Local level governance and schooling in decentralizing Indonesia

Vivi Alatas (EASPR)

and

Deon Filmer (DECRG)

Conference on Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization

February 2004

Status of study / focus of presentation

Preliminary and incomplete study: What has been the impact of decentralization on

education outcomes? But

– Limited time that decentralization been implemented in Indonesia;

– Lags involved in the realization of impacts;– Lags in measurement of impacts.

This paper and presentation are a description of the assessment strategy and a discussion of some preliminary findings

BackgroundDecentralization in Indonesia

In 2000: Big-bang decentralization to district (Kabupaten) level

In addition to the overall changes, the education sector was particularly affected:

– Junior Secondary schooling was previously administered by central authorities (through their deconcentrated structures) and is now administered through the local government office along with Primary schooling.

– Funding for Basic Education now comes from the Local Government budget, and is therefore determined by the local political process.

BackgroundDecentralization in Indonesia

Simultaneously, a general move to increased school-based management

All this against the backdrop of the East Asian financial crisis which was particularly harsh in Indonesia

BackgroundOpportunities and risks of decentralization

Potential benefits– Reflect demands of local population– Potential efficiency gains– Innovation– Local-level ownership

Risks– Local allocations to education less than (nationally) socially optimal– Local elite capture– Lack of experience of the local administration– Increase in inequality

Literature points to potential importance of autonomy and accountability at the local level

Research strategy

“Big-bang” rules out any simple counter-factual … “what would have happened without decentralization?”

The approach used is to exploit the fact that decentralization will lead to increased variability in factors that affect outcomes

Documenting this variability, and relating it to changes in outcomes, is how we propose to assess the impact of decentralization on outcomes

WDR2004: A framework for how decentralization might affect outcomes?

Students/Parents

Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Voice

Client power

Compact and management

WDR2004: A framework for how decentralization might affect outcomes?

Students/Parents

Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Voice

Client power

Compact and management

Building accountability into the systemVoice

Ah, there he is again! How time flies! It’s time for the general election already!

By R. K. Laxman

WDR2004: A framework for how decentralization might affect outcomes?

Students/Parents

Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Voice

Client power

Compact and management

Building accountability into the systemClient Power

I can’t understand these people. Not a soul here knows how to read or write and yet they want a school

By R. K. Laxman

Decentralization: increased variability of accountability relationships

Students/Parents

Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Students/Parents

Local Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Students/Parents

Local Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Students/Parents

Local Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Students/Parents

Local Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Students/Parents

Policymakers

Schools/teachers

Research strategy

Identify district and school level indicators of – Voice– Compact– Management– Client power

And exploit how those have changed over time in order to assess the impact of decentralization

Current paper

Use baseline data to describe patterns and relationships between the indicators and outcomes

Data

Governance and Decentralization Survey– 177 Districts– Conducted in early 2002– Instruments to:

local administration officers (including the Dinas office) as well to school head teachers

School census from MONE– All schools– Includes data on revenues; expenditure, school characteristics,

teacher background, – And, our outcome of interest, school average results on national

standardized tests (NEM)

Data

District budget data– Development (investment) and routine (operational)

data for 1994-1999 period

Household survey data from SUSENAS– District average household per capita expenditures

(and its standard deviation)

Combining data—the “matched” and “unmatched” samples

The limited number of schools in the GDS means that if school level indicators derived from the GDS are used, the sample size shrinks dramatically (about 140 JS schools).

So much so that it is hard to identify any statistically significant results in the data analysis.

Combining data—the matched an unmatched samples

Using district average indicators derived from the GDS allows the analysis to include all schools in the school census (e.g. about 3300 JS schools)

Focus (for the moment) on Secondary schools

Empirical model

Dependent variable = test scores Independent variables =

– Measures of voice, compact, management, client power– Control variables– One specification includes school-level education inputs

“Cross-sectional” data combining school (and other) data from 1999 with GDS data data from early 2002

OLS regression

Results

Voice– More NGO involvement as measured by

the number of meetings between NGOs and local government; and NGOs as channels for complaints about education services

is associated with higher test scores– The

Frequency of media publicity about problems in education

is associated with lower test scores (reverse causality?)

Results

Compact– Clarity of the schools objectives as measured by

head teacher’s involvement in setting the school’s vision and mission

is associated with higher test scores– The

number meetings between local government education administrators and head teachers

is not associated with test scores (quality of the meetings?)

Results

Management– Greater

head teacher involvement in teacher recruitment

and in school based management

is consistently associated with better test scores– But

involvement in curriculum, budget allocation,

and decisions regarding teacher discipline

are negatively associated with test scores (reverse causation?)

Results

Client power– Appears to be a weak force, although

involvement of Parent Teacher Associations in teaching tools procurement

and in curriculum

are associated with higher test scores (JS level)– But involvement in none of the other areas, e.g.

teacher discipline, school based management, textbooks

are associated with outcomes.

Looking forward

Decentralization is expected to affect indicators that appear associated with learning outcomes

Assessing the “impact” of decentralization will be made even harder:

– Centralized data collection efforts are weakening– National standards are falling by the way (e.g. NEM)– Ensuring sufficient sample sizes to measure effects is difficult.

Hope that new rounds of GDS can overcome some of these constraints, as will working with counterparts to ensure complete and timely data collection