locke on capitalist appropaition.pdf

8/13/2019 locke on capitalist appropaition.pdf

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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Locke on Capitalist AppropriationAuthor(s): C. B. MacphersonSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec., 1951), pp. 550-566Published by: University of Utahon behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/443153.

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LOCKE ON CAPITALIST APPROPRIATIONC. B. MACPHERSON

University of TorontoALTHOUGH John Locke's theory of property has always been rec-ognized as an essential part of his theory of civil society andgovernment, its full importance seems scarcely to have been real-ized. Nor has the attention given it been as careful as it deserves. Locke's

writings, of course, invite one to read between the lines; indeed, this isunavoidable if one is to make sense of the Second Treatise. But in doingso it is dangerously easy to neglect the plain statements and implicationsof the lines themselves in favor of some attractive theory which a carefulreading of the lines would forbid. In nothing has this been more apparentthan in the readings of Locke's theory of property. The view presentedhere cannot claim to be exempt from this danger, but a fresh examina-tion of what Locke wrote about property rights may support a ratherdifferent view of the purpose, and hence the importance, of Locke's theoryof property, from that which has found favor recently. The purpose ofthis article is to suggest a consistent construction of Locke's theory ofproperty right, and to show that the assumptions involved were theassumptions made by Locke. The implications of his theory of property,and of its implicit assumptions, for his theory of the state, must be leftmainly for later examination.

The definition of property. We cannot begin to examine the implica-tions of Locke's doctrine that the great and chief end, therefore, of men'suniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government,is the preservation of their property (?124),1 repeated in many variationsthroughout the Second Treatise (e.g., ??94, 134, 138, and 222), withoutnoticing the peculiar definition Locke gives of property. Men's lives,liberties and estates . . . I call by the general name, property. (?123)

By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean thatproperty which men have in their persons as well as goods. (? 173) IfLocke had held consistently to this unusually wide definition of propertyhis political theory would not be nearly as distinct from others as it is. Butit is clear that by property, much of the time Locke meant land and com-modities; that is, property in the more usual sense. This is obviously soin the crucial sections on the limitations of the legislative power (??135,1Unless otherwise indicated, references are to sections in John Locke: The Second Treatise of CivilGovernment and a Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by J. W. Gough (Oxford: Blackwell; NewYork: Macmillan, 1947). Gough's edition is superior to others currently in use in that it is basedon the 1764 edition of the Treatises embodying corrections and additions made by Locke to hisearlier editions. 550

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LOCKE ON CAPITALISTAPPROPRIATION138, 139), where he distinguishes between the individual's right to lifeand to property; it is equally so in the whole of chapter v of the SecondTreatise, entitled Of Property.It needs no argument to establish that Locke, in spite of his attemptto use property in the broad sense in which he defined it, had the nar-rower and more usual sense in mind, both when he set out to demon-strate the existence and extent of the natural right to property and whenhe sought to demonstrate the limitations of governmental power. Buthis inclusion of life and liberty, as well as estate-of one's person as wellas one's goods-in the term property is itself curious. It is usuallyexplained by saying that Locke regarded possessions as extensions of per-sonality, and that he emphasized this by making the same term coverpersonality (life and liberty) and possessions. There is no doubt thatLocke regarded the right to possessions as derived from the right to lifeand to one's own labor, for he says that every man has a property inhis own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labourof his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.(?27) But still, why should Locke define life and liberty as property?Why speak of a property in his own person, rather than a right to hisown life and labor?

Locke sometimes writes as if life and liberty were valuable becausethey were means of getting possessions. In the First Letter ConcerningToleration, in which the doctrine of the purpose of civil society is setout more succinctly than in the Treatise, we read that. . . the pravity of mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon thefruits of other men's labours than take pains to provide for themselves, the necessity ofpreserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired, and alsoof preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may acquire what they fartherwant, obliges men to enter into society with one another .. 2

Again, in his insistence that everyone has a property in his ownperson- the labour of his body and the work of his hands - one mightsee an assumption that the powers of the body (life) are valuable asmeans of acquiring material possessions;the concept of a property in one'sown person is introduced in order to establish a right to the acquisitionand possession of goods or, to use Locke's own word, to their appro-priation.The paradox that, to Locke, life and liberty derive their value asinstruments for the acquisition of property cannot be fully sustained,but it is illuminating that Locke can write as if personality was anextension of possessions, rather than possessions being an extension ofpersonality. We shall return to this point after we have examined2 The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 152. My italics.

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552 THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYthe implications of Locke's main arguments about property. It will thenbe seen that there is reason to think that Locke was more consistentin his definition of property than is generally allowed. Property in one'sperson, meaning property in one's capacity to labor (?27), was of thesame nature as property in goods; it was a disposable asset.

The initial natural right to limited property. In order to show thatthe purpose of government was the preservation of individual property,Locke had to demonstrate that property was a natural right of theindividual-a right not derived from any contract or agreement to entersociety and not dependent on society and government, but one inheringin each human being as such, like the right to life. At the beginning ofthe Treatise Locke sets it down as self-evident that all men have a naturalright to property. The condition all men are naturally in is a state ofperfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessionsand persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature,without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.(?4) The bounds of the law of nature require that being all equal andindependent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, orpossessions. (? 6) These propositions, which take for granted a naturalright to possessions, as well as to life, health and liberty, seemed to Locketo require little demonstration; they followed from the axiomatic proposi-tion that all men are naturally equal in the sense that no one has naturaljurisdiction over another, there being nothing more evident than thatcreatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all thesame advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should alsobe equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection. (?4)If Locke had been concerned only to show that individuals had a naturalright to property within the bounds of the law of nature, he mighthave left the matter there. But in fact he devotes a whole chapter tothe question of property right; and, since the upshot of the chapter is torelease the individual property right from the limitations of the lawof nature, we may not unfairly conclude that the removal of theselimitations was the main purpose of the extensive discussion of propertyin chapter 5. Locke's astonishing achievement was to base the propertyright on natural right, and then to remove all the natural law limitationsfrom the property right.

The significance of the chapter may be lost by not attending toLocke's own opening statement of his intention. He begins by accepting,as the dictate both of natural reason and of Scripture, that the earthand its fruits were originally given to mankind in common. (?25) Thiswas, of course, the traditional view, found alike in medieval and in



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LOCKEON CAPITALISTAPPROPRIATIONseventeenth century Puritan theory. But Locke accepts this position onlyto refute the conclusions previously drawn from it, which made propertysomething less than an absolute and unlimited individual right.

But this [that the earth was given to mankind in common] being supposed, itseems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a propertyin anything. ... I shall endeavour to show how men might come to have a propertyin several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without anyexpress compact of all the commoners. (?25)Locke's purpose, then, was at least to remove the doubts and reserva-tions about individual property rights which were still in the minds ofthose who had been brought up in the older tradition.The opening stages of his argument are so familiar as to require littlecomment: Men being once born have a right to their preservation, andconsequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affordsfor their subsistence. (?25) The earth and its produce were given tomen for the support and comfort of their being and, though theybelonged to mankind in common, yet being given for the use of men,there must of necessity be means to appropriate them some way or otherbefore they can be of any use or at all beneficial to any particular man.

(?26) Before any man can use any of the natural produce of the earthfor his nourishment or support he must appropriate it; it must be his,and so his, i.e., a part of him, that another can no longer have any rightto it, before it can do any good for the support of his life. (?26) Theremust therefore be some rightful means of individual appropriation, i.e.,some individual right to appropriate. What is this right? The right,and the initial extent and limits of the right, Locke derives from thefurther postulate that every man has a property in his own person;this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body andthe work of his hands we may say are properly his. (?27) Whatevera man removes out of its natural state, he has mixed his labour with ;and, by this mixing, he makes it his property- at least where there isenough and as good left in common for others. (?27) No consent of theothers is needed to justify this kind of appropriation; if such consent asthat was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God hadgiven him. (?28) Thus from two postulates, that men have a rightto preserve their life and that a man's labor is his own, Locke justifiesindividual appropriation of the produce of the earth which was originallygiven to mankind in common.Now the individual appropriation justified by this argument hascertain limitations; two of them are explicitly and repeatedly stated byLocke, a third has been taken (though wrongly, I shall argue) to havebeen necessarily implied by the logic of Locke's justification. First, a man

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THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYmay appropriate only as much as leaves enough and as good for others(?27; cf. ?33); this limit, explicitly stated by Locke, is clearly requiredby the justification, because each man has a right to his preservation andhence to the appropriation of the necessities of his life.

Second, as much as anyone can make use of to any advantageof life before it spoils, so much may he by his labour fix a property in;whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs to othersNothing was made by God for men to spoil or destroy. (?31) Barterof the surplus perishable produce of one's own labor was permitted withinthis limit; no injury was done and no portion of the goods that belongedto others was destroyed so long as nothing perished uselessly in the appro-priator's hands. (?46)

Third, rightful appropriation appears to be limited to the amounta man can procure with his own labor; this seems necessarily implied inthe justification, for it is the labour of his body and the work of hishands which, being mixed with nature's products, makes anything hisproperty.So far Locke has justified only appropriation of the fruits of theearth, but he also goes on to include the land itself:. . . the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the beaststhat subsist on it, but the earth itself. . . I think it is plain that property in that, too,is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates,and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does as it wereenclose it from the common. (?32)No consent of the others is needed for this appropriation. For God com-manded man to labor on the earth, and so entitled him to appropriatewhatever land he mixed his labor with; and, besides, the originalappropriation was not any prejudice to any other man, since there wasstill enough and as good left for others. (?33) The same limits to theappropriation of land as to the appropriation of its natural produce areimplied in this justification. A man is entitled by these arguments toappropriate only as much as leaves enough and as good for others, asmuch as he can use the product of, and as much as he can cultivatewith his own labor.

It is instructive that Locke, speaking here mainly of the appropriationof land in the first ages of the world, when men were more in dangerto be lost by wandering from their company in the then vast wildernessof the earth than to be straitened for want of room to plant in (? 36),reads back into primitive society the institution of individual ownershipof land, taking it for granted that that was the only way land couldthen be cultivated. His disregard of communal ownership and labor inprimitive society allows him to say that the condition of human life,

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LOCKEON CAPITALISTAPPROPRIATIONwhich requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introducesprivate possessions. (?35) He even reads into primitive society theseventeenth century contrast between the industrious laborer and the idleand contentious: God gave the earth to the use of the industrious andrational (and labour was to be his title to it), not to the fancy or covet-ousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. (?34)If Locke had stopped here he would have had a defense of limitedindividual ownership, though the argument would have had to bestretched pretty far even to cover the property right of the contemporaryEnglish yeoman, for it would have to be shown that his appropriationleft enough and as good for others. Locke suggests that defense in arguingthat, full as the world seems, a man may still find enough such landin the inland vacant places of America. (?36) But he does not insiston this. He is not trying to make a case for such limited appropriation;he is making a case for an unlimited natural right of appropriation, aright transcending the limitations involved in his initial justification. Lockeproceeds to show how these natural law limitations may be removed, andthis by the consent of men still in the state of nature.

The removal of the initial limitations. The crucial argument has sooften been misunderstood that it is necessary to examine it closely. Thetransition from the limited to the unlimited right is first stated in ?36.After saying that by including the vacant lands of America there maystill be enough land in the world for everyone to have as much as he canwork and use, Locke continues:But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on, this I dare boldly affirm- that the samerule of propriety, viz., that every man should have as much as he could make use of,would hold still in the world without straitening anybody, since there is land enoughin the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and thetacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessionsand a right to them.... (?36)

This is quite explicit. The natural law rule, which by its specificterms limited the amount anyone could appropriate so that everyonecould have as much as he could use, does not now hold: it would hold... had not . .. money introduced (by consent) larger possessions anda right to them. The reason the rule does not now hold is not thatthe land has run out: there is enough in the whole world to suffice doublethe inhabitants, but only by including those parts of the world wheremoney has never been introduced. There, where the old rule still holds,there are great tracts of unappropriated land, but this can scarcehappen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the useof money. (?45) Wherever money has been introduced there ceases tobe unappropriated land. The introduction of money by tacit consent has

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removed the previous natural limitations of rightful appropriation, andin so doing has invalidated the natural provision that everyone shouldhave as much as he can make use of. Locke then proceeds to show inmore detail how the introduction of money removes the limitations in-herent in his initial justification of individual appropriation.

(a) The spoilage limitation. Of the two limitations he had explicitlyrecognized, the second (as much as a man can use, or use the product of,before it spoils) seemed to Locke to be obviously transcended by theintroduction of money. Gold and silver do not spoil; a man may there-fore rightfully accumulate unlimited amounts of it without any spoilage,

the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the large-ness of his possessions,but the perishing of anything uselessly in it. (? 46)Not only is the limit removed from movable property, but it is alsoremoved by the same token from land itself: . . . a man may fairlypossess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receivingin exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded upwithout injuring anyone; these metals not spoiling or decaying in thehands of the possessor. (?50)Locke saw no difficulty about this. But the fact that he left certainquestions unasked is itself revealing. Why would anyone want to appro-priate more than he could make use of for the support and conveniencyof life? Locke had shown that before the introduction of money no onewould want more. (?36) Why should he want it after? What is thedesire of having more than man needed (?37), which Locke finds tohave entered with the introduction of money? It is, I think, the specificallycapitalist desire for accumulation that Locke is taking for granted.At first sight, indeed, Locke might seem to be speaking merely ofuseless hoarding: the terms he uses for this accumulation are heap up(?46) and hoard up. (??48, 50) But we have only to refer to Locke'seconomic treatises to see that he was a mercantilist to whom the accumu-lation of gold was a proper aim of mercantile policy, not as an end initself but because it quickened and increased trade. His main concern inthe Considerations on ... Money is the accumulation of a sufficient supplyof money to drive trade ; both exporting and hoarding (i.e., accumu-lating money without using it as capital) injure this.3 The aim of mer-cantile policy and of individual economic enterprise was to Locke theemployment of land and money as capital; the money to be laid out intrading stock or materials and wages, the land to be used to producecommodities for trade. That this was what Locke had in mind in theTreatise as the new reason for larger appropriation after the introduction3 Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money(1691); Works (1759 edition), Vol. II, pp. 22-23.

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of money is suggested by ?48, where the introduction of money is shownto provide both the opportunity and the reason (which could not haveexisted previously) for a man to enlarge his possessions beyond the useof his family and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in whattheir own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishableuseful commodities with others. It is commerce . . . to draw money tohim by the sale of the product that provides the reason for appropriationof land in excess of what would provide a plentiful supply to [hisfamily's] consumption.It could be thought that Locke was here merely saying that money,by enlarging trade past the simple barter stage, enabled those who hadmoney to consume more various and gratifying commodities. But thatinterpretation can scarcely be sustained when we notice Locke's conceptof money. In the Considerations he identifies money and capital, andassimilates both to land:

Money therefore, in buying and selling, being perfectly in the same condition withother commodities, and subject to all the same laws of value, let us next see how itcomes to be of the same nature with land, by yielding a certain yearly income, whichwe call use, or interest.4Money, Locke emphasizes, is a commodity; it has a value because it isa commodity which can enter into exchange with other commodities. Butits purpose is not merely to facilitate the exchange of things producedfor consumption, that is, to enlarge, beyond the scale of barter, exchangebetween producers of goods intended for consumption. The characteristicpurpose of money is to serve as capital. Locke sees land itself merelyas a form of capital.We notice, incidentally, how modern was Locke's attitude towardsmoney. In arguing that the taking of interest for the loan of money isequitable, as well as by the necessity of affairs, and the constitution ofhuman society, unavoidable, he disposed of the medieval view withoutseeming to deny it. Land, he says, produces naturally something newand profitable, and of value to mankind; but money is a barren thing, andproduces nothing.... How then has money come to be of the samenature with land, as it has done in yielding a yearly income (interest)akin to the rent of land? Simply by compact between those of unequalpossessions. Moneyby compact transfers that profit, that was the reward of one man's labour, into anotherman's pocket. That which occasions this, is the unequal distribution of money; whichinequality has the same effect too upon land, that it has upon money. . . . For as theunequal distribution of land, (you having more than you can, or will manure, andanother less) brings you a tenant for your land; . . . the same unequal distribution ofmoney, (I having more than I can, or will employ, and another less) brings me a tenantfor my money. . .4 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 19.5 Loc. cit.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYThe barren quality traditionally assigned to money is not explicitlydenied; it is neatly transcended by the concept of consent between un-

equals. The value of money as capital is created by the fact of itsunequal distribution. Nothing is said about the source of the inequality;it is simply taken to be part of the necessity of affairs and the consti-tution of human society.What is relevant here is that Locke saw money not merely as amedium of exchange but also as capital. Indeed, money's function as amedium of exchange was seen as subordinate to its function as capital,because the purpose of agriculture, industry, and commerce was in his viewthe accumulation of capital; and the purpose of capital was not to providea consumable income for its owners, but to beget further capital by profit-able investment. Mercantilist that he was, when Locke discussed thepurpose of economic activity it was generally from the point of view ofthe nation's rather than of the individual's wealth. In some notes writtenin 1674 on trade, in which term he included agriculture and industry aswell as commerce, his expression is almost Hobbesian:The chief end of trade is Riches and Power which beget each other. Riches consists inplenty of mooveables, that will yield a price to foraigner, and are not like to be con-sumed at home, but espetially in plenty of gold and silver. Power consists in numbersof men, and ability to maintaine them. Trade conduces to both these by increasingyr stock & yr people. & they each other.6

If Locke does not recognize as clearly as Hobbes that the goal ofindividual activity is wealth and power, it is at least clear in theConsiderations that he assumes the same goal for the individual estateas for the national: consume less than the revenue and so accumulatecapital; for the nation's wealth was the capital accumulated by privateindustry and commerce.

Enough has now been said to show that the desire of having morethan men needed (?37), or the desire to enlarge his possessions beyondthe use of his family and a plentiful supply to its consumption (?48),which Locke found to have entered with the introduction of money andgoverned men's actions since, was in his view neither a desire for miserlyhoarding nor merely a desire to consume more various and gratifyingcommodities, but rather a desire to accumulate land and money as capital.In the course of his argument in the Treatise, Locke seems unconsciouslyto have changed the meaning of using land or produce before it spoils.Prior to the introduction of money, using meant consuming or barter-ing for other directly produced or directly gathered produce of nature;the purpose of production and appropriation was present or future con-sumption; the limit, both of land and produce, was spoilage of consum-6 Locke ms. notes Trade ; Bodleian Library, Lovelace Collection (Economics. Trade. f. 18).

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ables. (??37, 38) After the introduction of money, using meant usingas capital; as such any amount of land or money can be used withoutspoilage; the spoilage limitation has disappeared. Locke has justified thespecifically capitalist appropriation of land and money.

(b) The sufficiency limitation. The first limitation on individualappropriation (that every appropriation must leave enough and as goodfor others) is less obviously overcome by reference to the introductionof money by consent, yet there can be no doubt that Locke took it to beovercome. (??36, 45 ad fin.) He provides little detailed argument onthis point; perhaps he thought it sufficiently evident to require no sep-arate argument. His chain of thought seems to have been that the auto-matic consequence of the introduction of money is the development ofa commercial economy, hence the creation of markets for the produceof land hitherto valueless, hence the appropriation of land not hithertoworth appropriating. (??45,48) By implication, consent to the use ofmoney is consent to the consequences (?36), and an individual is there-fore justified in appropriating land even when it does not leave enoughand as good for others.While the case for the removal of the second limitation can be madeout by inference in this way, Locke apparently felt that a more directargument was needed, for in a revision of the third edition of theTreatises he added a new argument following the first sentence of ?37.7

To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour doesnot lessen but increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving tothe support of human life produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land are(to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by anacre of land of equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that enclosesland, and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres than he couldhave from a hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind:for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but theproduct of a hundred lying in common.The implication is that although all the land, or more land thanleaves enough and as good for others, may be appropriated, the greater

productivity of the appropriated land more than makes up for the lackof land available for others. This assumes, of course, that the increasein the whole product will be distributed to the benefit-or at least notto the loss - of those left without enough land. Locke makes this assump-tion. Even the landless day-laborer gets a bare subsistence.8 And baresubsistence, at the standard prevailing in a country where all the landis appropriated and fully used, is better than the standard of any memberof a society where the land is not appropriated and fully worked: a kingTThe new passage was first published in the 4th edition of the Treatises (1713), and appeared in allsubsequent standard editions of the Treatises and the Works, but is unfortunatelynot reproducedin any of the modern reprints of the Second Treatise except the Gough edition.8 Some Considerations . . ., Works (1759 edition), Vol. II, p. 29.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYof a large and fruitful territory there [among several nations of theAmericans ] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer inEngland. (?41) Thus appropriation of land in excess of what leavesenough and as good for others is justified both by the implied tacit consentto the necessary consequences of the introduction of money, and by theassertion that the standards of those without land where it is all appro-priated and used are higher than the standards of any where it is notgenerally appropriated.

(c) The supposed labor limitation. The third apparently impliedlimitation on individual appropriation (only as much as one has mixedone's own labor with) seems the most difficult to transcend or remove,for it appears to be absolutely required by the very labor justificationLocke has given for any appropriation. Surely, we may think, the onusis on Locke to show how this limitation, as well as the other two, maybe considered to be overcome as a consequence of the introduction ofmoney. But Locke did not think so. He offered no explicit argumentto this purpose. He did not need to do so, for all along he was assumingthe validity of the wage relationship, by which a man may rightfullyacquire a title to the labor of another. A freeman may sell to another

for a certain time the service he undertakes to do in exchange for wageshe is to receive. (?85) Locke's initial emphasis -that every man hasa property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself,and that, when he mixes his labor with nature, this labour being theunquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a rightto what that is once joined to (?27) -is not at all inconsistent withthe alienation of one's labor in return for a wage. On the contrary, themore emphatically labor is asserted to be a property, the more it is to beunderstood to be alienable; for property, in the bourgeois sense, is notonly a right to enjoy or use; it is a right to dispose of, to exchange, toalienate. To Locke a man's labor is so unquestionably his own propertythat he may freely sell it for wages. The labor thus sold becomes theproperty of the buyer, who is then entitled to appropriate the produceof that labor. That Locke was taking this for granted from the beginningof his labor justification of property is evident from the following passage,which has perplexed some and been neglected by others:

Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I havedigged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become myproperty, without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine,removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.(?28)Had Locke not been taking the wage relationship entirely for granted,his inclusion of my servant's labor in the labour that was mine wouldhave been a direct contradiction of the whole case he was there making.

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LOCKE ON CAPITALISTAPPROPRIATIONGranted his assumption, there is no contradiction. On this ground alonewe are entitled to conclude that Locke was assuming the existence ofthe wage relationship as part of the natural order; in other words, thathe was taking for granted the right to appropriate the produce of thelabor of others. The labour that is mine may be mine either by pur-chase or as part of my natural powers.This is not the view commonly ascribed to Locke. It is generallysaid that Locke justified as a natural right only that property acquiredby one's own natural labor. To ascribe such a purpose to Locke is to dohim less than justice, for it leaves him without having provided anyjustification in natural right for the large properties typical of the Whigstate and of his own class. There is, of course, every reason why themodern reader may be misled (as a contemporary reader would not havebeen) into thinking that Locke was speaking only of appropriation byone's own natural labor. We are somewhat tender today (as men ofLocke's day were not) about the implications of capitalist appropriation,and we are not apt therefore to allow Locke the seventeenth centuryassumptions about labor. Locke himself, in the Considerations, treatswage laborers as a normal and substantial class in the contemporaryeconomy; and assumes as self-evident that, of necessity, wages are nor-mally at a bare subsistence level, and that the wage laborer has no otherproperty than his labor. When he estimates the velocity of circulationof money the only three classes he considers significant are laborers, land-owners, and brokers, i.e., merchants and shopkeepers; and the laborersare assumed to be living generally but from hand to mouth. 9 Again,in tracing the incidence of taxation he says taxes cannot fall on the poorlabourer or handicraftsman for he just lives from hand to mouth already ;if a tax raises the price of his food, clothing, or utensils, then eitherhis wages must rise with the price of things, to make him live; or else,not being able to maintain himself and family by his labour, he comes tothe parish. 10 And when, in a period of deflation, economic classesstruggle to retain the same money income, this pulling and contest isusually between the landed-man and the merchant. For the labourer'sshare, being seldom more than a bare subsistence, never allows that bodyof men, time, or opportunity to raise their thoughts above that, or strugglewith the richer for theirs. . . 11 In all this Locke shows no repugnanceto the implications of capitalist appropriation. Yet in his chapter onproperty in the Second Treatise, Locke harps incessantly on the twothemes of the savage individualist and the self-sufficient cultivator; rarely9 Works (1759 edition), Vol. II, pp. 13-16.10Ibid., p. 29.n Ibid., p. 36.

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does he mention the ownership of large estates and even where he does(as in ?48), it is apparently in the context of an individual's own labor.Nowhere in the Treatise does he say that men have a natural right tomore land or capital than they can work by their own natural labor; allthat he specifically justifies as a natural right is more than leaves enoughand as good for others (? 36), and more than the owner can use theproduct of. (?50) Even the passage in which the labor of my servant ismy labor and entitles me to appropriate (?28), has been explained awayas being asserted of appropriation of the produce of commons whichremain so by compact (i.e., as a right of appropriation in civil society,not a natural right), although Locke asserts the principle with completegenerality as applying in any place where I have a right to [the naturalproduce] in common with others.If there were no other evidence that Locke.was taking for granteda natural right to appropriation of other men's labor, the general view ofLocke's purpose might be allowed; but when the clue of ?28 is followed,further evidence appears. We may notice first that some of the confusionabout Locke's purpose and assumptions is due to a too narrow inter-pretation of his state of nature as a natural economy. To this confusionLocke contributed liberally by jumping back and forth between the primi-tive savage economy, in which the natural limits of no spoilage and leavingenough for others apply, and the developed monetary and commercialeconomy in which all the land is appropriated and in which these limitsdo not apply. But it must be borne in mind that both these economiesare specifically ascribed by Locke to the state of nature; the consent to theintroduction of money, and the consequent inequality of private posses-sions, are prior to or quite apart from the agreement which sets up civilsociety:. .. it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession ofthe earth; they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a manmay fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving inexchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injuryto anyone; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. Thispartage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicableout of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold andsilver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money. (?50)12

When this is kept in mind, it begins to appear as if Locke's justificationof the appropriation of all the land, leaving less than enough for others,implies a further justification of more than a man can work by hisown natural labor. A monetary and commercial economy sufficientlywell developed and pervasive to put a value on and hence to lead tothe appropriation of all the land, leaving not enough for others, couldI My italics. Somemisprintsn the Goughedition have been corrected o conform o the text of the1764 dition.

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LOCKE ON CAPITALISTAPPROPRIATIONscarcely have been understood by Locke or the men of his time exceptas implying the existence of a landless laboring class. If the ascriptionof wage labor to a state of nature seems strange, it is no more strangethan Locke's ascription of a developed commercial economy to the stateof nature. He is consistent enough: his view is that each institutionowes nothing to civil society but is based on simple agreement or consentbetween individuals governed only by natural law. Thus, (1) accumulationof capital through the medium of money is based only on consent ofindividuals to put a value on money; and (2) the wage relationshipis based only on the free contract of the individuals concerned. Thatneither of these propositions has historical warrant is beside the point.But the clearest evidence that Locke regarded as valid in the stateof nature the appropriation of more land or capital than one could work,and the wage relationship by which that property is made profitable, isvery simple. It is plain that he regarded such ownership, and the wagerelationship, as justified in civil society. According to Locke, the agree-ment to enter civil society does not create any new individual rights; andcivil society has no power to override natural law, its power and that ofgovernment being limited to the enforcement of natural law principles.(?135) It is just because of this that Locke was so concerned to showthat the right to unequal property is a right that men bring with theminto civil society; that it is individual consent in the state of nature-notthe agreement to establish civil society-which justifies property in excessof the initial natural limits. Now since the agreement to enter civil societycreates no new individual rights, and since the individual right to moreproperty than a man can work by his own natural labor is asserted tobe a right in civil society, Locke must have assumed it as a natural right.Since he assumed the wage relationship as justified in civil society he mustalso have assumed a natural right to alienate one's own labor.It may seem strange that Locke, who derives the right to appropriateland and goods from the right to preserve one's own life and from thenatural property in one's labor, should assume a natural right to alienateone's labor while denying a natural right to alienate one's life. Yet hedoes make a distinction between property (including the property in one'sown labor) and life. In chapter ii of the Second Treatise, the distinctionis not yet made: men have a natural right to dispose of their possessionsand persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature.(?4) But after he has established the natural right to unequal possessions,a distinction appears, as we would expect: in the state of nature, heasserts, nobody has an absolute arbitrarypower over himself, or over anyother, to destroy his own life, or to take away the life or property ofanother. (?135) Thus while no one has a natural right to alienate his

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THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYown life, which is God's property, or to take arbitrarilythe life or propertyof another, he is left with a natural right to alienate his own property.That Locke's law of nature gives a man's wife and children a claim onhis estate in the event of his death or conquest (??182-183) does notseem to be a limit on his disposal of it while he is a free agent.

Any property right less than this would have been useless to Locke,for the free alienation of property, including the property in one's labor,by sale and purchase is an essential element of capitalist production.The alienation of one's own labor is sharply distinguished from the grantingof arbitrary power over one's life, in Locke's distinction between the slaveand the free wage earner. (?85)We are, I think, entitled to conclude that Locke assumed that laborwas naturally a commodity. It would take us beyond the limits of thispaper to discuss the changing attitude toward labor from the Middle Agesto the seventeenth century; it may be sufficient to point out that Hobbeshad already assumed labor to be a commodity13 and that Locke, whodissociated himself from many of Hobbes' views, did not dissociate him-self from this. In emphasizing that a man's labor is his own, Lockemarked out the extent of his departure from the medieval view and of hisacceptance of the bourgeois view expressed so tersely by Hobbes. Since,in making the assertion that a man's labor is his own, Locke has separatedlife and labor, the paradox suggested earlier14cannot be sustained. Lockefell short of Hobbes in his acceptance of bourgeois values. To Hobbes,life itself was in effect reduced to a commodityl5; to Locke, life was stillsacred and inalienable, although labor, and one's person regarded asone's capacity to labor (?27), was a commodity. Locke's distinctionbetween life and labor is a measure of his retention of the traditionalvalues. His confusion about the definition of property, sometimes but notalways including life and liberty, may be ascribed to the confusion in

hismind between the remnant of traditional values and the new bourgeoisvalues. It is this, no doubt, which makes his theory more agreeable tothe modern reader than the uncompromising doctrine of Hobbes. Lockedid not care to recognize that the continual alienation of labor for a baresubsistence wage, which he asserts to be the necessary condition of wagelaborers throughout their lives, is in effect an alienation of life and liberty.If it be assumed, then, that Locke took it for granted, throughout hisjustification of the natural right to property, that labor was naturally acommodity, and that the wage relationship which gave me the right toappropriate the produce of another's labor was a part of the natural13Hobbes: Leviathan, Oakeshott edition (Oxford: Blackwell; New York: Macmillan, 1947), chap. XXIV,p. 161.14Supra, p. 551.15Leviathan, Oakeshott edition, chap. X, p. 57.

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LOCKE ON CAPITALISTAPPROPRIATIONorder, it follows that the third apparent limitation on the natural rightto appropriate (i.e., as much as one can work with one's own naturallabor) was never entertained by Locke. There is, then, no question ofLocke's removing this limitation; it was not present in his mind, but hasbeen read into his theory by those who have approached it in the moderntradition of humane liberalism, as well as by those who have thoughtto find in Locke a supporter of the petty bourgeois socialist doctrine thatthe laborer should get the whole product of his work.

The significance of Locke's theory of property. When Locke's assump-tions are understood as presented here, his doctrine of property appears ina new light; or, rather, it is restored to the meaning it must have had forLocke and his contemporaries. His insistence that a man's labor was hisown-which was the essential novelty of Locke's doctrine of property-has almost the opposite significance from that more generally attributedto it in recent years; it provides a moral foundation for bourgeois appropri-ation. With the removal of the two initial limitations which Locke hadexplicitly recognized, the whole theory of property is a justification of thenatural right not only to unequal property but to unlimited individualappropriation as well. The insistence that a man's labor is his ownproperty is the root of this justification. To insist that a man's labor ishis own is not only to say that it is his to alienate in a wage contract;it is also to say that his labor and its productivity are things for whichhe owes no debt to civil society. If it is labor-a man's absolute property-which justifies appropriation and creates value, the individual right ofappropriation overrides any moral claims of the society. The traditionalview that property and labor are social functions, and that ownership ofproperty involves social obligations, is thereby undermined.In short, Locke has done what he set out to do. Starting from thetraditional assumption that the earth and its fruits had originally beengiven to mankind for their common use, he has turned the tables onall who derived from this assumption theories which were restrictive ofcapitalist appropriation. Private appropriation, traditionally justified asan institution made necessary by man's sinful nature, and thereforeregarded as a necessary evil and subject to limitations and reciprocalobligations, was justified by Locke as a right flowing from man's naturaland wholesome needs. Individual appropriationwas freed from the stigmaof original sin,16and this release carried with it release from the limitationsand obligations of individual appropriation.16Although Locke got entirely away from original sin in his chapter on property, there is still a remnantof the traditional view in a passing reference in ? 111 to the golden age (before vain ambition,and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a mistake oftrue power and honour) ...

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THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYThus Locke, in creating a persuasive and acceptable alternative tothe organic functional view of property and of society, which still had

some strength in England, provided the ideological support for capitalistappropriation. He supplied, for his own and future generations of Whigs,the moral basis they needed for their program of enclosure, capitalaccumulation, and capitalist enterprise.

This, I think, is the basic significance of Locke's doctrine of property,and perhaps of his whole theory of the state as well. The justification of anatural individual right to unlimited appropriation went deeper and wasof more lasting importance than the immediate political conclusion of theSecond Treatise, the justification of William's title to the throne, or thanthe whole demonstration that consent implied limited government. InLocke's hands, the doctrine of consent made property stronger than civilsociety. It is true that when any of Locke's natural individuals puts him-self into a civil society he submits to the community, those possessionswhich he has or shall acquire. (?120) This, of course, does not meanthat he hands over his property but only his previous jurisdiction; thecivil society has the right to regulate property, but the individual canstill, if he wishes to leave a given civil society, sell his land and presumablyremove his capital. (?121) The civil society, however, has only a limitedjurisdiction;its power to regulate propertycan be exercised only to preserveproperty. (??135, 138, 139) Even the majority of the people, which isthe supreme power in civil society, cannot override the limit on thatsociety's jurisdiction which is set by the fact that the purpose of theagreement to enter civil society is to preserve individual property.Of the two kinds of consent on which Locke built his whole politicaltheory, the consent to unlimited property right (implied in the agree-ment to put a value on money) is more powerful than the consent toestablish civil society. Both the unlimited property right and the suprem-acy of the majority in civil society are established by consent; in bothcases, the consent of all concerned justified an institution superseding theinitial natural right. But while in the first case consent removed all thenatural law limitations on the individual right to property, in the secondcase the natural law limits still apply. The consent which subordinatesthe individual to the civil society is not strong enough to transcend thenatural laws, which continue to safeguard the individual from arbitraryrule; the consent which establishes unlimited appropriation easily tran-scends the original natural right which ensured that every individualshould have property. No clearer indication of Locke's fundamentaldoctrine of the true original, extent and end of civil government isneeded.

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