organizational coherence and control). The chapters chart these mea-sures of demand and supply of leadership across various negotiations, issues, andactors. They address French, Dutch, Irish, Italian, Franco-German, British, andPolish national leadership at various points during the late 1990s and early2000s, as well as the impact of the European Commission, European Parliament,and the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.

Students of the EU will clearly profit from the expert information containedin these case studies. Their contribution in theoretical terms, however, is lessclear. Two ambiguities confuse the effort to bridge intergovernmentalism andinstitutionalism. The first problem is that the volume’s leadership focus oftensounds like new vocabulary applied to conventional accounts. Given that Beachand Mazzucelli basically define leadership as any attempt to get others to dosomething together, any strategy that aims at building a coalition—that is,almost any strategy in the context of EU treaty negotiations—is an example of

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International Studies Review (2007) 9, 729–731

‘‘leadership.’’ We hear, for example, that Poland’s attempt to persuade others toretain the Nice Treaty compromise on Council voting is a case of ‘‘negative’’and failed leadership (p. 6). In the otherwise strong chapter by Simone Bunse,Paul Magnette, and Kalypso Nicolaidis on ‘‘big’’ versus ‘‘small’’ states in the con-stitution negotiations, we are told that, ‘‘given the intensity of the preferences ofthe bigs, the Praesidium’s support of the Franco-German compromise, and thelack of coherence of the small state coalition, the bigs were effectively able toexploit their strong material resources, providing successful structural leadershipin the Convention that resulted in a pro-big state institutional outcome’’(p. 135). This argument is lucid and persuasive, but it is hard to tell what isdistinctive about the contribution that ‘‘leadership’’ has made to the ultimateresult.

A second ambiguity arises from a mischaracterization—if, admittedly, a com-mon mischaracterization—of the debate between the two schools that the ‘‘lead-ership model’’ is supposed to bridge. At several points, as in Beach’s chapter onthe Council Secretariat, we are offered the foil of ‘‘the still popular either–ordichotomy between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists’’ (p. 91). Thedichotomy, apparently, is that intergovernmentalists see an EU driven entirely bynational governments, whereas neofunctionalists (or, in latter-day form, institu-tionalists) see an EU driven entirely by supranational actors or processes. But noone has ever made the latter argument. Intergovernmentalists do assert that onlynational governments matter, but all variants of institutionalism assert only thatsupranational actors and processes also matter, not that national governmentsdo not. Beach, Mazzucelli, and their contributors clearly take the institutionalistside. They argue that both national governments and supranational actors haveexerted leadership in EU negotiations.

Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration might still help bridge theschools if it offered explanatory conditions under which national governmentsor supranational actors exert leadership. Yet, the book’s model is actually typo-logical, not explanatory, and, like much typological theory, it shades into tautolo-gies. On the demand side, different kinds of bargaining problems dictate theneed for certain kinds of leadership. Thus, ‘‘a situation like the deadlock duringthe Nice European Council in December 2000 was arguably one in which struc-tural leadership [based on material resources] from a position of obviousstrength was necessary to ‘muscle’ governments to concede in the sensitive dis-cussions on revising Council voting weights. In this negotiating context, if anactor attempted to supply instrumental leadership [based on information orexpertise], for example, by tabling creative compromise proposals, the suppliedleadership would not match the demand, and, therefore, would be unsuccessful’’(p. 10). In other words, if bargaining is at an impasse, we need impasse-breakingleadership. On the supply side, we learn that if actors possess the resources nece-ssary to meet this demand, then they will do so. If an actor has materialresources, it can exert structural leadership. If an actor has information or exper-tise, it can exert instrumental leadership. If someone has the right kind of repu-tation or ‘‘internal capacity,’’ that helps too. If Beach, Mazzucelli, and theircontributors could somehow measure which actors possess these capacities andwhich do not, and if they could determine more precisely how these resourcemixes change over time, the overall argument would cease to be tautological. Asit is, ‘‘leadership’’ appears to be merely a label used to talk about the residualsin simple models of national bargaining.

As it is, the case studies in Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration pro-vide convincing evidence that the residuals to simple deals have had a hugeimpact on EU bargaining in recent years. More players, more issues, and uncer-tainty about what national governments want from the EU have made for messy,even aimless negotiations. The chapter by Renaud Dehousse and Florence

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Deloche-Gaudez makes this point particularly well and goes so far that it seemsto question the book’s search for leadership in recent history. As Dehousse andDeloche-Gaudez assert, ‘‘one could argue that the last three rounds of [intergov-ernmental conferences] were characterized by an inherent weakness of leader-ship’’ (p. 223). Similarly, in their conclusion, Beach and Mazzucelli allow that‘‘another take on this situation is that the EU is presently leaderless … onecould interpret the recent history of the Union as a listless drift from one subop-timal outcome to another’’ (p. 244). The fact that none of the contributionsdirectly dispute this interpretation is important. Besides hinting that leadershipis extremely difficult to theorize, and especially difficult to pinpoint in recentEU history, Beach and Mazzucelli underscore the new, pervasive pessimism ofthose concerned about the future of the EU.

References

Moravcsik, Andrew. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maas-tricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sandholtz, Wayne, and Alec Stone-Sweet, eds. (1998) European Integration and Supranational Gov-ernance. New York: Oxford University Press.

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