LOCAL RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS - CAA Seminars and Presentations/Local...RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS WHY HAVE THEM...
Transcript of LOCAL RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS - CAA Seminars and Presentations/Local...RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS WHY HAVE THEM...
RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS WHY HAVE THEM AT ALL?
BECAUSE RUNWAY INCURSION AND EXCURSION INCIDENTS ARE THE ONE
AVIATION SAFETY STATISTIC THAT HAS NOT REDUCED IN OVER 20 YEARS.
• TENERIFE 27TH March 1977 – KLM Boeing 747-200 initiates an unapproved take-off
run, during Low Visibility conditions, on the runway at Tenerife North Airport and collides
with a taxiing Pan American Boeing 747-100, resulting in 583 deaths.
• TAIPEI 31st October 2000 – Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400 turns onto the wrong
runway, at night in reduced visibility, at Taipei Airport and during its take-off run the
aircraft collides with construction vehicles on the runway, resulting in the death of 83
people.
• MILAN 8th October 2001 – SAS MD-87 on its take-off run collides with a Citation 2 Jet
which was attempting to taxi across the runway without ATC clearance, during Low
Visibility conditions, at Milan Linate Airport, resulting in 118 deaths.
• LEXINGTON 27th August 2006 – Delta Connection CRJ100 turns onto the wrong
runway, at night, at Lexington Airport and during take-off overruns the short, unlit,
runway, resulting in the death of 49 people.
THAT IS A TOTAL OF 833 DEATHS IN 4 AVOIDABLE INCIDENTS AND
ALL DUE TO A RUNWAY INCURSION OR A RUNWAY EXCURSION
RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS HISTORY – BEFORE RST ESTABLISHMENT
• ICAO released Document 9870 Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions in
2007 as a direct result of the runway incidents mentioned.
• ICAO Document 9870, Chapter 3, states that individual aerodromes should establish
Runway Safety Teams as part of a Runway Incursion Prevention Programme.
• ICAO Document 9870, Chapter 3, goes on to list the minimum representative list of
those who should have a direct involvement in the Runway Safety Team as well as
giving guidance on objectives, terms of reference, responsibilities and effectiveness of
the Runway Safety Team.
• ICAO Document 9870, Chapter 6, describes the different types of Runway Incursion
and gives them a Severity Classification from Severe to Low (A to E)
RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS BACKGROUND – DEVELOPING RST
SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS
ACCIDENT REFER TO ICAO ANNEX 13 DEFINITIONS OF AN ACCIDENT
A A serious incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided
B
An incident in which separation decreases and there is a significant
potential for collision, which may result in t a time-critical
corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision
C
An incident characterised by ample time and/or distance to avoid a
collision
D
Incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as
incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected
area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft
but with no immediate safety consequences
E Insufficient information inconclusive or conflicting evidence precludes
severity assessment
RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS CURRENT – ESTABLISHING RST at ACSA
CAPE TOWN / JUL 11 JOHANNESBURG / JAN 12 DURBAN / OCT 12
PORT ELIZABETH / MAR 13 GEORGE / APR 13 BLOEMFONTEIN / JUL 13
ICAO DOC 9870
RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN ICAO
CHAPTER 3.1
Establishing a Runway Incursion Prevention Programme
3.1 RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS
3.1.1 A runway incursion prevention programme should start with the establishment of runway safety teams at individual aerodromes. 3.1.2 The team should comprise representatives from aerodrome operations, air traffic service providers, airlines or aircraft operators, pilot associations and any other groups with a direct involvement in runway operations.
• The terms of reference template is given in Doc 9870.The task is
protection of aircraft
• from incursion as a result of
Entering wrong Runway and Taxiway
People
Vehicles
Bird and Wildlife
FOD
Local Runway Safety Teams.
ICAO DOC 9870
CHAPTER 3.4
RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION Hot Spots
Definition ICAO Doc 9870, Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions defines a “hotspot” as “A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is necessary.”
HOTSPOTS Many aerodromes have hazardous locations on runways and/or taxiways where incursion incidents have occurred, sometimes frequently. Any such position is commonly referred to as a "hotspot".
1. Enhanced Runway Ahead, 2. Enhanced Centreline, 3. Stop Bar, 4. Enhanced Runway
Designator, 5. Runway Hold Marking, 6. Guard Lights, 7. Illuminated Signage
CONT ….
A STERN WARNING WITH LEGAL THREAT USED TO DETER PEOPLE FROM
TRESPASSING AT ANY AIRFIELD AND PREVENT RUNWAY INCURSION
PEOPLE PROTECTION - SIGNAGE
RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION Road Signage
ANNEX 14 STANDARD
STOP SIGNAGE WITH INSTRUCTION NOTICE AT ROADWAY JUNCTION WITH
TAXIWAYS AND/OR RUNWAYS
RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN ICAO
SQUID TRANSPONDERS ALSO FITTED TO THOSE SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE
VEHICLES WHO OPERATE CLOSE TO OR ON TAXIWAYS AND RUNWAYS
RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION VEHICLE PROTECTION
INSTRUCTION SIGN BUT USE OF NO RIGHT TURN USED ON ROADWAY AT CPT
Kimberley Airport (KIM) is located in an arid semi-desert region of South Africa. KIM had
had issues with a local mammal species of nocturnal Anteater, known as an Aardvark
(Earth Pig), burrowing under the airport perimeter fence
ANIMALS
Perimeter Fence showing clear signs of Aardvark
burrowing under fence to access aerodrome
The risks presented by the presence of such animals, forcibly entering the airport,
in search of food had never been discussed with Pilots or Airlines.
On 16th July 2010, at 1915z, a South African Express Airways De Havilland Canada DH8-
300 operating a scheduled flight with 44 Passengers and Crew on board, from
Johannesburg O.R. Tambo International Airport (JNB) to KIM, made a night landing at
KIM. One second after touchdown the aircraft struck an Aardvark on the runway.
CONT ….
Mitigation --re installing a 14km long perimeter fence to a depth of half a meter
and sideways 1 meter resulted in no further perimeter fence breaches reported.
Upington Airport (UTN) is located in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa. It is
situated close to both the Namibia and the Botswana borders and, subsequently, the
airport is utilised by the GA industry as an international gateway airport to clear both
customs and immigration enroute to, or from, Namibia or Botswana. Uniquely, UTN is the
only international airport used by transiting Microlight and Light Sports aircraft.
ACSA – UPINGTON AIRPORT
Between 22nd April and 28th June 2013, i.e. a two month period, UTN experienced 12
Runway Excursions, all of ICAO Severity Classification C or D. Of these 12
excursions, 10 of them were committed by Microlight and Light Sport aircraft.
Microlight sharing the airport with normal IFR traffic Jabiru Light Sports aircraft using UTN
By not having a LRST operational, there had been no previous meetings with the Pilot
Associations of these specialised aircraft to discuss problems they might encounter by
operating at a licensed international airport. As a result of the excursions a LRST meeting
was called where all issues were identified and solutions agreed that would ensure that
runway safety was improved for microlight and light sports aircraft Pilots.
Example – UPINGTON
AIRPORT
A complicated 3 Runway layout and Microlight Pilots who are unfamiliar with
operating within an ATC controlled airport and controlled airspace were the main
transgressors. Improved Markings and Signage resulted in no further incursions.
HOTSPOT Unmarked Stopway used as taxiway HOTSPOT Holding Points not enhanced
The need for a Runway Safety Team at every airport in Africa is a REAL one .It works
and can go a long way in enhancing safety and saving lives,
• The LRST meetings do not have to be separate meetings on their own. If it helps
you, simply add them to your existing Airside Safety Committee meetings.
• BUT REMEMBER…… FOR THE LRST TO SUCCEED… YOU MUST…….
• Invite Pilots from ALL levels who use your airport and runways (Military, GA,
Corporate, Airlines etc.). Without crucial input from Pilots your LRST will not work or
perform as it should
• BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY..... FOR THE LRST TO SUCCEED… YOU MUST…..
SHOW CONTINUOUS PASSION, DESIRE, FOCUS AND
SUPPORT FOR THE LRST.
If all else fails ….…….
RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS Airport Experiences
CONCLUSION
Runway Incursion- Toll Booth
Ultimate Protection
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