Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010...
Transcript of Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010...
![Page 1: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Logics of Rational AgencyLecture 1
Eric Pacuit
Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceTilburg Univeristy
ai.stanford.edu/~epacuit
June 21, 2010
Eric Pacuit
![Page 2: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Part 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I Logics of Informational Attitudes and Informative Actions
I Logics of Motivational Attitudes (Preferences)
I Time, Action and Agency
Part 3: Merging Logics of Rational Agency
I Two Models of Information Dynamics
I “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ
I Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences
I Preferences Change, Plans Change
I Logics of Rational Agency in Action: Logic and Games
Eric Pacuit
![Page 3: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Part 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I Logics of Informational Attitudes and Informative Actions
I Logics of Motivational Attitudes (Preferences)
I Time, Action and Agency
Part 3: Merging Logics of Rational Agency
I Two Models of Information Dynamics
I “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ
I Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences
I Preferences Change, Plans Change
I Logics of Rational Agency in Action: Logic and Games
Eric Pacuit
![Page 4: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Part 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I Logics of Informational Attitudes and Informative Actions
I Logics of Motivational Attitudes (Preferences)
I Time, Action and Agency
Part 3: Merging Logics of Rational Agency
I Two Models of Information Dynamics
I “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ
I Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences
I Preferences Change, Plans Change
I Logics of Rational Agency in Action: Logic and Games
Eric Pacuit
![Page 5: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Part 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I Logics of Informational Attitudes and Informative Actions
I Logics of Motivational Attitudes (Preferences)
I Time, Action and Agency
Part 3: Merging Logics of Rational Agency
I Two Models of Information Dynamics
I “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ
I Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences
I Preferences Change, Plans Change
I Logics of Rational Agency in Action: Logic and Games
Eric Pacuit
![Page 6: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Part 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I Logics of Informational Attitudes and Informative Actions
I Logics of Motivational Attitudes (Preferences)
I Time, Action and Agency
Part 3: Merging Logics of Rational Agency
I Two Models of Information Dynamics
I “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ
I Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences
I Preferences Change, Plans Change
I Logics of Rational Agency in Action: Logic and Games
Eric Pacuit
![Page 7: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Part 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I Logics of Informational Attitudes and Informative Actions
I Logics of Motivational Attitudes (Preferences)
I Time, Action and Agency
Part 3: Merging Logics of Rational Agency
I Two Models of Information Dynamics
I “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ
I Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences
I Preferences Change, Plans Change
I Logics of Rational Agency in Action: Logic and Games
Eric Pacuit
![Page 8: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Course Websiteai.stanford.edu/~epacuit/lograt/nasslli2010.html
Reading Material
X Pointers to literature on the website
Concerning Modal Logic
X Course by Blackburn and Areces
X Modal Logic for Open Minds by Johan van Benthem (CSLI,2010)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 9: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Plan for the Course
Part 1: Introduction, Motivation and Background
Eric Pacuit
![Page 10: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 11: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
I Philosophy (social epistemology, philosophy of action)
I Game Theory
I Social Choice Theory
I AI (multiagent systems)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 12: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
What is a “rational agent”? What are we modeling?
has consistent preferences (complete, transitive)
(acts as if she) maximizes expected utility
reacts to observations
revises beliefs when learning a surprising piece of information
understands higher-order information
plans for the future
asks questions
????
Eric Pacuit
![Page 13: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
What is a “rational agent”? What are we modeling?
I has consistent preferences (complete, transitive)
I (acts as if she) maximizes expected utility
I reacts to observations
I revises beliefs when learning a surprising piece of information
I understands higher-order information
I plans for the future
I asks questions
I ????
Eric Pacuit
![Page 14: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
I playing a (card) game
I having a conversation
I executing a social procedure
I ....
Goal: incorporate/extend existing game-theoretic/social choiceanalyses
Eric Pacuit
![Page 15: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
There is a jungle of logical frameworks!
I logics of informational attitudes (knowledge, beliefs,certainty)
I logics of action & agency
I temporal logics/dynamic logics
I logics of motivational attitudes (preferences, intentions)
I deontic logics
(Not to mention various game-theoretic/social choice modelsand logical languages for reasoning about them)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 16: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
We are interested in reasoning about rational (and not-so rational)agents engaged in some form of social interaction.
There is a jungle of formal systems!
I logics of informational attitudes (knowledge, beliefs,certainty)
I logics of action & agency
I temporal logics/dynamic logics
I logics of motivational attitudes (preferences, intentions)
I deontic logics
(Not to mention various game-theoretic/social choice modelsand logical languages for reasoning about them)
I How can we compare different logical frameworks addressingsimilar aspects of rational agency and social interaction?
I How should we combine logical systems which addressdifferent aspects of social interaction towards the goal of acomprehensive (formal) theory of rational agency?
I How does a logical analysis contribute to the broaderdiscussion of rational agency and social interaction withinphilosophy and the social sciences?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 17: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Theory
“We wish to find the mathematically complete principles whichdefine ‘rational behavior’ for the participants.” (pg. 31)
J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.Princeton University Press, 1944.
“Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help usunderstand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makersinteract.” (pg. 1)
M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. Introduction to Game Theory. MIT Press, 2004.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 18: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Theory
“We wish to find the mathematically complete principles whichdefine ‘rational behavior’ for the participants.” (pg. 31)
J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.Princeton University Press, 1944.
“Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help usunderstand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makersinteract.” (pg. 1)
M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. Introduction to Game Theory. MIT Press, 2004.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 19: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Theory
“We wish to find the mathematically complete principles whichdefine ‘rational behavior’ for the participants.” (pg. 31)
J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.Princeton University Press, 1944.
“Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help usunderstand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makersinteract.” (pg. 1)
M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. Introduction to Game Theory. MIT Press, 2004.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 20: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Situations
Bob
Ann
U L R
U 1,2 0,0 U
D 0,0 2,1 U
1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in someinterdependent decision problem, and
2. the players recognize that they are engaged in a gamesituation
Eric Pacuit
![Page 21: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Situations
Bob
Ann
U L R
U 1,2 0,0 U
D 0,0 2,1 U
What should Ann (Bob) do? aldkfj adsfj asdf asdf asdf asdfasdfasf
the players recognize that they are engaged in a gamesituation
Eric Pacuit
![Page 22: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Situations
Bob
Ann
U L R
U 1,2 0,0 U
D 0,0 2,1 U
What does it mean for Ann to be perfectly rational? aldkfjadsfj asdf asdf asdf asdf asdfasf
the players recognize that they are engaged in a gamesituation
Eric Pacuit
![Page 23: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Game Situations
Bob
Ann
U L R
U 1,2 0,0 U
D 0,0 2,1 U
Ann’s best choice depends on what she expects Bob to do,and this depends on what she thinks Bob expects her to do,and so on...
the players recognize that they are engaged in a gamesituation
Eric Pacuit
![Page 24: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Who is game theory about?
L. Samuelson. Comments on Game Theory. Game Theory: 5 Questions, Auto-matic Press, 2007.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 25: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Who is game theory about?
1. Classical view: idealized world with perfectly rational agents
The game itself it taken to be a literal description of thestrategic interactionAny appropriate concept of equilibrium should be animplication of the information provided in the modeledinterpreted through assumption of perfect rationality.
2. Humanistic view: real people in interactive situations
the mathematical structures are models of the interactivesituationthe appropriate notion of equilibrium is part of thespecification of the model
L. Samuelson. Comments on Game Theory. Game Theory: 5 Questions, Auto-matic Press, 2007.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 26: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Who is game theory about?
1. Classical view: idealized world with perfectly rational agents
• The game itself it taken to be a literal description of thestrategic interaction
“We adhere to the classical point of view that the gameunder consideration fully describes the real situation —that any (pre) commitment possibilities, any repetitiveaspect, any probabilities of error, or any possibility ofjointly observing some random event, have already beenmodeled in the game tree.” (pg. 1005)
E. Kohlberg and J.-F. Mertens. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econo-metrica, 54, pgs. 1003 - 1038, 1986.
L. Samuelson. Comments on Game Theory. Game Theory: 5 Questions, Auto-matic Press, 2007.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 27: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Who is game theory about?
1. Classical view: idealized world with perfectly rational agents
• The game itself it taken to be a literal description of thestrategic interaction
• Any appropriate concept of equilibrium should be animplication of the information provided in the modeledinterpreted through an assumption of perfect rationality.
2. Humanistic view: real people in interactive situations
the mathematical structures are models of the interactivesituationthe appropriate notion of equilibrium is part of thespecification of the model
L. Samuelson. Comments on Game Theory. Game Theory: 5 Questions, Auto-matic Press, 2007.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 28: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
Who is game theory about?
1. Classical view: idealized world with perfectly rational agents
• The game itself it taken to be a literal description of thestrategic interaction
• Any appropriate concept of equilibrium should be animplication of the information provided in the modeledinterpreted through an assumption of perfect rationality.
2. Humanistic view: real people in interactive situations
• the mathematical structures are models of interactivesituations
• the appropriate notion of equilibrium is part of thespecification of the model
L. Samuelson. Comments on Game Theory. Game Theory: 5 Questions, Auto-matic Press, 2007.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 29: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
But, the game models are missing something...
Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions.
But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12 %respectively. But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations. (pg. 72)
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review, 98, pgs. 72-86, 2008.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 30: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
But, the game models are missing something...
Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game.
For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12 %respectively. But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations. (pg. 72)
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review, 98, pgs. 72-86, 2008.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 31: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
But, the game models are missing something...
Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12 %respectively.
But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations. (pg. 72)
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review, 98, pgs. 72-86, 2008.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 32: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
But, the game models are missing something...
Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12 %respectively. But the political situations are quite different.
Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations. (pg. 72)
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review, 98, pgs. 72-86, 2008.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 33: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
But, the game models are missing something...
Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12 %respectively. But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations. (pg. 72)
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review, 98, pgs. 72-86, 2008.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 34: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
What about a logical analysis?
I Which aspects of social situations should we focus on?Knowledge, Beliefs, Group Knowledge, Preferences, Desires,Ability, Actions, Intentions, Goals, Obligations, etc.
I One grand system, or many smaller systems that loosely “fit”together?
I Combining systems is hard! (conceptually and technically)
I Logics of rational agents in social situations.vs.
Logics about rational agents in social situations.
I Normative vs. Descriptive
Eric Pacuit
![Page 35: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
What about a logical analysis?
I Which aspects of social situations should we focus on?Knowledge, Beliefs, Group Knowledge, Preferences, Desires,Ability, Actions, Intentions, Goals, Obligations, etc.
I One grand system, or many smaller systems that loosely “fit”together?
I Combining systems is hard! (conceptually and technically)
I Logics of rational agents in social situations.vs.
Logics about rational agents in social situations.
I Normative vs. Descriptive
Eric Pacuit
![Page 36: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
What about a logical analysis?
I Which aspects of social situations should we focus on?Knowledge, Beliefs, Group Knowledge, Preferences, Desires,Ability, Actions, Intentions, Goals, Obligations, etc.
I One grand system, or many smaller systems that loosely “fit”together?
I Combining systems is hard! (conceptually and technically)
I Logics of rational agents in social situations.vs.
Logics about rational agents in social situations.
I Normative vs. Descriptive
Eric Pacuit
![Page 37: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
What about a logical analysis?
I Which aspects of social situations should we focus on?Knowledge, Beliefs, Group Knowledge, Preferences, Desires,Ability, Actions, Intentions, Goals, Obligations, etc.
I One grand system, or many smaller systems that loosely “fit”together?
I Combining systems is hard! (conceptually and technically)
I Logics of rational agents in social situations.vs.
Logics about rational agents in social situations.
I Normative vs. Descriptive
Eric Pacuit
![Page 38: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
What about a logical analysis?
I Which aspects of social situations should we focus on?Knowledge, Beliefs, Group Knowledge, Preferences, Desires,Ability, Actions, Intentions, Goals, Obligations, etc.
I One grand system, or many smaller systems that loosely “fit”together?
I Combining systems is hard! (conceptually and technically)
I Logics of rational agents in social situations.vs.
Logics about rational agents in social situations.
I Normative vs. Descriptive
Eric Pacuit
![Page 39: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
What about a logical analysis?
I Which aspects of social situations should we focus on?Knowledge, Beliefs, Group Knowledge, Preferences, Desires,Ability, Actions, Intentions, Goals, Obligations, etc.
I One grand system, or many smaller systems that loosely “fit”together?
I Combining systems is hard! (conceptually and technically)
I Logics of rational agents in social situations.vs.
Logics about rational agents in social situations.
I Normative vs. Descriptive
Eric Pacuit
![Page 40: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
The point of view of this model is not normative; it is not meantto advise the players what to do. The players do whatever they do;their strategies are taken as given.
Neither is it meant as adescription of what human beings actually do in interactivesituations. The most appropriate term is perhaps “analytic”; itasks, what are the implications of rationality in interactivesituations? Where does it lead? This question may be asimportant as, or even more important than, more direct “tests” ofthe relevance of the rationality hypothesis. (pg. 622)
R. Aumann. Irrationality in Game Theory. in: Aumann’s Collected Papers,Volume 1, Chapter 35, 1992.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 41: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
The point of view of this model is not normative; it is not meantto advise the players what to do. The players do whatever they do;their strategies are taken as given. Neither is it meant as adescription of what human beings actually do in interactivesituations.
The most appropriate term is perhaps “analytic”; itasks, what are the implications of rationality in interactivesituations? Where does it lead? This question may be asimportant as, or even more important than, more direct “tests” ofthe relevance of the rationality hypothesis. (pg. 622)
R. Aumann. Irrationality in Game Theory. in: Aumann’s Collected Papers,Volume 1, Chapter 35, 1992.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 42: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
The point of view of this model is not normative; it is not meantto advise the players what to do. The players do whatever they do;their strategies are taken as given. Neither is it meant as adescription of what human beings actually do in interactivesituations. The most appropriate term is perhaps “analytic”; itasks, what are the implications of rationality in interactivesituations? Where does it lead?
This question may be asimportant as, or even more important than, more direct “tests” ofthe relevance of the rationality hypothesis. (pg. 622)
R. Aumann. Irrationality in Game Theory. in: Aumann’s Collected Papers,Volume 1, Chapter 35, 1992.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 43: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
Introductory Remarks
The point of view of this model is not normative; it is not meantto advise the players what to do. The players do whatever they do;their strategies are taken as given. Neither is it meant as adescription of what human beings actually do in interactivesituations. The most appropriate term is perhaps “analytic”; itasks, what are the implications of rationality in interactivesituations? Where does it lead? This question may be asimportant as, or even more important than, more direct “tests” ofthe relevance of the rationality hypothesis. (pg. 622)
R. Aumann. Irrationality in Game Theory. in: Aumann’s Collected Papers,Volume 1, Chapter 35, 1992.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 44: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
Background
I Basic Modal Logic
I Weak Systems of Modal Logic
I Combining Logics
I Comparing Logics
Eric Pacuit
![Page 45: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Background
X Basic Modal Logic
⇒ Weak Systems of Modal Logic
⇒ Combining Logics
⇒ Comparing Logics
Eric Pacuit
![Page 46: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 47: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
The Basic Modal Language: L
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | �ϕ | ♦ϕ
where p is an atomic proposition (At)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 48: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Kripke (Relational) Models
M = 〈W ,R,V 〉
I W 6= ∅I R ⊆W ×W
I V : At→ ℘(W )
Eric Pacuit
![Page 49: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Kripke (Relational) Models
M = 〈W ,R,V 〉
I W 6= ∅I R ⊆W ×W
I V : At→ ℘(W )
Eric Pacuit
![Page 50: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Truth in a Kripke Model
1. M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
2. M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
3. M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
4. M,w |= �ϕ iff for each v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ
5. M,w |= ♦ϕ iff there is a v ∈W such that wRv and M, v |= ϕ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 51: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Validities
(M) �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ �ϕ ∧�ψ
(C) �ϕ ∧�ψ → �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(N) �>
(K) �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
(Dual) �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
(Nec) from ` ϕ infer ` �ϕ
(Re) from ` ϕ↔ ψ infer ` �ϕ↔ �ψ
(Mon)` ϕ→ ψ
` �ϕ→ �ψ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 52: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Validities
(M) �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ �ϕ ∧�ψ
(C) �ϕ ∧�ψ → �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(N) �>
(K) �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
(Dual) �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
(Nec) from ` ϕ infer ` �ϕ
(Re) from ` ϕ↔ ψ infer ` �ϕ↔ �ψ
(Mon)` ϕ→ ψ
` �ϕ→ �ψ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 53: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Neighborhoods
In a topology, a neighborhood of a point x is any set A containingx such that you can “wiggle” x without leaving A.
A neighborhood system of a point x is the collection ofneighborhoods of x .
Eric Pacuit
![Page 54: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Neighborhoods in Modal Logic
Neighborhood Structure: 〈W ,N,V 〉
I W 6= ∅I N : W → ℘(℘(W ))
I V : At→ ℘(W )
Eric Pacuit
![Page 55: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Notation
Given ϕ ∈ L and a model M, the
I proposition expressed by ϕ
I extension of ϕ
I truth set of ϕ
is
(ϕ)M = {w ∈W | M,w |= ϕ}
Eric Pacuit
![Page 56: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Notation
Given ϕ ∈ L and a model M, the
I proposition expressed by ϕ
I extension of ϕ
I truth set of ϕ
is
(ϕ)M = {w ∈W | M,w |= ϕ}
Eric Pacuit
![Page 57: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
w |= �ϕ if the truth set of ϕ is a neighborhood of w
neighborhood in some topology.J. McKinsey and A. Tarski. The Algebra of Topology. 1944.
contains all the immediate neighbors in some graphS. Kripke. A Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic. 1963.
an element of some distinguished collection of setsD. Scott. Advice on Modal Logic. 1970.
R. Montague. Pragmatics. 1968.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 58: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
w |= �ϕ if the truth set of ϕ is a neighborhood of w
What does it mean to be a neighborhood?
neighborhood in some topology.J. McKinsey and A. Tarski. The Algebra of Topology. 1944.
contains all the immediate neighbors in some graphS. Kripke. A Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic. 1963.
an element of some distinguished collection of setsD. Scott. Advice on Modal Logic. 1970.
R. Montague. Pragmatics. 1968.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 59: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
w |= �ϕ if the truth set of ϕ is a neighborhood of w
neighborhood in some topology.J. McKinsey and A. Tarski. The Algebra of Topology. 1944.
contains all the immediate neighbors in some graphS. Kripke. A Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic. 1963.
an element of some distinguished collection of setsD. Scott. Advice on Modal Logic. 1970.
R. Montague. Pragmatics. 1968.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 60: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
w |= �ϕ if the truth set of ϕ is a neighborhood of w
neighborhood in some topology.J. McKinsey and A. Tarski. The Algebra of Topology. 1944.
contains all the immediate neighbors in some graphS. Kripke. A Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic. 1963.
an element of some distinguished collection of setsD. Scott. Advice on Modal Logic. 1970.
R. Montague. Pragmatics. 1968.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 61: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
w |= �ϕ if the truth set of ϕ is a neighborhood of w
neighborhood in some topology.J. McKinsey and A. Tarski. The Algebra of Topology. 1944.
contains all the immediate neighbors in some graphS. Kripke. A Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic. 1963.
an element of some distinguished collection of setsD. Scott. Advice on Modal Logic. 1970.
R. Montague. Pragmatics. 1968.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 62: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
To see the necessity of the more general approach, wecould consider probability operators, conditionalnecessity, or, to invoke an especially perspicuous exampleof Dana Scott, the present progressive tense....Thus Nmight receive the awkward reading ‘it is being the casethat’, in the sense in which ‘it is being the case thatJones leaves’ is synonymous with ‘Jones is leaving’.
(Montague, pg. 73)
R. Montague. Pragmatics and Intentional Logic. 1970.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 63: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Segerberg’s Essay
K. Segerberg. An Essay on Classical Modal Logic. Uppsula Technical Report,1970.
This essay purports to deal with classical modal logic.The qualification “classical” has not yet been given anestablished meaning in connection with modallogic....Clearly one would like to reserve the label“classical” for a category of modal logics which—ifpossible—is large enough to contain all or most of thesystems which for historical or theoretical reasons havecome to be regarded as important, and which also possesa high degree of naturalness and homogeneity.
(pg. 1)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 64: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Segerberg’s Essay
K. Segerberg. An Essay on Classical Modal Logic. Uppsula Technical Report,1970.
This essay purports to deal with classical modal logic.The qualification “classical” has not yet been given anestablished meaning in connection with modallogic....Clearly one would like to reserve the label“classical” for a category of modal logics which—ifpossible—is large enough to contain all or most of thesystems which for historical or theoretical reasons havecome to be regarded as important, and which also possesa high degree of naturalness and homogeneity.
(pg. 1)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 65: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Logics of High Probability
�ϕ means “ϕ is assigned ‘high’ probability”, where high meansabove some threshold r ∈ [0, 1].
Claim: Mon is a valid rule of inference.
Claim: C is not valid.
H. Kyburg and C.M. Teng. The Logic of Risky Knowledge. Proceedings ofWoLLIC (2002).
A. Herzig. Modal Probability, Belief, and Actions. Fundamenta Informaticae(2003).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 66: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Logics of High Probability
�ϕ means “ϕ is assigned ‘high’ probability”, where high meansabove some threshold r ∈ [0, 1].
Claim: Mon is a valid rule of inference.
Claim: C is not valid.
H. Kyburg and C.M. Teng. The Logic of Risky Knowledge. Proceedings ofWoLLIC (2002).
A. Herzig. Modal Probability, Belief, and Actions. Fundamenta Informaticae(2003).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 67: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Logics of High Probability
�ϕ means “ϕ is assigned ‘high’ probability”, where high meansabove some threshold r ∈ [0, 1].
Claim: Mon is a valid rule of inference.
Claim: C is not valid.
H. Kyburg and C.M. Teng. The Logic of Risky Knowledge. Proceedings ofWoLLIC (2002).
A. Herzig. Modal Probability, Belief, and Actions. Fundamenta Informaticae(2003).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 68: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Logics of High Probability
�ϕ means “ϕ is assigned ‘high’ probability”, where high meansabove some threshold r ∈ [0, 1].
Claim: Mon is a valid rule of inference.
Claim: C is not valid.
H. Kyburg and C.M. Teng. The Logic of Risky Knowledge. Proceedings ofWoLLIC (2002).
A. Herzig. Modal Probability, Belief, and Actions. Fundamenta Informaticae(2003).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 69: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
Eric Pacuit
![Page 70: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
Note: the language is restricted so that ��α is not a wff.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 71: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
Consensus: α is accepted provided everyone accepts α.
(E) �α↔ �β provided α↔ β is a tautology
(M) �(α ∧ β)→ (�α ∧�β)
(C) (�α ∧�β)→ (�α ∧�β)
(N) �>(D) ¬�⊥
Eric Pacuit
![Page 72: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
Consensus: α is accepted provided everyone accepts α.
(E) �α↔ �β provided α↔ β is a tautology
(M) �(α ∧ β)→ (�α ∧�β)
(C) (�α ∧�β)→ (�α ∧�β)
(N) �>(D) ¬�⊥
Theorem The above axioms axiomatize consensus (providedn ≥ 2|At|)).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 73: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
Majority: α is accepted if a majority of the agents accept α.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 74: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
Majority: α is accepted if a majority of the agents accept α.
(E) �α↔ �β provided α↔ β is a tautology
(M) �(α ∧ β)→ (�α ∧�β)
(S) �α→ ¬�¬α(T) ([≥]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [≥]ϕk ∧ [≤]ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [≤]ψk)→∧
1≤i≤k([=]ϕi ∧ [=]ψi ) where ∀v ∈ VI :|{i | v(ϕi ) = 1}| = |{i | v(ψi ) = 1}|
Theorem The above axioms axiomatize majority.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 75: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/75.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Example: Social Choice Theory
�α mean “the group accepts α.”
M. Pauly. Axiomatizing Collective Judgement Sets in a Minimal Logical Lan-guage. 2006.
T. Daniels. Social Choice and Logic via Simple Games. ILLC, Masters Thesis,2007.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 76: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/76.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Many Other Examples
I Epistemic Logic: the logical omniscience problem.
M. Vardi. On Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience. TARK (1986).
I Reasoning about coalitions
M. Pauly. Logic for Social Software. Ph.D. Thesis, ILLC (2001).
I Knowledge Representation
V. Padmanabhan, G. Governatori, K. Su . Knowledge Assesment: A ModalLogic Approach. KRAQ (2007).
I Program logics: modeling concurrent programs
D. Peleg. Concurrent Dynamic Logic. J. ACM (1987).
I More during this course....
Eric Pacuit
![Page 77: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Neighborhood Frames
Let W be a non-empty set of states.
Any map N : W → ℘(℘(W )) is called a neighborhood function
DefinitionA pair 〈W ,N〉 is a called a neighborhood frame if W a non-emptyset and N is a neighborhood function.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 78: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/78.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Terminology
Let F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
I F is closed under intersections if for any collections of sets{Xi}i∈I such that for each i ∈ I , Xi ∈ N(w), then∩i∈I Xi ∈ N(w).
I F is supplemented, or closed under supersets or monotonicprovided for each X ⊆W , if X ∈ N(w) and X ⊆ Y ⊆W ,then Y ∈ N(w).
I F contains the unit provided W ∈ N(w)
I the set ∩X∈FX the core of F . F contains its core provided∩X∈FX ∈ F .
I F is augmented if F contains it core and is supplemented.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 79: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/79.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Terminology
Let F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
I F is closed under intersections if for any collections of sets{Xi}i∈I such that for each i ∈ I , Xi ∈ N(w), then∩i∈I Xi ∈ N(w).
I F is supplemented, or closed under supersets or monotonicprovided for each X ⊆W , if X ∈ N(w) and X ⊆ Y ⊆W ,then Y ∈ N(w).
I F contains the unit provided W ∈ N(w)
I the set ∩X∈FX the core of F . F contains its core provided∩X∈FX ∈ F .
I F is augmented if F contains it core and is supplemented.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 80: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/80.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Terminology
Let F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
I F is closed under intersections if for any collections of sets{Xi}i∈I such that for each i ∈ I , Xi ∈ N(w), then∩i∈I Xi ∈ N(w).
I F is supplemented, or closed under supersets or monotonicprovided for each X ⊆W , if X ∈ N(w) and X ⊆ Y ⊆W ,then Y ∈ N(w).
I F contains the unit provided W ∈ N(w)
I the set ∩X∈FX the core of F . F contains its core provided∩X∈FX ∈ F .
I F is augmented if F contains it core and is supplemented.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 81: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/81.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Terminology
Let F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
I F is closed under intersections if for any collections of sets{Xi}i∈I such that for each i ∈ I , Xi ∈ N(w), then∩i∈I Xi ∈ N(w).
I F is supplemented, or closed under supersets or monotonicprovided for each X ⊆W , if X ∈ N(w) and X ⊆ Y ⊆W ,then Y ∈ N(w).
I F contains the unit provided W ∈ N(w)
I the set ∩X∈FX the core of F . F contains its core provided∩X∈FX ∈ F .
I F is augmented if F contains it core and is supplemented.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 82: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/82.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Terminology
Let F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
I F is closed under intersections if for any collections of sets{Xi}i∈I such that for each i ∈ I , Xi ∈ N(w), then∩i∈I Xi ∈ N(w).
I F is supplemented, or closed under supersets or monotonicprovided for each X ⊆W , if X ∈ N(w) and X ⊆ Y ⊆W ,then Y ∈ N(w).
I F contains the unit provided W ∈ N(w)
I the set ∩X∈FX the core of F . F contains its core provided∩X∈FX ∈ F .
I F is augmented if F contains it core and is supplemented.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 83: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/83.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Kripke Frames to Neighborhood Frames
Let R ⊆W ×W , define a map R→ : W → ℘W :
for each w ∈W , let R→(w) = {v | wRv}
Eric Pacuit
![Page 84: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/84.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Kripke Frames to Neighborhood Frames
Let R ⊆W ×W , define a map R→ : W → ℘W :
for each w ∈W , let R→(w) = {v | wRv}
DefinitionGiven a relation R on a set W and a state w ∈W . A set X ⊆Wis R-necessary at w if R→(w) ⊆ X .
Eric Pacuit
![Page 85: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/85.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Kripke Frames to Neighborhood Frames
Let R ⊆W ×W , define a map R→ : W → ℘W :
for each w ∈W , let R→(w) = {v | wRv}
Let NRw be the set of sets that are R-necessary at w :
NRw = {X | R→(w) ⊆ X}
Eric Pacuit
![Page 86: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/86.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Kripke Frames to Neighborhood Frames
Let R ⊆W ×W , define a map R→ : W → ℘W :
for each w ∈W , let R→(w) = {v | wRv}
Let NRw be the set of sets that are R-necessary at w :
NRw = {X | R→(w) ⊆ X}
LemmaLet R be a relation on W . Then for each w ∈W , NR
w isaugmented.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 87: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/87.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Kripke Frames to Neighborhood Frames
Properties of R are reflected in NRw :
I If R is reflexive, then for each w ∈W , w ∈ ∩NRw
I If R is transitive then for each w ∈W , if X ∈ NRw , then
{v | X ∈ NRv } ∈ NR
w .
Eric Pacuit
![Page 88: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/88.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Neighborhood Frames to Kripke Frames
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
for all X ⊆W , X ∈ N(w) iff X ∈ NRw .
Theorem
X Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w ∈W , let N(w) = NR
w .
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
X Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w , v ∈W , wRNv iff v ∈ ∩N(w).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 89: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/89.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Neighborhood Frames to Kripke Frames
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
for all X ⊆W , X ∈ N(w) iff X ∈ NRw .
Theorem
X Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w ∈W , let N(w) = NR
w .
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
X Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w , v ∈W , wRNv iff v ∈ ∩N(w).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 90: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/90.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Neighborhood Frames to Kripke Frames
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
for all X ⊆W , X ∈ N(w) iff X ∈ NRw .
Theorem
X Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w ∈W , let N(w) = NR
w .
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
X Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w , v ∈W , wRNv iff v ∈ ∩N(w).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 91: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/91.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
From Neighborhood Frames to Kripke Frames
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
for all X ⊆W , X ∈ N(w) iff X ∈ NRw .
Theorem
X Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
I Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w ∈W , let N(w) = NR
w .
Theorem
I Let 〈W ,R〉 be a relational frame. Then there is an equivalentaugmented neighborhood frame.
X Let 〈W ,N〉 be an augmented neighborhood frame. Thenthere is an equivalent relational frame.
Proof.For each w , v ∈W , wRNv iff v ∈ ∩N(w).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 92: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/92.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Neighborhood Model
Let F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame. A neighborhood modelbased on F is a tuple 〈W ,N,V 〉 where V : At→ 2W is a valuationfunction.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 93: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/93.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Truth in a Model
I M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
I M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
I M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
I M,w |= �ϕ iff (ϕ)M ∈ N(w)
I M,w |= ♦ϕ iff W − (ϕ)M 6∈ N(w)
where (ϕ)M = {w | M,w |= ϕ}.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 94: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/94.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Truth in a Model
I M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
I M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
I M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
I M,w |= �ϕ iff (ϕ)M ∈ N(w)
I M,w |= ♦ϕ iff W − (ϕ)M 6∈ N(w)
where (ϕ)M = {w | M,w |= ϕ}.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 95: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/95.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
Suppose W = {w , s, v} is the set of states and define aneighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 as follows:
I N(w) = {{s}, {v}, {w , v}}I N(s) = {{w , v}, {w}, {w , s}}I N(v) = {{s, v}, {w}, ∅}
Further suppose that V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}.
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
Eric Pacuit
![Page 96: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/96.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
Suppose W = {w , s, v} is the set of states and define aneighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 as follows:
I N(w) = {{s}, {v}, {w , v}}I N(s) = {{w , v}, {w}, {w , s}}I N(v) = {{s, v}, {w}, ∅}
Further suppose that V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}.
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
Eric Pacuit
![Page 97: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/97.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
Suppose W = {w , s, v} is the set of states and define aneighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 as follows:
I N(w) = {{s}, {v}, {w , v}}I N(s) = {{w , v}, {w}, {w , s}}I N(v) = {{s, v}, {w}, ∅}
Further suppose that V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}.
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
Eric Pacuit
![Page 98: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/98.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
Suppose W = {w , s, v} is the set of states and define aneighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 as follows:
I N(w) = {{s}, {v}, {w , v}}I N(s) = {{w , v}, {w}, {w , s}}I N(v) = {{s, v}, {w}, ∅}
Further suppose that V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}.
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
Eric Pacuit
![Page 99: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/99.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
Eric Pacuit
![Page 100: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/100.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, s |= �p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 101: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/101.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, s |= �p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 102: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/102.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, s |= ♦p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 103: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/103.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, s |= ♦p
(¬p)M = {v}
Eric Pacuit
![Page 104: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/104.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p?
M, v |= ♦�p?M,w |= ��p?
M,w |= ♦�p?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 105: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/105.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�p?M,w |= ��p?
M,w |= ♦�p?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 106: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/106.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�p?M,w |= ��p?
M,w |= ♦�p?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 107: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/107.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�p?M,w |= ��p?
M,w |= ♦�p?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 108: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/108.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�pM,w |= ��p
M,w 6|= ♦�p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 109: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/109.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�pM,w |= ��p
M,w 6|= ♦�p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 110: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/110.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�pM,w |= ��p
M,w 6|= ♦�p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 111: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/111.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Detailed Example
V (p) = {w , s} and V (q) = {s, v}
w s v
{s} {v} {w , v} {w , s} {w} {s, v} ∅
M, v |= �♦p
M, v |= ♦�pM,w |= ��p
M,w 6|= ♦�p
Eric Pacuit
![Page 112: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/112.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
DefinitionA modal formula ϕ defines a property P of neighborhood functionsif any neighborhood frame F has property P iff F validates ϕ.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 113: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/113.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
LemmaLet F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame. ThenF |= �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ �ϕ ∧�ψ iff F is closed under supersets.
LemmaLet F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame. ThenF |= �ϕ∧�ψ → �(ϕ∧ψ) iff F is closed under finite intersections.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 114: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/114.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
LemmaLet F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame. ThenF |= �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ �ϕ ∧�ψ iff F is closed under supersets.
LemmaLet F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame. ThenF |= �ϕ∧�ψ → �(ϕ∧ψ) iff F is closed under finite intersections.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 115: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/115.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
Consider the formulas ♦> and �ϕ→ ♦ϕ.
On relational frames, these formulas both define the sameproperty: seriality.
On neighborhood frames:
I ♦> corresponds to the property ∅ 6∈ N(w)
I �ϕ→ ♦ϕ is valid on F iff F is proper.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 116: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/116.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
Consider the formulas ♦> and �ϕ→ ♦ϕ.
On relational frames, these formulas both define the sameproperty: seriality.
On neighborhood frames:
I ♦> corresponds to the property ∅ 6∈ N(w)
I �ϕ→ ♦ϕ is valid on F iff F is proper.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 117: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/117.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
Consider the formulas ♦> and �ϕ→ ♦ϕ.
On relational frames, these formulas both define the sameproperty: seriality.
On neighborhood frames:
I ♦> corresponds to the property ∅ 6∈ N(w)
I �ϕ→ ♦ϕ is valid on F iff F is proper.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 118: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/118.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
Consider the formulas ♦> and �ϕ→ ♦ϕ.
On relational frames, these formulas both define the sameproperty: seriality.
On neighborhood frames:
I ♦> corresponds to the property ∅ 6∈ N(w)
I �ϕ→ ♦ϕ is valid on F iff F is proper.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 119: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/119.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
What can we say?
LemmaLet F = 〈W ,N〉 be a neighborhood frame such that for eachw ∈W , N(w) 6= ∅.
1. F |= �ϕ→ ϕ iff for each w ∈W , w ∈ ∩N(w)
2. F |= �ϕ→ ��ϕ iff for each w ∈W , if X ∈ N(w), then{v | X ∈ N(v)} ∈ N(w)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 120: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/120.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Find properties on frames that are defined by the followingformulas:
1. �⊥2. ¬�ϕ→ �¬�ϕ3. ♦ϕ→ �ϕ4. ♦�ϕ→ �♦ϕ5. �♦ϕ→ ♦�ϕ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 121: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/121.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Non-validities
1. �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ �ϕ ∧�ψ2. �ϕ ∧�ψ → �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
3. �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
4. �>5. �ϕ→ ϕ
6. �ϕ→ ��ϕ7. Many more...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 122: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/122.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Validities
(Dual) �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ is valid in all neighborhood models.
(Re) If ϕ↔ ψ is valid then �ϕ↔ �ψ is valid.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 123: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/123.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Other modal operators
I M,w |= 〈 〉ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ ]ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= 〈 ]ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ 〉ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 124: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/124.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Other modal operators
I M,w |= 〈 〉ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ ]ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= 〈 ]ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ 〉ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 125: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/125.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Other modal operators
I M,w |= 〈 ]ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ 〉ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 126: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/126.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Other modal operators
I M,w |= 〈 ]ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ 〉ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
LemmaLet M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 be a neighborhood model. The for eachw ∈W ,
1. if M,w |= �ϕ then M,w |= 〈 ]ϕ
2. if M,w |= [ 〉ϕ then M,w |= ♦ϕHowever, the converses of the above statements are false.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 127: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/127.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Other modal operators
I M,w |= 〈 ]ϕ iff ∃X ∈ N(w) such that ∀v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
I M,w |= [ 〉ϕ iff ∀X ∈ N(w) such that ∃v ∈ X , M, v |= ϕ
Lemma
1. If ϕ→ ψ is valid, then so is 〈 ]ϕ→ 〈 ]ψ.
2. 〈 ](ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (〈 ]ϕ ∧ 〈 ]ψ) is valid
Investigate analogous results for the other modal operators definedabove.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 128: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/128.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 129: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/129.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 130: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/130.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
Are multi-relational semantics equivalent to neighborhoodsemantics?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 131: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/131.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
Are multi-relational semantics equivalent to neighborhoodsemantics? Almost
Eric Pacuit
![Page 132: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/132.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
A world is called queer if nothing is necessary and everything ispossible.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 133: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/133.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
w is queer iff N(w) = ∅
Eric Pacuit
![Page 134: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/134.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
w is queer iff N(w) = ∅
A multi-relational model with queer worlds is a quadrupleM = 〈W ,Q,R,V 〉.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 135: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/135.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
A multi-relational Kripke model is a triple M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 whereR ⊆ ℘(W ×W ).
M,w |= �ϕ iff ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRv then M, v |= ϕ.
w is queer iff N(w) = ∅
A multi-relational model with queer worlds is a quadrupleM = 〈W ,Q,R,V 〉.
M,w |= �ϕ iff w 6∈ Q and ∃R ∈ R such that ∀v ∈W , if wRvthen M, v |= ϕ.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 136: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/136.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Different Semantics
M. Fitting. Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics. 1983.
L. Goble. Multiplex semantics for Deontic Logic. Nordic Journal of PhilosophicalLogic (2000).
G. Governatori and A. Rotolo. On the axiomatization of Elgesems logic of agencyand ability. JPL (2005).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 137: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/137.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕM �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (�ϕ ∧�ψ)
C (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 138: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/138.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕM �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (�ϕ ∧�ψ)
C (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
A modal logic L is classical if itcontains all instances of E and isclosed under RE .
Eric Pacuit
![Page 139: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/139.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕM �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (�ϕ ∧�ψ)
C (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
A modal logic L is classical if itcontains all instances of E and isclosed under RE .
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 140: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/140.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕM �(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (�ϕ ∧�ψ)
C (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
In E, M is equivalent to
(Mon)ϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψ
Eric Pacuit
![Page 141: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/141.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
Eric Pacuit
![Page 142: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/142.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC 6. Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
EC is the logic E + C
Eric Pacuit
![Page 143: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/143.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
EC is the logic E + C
EMC is the smallest regularmodal logic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 144: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/144.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
EC is the logic E + C
EMC is the smallest regularmodal logic
A logic is normal if it contains allinstances of E , C and is closedunder Mon and Nec
Eric Pacuit
![Page 145: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/145.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
EC is the logic E + C
EMC is the smallest regularmodal logic
K is the smallest normal modallogic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 146: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/146.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
EC is the logic E + C
EMC is the smallest regularmodal logic
K = EMCN
Eric Pacuit
![Page 147: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/147.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
PC Propositional Calculus
E �ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
Monϕ→ ψ
�ϕ→ �ψC (�ϕ ∧�ψ)→ �(ϕ ∧ ψ)
N �>K �(ϕ→ ψ)→ (�ϕ→ �ψ)
REϕ↔ ψ
�ϕ↔ �ψ
Necϕ
�ϕ
MPϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
E is the smallest classical modallogic.
EM is the logic E + Mon
EC is the logic E + C
EMC is the smallest regularmodal logic
K = PC (+E ) + K + Nec + MP
Eric Pacuit
![Page 148: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/148.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Useful Fact
Theorem (Uniform Substitution)
The following rule can be derived in E
ψ ↔ ψ′
ϕ↔ ϕ[ψ/ψ′]
Eric Pacuit
![Page 149: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/149.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Facts (1)
TheoremThe logic E is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of all neighborhood frames.
LemmaIf C ∈ L, then 〈ML,N
minL 〉 is closed under finite intersections.
TheoremThe logic EC is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of neighborhood frames that are closed under intersections.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 150: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/150.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Facts (1)
TheoremThe logic E is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of all neighborhood frames.
LemmaIf C ∈ L, then 〈ML,N
minL 〉 is closed under finite intersections.
TheoremThe logic EC is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of neighborhood frames that are closed under intersections.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 151: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/151.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Facts (2)
Fact: The canonical model for EM is not closed under supersets.
LemmaSuppose that M = sup(Mmin
EM). Then M is canonical for EM.
TheoremThe logic EM is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of supplemented frames.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 152: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/152.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Facts (2)
Fact: The canonical model for EM is not closed under supersets.
LemmaSuppose that M = sup(Mmin
EM). Then M is canonical for EM.
TheoremThe logic EM is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of supplemented frames.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 153: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/153.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Some Facts (2)
TheoremThe logic K is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of filters.
TheoremThe logic K is sound and strongly complete with respect to theclass of augmented frames.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 154: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/154.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Incompleteness?
Are all modal logics complete with respect to some class ofneighborhood frames?
No
Eric Pacuit
![Page 155: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/155.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Incompleteness?
Are all modal logics complete with respect to some class ofneighborhood frames? No
Eric Pacuit
![Page 156: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/156.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
IncompletenessMartin Gerson. The Inadequacy of Neighbourhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Journal of Symbolic Logic (1975).
Presents two logics L and L′ that are incomplete with respect toneighborhood semantics.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 157: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/157.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
IncompletenessMartin Gerson. The Inadequacy of Neighbourhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Journal of Symbolic Logic (1975).
Presents two logics L and L′ that are incomplete with respect toneighborhood semantics.
(there are formulas ϕ and ϕ′ that are valid in the class of framesfor L and L′ respectively, but ϕ and ϕ′ are not deducible in therespective logics).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 158: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/158.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
IncompletenessMartin Gerson. The Inadequacy of Neighbourhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Journal of Symbolic Logic (1975).
Presents two logics L and L′ that are incomplete with respect toneighborhood semantics.
L is between T and S4
L′ is above S4 (adapts Fine’s incomplete logic)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 159: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/159.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Comparing Relational and Neighborhood Semantics
Eric Pacuit
![Page 160: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/160.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Comparing Relational and Neighborhood Semantics
Fact: If a (normal) modal logic is complete with respect to someclass of relational frames then it is complete with respect to someclass of neighborhood frames.
What about the converse?
Are there normal modal logics that are incomplete with respect torelational semantics, but complete with respect to neighborhoodsemantics?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 161: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/161.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Comparing Relational and Neighborhood Semantics
Fact: If a (normal) modal logic is complete with respect to someclass of relational frames then it is complete with respect to someclass of neighborhood frames.
What about the converse?
Are there normal modal logics that are incomplete with respect torelational semantics, but complete with respect to neighborhoodsemantics? Yes!
Eric Pacuit
![Page 162: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/162.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Comparing Relational and Neighborhood Semantics
There is
I an extension of K
D. Gabbay. A normal logic that is complete for neighborhood frames but not forKripke frames. Theoria (1975).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 163: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/163.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Comparing Relational and Neighborhood Semantics
There is
I an extension of K
D. Gabbay. A normal logic that is complete for neighborhood frames but not forKripke frames. Theoria (1975).
I An extension of T
M. Gerson. A Neighbourhood frame for T with no equivalent relational frame.Zeitschr. J. Math. Logik und Grundlagen (1976).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 164: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/164.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
Comparing Relational and Neighborhood Semantics
There is
I an extension of K
D. Gabbay. A normal logic that is complete for neighborhood frames but not forKripke frames. Theoria (1975).
I An extension of T
M. Gerson. A Neighbourhood frame for T with no equivalent relational frame.Zeitschr. J. Math. Logik und Grundlagen (1976).
I An extension of S4
M. Gerson. An Extension of S4 Complete for the Neighbourhood Semanticsbut Incomplete for the Relational Semantics. Studia Logica (1975).
Eric Pacuit
![Page 165: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/165.jpg)
Background: Weak Systems of Modal Logic
X Basic Modal Logic
X Weak Systems of Modal Logic
⇒ Combining Logics
⇒ Comparing Logics
Eric Pacuit
![Page 166: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/166.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Literature
A. Kurucz. Combining modal logics. in: P. Blackburn, J. van Benthem andF. Wolter (eds.) Handbook of Modal Logic, Studies in Logic and PracticalReasoning 3, Elsevier, 2007 pp. 869 - 924.
D. Gabbay, A. Kurucz, F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev. Many-DimensionalModal Logics: Theory and Applications. Studies in Logic and the Foundationsof Mathematics 148, Elsevier, 2003.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 167: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/167.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Transfer Results
Given a family L of modal logics and a combination method C, docertain properties of the component logics L ∈ L transfer to theircombination C(L)?
Typical Assumptions:
1. C is only defined on finite families L of modal logics
2. C(L) is a (multi-)modal logic
3. C(L) is an extension of each component logic L ∈ L
Does (recursive) axiomatizability, decidability, complexity transfer?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 168: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/168.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Transfer Results
Given a family L of modal logics and a combination method C, docertain properties of the component logics L ∈ L transfer to theircombination C(L)?
Typical Assumptions:
1. C is only defined on finite families L of modal logics
2. C(L) is a (multi-)modal logic
3. C(L) is an extension of each component logic L ∈ L
Does (recursive) axiomatizability, decidability, complexity transfer?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 169: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/169.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Transfer Results
Given a family L of modal logics and a combination method C, docertain properties of the component logics L ∈ L transfer to theircombination C(L)?
Typical Assumptions:
1. C is only defined on finite families L of modal logics
2. C(L) is a (multi-)modal logic
3. C(L) is an extension of each component logic L ∈ L
Does (recursive) axiomatizability, decidability, complexity transfer?
Eric Pacuit
![Page 170: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/170.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Fusions
Let L1 and L2 be two normal (multi-)modal logics with disjoint setsof modal operators (say {�1, . . . ,�n} and {�n+1, . . . ,�n+m}).
The fusion of L1 and L2, denoted L1 ⊕ L2, is the smallest normalmodal logic in the joint language containing both L1 and L2.
If C1 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉} and C2 = {〈W ,S1, . . . ,Sm〉} are classesof Kripke frames, let C1 ⊕ C2 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn,S1, . . . ,Sm〉}
Theorem.s. L1 ⊕ L2 is a conservative extension of L1 and L2. IfL1 and L2 are characterized by C1 and C2 respectively, thenL1 ⊕ L2 is characterized by C1 ⊕ C2.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 171: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/171.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Fusions
Let L1 and L2 be two normal (multi-)modal logics with disjoint setsof modal operators (say {�1, . . . ,�n} and {�n+1, . . . ,�n+m}).
The fusion of L1 and L2, denoted L1 ⊕ L2, is the smallest normalmodal logic in the joint language containing both L1 and L2.
If C1 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉} and C2 = {〈W ,S1, . . . ,Sm〉} are classesof Kripke frames, let C1 ⊕ C2 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn,S1, . . . ,Sm〉}
Theorem.s. L1 ⊕ L2 is a conservative extension of L1 and L2. IfL1 and L2 are characterized by C1 and C2 respectively, thenL1 ⊕ L2 is characterized by C1 ⊕ C2.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 172: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/172.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Fusions
Let L1 and L2 be two normal (multi-)modal logics with disjoint setsof modal operators (say {�1, . . . ,�n} and {�n+1, . . . ,�n+m}).
The fusion of L1 and L2, denoted L1 ⊕ L2, is the smallest normalmodal logic in the joint language containing both L1 and L2.
If C1 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉} and C2 = {〈W ,S1, . . . ,Sm〉} are classesof Kripke frames, let C1 ⊕ C2 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn,S1, . . . ,Sm〉}
Theorem.s. L1 ⊕ L2 is a conservative extension of L1 and L2. IfL1 and L2 are characterized by C1 and C2 respectively, thenL1 ⊕ L2 is characterized by C1 ⊕ C2.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 173: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/173.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Fusions
Let L1 and L2 be two normal (multi-)modal logics with disjoint setsof modal operators (say {�1, . . . ,�n} and {�n+1, . . . ,�n+m}).
The fusion of L1 and L2, denoted L1 ⊕ L2, is the smallest normalmodal logic in the joint language containing both L1 and L2.
If C1 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉} and C2 = {〈W ,S1, . . . ,Sm〉} are classesof Kripke frames, let C1 ⊕ C2 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn,S1, . . . ,Sm〉}
Theorem. L1 ⊕ L2 is a conservative extension of (consistent) L1
and L2. If L1 and L2 are characterized by C1 and C2 respectively,then L1 ⊕ L2 is characterized by C1 ⊕ C2.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 174: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/174.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Fusions
Let L1 and L2 be two normal (multi-)modal logics with disjoint setsof modal operators (say {�1, . . . ,�n} and {�n+1, . . . ,�n+m}).
The fusion of L1 and L2, denoted L1 ⊕ L2, is the smallest normalmodal logic in the joint language containing both L1 and L2.
If C1 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉} and C2 = {〈W ,S1, . . . ,Sm〉} are classesof Kripke frames, let C1 ⊕ C2 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn,S1, . . . ,Sm〉}
Theorems. L1 ⊕ L2 is a conservative extension of (consistent) L1
and L2. If L1 and L2 are characterized by C1 and C2 respectively,then L1 ⊕ L2 is characterized by C1 ⊕ C2.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 175: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/175.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Fusions
Let L1 and L2 be two normal (multi-)modal logics with disjoint setsof modal operators (say {�1, . . . ,�n} and {�n+1, . . . ,�n+m}).
The fusion of L1 and L2, denoted L1 ⊕ L2, is the smallest normalmodal logic in the joint language containing both L1 and L2.
If C1 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉} and C2 = {〈W ,S1, . . . ,Sm〉} are classesof Kripke frames, let C1 ⊕ C2 = {〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn,S1, . . . ,Sm〉}
Theorems. Many other properties transfer (eg., decidability). Seethe Kurucz paper for details. If L1 and L2 are characterized by C1and C2 respectively, then L1 ⊕ L2 is characterized by C1 ⊕ C2.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 176: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/176.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products
Suppose F1 = 〈W1,R11 , . . . ,R
11 〉 and F2 = 〈W2,R
12 , . . . ,R
m2 〉 be
Kripke frames. Define the product:
F1 ×F2 = 〈W1 ×W2,R1h , . . . ,R
nh ,R
1v , . . . ,R
mv 〉
where
(w1,w2)R ih(v1, v2) iff w1R i
1v1 and w2 = v2
(w1,w2)R iv (v1, v2) iff w2R i
2v2 and w1 = v1
Let L1, L2 be (Kripke complete) logics, the product is
L1 × L2 = Log({F1 ×F2 | F1 ∈ Fr(L1) and F2 ∈ Fr(L2)})
Eric Pacuit
![Page 177: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/177.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products
Let L1 and L2 be Kripke complete (uni-)modal logics. Let [L1,L2]be the smallest modal logic containing L1,L2 and the axioms:
(comm) ♦1♦2p ↔ ♦2♦1p
(cr) ♦1�2p → �2♦1p
R1
R2R2
R1
Eric Pacuit
![Page 178: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/178.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products
Let L1 and L2 be Kripke complete (uni-)modal logics. Let [L1,L2]be the smallest modal logic containing L1,L2 and the axioms:
(comm) ♦1♦2p ↔ ♦2♦1p
(cr) ♦1�2p → �2♦1p
R1
R2R2
R1
R1
R2R2
R1
Eric Pacuit
![Page 179: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/179.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products
Let L1 and L2 be Kripke complete (uni-)modal logics. Let [L1,L2]be the smallest modal logic containing L1,L2 and the axioms:
(comm) ♦1♦2p ↔ ♦2♦1p
(cr) ♦1�2p → �2♦1p
R1
R2R2
R1
R1
R2R2
R1
R1
R2R2
R1
Eric Pacuit
![Page 180: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/180.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products: Some Interesting Facts
I [L1, . . . ,Ln] ⊆ L1 × · · · × Ln
I very few transfer results: eg., [K4,K4] = K4×K4, but isundecidable.
I [S4, Log(〈ω,<〉)] is Π11-hard (another example coming later...)
The general situation is very interesting, but beyond the scope ofthis course (see the Kurucz paper).
We will see many examples of combining/merging modal logicsduring the course...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 181: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/181.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products: Some Interesting Facts
I [L1, . . . ,Ln] ⊆ L1 × · · · × Ln
I very few transfer results: eg., [K4,K4] = K4×K4, but isundecidable.
I [S4, Log(〈ω,<〉)] is Π11-hard (another example coming later...)
The general situation is very interesting, but beyond the scope ofthis course (see the Kurucz paper).
We will see many examples of combining/merging modal logicsduring the course...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 182: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/182.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products: Some Interesting Facts
I [L1, . . . ,Ln] ⊆ L1 × · · · × Ln
I very few transfer results: eg., [K4,K4] = K4×K4, but isundecidable.
I [S4, Log(〈ω,<〉)] is Π11-hard (another example coming later...)
The general situation is very interesting, but beyond the scope ofthis course (see the Kurucz paper).
We will see many examples of combining/merging modal logicsduring the course...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 183: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/183.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products: Some Interesting Facts
I [L1, . . . ,Ln] ⊆ L1 × · · · × Ln
I very few transfer results: eg., [K4,K4] = K4×K4, but isundecidable.
I [S4, Log(〈ω,<〉)] is Π11-hard (another example coming later...)
The general situation is very interesting, but beyond the scope ofthis course (see the Kurucz paper).
We will see many examples of combining/merging modal logicsduring the course...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 184: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/184.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products: Some Interesting Facts
I [L1, . . . ,Ln] ⊆ L1 × · · · × Ln
I very few transfer results: eg., [K4,K4] = K4×K4, but isundecidable.
I [S4, Log(〈ω,<〉)] is Π11-hard (another example coming later...)
The general situation is very interesting, but beyond the scope ofthis course (see the Kurucz paper).
We will see many examples of combining/merging modal logicsduring the course...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 185: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/185.jpg)
Background: Combining Logics
Products: Some Interesting Facts
I [L1, . . . ,Ln] ⊆ L1 × · · · × Ln
I very few transfer results: eg., [K4,K4] = K4×K4, but isundecidable.
I [S4, Log(〈ω,<〉)] is Π11-hard (another example coming later...)
The general situation is very interesting, but beyond the scope ofthis course (see the Kurucz paper).
We will see many examples of combining/merging modal logicsduring the course...
Eric Pacuit
![Page 186: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/186.jpg)
Background
X Basic Modal Logic
X Weak Systems of Modal Logic
X Combining Logics
⇒ Comparing Logics
Eric Pacuit
![Page 187: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/187.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
What is the precise relationship between Neighborhood Modelsand Relational Models?
We can simulate any non-normal modal logic with a bi-modalnormal modal logic.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 188: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/188.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
What is the precise relationship between Neighborhood Modelsand Relational Models?
We can simulate any non-normal modal logic with a bi-modalnormal modal logic.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 189: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/189.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 190: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/190.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 191: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/191.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}
I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 192: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/192.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}
I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 193: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/193.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}
I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 194: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/194.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 195: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/195.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
The key idea is to replace neighborhood models with a two-sortedKripke model.
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉, define a Kripkemodel M◦ = 〈W ′,RN ,R63,RN ,Pt,V 〉 as follows:
I W ′ = W ∪ ℘(W )
I R3 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w ∈ u}I R63 = {(u,w) |w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ),w 6∈ u}I RN = {(w , u) | w ∈W , u ∈ ℘(W ), u ∈ N(w)}I Pt = W
Let L′ be the language
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [3]ϕ | [ 63]ϕ | [N]ϕ | Pt
where p ∈ At and Pt is a unary modal operator.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 196: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/196.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Define ST : L → L′ as follows
I ST (p) = p
I ST (¬ϕ) = ¬ST (ϕ)
I ST (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ST (ϕ) ∧ ST (ϕ)
I ST (�ϕ) = 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ))
LemmaFor each neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 and each formulaϕ ∈ L, for any w ∈W ,
M,w |= ϕ iff M◦,w |= ST (ϕ)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 197: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/197.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Define ST : L → L′ as follows
I ST (p) = p
I ST (¬ϕ) = ¬ST (ϕ)
I ST (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ST (ϕ) ∧ ST (ϕ)
I ST (�ϕ) = 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ))
LemmaFor each neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 and each formulaϕ ∈ L, for any w ∈W ,
M,w |= ϕ iff M◦,w |= ST (ϕ)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 198: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/198.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Define ST : L → L′ as follows
I ST (p) = p
I ST (¬ϕ) = ¬ST (ϕ)
I ST (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ST (ϕ) ∧ ST (ϕ)
I ST (�ϕ) = 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ))
LemmaFor each neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 and each formulaϕ ∈ L, for any w ∈W ,
M,w |= ϕ iff M◦,w |= ST (ϕ)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 199: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/199.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Define ST : L → L′ as follows
I ST (p) = p
I ST (¬ϕ) = ¬ST (ϕ)
I ST (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ST (ϕ) ∧ ST (ϕ)
I ST (�ϕ) = 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ))
LemmaFor each neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 and each formulaϕ ∈ L, for any w ∈W ,
M,w |= ϕ iff M◦,w |= ST (ϕ)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 200: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/200.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Define ST : L → L′ as follows
I ST (p) = p
I ST (¬ϕ) = ¬ST (ϕ)
I ST (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ST (ϕ) ∧ ST (ϕ)
I ST (�ϕ) = 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ))
LemmaFor each neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 and each formulaϕ ∈ L, for any w ∈W ,
M,w |= ϕ iff M◦,w |= ST (ϕ)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 201: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/201.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Define ST : L → L′ as follows
I ST (p) = p
I ST (¬ϕ) = ¬ST (ϕ)
I ST (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ST (ϕ) ∧ ST (ϕ)
I ST (�ϕ) = 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ))
LemmaFor each neighborhood model M = 〈W ,N,V 〉 and each formulaϕ ∈ L, for any w ∈W ,
M,w |= ϕ iff M◦,w |= ST (ϕ)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 202: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/202.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Monotonic Models
LemmaOn Monotonic Models 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ) ∧ [ 63]¬ST (ϕ)) is equivalentto 〈N〉([3]ST (ϕ))
Eric Pacuit
![Page 203: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/203.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
What can we infer from the fact that bi-modal normal modal logiccan simulate non-normal modal logics?
Can we read off a notion of bisimulation? Not clear.H. Hvid Hansen, C. Kupke and EP. Neighbourhood Structures: Bisimilarity andBasic Model Theory. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 5:2, 2009.
I Decidability of the satisfiability problem
I Canonicity
I Salqhvist Theorem
O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. From Classical to Normal Modal Logic. in ProofTheory of Modal Logic, 1996, pgs. 293 - 311.
M. Kracht and F. Wolter. Normal Monomodal Logics can Simulate all Others.Journal of Symbolic Logic, Volume 64, Issue 1 (1999), 99-138.
H. Hansen (Chapter 10). Monotonic Modal Logics. 2003.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 204: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/204.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
What can we infer from the fact that bi-modal normal modal logiccan simulate non-normal modal logics?
Can we read off a notion of bisimulation?
Not clear.H. Hvid Hansen, C. Kupke and EP. Neighbourhood Structures: Bisimilarity andBasic Model Theory. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 5:2, 2009.
I Decidability of the satisfiability problem
I Canonicity
I Salqhvist Theorem
O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. From Classical to Normal Modal Logic. in ProofTheory of Modal Logic, 1996, pgs. 293 - 311.
M. Kracht and F. Wolter. Normal Monomodal Logics can Simulate all Others.Journal of Symbolic Logic, Volume 64, Issue 1 (1999), 99-138.
H. Hansen (Chapter 10). Monotonic Modal Logics. 2003.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 205: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/205.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
What can we infer from the fact that bi-modal normal modal logiccan simulate non-normal modal logics?
Can we read off a notion of bisimulation? Not clear.H. Hvid Hansen, C. Kupke and EP. Neighbourhood Structures: Bisimilarity andBasic Model Theory. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 5:2, 2009.
I Decidability of the satisfiability problem
I Canonicity
I Salqhvist Theorem
O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. From Classical to Normal Modal Logic. in ProofTheory of Modal Logic, 1996, pgs. 293 - 311.
M. Kracht and F. Wolter. Normal Monomodal Logics can Simulate all Others.Journal of Symbolic Logic, Volume 64, Issue 1 (1999), 99-138.
H. Hansen (Chapter 10). Monotonic Modal Logics. 2003.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 206: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/206.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
What can we infer from the fact that bi-modal normal modal logiccan simulate non-normal modal logics?
Can we read off a notion of bisimulation? Not clear.H. Hvid Hansen, C. Kupke and EP. Neighbourhood Structures: Bisimilarity andBasic Model Theory. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 5:2, 2009.
I Decidability of the satisfiability problem
I Canonicity
I Salqhvist Theorem
O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. From Classical to Normal Modal Logic. in ProofTheory of Modal Logic, 1996, pgs. 293 - 311.
M. Kracht and F. Wolter. Normal Monomodal Logics can Simulate all Others.Journal of Symbolic Logic, Volume 64, Issue 1 (1999), 99-138.
H. Hansen (Chapter 10). Monotonic Modal Logics. 2003.
Eric Pacuit
![Page 207: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/207.jpg)
Background: Non-Normal and Normal Model Logics
Background
X Basic Modal Logic
X Weak Systems of Modal Logic
X Combining Logics
X Comparing Logics
Eric Pacuit
![Page 208: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/208.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I What are the basic building blocks?
(the nature of time
(continuous or discrete/branching or linear), how (primitive) events
or actions are represented, how causal relationships are represented
and what constitutes a state of affairs.)
I Single agent vs. many agents.
I What the the primitive operators?
• Informational attitudes• Motivational attitudes• Normative attitudes
I Static vs. dynamic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 209: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/209.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I What are the basic building blocks?
(the nature of time
(continuous or discrete/branching or linear), how (primitive) events
or actions are represented, how causal relationships are represented
and what constitutes a state of affairs.)
I Single agent vs. many agents.
I What the the primitive operators?
• Informational attitudes• Motivational attitudes• Normative attitudes
I Static vs. dynamic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 210: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/210.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I What are the basic building blocks? (the nature of time
(continuous or discrete/branching or linear), how (primitive) events
or actions are represented, how causal relationships are represented
and what constitutes a state of affairs.)
I Single agent vs. many agents.
I What the the primitive operators?
• Informational attitudes• Motivational attitudes• Normative attitudes
I Static vs. dynamic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 211: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/211.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I What are the basic building blocks? (the nature of time
(continuous or discrete/branching or linear), how (primitive) events
or actions are represented, how causal relationships are represented
and what constitutes a state of affairs.)
I Single agent vs. many agents.
I What the the primitive operators?
• Informational attitudes• Motivational attitudes• Normative attitudes
I Static vs. dynamic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 212: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/212.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I What are the basic building blocks? (the nature of time
(continuous or discrete/branching or linear), how (primitive) events
or actions are represented, how causal relationships are represented
and what constitutes a state of affairs.)
I Single agent vs. many agents.
I What the the primitive operators?
• Informational attitudes• Motivational attitudes• Normative attitudes
I Static vs. dynamic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 213: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/213.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
I What are the basic building blocks? (the nature of time
(continuous or discrete/branching or linear), how (primitive) events
or actions are represented, how causal relationships are represented
and what constitutes a state of affairs.)
I Single agent vs. many agents.
I What the the primitive operators?
• Informational attitudes• Motivational attitudes• Normative attitudes
I Static vs. dynamic
Eric Pacuit
![Page 214: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/214.jpg)
Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency
⇒ informational attitudes (eg., knowledge, belief, certainty)
⇒ time, actions and ability
⇒ motivational attitudes (eg., preferences)
⇒ group notions (eg., common knowledge and coalitional ability)
⇒ normative attitudes (eg., obligations)
Eric Pacuit
![Page 215: Logics of Rational Agency - Stanford University Computer ... › ~epacuit › lograt › nasslli2010 › lograt-lec1.pdfPart 2: Ingredients of a Logical Analysis of Rational Agency](https://reader033.fdocuments.in/reader033/viewer/2022060319/5f0cd4677e708231d43756f7/html5/thumbnails/215.jpg)
End of Part 1.
Eric Pacuit