Local Elite Adjustment in Indonesia’s

Democratization:

Case Studies of North Sumatra and East Java,

1998-2013

Inaugural-Dissertation

zur

Erlangung der Doktorwürde

der Philosophischen Fakultät

der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität

Freiburg i. Br.

vorgelegt von

Panji Anugrah Permana

Aus Sukabumi, Indonesien

SS 2017

ii

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rüland

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Judith Schlehe

Vorsitzender des Promotionsausschusses: Prof. Dr. Andreas Mehler

Der Gemeinsamen Kommission der Philologischen,

Philosophischen und Wirtschafts- und

Verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät: Prof. Dr. Hans-Helmuth Gander

Datum der Fachprüfung im Promotionsfach: 11.07.2017

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page ........................................................................................................................................... i

Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... iii

List of Table ............................................................................................................................. v

List of Figure ............................................................................................................................ v

Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... vi

Chapter One Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 Chapter Two ............................................................................................................................... 7 Theory and Methodology ........................................................................................................... 7

I. Theoretical Premises ..................................................................................................................... 7 A. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 7 B. The Structuralist Approach ......................................................................................................... 7

Elite and democratization studies ................................................................................ 11 Structuralism and democratization studies in Indonesia ............................................. 12

C. The Actor-Centered Approach ................................................................................................. 14 Elite and democratization studies ................................................................................ 17 Elites and democratization studies in Indonesia .......................................................... 19

D. The Ideational Approach .......................................................................................................... 21

Ideas and democratization studies ............................................................................... 22 Democratization studies in Indonesia: Bringing ideas in ............................................ 23

Enlisting the cultural turn for elite studies in Indonesia .............................................. 25 E. Eclectic Theorizing in Elite Analyses ...................................................................................... 27 F. Research Arguments ................................................................................................................. 29

II. Methodology and Research Techniques ..................................................................................... 30 A. Comparative Case Study Method and Process Tracing Analysis ............................................. 30 B. The Cases .................................................................................................................................. 34 C. Research Techniques ................................................................................................................ 37

Chapter Three ........................................................................................................................... 40 Politics in Indonesia: Structure, Actors and Ideas .................................................................... 40

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 40 II. Trajectories of Political Order in Indonesia: Institutional Structure, Actor Strategies and Ideas . 42 A. Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957) ................................................................................... 42 B. “Guided Democracy” (1957-1965) .......................................................................................... 48 C. The New Order (1965/1966-1998) ........................................................................................... 50 D. The post-New Order Era: Bringing Democracy Back In ......................................................... 58

1. Habibie’s Reforms ................................................................................................... 59 2. Constitutional Amendments ..................................................................................... 61

3. Decentralization Reform in 1999: Deconstructing the Myth of Unitarism ............. 63 4. Revision of the Decentralization Policy in 2004 and Direct Local Elections ......... 66

III. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 68

Chapter Four Elites and Democratization in North Sumatra ................................................... 71 I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 71 II. Elite and Institutional Structure ..................................................................................................... 71 A. Socio-Economic Conditions and Historical Background ......................................................... 71 B. Institutional Dynamics of Local Political Power: Parties and Elections .................................. 75

1. General Elections ..................................................................................................... 75

2. Local Elections ........................................................................................................ 81 3. Elite Configuration: Old and New Elites ............................................................... 100

III. Elite and Strategic Actions towards Democratization ............................................................... 107 A. Local Elections and Transactional Politics ............................................................................. 111 B. Elite Networks and Alliance Building .................................................................................... 116

1. Party Networks and National Elites Networks ...................................................... 116

iv

2. Ethnic and Religious Politics ................................................................................. 122 3. Patronage and Personal Networks ......................................................................... 131 4. The Hobbesian Nature of Inter-Elite Competition ................................................ 137

IV. Elite and Ideational Contestation .............................................................................................. 144 A. Proximity to the People .......................................................................................................... 144 B. The Rise of Oppositional Ideas .............................................................................................. 153 C. External Challenge and Elite Perception: Local Elites as Ideational Carriers and Barriers ... 157

V. Conclusion: Tracing the Process of Elite Adjustment in North Sumatra .................................. 168

Chapter Five Elite and Democratization in East Java ............................................................ 172 I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 172 II. Elite and Institutional Context .................................................................................................... 172 A. Socio-Economic Condition..................................................................................................... 172 B. The Dynamics of Local Political Power: Parties and Elections ............................................. 174

1. General Elections ................................................................................................... 174 2. Local Elections ...................................................................................................... 181

C. Elite Continuity ...................................................................................................................... 200 III. Elite and Strategic Actions towards Democratization ............................................................... 206

A. Political Networks: Local Elites and Three Political Machines ............................................. 209 B. Personal Networks: Friends and Alliances ............................................................................. 214 C. Party Networks: Inclusion and Accommodation .................................................................... 220 D. Elite Cunning, Money Politics, and Political Corruption ....................................................... 227

IV. Elite and Ideational Structures .................................................................................................. 231 A. The Traditional Javanese Ideas of Stability and Harmony ..................................................... 231 B. The Bureaucratic Politician .................................................................................................... 234 C. Elite Resistance towards Liberal Democratic Ideas and Elite Perception towards Political

Reforms ....................................................................................................................................... 236 D. The Outsiders and Oppositional Ideas .................................................................................... 241

V. Conclusion: Tracing the Process of Elite Adjustment in East Java .......................................... 248

Chapter Six Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 253 I. Comparative Analyses: Similarities, Differences, and General Patterns .................................. 254 II. Understanding Elite Adjustment in Democratic Transition ...................................................... 260

Zussamenfassung .................................................................................................................... 265

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 267 Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 301

(List of Interviewees) ............................................................................................................. 301

v

LIST OF TABLE

Tabel 2. 1 Distribution of Interviewees................................................................................ 38

Table 4. 1 The Result of 1955 General Election at the National and North Sumatra .......... 76

Table 4. 2 The Results of the 1971 General Election at the National Level and in North

Sumatra (in percent) ............................................................................................ 77

Table 4. 3 The Results of the New Order’s General Elections at the National Level and in

North Sumatran (in percent) ............................................................................... 78

Table 4. 4 Results of General Elections in Post New Order Era at the National and North

Sumatra (by percent of popular vote) ................................................................. 79

Table 4. 5 Local Elections in North Sumatra and Medan, 1998-2010 ................................. 82

Table 4. 6 Candidates, Parties and Result of Gubernatorial Election in 2008 ..................... 94

Table 4. 7 Backgrounds of Candidates in Gubernatorial Elections ................................... 118

Table 4. 8 The Position of Political Parties in the Gubernatorial Elections ....................... 120

Table 4. 9 Ethnic and Religious Background of Candidates in Gubernatorial Election ... 124

Table 5. 1 The Result of 1955 General Election, National Level and East Java ............... 175

Table 5. 2 The Results of 1971 General Election, National Level and East Java .............. 176

Table 5. 3 The Results of The New Order’s General Election, National Level and

East Java (in percent) ........................................................................................ 178

Table 5. 4 Results of the General Elections in the Post-New Order Era, National Level

and East Java (by percent of popular vote ........................................................ 180

Table 5. 5 Composition of Political Parties/ Factions in the Provincial Legislature in the

Gubernatorial Election of 1998 ......................................................................... 182

Table 5. 6 The Results of the Gubernatorial Election of 1998 ........................................... 183

Table 5. 7 Composition of Political Parties/ Factions in the Provincial Legislature in the

Gubernatorial Election of 2003 ......................................................................... 185

Table 5. 8 The Result of the Gubernatorial Election of 2003 ............................................ 186

Table 5. 9 The Results of the Gubernatorial Election of 2008 (in percent) ....................... 193

Table 5. 10 The Results of the Mayoral Election of Surabaya in 2000 ............................... 195

Table 5. 11 The Results of the Mayoral Election of Surabaya in 2005 (in percent) ............ 197

Table 5. 12 The Results of the Mayoral Election of Surabaya in 2010 (in percent) ............ 200

LIST OF FIGURE

Figure 2.1 Causal factors and outcome .................................................................................... 30

Figure 2. 2 Periodization and Major Events of Local Elite Adjustment in North Sumatra and

East Java 1998-2013 ................................................................................................................. 34

Figure 4. 1 The Result of 2008 Gubernatorial Election (based on regions) ........................... 126

vi

GLOSSARY

abangan nominal Islam, syncretic Islam

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian

Armed Forces

adat tradition, custom

aliran stream

among roso managing the sense

AMPI Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia, Indonesian

Development Generation of Youth

APBD Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Local

Government Revenue and Expenditure), local government

budget

Banpres Bantuan Presiden, Presidential Grants

Bapak Pembangunan Father of Development, credit for President Soeharto

Bappeda Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional

Development Planning Agency

Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National

Development Planning Agency)

batik traditional cloth of Indonesian

Bhineka Tunggal Ika Unity in Diversity, Indonesian local beliefs

BIA Badan Intelijen ABRI, ABRI Intelligence Agency

BMS Baptist Mission Society, British Missionaries

BPK Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, State Audit Agency

BPS Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Statistics Agency

BPUPKI Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan

Indonesia, the Investigatory Committee for the Independence

Indonesia

BPWS Badan Pengembangan Wilayah Surabaya-Madura, Regional

Development of Surabaya-Madura

brengos Javanese’s name for moustache

Cakrabirawa Regiment Bodyguard to the President in Soekarno Era

calon dropping Centrally-ordered candidates

calon pendamping Supplemental/ accessorial candidates

CEPU Block One nationwide biggest contributor of oil, located in East

Java

Daerah pesisir barat West Coast regions

Daerah pesisir timur East Coast regions

dakwah proselytization/ missionary

desa village

Dewan Nasional National Council, established in the Guided Democracy era

Dewan Syuro Supreme/ Advisory Board

Dewan Tanfidz Executive Board

Dispenda Dinas Pendapatan Daerah, Revenue Service Office

DM-USU Dewan Mahasiswa Universitas Sumatra Utara, the Presidium

of the Student Council of the University of North Sumatra

DPA Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, Supreme Advisory Council

DPC Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, district board of political parties

DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representative Council

DPD Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, regional board of political parties

vii

DPP Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, central board of political parties

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Council

DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People’s

Representative Council, regional legislature

DPR-GR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong, Gotong Royong

Parliament

DPT Daftar Pemilih Tetap, fixed voter list

DPW Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, regional board of political parties

DRD Dewan Riset Daerah, Provincial Research Council

Dwi fungsi ABRI The doctrine of the military dual functions, in defense and

politics

Era reformasi Reform era, Post New Order Era

FKPMJSU Forum Komunikasi Pemuda dan Mahasiswa Jakarta-Sumatra

Utara (the Forum of Communication of the Youth and

Students of Jakarta-North Sumatra)

GAPENSI Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia,

Indonesian National Contractors’ Association

gawe karyo work and cooperation

Gerakan Pemuda Ansor Ansor Youth Movement

GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesian, National Student

Movement of Indonesia

Golkar Golongan Karya, Functional Group, the state political party

under the New Order, and one of the post-New Order party

golput Golongan Putih, a boycott movement in New Order’s general

elections

gotong royong mutual cooperation, mutual assistance

Guided Democracy the Sukarno Era, 1957-1966

HIPMI Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia, Indonesian Young

Entrepreneurs Association

HIPPI Himpunan Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia, Indonesian

Indigenous Businessmen’s Association

HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic University Students

Association

ICIS International Conference of Islamic Scholars

ICMI Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia, Association of

Indonesian Muslim Scholars

IKA-GMNI Ikatan Alumni Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia,

Association of Alumni of National Student Movement of

Indonesia

IKOPI Asosiasi Koperasi Pribumi, Indigenous Cooperative

Association

IMF International Monetary Fund

Inpres Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction

IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, the League of

Supporters of Indonesian Independence

ITB Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung Technology Institute

ITS Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November, Sepuluh November

Institute of Technology

Jadel Jawa Deli, Javanese-Deli

jakon Jawa Kontrak, Javanese contract workers

Jalinkesra Jalan Lain Menuju Kesejahteraan, Another Way to People

viii

Welfare

JLS Jalur Lingkar Selatan, South Ring Road Highway

kabupaten district, regency

KADIN Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Indonesian Chamber of

Commerce and Industry

KAHMI Kesatuan Alumni Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Alumni of

Islamic University Students Association

kajati Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi, High Attorney at the Province

kampung kampong, rural area

Kapolda Kepala Kepolisian Daerah, Chief of Provincial Police

KASDAM Kepala Staf Daerah Militer, Chief of Army Regional Staff

kawulo-gusti The relationship between the people and their leaders

kecamatan Sub-district

kepala desa village headmen

kepala dinas Head of province/ district level office

keterbukaan Opening

khittah Basic mission of NU in religious and social activities

KNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, National Committee of

Indonesian Youth

Kodiklat ABRI Komando Pendidikan dan Latihan ABRI, Indonesian Army of

Education and Training Command

konfrontasi Confrontation

konstituante Constitutional assembly

kopiah Moslem cap

KORPRI Korp Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian

Civil Service Corps

KOSTRAD Komando Cadangan Strategis TNI-Angkatan Darat, the

Army’s Strategic Reserve Force

kota Municipality

KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption Eradication

Commission

KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Elections Commission

KPUD Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, Regional General Elections

Commission

KSAD Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, the Army Chief of Staff

KY Komisi Yudisial, Judicial Commission

kyai religious teacher, in NU tradition

LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Science

Institute)

LSI Lembaga Survey Indonesia, Indonesian Survey Institute

LSN Lembaga Survey Nasional, National Survey Institute

LSPERS Lembaga Studi Perubahan Sosial, Study Group for Social

Change

MA Mahkamah Agung, Supreme Court

MABES ABRI Markas Besar ABRI, the Indonesian Army Headquarters

MABMI Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu Indonesia, Malay Cultural and

Customary Council)

Malari Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari, January Disaster, student

protest towards the New Order in 1974.

malu shyness

manunggaling kawulo gusti the unity of the leader and people

ix

marga clan/ kinship group in North Sumatra

Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of

Indonesian Muslim, party with Islamic modernist orientation,

the second largest party in the 1950s

MK Mahkamah Konstitusi, Constitutional Court

monoloyalitas mono loyalty, the loyalty of civil servant (bureaucracy) to

Golkar (state party) in the New Order Era

MPI Masyarakat Pancasila Indonesia, Community for Indonesian

Pancasila

MPM Mahasiswa Pancasila Medan, Student Association of

Pancasila

MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative

Assembly

MPRS Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, the Provisional

People’s Consultative Assembly

Munas Musyawarah Nasional, national party meeting

Musdalub Musyawarah Daerah Luar Biasa, (Extraordinary Regional

Party Congress)

Musrenbang Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan, Deliberation Panning

of Development

musyawarah mufakat Mutual consultation

nasakom Nasionalis Agama Komunis, Nationalist-Religion-

Communist, a syncretic political jargon in Soekarno Era

New Order the Soeharto Era, 1966-1998

noto roso controlling the sense

NST Negara Sumatra Timur, State of East Sumatra

NU Nahdlatul Ulama, the Awakening of Traditional Religious

Scholars and Teachers, Indonesia’s largest traditionalist

Islamic organization

P2SEM Program Penanganan Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat, Socio-

Economic Community Treatment Program

PAD Pendapatan Asli Daerah, locally-generated revenue

pakde Javanese’s name for uncle

PAN Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party

Pancasila the five guiding principle of the Indonesian state

Pancasila Democracy The political system of the New Order

Pangab Panglima ABRI, Commander in Chief of ABRI

Pangdam Panglima Daerah Militer, Regional Military Commander

Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Party

Parliamentary Democracy the era of liberal democracy in Indonesia, 1950-1957

Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party

Partai Gerindra Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia

Movement Party, led by Prabowo Subianto

Partai Hanura Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, People’s Conscience Party, led by

Wiranto

Partai Murba Proletarian/ socialist party

pasangan pelangi Rainbow pairs

PBB Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Moon and Star Party

PBR Partai Bintang Reformasi, Star Reform Party

PBSD Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, Social Democratic Labour

Party

x

PCD Partai Cinta Damai, Peace and Love Party

PD Partai Demokrat, Democrat Party, party founded and led by

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party,

one of political parties in the New Order, the party from

which the PDI-P split in 1997

PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian

Democratic Party Struggle, party led by Megawati

Sukarnoputri

PDS Partai Damai Sejahtera, Prosperous Peace Party

Pembaruan dan pembauran Renewal and assimilation

pemekaran Regional proliferation

Perti Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islam, Islamic Education

Movement Party

pesantren Islamic boarding schools

Pesindo Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Youth Socialist

Piagam Jakarta Jakarta Charter

PIB Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, New Indonesia Alliance

Party

PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party

PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party

PKNU Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, Ulema National

Awakening Party

PKPB Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, Concern for the Nation

Functional Group Party

PKPI Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Justice

and Unity Party

PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous and Justice Party

PNBK Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan, Freedom Bull

National Party,

PNI Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party,

founded by President Soekarno in 1920s

PNI-Marhaen Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaen, Indonesian National

Party-Marhaen

PNS Pegawai Negeri Sipil, civil servants

POLRI Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Police

PP Pemuda Pancasila, Pancasila Youth

PPDI Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic

Vanguard Party

PPDK Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, United Democratic

Nationhood Party

PPK Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan, Sub-District Electoral

Commission

PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, the Independence

Preparatory Committee

PPNU Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah, United of Nahdlatul

Ummah Party,

PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party

protap Provinsi Tapanuli, the Province of Tapanuli

PRRI Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, the

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia

xi

PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party

PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union

Party

PT Perseroan Terbatas, limited liability company

PT Bentoel Cigarette factory, located in East Java

PT Gudang Garam One of the biggest cigarette factory, located in East Java

PT PAL One of the biggest shipyard company, located in East Java

PT Semen Gresik One of the biggest cement firm, located in East Java

PT Tjiwi Kimia One of the biggest paper factory, located in East Java

pujakesuma Putra Jawa Kelahiran Sumatra, Sons of Java Born in

Sumatra

pungli Pungutan liar, illegal levies

putra daerah son of the region

Rakerdasus Rapat Kerja Daerah Khusus (Special Regional Meeting, of

political parties)

Reform Era/ Era Reformasi the Post-Soeharto Era, 1998- present

reformasi total total reform

Rehap Lunas Siregar, Harahap, Lubis, Nasution, an acronym of the four big

Mandailing clans of Siregar, Harahap, Lubis and Nasution

rekanan pemda Partner of local government

RMG Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft (German Mission Society,

German Missionaries)

sahabat semua suku Friend of All Ethnic Group

santri orthodox Islam

sarong Cloth of traditional Indonesian Moslems

SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of

Indonesia, 2004-2014

sekda Sekretaris Daerah, Secretary of the Province/ District

sembako sembilan bahan pokok, nine primary foods

silaturahmi developing communication

SIUPP Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers, Press Publication

Enterprise Permit

SKPD Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, heads of provincial/ district

offices

sultan/ raja king

Supersemar Surat Perintah 11 Maret, the Letter of Command of 11 March

1966

Tapsel/ Tabagsel Tapanuli Selatan/ Tapanuli Bagian Selatan, South Tapanuli

Region, southern region of North Sumatra province

tim sukses campaign team

tingkat penggangguran

terbuka

Open unemployment

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Military

ulama Religious teacher

ustadz Religious teacher

USU Universitas Sumatra Utara, University of North Sumatra

wagub Wakil Gubernur, Vice Governor

wijil tresno lead to love

1

Chapter One

Introduction

With the collapse of President Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998,

Indonesia embarked on a wide range of political reforms. These changes included the

introduction of a multi-party system which replaced the hegemonic party system1 of the New

Order era (Suryadinata 2007). The once dominant Golkar party can no longer win electoral

contests with ease due to the rise of other parties. The military has also undergone profound

changes, as its reserved seats in the parliament have been abolished (Honna 2003; Sebastian

2006; Mietzner 2006, 2009, 2011; Heiduk 2011; Rüland, Manea and Born 2013). Moreover,

the electoral system has been modified through the application of the open-list system of

proportional representation (King 2001, 2003; Subekti 2001; Sulistyo 2002; Reilly 2007). The

president and vice president are no longer elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly

(MPR); they are now directly chosen by the people. The 1945 Constitution has been amended

four times, introducing a presidential system of government based on an elaborate system of

checks and balances (Ellis 2002; Subekti 2001). Other significant changes include the

emergence of a new middle class, as well as the growth of civil society groups which have

spearheaded opposition against the New Order regime since the 1980s (Uhlin 1993, 1997;

Törnquist 2000; Aspinall 2005). Press freedom has also become a balancer and a monitoring

tool regarding the policies and economic performance of the government. Student groups,

intellectuals and professionals have been able to increase their bargaining position in

monitoring the government, in contrast to their experiences in the New Order. Another

important aspect initiating the political liberalization agenda was the release of some the New

Order’s prominent dissident political prisoners.

However, one of the most ambitious reforms in newly democratizing Indonesia was a

far-reaching and radical decentralization scheme, launched by Soeharto’s successor, President

Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (Bünte 2009; Hadiz 2004). Two major discourses dominated the

public discussion behind this scheme. The first discourse was about the bitter experience

under the centralized New Order system which allocated political power and economic shares

of central-local relations unfairly. It led to a widespread distrust of regional governments

toward central authority in Jakarta. The other debate was about a concern over the country’s

disintegration and the increase of separatist aspirations in some regions, particularly in Aceh

1 For the concept of „hegemonic party system,“ see Sartori (1976).

2

and Papua (Bertrand 2004; McGibbon 2006, 2007). In short, it can be said that the

decentralization scheme was produced in a period of extraordinary uncertainty and resulted in

a hurried and audacious policy choice. As a result, the “big bang” decentralization policy

enacted in Law Number 22/1999 and Law Number 25/1999 drastically shifted political

decision-making powers and reallocated financial resources from the center to regional

governments. Another significant feature of decentralization was the introduction of direct

popular elections of local chief executives in 2005.2 Until 1999, local legislatures nominated

three candidates, one of whom was subsequently selected by the central government. After

1999, in the initial years of the Reform Era, the central government lost its role in the

recruitment of local chief executives, leaving their election entirely in the hands of the local

legislatures.3

However, the impact of these local elections on Indonesian democratization is strongly

contested among scholars. While some maintain that they have made the Indonesian polity

more democratic, have given rise to a vibrant civil society (Haris et al. 2006; Romli 2006;

Legowo 2005; Fitriyah 2005; Antlöv 2004) and have increased the public needs orientation of

local politicians in service delivery (Kis-Katos and Sjahrir 2014), others argue that they have

rather contributed to firmly entrenching local elites in local power structures (Hadiz 2005;

Sulaiman and van Klinken 2007; Bakti 2007; Aragon 2007; McDougall 2007; Schulte-

Nordholt 2007; van Klinken 2007; McCharty 2007; Hidayat 2007; Romli 2007; Mietzner

2009; Schiller 2009; Bühler 2009; Aspinall 2010). These latter, more skeptical scholars

dominate the debate. They argue that local elites have captured local institutions, appropriated

local public resources for personal gain, and engaged in money politics to conquer elective

local government positions. This has resulted in wide-spread corruption, in fact,

“decentralization of corruption” as some observers contend (Rohdewohld 2003; Malley 2003;

Ratnawati 2006; Romli 2007a; McCharty 2007; Sulaiman and van Klinken 2007), patronage

politics (Hadiz 2003; Schulte-Nordholt 2005; Sidel 2005) and unprincipled ad hoc coalitions

among local elites. As a result, grassroots organizations of political parties have degenerated

into political vehicles for aspiring local leaders (Pratikno 2009; Choi 2007, 2009); electoral

fraud, money politics, rent seeking and politico-business symbiosis have become endemic

(Hidayat 2005, 2007, 2009; Lesmana 2007; Susanto 2007; Bünte 2009). Primordialism and

2 Although a result of decentralization policy and aimed at strengthening local democracy, direct local election

was not a product of the Law Number 22/1999, but rather a product of its revision in Law Number 32/2004. 3 This electoral mechanism of local executives by local legislatures was a subject of criticism. This mechanism

stimulated corruption, collusion, elitism, money politics, and transactional politics among local elites. These

critics were a basic starting point for the idea of direct local election; see Rasyid 2003, Haris et al. 2006, Romli

2006, Romli 2007a, Legowo 2005, Surbakti 2005, Fitriyah 2005.

3

ethnicity have often been employed to mobilize followers, with the unintended effect of

deepening ethno-religious strife (Smith 2009; Mietzner 2009a; Subianto 2009; Anggal and

Erb 2009).

If these analyses correctly depict local politics in Indonesia, this would have serious

consequences for the quality of the country’s democracy. As long as governance processes are

highly defective4, it is premature to consider a democracy to be consolidated, a point that has

been rarely addressed in the vast literature on political transition. This is more than surprising

as it is particularly at the local level, that the majority of people directly encounter political

decision-making. If local resources are becoming part and parcel of patronage politics, if

public service delivery is deficient and exclusive, and if local political leaders are

aggrandizing and enriching themselves, the legitimacy of the political system and the

personnel suffers. The consequence is the emergence of what Carothers has called “feckless

pluralism” or “dominant power politics” (Carothers 2002), or even worse than that.

However, given the diversity of the more than 500 local governments across the

Indonesian archipelago, it is risky to make sweeping conclusions about the country’s state of

local-level democracy (Mietzner and Aspinall 2010, 15-16). Numerous studies have, indeed,

as shown above, aptly documented the weaknesses of “big bang” decentralization, but as

Mietzner has pointed out, it also strengthened the cohesiveness of the Indonesian state at a

time when, due to numerous separatist conflicts, some observers were already depicting

Indonesia as a “failing state” (Mietzner 2011).

Nevertheless, quantitative data derived from 350 direct local elections between 2005

and 2008 show that the turn-over rate of incumbents - 40.1 percent - is quite high.5 While at

first sight this figure suggests that direct local elections instigate elite turn-over, and elite

capture is less wide-spread than asserted by the critics of Indonesia’s decentralization reforms,

the question of who precisely seeks political leadership positions in local electoral contests

nevertheless emerges. An analysis of the political background of candidates for local chief

executive posts in 205 regions from June 2005 to June 2006 indicates that elite circulation in

Indonesian local politics may be quite limited. This may be concluded from the fact that,

according to these data, 69.9 percent of the candidates for local chief executive posts were

former Regents, Mayors and bureaucrats. An additional 13.5 percent were professional

politicians.6 Other data exhibit a marked increase of businesspeople among the candidates for

4 On the concept of “defective democracy,” see Merkel (2004), Merkel and Croissant (2004).

5 Lembaga Survey Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute), internal database of 18 April 2008.

6 Kompas, 20 June 2006.

4

high local offices.7 During 2005-2008, 63.3 percent of the candidates in gubernatorial

elections were bureaucrats (23.3), parliamentarians (23.3), and regents or mayors (16.7

percent) (Bühler 2010, 275). These data also show that 11 percent of the candidates were

incumbent governor or deputy governor (Ibid., 275). Based on these data, one may argue that

locally established elites have been quite resilient and are still able to defend their elevated

political role even under the new democratic conditions. According to Bühler “a close

examination of the careers of these figures reveals that many of them were involved in local

politics for years, if not decades, throughout the New Order” (Ibid., 275). In other words,

direct local elections have not significantly produced new and alternative leadership.

Abundant research had been conducted in uncovering the impact of political reform in

Indonesia towards political elites, and even in particular approaching the phenomenon of elite

survival and the significant roles of established elites in Indonesia’s democratic transition.

While some scholars argue that Indonesia is characterized by a “freezing“ of structural

conditions following the breakdown of the New Order that has resulted in the structural

continuity of oligarchy, others argue that there exists local elite competition, diversification,

and reconfiguration. Nevertheless, the deeper question of how the process itself has occurred-

whether assuming elite continuity or change- has been grossly neglected. This study thus

raises the question of how and under what conditions local elite adjustment has taken place in

Indonesia. What factors have contributed to different patterns or outcomes of elite adjustment

in Indonesia’s democratization? Why have similar institutional reforms and designs of

democratization such as decentralization and direct local elections led to dissimilar outcomes

of elite adjustment? In short, this research seeks to examine processes of elite adjustment at

the local level. Pivotal here also is the question of the extent to which direct local elections

have been drivers of elite change. Or have, as the data above seem to suggest, old elites been

able to adjust to the new institutional environment and survive by capturing and manipulating

democratic institutions? Even more interesting is how old and new elites have managed to

conquer local elective positions. That is, what kind of alliances they have concluded, to what

extent they succeeded in excluding reformist politicians from local institutions, what

resources they are able to mobilize, and which electoral strategies they pursue?

These and similar questions will be addressed in this study, which is organized as

follows. The subsequent chapter outlines the theoretical framework and the methodology. The

7 In 50 direct local elections in June and July 2005, twenty-eight candidates had a background as business

owners. This deviates markedly from the professional profile of candidates during the New Order period. See

Marcus Mietzner (2010, 190). However, Bühler counted that only about 7.9 percent of the candidates in

gubernatorial elections during 2005-2008 were businesspersons. See Michael Bühler (2010, 275).

5

theoretical part discusses the concept of elite adjustment and reviews the major theoretical

strands of research on elites, which are structural approaches and actor-centered approaches.

It adds ideational approaches which have so far been much less applied. Especially

Indonesian elite studies have almost completely ignored ideational or cognitive approaches.

The eclectic or multivariate theoretical approach of this study, which combines all three major

strands of theorizing, thereby explicitly including an ideational perspective, is thus a major

innovation in the study of (local) elites in Indonesia. I argue that the problem of elite

persistence and elite adjustment to democratization are issues too complex for merely being

viewed either through a structuralist lens or as a chiefly actor-driven process. In doing so, I

propose eclectical theorizing (Katzenstein and Sil 2008) in approaching the problem of elite

adjustment in Indonesia. The following chapter also outlines the methodology which mainly

rests on by the comparative case study method (George 1979; Bennett 2002; Lim 2006;

Gerring 2007) and causal process tracing analysis (Bennett 2002, 2010; George and Bennett

2005).

With Chapter 3, the study turns to the empirical part. The chapter starts with a

description of the historical trajectory of Indonesia’s political system through the prism of

institutional structure, actor strategies, and ideas. It briefly describes the practices of

Indonesia’s four political systems, namely the Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957), the

Guided Democracy (1957-1966), the New Order (1966-1998), and the post-New Order or

Reform Era (1998 until today). The chapter ends with an overview of Indonesia’s institutional

reform in the Reform Era, including democratization, decentralization, and direct local

elections.

Chapter 4 scrutinizes elite adjustment in North Sumatra. Particular attention will be

given to the institutional context, actor’s strategic choice in democratization, and ideational

contestation. In a first step, the chapter portrays the institutional contexts by assessing the

historical background of provincial politics, the province’s socio-political and economic

structures, elections and parties, and elite configuration. Second, the chapter explores the

actor-centered dimensions of local politics. This entails examining the strategic use of

political and personal networks, elite alliance and coalition, inter-elite competition, and

money or transactional politics.8 And, third, this chapter analyzes the ideational contestation

between the new normative framework of democracy and the existing local beliefs and

authoritarian orthodoxies. Ideational change is thereby distinguished into a phase in which the

8 In this study, I will interchangeably use the term transactional politics and transactional practices. Both refer to

the practices overshadowing electoral contest such as money politics, vote-buying, buying the political party’s

tickets for running as candidates, bribery, etc.

6

old order and the beliefs associated with it collapse and a phase in which the new order

consolidates (Legro 2000). Special attention in this part is paid to illuminating the perception

of local elites towards the form of majoritarian and liberal democracy. The question is here

the extent to which local elites adopt the new democratic norms and to what extent they still

retain the authoritarian political beliefs predominant during the Suharto era. In other words,

this section analyses the role of local elites as carriers of ideas, examining how they

rhetorically behave as protagonists of democracy but at the same time resist democracy in

everyday political practices. Subsequently, chapter 5 investigates elite adjustment in East Java

by addressing the same questions as chapter 4 did.

Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main research findings. It seeks to identify patterns

of elite adjustment and to trace the causal processes underlying it. In an outlook, I will reflect

on the merits of eclectic theorizing in understanding elite adjustment in Indonesia and other

transitional settings.

7

Chapter Two

Theory and Methodology

I. Theoretical Premises

A. Introduction

Research on political elites has received particular attention from social scientists. The birth

of classic elite studies by European social scientists - Mosca, Pareto, and Michels - in the

early twentieth century has triggered an abundance of subsequent research on the role of elites

in politics and society, elite change and elite transformation. Classical elite studies, arguing

that elites are “inevitable,” view elite actions as the main drivers of social change (Field and

Higley 1980; Putnam 1976). More recently, in the post-World War II period, North American

social scientists spearheaded theorizing on elites and – contrary to classical theories -

proposed a more dynamic feature of elites including a reciprocal relationship with non-elite

groups.

This chapter provides a framework for the following empirical chapters which

examine local elite transformation in two Indonesian provinces after the fall of President

Suharto’s New Order regime in May 1998. It lays the foundation for an eclectic theoretical

approach which combines all three major theoretical strands of elite studies: (1) structuralist

analyses; (2) studies focusing on agency; and (3) studies highlighting an ideational

perspective in the study of elites. It must however be noted that like many other attempts to

order and systematize theoretical approaches, this distinction is of an ideal-type nature, which

blurs the fact that there is overlap and combination especially of structuralist and agency-

related approaches. The subsequent overview categorizes them with respect to the dominant

paradigm which in some cases is structure, in others agency and, quite rarely, ideas.

B. The Structuralist Approach

Structuralist elite theorists positioned elites and elite change in a larger societal context. For

them structure is epitomized in economic scope conditions, the educational system and

religion (Mosca 1939), political institutions and organizations such as political parties

(Michels 1962), the bureaucracy, the government, the military, corporations (Mills 1959,

Domhoff 1978), or institutions set up for managing functional issue areas (Keller 1963, 1968).

Although structuralist elite theorists shared a consensus on the significance of

8

structural or institutional power as determinants of elite behavior, they emphasized different

dimensions. While Mosca referred to social forces, Michels focused on political organization

embodied in the political party. By contrast, more recent North American theorists such as C.

Wright Mills found structural power located in the triangular relationship between the

military, corporations, and the political directorates. Keller’s strategic elites were derived

from four functional societal problems: goal attainment, adaptation, integration, and pattern

maintenance and tension management (Keller 1968, 27). Other elite theorists such as Dreitzel

focused on institutions and organizations in modern industrial society, which were

characterized by a performance-based selection process (Dreitzel in Hartmann 2007, 29-31).

For Field and Higley, structural power was related to levels of socioeconomic development,

and the attitudes and orientation of non-elites towards elites (Field and Higley 1980, 18-21).

Fundamental for structuralist elite theorists is the belief that elites are the product of

societal structure. This assumption implies that structures predetermine the behavior and

attitudes of elites. Or put differently: agency is the result of structure. As a consequence, elite

composition and elite change are also strongly determined by societal structure. When societal

structure shifts, elite change is the most likely consequence. Here, the structuralist approach

has emphasized the argument that the development of elites “is an unavoidable product of

modern social organization” (Marger 1981, 52). Scholars with a structuralist leaning have

thereby portrayed elites as “reactive actors to social threats” as well as structural constraints

and opportunities (Lopez 2013, 8). In short, structuralist elite theory proposed the argument

that the existence of elites is dependent on exogenous structural factors.

Early structuralism can be found in the work of the classical elite theorist, Gaetano

Mosca. Mosca conceptualized societal structure as social force and argued that changes in

social forces create changes in the composition of elites. This implies that “…if a new source

of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, if an old

religion declines or a new one is born, if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously,

far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class“ (Mosca 1939, 65). Later on, he illustrated

how the change from the feudal state to the bureaucratic state led to the demise of the feudal

elite or ruling warrior class and the ascent of an industrial elite with great capital: “…wealth

rather than military valor comes to be the characteristic feature of the dominant class: the

people who rule are the rich rather than the brave…to be rich is to become powerful” (Mosca

1939, 57).

Mosca’s theory thus highlighted the need for the political class “to be attentive to

emerging social forces and pressures” (Medding 1982, 397-398). In other words, elites should

9

be vigilant towards social change in economic, religious, and education institutions. Once

elites failed to anticipate social change, dislocation or elite change will be the likely result,

leading Mosca to stress the need for elite adaptation towards social change (Ibid., 398). Mosca

also argued in favor of elite circulation as the lower stratum acts “as the reservoir of

recruitment for the upper stratum, and as the supplier of talent” (Ibid., 398). According to

Medding, both these processes of social pressure and potential elite circulation suggest a high

degree of elite responsiveness to social forces and social change, which seems to stand in

direct contradiction with elite dominance and control (Ibid., 397-398).

For Robert Michels, elite power is the outflow of political organization. It is the

political party that enables elites to dominate and control the mass that is perceived as being

left without political structure and organization of their own (Ibid., 398-399). Michels

characterized his political elites as oligarchy (Michels 1962), which is a dominant and

exploitative minority, virtually independent of the control of, and tyrannizing the majority.

This minority imposes its will on the rest, its policies being the “outcome of the exigencies of

dominion and of the exploitation of the mass of helots effected by the ruling minority”

(Michels 1962, 353). The majority is subject to “eternal tutelage,” must “submit to the

dominion of a small minority” and “must be content to constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy”

(Michels 1962, 354). In this situation, the “power of the elected leaders over the elected

masses is almost unlimited” (Michels 1962, 365; see also Medding 1982, 396).

The American sociologist Charles Wright Mills continued the structuralist tradition by

paying attention to the pivotal role of institutions in his elite analyses. Mills posits elite power

as attached to institutions and defines his power elites “as those who occupy the command

posts” (Mills 1958, 34; Mills 1959, 4). Thereby his focus is on the power of American

military elites, corporate elites, and political elites (Ibid. 1959). According to Mills, the power

of making decisions is clearly located in political, military, and economic institutions, which

sideline and subordinate other sectors of society (Mills 1958, 32). For Mills, institutions are

indeed the centers of decisions and power by which history can be made (Ibid., 30-31). For

him, “the history of modern society can be understood as the enlargement and centralization

of the means of power, in economic, political, and military institutions” (Ibid., 31). He

continues that, “the rise of industrial society is thus the development of the means of

economic production” (Ibid., 31). Similarly, “the rise of the nation state has involved the

development of the means of violence and those of political administration” (Ibid., 31).

Mills also paid attention to the links between institutional characteristics and elite

structure, noting that if “institutional hierarchies are scattered and disjointed, then the

10

respective elites also tend to be scattered and disjointed. But if they have many

interconnections and points of coinciding interest, then elites tend to form a coherent kind of

grouping” (Ibid., 34). Nevertheless, it is not the unity of institutions alone that has a direct

impact on the unity of elites. Elite unity is also connected to other structural factors such as

the capitalist economy. As a consequence, elite formation and selection are also influenced by

structural factors outside elites themselves and existing institutions (Ibid., 34).

Elite attachment to institutions is also reflected in the work of the German elite

theorist Hans Peter Dreitzel, who centers his elite theory on a performance-based selection

process in a hierarchically structured modern industrial society. For him, “an elite is made of

the holders of top positions in group, organization, or institution who have acceded to these

positions on the basis of a selection process” (Dreitzel 1962, 71 as quoted in Hartmann 2007,

30).

Another elite theorist, Suzanne Keller, also highlighted the institutional dimension in

theorizing her strategic elites. Keller defined elites as “effective and responsible minorities

designated to serve the task of realizing major social goals and ensuring the continuity of the

social order” (Keller 1963, 31). For Keller, modern society consists of strategic elites with

specialized skills linked to social order, which markedly differs from past social formation

dominated by the aristocracy as the ruling class. This change of elite composition reflects

tremendous change in the societal structure such as population growth, occupational

differentiation, increased formal organization and bureaucratization, and moral diversity

(Keller 1963, 65-76; Keller 1968, 27). As a consequence of this development, there is no

single comprehensive elite in modern society but rather a complex system of specialized

elites. These specialized elites, or strategic elites in Keller’s term, reflect and promote the

pluralism characteristic of modern society (Keller 1968, 26).

Keller classified four categories of strategic elites aligned with four functional

problems which every society must resolve: goal attainment, adaptation, integration, and

pattern maintenance and tension management (Ibid., 27). First, political elites have the task of

goal attainment of all members of the society they lead. Political elites define and emphasize

common purposes and interests. Second, the economic, military, diplomatic, and scientific

elites have an adaptation function. Here, the elites coordinate diversified activities in societies

and “combat factionalism” (Ibid., 27). Third, there are elites exercising the function of moral

authority such as priests, philosophers, and educators. They are all elites of integration due to

their function to harmonize society. Fourth, and finally, there are elites consisting of

celebrities including outstanding artists, writers, theater and film stars, and top figures in

11

sports and recreation. This fourth category of elites has an objective to “keep the society knit

together emotionally and psychologically;” Keller denotes them as pattern-maintenance elites

(Keller 1963; Keller 1968, 27). Thus, the general functions of elites appear to be similar

across societies. According to Keller, “they symbolize the moral unity, coordinate and

harmonize diversified activities, combat factionalism, resolve group conflicts” (Keller 1968,

27) and incorporate all these functions into living institutions.

In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars began to study the dynamics of elite circulation and

transformation in Western countries. In general, they examined - at the national level - the

influence of economic structure and changes in the political system on elite transformation

(Putnam, 1976; Cayrol and Perrinau 1982; Eldersveld 1982; Legg 1982; Daalder and van den

Berg 1982). John Higley’s early work also contributed to this research agenda. In “Elitism”

(1980), which he published with Lowell Field, he argued that elite autonomy is faced with

structural factors: “elite formation and elite change are fundamentally and factually heavily

dependent on levels of socioeconomic development and the attitudes or orientation of non-

elites towards elites” (Field and Higley 1980, 18-21 as quoted in Hartmann 2007, 36; see also

Sherman and Kolker 1987, 158). While recognizing the importance of elites in shaping

societal trends, Field and Higley rejected the deterministic view of elites as all-powerful

actors, thereby differing from the rigid “elite inevitability” thesis of classical theorists such as

Mosca, Pareto, and Michels (Sherman and Kolker 1987, 158).

Elite and democratization studies

The third wave of democratic transition (Huntington 1991), which started in the mid-1970s

with the political transformations in southern Europe, stimulated debates among scholars

about the role of elites in democratization. In this debate, too, structuralist arguments of

different variants had numerous followers. For modernization theorists, elite patterns

necessary for democratic change are the result of profound societal change (Merkel 1999,

2010). Pivotal in this respect are the favorable scope conditions which economic growth

provided for democratization such as industrialization, urbanization, improved educational

opportunities, functional differentiation and, as a result, a broader, more pluralistic elite

structure.

Political economists and scholars in the tradition of critical theory, however, arrived at

different, much more skeptical conclusions. Many of them questioned major changes in the

class structure, if economic change and industrialization did not go hand in hand with a social

revolution, displacing the landed aristocratic elite and giving rise to an urban-based

bourgeoisie. “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” Barington Moore concluded succinctly (Moore

12

1966, 418).

Frances Hagopian, analyzing the survival of traditional elites in Brazil, explained elite

change and continuity in the post-authoritarian state by using a structuralist framework of

state-society relations, path dependencies shaping the political system and the mode of

transition. According to her, elite continuity is the result of corporatist legacies (Hagopian

1992). Following this logic, authoritarian elite survival and elite change are strongly

dependent on how authoritarian networks are preserved, reorganized or dismantled following

the process of transition (Ibid., 246-249). The degree to which state corporatist institutions

characterized by highly personalized politics, restrictions of political competition, dominant

party systems and durable clientelist networks are entrenched in a society, has a major bearing

on the resilience of the authoritarian order and is significant for elite survival and elite change

(Schmitter 1974, 105; Hagopian 1996, 25-26).

Other structuralists in democratization studies refer to the “three power structures,”

denoting class power, the role of the state and transnational structures (Grugel 2002, 54) as

strong driving forces for social change and democratization (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer,

Stephens and Stephens 1992). With this approach, long-term historical trajectories and the

phenomena of partial or incomplete democratization can be explained. However, the

weakness of this approach lies in a deterministic view of elite structure and the neglect of the

role of agency in democratization.

Structuralism and democratization studies in Indonesia

In studies on elite and political transition of post-New Order Indonesia, the structuralist

approach has received particular attention. Like Hagopian for Brazil, structuralist scholarship

in Indonesia also relied on the “oligarchy thesis” in order to show that the country’s elite

structure has not changed much during the Era Reformasi. To this school of thought belong

some prominent political scientists who engaged in Indonesian studies for decades such as

Jeffrey Winters, Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, to name the most influential ones.

These scholars share a consensus on the eminence of structural and institutional

elements in their analyses. Hadiz and Robison, for instance, state that their analyses focus on

“the structural factors that give rise to a particular form of politico-business oligarchy” (Hadiz

and Robison 2013, 38), defining oligarchy as “a system of power relations that enables the

concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense” (Ibid., 15). This includes the

belief in the primacy of structural power over agency. “In the Indonesian case,” they contend,

“individuals invariably find themselves required to accommodate the logic of the existing

power structure” (Ibid., 40).

13

Most oligarchy scholars stressed in their analyses “institutional inertia,” stating that

institutional change such as democratization, decentralization, the change toward a multi-

party system and free elections, and the emergence of vocal civil society movements did not

significantly contribute to the collapse of the oligarchic structure of the previous authoritarian

regime. For oligarchy scholars, “old faces continue to dominate politics and business, while

new ones are drawn into the same predatory practices that had defined politics in Indonesia

for decades” (Ibid., 35). For them, democratization “does not constitute a significant

disruption or even diminution of their (oligarchic and old elite, my emphasis) power”

(Winters 2013, 16). Winters continues this claim by stating that “having rules and norms in

the democratic political realm does not ensure oligarchs are tamed by impersonal institutions

of law” (Ibid., 16). Oligarchs and old elites still play a central role in determining who can

contend for political office (Ibid., 22). If reformist elites are to exist, this can only be possible

with the support of oligarchic backers or by involving themselves in predatory practices, such

as bribery, similarly to the oligarchs (Winters 2013, 28-29; Hadiz 2010, 29). Therefore,

oligarchy scholars are highlighting the durability and continuity of old elites and oligarchic

structure in the post-New Order polity. They argue that also in the Era Reformasi, Indonesia

is strongly influenced by the survival of oligarchic structure and disproportionally influential

actors who possessed superior material resources. Accordingly, democratization has only

shifted the form of oligarchy from sultanistic features to an electoral ruling oligarchy (Winters

2011, 2013).

Also specific institutional designs such as decentralization policy, electoral and party

reform are subjects of their skeptical view of the impact of institutional change. Hadiz and

Robison criticize decentralization policy by stating that “[…] far from providing a new

dimension of accountability and representation, the decentralization of administrative

accountability and parliamentary politics has extended the old ways of politics from the

political center in Jakarta down to a bewildering range of individuals and organizations in the

regions and towns of Indonesia” (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 36). As far as local political

parties and parliaments are concerned, they found these institutions “[…..] largely

unencumbered by programs and ideologies, and certainly free of liberal policies, and only

occasionally subject to the demands of broader social interests that remain largely

disorganized” (Ibid., 44).

Structuralists share – as we will see below – with actor-oriented scholars the belief

that elites usually rely on superior material resources in the pursuit of their interests. While

they concede that elites engage in material cunning, strategic action, use maximization and

14

profit taking, they differ from actor-oriented scholarship by the claim that these material

resources and the pertinent behavioral attributes are an inevitable outflow of their social

position and status.

In the Indonesian case, the oligarchy school proposed the wealth-defense thesis.

According to this view, the post-New Order polity is strongly influenced by the survival of an

oligarchy which possesses abundant material resources. Winters, for instance, defined

oligarchs as a small group of “actors who command and control massive concentrations of

material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and

exclusive social position” (Winters 2011, 6). Or expressed more precisely, oligarchy centers

on the political challenges of defending concentrated wealth” (Ibid., 14). With their material

power resources, oligarchs can do anything such as buying office or political-legal outcomes,

and they can operate directly or indirectly, “can sleep, play, or be far away while their wealth

power is fully engaged around the clock and for decades if necessary” (Ibid., 14). Winters, in

effect, refers to path dependency when arguing “that extreme material inequality necessarily

produces extreme political inequality” (Ibid., 12). Material power resources, thus, became

“virtually the only potent resource in politics,” a sufficient causal factor for the success of

elites in political competition and survival, as Liddle noted critically with reference to the

determinism inherent in the structuralist argument (Liddle 2013, 63).

C. The Actor-Centered Approach

Like structuralists, adherents of actor-centered approaches view elites as key players in social

and political change. While they do not completely dismiss structural scope conditions for the

analysis of elites in society, they differ from structuralists in that they do not regard them as

decisive and predominant factors for the social composition and the behavior of elites. Rather

than associating with them behavior that can be neatly derived from their social class or

status, they depict elites as persons that differ from the masses due to their peculiar capacities

or psychological characters. Elites have personal resources such as intelligence, cunning, or

skill. Agency-oriented approaches therefore focus on elites’ cunning for material benefits,

their strategic actions and choices for the sake of use maximization and the logic of

consequentialism in understanding the behavior of elites. It is context-specific voluntarist

agency and strategic behavior that determines social processes such as revolution, regime

change, and the stability of (democratic) political systems (Cammack 1990; Collier 1999). In

other words, analytical emphasis is less on the structure of institutions than on the acts of

employing, manipulating and orchestrating political organizations in line with their political

15

interests.

While classical elite theorists Mosca and Michels complemented their structuralist

notion of elites to a certain degree with agency-oriented factors such as “qualities that give

them a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” (Mosca 1939, 53) over those

they govern, it was Vilfredo Pareto who was the strongest articulator of agency and

voluntarism. Pareto defined elites through their capacity, personality, and skill. According to

Pareto, in order to remain in power and accomplish higher position, elites are “restored not

only in numbers, but – and that is more important thing - in quality” (Pareto 1935, 1430-1431,

sec. 2054; Pareto 1970, 118). Self-interest, manipulation and guile, cunning and chicanery,

the use of force and persuasion, of elites become central points in Pareto’s analyses (Pareto

1935, 1556, sec. 2227; Sherman and Kolker 1987, 144-145). Elites also relied on the use of

“their physical, moral, and intellectual persuasion” (Marger 1987, 53).

Pareto enunciated the concepts of sentiments or residues as the psychological

propensities of elite power. Residues can also be defined as “the immutable emotional

structures or an irrational core of social acts in man which govern the dominant non-logical

part of human actions” (Hartmann 2007, 13). Residues can also be understood as humans’

psychological instincts that enable them to a certain behavior. These sentiments or residues

are important not only in order for elevating elites into positions of power and preserving and

defending their power, but also for anticipating their fall from power (Sherman and Kolker

1987, 142-143).

Pareto subdivided six types of residues into two classes. Class I or “the residue of

combination” refers to the ability of innovations, speculative activities, and skepticism

(Hartmann 2007, 13-14). This residue leads to social revolutions initiated by elites, or can also

become a source of elite actions for “economic expansion and scientific creativity” (Sherman

and Kolker 1987, 143). Class II or “the residue of persistence to aggregates” relates to “a

conservative predisposition dominated by a desire to preserve of the status quo” (Ibid., 143).

This residue is thus related to elite action to preserve political stability, manage national

interests, and organize military activities (Ibid., 143). For Pareto, if elites want to sustain

power, they must hold the right combination of these psychological propensities (Sherman

and Kolker 1987, 143; Hartmann 2007, 14-15). Once elites fail to manage them, it will lead to

their decline or elite circulation takes place (Sherman and Kolker 1987, 143; Hartmann 2007,

15).

Accordingly, the two psychological instincts mentioned above produce two types of

elites, that is, lions and foxes. Elites relying more on persuasion, chicanery and cunning, or

16

Class I residues, are categorized by Pareto as foxes. Class II residues relying more on force

are lions. For Pareto, the success of elites in managing power is highly dependent on “the

right balance of persuasion and force, and thus between the qualities of foxes and lions”

(Sherman and Kolker 1987, 145-146).

A more recent scholar, strongly influenced by Pareto’s elite theory, is Harold

Lasswell. Like Pareto, “he concentrated primarily on the psychological conditions required to

capture and hold positions of power, nearly wholly neglecting socio-structural processes”

(Hartmann 2007, 24). He argued that in order to secure their power, elites must above all be

able “to manipulate the masses with all the means at their disposal, including symbols, force,

and material goods” (Hartmann 2007, 24; Lasswell 1936).

Other scholars such as Dahl and Sartori placed their analyses on political elites under

the framework of decision-making and elite negotiation and bargaining. For them, decision-

making in democracies is the result of bargaining and consensus of political elites. Political

elites are the key players in registering, representing, mediating, and adjusting public desires

of various institutional segments in society. Following this logic, Dahl defined elites as

“controlling group whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences on key political

issues” (Dahl 1958, 464). For Dahl, “democracy is the result of a complex set of elite

bargaining and dispositions toward conflict and agreement” (Dahl 1971 as quoted in Lopez

2013, 4). This complex set of elite bargaining is bassicaly developed by transaction and

contribution, either in the form of financial or non financial rewards such as social status and

prestige (Dahl 1961, 96-97).

Sartori developed decision-making theory in democracy even further. According to

Higley et.al., (1991), Sartori proposed an argument that “a stable democracy is possible only

if elites perceive decisional outcomes as positive-sum rather than zero-sum game” (Higley et

al., 1991, 37). Elites are working in committee structures and they examine, discuss, draft, and

decide issues to be converted into public policies (Sartori 1987, 228; Higley et al., 1991, 37).

The logic that underlies the working of elites in decision-making is what Sartori calls

“deferred reciprocal compensation” (Sartori 1987, 229; Higley et al., 1991, 37). Here, elites

“who feel less intensely about one issue will go along with a decision, expecting that they get

their way on another issue that is vital to them” (Higley et al. 1991, 37), following the logic of

“I give to get in return” (Sartori 1987, 229). In short, “elites work, interact, and coordinate on

the basis of concessions or “side payments” that they concede to each other” (Higley et.al.

1991, 37; Sartori 1987, 231-232).

Other scholars such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) maintained that political

17

reform, democratization, and increased redistribution in Western societies during the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are the results of elite strategic decisions. These

decisions are shaped by elites’ threat perception related to social unrest or revolution

(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Using rational choice approach, Acemoglu and Robinson

challenged studies, which regard the change of values, political competition, or the role of the

middle class as key variables in explaining the causes of democratization in Western societies

during this period (Collier 1999; Moore 1966).

While Higley in his early writings emphasized structural arguments, in subsequent

work he tilted towards the agency paradigm. Together with Dogan he discussed the role of

political elites in political crises and regime changes (Dogan and Higley 1998, 2012). For

them, “in moments of crisis, political elites possess autonomy and latitude for maneuver”

(Dogan and Higley, 1998, 2012). In addition, they argued that “the choices elites make at such

moments are frequently decisive for the outcomes of crises and for the regimes that follow”

(Dogan and Higley 1998, 2012, 269).

The agency-oriented approach in elite studies has been further developed with the rise

of the new elitist paradigm initially proposed by Field and Higley (1980). Broadly speaking,

the new elitist paradigm argues that “non-elites orientations are only manifested in very

general opinion tendencies and the detailed treatment of political questions is largely left to

elite choice” (Field and Higley 1980, 19-20; see also Hartmann 2007, 37). The new elite

paradigm also” introduced the significance of elite settlements, elite convergences, elite unity

and elite disunity as the determinants of the democratization process worldwide” (Lopez

2013, 6). For them, democracy is the result of a pact and cooperation between elite factions,

who sometimes reason that accepting a certain degree of elite circulation is more

advantageous than promoting a “zero sum” game (Lopez 2013, 6).

Elite and democratization studies

The new elitist paradigm received stronger emphasis due to shifts of scholarly attention from

structural explanations into elite pact-making and the elite consensus model in

democratization studies. Both analytical paths, while relying on agency, differ in explaining

elite choice and negotiation by their focus on different phases of transition. While the analysis

of pact-making characterizes the initial phase of transition (Karl 1990; Stepan 1986;

Huntington 1991, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), the elite-consensus model attaches greater

attention to the post-transition phase (Higley and Gunther 1992; Gill 1998; Karakatsanis

2001; Gel'man and Steen 2003; Higley, Bayulgen and George 2003; Gel'man 2003; Steen

2003; Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski 1996; Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski 1998).

18

Pact-making analyses can be found in the study of the third wave democratization,

where researchers highlighted the significant role of elite choices and interactions as key

variable in the breakdown of authoritarianism (O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead 1986; Peeler

2001, 234). According to Karl, this approach accepts that “outcomes depend less on objective

conditions than on subjective norms, images and perceptions surrounding strategic choices,

stresses the importance of collective decisions and political interactions” (Karl 1990, 6).

Accordingly, democratization is seen as a process that can be initiated independently of

structural circumstances. Przeworski (1986, 1991) utilized the tools of rational choice theory

and game theory to shed light on what he depicted as negotiating games among regime

reformers (“soft liners”), adherents of the autocratic ancien régime (or “hard-liners”),

opposition moderates and radical oppositionists (Peeler 2001, 234). A successful transition,

Przeworski argued, depends on an accommodation between regime reformers and opposition

moderates. In addition, the success of democratization is highly dependent on the strategies

adopted by key actors and is strongly influenced by “the presence of preferable alternatives”

and “cost-benefit calculations” (Przeworski 1986, 52; Grugel 2002, 59). The merit of this

approach is that it pioneers the separation of “political negotiations from economic

circumstances and the rejection of functional determinism” (Grugel 2002, 63).

The elite consensus model was developed later when scholarly attention shifted to the

post-transitional phase. Scholars working with this model focused on an elite settlement as a

key to the stability and the survival of democratic regimes (Higley and Gunther 1992).

Nevertheless, this model shares with the previous pact-making analyses the significance of

strategic elite negotiations and interactions. In both cases, “democratic transitions and

breakdowns are ultimately the products of historically contingent elite choices” (Higley and

Burton 1989, 17). Devoting attention to elite choices, Higley and Burton, clearly argue that

democratic transitions and breakdowns can be best understood through the internal relations

of national elites (Higley and Burton 1989, 17). When elite cohesion breaks down, unstable

regimes will be the most likely consequence. By contrast, consensually unified elites will

produce stable regimes (Higley and Burton 1989, 17-18). Higley and Pakulski (1999, 2012)

further elaborated this model, by adding the concept of elite differentiation besides that of

elite unity, as major factors for regime types. This model posits that elite consensus can be

achieved in the light of elite unity and elite differentiation (Higley and Pakulski 1999, 2012,

295). Strong unity and wide differentiation among elites lead to consensual elites and

accordingly create consolidated democracy. On the contrary, weak unity and narrow

differentiation tend to produce fragmented elites and result in unconsolidated democracy

19

(Higley and Pakulski 1999, 2012, 295-297). In short, the existence of consensus elites and

their power sharing are an indispensable prerequisite for today’s stable democracy (Hartmann

2007, 37; Higley et.al, 1991, 36).

A multi-dimensional approach is at the core of the actor-centered institutionalism as

proposed by Wolfgang Merkel and his collaborators (Merkel 1999, 2010; Merkel, Puhle,

Croissant, Eicher and Thiery 2003). In their model of “embedded democracy,” Merkel and

associates tried to combine structure, agency and culture in order to define conditions under

which new democracies consolidate. Yet the strong reliance on Scharpf’s actor-centered

institutionalism, though seeking to mitigate the agency bias inherent in rational choice

institutionalism through the inclusion of normative arguments (Scharpf 1997), gives the

model a strong rationalist and agency-related focus.

Elites and democratization studies in Indonesia

In contemporary elite studies in Indonesia scholars leaning towards actor-oriented approaches

include political scientists such as William Liddle, Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner,

Michael Bühler, Thomas Pepinsky, and others who may also be categorized as liberal-

pluralists. These scholars do not fully neglect structural arguments as much as structurally-

inclined scholars in many cases also do not completely dismiss agency. Yet for actor-oriented

analyses of democratization in Indonesia, policy change is to a much greater extent the result

of elite action than elite action that is predetermined by structure. In other words, elite action

is the key explanatory variable in actor-oriented analyses, whereas structure might be an

intervening variable at best. They believe in what structuralists such as Hadiz and Robison

dispute, that to a considerable extent individuals may “accumulate resources such as wealth,

authority, status, media control, and so on by virtue of the voluntary exercise of individual

skills, including that of leadership” (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 40).

Most actor-oriented analyses of democratization in Indonesia indeed belong to the

liberal-pluralist school of thought. Liberal-pluralists tend to emphasize the significant role of

political actors and individuals who can voluntarily and strategically influence and determine

the nature of political structure. Liddle, for instance, proposed a theory of action in order to

better understand Indonesian post-New Order polity. For him, a theory of action “can

conceptualize the role of the actor in the political system” (Liddle 2013, 62). Further, Liddle

suggested scholars must be attentive to “the actions of concrete individuals as their

independent and dependent variables to specify nature of the evidence that persuades them

and might persuade others of the validity of their claim” (Liddle 2013, 65).

Other liberal-pluralists such as Aspinall claimed that “personal qualities of leaders

20

may have been important” to create some policies that accordingly being “copied and adapted

from region to region” (Aspinall 2013, 117). These political elites are even “relatively

autonomous of the predatory interests” (Roser, Wilson, and Sulistyanto 2011, 15 as quoted in

Aspinall 2013, 117). In short, pluralist scholars evidently argued that individual decision-

makers can be drivers of political change and create policies autonomously or independently

of structural constraints (Bühler 2014, 162). In addition, they also stressed the personal

qualities of political elites for elevating and sustaining their power. Both aspects are among

the very notion of agency-oriented argument as previously discussed.

In contrast to the oligarchy thesis, some liberal-pluralist scholars argue that new

institutional designs paved the way for the change of elite behavior. For them, institutional

changes such as decentralization and direct local elections positively contribute to elite

adjustment. For political elites, these institutional changes “have created strong incentives for

all political players to design policies to attract constituents” (Aspinall 2013, 118) and “have

imposed a reorganization of local elites to build linkages to the population” (Bühler 2008,

315). Besides, institutional changes positively contribute to an increasing elite political

competition and elevate the role of constituents or public. For them, institutional changes

“have empowered Indonesian voters to have a significant say in the outcome of inter-elite

competition for political and economic power” (Mietzner 2010, 189), “have channeled

political competition in new directions” (Ibid., 318), have facilitated “virtual bidding wars to

entice voters” (Aspinall 2013, 118), “have shifted the balance of policy preferences in favor

of previously marginalized voters” (Ibid., 119), “have imposed a reorganization of local elites

to build linkages to the population” (Bühler 2008, 315) and “have given true power to the

population to elect or reject a candidate running for regent” (Ibid., 323). More than that,

Carnegie argues that institutional reforms of post-New Order “have, albeit modestly,

destabilized oligarchic proclivities (Carnegie 2008, 525). In short, most liberal-pluralists

shared a similar argument in positively appreciating the impact of democratic change on the

behavior of political elites, an increasing inter-elite competition, and the empowerment of

electorates.

Compared to structuralists, liberal-pluralists are also taking a more moderate

viewpoint in their treatment on material factors, although they too believe that material wealth

is a necessary condition for the success or failure of political elites in political arena. Liddle

for instance, prefers to see material wealth as “the only one of many resources mobilizable in

politics” (Liddle 2013, 63). Pepinsky, who proposed a critical pluralist idea, notes that

“material resources are necessarily at play in any aspects on Indonesia’s political economy”

21

(Pepinsky 2013, 7). However, he continues by stating that the effects of material resources on

political conflict are always conditional on non-material factors” (Ibid., 11) and rejecting “a

materialist scholar that non-material resources are outside his/ her theory’s explanatory scope”

(Ibid., 16).

Pluralist criticism of the materialist determinism of the oligarchy school is also

articulated by Mietzner in his analysis of political parties and politicians. Mietzner offers an

alternative interpretation that “goes beyond the focus of money as the vital power resources in

Indonesia’s post-New Order” (Mietzner 2014, 100). He provides an example of political elites

such as Akbar Tanjung of Golkar party whose material resources are limited, but nevertheless

has tremendous political influence (Ibid., 101-102).

D. The Ideational Approach

In the previous sections we saw that political elites have been either treated as

dependent on structural factors or as independent variable which influence political decisions

through their strategic actions. Structural as well as actor-centered analyses pay much

attention to the material and tangible factors such as political organization, class structure,

levels of economic development or power resources and mode of political transition. The role

of ideational factors such as ideologies, religious beliefs, collective norms, values, identities

and knowledge plays a much lesser role in elite analyses.

Pareto and Mosca are classical elite theorists who integrated the role of ideas in their

analyses on elites. Pareto formulated the concept of “derivations” as part of elite power

towards the masses. According to him, it is not only through manipulation and force that the

elite can consolidate its power over and control of the masses. Persuasion and myth are also

important tools for mass acceptance of elite rule. According to Pareto, derivations or myths

(such as the divine rights) have “effects of great consequence in the way of influencing human

conduct” (Pareto 1935, p. 1567, sec. 2239). In short, political myths play a function “to

persuade the masses to acquiesce to elite rule” (Sherman and Kolker 1987, 145).

Mosca agreed that elites need a legitimating myth for their rule over the masses. Here,

Mosca offered the concept of political formula as “the legal or moral basis, or principle, on

which the power of the political class rests” (Mosca 1939, 70). In agreement with Pareto,

Mosca referred his political formula to the divine right of kings as a legitimating myth that

“was the great superstition of past ages and contributes powerfully to consolidating political

organization and unifying peoples or even whole civilizations” (Ibid., 71). For Mosca, the

unity of elites and masses in their belief systems will accordingly strengthen the effectiveness

22

of political formula and positively contribute to political stability (Sherman and Kolker, 1987,

149). Elites use propaganda in the political, educational and religious system, and, if

necessary, also force in order to “win the masses and keep them loyal” (Mosca 1939, 190). On

the side of the masses, their loyalty and cohesion to collective ideas are normally achieved by

the spontaneous process of “mimetism” or imitation (Ibid., 184). Here, Mosca defines

imitation as “the tendency of an individual’s passions, sentiments and beliefs to develop in

accord with the currents that prevail in the environment in which he is morally formed and

educated” (Ibid., 184). From Mosca we learn that moral justification is crucial for elite

survival and consolidation.

By contrast, many other elite theorists paid little attention to the role of ideas for elite

power. They seem to ignore the need for the moral justification of elite rule. Mills, for

instance, claimed that “ideas which justify rulers no longer seem so necessary to their exercise

of power” (Mills 1958, 29-30). He further argued that “moral belief is not necessary, in either

the ruler or the ruled, for a ruling power to persist and even to flourish” (Ibid., 30). For Mills,

the irrelevance of moral belief or mass persuasion rests on two reasons: One is the frequent

absence in influencing great decisions, the other mass indifference (Ibid., 29-30).

In the 1960s and 1970s, growing scholarly attention was devoted to the study of

ideology, belief system, and ideas in political life. This trend emerged in parallel with the

intensive research on political culture and political development (Almond and Verba 1963;

Pye and Verba 1965; Putnam 1973; Almond and Verba 1979; Eckstein 1988). Nevertheless,

only few scholars tried to combine political culture and elite analysis. Putnam’s analysis of

elite political culture (Putnam 1971) and George’s “operational code analysis” in

understanding elite decision-making (George 1969) are among the exceptions.

Ideas and democratization studies

This disconnect between elite studies and ideational analyses has continued in the more recent

scholarly literature. While the literature on ideas largely ignored elite as study object and

rather contributed to policy studies, political economy (George 1979b; Hall 1989; Goldstein

1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Schmidt 2008; Legro 2000; Sikkink 1991; Campbell

2002; Yee 1996; Blyth 2002), international organizations (Acharya 2004; Jetschke and

Rüland 2009; Rüland and Bechle 2014) and political parties (Berman 1998), elite studies and

the democratization literature infrequently utilized ideational analysis. In elite studies,

structuralist and voluntarist approaches with their material dimension still play a dominant

role. A similar development can also be observed in democratization studies where

structuralist approaches and rational choice theory take a prominent position.

23

A partial exception are culturalist approaches (Huntington 1984; Pye 1985), which

link the prospects for democratization to religious values deeply entrenched in societies’

cultural memory. Other culturalist studies inspired by the seminal work of Almond and Verba

(1963) focussed on the importance of civic culture, individualism, religion and mutual trust as

driving forces of democratization (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart 1997; Huntington

1996; Diamond 1999). These studies tried to build a link between democracy and a particular

political culture, exploring to what extent the latter can foster political participation. More

recent culturally inspired studies also analyze the relationship between civil society and civic

freedom (Grugel 2002, 50). Yet some of these studies have been strongly criticized as overly

essentialist (Rüland 1994) and few of them paid particular attention to elites.

Democratization studies in Indonesia: Bringing ideas in

Elite and democratization studies in Indonesia almost completely ignored ideas. As shown in

the sections above, in Indonesia’s post-New Order polity, the investigation of political elites

and political transition are dominated by the structuralist oligarchy thesis and actor-oriented

liberal-pluralist approaches. Only a few studies integrated ideational issues into the general

analysis of political transition in Indonesia.

Concerning pro-democratic activists as his object of analysis, Uhlin applied

transnational democratic diffusion as his conceptual framework. He figured out on how pro-

democratic activists in Indonesia react to democratic ideas through the cognitive processes of

adoption, adjustment and rejection (Uhlin 1993, 523-524). However, Uhlin’s study neither

focussed on political elites nor on the post-New Order context. Instead, he examined the pre-

transition phase and concentrated on the role of non-elite actors (NGOs) in democratization.

Ecklof’s study applying a political culture approach in analyzing the Partai Demokrasi

Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI) covered a similar time-frame (Ecklof 2003).

By contrast, Webber and Choi situated their analyses in the post-New Order era,

arguing that the pervasiveness of patrimonial norms and practices became an impediment for

the consolidation of democracy (Webber 2006; Choi 2009). While Webber provided a general

overview on democratization in post-authoritarian Indonesia, Choi applied the concept of

patrimonialism to Indonesian post-New-Order local politics. However, both authors did not

systematically link their analyses to elite studies.

Given these blind spots identified in the general literature on elites in democratization

processes and the study of democratic transition in Indonesia, this study seeks to apply a more

comprehensive framework which – apart from structural and agency-related arguments – also

24

integrates ideas in the analysis of elite change. It is in this respect that this study enters new

ground in the analysis of elites in Indonesia. It thereby draws on the cultural turn of the 1990s

in political science. Reflexivist approaches such as sociological institutionalism (Hall and

Taylor 1996; Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Tannenwald

2005; Berman 2001, 2013; Beland and Cox 2011) provide a particularly useful theoretical

framework to better understand the phenomenon of elite adjustment under the condition of

transitional democracy such as in Indonesia. From this literature, the subsequent study adopts

some analytical instruments such as the concepts of ideational change, ideational contestation,

localization and the role of elites as ideational carrier in political change.

In examining elite adjustment in Indonesia, this research integrates the ideational

dynamics between the transnational norm of democracy and the preexisting ideational

structures in Indonesia into its analytical framework. Democratic ideas can be seen in this

particular context as international or transnational norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;

Acharya 2004; Jetschke and Rüland 2009). These ideas are viewed as road maps or visions on

how to manage political affairs. Meanwhile, local norms are ideas, which are historically and

collectively constructed, reflecting a given identity and, hence, considered as appropriate

(March and Olsen 1989). Like ideologies, these ideas are abstract and based on philosophical

and theoretical foundations. However, different to ideologies, they are not a “total vision of

the world” (Aron 1967, 44; Berman 1998, 20), because they relate to everyday political

activities and policy solutions on governing political matters. In other words, the object of

study lies in “the middle range of ideas” (Berman 1998, 21). It means that ideas under study

have a certain level of generality and at the same time can be operationalized as a predictor of

political behavior because they are related to practical and everyday activities of political

actors.

Crucial for understanding processes of ideational change is the work of Jeffrey Legro.

Legro differentiates between two processes of ideational change, that is, “collapse” and

“consolidation.” The former occurs when actors collectively agree that “the old orthodoxy is

inadequate and should be replaced” (Legro 2000, 424). This is the case when the old ideas no

longer live up to the expectations associated with them. Facilitating such change are events

such as major external shocks or crises. They erode the plausibility of the old ideas and

provide avenues for new external ideas which in the process become the new orthodoxy. Or in

the words of Legro: “...when an old orthodoxy collapses, an oppositional idea with pre-

existing social support that appears to coincide with socially desired results (whether it

actually caused such results is irrelevant) is likely to be the new focal point of consolidation

25

and institutionalization” (Legro 2000, 429, 430).

However, if the new orthodoxy likewise does not meet the expectations associated

with them, the new ideas fail to consolidate. This subjects them to a process where they have

to compete with multiple oppositional ideas, including extant local ideas or the “old

orthodoxy.” This means that “the consolidation phase is more likely to be characterized by

indeterminate political contestation” (Legro 2000, 430).

The theoretical framework that gives particular attention to ideational contestation

between transnational norms and extant local norms is the localization concept formulated by

Amitav Acharya. Acharya introduces his theory by criticizing the existing norm diffusion

literature which, he charges, pursues a “moral cosmopolitanist” perspective. To him, this

perspective is unsatisfactory due to the following critical points. It is prejudiced in

dichotomizing “the good” of universal ideas and “the bad” of local beliefs. Moreover, it

strongly emphasizes the role of transnational agents and consequently neglects the role of

local agents. Besides, it sees norm diffusion as a process of conversion rather than

contestation (Acharya 2004, 242-243). Overall, this moral cosmopolitanist perspective

ignores the significance of local “social understandings that can contradict and overwhelm

international prescriptions” (Legro 1997, 32).

Enlisting the cultural turn for elite studies in Indonesia

The previous discussion has amply shown that the cultural turn of the 1990s in social

sciences has so far largely eluded elite studies in Indonesia. This is somewhat surprising as

constructivist scholarship opened many avenues to bring in the non-materialist foundations of

elite behavior. Amitav Acharya’s theory of “constitutive localization” is a case in point

(Acharya 2004, 2009). Acharya defines localization as an “active construction (through

discourse, framing, grafting, and pruning) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the

former developing congruence with local beliefs and practices,“ the so-called “cognitive

prior” (Acharya 2004, 245). Localization is an evolutionary process of ideational diffusion

between transnational norms and local beliefs, which is characterized by a “mutually

constitutive” relationship (Acharya 2004, 252). This process stands in between norm

resistance and norm displacement. It is, expressed simply, a process of fusing the new

external and the old local norms.

Following the above definition of localization, it is clear that local actors play an

important role as ideational carriers in the process of ideational contestation. The influence of

ideas on political behavior does not emerge from a political vacuum and can only be

26

understood when taking into account specific political actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998,

256; Berman 1998, 22). To put it another way, in order to become salient, ideas will need

agents who share them as collective values. The analysis of ideational diffusion refers to this

ideational agency as an ideational carrier (Berman 1998) or norm entrepreneur (Finnemore

and Sikkink 1998). These actors play a crucial role in the process of “norm emergence”

(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). To facilitate society’s compatibility with pre-existing norms,

ideational carriers frequently frame external ideas in the light of extant local norms, that is,

the logic of appropriateness.

This study conceptualizes the elite (both the old-established and the new elite) as a

ideational carrier that channels various ideas into the social discourses in Indonesia. Elites act

as mediators between the competing foreign notions of democracy on the one hand, and local

norms and local versions of political order on the other. Hence, this research accepts

Berman’s propositions on ideational carriers, which are the following:

“First, the carrier´s status within the system will affect the likelihood of an idea´s gaining

political salience: the greater the influence of the carrier, the greater the chance that the

idea carried will attain political importance. Second, the lengthier and more successful

the carrier’s career, the more likely it is that his or her ideas will gain acceptance. The

longer a carrier has to mobilize support and provide incentives and disincentives for

cooperation, the greater will be the chance that others will come to accept the idea.

Prominent carriers, moreover, will be better positioned to ensure that their ideas remain a

force in politics even after they have left the scene.” (Berman 1998, 25).

These theoretical propositions establish three conditions that influence the success of the

diffusion of ideas, namely the elite’s status and influence in society, the elite’s duration in

power, and the perceived prominence of the elite in society. From these findings, one can

derive that, compared to the newly emerging elite, the established elite – as long as it is not

discredited - can more easily diffuse norms. This superiority is due to the established elite’s

position in bureaucracy, political networks and alignments, its knowledge of the local

problems, and its capacity in solving policy problems.

Furthermore, my previous discussion of the localization concept points to the

significance of local actors in norm contestation, since, as Acharya stated, “it is also a process

in which the role of local actors is more crucial than that of outside actors” (Acharya 2004,

244). Local agents have an important role in building congruence between external ideas and

local beliefs. Local agents act as the “insider proponents” of ideas, their credibility and

prestige are scrutinized by the public. This credibility tends to be greater when local agents

acting as ideational carriers represent local values rather than foreign norms (Acharya 2004,

247-248). This conceptual framework for local actors can be applied to the questions of: first,

27

how old and new elites choose from existing ideas; second, what implications these choices

have on society’s perception of the elite; and third, how elites respond to democratization

under these circumstances.

Moreover, in the process of localization, established elites realize that new norms can

be used as instruments to preserve their legitimacy and authority (Acharya 2004, 248). For old

local elites, localization can be an appropriate adaptation strategy as long as new norms do not

interfere with their legitimacy and thereby disrupt the social structure. As the transition

literature shows, democracy and other emerging new norms are not necessarily viewed by

established elites as a threat to their social status as long as they are not excluded from the

political process. Elites may accept the new norm of democracy because, to some extent, it

provides them with an opportunity for their political maneuvering. However, this situation

might be different if established elites prefer a resistance strategy which may evoke tough

responses from the new elites, seeking to entirely dislodge them from positions of political

authority.

While the concept of localization strongly stresses ideational processes and firmly

rests on a reflexivist logic, one of its great advantages is that it does not neglect strategic

action. This is highlighted by the active role of local actors as norm recipients which

reinterpret and reconstruct alien norms through framing, grafting and pruning (Acharya 2004,

243-244). They localize external normative challenges in order to modernize and thus re-

legitimize the extant normative order. The way they do this is clearly of a strategic nature.

The fusing of new external and extant local values is thus part of a process of use

maximization which climaxes in the objective to defend their elite status under the conditions

of major structural change. Acharya’s approach is thus superior and of a greater explanatory

scope than exclusively rationalist norm diffusion approaches such as, inter alia, epitomized in

the work of Oliver (1991), Braun and Gilardi (2006) or Simmons, Dobbins, and Garrett

(2007).

E. Eclectic Theorizing in Elite Analyses

Each of the theoretical approaches to elite studies discussed above – the structuralist

approach, the actor-centered approach and the ideational approach – has its merits in helping

to understand and interpret elites. Nevertheless, the “excessive monism” (Hall 1997, 189) or

“excessive compartmentalization” (Katzenstein and Sil 2008, 116) caused by applying these

approaches exclusively has the consequence of overlooking other approaches. To tackle this

problem, I apply the concept of analytical eclectisism in this study (Sil and Katzenstein 2010;

Katzenstein and Sil 2008; Sil 2000; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Eclectic theorizing has

28

received much attention in recent years, especially in non-Western research contexts which

cannot be captured well by Western-centric theories. Eclectic theorizing is “an intellectual

stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical

constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex arguments that bear

on substantive problems of interest” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 411). It treats theoretical

approaches not as exclusionary but as complementary to each other.

The application of eclectic theorizing in this research is driven by the pragmatic

intention to answer the research question of elite adjustment in Indonesia’s democratization.

More concretely, it has two basic objectives: first, to help in better grasping a given problem

and, second, to make the best use of the merits of competing theoretical approaches in

interpreting elite. The latter objective is crucial as it is almost impossible to neglect existing

research traditions as expressed in the structuralist, actor-oriented and ideational schools of

thought. It is hardly credible to adopt only one single approach in dealing with the complexity

of political life and elite change. This research, thus, adopts the position of self-consciously

engaging “in pursuit of empirical and conceptual connections that recognize the complexity of

political life in ways that no single research tradition can” (Katzenstein and Sil 2008, 118). By

taking eclectic scholarship seriously, this research proposes “a wider range of alternative

combinations of analytic and empirical components” (Katzenstein and Sil 2008, 119).

This study follows three distinguishing features of the eclectic theorizing in

comparison to any single conventional approach. It rests on a pragmatist ethos, it has an open-

ended approach to identifying problems, and it generates complex causal mechanisms and

causal interactions in diverse contexts (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 412). Rather than reducing

complexities, this research seeks “to trace the complex stories and causal interactions through

which different types of mechanisms interact” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 416) in the process

of elite adjustment.

As a consequence of eclectic theorizing this study takes ideas serious as factors

influencing elite behavior, but also leaves the door open for an analysis of non-ideational

factors shaping the phenomenon of elite adjustment in democratization. This theoretical

position is attributed to the fact that social phenomena are too complex as to be reduced to a

monolithic and unidirectional causality (George 1979b, 104; Hall 1989, 390). By regarding

ideational factors as significant and at the same time accepting non-ideational explanations, I

avoid the exclusiveness which usually characterizes one theoretical strand.

29

F. Research Arguments

With reference to the previous theoretical framework, this comparative case study on

elite adjustment in the two Indonesian provinces of North Sumatra and East Java proposes the

following basic arguments. First and foremost, democratization does not occur in a

unidirectional and monolithic style because it is the result of dynamic interactions between

institutional context, actor’s strategic actions and ideational contestation. As a consequence,

the process of elite adjustment in the democratic regime is strongly influenced by these

dynamic interactions.

The institutional context is shaped by negotiated transition, the legacy of authoritarian

networks and the declining antagonism between democrats and their opponents. These

processes led to the founding institutional arrangements such as the decentralization policy

and the design of local elections. Nevertheless, founding democratic arrangements have

produced not only a basis of legitimacy for democratic regimes, but have also created an

electoral arena characterized by material transactions or money politics. This fact has

significantly curtailed the growth of new democratic elites and negatively affected democratic

practices by re-socializing authoritarian traditions.

However, without social base, those institutional arrangements and the related material

resources do not secure elite survival. The breakdown of the authoritarian regime and the

subsequent negotiated transition has not eradicated authoritarian ideas and local beliefs which

are institutionally embedded and still have diehard followers. Although democracy as the new

norm is strongly supported and intensively discussed in the public discourse, democracy has

been implanted into a political space which has already been occupied by existing and

enduring ideational structures. In such a context, political elites do not passively adopt

democratic norms in daily political practices. Instead, they actively shape democratic

institutions in line with their political interests. The fact that established elites are more likely

to have greater opportunities in this situation must be attributed to their political experience,

the duration they held power and their prominent status and influence in society. As a result,

rather than being restrained by democratization, established elites are able to adjust to

democracy and succeed in political contests.

However, beyond the structural and ideational explanations above, the degree of elite

adjustment is likely to be greater when elites can combine two basic personal resources, that

is, political skills and bureaucratic capability. Political skills relate to their ability to build

political consensus among political actors, create political networks, pacts and alignments,

gain political legitimacy and fulfill social expectations. Meanwhile, bureaucratic capacity

30

stems from their administrative expertise, their capacity to interpret policy, and their

knowledge about local problems. Once political elites fail to apply these two skills in the

democratic arena, they are likely to face problems in sustaining their power.

I further argue that elite adjustment can take various forms depending on the specific

institutional context, the sequence of events of democratization, and the social expectations of

the public. In the initial phase of transition, the established elite adopted a response of passive

conformity towards democratization. Adoption of this strategy is related to the strong

institutional pressure emanating from democratization and the dominant democracy discourse

prevalent soon after the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. Gradually, this response

shifted to an “avoidance” strategy characterized by the symbolic acceptance of democracy

and political behavior characterized by the mimicry of democratic norms. This also includes

that the political class rejuvenated itself and absorbed elements of civil society into its camp.

This enables them to exert their previous expertise, that is, political skills and bureaucratic

capability, to expose and exploit the shortcomings of the new central government’s policies

and regulations. Following these processes, established elites tended to switch to a pattern of

responses in which they exert more active resistance strategies.

Figure 2.1 Causal factors and outcome

II. Methodology and Research Techniques

A. Comparative Case Study Method and Process Tracing Analysis

In this study I employ the comparative case study method. The application of this method

follows several considerations relevant to the research objective. First, as this study attempts

to explain the complexity of mechanisms of change, it is faced with the “problem of

equifinality.” The strength of the Small N-case study lies in dealing with the problem of

Institutional Structure

Elite Adjustment

Actor Strategic Actions

Ideational

Contestation

31

multiple causalities. According to Bennett, this method focuses “on the conditions and

mechanisms rather than the frequency with which the specified outcomes and mechanisms

occur” (Bennett 2004, 42-43). Second, this research mainly relies on the depth of analysis as a

virtue of case study research rather than searching for the breadth exposition as commonly

found in Large-N research. By focusing on the depth analysis, this research seeks to explore

“the detail, richness, completeness, and wholeness of explanation” (Gerring 2007, 49). Third,

as the research objective is typified by Y-centered analysis (outcomes as variable of interest),

my study focuses on the exploratory/generating-hypothesis (causal mechanism) rather than

testing-hypothesis (causal effect) (Ibid., 43-48). This exploratory work fits well with the case

study design because it seeks “to operationalize qualitative variables (construct validity),

identify new variables or hypotheses, examine potential causal mechanisms within particular

cases or contexts, explain cases historically and to incorporate complex causal relations”

(Bennett 2004, 19). Fourth, in terms of data availability, the case study method has another

strength in its flexibility “to check facts, to consult multiple sources, and to go back to

primary materials” (Gerring 2007, 59). However, as George warned, the case study method,

particularly in the form of single case-study, has a basic weakness in its idiosyncratic features

or lack of “scientific consciousness,” which together do not form a cohesive whole (George

1979, 62). To overcome these shortcomings, this research will utilize the controlled

comparison approach.

In applying controlled comparison design, I will employ Mill’s method of most similar

design with some flexibilities and adjustments. With this design, two cases under study share

a whole range of contextual similarities (political, social, economic and financial capacity,

cultural, and demographic setting), except for the outcome and the proposed independent

variable (Lim 2006, 34-41; Bennett 2004, 31). According to Bennet (2004, 32), Mill’s method

itself has at least three basic attributes. First, it consists of “deterministic regularities of causal

mechanisms involving conditions that contributed to the outcome” (Bennet 2004, 32). Second,

“all variables that potentially contributed to the outcome would have to be assessed in the

analysis” (Ibid., 32). Third, “cases must be available for study to see the possible causal

paths” (Ibid., 32).

Nevertheless, these basic characteristics of Mill’s method inform us about its explicit

drawbacks. First, this design operates on the basic principles of the “method of elimination,”

whereas equifinality is present in many social phenomena. George and Bennett have

highlighted this problem, stating that “it is not always clear whether they [researchers]

recognize that the variables excluded as neither necessary nor sufficient may still have

32

considerable causal significance when combined with other variables. This is a matter of

considerable importance since we believe that there are few nontrivial theories in the social

sphere strong enough to support general claims of necessary or sufficiency for single

variables, and that indeed the causation of many phenomena of interest to social researchers is

complex and lacks nontrivial necessary or sufficient conditions” (George and Bennett 2005,

157). Second, the most similar design cannot completely control the effect of potential causal

factors to each case (Berman 1998, 35). Third, the three basic requirements of Mill’s method

as proposed by Bennett seem unrealistic and it is almost impossible to find a situation in

which all variables can be held constant, except the proposed independent variable and the

dependent variable (Bennett 2004, 32). To deal with these drawbacks, I employ process

tracing, longitudinal analysis, and the combination of cross-case (comparison) with within-

case analysis. Process tracing is needed to deal with the problem of elimination, while

longitudinal and within-case analyses are valuable in handling the weakness of controlling the

effect of potential independent variables to each case. The following discussion will explain

this aspect in greater detail.

Considering its imperfections, this research will use Mill’s method in a preliminary

way to identify potentially relevant variables, then emphasize the use of process tracing in

order to deal with the weakness of Mill’s method (Ibid., 22-23). According to Bennett, the

advantage of process tracing is in its ability to check the significance of intervening variables

between the causal factors and outcome as predicted by theories (Ibid., 22). In other words,

process tracing seeks to explore the causal mechanisms in a case under investigation and finds

out possible explanations from the chain of evidence from hypothesized cause and outcome

(Ibid., 22). In conclusion, process tracing is a powerful research strategy for helping to

achieve “continuity and completeness” in explaining a case (Ibid., 22-23).

In organizing process tracing, I apply a deductive and an inductive element.

Deductively, I use theories “to predict the values of intervening variables in a case, and then

test these predictions” (Ibid., 23). However, the inductive element is employed predominantly

because this research seeks to find insights and additional predictions about the process and

explain the “unanticipated sequences” in the case (Ibid., 37). The inductive strategy is

predominantly employed in order to “detect unexpected clues or puzzles that indicate the

presence of left-out variables which may lead to the development of new hypotheses” (Ibid.,

23).

Furthermore, the comparative method will be combined with longitudinal analysis in

the “before-after” case that pays attention to the relevant causal factors over time. It means

33

that this procedure over time focuses on the outcome and provides “control for the possibility

of too many factors in the analysis” (George and Bennett 2005, 81). Besides, in order to

manage the problem of controlling the effect of potential independent variables, this research

combines the comparative method with within-case analysis. In other words, this research will

be constructed diachronically (by observing the case or some subset of within-case units over

time) and synchronically (by observing within-case variation at a single point in time) (Gering

2007, 21). In short, this study combines the “horizontal” aspect by applying cross-case

analysis and the “vertical” feature by employing within-case analysis.

The operationalization of longitudinal analysis rests on the period of time between

1998 and 2013. This period of time has been identified as a critical juncture in Indonesia’s

democratization process. Thus, democratization and decentralization are the institutional

context in which this research is placed. In particular, local elections will be analyzed as the

main events. Further, based on the institutional context and major events in the cases under

study, two main phases are proposed in this examination: the 1998-2004 period, and the 2005-

2013 period. The first phase between 1998 and 2004 is shaped by institutional contexts and

events impacting on and impacted by the process of negotiated transition in 1998, the

enactment of Law Number 22/1999 on Decentralization, and elections of chief local

executives by local parliaments. Meanwhile, the second phase of 2005-2013 is equivalent to

the second period of transition, inaugurated by the implementation of the Law Number

32/2004 on Decentralization and direct elections of local chief executives.

34

Period North Sumatra East Java

Period

1998-2004

First transition, the

phase of installation of

democracy, negotiated

transition

Law Number 22/1999

on Decentralization

Elections by local

parliament in 1998,

2000, 2003

First transition, the phase

of installation of

democracy, negotiated

transition

Law Number 22/1999 on

Decentralization

Elections by local

parliament in 1998, 2000,

2003

Period

2005-2013

Second transition, the

phase of consolidation

of democracy

Law Number 32/2004

on Decentralization

Direct Local Elections

in 2005, 2008 and

2010

Second transition, the

phase of consolidation of

democracy

Law Number 32/2004 on

Decentralization

Direct Local Elections in

2005, 2008 and 2010

Figure 2. 2 Periodization and Major Events of Local Elite Adjustment in North Sumatra and East Java

1998-2013

B. The Cases

The case selection method is carefully planned on systematic grounds of various causal

leverage patterns rather than numbers, that is, cases which belong to the same class but differ

from each other (George 1979, 60; Ragin 2007, 68). The variance here is described in terms

of qualitative rather than quantitative or dichotomous types of outcomes. The investigator

seeks to explore the greater number of categories (in contrast to fewer categories such as

dichotomous variables as normally found in quantitative measures) to gain insights into the

richness and nuances of the causal factors (George and Bennett 2005, 85). The cases are

intentionally selected and necessarily unrepresentative of wider populations, and seek

contingent generalizations that apply to cases that are similar to those under investigation

(Bennett 2002, 51).

The option of examining elite change at the provincial level follows three premises.

First, the provincial level has a wide-ranging analytical leverage. It connects the political

dynamics at the national and the regency (kabupaten) level. Although this research pays

attention to provincial politics, it concurrently examines the political dynamics at the regency

HORIZONTAL

VE

RT

ICA

L

35

level (the capital cities of Medan and Surabaya). Second, in decentralization policy, the

province is restored as an important level. As a form of radical decentralization, Indonesia has

paid strong attention to the regency level, but there is now a tendency towards restoring some

of the provincial government’s political power after the revision of the decentralization

policy. Third, the provincial level study promises a great array of data regarding the elite

configuration. Overall, by tracing the adjustment of regional elites, this research expects a link

between local and national politics which, later on, will be critically examined against the

background of the larger democratization issues.

My decision to analyze the provinces of North Sumatra and East Java is based on

several factors relevant to the research objective. Both have similar backgrounds as provinces

which are institutionally influenced by the process of democratization and decentralization.

As a consequence, they share similarities of transitional situations, the structure of local

government, decentralization policy, the design of party systems and electoral arrangements

including local elections.

In particular, the two provinces have several distinguished characteristics in relation to

the independent variable. They are economically and politically significant cases. Their

demographic figures, political dynamics, socio-cultural backgrounds, and economic and

financial profiles, make them excellent case studies. While East Java is located centrally in

the archipelago and North Sumatra in the periphery, both provinces are highly urbanized and

industrial hubs. Both provinces are among the most heavily populated provinces in Indonesia.

North Sumatra has a population of approximately 12 million spread out over twenty-five

regencies/cities. Meanwhile, East Java has a population of 38 million, with over thirty-eight

cities/regencies (KPU 2009). Among the thirty-three provinces in Indonesia, East Java is the

biggest province of voters, with about 29 million, while North Sumatra is the largest voters’

area outside Java with more than 9 million voters (KPU 2009). This demographic dimension

has an important effect particularly on electoral politics in which political parties intensively

compete in gaining political support.

Seen from the angle of post-New Order political constellations, both provinces are

very important in terms of the parties’ electoral competition, particularly between the two

“established” parties (The Functional Groups Party/Golkar and The Indonesia Democracy

Party-Struggle/PDI-P) and the newly emerging party, the Democrat Party (Partai

Demokrat/PD). North Sumatra is an electoral stronghold for the Golkar Party and the PDI-P,

two parties which have been considered to be “nationalist-secular” ones (Mujani and Liddle

2010, 36; Ufen 2006, 11-13; Webber 2006, 399; Qodari 2005, 79; Baswedan 2004, 672-674).

36

Meanwhile, East Java is a territory predominantly influenced by strong nationalist traditions,

as shown by the PDI-P mass base, as well as being a strong basis of traditional Islamic

movements, as represented by the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Awakening of

Traditional Religious Scholars and Teachers (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU). Moreover, highly

dynamic cultural settings with different backgrounds have enriched the political contest in

both regions. North Sumatra with highland communities has a strong feature of ethnic politics

and religious division, while East Java with the coastal communities has its peculiarity in

traditional Islam, nationalist tradition, and divided sub-culture.

Political struggle in both regions is also deepened by their similarly strong economic

and financial performances. Both provinces are significance in terms of their economic

structure, either in the past or in the contemporary era. According to Hadiz, “North Sumatra

was the center of the plantation sector in the colonial era, while East Java is the home of the

vibrant port city of Surabaya (now a gateway to Eastern Indonesia) and a vast rural and

agricultural hinterland” (Hadiz 2004,8). Hadiz also noted that “both provinces had been

beneficiaries of the New Order’s economic development policy and were locations of a

sprawling and quickly expanding manufacturing sector in the 1980s and 1990s” (Ibid.). North

Sumatra and East Java cannot be separated from their own resources, which influence the

dynamic relationship between political actors and various interest groups. In the

contemporary era, natural resources such as oil and liquid gas are found in Tambang Asahan,

and tin mine estates are located stretched along Sumatra’s east coast. The natural resources

also include natural products such as rubber, palm trees, sugar cane, coffee, etc. East Java also

has its peculiarities. This province has several large-scale industries, including the biggest

shipyard of PT PAL, PT Tjiwi Kimia’s biggest paper factory, the biggest cigarette factories of

PT Gudang Garam and PT Bentoel, and a plant of the country’s largest cement firm, PT

Semen Gresik. The province’s most prominent natural resource is oil. Its extractive activities

take place within the renowned CEPU Block, which is also the nationwide biggest contributor

of oil in Indonesia. Furthermore, among the thirty-three provinces of Indonesia, both rank

seventh in terms of locally-generated revenue, provincial budget, block grant, specific

allocation fund, as well as the shared-tax revenue (Kementrian Keuangan RI 2008, 2009).

Indeed, electoral politics became important in light of this context, not only in order to view

the political struggle of the candidates, but also in scrutinizing the interaction among the

national elites. Certainly, elite cooperation and competition are crucial in understanding the

struggle for political and economic power.

37

C. Research Techniques

Data and information were gathered from structured and semi-structured interviews,

participant observation, documentary sources, statistical data, scholarly journals, national and

local newspapers and the internet. The main source of data comes from interviews and

participant observation. Participant observation in district level local elections had been

conducted in both cases to get an initial empirical insight into the variable of interest.

Moreover, in order to get a better idea about potential causal mechanisms, I interviewed sixty-

three informants ranging from local executives (Governors and Vice Governors, former

Governors and Vice Governors, Mayors/Regents and Vice Mayors, and former Mayors and

Vice Mayors), local election candidates (at the provincial and regency level), national and

local legislators, politicians and political party functionaries, career bureaucrats, businessmen

and local strongmen, religious leaders, academicians at the national and local levels,

journalists and successful/victorious teams in electoral competitions (see the table). Local

executives, bureaucrats and legislators at the national and local level are crucial respondents

for obtaining information on all aspects of decentralization policies and local government

issues. They provided some useful comparative perspectives on policy problems of the New

Order period and the post-New Order era. Politicians and actors who have competed or have

been involved in local elections provided information on how have they perceived political

change, what strategies in political competition and mobilization they have applied, and how

they have built elite networks. Meanwhile local academicians, local journalists, and campaign

managers are important in providing background information on the local context and its

evolution over time. However, some of these informants overlap in their functions, for

instance, local NGO activists, local journalists, local academicians and businesspeople that

are at the same time campaign managers of local election candidates. More than that, career

bureaucrats often become politicians. National legislators whom I interviewed have

previously been candidates in local elections, local bureaucrats or provincial legislators. To

deal with the problem of overlapping functions, I categorized them using the most dominant

characteristic by which they might be identified. However, in the process of interviewing, I

could flexibly ask them in an interchangeable status. Some informants were interviewed twice

in order to clarify issues previously discussed or arising from subsequent interviews and for

getting more detailed and qualified information. The average duration of the interviews was

between 1 and 2 hours; a few took even more than that. These interviews were conducted

during the period of April-May 2010, April-May 2011, and January-March 2012.

38

Table 2. 1Distribution of Interviewees

No Category of Interviewees Number

1. Local Executives at Provincial Level (Governor, Vice Governor,

Former Governor, Former Vice Governor)

5

2. Local Executives at Regency Level (Mayor, Regent Vice Mayor,

Vice Regent, Former Mayor, Former Regent, Former Vice

Mayor, Former Vice Regent

6

3. Local Election Candidates at the Provincial Level 6

4 Local Election Candidates at the Regency Level 6

5. Politicians and Legislators at the Local Level 9

6. National Legislators 3

7. Career Bureaucrats 1

8. Electoral Commissioners at the Local Level 4

9. Business persons 1

10. Local scholars (political scientists, historians, anthropologists,

sociologists)

8

11. Local NGO Activists 3

12. Local Journalists 4

13. Political consultants/political strategists 2

14. Religious leaders 1

15. Social science scholars at the national level (political scientists,

sociologists, anthropologists, and administrative science experts)

4

TOTAL 63

There were two basic challenges I faced in conducting interviews. The first problem

related to the reliability of data/information. Interviewing elites usually raises problems of

how to ensure that they provide credible information. In order to deal with this challenge, I

proposed the following steps. First, implementing a formal procedure by requesting an

institutional letter of recommendation that confirms both my position as a researcher and that

the information will be used for academic purposes. Second, finding an appropriate gate-

keeper (usually their confidants) who not only assisted in arranging the appointment, but also

provided a personal guarantee of my research. Third, in order to get more qualified

information, I conducted personal communication with informants in informal ways, or with

39

their confidants. Fourth, I had a chance to clarify and cross-check information with other

informants.

The second challenge is the trade-off of using a tape recorder in my research. Using a

trade recorder means getting the original, literal and complete information. Refraining from

using it may encourage the interviewee to be more open in providing information. I decided to

use the tape recorder in consideration of the fact that I could then record detailed information,

get the flow of information, and memorize the context of the interviews. However, I offered

to switch off the tape recorder if interviewees wanted to talk more openly or to maintain the

confidentiality of the information. In this case, I relied on my field-work notes as a substitute.

In any case, while I recorded almost all the interviews, I also took notes from them.

Another important source consists of legal and government documents. They include

laws on decentralization, national and local government policy documents on

decentralization, local election arrangements, results of elections, national and local budgetary

documents and national and local statistical yearbooks. Quantitative and statistical data

inform the results of elections in both regions for all national elections since 1955, all general

elections in the New Order era, and general elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009. All these data

are required in order to trace the continuity and change in political parties’ power in both

regions. Quantitative data of all local elections at provincial level in the late and post-New

Order era are utilized in order to understand the political constellation in the provincial

parliaments and in direct elections. Besides, these data are useful in revealing the political

support for elites under study. This political support is not only based on political parties, but

also relies on demographic, ethnic or religious indicators.

To deepen and enrich the evidence, information is also extracted from the secondary

literature, a wide range of scholarly journals, national and local newspapers, biographies and

internet sources. National newspapers (both paper and online versions) such as Kompas, The

Jakarta Post, Media Indonesia, Tempo, and Republika as well as local newspapers such as

Sumut Pos, Waspada and Waspada Online, Tribun Medan, Analisa, Sinar Indonesia Baru

(leading public media in North Sumatra) and Jawa Pos, Surya Online, Harian Surya, Duta

Masyarakat (leading print and online media in East Java) were used as secondary data. All

these newspaper data provide useful information on crucial events such as the process of

transition at the national and local level, the process of policy formulation, for instance

decentralization policy, and also political events during local elections. Some major policy

issues at the local level are also documented in this newspaper data, and it enriches the

information of research.

40

Chapter Three

Politics in Indonesia: Structure, Actors and Ideas

I. Introduction

This chapter provides the historical and political context for the present study. Before

addressing the core question of how elite adjustment in the post-New Order period has taken

place at the local level, it is necessary to provide the reader with the background of

Indonesia’s political development. Since gaining its independence, Indonesia has experienced

four distinct periods of different government systems. Although all systems claimed or claim

to be democratic, we can classify Indonesia’s political history into two democratic or nearly-

democratic systems and two authoritarian types of political system. While the era of

Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957) and the era of Reformation/post-New Order (1998-

present) were or are democratic, the era of Guided Democracy (1959-1965) and the New

Order regime/ Pancasila Democracy (1965/1966-1998) were of an authoritarian nature. In

this chapter, I show how institutional structure, political actors’ strategies and ideas have

played a significant role in shaping the trajectory of Indonesia’s post-independence political

development.

The failure of Parliamentary Democracy in the 1950s was mainly caused by the

weakness of democratic institutions (Anderson 1983, 482-483); weak societal support,

particularly among elites, for liberal democratic ideas (Feith 1962); the hidden agenda of

President Soekarno and the military (Lev 1994); and also by the persistence of deeply

entrenched illiberal indigenous political ideas (Benda 1964; Soemardjan 1970). The successor

to this liberal democracy, the authoritarian system of “Guided Democracy,” faced similar

predicaments: this first authoritarian experiment failed due to its lack of a profound

institutional basis, the unmanageable power struggles between President Soekarno, the

Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and the military (Feith 1963),

and also the growing number of critics from Western-democratic supporters towards

Soekarno regime (Feith 1963, 342-348). In short, according to Crouch, “both regimes failed to

create a stable political order, either in the form of plural politics of parliamentary system or

the balancing of rival coalition partners under Guided Democracy” (Crouch 1979, 166).

The New Order learnt from “Guided Democracy” by strengthening the new regime’s

institutional and ideological basis and by providing material incentives to elite groups and the

population. It combined three political resources as its basis of political legitimacy: the

41

coercive or repressive approach, material inducement and the persuasive approach through

normative or popular ideology (Liddle 1992, 1996). The survival of the New Order regime

over more than three decades can be seen as the first “success” story of authoritarianism in

Indonesia and that success was built upon the three aforementioned approaches. The coercive

approach created the basis for controlling political institutions, the material approach used the

“more tangible” (Liddle 1996, 249) measures of distributing material resources to the

regime’s supporters and wider population and the persuasive approach relied on the

ideologies of the integralist state and developmentalism. Nevertheless, the regime’s decay in

the 1990s was also anchored in these three basic elements of legitimacy. Growing and

spreading democratic ideas in correspondence with the Third Wave of democratization

(Huntington 1991) and the radicalization of democracy activists; intra-elite conflicts

foreshadowing the limits of patronage and co-optation, and the Asian Financial Crisis of

1997/1998 dramatically undermining the regime’s developmentalist self-image and ability to

create economic growth paved the way towards regime change and the revitalization of

democracy in Indonesia.

Following the introduction, the subsequent section (3.2) – in line with the theoretical

framework - illustrates how the interplay of the three major factors of (1) structural

conditions, (2) actors’ strategies and (3) political ideas has impacted on Indonesia’s pre-

Reformasi political development. The section is subdivided into four sub-sections. The first

sub-section (3.2.1) focuses on the period of parliamentary democracy (1950-1957) which

followed the withdrawal of the Dutch colonizers from Indonesia in late 1949.9 This

periodizing disregards that Indonesia had already declared independence on 17 August 1945.

But the armed struggle against the Dutch, who sought to revitalize their former colonial

empire after the surrender of the Japanese at the end of the Pacific War, made it impossible to

build up more than only rudimentary state structures. This justifies to start the overview with

the establishment of a parliamentary democratic political system in Indonesia in 1950. The

second sub-section (3.2.2) takes a brief look at the period of “Guided Democracy” (1957-

1965) under President Soekarno, which paved the way for more than four decades of

authoritarian rule. Accordingly, the third sub-section (3.2.3) outlines major features of

President Soeharto’s New Order regime (1965/1966-1998). The 1965 coup attempt, allegedly

staged by leftist army officers and the PKI enabled Soeharto10

, then the commander of the

9

The Dutch still retained Irian Jaya (today Papua) until 1962 from where they were expelled by an Indonesian

military campaign and international pressure. (See Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 3-13). 10

The events surrounding the 30 September coup are still greatly contested by Indonesians and international

historiographers. The official version of the Indonesian government until to the present day was published by the

42

Jakarta-based elite Komando Cadangan Strategis TNI-Angkatan Darat (KOSTRAD), to crush

the coup and remove Soekarno from power. The fourth sub-section (3.2.4) then describes the

changes in Indonesia’s political system (Era Reformasi 1998-present) triggered by the forced

resignation of President Soeharto and the end of his New Order regime. This part will also

discuss some important elements of political change in Indonesia’s post-New Order political

development such as constitutional amendments, the change to a multi-party system, electoral

reforms including the direct election of the President, decentralization, and the direct election

of local executives. The chapter ends with summarizing its main findings (3.3).

II. Trajectories of Political Order in Indonesia: Institutional Structure, Actor

Strategies and Ideas

A. Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957)

When the Dutch eventually left Indonesia in 1949, the country had to decide what kind of

political format it wanted to adopt. The literature names at least four major reasons why

parliamentary democracy was adopted as the political system after the withdrawal of the

Dutch. The first argument stressed the transitional situation. The rise and existence of

parliamentary democracy over seven years was perceived as the result of a lack of choice.

“No other political regime was possible” at that time, Anderson stated (Anderson 1983, 482).

On the one hand, this political system was the product of agreement between the governments

of the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch (Kahin 1952; Feith 1962). On the other, it was

believed to be the most appropriate form of government given the political realities in

Indonesia. Parliamentary democracy with its popular representation system, including an

electoral system based on proportional representation (Feith 1954; Compton 1954; Tinker and

Walker 1956), was viewed as a clear expression of societal supremacy toward the state

(Anderson 1983, 482) and – in consideration of Indonesia’s extreme social and cultural

plurality - as an institutional safeguard for minorities.

The second reason was interest-driven and strategic. The experiment of parliamentary

democracy was also related to the fact that Indonesia needed international support (Feith

1962, 43). The search for international support, however, encouraged Indonesia’s elites to

build its government democratically.

Ministry of the State Secretariat in 1994. Previously, the regime version appeared in the writing of army

historian Nugroho Nutosusanto and the prosecutor Ismail Saleh (Notosusanto and Saleh 1989).

43

The third reason is related to the process of ideational emulation. At that time, Western

democratic ideas and their institutional arrangements had a high reputation in Asian countries,

particularly India and Burma, who supported newly independent Indonesia in international

fora (Feith 1962, 44). Thus, Indonesian elites - to a considerable extent - emulated the

Western democratic model.

The fourth reason was that there was also a small group of elite members who

regarded the Western model as the ideal political system for Indonesia. They were influenced

by European liberalism and socialism and believed that Western-style democracy could

protect Indonesia from resorting to authoritarian rule, fascism and demagoguery (Feith 1962,

41-45).

However, the parliamentary experiment was short-lived. It took more than five years

until a nation-wide parliamentary election (in 1955) could eventually be held, the results of

which were inconclusive. As shown by the electoral results, the political party system was

highly fragmented. With 22.32 percent the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National

Party, PNI) came in first, followed by Masyumi (the Consultative Council of Indonesian

Muslims/Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), a modernist Islam party with 20.92 percent, the

Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of the Ulama, NU), a traditionalist-Islam party with 18.41

percent, and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) came in

fourth with 16.36 percent of national votes. Altogether these four political parties gathered

78.01 percent of national votes and held 77 percent of total seats in the national legislature

(Feith 1971). The rest consisted of the middle-range parties which obtained only four to eight

seats in the national legislature such as the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian

Islamic Union Party, PSII), the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party,

Parkindo), Catholic Party, and the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party, PSI),

and also some small parties which gathered one to two seats in the national legislature (Feith

1957). Many parties represented in the national legislature greatly impeded the formation of

party coalitions for a stable government and decision-making, a situation that frequently led to

political deadlock. Seven cabinets succeeded each other since 195011

to 1957. In 1957, Ali

Sastroamidjojo, which came to power as a result of the 1955 election, was unable to cope with

the regional military rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, and, as a consequence, declared

martial law (in 1957) before resigning as prime minister. The proclamation of martial law

11

This account is based on the effective enactment of the provisional constitution of 1950 as the result of series

agreement between Indonesia, the Dutch, and mediator countries. However, parliamentarian system was

factually introduced to replace presidential system in November 1945, when Soekarno appointed Sutan Sjahrir as

Prime Minister.

44

came at the request of the military elites in Jakarta and, supported by Soekarno, sought to

tackle the rebellions and to prevent the split in the military to deepen (Lev 1964, 23). The

unrest was mainly related to dissatisfaction of some regional military commanders in the

Outer Islands (particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi) towards the practice of the parliamentary

system, the Java-centric policy-making, and also the involvement of the PKI in the cabinet of

Juanda (Lev 1957, 19-60). Nevertheless, even martial law could not completely prevent the

regional protests towards Jakarta. In early 1958, some regional military commanders in

consonance with Masyumi and PSI leaders launched the Revolutionary Government of the

Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/ PRRI) in West

Sumatra, demanding, among others, the disbandment of the Juanda cabinet (Lev 1964, 49).

Without doubt, Jakarta viewed this protest as a rebellion and separatist movement and

launched a military action to stop the movement.

However, this was not yet the end of the crisis. Soekarno and his new political allies,

the military and the communist party, engineered the takeover of power from the cabinet and

parliament. Finally, through the presidential decree in 1959, Soekarno declared the

disbandment of the elected constitutional assembly (Konstituante) on the pretext that it failed

to draft a permanent constitution,12

suspended parliament, and declared the return to the 1945

constitution. Through this presidential decree, Soekarno ushered in the period of “Guided

Democracy.”

Influenced by Western liberal ideas, the era of parliamentary democracy was also

characterized by a commitment to political decentralization. Since Independence, three laws

had been enacted to regulate local government. These were the Law Number 1/1945, Law

Number 22/1948, and Law Number 1/1957. Although the first law on decentralization was

unclear and with only six articles very short, the government of newly independent Indonesia

showed a commitment to local democracy (Djohan 2005, 65-68). Following this initial effort

to create a decentralization law was Law Number 22/1948 which constituted a serious attempt

in regulating decentralization in its political, financial, and administrative aspects, including

the arrangement of special regions. This law championed regional autonomy, local

democracy, people’s sovereignty, and modern local government institutions (Ibid., 73-77).

12

The Konstituante is a Constituent Assembly with the objective to amend the 1945 Constitution. This idea

originated from Soekarno’s speech in the Independence Preparatory Committee (Panitia Persiapan

Kemerdekaan Indonesia/ PPKI) in 1945, in which he stated that the 1945 Constitution was the provisional

constitution (revolutiegrondwet) and should be refined later (Yamin 1959, 140). After the revolutionary period

(1945-1949), the effort to establish the Konstituante continued. It eventually started operations after elections to

the body in 1955. Nevertheless, after almost three years of work to write a new constitution, Soekarno through

the Presidential Decree 5 July 1959 terminated the Konstituante and announced to return to the 1945

Constitution. For details, see Nasution (1994, 1995, 404-405; 2001, 75-79); see also Budiardjo (1956), Feith

(1962, 97-98).

45

However, the implementation was ineffective due to unclear regulations in specifying central-

local relations and lack of preparation in regulating the technicalities of local government

(Maryanov 1958, 57-67). The Law Number 1/1957 was even more progressive. This law

replaced the indirect election of local head executives by direct popular elections (Djohan

2005, 81-84). Nevertheless, the commitment to establish modern local government

institutions only looked good on paper. Structural constraints and political conditions led to

political instability and regional crises caused ineffective implementation (Djohan 2005, 85,

Maryanov 1958, 67-69; Mackie 1980, 672-674). In many parts of the countries local

government suffered from similar deficiencies as the national political system.

This first attempt by Indonesia to build a democratic order thus failed. Cultural

approaches13

attribute this failure to the fact that liberal democratic ideas constituted only a

thin layer, promoted mainly by elites with a background of Western education. By contrast,

the overwhelming majority of politicians and ordinary Indonesians were socialized by

political ideas that strongly deviated from Western-inspired liberalism (Benda 1964). These

ideas merged with extant local ideas - which themselves rested on earlier layers of localized

foreign ideas of Indian, Chinese and Islamic origin (Reid 1998) -, Indonesian customary law

(adat) re-constructed by Indonesian nationalists and highly conservative – not to say

reactionary - Western organic state theory. The adoption of the latter – highly influential in

many parts of Europe and subsequently Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

century - mainly served to modernize and thereby increase the legitimacy of the extant local

ideas.

The most articulate architect of this collectivist and, hence, staunchly anti-liberal set of

political ideas was Prof Supomo, a lawyer trained in Leiden. In the 1920s, Supomo and other

nationalists, inspired by Dutch law professor Cornelis van Vollenhoven, began to search

Indonesian customary law (adat) for norms and ideas that would constitute the Indonesian

“Volksgeist” (Reeve 1985; Bourchier 1994, 1999, 2001, 2014; Simanjuntak 1994; Nasution

1995). At least five basic sets of traditional norms have been identified by these nationalists

and – subsequently foreign scholars - to characterize social relationships among Indonesians.

First, Indonesian society is typified by an extraordinary ability to adapt to different

cultural influences (Willner 1966; Geertz 1963; Geertz 1972). Its geographical position and

intensive interaction with external norms have contributed to the ability of Indonesians to

respond to external ideational pressures (Willner 1966; Geertz 1963) with “receptivity,

flexibility, and at the same time selectivity” (Geertz 1963, 96). In other words, Indonesians

13

On the discussion of cultural approach see (Cribb 2000)

46

have a natural talent for practicable adjustment and absorption, but still keep “a distinct and

overall unique character” (Geertz 1963, 154).

Second, the dominant ideas in many Indonesian communities are harmony, the

minimization of conflict, and the preservation of unity. This does not mean that liberalism and

contestation have no place in the Indonesian polity, but these characteristics are not

predominantly adopted by the majority of Indonesian communities. Shyness (malu), the

importance of controlling emotion, and indirectly expressing ideas are still seen as positive

values by many Indonesians (Willner 1966).

Third, interdependence of community and reciprocal obligation through mutual

cooperation (gotong royong, see Bowen 1986) is another important dimension of traditional

values (Ibid.). In contrast to Western societies which Indonesian nationalists essentialized as

typified by individualism, personal ambition and material profit, the majority of Indonesian

people are seen as living in a network of interdependence and reciprocity (Ibid.). This exerts

pressure on those who occupy prominent positions in the social hierarchy to distribute their

wealth to the members of the network (Ibid.). The notion that rulers must create conditions in

which the population enjoys prosperity and economic well-being is an ancient idea that can be

traced as far back as to pre-colonial kingship and has been a major source of legitimacy for

the righteous ruler (Nguitragool 2012, Schulte-Nordholt 1987).

Fourth, conformity to group norms and expected social behavior figured highly in

traditional Indonesian societies (Willner 1966). This is strongly related to a collectivistic

notion of state and society and rejection of individualism as a tenet of social organization.

Learning in Indonesian societies is represented by the processes of observation, absorption,

and imitation (Ibid.). Experimentation seldom occurs in these learning processes. More than

that, demanding attention, showing off, seeking the limelight, or trying different approaches

are usually interpreted as negative (Ibid.). From this perspective, collectivism or anti-

individualism may be regarded in the Indonesian milieu as a cultural expression which

“avoids self-assertion and anonymity” (Djaksonagoro 1970, 198).

Fifth, and finally, there was the belief that the indigenous Indonesian system of

government did not determine leadership on the basis of skills or formal education, but by

ideals such as honesty, helpfulness, reliability and wisdom (Soemardjan 1970, 130). A village

headman was seen as “a father of the whole community who [was] trying to promote the

happiness and prosperity of his community, unity and harmony, between his village and the

unseen spiritual forces that live in and around it” (Soemardjan 1970, 130; Supomo 1970, 190).

47

Supomo galvanized these and other ideas into a state philosophy that became known

as “integralism” and which served to legitimize the authoritarian orders that followed the

period of parliamentary democracy. The core idea of the integralistic state is the notion of

unity between leader and people, with the basic principle of “the oneness of the entire state”

(Supomo 1970, 189). The concept of “one-ness” has been highly attractive to the nationalist

elite seeking to mobilize the nationalist movement and at the same time justify claims for

leadership after Independence. Supomo and other nationalist leaders thereby also drew from a

pre-colonial idea of imported Hindu-Brahmanic statecraft that following Benedict Anderson

is known as “Javanese conception of power.” This notion of power differs fundamentally

from Western concepts: power is finite, amoral and a ruler must possess all of it in order to

secure his legitimacy (Anderson 1972). By implication, such a concept of power is completely

at variance with liberal ideas of the division of power or decentralization. Unsurprisingly,

these liberal ideas played no role in the Indonesian constitution drafted by the nationalists

under Supomo’s strong intellectual influence in 1945. All powers lay in the hands of the

executive, leaving, if at all, only a rubber stamp function to the legislature.

The state is treated in Supomo’s integralism as a family, where the father is “the head

who best understands the needs of its members” (Reid 1998, 25). Everybody has his or her

position and function in this social order, which is hierarchical, and leaves space neither for

the liberal idea of upward mobility through personal achievement nor the socialist idea of

social change through class struggle. Social order exists, if – as shown above – people live

together in harmony, unity and tranquility (Reeve 1985; Bourchier 1994, 1999, 2001, 2014).

For Supomo “the inner spirit of the Indonesian people is characterized by the unity of kawulo-

gusti, that is, the unity of the outer and the inner world, of the macro-cosmos and micro-

cosmos, of the people and their leaders” (Supomo 1970, 190; Supomo 1959, 113; Schulte-

Nordholt 1987). This philosophical basis ruled out the liberal notion of a dualism between

individual and state as well as the dualism between society and state (Staat und staatsfreie

Gesellschaft). As a consequence, there is no guarantee for fundamental rights and liberties

(Grund- und Freiheitsrechte) of the individual against the state, because the individual is an

organic part of the state and in Hegelian terms, the state – as “gemeinschaft” – is the highest

ethical principle (Supomo 1970, 191; Supomo in Yamin 1959, 114). Although these

ideological foundations strongly drawing from Javanese culture were not without alternative –

especially in the regions outside Java (Reid 1998; Antlöv 2005) – they dominated the

discourse about the state and became even more influential as the parliamentary order

increasingly failed to satisfy the expectations associated with it (Legro 2000).

48

B. “Guided Democracy” (1957-1965)

As previously described, following its failure to handle regional unrests in 1957, Prime

Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo announced martial law. Since then, the tendency towards Guided

Democracy was irrevocable. Soekarno appointed Djuanda Kartawidjaja as the new prime

minister and military elites took military action to quell the regional rebellion of PRRI.

However, the new cabinet that consisted of four major political parties and non-party

representations was unable to work effectively work and the political instability increased.

Having a justification to restore political order, in 1959 Soekarno promulgated a decree

disbanding the Konstituante and declared the return to 1945 constitution.

The new period, which Soekarno called “Guided Democracy,” saw the suspension of

all legislative bodies and the reduction of political parties (from twenty-seven to ten) of

which, among others, the PKI could continue to exist. Due to the involvement of Masyumi

and PSI in the PRRI rebellion, these two pro-regionalist parties were disbanded and banned

(Mackie 1980, 674). As a substitution of the national legislative, Soekarno created a new

national parliament called DPR-GR/ Gotong Royong Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-

Gotong Royong), the members of which were appointed by the President and its leaders were

given a position as ministers. In the new political system, the President controlled parliament

and eliminated political opposition. No elections were held during this period. The “Guided

Democracy” was a political system in which power was only shared by Soekarno and the

army, with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as the third partner in a coalition of strange

bed fellows (Feith 1963, 309-409; Feith 1964, 1994; Lev 1964, 1994; Mackie 1980, 674-676).

The way of the regime managed the political system at the national level was also

reflected in the handling of local affairs. Central-local relations and local government were

designed to adopt the credo of “Guided Democracy.” With this, the spirit of liberalism and

local autonomy as enunciated in the previous parliamentarian era (through the Law Number

1/1957) was discarded. Following the presidential decree in 1959 in which Soekarno declared

the return to the 1945 constitution, Law Number 1/1957 was invalidated. In 1959, Soekarno

declared a presidential decision on local government (Penetapan Presiden No 6/1959) and

one year later, in 1960, he issued the presidential decision on the Gotong Royong Parliament

that regulated the national and local parliamentary affairs (Penetapan Presiden No 5/1960)

(Djohan 2005, 100). Both laws made local government responsible to central government, not

the local parliament. Local chief executives were appointed by the central government, a

serious setback in comparison to the previous law that envisaged to conduct direct local

elections. The local parliament was also appointed by the central government as it was also

practiced in the national parliament. Local chief executives were only the extension and

49

political vehicle of the central government. Unsurprisingly, they were also independent of any

control from the legislative institution (Ibid., 100-102). The effort to revise the regulation in

1965 (through Law Number 18/1965) as a response to criticism from political parties did not

significantly change the centralist structure of local government in this era. Central

government independently appointed local chief executives and the proposal of candidates for

the office by the local legislative was not binding. Local chief executives were given a

position as civil servant (Ibid., 101). The responsibility of the local government was directed

to both the central government and the local legislative.

Ideationally, the “Guided Democracy” marked a return to the integralistic state

concept promoted by Supomo,14

of which also Soekarno was an ardent advocate. Nothing

epitomized the return to the integralist state idea more than the re-institution of the 1945

Constitution in 1959, which replaced the essentially liberal provisional Constitution of 1950.

Soekarno had persistently derided Western parliamentary democracy as “50 percent plus one”

order (Ricklefs 2001, 305). He was of the firm belief that Western versions of democracy did

not fit Indonesia’s and other Eastern countries’ culture.

The process of regime change from Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957) to “Guided

Democracy” (1957-1965) can be viewed as the strengthening of indigenous values. The rise

of charismatic personal leadership (Liddle 1996, 71) can be interpreted as a process of re-

culturation and reproduction of the past political formation (Soemardjan 1970; Wilner 1966).

Benedict Anderson’s work in particular has been crucial in tracing and identifying this

ideational change. He argued that the political basis of the Javanese conception of power,

which is characterized by “centrism, syncretism, and absorption,” can be found in the style

and treatment of political leadership in Soekarno’s Guided Democracy. This political style

resembles the way Javanese Kings managed their power (Anderson 1972). The concept of

unity or centrism is fundamental to the Javanese conception of power. As illustrated by

Anderson, concentration is identical with the idea of purity and strong power, while diffusion

and disintegration are identified as impurity or distraction and as leading to the loss of power

(Anderson 1972). Unity and nation-building are the most important concepts in the political

rhetoric of President Soekarno. The significant aspect of national unity is not only related to

the Javanese conception of power, but also as the basic task of the leader in maintaining unity

as putatively rooted in village community (Djaksonagoro 1970; Supomo 1970). In addition,

the character of syncretism and absorption can also be found in modern political systems.

Soekarno, for instance, stressed the importance of the mutual assistance principle (gotong

14

On the integralistic state concept see (Bourchier 1994, 1999, 2001, 2014; Reeve 1985; Simanjuntak 1994;

Nasution 1995).

50

royong) in managing political affairs (Soekarno 1970a). Other examples are Soekarno’s

syncretic conceptions: first, the Five Principles (Pancasila) (Soekarno 1970b), and second,

the Nationalist-Religion-Communist (NASAKOM) jargon (Soekarno 1970c). Besides, the

notions of “centrism, syncretism, and absorption” can also be recognized in the establishment

of the National Council (Dewan Nasional)15

that aimed to unify all socio-political power in

Indonesia (Sundhaussen 1989; Feith 1963, 319; Lev 1994).

Other features that substantively contrasted with the idea of liberal and majoritarian

principle of democracy was Soekarno’s belief on musyawarah-mufakat16

as the core idea of

“Guided Democracy.” For the sake of national unity, he urged musyawarah-mufakat as the

very idea of all political mechanisms. It realized since he announced his anti-party sentiment

in 1956 (Sukarno 1970d), his idea to create the Dewan Nasional that operated through

consensus rather than voting, and his request to create a four-legged cabinet (consisting four

major political parties with various ideologies) in the Djuanda administration in 1957. As a

consequence, Guided Democracy portrayed liberal democracy as a potential threat to national

unity and spurred public paranoia towards liberal political ideas. This “Guided Democracy”

regime associated the previous and first experiment at democracy as with political instability,

ethnic and religious strife as well as ideological conflicts, and ineffective Cabinets (Feith

1962, 1994; Lev 1994; Bourchier 1994; McVey 1994; Liddle 1992).

C. The New Order (1965/1966-1998)

The “Guided Democracy” under the leadership of Soekarno failed to manage the political

system. Its profound lack of institutional basis, the unmanageable power contests between

President Soekarno, the PKI and the army (Feith 1963), and also the growing criticism from

supporters of Western democracy (Feith 1963, 342-348) led to the demise of the “Guided

Democracy” and the formation of a new regime. Tensions between Soekarno’s allies - - the

army and the PKI – mounted and came to a climax in 1965. In the 30th

September affair

military officers under the leadership of the Commander of the Cakrabirawa Regiment

(Bodyguards to the President) kidnapped and killed six army generals. It was later announced

that the regiment was influenced and provoked by the PKI to arrest these army generals in

order to protect President Soekarno from a coup attempt. Nevertheless, the situation was

15

Dewan Nasional (National Council) is a Soekarno concept following the establishment of Guided Democracy.

According to Feith, it is “a high advisory body on which various functional groups - workers, peasants, national

businessmen, and so on — would be represented and which would operate through consensus rather than by

voting” (Feith, 1963, 319-320). 16

On the discussion musyawarah-mufakat see (Kawamura 2011)

51

changing and the PKI became the suspect of the coup attempt and their leaders were as the

alleged masterminds. Under the leadership of Major General Soeharto, the Chief of the

Army’s Strategic Reserve Force (KOSTRAD), the army succeeded in crushing the communist

movement, in the process killing at least half a million suspected communists (Ricklefs 2001,

347-349).17

Moreover, it was the Letter of Command of 11 March 1966 (Supersemar) from

Soekarno to Soeharto that can be seen as the initial step of taking over power from the former

by the latter. According to Crouch, Supersemar was a “disguised coup” perpetrated by

Soeharto to dislodge Soekarno from power (Crouch 1978). After the success of his political

maneuver and the return to political stability, Soeharto was appointed as acting President by

the MPRS (the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly/ Majelis Permusyawaratan

Rakyat Sementara) in 1967. His presidency was eventually made permanent position in the

following year.

As an authoritarian regime, the New Order based its legitimacy on three elements:

institutional structure, material incentives and ideological foundation. During its 32 years of

existence, the New Order firmly established and consolidated its authoritarian structures and

policies. The regime elevated Golkar to become the hegemonic government party, established

the military in politics through the “dwi fungsi” doctrine,18

eliminated and banned the

Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), systematically sidelined Soekarno’s supporters in the

Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), took effective control of the parliament, and carved out

for itself a monopoly in the bureaucracy (Feith 1968; Liddle 1978, 124-127, 1992; King 1992,

104-116; Emmerson 1983, 1225-1231; Suryadinata 1992). The regime’s consolidation

continued in the 1970s by emasculating political parties through fusing them. This led to a

decline from ten political parties which run in 1971’s general election to only three electoral

contestants in the 1977 general election.19

17

The 30th

September 1965 coup attempt had been followed by mass killings of suspected communist party

members, supporters and sympathizers throughout the country. There is no precise statistic on the death toll of

this massacre, although one report stated that approximately five hundred thousand people were killed between

October 1965 and March 1966 (Cribb 2001, 219). Party members, supporters, or sympathizers surviving the

mass slaughter were sent to penal colonies such as the ones on Buru Island. For a comprehensive edited volume

discussing the mass killings, see (Cribb 1990). 18

“Dwi fungsi” establishes the dual functions of the military according to which the military is not only

responsible for the external and internal security of the state, but also performs social functions. The latter are

reflected in the military’s territorial structure which parallels the civilian bureaucracy and the seconding of

military officers to civilian positions (Crouch 1972, 1979; MacDougall 1982). Up to 80 percent (until 1977) and

still about 50 percent (until 1997) of Indonesian governors were active or retired military officers (Malley 1999,

76). Moreover, at least until the mid-1980s also many Indonesian ambassadors were senior military officers

(Nabbs-Keller 2013). 19

The idea of fusing political parties emerged in 1970 when Soeharto proposed to party leaders to combine

parties in three groupings: spiritual, nationalist, and functional. See Hindley (1971, 116-118); Moertopo (1974,

64-74); Budiardjo (1988, 275).

52

Control over political parties also included restrictions in opening sub-district

branches. The rationale behind this policy was the “floating mass” doctrine, which sought to

legitimize the de-politicization of Indonesian society on the ground that ordinary people are

like a floating mass which could be easily manipulated by all kinds of political opponents. It

was implemented by the prohibition of all parties to have village branches (desa) throughout

the country (Cahyono 1998, 151-196) This policy resulted in the organizational weakness of

political parties and impeded them in mobilizing voters at the grassroots level. The exception

was Golkar, which as the regime’s political party took advantage of its alliances with the

military and bureaucratic institutions (Fatah 1994, 191).

The regime’s control over political parties also implied government interventions into

their internal affairs, as exemplified in the case of the United Development Party (PPP) and

the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) (Haris and Saidi 1991; Putranto et.all. 2006; Sanit

1997; Radi 1984; Zulkifli 1996, 135-195; Eklof 2003; Lay 2010; Haris 2014). In both cases

the New Order regime used strong-arm tactics to influence leadership elections and blocked

the rise of any potential dissidents to top positions of these political parties (Haris and Saidi

1991; Eklof 2003; Lay 2010; Haris 2014).

The absence of a competitive political process was exacerbated by rigged elections

(Liddle 1992b; Irwan and Edriana 1995; Hikam 1998, 49-81; Haris 1998, 82-114). In the

absence of an independent electoral commission, the military and the bureaucracy became

effective political machineries for ensuring the victory of Golkar in six New Order general

elections (Fatah 1994, 191-193; Liddle 1992b; Crouch 1979b, 576; Ward 1974; Sanit 1985,

162; Liddle 1988, 185). Elections were thus hardly free and fair.

The role performed by parliament was an outcome of non-competitive elections. Apart

from Suharto’s dominant Golkar party, it only consisted of co-opted political parties. It was a

legislature that could not perform even its most basic functions in legislation, budgeting and

oversight (Sanit 1985, 249-288; Haris 1998, 82-114). Golkar and the military/police factions

always had at least a simple majority. As a consequence, the legislature’s performance was

hardly more than a “rubber-stamp,” at least until the early 1990s (Rüland, Jürgenmeyer,

Nelson & Ziegenhain 2005; Ziegenhain 2008).

The asymmetric horizontal division of power in terms of a dominant executive and a

weak legislature was complemented by a no less asymmetric vertical division of power. Law

Number 5/1974 created the legal basis for an extremely centralistic regime (Liddle 1992, 452;

Malley 1999), in which Jakarta effectively controlled regional affairs in the political and

economic domains. Decentralization policy in the New Order was thus a continuation of the

53

previous policy in “Guided Democracy,” although it rested on a more systematic institutional

architecture. It was centralist in the sense that central government controlled local authorities.

Local legislatures as the representation of local people had no effective policy-making and

oversight competences (Hoessein 2005, 205). Public participation of local people in policy

making was also absent (Rasyid 2002, 14). On the side of the executive, three candidates for

the post of local chief executive were proposed by the local legislatures, but it was the central

government which chose one among them (Rasyid 2003, 64; 2004, 68). As a consequence, the

local chief executives (governors, mayors, or regents) were not only the head of the region,

but also the representative of the central government (Rasyid 2004, 68). In terms of authority,

the central government controlled all local authorities and created uniformity of local

government down to the village level. This structure resulted in a lack of innovation,

bureaucratic red tape, and a slow response of local governments in responding to local

problems (Rasyid 2002, 14). The rationale of this political format was the prevention of

centrifugal separatist movements as occurred in the 1950s (MacAndrews 1986, 29; Hoessein

2005, 204). The centralist structure of central-local relations was also reflected in the financial

arrangements where local government depended on the financial support of the central

government in the form of subsidies and grants (Booth 1986, 77-100; Simanjuntak 2005,

245).

Press freedom as a basic element of democratic polity was virtually absent (Hill 1994;

Hidayat 2000, 127-164). Only few oppositional newspapers and magazines survived and their

existence was overshadowed by bans of the regime. The government possessed an effective

control towards press through the license system, the so-called Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan

Pers (SIUPP) or Press Publication Enterprise Permit. Once critical press reporting

transgressed a certain “red line,” the regime could easily revoke the newspaper’s license or

permit, as occurred with several critical magazines including Indonesia Raya, Tempo, Editor,

and Detik (Hill 1994, 34-60; Haryanto 1995; Rüland, Lang & Wiese 2014).

The New Order’s more repressive actions were directed toward the more militant

opposition groups: fundamentalist Islam in Lampung and Tanjung Priok, separatist

movements in Aceh and Papua, middle class dissidents, and NGO activists (Aspinall 2005;

Fatah 2010). Killings and imprisonments of political dissidents were used as an

uncompromising way of punishing and intimidating the opposition. In addition, corporatist

arrangements served to control interest representation by business associations (MacIntyre

1994) and organized labor (Hadiz 1994).

54

In contrast to the repressive treatment meted out to its political opponents, the regime

provided rewards towards its advocates, followers, and the majority of the people. By strongly

promoting development, the New Order built its legitimacy on economic success (Vatikiotis

1993, 32-59). Strategic alliances between bureaucracy, domestic and foreign capital as well as

the military succeeded in establishing a bureaucratic authoritarian regime (O’Donnell 1973).

Chinese domestic conglomerates collaborated with the Soeharto family and bureaucrats and,

backed by the military, were the main beneficiaries of the regime’s development policies

(Liddle 1992, 449). The monopolistic economy built up by the regime and domestic

capitalists strongly depended on state protection (MacIntyre 1990, 369-393). Kunio called this

phenomenon “ersatz capitalism” (Kunio 1988). Soeharto’s loyalist generals, national

politicians, bureaucrats, and local elites obtained incentives ranging from formal political

positions such as ministers, governors, members of parliament and ambassadors to positions

on the board of commissioners in state enterprises and enjoyed privileged access to business

licenses and state protection (Crouch 1979b; Jenkins 1984; Liddle 1985, 73, 78-79; Robison

1986; Mackie 2010).

Besides loyalist elite groups, the regime paid also attention to the larger population.

Economic growth, price control over some basic products important for the people such as

fuel and rice together with state subsidies in the agricultural sector such as fertilizers and

pesticides were among the New Order regime’s policies that served to showcase the regime’s

social responsibilities. The regime also appeared to the majority of people as economic and

social benefactor through specific agricultural, rural and infrastructural development policies

(Liddle 1992, 449). President Soeharto himself played a high-profile role in several social

assistance programs through the Inpres (Instruksi Presiden/ Presidential Instruction) and

Banpres (Bantuan Presiden/ Presidential Grants) schemes (Liddle 1985, 78; Rock 2003).

Through these presidential grants people appreciated the state’s attention and Soeharto was

celebrated as Bapak Pembangunan (Father of Development) (Heryanto and Lutz 1988; Huat

1993, 137). Uncounted schools, traditional markets, mosques, people’s farms, and agricultural

products throughout the country were the result of the presidential grants. As a consequence,

the New Order, according to William Liddle, acquired the reputation of a “benevolent-

obedience” regime (Liddle 1996, 80; Robertson-Snape 1999, 597).

From an ideational perspective, the New Order regime is a synthesis of two major

strands of political thought: integralism and developmentalism (Feith 1991, 72). The first

almost seamlessly continued Supomo’s ideas and developed them further. It strongly drew

from familist and other organic state theorems, proclaiming that the state should be run like a

55

family and be organized along state-corporatist principles according to which state and

individual citizen are inseparable.

The second set of ideas, too, is deeply rooted in ideational legacies of the pre-colonial

period. As noted earlier, prosperity and economic well-being has been an ancient source of

legitimation for rulers (Nguitragool 2012). But Suharto’s development agenda was also

related to a global trend of that time: many authoritarian Third World regimes - especially in

East Asia - adopted in the 1970s and 1980s the model of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime

(O’Donnell 1973; Huntington 1972). This state ideology bestows priority upon economic

development and political stability, while ignoring political freedom and human rights (Uhlin

1995). Accordingly, major political institutions rest on military force, the bureaucracy, and

foreign capital (Robison 1978, 1986; Budiman 1991, 22-42).

Complementing these two major ideational streams were the state-ideology Pancasila

(Morfit 1981; Darmaputera 1988; Ward 2010), the negative image of liberal democracy

linked to its failure in the 1950s, and strident anti-communism (Uhlin 1997, 52-57). These

basic ideological tenets constituted the normative foundations of the anti-democratic character

of the New Order (Uhlin 1997, 56).

Nevertheless, the ideological foundation, institutional basis and material incentives

justifying authoritarian practices could not prevent challenges of the regime by opposition

forces from the early 1970s to the end of the 1980s. In the 1970s, opposition to the regime

was dominated by student movements. In the early 1970s, some student activists led by Arief

Budiman criticized the New Order’s general election and started the election boycott

movement (Golongan Putih/Golput). This movement expressed the widespread protest to the

regime’s systematic rigging of the first New Order general elections in 1971 (Aspinall 2005,

14). Other student protests followed such as the “January Disaster” (Malapetaka Lima Belas

Januari/Malari) in 1974 which targeted the increasing influence of foreign capital on

Indonesia’s development. In 1978, student activists of the Bandung Technology Institute

(Institut Teknologi Bandung/ITB) protested and opposed Soeharto’s renewed candidacy as

president. The protest ended with a military crackdown on the campus and the de-

politicization of universities (Aspinall 2005, 15).

In the 1980s, opposition had spread beyond student activists. Some dissident groups

are of notable importance, such as the Petition 50 group. This group was led by several

prominent retired Generals and democracy activists who criticized the regime for not

consistently implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Other political dissidents

included Islamic fundamentalist groups in Jakarta’s Tanjung Priok quarter and in Lampung

56

(South Sumatra) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their advocacy activism,

as, for example, in the case of the controversial Kedung Ombo dam building project (Lucas

1992). While initially these sporadic expressions of dissident were not more than irritations

for the regime, this political disobedience became the root for the more organized movement

that followed in the 1990s (see Uhlin 1997).

Many non-state political actors deviated from the regime’s ideological orientations.

Assessing this development, scholars distinguish three major strands: First, the Left which

consisted of radical democrats who stressed the need to mobilize the masses and to build

countervailing forces against state and capital (Törnquist 1991 quoted in Uhlin 1997; Feith

1991; Uhlin 1997). In their emancipatory perspective, democracy is not only understood

simply as a liberalization of the political sphere, but also as the struggle for social and

economic equality, and the emancipation of the marginalized parts of the population (Uhlin

1997, 131-132). This group consisted of dissident academics, journalists, student activists,

and lawyers (Feith 1991). Second, in the Center, the focus of attention lay on the question of

how to strengthen autonomous legal institutions, the media and civil society associations

(Feith 1991; Törnquist 1991 quoted in Uhlin 1997, 128). The centrists could be called critical

pluralists (Feith 1991) or liberals (Uhlin 1997), emphasizing the need for democratic political

reforms in order to strengthen the institutions of civil society against the state. Most advocates

of this perspective relied on a more gradual process of democratization through free and fair

elections, representative democracy, and strengthening civil society (Uhlin 1997, 134). Unlike

the radical democrats, they believed in democratization from above and rejected popular

participation or lower class participation in politics. This group consisted of academics,

professionals, and non-governmental groups (Feith 1991). Third, the right consisted of

economic liberalizers who were more concerned with economic reforms than political reforms

(Ibid.). Major proponents of this group were technocrats, economists, business people, and

professional communities (Ibid.). Nevertheless, beyond this categorization, the conservatives,

whose ideas intersected with those of the liberals, relying on democracy in a more procedural

form, should also be noted. But their political ideas also overlapped with “integralist” thought

and emphasized the importance of national unity as Indonesia’s main value (Uhlin 1997, 136-

137). Conservative ideas can be found among certain elite dissidents and retired generals, as

well as among several “soft-liners” within the authoritarian elite (Ibid., 137). Other important

groups outside the regime were Islamic groups which combined the idea of democracy with

Islamic beliefs (Ibid., 63-83).

57

By the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the situation had markedly changed.

Three basic challenges threatened Soeharto’s New Order regime. The first was the changing

international situation following the advance of the “Third Wave” of democratization

(Huntington 1991) in many parts of the world. Unlike the previous waves of democratization,

the third wave was characterized by a transnational diffusion of democratic ideas or what

Huntington had termed snowballing effects. Such processes of diffusion could also be

observed in the Indonesian case where pro-democratic activists learned from other

democratizing countries in the region. Examples were the democratization in the Philippines’

following the so-called “People’s Power Revolution” in 1986, the democratization in South

Korea and Taiwan, the Tiananmen Square uprising in China in 1989, the breakdown of the

communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the pro-democratic movement in Thailand

in 1992 (Croissant 2004). These international events gave Indonesia’s democracy activists

confidence that political change in Indonesia was also possible (Uhlin 1997, 155-184). From

these transitional events, many democracy activists in Indonesia learnt how to effectively

challenge the authoritarian Soeharto regime.

The second challenge was related to intra-elite conflict. By the end of the 1980s, one

particular factor signaled Soeharto’s weakening grip on power: his increasingly strained

relationship with the country’s most powerful institution besides himself, the military. This

conflict came openly to the fore in the selection of the country’s vice president in 1988.

Soeharto’s designation of Lieutenant General Sudharmono for the post aroused strong

resistance from a powerful military faction led by General Benny Moerdhany. This forced

Soeharto to reassign key military posts to close confidants (Liddle 1996, 211). As a reaction

to these events, Soeharto began to search for new political allies and found them in political

Islam which - after muzzling it since taking over power in the 1960s - he co-opted in the form

of a newly established organization, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals

(Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) under the leadership of his trusted aide

Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (Schwarz 1994; Vatikiotis 1993).

The third challenge was the regime’s shift in political orientation towards becoming

more accommodating to emerging societal forces. Political change and democratization in

other countries contributed to changing the regime’s political orientation in the early 1990s.

Emerging democracies elsewhere in the region encouraged the New Order regime to soften its

repressive character. An indicator for this trend of “opening” (keterbukaan) was the release of

political prisoners in 1993 and the formation of a national Human Rights Commission.20

20

“Right Extremists” were released (‘Ekstrem Kanan’ Dibebaskan), Tempo, 4 September 1993.

58

However, this release was also related to the new strategic partnership with political Islam,

with the effect that many of the released were Islamic dissidents.21

Nevertheless, this

accommodation not completely eliminated the regime’s repressive nature. In 1996, the regime

turned against Megawati Soekarnoputri’s supporters in the PDI’s internal conflict which the

regime itself had provoked (Eklof 2003, chapter 11). The conflict led to open criticism of the

regime by Megawati’s followers and pro-democratic activists. Many party members and pro-

democratic activists were imprisoned immediately after the riot at the party’s headquarter in

central Jakarta. This event was followed by the manipulated general elections in 1997 and the

appointment of a highly reform-averse cabinet in early 1998 (Eklof 1997). At the same time,

the financial crisis which had eclipsed several Southeast Asian countries since May 1997 and

which also engulfed Indonesia in subsequent months, had grossly undermined the regime’s

sole remaining legitimacy ground: economic development. The Asian Financial Crisis thus set

the stage for the resignation of President Soeharto on 21 May 1998 and the subsequent

collapse of the New Order regime.

D. The post-New Order Era: Bringing Democracy Back In

The monetary crisis in mid-1997 was the catalyst for a wider economic crisis in Indonesia. In

only a few months from the middle of 1997 to early 1998, the exchange rate of Indonesia’s

rupiah had depreciated by as much as 86 percent.22

In the process, the real economy was badly

affected as well, leading to a contraction of Indonesia’s economic growth from 4.7 percent in

1997 to minus 13.2 percent in 1998. At the same time, the inflation rate surged, peaking at

59.6 percent in early 1998 (IMF, 1999). As these quantitative indicators show, the financial

crisis later led to a substantial decline in consumer purchasing power.

Even though the government was trying hard to stabilize the economy by inviting the

IMF to intervene in October 1997, the political situation went increasingly out of control. The

crisis spurred the radicalization of pro-democratic forces, particularly the student movement

which protested against the regime in almost all big cities. No longer did the critics of the

New Order regime focus on the performance of the economy alone: the student movement

shifted the attention to the issue of presidential succession, military involvement in politics,

the need for free and fair elections, and the reformation of political institutions. As the crisis

21

Ibid. The regime at that time released some Islamic dissidents such as A.M. Fatwa, A.Q Jaelani, Tasrief

Tuasikal, and Eddy Ramli. 22

The exchange rate was 2.400 rupiah per 1 dollar in July 1997, before it depreciated to 17.000 rupiah per 1

dollar on 22 January 1998. See Bullard, Bello, and Malhotra (1998, 95-96); MacIntyre (1998, 371); Sadli (1998,

273).

59

intensified, the New Order increasingly displayed internal rifts which, according to actor-

centered transition theory (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991), precede the

collapse of the ancien régime. Cabinet ministers and the parliamentary leadership defected,

while the military leadership, except for diehard Soeharto supporters, did little to suppress the

student protests (Rüland, Jürgenmeyer, Nelson & Ziegenhain 2005; Ziegenhain 2008). By 21

May 1998, the situation had become untenable for Soeharto, leading to his resignation and

opening the way for Indonesia’s democratization.

1. Habibie’s Reforms

Soeharto’s resignation left the country in an acute power vacuum, raising serious questions

about the country’s political future. The transfer of power to his vice president Bacharuddin

Jusuf Habibie was particularly disappointing for the radical democrats. An important part of

their demand for total reform (reformasi total) was purging the new regime of authoritarian

elements.

However, transition in Indonesia was characterized by a collaboration of “the

moderates” in the opposition camp and “soft-liners” of the former authoritarian regime

(Budiman 1999; van Klinken 1999). Negotiated or “pacted” transitions may result in a

comparatively smooth regime change, but may also downgrade the quality of democracy

(O’Donnell 1992; Valenzuela 1992). In the Habibie presidency (1998-1999), especially when

the Special Session of the Consultative People’s Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan

Rakyat, MPR) approached in November 1998, three power centers emerged. The first group

sought to preserve as much of the status quo as possible: these were pro-Soeharto elements

inside the military institution, the Golkar party and cronies of Soeharto. The second group

consisted of moderate reformists, dominated by civilian elites controlling mass-based political

parties (Ciganjur Group).23

The third group was radical reformists, who mainly relied on

thestudent movement and NGOs (Haris 2002, 10). The interactions of these power centers

created multiple configurations of conflict, cooperation and consensus and largely shaped the

post-New Order transition.

After Habibie came to power, he initiated significant political reforms. Even though

Habibie was a remnant of the New Order regime, his political orientation was different from

23

Ciganjur refers to one of suburbs of Jakarta where Abdurrahman Wahid, one of the leaders of this Group,

resided. Besides Wahid, the group consisted of Amien Rais (the leader and founder of National Mandate

Party/Partai Amanat Nasional/PAN), Megawati Soekarnoputri (the leader of Indonesian Democratic Party-

Struggle/Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan/PDI-P), and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X (the Sultan of

Yogyakarta).

60

his predecessor. However, it is not clear to what extent his reforms were driven by a sincere

commitment to democracy or the motivation to stay in power. As a former Soeharto confidant

embattled in office from the very first day, Habibie had to develop reformist credentials and

political legitimacy of his own. Radical democracy activists distrusted him and saw in him an

interim and caretaker president at best (Budiman 1999). However, intellectuals close to

Habibie such as Dewi Fortuna Anwar argued that Habibie was substantially different from

Soeharto. She claimed that “unlike Soeharto, who was highly suspicious of the West and

regarded democracy and human rights as manifestations of ‘Western values’ incompatible

with Indonesian cultural identity, Habibie did not seem to have any discomfort with ‘Western

values’ and once he became president he immediately embraced the concept of democracy

and human rights as universal values” (Anwar 2010, 100).24

During his 17 months in power, Habibie’s government initiated far-reaching political

change in Indonesia: he re-established civil liberties, enabled political liberalization,

conducted the first free and fair parliamentary elections since 1955, commenced a radical “big

bang” decentralization scheme, and paved the way, albeit unwittingly, toward the

independence of East Timor (Habibie 2006). In his short presidency, evidence for the

government’s commitment to civil liberties can be found in the release of political prisoners

and the guarantee of media freedom (Anwar 2010, 104). Following the re-instatement of civic

rights, the reforms also propelled political liberalization. Parliamentary elections were

scheduled for 1999 instead of 2002, and two landmark laws passed in the People’s

Consultative Assembly (MPR) Special Session of 1998 provided the legal foundations for

free and fair elections and created a framework for the participation of political parties.

Indonesia subsequently became a multi-party state and an independent election commission

(Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) was tasked with supervising the elections (Anwar 2010,

106-107).

The general election was eventually held in June 1999, with the participation of forty-

eight political parties. The Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (Partai Demokrasi

Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDI-P) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri won, garnering 33.8 percent

of the votes, followed by Golkar, the dominant party during the New Order, with 22.3

percent. However, no party won an overall majority (Ananta et al 2004, 250). This result

determined the political constellation in the MPR, which in October 1999 had to elect the

President. The stronger position of anti-Habibie factions in the MPR led to the rejection of his

Presidential accountability report. Contributing to his defeat was the military, which was

24

On Habibie’s commitment towards democracy and human rights, see his autobiography (Habibie 2006).

61

frustrated over the loss of East Timor (Anwar 2010, 108). His regime ended amid intense

behind-the-scene maneuverings with the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as president, even

though the latter’s party, the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB),

won only 12.61 percent of the votes in the June 1999 general election. The victory of

Abdurrahman Wahid in the presidential election in the MPR degraded the victory of PDI-P in

the general election. Megawati Soekarnoputri, the leader of the PDI-P, was outmaneuvered in

this political horse-trading in the MPR, and eventually had to settle for the position of vice

president.

2. Constitutional Amendments

One of the most important agendas in political reform was constitutional amendment. This

process took place during 3 years, from 1999 to 2002. During Indonesia’s post-New Order

era, four constitutional amendments were passed in the MPR General Session. The need for

amendments, however, became evident in the period of Habibie’s rule through the MPR

Special Session in November 1998. Although political parties, academicians, and NGOs gave

considerable attention to the need for an immediate amendment of the constitution, most of

the political parties were concentrating on preparing for the general election in 1999. As a

consequence, the first discussion and decision on the constitutional amendment only took

place in the MPR General Session in October 1999.

In the first amendment, which was passed on 19 October 1999 in the MPR General

Session, some articles of the 1945 Constitution were replaced. In short, the first amendment

focused on curtailing executive power, limiting the Presidential term to a maximum of two

periods, and also the strengthening of legislative power. Federalism was discussed as an

option and proposed particularly by the National Mandate Party (PAN), although the majority

of politicians rejected this idea based on bad memories of the federal state implemented in

Indonesia by the Dutch and adverse experiences with regionalism in the 1950s (see Maryanov

1958; Legge 1961). However limited, the first amendment was seen as “a clear statement of

political transition from authoritarianism” (Lindsey 2002, 249).

The second amendment, passed on 18 August 2000, was a step forward in relation to

the previous amendment. Three basic pillars of authoritarianism were changed in this second

amendment. Several important articles were newly inserted, e.g. principles with regard to

human rights, military disengagement in politics, and changing centralistic components of the

government (Ibid., 256). The constitution finally included some articles on human rights.

62

Decentralization and democratic elections of local executives were also guaranteed. Finally,

the military and the police were separated to execute different functions (Ibid., 252).

The third amendment concentrated on presidentialism and on strengthening the

judiciary. This amendment not only inaugurated direct presidential elections, but also

guaranteed that the president could not be removed from office on political grounds. Due to

bad experiences, like the impeachment of President Wahid by the MPR shortly before the

implementation of the third amendment in mid-2001, the article was supposed to provide a

more solid basis for the presidential system. In addition, the third amendment provided a

strengthened foundation for the independence of the judicial system through the establishment

of the Constitutional Court (Mahmakah Konstitusi) and the independent Judicial Commission

(Komisi Judisial). Other important changes concerned the establishment of a Regional Senate

(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), the independence of the Commission of Elections (Komisi

Pemilihan Umum, KPU), and the State Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK).

The fourth and final amendment did not regulate significant issues as the second and

third amendments had done. This amendment regulated the second round of presidential

elections, i.e. it was stipulated that a candidate had to obtain more than 50 percent of the votes

with at least 20 percent in half of the country’s provinces. Another article governed the

abolition of the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, DPA) and the

elimination of reserved seats in parliament, which had been an exclusive privilege of the

military and the police in the past.

Following the process discussed above, there was a debate on the success of the

constitutional amendments. Most observers saw the process as primarily symbolic rather than

as producing substantial change (Ellis 2002; Lindsey 2002; Crouch 2010; King 2001).

However, from a more optimistic perspective, this attempt can be perceived as the first

historical effort, after the failure of the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) to amend the

constitution of 1945.

When the idea of amending the constitution was raised immediately after the

breakdown of the New Order, groups of elites within the military and the PDI-P still believed

in the sacredness of the old constitution as a symbol of national independence. In their

opinion, the constitution was without fault and the major problems rested only in the actual

implementation (Crouch 2010, 52-53). Other groups, especially some of the new parties, were

more reform-minded or at least tried to appropriate democratic ideas as their own ideas.

Outside of the system, groups of academics and NGOs demanded more progressive change

including the establishment of an independent constitutional commission (Ellis 2002; Lindsey

63

2002). However, in order to find a solution, a compromise was agreed upon on the basis of

musyawarah-mufakat. Following this consensus, the amendments would not touch the basic

foundation of the nation. According to Crouch, this basic foundation is found in the preamble

that contain the national ideology of Pancasila, the presidential system, and the unitary state

(Crouch 2010, 53). This shows how deeply the extant ideational structure is embedded in the

collective memory of political actors, even when most of them were not directly involved in

the political proceedings of the 1950s. Pancasila as the fundamental norm of Indonesia was

understood as a normative defense against the effort of some Islamic groups to include the

Jakarta Charter25

in the constitution, as attempted during the Parliamentary Democracy era.

Similar to this, the firm commitment to a presidential system was a result of the negative

experience of a “Western” parliamentary system in the 1950s. In addition, federal states as

introduced by the Dutch, and regional rebellions in the 1950s, led to a strong aversion towards

establishing federalism in the post-New Order polity. Although limited, cognitive factors

played a central role in impeding the more progressive demands for reform. The consensus

mentioned above was not only supported by the conservatives but also by the moderate

groups of reformers. Finally, the constitutional amendments with their substantial adoption of

liberal democratic values can be seen in a sense as some sort of victory of liberal democrats.

3. Decentralization Reform in 1999: Deconstructing the Myth of Unitarism

The political reform in post-Soeharto Indonesia was not completed with the institutional

changes created by the constitutional amendments, re-designing the presidential system, re-

formulating the party system, and reforming the electoral design. It had spread to another

component of the political system, namely the relationship between the center and the regions.

Following the fall of Soeharto, growing regional aspirations to decentralize emerged. This

political demand arose due to the fact that the centralistic government under the rules of

Soekarno and Soeharto did not distribute political and economic goods fairly. In short, a

centralistic government was regarded as inappropriate in combination with a flourishing

democratic political system. In order to respond to this political demand, Habibie’s

25

The Jakarta Charter is the draft for the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This draft was discussed in the

Investigatory Committee for the Independence Indonesia (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan

Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI) which incorporated Pancasila in the preamble of the constitution. There was

a debate on the content of the preamble between so called Islamist and secular-nationalist camps. The former

proposed to incorporate the words “…with the obligation to carry out Islamic Law for its adherents.” The latter

proposed to exclude these words and considered to dispel any words about Islam, merely stating that “The state

is based upon the belief in one God.” The latter version was accepted by the Committee, although in the

subsequent years, the Jakarta Charter became one of the major aspirations of the Islamist camp. For details, see

Yamin (1959, 153-154); Nasution (1995, 11); Barton (1999, 49); Ichwan (2003); Fealy (2004); Hosen (2005);

Elson (2009, 2013).

64

administration created a team mandated with exploring decentralization reforms led by Ryaas

Rasyid, a political scientist with expertise on decentralization. Rasyid was not only the main-

architect of the decentralization law, but also the chief expert on the team that developed three

fundamental political reform laws: the Law on Political Parties (Law No. 2/1999), General

Election (Law No. 3/1999), and the Law on Parliament (Law No. 4/1999).26

The latter team

comprised seven experts; five of which were American-trained political scientists (see Crouch

2010, chapter two). However, the team concerned with decentralization laws was not only

composed of academics but also bureaucrats from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The decentralization laws produced by this team were obviously radical, progressive,

and liberal. Most political analysts observed the change created by Indonesia’s

decentralization policy as having “few parallels in the contemporary world” (Aspinall and

Fealy 2003).27

This “big bang reform” (Hofman and Kaiser 2004; Rasyid 2004) radically

shifted political affairs from the central authority to district governments. Central power

rested on five basic political pillars, consisting of foreign policy; defense and security; the

judiciary; monetary and fiscal policy; and religion. What is more, regional governments were

subsequently endowed with rights to elect their local executives through local legislatures in

democratic elections. This mechanism is clearly different from the process that existed during

the New Order, under which the central government possessed veto power in determining

local executives. In short, the content of the decentralization policy, as stated by Rasyid, is “in

fact not very different to federalism” (Crouch 2010, 92). The only major difference rested in

the authority being bestowed upon the district level, not the provincial level as generally

implemented in a federal system.

The formulation of the decentralization policy was developed during the deep crisis

and the uncertainty after the fall of the New Order. Harold Crouch described this institutional

context accurately as “crisis-ridden,” which was indicated by growing concerns over the

country’s disintegration (Crouch 2010). As previously explained, regional resentment towards

the New Order’s centralistic government triggered radical aspirations in the form of separatist

movements. This tendency could particularly be seen in regions rich in resources such as

Aceh, Irian Jaya (later Papua), West Kalimantan, and Riau. Additionally, the disintegration of

the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia aroused fear among political elites of a similar development

in Indonesia. This institutional context paved the way for debates on the matter, and a

consensus was quickly reached based on lessons from countries which had experienced

similar decentralization reforms (see Crouch 2010). The decision for implementing

26

On the discussion of these three laws, see (Darwis et al. 2000). 27

See also (Crouch 2010) for a comparison of processes of decentralization in other developing countries.

65

decentralization was made in the MPR Special Session in November 1998 and it was

established in the MPR decree Number XV/1998. The team had only been working for a short

period and already in February 1999 the draft was sent to parliament. Without thorough

debates and with little feedback from politicians, the decentralization laws were signed by the

president in May 1999 (Crouch 2010; Schulte-Nordholt 2005).

Law Number 22/1999 on the Regional Government and Law Number 25/1999 on the

Fiscal Balance between the Central and Regional Government came into effect in January

2001. However, beyond the transition, the rather hasty drafting of these laws might also have

been driven by the fact that the politicians had to focus on several other political issues and

could not actually concentrate on this one matter alone. Instead, political reformation laws on

elections, political parties and parliament were receiving more attention from politicians,

which is also due to the fact that they were preparing for the general election in June 1999.

From an interest-driven perspective, the decentralization policy was not resisted by

major political parties. The nationalist camp, the PDI-P, and the military did not oppose it due

to the reason of disintegration threat as illustrated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

For Habibie, this policy could be seen as a way to gain more legitimacy in a situation in which

regions strongly lobbied for greater autonomy. For a major party such as Golkar party,

supporting decentralization meant that it had better prospects of maintaining “its power bases

in the Outer Islands” (Schulte-Nordholt 2005, 37). The party expected to gain political

mileage out of decentralization due to its strong presence in certain regions, particularly in the

Outer Islands. Different from their rather straightforward formulation, the actual

implementation of the decentralization laws encountered severe problems. Central issues

attracting public attention were the corruption among local executives and legislatures, vote-

buying during elections, as well as the accountability report of the local chief executives.

Following this, other problems started to occur, notably arising from the weak institutional

basis of, and the lack of supporting regulation for, the decentralization policy. In addition, the

rapid formulation and lack of proper preparation contributed to the chaotic implementation in

the regions (Crouch 2010).

From an ideational perspective, resistance arose in the unitarist camp. Major political

parties such as the Golkar party, the PDI-P party and the military initially supported the

decentralization, or at least were pressured to do so by the crisis. Major opposition against the

implementation came from the central bureaucrats. This group of bureaucrats received

symbolic support from President Megawati who was skeptical of the decentralization and how

it might affect national unity and the integrity of the unitary state (Crouch 2010, 103). This

66

group of bureaucrats were convinced that the abolition of the hierarchical relationship

between the different levels of government resulted in chaotic and un-coordinated

administrative affairs. The focus of decentralization on a district level markedly reduced the

powers of both provincial and central government. What is more, the strong authority of the

district level led to the rise of regional egoism, arrogance of the regions rich in resources and

separatist inclinations (Crouch 2010).

Moreover, the unitarist camp joined forces with the camp more concerned with the

changing vertical distribution of power, which was mainly represented by the central-

bureaucratic institutions. For the latter, decentralization meant the loss of central authority,

material benefits, and institutional self-esteem, all of which they enjoyed during the previous

centralistic system. The three major problems faced by decentralization – an elementary

weakness of institutions, a lack of regulatory clarity and a lack of preparation – were also

influenced by conflicting interests between the reformists and conservatives inside the central-

bureaucratic elites. The “liberal-federalist” ideas of decentralization - as Rasyid later showed

in his position as the Minister of State for Regional Autonomy – were confronted with the

“conservative-unitarist” idea of Lt. Gen. (ret) Surjadi Sudirdja as the Minister of Home

Affairs. The latter eventually prevailed in this conflict when the responsibility for

decentralization was transferred back to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Crouch 2010, 96).

4. Revision of the Decentralization Policy in 2004 and Direct Local

Elections

Only a month after its chaotic implementation, the government started to revise

decentralization laws. However, the revision itself was not solely initiated by the government.

Before this revision, the MPR recommended a fundamental re-evaluation through Decree

Number IV/2000 (Wasistiono 2005, 186). Led by the senior bureaucrat of the Ministry of

Home Affairs, Dr Soedarsono Hardjosoekarto, the modification of the laws focused on three

major aspects: first, the re-establishment of central authority in regional governments; second,

the revitalization of the unitary state through the concept of “interdependent and hierarchical”

relationships between central, provincial and district governments; and, third, the enactment

of direct elections of local executives.

However, this revision cannot be seen as a full-move towards re-centralization in the

same way as it was implemented during the centralistic New Order. In general, the central

government still recognized some fundamental bases of decentralization, but the patterns of

hierarchical administrative affairs became clearer. The basic philosophy underlying the Laws

67

No 22/1999 and the revision in Law No 32/2004 were similar in terms of their recognition of

the principle of diversity in the unitary state. Different from this principle, in the New Order

era, Law No 5/1974 recognized the basic principles of uniformity in all of the forms of

regional governments. Some observers (Hoessein 2005; Wasistiono 2005) interpreted the

revision of Law No 32/2004 as a marriage of local democracy (as characterized in Law No

22/1999) and structural efficiency (as characterized in Law No 5/1974). Finally, one

significant feature of the new law was the adoption of direct elections of local executives.

The decision to implement direct elections cannot be separated from several other

important factors during the implementation of decentralization. Since its implementation in

early 2001, the relationship between local executives and the local legislature was

characterized by questionable practices. First, Law No 22/1999 gave central power to the

local legislature, and consequently the institution had the political power to reject local

executive reports or to dismiss them. Second, in order to make the process of executive

accountability smooth, both institutions practiced collusion, deal-making and bargaining

processes, or even material transactions. Third, it also included vote-buying in the elections of

local executives by local legislators. As a result, the previous law (No 22/1999) established

the elections of chief executives by local legislatures. However, regarding political change,

the previous law did not significantly change the structure of local elites. Some observers

concluded that authoritarian elements survived in the local political landscape (Schulte-

Nordholt 2005; Crouch 2010). Another event that created the need for direct local elections

was the amendment of the constitution in 2000 regarding the necessity of democratic elections

of local executives. Finally, the implementation of direct local elections cannot be separated

from the spirit and implementation of direct elections of the president as for the first time

practiced in 2004.

In contrast to the formulation of Law No 22/1999, its revision was not a response to a

crisis; a chaotic situation, with high political demands from the regions and the possibility of

national disintegration. As a consequence, the formulation was discussed in few debates and

the contents followed the logic of appropriateness to a changing political environment. Its

revision, the Law No 32/2004, was influenced more by the interests of political players,

mostly the central government and the big political parties. The tendency towards re-

centralization cannot be separated from the interests of the central bureaucratic institutions in

regaining their political power. The revision was also supported by established political

parties such as the Golkar Party and the PDI-P, particularly because it contains the enactment

68

of direct local elections. Their calculations were based in particular on having confidence in

their strong political basis in the regions.

III. Conclusion

This chapter shows that modern Indonesia has experienced both democratic and authoritarian

political systems. Indonesia’s political trajectory includes a short-lived experiment with

democracy in the 1950s, the long journey of authoritarianism for almost 40 years, and the

revitalization of democracy in the new millennium. This political trajectory has been shaped

by institutional infrastructure, political actors’ strategies and political ideas.

Six decades of experience in modern political systems show that democracy and

authoritarianism were contesting norms in Indonesia. Authoritarian experiences usually had

their normative legitimacy in the extant local norms which survived over centuries in pre-

modern Indonesia. In this context, it becomes clear why authoritarian rule could survive in

modern Indonesia for such a long time.

Nevertheless, historical evidence also illustrates that Indonesian society has the

flexibility to accept external values and modern political thoughts. Indonesians have selected

external values from different cultures and religions such as Hinduism and Islam, as well as

from Western political thought over a long time. The process of interaction with external

ideas did not consist of a process of full adoption, but was instead one of cultural adjustment.

In other words, Indonesians did not simply take over these external ideas, but rather localized

and adjusted them to local contexts.

The attempt to adopt a democratic system in the 1950s demonstrated the open-

mindedness of political thought among political elites in response to cosmopolitan ideas. The

failure of this experiment cannot be solely attributed to ideational counter-trends, but also

rests on the weakness of the existing degree of institutionalization and of the lack of

democratic supporters. This condition, however, is different from the situation of

democratization in the post-New Order era. In the latter, democrats from different factions

had been struggling against the authoritarian regime for more than two decades, which means

that the democratic system had supporters who were democrats. In addition, the second

democratic experiment concentrated more on building the institutional foundation of

democracy. Moreover, also international political conditions also differed greatly from the

global situation in the 1950s. With the growing global interdependence and transnational pro-

democratic movements, democratic ideas diffused with greater ease.

69

The rise of the liberals in the era of democratization in Indonesia succeeded in

facilitating political reform agendas. However, this interim-victory still faced resistance from

authoritarian elements. In all likelihood, the most problematic issue for the future of

Indonesia’s democratic consolidation does not only rest on the material interests of its

authoritarian elements, but also on the contestation between new ideas of democracy and

enduring and established ideas which are deeply embedded in political structures. Due to

Indonesia’s “pacted” transition, the breakdown of President Suharto’s New Order regime

cannot be necessarily interpreted as the disappearance of authoritarian ideas.

As regards liberal ideas, they, too, have their place in the history of the political

system in Indonesia, and these ideas flourished again in the last days of the New Order.

However, liberal democratic ideas are still regarded as foreign ideas, and they are not yet

strongly anchored in the everyday life of the political elite and the people.

Institutional infrastructure and interests of political elites also played important roles

in shaping the country’s political trajectory. The weak institutional basis of parliamentary

democracy contributed to its short-lived existence in the 1950s. Cabinets could not work

properly as they highly depended on a shaky coalition building in the parliament and among

political parties. Extra-parliamentary power persisted as illustrated by the growing aspirations

of separatist movements, following unfair central-local relations. This was also exacerbated

by fierce elite rivalry, particularly between Soekarno and the military vis a vis political parties

and parliament.

Arguably, the Guided Democracy as its successor struggled with similar

circumstances. Rather than paying attention to develop a modern and rational administration,

the era of Guided Democracy was riddled with abundant political rhetoric and ideological

disputes. This led not only to an abysmal failure in the economic development but also

undermined political stability. This institutional vulnerability led to elite struggle and

culminated in the PKI’s coup in 1965.

Having learnt from its predecessors, the New Order built its long authoritarianism on a

strong institutional infrastructure, an elaborated ideology and material incentives. It relied on

Golkar as hegemonic party, inviting the military to play a significant role in politics,

controlling other political parties and the parliament, applying corporatist arrangements

towards civil society, and using a coercive approach towards oppositional forces. Rhetorically

it highlighted economic development, expressed in the mantra of developmentalism. In other

words, political stability was to be maintained at all cost in order to achieve economic growth.

70

Nevertheless, at the end it could not avoid institutional decay, the decline of legitimacy by a

devastating economic crisis, and the rise of liberal ideas.

The post-New Order’s transitional democracy was initiated by elite negotiation that

eventually led to the installation of democratic institutions. This included amendments of the

constitution, the conduct of free and fair elections, the revitalization of a multi-party system,

the withdrawal of the military to the barracks, political space for a lively civil society, press

freedom and the enactment of decentralization policy. However, the installation of democratic

institutions cannot be separated from elite’s struggles where the democratic transition also

provided authoritarian elements room for political maneuver. In this case, the future of

Indonesia’s fledgling democracy might be highly dependent on how the country can manage

its democratic institutions, contradictory elite interests, and the transformation of authoritarian

norms into democratic ideas by the elite and the population. To a considerable agree, this

outcome of this transformation is decided at the local level and the type of elites emerging

there. This ensuing process of elite change and adjustment to Indonesia’s changed new

democratic system is at center stage of the two case studies that follow in chapters 4 and 5.

71

Chapter Four

Elites and Democratization in North Sumatra

I. Introduction

In this chapter I will trace the process of local elite adjustment in the province of North

Sumatra. I will analyze how and under which conditions local elite adjustment has taken place

in the province, in line with the theoretical chapter focusing on three major factors, namely:

institutional structure, actor strategies, and ideational contestation. More specifically, I will

study historical antecedents, general and local elections, competition in political parties, and

discursive practices for gaining a better understanding of local elite adjustment in the region.

The chapter is organized into five sections. Following this introduction, the second

section covers structure defined by the institutional context. It will show how structural

factors as epitomized by the national political system, the local government system and the

local electoral system impact on the local elite configurations. The third section will discuss

local elections in greater detail by applying an actor-centered perspective. This section

focusses on transactional politics, alliance-building, and the means marshalled in inter-elite

competition. The fourth section will be devoted to the cognitive dimension. Starting with what

Acharya has called the “cognitive prior” (Acharya 2009), the set of extant ideas and beliefs

about statecraft and political order (ibid.), the section explores the rise of oppositional ideas,

external challenges and elite perception. It concludes with a discussion on ideational change

and ideational contestation. The last section summarizes the empirical findings of this case

study.

II. Elite and Institutional Structure

The subsequent section examines North Sumatran provincial politics and local election from a

structural perspective. The argument is here – as indicated above – that the national

government system and its institutional framework, the variations of the local government

system and the local electoral system – greatly, though not exclusively, determine the

trajectories of local elite composition.

A. Socio-Economic Conditions and Historical Background

North Sumatra consists of thirty-three regencies and municipalities. Almost half of these are a

product of the regional proliferation policy (pemekaran) executed since Indonesia enacted

72

decentralization. They are home of a population of 12.98 million according to the population

census of 2000 (BPS Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011). This makes North Sumatra one of the

largest provinces in Indonesia. The population is divided into various ethnic and religious

groups. The Bataks are the largest ethnic group with 44.75 percent of the population (BPS

Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011). Within this group, there are several sub-ethnic groups

including (Christian) Toba Batak, (Muslim) Mandailing Batak as well as Pakpak Batak,

Angkola Batak, and Karo Batak whose religious affiliation is mixed. Of these ethnic groups,

the two largest are the Toba Batak with 25.62 percent of the population and the Mandailing

Batak with 11.27 percent of the population (BPS Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011). The second

largest ethnic group is the Javanese with 33.40 percent. In terms of religion, Islam dominates

with 65.45 percent of the population; Protestants and Catholics make up 31.40 percent (BPS

Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011).

The province is economically prosperous, with a growth rate of 6.35 percent per year.

Nevertheless, 11.31 percent of the people are still classified as poor (BPS Provinsi Sumatra

Utara 2011). The majority of the population (over 90 percent) has received a secondary school

education. However, the number of people with tertiary education is still very low, only about

3.82 percent (BPS Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011).

In 2010, the economic growth of the province (6.35 percent) was actually higher than

the national growth of 6.1 percent (BPS Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011). Most of the province’s

Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) came from three key sectors: manufacturing

(22.96 percent), agriculture (22.92 percent), and trade and services (19 percent) (BPS Provinsi

Sumatra Utara 2011). The existence of a large agricultural sector is obvious, since plantations

cover 22.73 percent of the whole area of North Sumatra. The province is best known for its

production of rubber, palm, sugar cane, coffee, etc.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, North Sumatra has been confronted with

colonialism, rug-shot capitalism in plantations, and ethnic tensions caused by migration, civil

war, and social revolution, resulting in high levels of ethno-religious tension. Clifford Geertz

thus characterized the history of this region as influenced by “a disturbing ‘foreign’ element

to the already explosive ethnic mix” (Geertz in Pelzer 1982, ix).

The regions of Tapanuli or Batak in the central and southern part of the province have

their own history. During the nineteenth century, three major events affected the development

of these regions: the Paderi War in the south (related to the process of Islamization of the

Mandailing Batak), the Batak War against the Dutch colonialists, and the activities of

Christian missionaries in the central part of Tapanuli inhabited by the Toba Batak. The Paderi

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War occurred between 1824 and 1833 in the southern part of Tapanuli. Motivated by the

purification of Islamic belief, some Minangkabau ulamas (religious teachers) started this war

against the Dutch-backed population adhering to local customary law (adat). This war then

spread to the northern part of West Sumatra (in particular the southern part of Tapanuli)

(Simanjuntak 2009; Castles 1972). This war was also seen as an attempt to counter the

process of Christianization in Tapanuli which was originally initiated by Stamford Raffles – at

the time British Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies - and the Dutch. Driven by the

concern that the two predominantly Islamic territories of Aceh and Minangkabau (West

Sumatra) could be a significant threat to colonial government in Sumatra, Raffles launched a

strategy of blocking them in the middle of these regions.28

Consequently, he supported British

missionaries who came to Tapanuli with the Baptist Mission Society between 1820 and 1824.

This effort failed and was followed by another two failures of Christian missions: American

missionaries in 1834 and Dutch missionaries in 1856. The eventual success of the Christian

mission among the Batak people was due to the German Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft

(RMG), which started its mission in Tapanuli in 1861. One of the German missionaries

spreading Christianity among the Batak people was Ludwig Ingwer Nommensen. Winning

over the Batak’s traditional elites and the grassroots, his mission succeeded in converting the

Batak people to Christianity in only four decades between 1861 and 1900 (Simanjuntak 2009,

75-77). At around the same time as the last missionary wave, the Batak War (1877-1907)

raged, in which Batak people under the leadership of Sisingamangaraja XII rebelled against

the Dutch colonial power and Christianization in the region (Simanjuntak 2009, 69-70).

While history in the central and southern regions was driven by religious and anti-

colonial wars, tremendous capitalist development was the major feature in the eastern part.

Since Java’s land area was comparatively small and its economic value for the Dutch thus

limited, they searched for other sources of exploitation. In 1863, Western tobacco plantations

opened on the East Coast of Sumatra. In order to support the large-scale tobacco industry,

companies invited Chinese laborers from China, Singapore, and Penang (Perret 2010, 37). In

addition to tobacco, other agricultural plantations – e.g. rubber, coffee, tea, and palm oil -

emerged from 1890 onwards. The establishment of these large-scale plantations on the East

Coast attracted migration from outside the country, from other islands and from the central

and southern parts of the region. As a result of the colonial government's increasing taxation

of the labor of Chinese workers, plantation companies brought Javanese people to work in

28

According to Castles, this strategy is known as “wedge policy,” “the strategy of keeping the two Islamic

bulwarks of Aceh and Minangkabau separated by a belt of non-Muslim territory” (Castles 1972, 26).

74

plantations. As a result, the demographic composition of East Sumatra changed dramatically.

It was not only inhabited by the indigenous people of the Malay, the Simalungun Batak, and

the Karo Batak, but also Javanese, Chinese, Toba Batak, Mandailing Batak, and other ethnic

groups. Based on the 1930 census, the Javanese were the single largest ethnic group in East

Sumatra with 35 percent of the population, followed by the Malay with 19.9 percent, the

Chinese with 11.4 percent, with Batak sub-ethnic groups (Karo, Toba, Mandailing,

Simalungun, etc.) comprising less than 10 percent of the population (Reid 1979, 43). The

plantations were not only providing an increasing wealth for the capitalists and the colonial

government, but they also increased the socio-economic status and privilege of traditional

elites, particularly several large Malay sultanates.

The symbiotic relationship between the capitalists, colonial government, and

traditional rulers deteriorated following the global economic depression in the 1930s. This

unfavorable condition was aggravated by the extravagant lifestyle and massive debt of

aristocrats and their royal families (Reid 1979, 50-53). The latter’s luxurious lifestyle

attracted criticism and negative sentiments from non-Malay nationalist (pergerakan) groups

(Reid 1979, 53; van Langenberg 1982, 4-5). This situation could be seen as a seed of social

discontent mounting to revolution in this region after independence was achieved.

After independence in 1945, the transfer of power in the region between the Japanese

authorities, the Allies and the representatives of the new Republic turned out to be a complex

process. In addition to these formal authorities, there were two other political forces: the

declining old authority of aristocracies or Sultanates and the rising power of radical

republicans (Reid 1979, 148-177). The proclamation in Jakarta of Indonesia as a new republic

accelerated the radicalization of nationalist supporters and revolutionaries in the region. The

main targets of these groups were the traditional rulers that, in the past, had collaborated with

the colonial powers. In a chaotic situation, revolutionaries consisting of some radical elements

of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the

Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo) launched a social movement that later turned into a

social revolution. In early March 1946, hundreds of traditional elites and families of ethnic

Malay, Simalungun, and Karo were either killed or arrested. According to Reid, two motives

could be identified in this social revolution: (1) the resentment of revolutionaries to traditional

elites’ sympathy to the Dutch and its dangerous consequences for independence; and (2) the

desire to gain control of the wealth of the aristocratic class (Reid 1979, 230). Additionally,

this social revolution symbolized the democratic aspirations in the region, although it was

unstructured following the chaotic process of power transition.

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However, this social revolution was not exclusively nationalist in character. It also

had a component of class struggle, since it was related to communist leadership and questions

of ownership, and elimination of the social status and privileges of the aristocratic class.

Finally, there was also an ethnic dimension in this upheaval. The revolution consequently

altered the special status of the aristocratic class, abolished the privileges of native ethnic

groups (primarily the Malays), and nationalized the communal land rights (van Langenberg

1982, 5). Javanese and Toba Batak migrants who worked as peasant cultivators in plantations

gained from the revolution and became the supporters of the PNI and PKI with their quest for

a unitary and independent Indonesian state (Reid 1979, 256). In contrast to them, the Malay

and Simalungun people, who had lost their social and economic privileges, continued to strive

for a federalist system with the support of the Dutch (Reid 1979, 256). Especially Malay

aristocratic rulers perceived federalism as a chance for restoring their power. Under the name

of the State of East Sumatra (Negara Sumatra Timur/NST), the restoration of the East

Sumatran kingdoms from 1948 to 1950 was short-lived (Reid 1979, 260; van Langenberg

1982). Nevertheless, in this federal state, the “moderate” Malay intellectuals who led the state

were strongly opposed to the conservatism of the sultans and rajas (van Langenberg 1982,

15). After the departure of the alien military forces and the re-integration of the republic, and

following strong resistance from the non-Malay ethnic population (van Langenberg 1982, 27),

the existence of the NST ended in 1950. In that same year, the former NST region was

“merged with Tapanuli in a larger province of North Sumatra” (Reid 1979, 262).

B. Institutional Dynamics of Local Political Power: Parties and Elections

1. General Elections

General Election of 1955

Political life in North Sumatra can be best understood when looking at the differences existent

in the dynamics of political parties from one period to another. This section studies the

institutional framework impacting on the dynamics of local political power: general elections

under different political systems and local elections. The first part will show the constellation

of political parties in the general election of 1955, general elections in the New Order era and

general elections in the post-New Order period. The second section will explore the local

elections from the period of democratization in 1998 until 2010. At the time of writing, the

2014 general elections and several local elections in the province had not yet taken place.

The results of the 1955 parliamentary election reveal important facts regarding

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political parties in North Sumatra. First, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin

Indonesia/Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) as a political party with modernist-

Islamic values had the largest support from North Sumatran voters with 37 percent of the

vote. This result differed markedly from Masyumi’s national-level result. At the national

level, with 20.92 percent of the vote Masyumi was only the second largest party the after PNI

(Indonesian National Party/Partai Nasional Indonesia) (22.32 percent). In the North Sumatra

region, the PNI itself won the second-highest level of popular support with 15.44 percent of

the vote. Second, in this region, there was quite significant support for Parkindo (Indonesian

Christian Party/Partai Kristen Indonesia). With 13.65 percent, this party was the third largest

in terms of popular support. The strong support for Parkindo, however, is related to the fact

that – as shown in the previous section - North Sumatra has a large Christian population,

particularly among the Toba Batak ethnic group. Third, political support for the PKI

(Indonesian Communist Party/Partai Komunis Indonesia) was also high - 12.13 percent.

Electoral support for the PKI seems to be related to the fact that North Sumatra is a plantation

region. One of the most crucial bases of the PKI was indeed in fact plantation laborers. Their

exploitation added a class struggle dimension29

to the conflict lines in the region even before

the Coup of PKI in 1965, fueling a communist riot in Bandar Betsy, North Sumatra. Fourth,

the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU/The Revival of the Islamic Scholars), which has a traditional-Islam

orientation and was Java-centric, did not receive significant support in North Sumatra. The

party garnered only 4 percent of the vote, which was considerably lower than its national

support of approximately 18 percent.

The election results presented above provide a basic framework for understanding that

North Sumatra is a region where political parties with varying ideologies (modernist-Islam,

nationalist, Christian and communist) all received substantial popular support.

Table 4. 1The Result of 1955 General Election at the National and North Sumatra

(in percent)

Political Parties National North Sumatra

PNI 22.32 15.44

Masyumi 20.92 37,00

Nahdlatul Ulama 18.41 4,11

PKI 16.36 12,13

Parkindo 2.66 13,65

Perti 1.28 3,67

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 2000, 18, 36.

29

Interview with Ichwan Azhari, Medan, 4 May 2011.

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General Elections in the New Order Era

During the time of the New Order, from 1971 to 1997, six general elections were held. Except

for the general election in 1971, only three political parties were allowed to participate in

general elections: the Functional Group (Golongan Karya/Golkar), the United Development

Party (PPP), and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In 1971, ten political parties

participated in the general election, before, in 1973, the Christian and nationalist parties were

merged into the PDI and the Islamic parties into PPP (Hindley 1971; Moertopo 1974;

Budiardjo 1988; Vatikiotis 1993; Schwarz 1994). On the whole, all general elections during

the New Order era were dominated by Golkar, which was the government party. The other

two parties (PPP and PDI), even though they were called non-government parties, were also

under the control of the government. This control was applied by means of ideological

cooptation as well as pressure exerted by the government on the respective party’s elite and

government interference into these parties’ internal affairs even to the point of leadership

recruitment (Schwarz 1994, Sanit 1997, Lay 2010, Putranto et.all. 2006, Fatah 1994 (ch.8),

Suryadinata 1992, Liddle 1999 (ch.2), Radi 1984). The results of all general elections during

the New Order can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 (below). They are subdivided into national

results and the results in North Sumatra.

Table 4. 2 The Results of the 1971 General Election at the National Level and in North

Sumatra (in percent)

Political Parties National North Sumatra

Golkar 62.82 70.14

NU 18.68 5.36

Parmusi 5.36 7.34

PNI 6.93 6.52

PSII 2.39 2.74

Parkindo 1.34 4.40

Katolik 1.10

Perti 0.69 3.50

IPKI 0.61

Murba 0.08

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 2000, 52-55.

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Table 4. 3 The Results of the New Order’s General Elections at the National Level and

in North Sumatran (in percent)

Political

Parties

1977 1982 1987 1992 1997

National North

Sumatra

National North

Sumatra

National North

Sumatra

National North

Sumatra

National North

Sumatra

Golkar 62.11 66.46 64.34 72.54 73.16 72.76 68.10 71.29 74.51 80.33

PPP 29.29 22.22 27.78 20.44 15.97 13.76 1701 17.81 22.43 12.84

PDI 8.60 11.32 7.88 7.01 10.87 13.48 14.89 10.90 3.06 6.83

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 2000, 74-174.

The statistical data above show the domination of Golkar at the national level as well

as in the region of North Sumatra. In the general election of 1971, Golkar gained 70 percent

of the total vote in North Sumatra (Table 3). Two groups of political parties with ideological

affiliation to Islam and nationalist-Christianity came in far behind Golkar.

After the fusion of political parties in 1973, the electoral base for nationalist-Christian

political parties (which fused into PDI) was weakened. In contrast, support for the United

Development Party (PPP) was still quite strong during the New Order era. In five general

elections, the PPP attained between 13 and 22 percent of the total votes. This result was

higher than that of the PDI, which received only between 6 and 13 percent of the vote.

However, the general trend for both parties was similar: they had decreasing electoral support.

In the late New Order era, the situation for PDI even worsened. The party faced serious

internal elite conflict as a result of government intervention against the leadership of

Megawati Soekarnoputri, whom the regime saw as threatening its legitimacy. The central

government intervened and ensured that Surjadi, Megawati’s opponent, was appointed as

leader of the party (Putranto et.all. 2006).

During the New Order era, developments similar to those at the national level occurred

in North Sumatra. This region had electoral bases for the modernist-Islam party (Masyumi),

the nationalist party (PNI), and the Christian party (Parkindo). But during this period the two

non-government parties, PPP and PDI, could not mobilize significant popular support. Golkar,

as the representation of the regime, consistently won all general elections, with over 64

percent of the vote.

General Elections in the Post New Order Era

The lack of competition among political parties during the New Order era changed

dramatically after the forced resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998. Until the time of

writing, Indonesia conducted three general elections (1999, 2004, and 2009) which combined

a multiparty structure with a variant of a proportional representation system (Subekti 2001;

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King 2001, 2003; Crouch 2010). The following table (Table 5) exhibits the results of the

elections.

Table 4. 4 Results of General Elections in Post New Order Era at the National and

North Sumatra (by percent of popular vote)

Political Parties 1999 2004 2009

National North

Sumatra

National North

Sumatra

National North

Sumatra

Demokrat * * 7.5 7.52 20.81 23.99

Golkar 22.4 21.81 21.6 20.68 14.45 11.92

PDI-P 33.7 39.66 18.5 14.81 14.01 9.19

PK(S) 1.35 0.84 7.3 7.39 7.89 7.25

PAN 7.1 9.00 6.4 5.59 6.03 4.74

PPP 10.7 10.05 8.2 7.21 5.33 4.03

PKB 12.6 1.11 10.6 2.23 4.95 1.62

Gerindra * * * * 4.46 2.78

Hanura * * * * 3.77 3.5

Other 12.15 17.08 19.9 34.57 18.2 30.98

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 1999, 1999a, 2000, 2004; Yatim et.al. 2010;

Ananta et al. 2004.

*did not participate

The electoral results suggest that in the Post New Order era a great number of political

parties competed in three general elections. In 1999, the PDI-P obtained the greatest popular

support at the national level with 33.7 percent of the vote. With almost 40 percent, popular

support in the province of North Sumatra was even higher. The Golkar Party came in second

with 22.4 percent nationally and 21.81 percent in the province. Third at the national level was

the People’s Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/ PKB) with 12.6 percent, although

support for this party was significantly lower in North Sumatra, where it obtained only 1.11

percent. The PKB was the party for which most Javanese voted, with the Muslim socio-

religious organization Nahdlatul Ulama (see above) as their strongest source of support. The

PPP attained more than 10 percent at both the national level and in the province of North

Sumatra.

The result of the 1999 general election shows the growing popularity of the PDI-P as

the most articulate opposition to the New Order regime. The PDI-P, with Megawati as its

prominent leader, succeeded in representing the party as possessing a strong anti-authoritarian

spirit. The results of the Golkar Party suggest that, on the one hand, the Golkar Party lost

80

significant popular support compared to the general elections during the New Order era. After

the collapse of the regime, the party became the target of widespread criticism which went so

far that student movements and pro-democracy activists demanded its dissolution and banning

in the country. On the other hand, the fact that the Golkar Party still managed finishing in

second place is testimony of its strong political infrastructure throughout the country, which

was its heritage from the past (Suryadinata 2007, 340-341; Crouch 2010; Tomsa 2006, 2007,

2008; Tandjung 2007).

The 2004 general elections largely confirmed this assessment. The Golkar Party

overturned the PDI-P. With 21 percent both at the national level as well as the provincial

level, the Golkar Party won about the same percentage of the vote as in 1999. Surprisingly,

though, this was enough to become the largest party in the country and in the province,

benefitting from the fact that the PDI-P’s vote nose-dived from 31 percent to 18 percent at the

national level and from almost 40 percent to an utterly disappointing 15 percent at the

provincial level. This significant decrease in PDI-P popularity can be attributed to several

factors: the decreasing popularity of Megawati as the President, the lack of capable party

cadres, and charges of corruption against party members. Once again, the PKB suffered from

a significant gap between popular support at the national level and in the province of North

Sumatra. Popular support for the PPP decreased between 2-3 percent at both levels. Finally,

the general election of 2004 was marked by the introduction of the two “new rising stars:” the

Democrat Party (PD) and the Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS).

Both parties obtained more than 7 percent at the national level and in the province of North

Sumatra.

The general election of 2009 showed an unstoppable rise of the PD. The PD won the

national parliamentary election with almost 21 percent. With 24 percent voting for the PD, the

result in North Sumatra was even higher. A few months after the parliamentary elections, in

July 2009, the party’s candidate, retired Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

(usually referred to as SBY) also won the presidential elections, thereby becoming the

country’s fourth post-New Order president. The rise of the PD went hand in hand with

decreasing popular support for the PDI-P and the Golkar Party. The Golkar Party lost 7

percent at the national level and 9 percent in the province of North Sumatra, and the PDI-P

lost between 4 and 5 percent at both levels. The results for the PKS remained stable at both

levels, and the results of the PPP and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat

Nasional/PAN) decreased slightly. The PKB suffered greater losses – it garnered more than 5

percent less than in the previous general election.

81

The results of three general elections in the post New Order era demonstrate the

volatility of the Indonesian political party system. The winner of general elections can be

replaced periodically, a development that can be traced back to several causes. First, during

the authoritarian New Order, the formation of a party identification among the population was

weak, since the state actively promoted the success of the Golkar Party as the hegemonic

party. Second, the popularity of political parties during the post-New Order era relied on the

popularity of their top leaders, as in the case of the PD and SBY (Honna 2012; Mietzner

2013). Third, elections, by and large, began to show a mechanism of “reward and

punishment” for political parties. Once political parties are able to create public sympathy,

they can transform this sentiment into good results in an election. On the other hand, if

political parties act in a way that generates public disappointment (i.e. their members get

involved in corruption), electorates punish them in subsequent elections.

2. Local Elections

The subsequent analysis of local elections will focus on gubernatorial elections at the

provincial level and mayoral elections in Medan as the capital and the biggest city in North

Sumatra. These two local electoral arenas are significant with regard elite representation, both

in terms of their official roles or informal networks.

Local elections for the governor of North Sumatra and mayor of Medan followed two

different electoral systems. The first system, applied before 2005, provides for the election of

the chief local executives by local legislatures (at provincial or city levels). In this system,

local legislatures elect the local chief executive based on the “one man, one vote” principle in

the local parliament’s general assembly. However, under this system, there are variants.

During the New Order era, local legislatures elected three to five candidates for the local chief

executives, and sent their names to the central government, represented by the Ministry of

Home Affairs. After that, the central government selected or assigned one of them as local

chief executive. This mechanism was regulated under Law No. 5/1974 on Local Government.

In the post-New Order era, after the implementation of Law No. 22/1999 on Decentralization,

the mechanism of election in local legislatures was changed. Based on this new law, the local

legislatures elected local chief executives independently and without any intervention from

the central government.

The second system is direct local election. This system was introduced in 2005 under

the revised decentralization law (Law No. 32/2004). In this electoral system, political parties

82

or a coalition of political parties can nominate candidates.30

The basic requirement for

political parties to field candidates is that the respective party or the coalition of parties must

have received at least 15 percent of the seats in the local legislature or 15 percent of total

votes in the provinces or regencies in the last general election.

Based on the above classifications, in subsequent sections, I examine six cases of local

elections in North Sumatra. First is the gubernatorial election in 1998 in the New Order

system (election in local legislature and final decision resting with the central government).

Second is the gubernatorial election in 2003 with the system of election by local legislature

without intervention from the central government. Third is the gubernatorial election in 2008

with direct local election, as prescribed in the new law of decentralization (Law No. 32/2004).

Fourth is the mayoral election of Medan in 2000 with the system of election by local

legislature without intervention of the central government. Fifth and sixth are the mayoral

elections of Medan with direct local election: 2005 and 2010. Table 6 below describes each

case with its specifications.

Table 4. 5 Local Elections in North Sumatra and Medan, 1998-2010

No. Cases Level of

Government

Legal Basis Modes of Election

1. Gubernatorial

Election in 1998

Governor/Provincial

Government

Law Number 5/ 1974 Local legislatures elect 3-5

candidates and later on

consult with the central

government. Central-

government chooses one of

the candidates as local

executive.

2. Gubernatorial

Election in 2003

Governor/Provincial

Government

Law Number No. 22/

1999

Local legislature elects

Governor without

intervention of central

government.

3. Gubernatorial

Election in 2008

Governor/Provincial

Government

Law Number 32/ 2004 Direct local election by the

people

4. Mayoral Election of

Medan in 2000

Mayor/Municipality

Government

Law Number 22/ 1999 Local legislature elects

Mayor without intervention

of central government

5. Mayoral Election of

Medan in 2005

Mayor/Municipality

Government

Law Number 32/ 2004 Direct local election by the

people

6. Mayoral Election of

Medan in 2010

Mayor/Municipality

Government

Law Number 32/ 2004 Direct local election by the

people

Source: Laws No. 5/1974, No. 22/1999 and No. 32/2004.

30

After the implementation of direct local elections in Indonesia, there was criticism regarding limited access for

candidates who could not participate in elections because they did not receive any party’s support. Lalu

Ranggalawe (a local legislator from Central Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara) called on the Constitutional Court

(Mahkamah Konsitusi) to subject this matter to a judicial review. After the court’s ruling, the government

enacted a new regulation which allowed independent candidates (non-party candidates) to participate in direct

local elections. See Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-V/2007, 23 July 2007.

83

The 1998 Gubernatorial Election: The Last Election with Central Government Interference

in the Centralistic New Order

In the course of the 1998 gubernatorial election, most candidates still had social backgrounds

as high-ranking military officers, bureaucrats, or they were politicians from the Golkar Party.

The nomination process lasted for more than a year, after which eventually nineteen

candidates with military backgrounds (either active personnel or retired officers) and twenty-

two with civilian backgrounds were submitted to the legislature. The candidates submitted

letters of support which they received either from civil organizations or individuals.

Candidates with military backgrounds ranged from the rank of major general to colonel with

different positions such as Regional Military Commander (Panglima Daerah Militer),

members of national parliament, regents or mayors. Involvement of military officers was

possible due to the dual function of the Indonesian military (Dwifungsi ABRI), under the New

Order which means that military personnel can become involved in political affairs in addition

to their primary defense duties. Some well-known figures registered as candidates, such as

Major General Tengku Rizal Nurdin (Regional Military Commander of Bukit Barisan),31

Major General Syamsir Siregar (Former Head of the ABRI Intelligence Agency/BIA), Major

General Sembiring Meliala (member of national legislature from the ABRI faction),32

Major

General Luhut Panjaitan (the Commander of the Indonesian Army of Education and Training

Command/KODIKLAT ABRI), Major General Agum Gumelar (Regional Military Commander

of Wirabuana),33

Brigadier General Mudyono (former Chairman of the North Sumatra

parliament/DPRD Sumatra Utara), and Colonel Bachtiar Jafar (Mayor of Medan). On the

civilian side, several well-known names were also recorded, such as Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe (Vice Governor of North Sumatra), A.M. Situmorang (Deputy Governor), some

Regents and Mayors, and also academicians like the Rector of the University of North

Sumatra (Universitas Sumatra Utara).

After the process of screening and filtering, the local legislature decided to select five

candidates for the shortlist of Governor. They were Tengku Rizal Nurdin (Regional Military

Commander), Usman Pelly (academician), A.M. Situmorang (Deputy Governor), Syarifudin

Harahap (former Secretary of the Province, Sekretaris Wilayah Daerah), and Fahruddin Lubis

(Assistant of Administrative Development of the Province/Asisten Administrasi

31

Bukit Barisan is the military-region/military-territory of North Sumatra, West Sumatra and Riau. 32

In the Indonesian Parliament, a group of members belonging to the same party is called a faction, what in

Britain would be called a parliamentary party or group. However, small parties sometimes coalesce to form a

faction. For the definition and description of this concept in the Indonesian context, see J.H.A. Logemann (1952,

349). 33

Wirabuana is the military-region/military-territory of Celebes (Sulawesi).

84

Pembangunan Provinsi). The decision to proceed with five candidates was wholly determined

by the political process in the provincial parliament. It did not necessarily reflect the quantity

of letters of support that the candidates had received. According to local parliament

documents, support for Major General Syamsir Siregar was the highest with 2,853 letters of

support. He was followed by Major General Tengku Rizal Nurdin with 2,572 and Zulkifli

Harahap with 2,413.34

After approving five candidates, the local legislature presented the results to the

Minister of Home Affairs in Jakarta, who decided to continue with three names: Tengku Rizal

Nurdin, Usman Pelly, and A.M. Situmorang, as candidates for governor. From these three

candidates, it was clear that Tengku Rizal Nurdin would not face serious opposition in the

next stage of the process. Usman Pelly and A.M. Situmorang were not as popular as Rizal. At

that time, these two figures were far less popular than Major General Syamsir Siregar, Abdul

Wahab Dalimunthe, or Zulkifli Harahap. Following the screening of the three candidates, the

provincial parliament held a general meeting to elect one of them. On 14 May 1998, Tengku

Rizal Nurdin received forty-nine votes and thereby won the election easily. Usman Pelly and

A.M. Situmorang received only three and two votes respectively. After this, the results were

sent to the central government, which had veto power and could select another candidate as

the one who received the strongest support in the provincial legislature. Finally, the central

government approved the results and Tengku Rizal Nurdin was formally elected as Governor

of North Sumatra.

The victory of Tengku Rizal Nurdin was due to support from the military elites in

Jakarta and broad support by local legislators, especially those of the Golkar Party.35

The

decision to appoint him as the one and only candidate from the military was made by the

Commander in Chief of ABRI (Panglima ABRI/PANGAB) and the Army Chief of Staff

(Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat/KSAD).36

In addition, other factions of political parties in the

provincial parliament, PPP and PDI, also supported Tengku Rizal Nurdin as governor.

Hence, there was no significant public participation in the 1998 gubernatorial election.

Hidden competition occurred inside the provincial military establishment (ABRI), which

accepted a recommendation from the military elites in Jakarta. The decision of military elites

34

“Dokumen Berkas Proses Pencalonan dan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Sumatra Utara Masa Jabatan

1998-2003,” Kantor DPRD Sumatra Utara. 35

In the New Order era, the internal structure of Golkar can be divided into three pillars (Tiga Jalur), referred to

as ABG; an acronym for ABRI (the military), Birokrat (bureaucrats) and Golkar (Golkar politicians). These

“three pillars” were usually involved in strategic political decisions, including deciding on local executives. In

the 1998 gubernatorial election in North Sumatra, press reports documented the meeting of these “three pillars.”

See meeting of these “three pillars” can be seen in “Keputusan Tiga Jalur Belum Ada,” Waspada 15 April 1998;

“Rapat Tiga Jalur Balon Gubsu Deadlock,” Waspada, 30 April 1998. 36

"Mendagri: ABRI Aktif Harus Dapat Restu dari KSAD dan Pangab,“ Waspada, 16 April 1998.

85

in Jakarta to approve only one candidate might have been made in the interest of preserving

the cohesion of military organization. Thus, the appointment of Tengku Rizal Nurdin as the

candidate of the military can be seen as a clear feature of centralism of the New Order regime

(Damanik 2008, 47-48).37

Another feature of centralism appeared in the electoral mechanism.

The Minister of Home Affairs had the power to screen and filter the candidates as well as the

veto power to decide upon a candidate without any consideration of the result of the election

in the provincial parliament. Another centralistic attribute can be found in the process of

candidacy of other figures from bureaucratic backgrounds or academicians. As a bureaucrat in

the province, A.M. Situmorang had to get approval from the Governor. Similarly, Usman

Pelly, as an academician, had to ask permission from the Minister of Education in Jakarta.

Somewhat different from previous elections in the New Order era, this election during

the last days of the Soeharto regime showed a few elements of progress. In terms of

candidacy, there was a growing participation in the election by mayors, politicians,

bureaucrats, retired generals, NGO activists, academicians, lawyers, businesspeople,

journalists, and other professions. Even though candidates with military and bureaucratic

backgrounds still dominated, the initial process of democratization at the national level

encouraged some figures from non-bureaucratic or non-military backgrounds to compete in

the election. Moreover, the mechanism of the letter of support for the candidates was getting

more attention from various mass organizations. More than that, several civil society

organizations, such as the Forum of Communication of the Youth and Students of Jakarta-

North Sumatra (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda dan Mahasiswa Jakarta-Sumatra

Utara/FKPMJSU) started to criticize the centralistic process and the mechanism of “centrally-

ordered candidates” (calon dropping/calon pesanan dari pusat) and

“supplemental/accessorial candidates” (calon pendamping).38

The atmosphere of openness

and public participation led to some critical opinions being voiced against the local

parliament’s management of the election. Local parliament was seen as not paying enough

attention to public aspirations.39

The ensuing public call for electoral reform coincided with

the growing mass-movement for political reform. Since the end of April 1998, student

demonstrations had been occurring in Medan, the provincial capital, which resulted in ethnic

37

Khairul Ikhwan Damanik, Tengku Rizal Nurdin, Selalu Berbuat yang Terbaik, Medan: Universal Komunika,

2008, pp. 47.48. In this biography of Tengku Rizal Nurdin, it was stated that Tengku Rizal Nurdin took the order

to run as a candidate from the Commander of the Armed Forces (Panglima ABRI) General Feisal Tanjung. 38

“DRPD Sumut Dinilai Sepelekan Aspirasi Masyarakat”, Waspada, 29 April 1998; “Pemilihan Gubsu Jangan

Tutup Aspirasi Masyarakat,” Waspada, 22 April 1998. 39

“DRPD Sumut Dinilai Sepelekan Aspirasi Masyarakat,” Waspada, 29 April 1998.

86

riots.40

Ethnic riots and demonstrations for reform also occurred in several cities in other

North Sumatran cities on 7 May 1998,41

thus preceding the riots in Jakarta on 13 May 1998.42

The increased public attention for the protest movements and riots in North Sumatra might

have reduced the attention given to the electoral process.

The 2003 Gubernatorial Election: Old System with New Spirit

In the 2003 gubernatorial election, as a result of the decentralization reforms initiated in 1999

(Law No. 22/1999), the provincial parliament elected the local chief executives without

intervention from central authority. Another reform was the introduction of pairs of

candidates (for governor and vice-governor) in the local elections, replacing the previous

system in which only the governor was elected. There was a significant increase in the

number of participants in the candidacy process, with variegated professional backgrounds.

There were not only military officers, bureaucrats and politicians, but also NGO activists,

academicians, business people, journalists, and people of several other professions. Political

openness, political reforms and decentralization thus facilitated a higher degree of political

participation, even making grassroots participation possible.43

These reforms engendered, at

least to some extent, a greater willingness of citizens to get involved in the political process

compared to the previously limited participation in the New Order era. It can be interpreted

also as part of the process whereby military officers and bureaucrats ceased to be the only

options for local executive positions. During the previous decades of the country’s political

history it was unimaginable that NGO activists, journalists, high school teachers, tourist

guides or dishwashers could come to the provincial parliament and register themselves as

candidates for governorship.

Nevertheless, public euphoria generated by the process of candidacy was at odds with

the political process in the local parliament. After the process of screening and filtering, the

local parliament approved only three pairs of candidates. These three were Amrun Daulay-

Baskami Gintings, Chairuman Harahap-Serta Ginting, and Tengku Rizal Nurdin-Rudolf

Pardede.44

Tengku Rizal Nurdin was the incumbent and was running for his second term. At

that time, Amrun Daulay was the Secretary of the Province (Sekretaris Daerah), who had

40

“Perekonomian Medan Lumpuh;” “19 Mobil, 40 Sepedamotor Dibakar dan Dirusak;” “1200 Kios/ Lods

Dibakar,“ Waspada, 7 May 1998. 41

“Luar Medan Jadi Sasaran,” Waspada, 8 May 1998. 42

The riots in Jakarta were part of mass violence that occurred throughout the country and had an anti-Chinese

racial background. The riots were triggered by the economic crisis and eventually led to the resignation of

President Soeharto and the breakdown of the New Order regime. 43

“Masyarakat Kelas Bawah Hendak Tunjukkan Eksistensinya,” Sumut Pos, 22 March 2003. 44

“DPRDSU Loloskan 3 paket BK1,” Waspada, 1 May 2003.

87

nominated himself against his superior. Amrun held some important positions in the region.

He was not only Secretary to the Province for two terms, but also had officiated as regent in

several regencies in North Sumatra. The third candidate, Chairuman Harahap had held a

position as the High Attorney (Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi) of the North Sumatra province.

Rudolf Pardede was a businessperson from a well-known and rich family in North Sumatra.

He was the Chairman of the PDI-P of North Sumatra, which held the majority of seats in the

local parliament. Two additional candidates were politicians and members of local

parliament: Baskami Gintings, a politician from PDI-P, and Serta Ginting from the Golkar

Party.45

In contrast to the gubernatorial election of 1998, the process in 2003 showed

significantly more elite competition. PDI-P as the major party in the provincial parliament had

to contend with internal friction. Even though it formally supported Tengku Rizal Nurdin and

Rudolf Pardede as its party’s Regional Chairman, one of its politicians, Baskami Gintings, ran

as a candidate for vice-governor with his running mate, Amrun Daulay. This revealed that

there was competition between two cadres of this party in the same election. In the field of

bureaucracy, tension mounted between Rizal and his subordinate, Amrun. According to

Amrun, he ran for governorship after asking permission from Rizal. Referring to Amrun’s

acknowledgement, Rizal stated personally to him that he would not run again for the second

term.46

Rizal’s statement was a basic reason for Amrun to run in the election. Yet Rizal

decided to run for a second term. More than that, he responded to Amrun’s seeming disloyalty

by discharging him from the position of Secretary of the Province during the process of

candidacy. Fortunately for him, Amrun had a good relationship with the national Minister of

Social Affairs and also the National Chairman of the United Development Party (PPP),

Bachtiar Chamsyah. As a result, Amrun was appointed a Director General of Social

Assistance in Jakarta. This post is quite prestigious in the bureaucratic structure in Indonesia.

Another contest, albeit with less tension, evolved within Golkar Party between Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe, the Regional Chairman of the party and the Vice-Governor, and Chairuman

Harahap. Chairuman succeeded in obtaining the ticket to run as his party’s candidate.

Although Amrun was perceived as having a close relationship with the National

Chairman of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP), Bachtiar

45

After the general election of 1999, Golkar (Functional Group) revised its name to “Golkar Party.” The change

itself was symbolically reflected as Golkar became more equal to other parties in the post-New Order era, while

in the New Order era, Golkar called itself a “non-party” and represented the party as a “Functional Group”. The

symbolic significance of this was related to Golkar’s connotation as the integral part of the New Order regime.

This was an attempt to detach Golkar from the negative connotation of political parties in the authoritarian

period. 46

Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011.

88

Chamsyah, he did not get solid support from this party’s legislators in the provincial

parliament. Amrun and Bachtiar had a similar background as activists of the Islamic

University Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/HMI) and its alumni

association KAHMI in the region. One of the reasons for the PPP’s weak support for Amrun

was the fact that its Regional Chairman (Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah/DPW), Hasrul

Azwar, supported Tengku Rizal Nurdin.47

According to Amrun, he was supported by

politicians of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional/PAN) and the Prosperous

Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS).48

The other candidate, Chairuman Harahap,

also became a candidate after the Golkar Party threw its support behind him. However,

Chairuman was neither the leader of this party nor a local bureaucrat.

The competition itself generated speculation from local observers. One of the local

political scientists of the University of North Sumatra, Muryanto Amin, observed that the

competition of three pairs of candidates showed that the candidates instrumentalized ethno-

religious divisions and geo-political aspects as part of their political strategy.49

Tengku Rizal

Nurdin, for example, was a representative from the Moslem-Malay community, while his

partner, Rudolf Pardede, was a businessmen-cum-politician with a Christian Toba Batak

background. This combination was seen as appropriate in light of the ethno-religious divisions

which existed in the region. Chairuman's running as a candidate was seen as part of Tengku

Rizal Nurdin’s political strategy. With Chairuman running, Tengku Rizal Nurdin wanted to

split the support for Amrun in the provincial parliament50

as Chairuman had a similar

background as Amrun. They were both Islamic Mandailing Batak and in a geo-political sense

representatives of the South-Tapanuli region (Tapanuli Bagian Selatan/Tabagsel).

The proportion of political support in the local parliament for the various candidates

was slightly uneven. PDI-P, the party that supported Tengku Rizal Nurdin, had thirty seats,

while the Golkar Party which supported Chairuman Harahap had seventeen seats. Two other

parties, the Khrisna party and the Peace and Love party (Partai Cinta Damai), also supported

Chairuman. Each of them had one seat. This means that Chairuman had a total support of

nineteen seats in the provincial parliament. Amrun, however, had less support from PAN with

only seven seats. Until 7 May 2003, other factions like PPP (eight seats), TNI/POLRI (nine

seats) and the Joint Faction (nine seats) had not clearly declared their support for a definite

candidate.51

47

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 48

Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011. 49

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 50

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 51

“Hari Ini Ketua dan Enam Pimpinan Fraksi DPRDSU Menghadap Presiden,” Waspada, 7 May 2003.

89

The election itself had to be postponed due to administrative review by the Ministry of

Home Affairs. The problem was allegations that Rudolf Pardede’s electoral documents

contained a fake diploma (ijazah palsu).52

Some student organizations such as the Student

Association of Pancasila Medan (Mahasiswa Pancasila Medan) and the Presidium of the

Student Council of the University of North Sumatra (Dewan Mahasiswa Universitas Sumatra

Utara) reported this alleged fraudulous behavior to the Provincial Parliament.53

Yet the

administration’s review resulted in the decision of the Ministry that Rudolf Pardede could

continue as a candidate even though it remained unclear whether the diploma was valid or

not.

The election was held on 26 May 2003. In the first round, the incumbent, Tengku

Rizal Nurdin, with his running mate Rudolf Pardede, received thirty-nine votes; Chairuman

Harahap-Serta Ginting received twenty-seven votes; and Amrun Daulay-Baskami Gintings

nineteen votes. Since no single candidate achieved a simple majority, there had to be a second

round of elections among the two leading candidates. In the second round, Tengku Rizal

Nurdin-Rudolf Pardede won with a total of fifty-one votes, while their contenders Chairuman

Harahap-Serta Ginting obtained only thirty-three votes. In this second round, there was one

abstention.54

Also in the final round, it can be seen that Baskami Gintings, a member of PDI-

P, shifted his political support to Tengku Rizal Nurdin. According to Baskami, the decision to

switch support was an instruction from Taufik Kiemas, a PDI-P leader of Jakarta,55

and

husband of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the National Chairman of the party and the President at

that time. Tengku Rizal Nurdin was then elected by the provincial parliament for a second

term as governor.

The gubernatorial election in 2003 had several distinct characteristics compared to the

elections in the New Order era. First, there was a more inclusive set of candidates. In the

initial process of registration, the public was highly attentive and candidates came from

various backgrounds. However, this initial openness soon ended when the election process

entered the provincial parliament. Second, in some cases parties’ functionaries no longer

followed the policies of their respective parties. Leaders of the same political party contested

52

“DPRDSU Kembali Diminta Konsultasi dengan Mendagri Soal Suksesi Gubsu: Mendagri Minta Isu-isu agar

Diantisipasi,” Waspada, 21 May 2003. For the issue of the alleged fake diploma of Rudolf Pardede before the

election, see “DPRDSU Loloskan Tiga Paket BK 1: Adanya Ijazah Palsu Bukan Urusan DPRDSU,” Waspada, 1

May 2003; “Ada Fraksi DPRDSU Bocorkan Berkas Calon Gubsu-Wagubsu,” Waspada, 15 May 2003. After the

election, public complaints on this issue are documented in “Uji Publik Terbatas pada Pengaduan Politik Uang,”

Waspada, 28 May 2003. 53

"Wakil Gubernur Sumatra Utara Terpilih, Diduga Tersangkut Ijazah Palsu,“ tempo.co.id, 31 May 2003,

accessed on 14 August 2013. 54

“Rizal Lima Tahun Lagi,” Waspada, 27 May 2003. 55

“Baskami Ginting Dinilai Sebagai Penyelamat Partai,” Waspada, 29 May 2003.

90

against each other in the election, as the example of PDI-P cadres Rudolf Pardede and

Baskami Gintings demonstrated.

This election was not only characterized by political scheming within parties, e.g.

party members fighting against each other, but also by the growing opportunism of political

actors. Local politicians, some of whom became members of the regional elite, showed their

support for different candidates. Syamsul Arifin,56

for instance, supported both Tengku Rizal

Nurdin and Amrun Daulay.57

One local observer indeed stated that Syamsul was providing

more of his support to Amrun Daulay. However, after the victory of Tengku Rizal Nurdin,

Syamsul was “the first person who admired Tengku Rizal Nurdin.”58

Third, this gubernatorial

election was overshadowed by the issue of money politics among candidates and local

legislators. This is reflected by the fact that the legislators were “quarantined” in one place

before the voting day.59

This measure aimed to isolate the local legislators from vote buying

practices. Fourth, this gubernatorial election ended the “centrally-ordered” mechanism which

was part of the centralistic New Order system. The number of candidates with a military

background declined and they were replaced by civilian candidates with bureaucratic,

political party, business, professional and NGO backgrounds. The decision to determine

candidates who were eligible to run was, however, taken in an elitist and, in the end,

centralistic fashion. It was elitist in the sense that the process in the provincial parliament was

isolated from public participation, and it was centralistic in that the central party leadership

decided who would run in the contest. The final decision thus shifted from the regime in the

New Order to the elites of the central parties in the Era Reformasi. Fifth, and finally, this

election exhibited a more aggressive nature of competition among political parties than

previous local elections. As the ruling party in the New Order era, Golkar faced new and

strong political contenders, particularly PDI-P. Nevertheless, this did not lead to the decline of

Golkar’s negotiation power in the local arena. With their abundant political experience,

Golkar politicians were still able to mobilize strong political support, as indicated by the

provincial legislators’ support for Chairuman.

The 2008 Gubernatorial Elections: New System in the New Spirit

The gubernatorial election of 2008 was influenced by two political conditions. First, two

important figures in the region, Raja Inal Siregar (Governor between 1988 and 1998) and

Tengku Rizal Nurdin (Governor between 1998 and 2008) died in an airplane crash in Medan

56

At this time, Syamsul Arifin was the Regent of Langkat and a politician in the Golkar Party. In the local

election of 2008, Syamsul was elected Governor. 57

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 58

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 59

“85 Anggota DPRDSU Menginap di Hotel Tiara,” Waspada, 25 May 2003.

91

in 2005. This resulted in a “back to zero” situation in terms of elite configuration. Second,

after Tengku Rizal Nurdin died, his Vice-Governor, Rudolf Pardede, replaced him as Acting

Governor. Although Pardede enjoyed popularity as a businessperson and his father was a

minister in the Soekarno era, his political and bureaucratic experience was still limited. His

leadership was interpreted as lacking bureaucratic capability and managerial skills.60

These

two events - the death of Nurdin and Siregar, and Pardede succeeding Nurdin - began the

process of “de-patronization” in which local elites who previously followed Tengku Rizal

Nurdin as their patron started to build different political bases for the following electoral

contest.

The process of “de-patronization” and local elites’ preparation for the election

heightened tension and competition. To some extent, the competition among local elites

threatened the cohesion of political parties. The two largest parties, Golkar and PDI-P, faced

serious friction among their leading local cadres. In Golkar, a contest to win the party’s ticket

for the election took place among three provincial party leaders: Ali Umri, Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe, and Syamsul Arifin. Ali Umri was the Mayor of Binjai and held a top position as

Regional Chairman (Ketua Dewan Pengurus Daerah) of the Golkar Party in North Sumatra.

Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe was the former Regional Chairman of the party; and at that time,

he served as the Chairman of the Provincial Parliament of North Sumatra. Syamsul Arifin was

the Regent of Langkat and the Chairman of the Regional Advisory Council (Ketua Dewan

Penasehat Daerah) of the Golkar Party in North Sumatra.

Ali Umri eventually won the contest and became the official candidate of the Golkar

Party. His victory was not only due to his formal position as the Regional Chairman, but also

to his close personal ties with his national patron, Surya Paloh, who happened to be the

Chairman of the National Advisory Council (Ketua Dewan Penasehat) of the Golkar Party.

As the Regional Chairman, Ali Umri had an opportunity to block other candidates from his

party.61

Concurrently, Jusuf Kalla (with the support of Surya Paloh) had defeated Akbar

Tanjung for the position of the National Chairman of the Golkar Party.62

As a consequence of

Ali Umri’s victory, Syamsul Arifin and Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe were eliminated from the

candidacy. Furthermore, Syamsul Arifin and Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe were expelled from

the party due to their continued opposition to the party’s choice of Ali Umri as their official

60

Interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, 2 May 2011. 61

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011. 62

For details of the competition between Jusuf Kalla and Akbar Tanjung in the National Meeting (Musyawarah

Nasional) in Bali, December 2004 see Akbar Tanjung, “The Golkar Way: Survival Partai Golkar di Tengah

Turbulensi Politik Era Transisi” (The Golkar Way: Survival of Golkar Party in the Midst of Political Turbulence

of Transition Era), Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007.

92

candidate. Syamsul Arifin and Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe later accepted support from other

political parties.

The victory of Ali Umri itself can be seen as a surprising political event. At that time,

Ali Umri was 41 years old, he had served two terms as the Mayor of Binjai starting from the

age of 34, and had become the Regional Chairman of the Golkar Party. Syamsul Arifin and

Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe were the old players in the political and bureaucratic arena with

long and plentiful political experience. Before their contest, Ali Umri himself was not really

considered a highly influential figure in the Golkar Party in the region. His standing in the

party was not as strong as that of Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe, Syamsul Arifin or Amrun

Daulay (Regent of Mandailing Natal).63

After they were defeated in Golkar’s internal struggle, Syamsul Arifin and Abdul

Wahab Dalimunthe sought to find alternatives. Syamsul remained in the party, although the

party revoked his membership. He eventually accepted electoral support from an array of

smaller parties: PPP, PKS, PBB, Patriot, PKPB, PKPI, PPDK, PSI, Merdeka, PPDI, and

PNUI. Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe expressed his disappointment by leaving the party and

joining the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat). As a result, fierce elite competition

fragmented the Golkar Party because the three candidates, who were involved in the contest,

had their own followers. Moreover, Abdul Wahab became the Regional Head of the Victory

Team for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) second presidential run in 2009. Yudhoyono

was the founder and the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Democrat Party. However,

Chairuman Harahap, the party’s functionary and former candidate for Governor in 2003,

described this phenomenon as only a friction among local elites, and not as factionalism.64

It was not the Golkar Party alone that faced internal friction; PDI-P encountered a

similar situation. In contrast to Ali Umri of the Golkar Party, Rudolf Pardede - the Regional

Chairman of PDI-P and Acting Governor - did not gain the party’s approval to run as a

candidate. The central party leadership in Jakarta recommended Major General (ret) Tri

Tamtomo (the former Regional Commander of Bukit Barisan, see above) as the party’s

candidate. Pardede disagreed with the central decision and tried to register with the Regional

Electoral Commission (KPUD). Responding to Pardede’s resistance, the central party’s

leadership remained uncompromising and removed him from the position of Regional

Chairman of the party. To solve the problem, the central party sent a team under the

leadership of Panda Nababan (who also became the Acting Regional Chairman). The process

of candidacy itself was marked by high tension between the supporters of Pardede and the

63

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 64

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011.

93

central representatives in the registration process of the KPUD.65

In the end, it was, Tri

Tamtomo who ran in the election as the PDI-P candidate.

Elite competition of a lesser degree also occurred in the Democrat Party. After failing

in the Golkar Party, Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe proposed himself to the Democrat Party. In

this party he had to compete with Tengku Milwan, a former military officer and Regent of

Labuhan Batu for two periods.66

Similar to Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe, Milwan had been a

member of the Golkar Party (Tans 2011). After prevailing in this intra-party contest, Abdul

Wahab Dalimunthe accepted the Democrat Party's nomination. With extensive bureaucratic

experience, strong social networks, and as a strong figure in public discourse, Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe ran as a candidate without any essential difficulties. Besides, unlike Golkar and

PDI-P, both of which were well established parties, the Democrat Party had a basic problem

in that it lacked experienced leaders due to the fact that the party was new in Indonesia.67

In

addition, the decision to nominate Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe was related to what had

occurred in two interconnected political events: the impact of internal competition among

national elites of Golkar and the upcoming presidential election in 2009. One local observer,

Muryanto Amin, stated that Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe had a close personal relationship with

Akbar Tanjung, the former National Chairman of the Golkar Party.68

This close relationship is

unsurprising since they formerly served as the National Chairman and Regional Chairman of

the party, respectively. What is more, Akbar Tanjung proposed Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe to

SBY as the candidate for the Democrat Party after Akbar’s defeat by Jusuf Kalla in the

National Meeting (Musyawarah Nasional/Munas) of the Golkar Party in 2004.69

The

relationship between SBY and Jusuf Kalla (the President and Vice President) in 2008 was not

fully harmonious because Kalla intended to run as a candidate in the presidential election in

2009.70

After being defeated by Jusuf Kalla, Akbar Tanjung tried to cultivate closer

connections to SBY and proposed Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe as candidate for governor. As a

consequence, Akbar Tanjung supported SBY’s candidacy for a second term. This is further

evidenced by the appointment of Abdul as the Regional Head of the Victory Team of SBY in

65

“Coret Rudolf Pardede, PDIP Usung Tritamtomo di Pilkada Sumut,” available at: news.detik.com, 25 January

2008, (accessed, 31 March 2012). 66

In 2010, two years after the gubernatorial election, Tengku Milwan was elected as the Regional Chairman of

the Democrat Party after contesting with several candidates such as Amri Tambunan (Regent of Deli Serdang),

available at: http://www.potretnews.com, 06/11/2010, (accessed 5 December 2012). 67

The Democrat party was founded in 2001 and formally registered as political party in 2003. This party was

established as a political vehicle of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who ran for President in the 2004 election. 68

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 69

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 70

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla (JK) formed a pair of candidates in the presidential

election of 2004, and were elected as the President and Vice President. In the presidential election of 2009, they

ran separately for the position of President.

94

North Sumatra. For SBY himself, the decision to choose Abdul benefited him and his party in

two ways. On the one hand, SBY received a higher degree of support in the competition

against Jusuf Kalla, resulting in a concomitant loss of support for Jusuf Kalla inside the

Golkar Party. On the other hand, the Democrat Party had an experienced and well-known

candidate: Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe. Table 7 below summarizes the results of the 2008

gubernatorial election in North Sumatra:

Table 4. 6 Candidates, Parties and Result of Gubernatorial Election in 2008

No. Candidates Political Parties Results (in

percent)

1 Syamsul Arifin

Gatot Pujo Nugroho

PPP, PKS, PBB, Patriot, PKPB,

PKPI, PPDK, PSI, Merdeka, PPDI,

PNUI

28.31

2 Tri Tamtomo

Benny Pasaribu

PDI-P 21.69

3 Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe

Raden Muhammad Syafii

PD, PAN, PBR 17.40

4 RE Siahaan

Suherdi

PDS, PKB, PPIB, PPD, PNI-

Marhaenisme, Pelopor, PNBK,

PBSD

16.58

5 Ali Umri

Maratua Simanjuntak

Golkar 16.01

Source: KPUD of North Sumatra (KPUD Sumatra Utara) 2008

With the support of mid-sized Islamic parties, the pairing of Syamsul Arifin and Gatot

Pujo Nugroho won the election with 28.31 percent of popular votes. Tri Tamtomo and Benny

Pasaribu with the support of the PDI-P obtained second place with 21.69 percent. Three other

pairs of candidates attained slightly different results, between 16 and 17 percent of popular

vote. Although Ali Umri was supported by the Golkar Party, he lost the election and came in

last place. This poor result was not only influenced by frictions in the Golkar Party, but the

election also demonstrated the more crucial aspect of candidates’ image and popularity rather

than party identification. However, compared to the Golkar Party, the success of Tri

Tamtomo-Benny Pasaribu showed that the PDI-P performed in a more cohesive manner, even

though they were less popular in the region compared to other candidates.

The results of this first direct gubernatorial election were appealed by the pairing of

Tri Tamtomo and Benny Pasaribu at the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung).71

However, the

Court rejected their appeal and as a consequence ensured that Syamsul Arifin and Gatot Pujo

71

“Triben Daftarkan Permohonan Keberatan Pilkada ke PT,” waspada.co.id, 29 April 2008, 08.25, (accessed in

29 July 2013).

95

Nugroho were declared winners of the election.72

This was in consonance with Law No.

32/2004 which states that a pair of candidates that obtains more than 25 percent of the vote

wins the election.73

Mayoral Elections of Medan in 2000, 2005, and 2010

The mayoral election of Medan in 2000 followed electoral rules similar to the gubernatorial

election of 2003. Based on these rules, the local chief executive was elected by the local

parliament without intervention from the central government. The legal basis for both

elections was Law No. 22/1999 on decentralization.74

In this system, local parliaments had

full authority to elect local executives. The authority of the central government rested only on

the legal and administrative authorization in the final step of the process. As explained

previously, the contrast to the previous system in the New Order era was the introduction of

the pairing of candidates.

In 2000, the local parliament of Medan consisted of forty-five parliamentarians from

different political parties. The PDI-P was the largest with sixteen seats, followed by the

Golkar Party with six seats, the TNI/POLRI faction had six seats, the Joint Faction (Fraksi

Gabungan, a coalition of PKS and PBB) had six seats, and the Unified Faction (Fraksi

Bersatu, the unification of small parties) had four seats. Due to the electoral rules, candidates

had to get support of at least two factions in the local parliament. After the process of

selection, there were three pairs of candidates who were eligible based on the minimum

support of two factions. They were the pairs of Abdillah-Maulana Pohan, Zaufi Lubis-Fachri

Muda, and Ridwan Batubara-Bahdin Nur Tanjung. Bureaucratic figures dominated the list of

candidates, but candidates with a business background like Abdillah, a contractor involved in

government infrastructure proejcts and with close contacts to the local government also

emerged. On the day of election, Abdillah-Maulana Pohan won a comfortable majority with

the support of thirty-five votes. Zaufi Lubis-Fachri Muda received six votes and Ridwan

Batubara-Bahdin Nur Tanjung only four votes.75

Several issues surfaced during the election. The first issue was the tension inside

political parties in nominating their candidates. As the biggest political force in the local

parliament, the PDI-P experienced the most serious internal friction. Thus, the party’s support

72

“Gugatan Triben Kandas,” Harian Mandiri Online in

http://harianmandiri.wordpress.com/2008/05/28/gugatan-triben-kandas/, 28 May 2008, (accessed in 29 July

2013). 73

Law Number 32/ 2004 on Local Government, Article 107 (2). 74

For the mechanism of election in the local parliaments, see Law Number 22/1999, Article Number 40. 75

“Abdillah Menang Mutlak,” Waspada, 21 March 2000.

96

of Zaufi Lubis in the process of candidacy did not manifest itself on voting day. Zaufi Lubis

obtained only six votes, which contrasted considerably with the party’s total of sixteen seats

in the local parliament.

The internal friction primarily started already during the candidate selection. Many

PDI-P members protested in the local parliament and complained about seeming vote buying

in the course of the candidate selection and the election itself.76

Some PDI-P legislators, who

switched their support from Zaufi Lubis to Abdillah, were charged with vote buying. This

accusation turned out to be true in the case of four legislators from PDI-P, who admitted that

they had received money.77

The requirement of obtaining the support of at least two factions

in the local parliament seemed to be the cause for this practice.78

The practice of vote buying

in political parties was unanticipated in the regulations, and it spread as political parties

became mere political vehicles for the candidates. Without the support of political parties,

candidates could not continue their candidacy. Moreover, money politics also impacted on the

cohesion of political parties. Formal decisions of political parties in nominating one candidate

could be reversed by the transaction between legislators and other candidates.

However, new developments emerged in the electoral process, notably the rise of

candidates with business backgrounds. In the public opinion, businesspersons were assumed

to be able to foster and accelerate local development with their expertise.79

The pair of

Abdillah-Maulana Pohan was identified as an ideal combination of a businessperson with

innovative capacities, and a bureaucrat whose abilities lay in understanding regulations and

governmental affairs.

Five years later, in the mayoral election of 2005, the electoral system was changed.

Law No. 32/2004 stipulated that mayoral elections were to be conducted through direct

elections. The people were to directly elect their local chief executive based on the principle

of “one man-one vote.” The reason behind the replacement of the system from election by

local parliament to the direct election was the widespread practice of vote buying in the

previous arrangement. However, the process of candidate selection still had to go through

political parties. As a consequence, the pairs of candidates that voters could choose from were

very limited. There were only two pairs of candidates that obtained eligibility by support of

political parties: Abdillah-Ramli and Maulaha Pohan-Sigit Pramono Asri. Abdillah was the

incumbent mayor, while Maulana Pohan, his contender, was the incumbent vice mayor. Ramli

76

“Penyampaian Visi Misi Terganggu,” Waspada, 9 March 2000. 77

“Pemilihan Abdillah Sah,” Waspada, 23 March 2000. 78

“FPG Tidak Akan Memperjualbelikan Calon,” Waspada, 6 March 2000. 79

“Abdillah-Maulana Pasangan Walikota Paling Diinginkan,” Waspada, 18 March 2000.

97

was a career bureaucrat with the position of Secretary of the Local Government (Sekretaris

Daerah). Sigit Pramono Asri was a politician of the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) and

had served as a legislator in the provincial parliament since 1999. So even though the field of

contestants was severely limited, they nonetheless came from different backgrounds:

businessperson (Abdillah), career bureaucrat (Maulana Pohan and Ramli), and politician

(Sigit Pramono Asri).

The parties’ support of these candidates was uneven. Almost all political parties

supported Abdillah-Ramli, whereas only PKS endorsed Maulana Pohan-Sigit Pramono Asri.

In addition, Abdillah and Ramli also enjoyed wide support from social organizations and local

media. Abdillah had a positive image as a caring leader and was perceived as close to the

people. As a result, Abdillah-Ramli obtained 62.54 percent of the vote, while Maulana-Sigit

gathered only 37.46 percent.80

This direct local election also inaugurated Abdillah as part of

the new popular elite in Medan and North Sumatra. His style of populist leadership and an

extensive social network were seen as his greatest assets for running in the gubernatorial

election in 2008.

Nevertheless, Abdillah found himself in prison in early 2008 after more than half a

year of court proceedings.81

He and his vice mayor, Ramli, were charged with corruption in

relation to the local budget of Medan. After Abdillah and Ramli had left their positions,

Medan faced a power vacuum. The problem was solved by the appointment of an acting

mayor. During this period, Afifudin Lubis, Rahudman Harahap, and Syamsul Arifin

(Governor) all at various times held the position of acting mayor of Medan. In the transitional

situation, the figure of Rahudman Harahap appeared in public discussions. He was a

newcomer in the city’s political arena, but an experienced career bureaucrat who had held

several essential positions in some regions of North Sumatra. During the short time he served

as acting mayor, he made a name for himself with a program to promote city cleanliness. This

position as acting mayor enabled him to have a better standing during the electoral

competition in 2010.

In contrast to the mayoral election of 2005, in the 2010 election ten pairs of candidates

run. The candidates’ motivation to compete in this election seemed to have increased by the

absence of Abdillah, who was jailed for corruption. One of the contenders was Sigit Pramono

Asri, a PKS politician who had run for the position of vice mayor in the 2005 election. In the

2010 election, he was nominated as a candidate for mayor. Another was Maulana Pohan,

Abdillah’s vice mayor in the first term, and a candidate for mayor in the election of 2005.

80

“Rekapitulasi Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Walikota Medan Tahun 2005,” KPU Kota Medan. 81

“Walikota Medan Divonis 5 Tahun Penjara,” Kompas, 22 September 2008.

98

From the Golkar Party, Ajib Shah ran for the first time. Ajib was a local legislator and came

from the rich Shah business family. Bahdin Nur Tanjung (who for the first time in 2000 was

introduced as a candidate for the position of vice mayor) tried to run again. Two other figures

were Rahudman Harahap and Sofyan Tan. Rahudman was acting mayor, while Sofyan Tan

was a PDI-P politician with a background of social activism.

Due to the sheer number of candidates, the election itself was held in two rounds. In

the first round, Rahudman with his running mate Dzulmi Eldin (Secretary of the Local

Government) earned 22.20 percent of the vote. The other candidates, Sigit, Ajib Shah, and

Maulana, obtained only 14.33 percent, 13.72 percent, and 11.25 percent, respectively.82

Rahudman’s challengers in the second round were Sofyan Tan-Nelly Armayanti who obtained

20.72 percent of the vote in the first round. In this second round, Rahudman-Dzulmi obtained

a simple majority and won the competition with 65.88 percent of the vote, while their

competitors Sofyan-Nelly received only 34.12 percent.83

Although Rahudman was a newcomer in Medan, he was an experienced career

bureaucrat in several other regions in the province. While holding the position of Secretary of

the Local Government in South Tapanuli (Tapanuli Selatan), he ran unsuccessfully for the

office of regent in 2005. After his defeat, he was banished by the winner and was placed in a

staff position in the office of the province. During the period in which Rudolf Pardede was

Acting Governor, Rahudman was appointed as the Assistant to the Province (Asisten Daerah

III). After Syamsul Arifin held the position of governor, Rahudman officiated as Acting

Mayor of Medan to replace the jailed Abdillah. In less than 2 years, Rahudman succeeded in

defeating most of the experienced political players in Medan due to his long experience as a

career bureaucrat and familiarity with political struggles. His strongest competitor, Sofyan

Tan, was not a newcomer in the political arena. However, Sofyan was born and grew up in

Medan, politically socialized in the field of social activism and affiliated with Golkar and its

party under-organizations of the New Order era.84

He was also involved in the education field

where multiculturalism is a major goal. Later on, in the post-New Order era, he joined the

PDI-P.85

In the local election, Sofyan faced a major challenge concerning his social identity:

his ethnicity as a Chinese was exploited by his contenders.

82

“Daftar Rekapitulasi Hasil Pemilu Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Kabupaten/Kota Se-Sumatra

Utara Tahun 2010-2011,” KPU Provinsi Sumatra Utara. 83

“Daftar Rekapitulasi Hasil Pemilu Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Kabupaten/Kota Se-Sumatra

Utara Tahun 2010-2011,” KPU Provinsi Sumatra Utara. 84

For biography of Sofyan Tan, available at: www.dpr.go.id/anggota/detail/id/1330 (accessed in 5 January 2017) 85

Budi Agustono, “Sofyan Tan Tionghoa ‚Wakil Walikota,” Waspada, 21 December 2009.

99

In the initial process of the election, Governor Syamsul Arifin proposed Rahudman

and Sofyan as a pair of candidates. Rahudman and Sofyan met Megawati Soekarnoputri in

order to get the endorsement for their candidacy from the PDI-P party leadership.86

However,

the process took several turns; one reason being that at that time a corruption case implicating

Rahudman surfaced from the time when he had served as the Secretary of the Local

Government in South Tapanuli (Tapanuli Selatan). If the allegations proved to be true in

court, Rahudman would be jailed and Sofyan would take the position of mayor, replacing

Rahudman. This led Rahudman’s supporters to worry that Sofyan, a Chinese, would take over

the position.87

As a result of these ethnically-based reservations, Rahudman ran with Dzulmi

Eldin with the support from the Democrat Party. Dzulmi had a background as a career

bureaucrat (the Secretary of the Local Government) and was supported by the Malay ethnic

association. Sofyan then ran as a candidate for mayor with the PDI-P support.

The mayoral election in Medan in 2010 led to some important developments. First,

with ten pairs of candidates, the electoral process was highly competitive.88

The great number

of candidates resulted from the new regulations allowing independent (non-party) candidates

to run in local elections. Candidates in this local election came from different social

backgrounds including career bureaucrats, politicians, academicians, social activists, and also

a former commissioner of the local election commission. Second, the huge number of

candidates created the need for a second round of elections, since none of the candidates

could generate sufficient popular support to win in the first round. However, popular support

for the candidates did not differ markedly. This could be an indication that there was no

popular figure and each of the candidates had basic weaknesses which could be exploited by

the opponents. For instance, Rahudman had political credit as an experienced bureaucrat, but

he faced corruption charges. Sofyan Tan - who run on “renewal and assimilation”

(pembaruan dan pembauran) platform - faced discrimination due to his Chinese ethnic

background. Ajib Shah, although coming from a well-known family, was alleged to have been

involved in criminal activities in his youth.89

Sigit Pramono, although possessing a good

reputation as a clean politician, lacked popularity beyond his PKS party. Maulana Pohan who

had lost in the previous local election faced similar constraints. The lack of popular

alternatives and Sofyan’ ethnic Chinese background eventually worked to Rahudman’s

86

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 87

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 88

Several direct local elections took place, in which as much as which eleven pairs of candidates participated in

the event; “11 pasangan calon perebutkan Walikota Bengkulu,” www.waspada.co.id, 7 August 2012 (accessed in

4 May 2013). 89

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011.

100

advantage. However, Rahudman’s victory was also due to the support of Syamsul Arifin as

governor, large political parties, and the local bureaucracy.

3. Elite Configuration: Old and New Elites

In the New Order era, the model of local leadership was a replica of the centralistic-

authoritarian paragon. Centralization and Jakarta’s control of local political dynamics

demanded strong political leadership. Soeharto and his military inner circle attempted to

control almost all of the political landscape in the name of national unity. As a consequence,

elite circulation in the local arena was dominated by figures with military or bureaucratic

backgrounds. During the New Order era, military domination of the local chief executives

was part of the strategy of regime stability. According to MacDougall, the military dominated

the Ministry of Home Affairs. At that time, the ministry was at the top of all local

bureaucracies and controlled them. The regime pursued three objectives in the interest of

assuring this dominant position of the military (MacDougall 1982, 100).

The first objective was to control the bureaucrats at all levels, from the provincial level

down to the villages. The second was to ensure a positive result in the general elections. And

the third was related to accelerating and fostering socioeconomic development on which the

legitimation of the regime greatly depended (MacDougall 1982, 100). For these three reasons,

the regime significantly increased the level of military personnel in the Ministry of Home

Affairs. The rapidly increasing number of military personnel in this ministry can be seen over

more than 15 years between 1966 and 1982. In 1966, the percentage of military personnel was

only 29 percent. This number significantly increased to 71 percent in 1971, and became 89

percent in 1982 (MacDougall 1982, 90). Therefore, the Ministry of Home Affairs was the

second largest Ministry under military control after the Ministry of Defense and Security

(Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan), the personnel of which was composed by 100

percent of military personnel in 1982 (MacDougall 1982, 90).

During the New Order era, local elites replicated the authoritarian New Order style of

leadership, and this leadership was characterized by centralistic command and tended to be

undemocratic. Furthermore, this top-down style was “far-off” to and “untouchable” for the

public. Although the leaders noticed the aspirations of the people, local political elites tended

to make decisions regardless of pressure from the masses. This style of political leadership is

referred to by one local scholar as the archetypal “commander” style.90

This term refers to the

convention in Indonesia’s New Order that most governors were previously regional military

90

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011.

101

commanders. North Sumatra was no exception to this political culture and leadership style. In

the New Order and transition eras, the two most important figures in this region were

Lieutenant General (ret) Raja Inal Siregar and Major General (ret) Tengku Rizal Nurdin. Raja

Inal Siregar ruled as the governor for two electoral periods between 1988 and 1998, and had

previously been the Chief of Regional Staff of Bukit Barisan, Regional Commander of

Merdeka (the old military territory of North and Central Sulawesi), and Regional Commander

of Siliwangi (West Java). Raja’s military career did not really differ from that of Tengku

Rizal Nurdin, who held positions as Chief of Regional Staff (Kepala Staf Daerah

Militer/Kasdam) and Regional Commander (Panglima Daerah Militer/Pangdam) of Bukit

Barisan. Rizal replaced Raja in the position of governor through the elections in the local

parliament in 1998 and 2003. After retiring from the governorship, Raja Inal Siregar became a

member of the National Senate (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD), in which he represented

North Sumatra. The airplane accident of 2005 mentioned earlier ended their careers and lives.

The deaths of these two prominent local figures made way for a new local political

constellation where some of their supporters could compete in the local political arena.

Although both leaders had similar backgrounds as military commanders, the public

perceived them differently. Raja Inal Siregar was considered a strong and stern leader,

whereas Tengku Rizal Nurdin was regarded a more communicative and open-minded figure.

One local political scientist and NGO activist, Ahmad Taufan Damanik, attributed this to the

fact that, unlike Raja, Rizal had received military training in America and was hence

familiarized with the concepts of a democratic army and democracy.91

The variation in

leadership style may be a result of the different cultural backgrounds of the two generals.

Rizal came from the Malay culture whose members are said to be softer, more implicit and

indirect in their communication style, while members of the Batak culture, such as Raja, are

perceived as more straightforward, outspoken and explicit.

In the post-New Order era, one can generally classify the local elites into two

categories. The first category is the old elites who were already involved in the political arena

during the New Order era and have continued their political career in the Era Reformasi. This

category of local elites is diverse, ranging from local bureaucrats, politicians or legislators to

active or retired military officers. The second category is the new elites who stood outside of

the political structures in the New Order. They are the politicians from political parties, which

only appeared after the resignation of Soeharto, as well as academicians, professionals, former

student activists, former NGO activists, and former journalists, all of whom entered the

91

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011.

102

political arena after the breakdown of the New Order. Some of the new local elites also were

businesspersons. These new elites were still affiliated with the old political players in various

ways. As we shall see below, most of them were connected by patronage relations with the

old elites.

In the New Order era, most social organizations were the product of state corporatism

(MacIntyre 1994; Hicks 2012). Some of these organizations had ties to political parties. The

affiliation of mass organizations with political parties was not only developed formally, but

also personally. In addition, several new elites who emerged in the post-New Order era were

members of old elite families.

For example, the old elite in the region is represented by several prominent figures

such as Syamsul Arifin, Hasrul Azwar, Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe, Chairuman Harahap, Tri

Tamtomo, Amrun Daulay, Tengku Milwan, and Rahudman Harahap. They all had experience

as local politicians, local bureaucrats, high-ranking military officers, or holders of local

executive positions during the New Order. During the democratic transition they did not

necessarily lose their prominent status in the political arena. They survived and, even more,

succeeded in the post-transition political contests.

Their track record supports this assessment. Syamsul started his political career in

1977 as a local legislator from Golkar in Langkat regency. Besides his position as a member

of local parliament, Syamsul had been actively associated with various mass organizations,

such as the Indonesian Development Generation of Youth (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan

Indonesia/AMPI), the National Committee of Indonesian Youth (Komite Nasional Pemuda

Indonesia/KNPI), the Malay Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu

Indonesia/MABMI), and the Indonesian Indigenous Businessmen’s Association (Himpunan

Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia/HIPPI), both in the regency of Langkat and at the provincial

level. When he was elected as the Regent of Langkat in 1999, he was among the first local

chief executives who had a background as an active member of youth organizations or mass

organizations. These organizations were the product of state corporatism in the New Order.

After two terms in the position of Regent, Syamsul ran successfully in the gubernatorial

election of 2008. His success in the contest was partly due to his long experience in the

political arena for more than 31 years and his strong social network based on membership in

the organizations mentioned above. This social capital was reinforced by his formal position

as a local legislator, regent, and member of the Golkar Party.

Another example is Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe, who had a background as a long-

standing career bureaucrat. Wahab was the oldest of the candidates in the gubernatorial

103

election of 2008. He began his career as an employee of a plantation company. After

graduating with a law degree from the University of North Sumatra, he became a local

bureaucrat in Labuhan Batu regency. In this region, Wahab held the important position of

Secretary of the Local Government (Sekretaris Wilayah Daerah) for 10 years. After this

position, Wahab was appointed as Assistant Governor for People’s Welfare (Asisten

Kesejahteraan Rakyat) in the provincial government, and later on he was given the post of

Acting Regent of Asahan in 1984. After 4 years in this region, Wahab obtained the position of

Regent of Central Tapanuli (Tapanuli Tengah) from 1988 to 1990. Additionally, he became

familiar with another sector of the bureaucratic structure as the Regional Inspector of the

Province during 1990-1994. In 1995, he held the top provincial bureaucratic post as the

Secretary of the Province (Sekretaris Provinsi). Afterwards, in 1998, he was appointed as the

Vice Governor (Wakil Gubernur), during the period when Tengku Rizal Nurdin was

governor.92

In the political arena, Wahab had been a member of Golkar since 1968 and in

2001 he attained the provincial top-level position in this party as the Regional Chairman for

North Sumatra (DPD Golkar). His position as the leader of the Golkar Party paved him the

way to the position of Chairman of Provincial Parliament (Ketua DPRD). Similarly to

Syamsul, the important positions he held helped Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe to establish

himself as one of the prominent figures in North Sumatra. In short, based on the above

evidence, it can be concluded that the old elites in North Sumatra depended on several

important assets, such as large social networks, strong political skills, and long bureaucratic

experience.

In contrast to most established political players, the new elites have entered the

political arena in different ways: fast-track, instant, and being promoted by external forces.

Some new members of the local elite with business backgrounds cannot be called new elites.

One categorical reason for this is that even though they entered the political arena after the

New Order era, some of them were already businessmen in the New Order period and were

affiliated with the old elites, mass corporatist organizations, or political parties of the previous

regime. Figures in this category are Abdillah (Mayor of Medan), Tengku Ery Nuradi (Regent

of Serdang Bedagai), and Ali Umri (Mayor of Binjai and candidate for Governor in 2008).

Abdillah (who was elected in the mayoral election of Medan in 2000) was a businessperson

and a partner of the Medan local government (rekanan pemda). In his business activities he

had a close relationship with the mayor, Bachtiar Jafar. With the support of Jafar, Abdillah

92

The track record of Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe was obtained from an interview with the latter, Medan, 3 May

2011. It was also compiled from secondary data such as Khaerudin, “Pengabdian Paripurna Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe, Sering Jadi Sasaran Tembak,” Kompas, 7 April 2008.

104

succeeded in the electoral competition. Another factor that contributed to his victory is his

family’s background. Abdillah is the son of H. Said, a well-known traditional cloth merchant

in this city and an activist of the mass-based Islamic organization in the region, Al-

Washliyah.93

This strong social network of his late father helped Abdillah significantly in the

local elections.

Another figure is Tengku Erry Nuradi, whose name cannot be separated from his

older-brother, Tengku Rizal Nurdin, Governor from 1998-2005. With his background as a

businessman, Erry entered the political arena when his brother was in the public’s memory.

Tengku Rizal Nurdin had a good reputation as a modest, friendly and humble governor and

the people in the province deeply regretted his premature death. Erry and Rizal were also seen

as the representatives of esteemed Malay families.

The last example in this group is Ali Umri. In the New Order era, Ali Umri was a

Golkar-affiliated businessman. He was also involved in several business associations such as

the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda

Indonesia/HIPMI), the Indonesian National Contractors’ Association (Gabungan Pelaksana

Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia/Gapensi), the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

(Kamar Dagang dan Industri/KADIN), and he led the Golkar youth organization, the

Indonesian Development Generation of Youth (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan

Indonesia/AMPI).94

In 1999, he was elected as a member of local parliament in Binjai, and

one year later as Mayor at the age of 32. The political star of Ali Umri rose rapidly, and 2

years later he held the positions of Local Chairman of the Golkar Party in Binjai and Regional

Chairman of the Golkar Party of North Sumatra. He was able to lead this major political party

and skip the tedious process of career advancement. The fast track political career of Umri

cannot be understood without reference to his close relationship with Surya Paloh, who was

the influential Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Golkar Party.

Further, it was hardly conceivable in the New Order for someone to hold the position

of mayor at the age of 32 years. Moreover, Umri’s lack of political and bureaucratic

experience makes his case a hallmark of change in terms of local elite recruitment. This

development devalued the rise through the bureaucratic ranks and opened up opportunities for

everyone to attain elite status. The political reforms in the areas of democratization and

decentralization paved the way for a process of faster and more extended elite circulation.

Commenting on the effects of democratization, Ali Umri stated:

“When I held the position of a leader of a business organization, I had never thought

93

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 94

“Ali Umri: Orang Muda dari Partai Beringin,“ Kompas, 2 April 2008.

105

that I could obtain the position of a mayor, because you actually had to be a civil

servant or military officer for this. I led HIPMI, KADIN, GAPENSI, and AMPI in

Binjai. I think I obtained a benefit as a private person who can run for the election.

This is the goodness of the reform, without restrictions …”95

However, beyond the category of new elites with affiliations to the New Order regime,

a new category of local leaders can be identified. This group includes local figures who do not

have any connections with the past regime or the established elites. This group is mostly

associated with the politicians of the new parties in the post-New Order era, or former

democracy activists who moved from civil society to the political arena. Examples in this

category are the PKS politicians Gatot Pujo Nugroho96

and Sigit Pramono Asri.

The background of Gatot is far from spectacular. Before the 2008 gubernatorial

election, his name was less known than that of Sigit Pramono Asri, who had competed in the

Medan mayoral election and had been a member of the provincial parliament since 1999.

Before he jumped into the political arena, Gatot was a lecturer at the Medan Polytechnic and a

civil servant. During his time on campus, Gatot was actively involved as a campus dakwah

activist and this activity became more intense during his study at Bandung Technology

Institute (ITB).97

His name appeared in the political arena after he held the position of

Regional Chairman of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in 2006. His leadership of this

party paved his way to the center of local power. Before the election, Gatot was actively

involved in building a coalition of Islamic political parties in opposition to the leadership of

Rudolf Pardede.98

Similar to Gatot, Sigit was also a dakwah activist on his campus, the University of

North Sumatra. However, Sigit began his political career earlier than Gatot. In 1999, he was

elected as a provincial legislator, and he was reelected in 2004 and 2009. But his political

performance as a local legislator did not guarantee him success in the local elections: he failed

as a candidate for vice mayor in the Medan mayoral election of 2005 and as a candidate for

mayor in that city’s mayoral election of 2010.

The configuration of local elites in the post-New Order period illuminates several key

points. First, political change created a more open environment for local elite recruitment and

circulation. Members from very diverse social backgrounds can compete for public positions,

95

Interview with Ali Umri, Medan, 29 April 2011. 96

In the 2008 gubernatorial election, Gatot Pujo Nugroho was elected as vice Governor. After Governor

Syamsul Arifin was charged with corruption and jailed in Jakarta in 2010, Gatot was appointed as Acting

Governor. After the court proceedings, the President formally discharged Syamsul as governor on 12 October

2012 and the Provincial Parliament appointed Gatot as definitive Governor. 97

“Gatot dan Komitmen Melayani,” Kompas, 10 April 2008. 98

loc.cit.”Gatot dan Komitmen Melayani,”Kompas, 10 April 2008, also interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho,

Medan, 2 May 2011.

106

in particular those of local chief executives. However, this positive development also raises

the possibility of electing incompetent politicians. Second, the analysis highlights the

surviving power of the old elites. Two factors contribute to their continuing political

significance in the democratic regime. On the one hand, they have performed in the political

arena for a long time, which contributes to their political knowledge and experience. From

this elementary political capital, on the other hand, they can rely on widely ramified social

networks in various fields of the political arena, social organizations, and the bureaucratic

domain. After regime change, they activated this social capital and succeeded in political

competition. Third, the new elites who were affiliated with the authoritarian elements of the

New Order have, to a certain level, some political advantages compared to the “pure” new

elites. Most of the figures in this category are the product of past political patronage, members

of established families, or affiliated with socio-political structures of the New Order. Their

experiences with the New Order’s patronage networks socialized them in authoritarian

traditions.99

This pattern of socialization not only preserved authoritarian practices, but also

restricted the expansion of democratic norms. Far from acting as proponents of democracy,

these elites continued to cultivate ties to the old elites. Fadly Nurzal, a representative of this

group and a young leader of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), stated that in reforming

the party he did not take a confrontational approach, he did not hurt the old politicians in the

party, and he was searching for compromise.100

The case of Fadly Nurzal also highlights the

process of learning from old elites; Nurzal stated that when he accompanied Syamsul Arifin

in the campaign, he sometimes recorded Syamsul’s speeches on his cell phone and used them

when he needed them.101

Fourth, the more genuine new elites who entered the political arena

after 1998 have faced higher political barriers, but at the same time they had less historical

“baggage” to carry. Options for this group might be restricted to two distinct choices: either to

be patient and slowly promote democratic norms or to build political alliances with the old-

authoritarian elements and become the latter’s political clients. According to Fadly Nurzal,

the new elites must increase their political experience if they want to replace the old ones.102

99

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 100

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 101

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 102

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011.

107

III. Elite and Strategic Actions towards Democratization

The following section analyzes local politics and local elections in North Sumatra from a

different angle. While in the previous section, the analysis concentrated on the impact of the

institutional structure on elite composition, this section examines the strategic actions of

elites. This includes investigating their pact and alliance building and the use of material

resources for electoral success.

During the democratic transition, local elites who were associated with the New Order

faced an uncomfortable situation following the strengthening of the democratic movement.

This old regime group consisted of local politicians from the New Order political parties, in

particular Golkar and PPP, and local bureaucrats. They were the targets of criticism by the

reform movement and people regularly demonstrated in front of local parliaments or

governmental offices. The pressure of demonstrators on the old authoritarian regime was

strong and these local elites had no choice but to agree to their political demands. One of the

old local elites in the province of North Sumatra, Hasrul Azwar, described the situation as

follows:

“In the time of reform, my position was that of the Vice Chairman of the Provincial

Parliament of North Sumatra. Certainly at the national level, even at the local level, we

could not restrain demonstrators who came and stormed the office of the provincial

parliament. It was like I was on trial, something like an open trial in my office …”103

Responding to this unfavorable situation, the old local elites tried to reach some

understanding with the reform activists. Benefitting from the declining euphoria over regime

change, the old elites slowly but surely replaced their former strategy of conformity (i.e.

through acquiescence to the democratic agenda) with a strategy of intensive communication

with pro-democratic activists, combined with inducing these activists into their political bloc.

Additionally, after only two years of widespread support, the pro-democratic movement faced

disorientation. This political disorientation occurred due to the necessity of developing and

adhering to multiple urgent political issues as opposed to the simple, single goal of regime

change in the early stages of reform. This situation weakened pressure on the old authoritarian

element. Furthermore, the new NGOs which emerged in the reform era did not all have a

commitment to democracy, a clear goal or solid organization. Some of them were built as

political instruments of old-established elites and some NGO activists benefited from the

reform by extorting money for the use of their organizations. Moreover, some independent

103

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011.

108

political activists or former student activists lost interest in becoming politicians or political

brokers. Therefore, the nature of the relationship between pro-democratic activists and old

elites was changing from one of antagonism to one of partial cooperation. More than that,

some NGO activists were allegedly involved in “transactional practices,” that is, money

politics, and were absorbed into old political traditions.104

However, the old authoritarian

elements could not fully control the political arena and they had to continue to adapt to the

new political environment. They had to be aware of and sensitive to public opinion, issues,

and political demands from diverse interest groups.

The strategies of communication and inducement employed by old elites toward pro-

democratic activists were followed by a more active involvement in the local political arena.

Starting with the infiltration of political parties and local NGOs, old elites adapted to the new

policies of decentralization and direct local elections. With their political experience from the

previous political system, they could astutely influence local regulations and policy-making in

the local parliament, control strategic positions and co-opt key office holders in the latter (e.g.

securing the position of chairman or vice chairman) and manipulate bureaucratic structures.105

Moreover, after re-establishing their elevated political role in the new regime, the old elites

became more active in the rent-seeking activities of local development projects compared to

the years before.

Old local elites have adapted to the new environment by projecting themselves as part

of the democratic system. This endeavor was related to their strategy of dissociation from the

past political regime. In fact, however, they were simply reproducing old political traditions in

the new political system of democracy.106

The reproduction of past political culture could

effectively be operated in their relations with the new elites, NGO activists, or in formal

political institutions which were still partially under their control.107

This strategy had to be

continually applied as the political arena became more open and competitive.

The adaptation of old political elites to the new political environment was supported

by their experience in nurturing social interactions and networking. What this means, has been

aptly expressed by Syamsul Arifin as follows:

“… I was living among the grassroots; my childhood was spent in Kotamaksum,

Medan. The process of maturing took place in Brandan, in the village. Living in a rural

society is very tough. If we do not take care of the people and our surroundings, so the

people and our surroundings will not take care of us. If somebody dies and we do not

104

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011; Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28

April 2011. 105

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 106

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 107

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011.

109

come, if somebody gets married and we are not invited, if somebody is sick and we

can’t see the person, if there is a gathering and we don’t want to participate, if there is

a patrol and we do not want to come, then we don’t have any value in the village

…”108

This learning process of living in a community’s collectivity contributed to elites’ natural

ability to engage with the people. For them, the core aspect of social engagement is

communication. This special component became an effective selling point in their political

contest, as Syamsul Arifin describes:

“… because God says Habluminallah (obey God) and Habluminannas (maintain

human relations). If we want to be good in our relation with the above (God), we have

to be good in our relation with the below (people). Support from above has never

occurred without support from below, so maintain the below first …”109

Furthermore, the process of adaptation of old elites to democratization was reflected in local

values. For instance, Syamsul Arifin quoted some traditional Malay expressions, symbolizing

how the elites should adapt to the new political situation:

“… if we are not good at dance, don’t blame the floor …”

“… a dance has to fit the rhythm of a drum, as a drum has to fit the rhythm of a dance

…”110

The first statement shows the tendency of humans to blame the situation on a scapegoat, so

that the failure is not theirs. The second utterance means that we must adapt to the changing

environment as a natural process of life. Basic indicators of success are determined by the

human capacity to adjust to a new environment.

Yet, in the process of adaptation the actor is not solely passively following the

changing situation. He or she is expected to avoid becoming involved in other political

players’ gambits. In order to control the game in the political arena, political actors must be

aware of, anticipate and control situations. The leaders, according to Syamsul Arifin, should

keep their abilities and adopt the philosophy of reading (iqro) in all senses: to read for what

had been written (tersurat), to read implicit ideas that have not been directly expressed

(tersirat), and to read concealed or hidden ideas (tersuruk).111

These attitudes determine how

actors could actively become involved in the changing political system, but at the same time

try to adapt to the situation without radically resisting political change itself. This also shows

the elites’ awareness in predicting uncertain situations that generally occur as part of political

108

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 109

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 110

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 111

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011.

110

change. Their ability to predict the direction of political change can be seen as a natural

political “soft” skill that can only be gained through lengthy experience as a political actor

and knowledge of political and social institutions. For instance, old players in the political

arena possessed such adaptability in their political parties. They could survive and even gain

important positions under different leaders. According to them, loyalty to the leaders was a

key virtue under all political circumstances. In other words, they preferred to choose

compromise rather than conflict and tried to set their position in the middle in order to be

accepted by all sides. This modus of adaptation on first sight appears opportunistic, but has

been utilized effectively by local elites in order to survive during political change. One

member of the old elite, Hasrul Azwar, the Regional Chairman of the PPP, recounts his

experiences as follows:

“… I existed in the era of Mr. Naro, I existed in the era of Mr. Ismail Hasan as the

Chairman of the party, I existed in the era of Mr. Hamzah Haz as the Chairman of the

party. And I existed in the era of Mr. Suryadarma as the Chairman, and even though I

did not choose him, I was appointed as the Head of Faction (in the National

Parliament). First, this might be simple, but in practice this was difficult. There is one

hadith [a saying or teaching of Prophet Muhammad, P.A.] which states that we do not

allow for others’ disadvantage. Don’t bother others and don’t let others bother us! I

applied the principle to be loyal to whoever was the leader. If a conflict occurred, I

avoided getting involved. I kept my loyalty to the leader because he was the result of a

musyawarah [general meeting with deliberation, P.A.]. This made me always have a

position in every era, either at the local or the national level. And second, if a conflict

occurred, my position was always in the middle …”112

The resistance of local elites to democracy was not obvious from their actions. They

could infiltrate the democratic system with conservative ideas or by invoking authoritarian

nostalgia. They usually compared the political stability of the New Order with the uncertain

condition of its successor: the democratic political system. One criticism that was often aired

was excessive political change and the ensuing instability and uncertainty, as evidenced by

decentralization policy, direct local elections, freedom of the press, demonstrations, and the

growth of NGOs. For these elites, living in the New Order era was better compared to the

post-New Order, as stated by Hasrul Azwar:

“… I have been living in two eras. The system of the New Order was rigid;

consequently I had to resign as a civil servant. In 1982, when I was elected to the

DPRD, I experienced joy and sorrow of the political condition in the New Order.

Nowadays, I also experience joy and sorrow of the political life in the reform era. If

we are talking about its detriment, the present situation is more detrimental. To be

honest, although in the past we were under pressure, political power was under the

control of Soeharto, but we felt free in terms of saying our opinion in parliament.

112

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011.

111

Nowadays, everything that is done by the legislators is wrong, public trust in the

legislators at every level is low. This also occurs to the political parties …”113

A. Local Elections and Transactional Politics

One important issue that emerged simultaneously with the implementation of direct

local elections is massive transactional or “money politics.” The practice of vote buying had

been evident in the previous system of local elections (in which local parliaments elected

local executives), but it was limited to the members of local parliaments and the candidates.

One of the reasons behind establishing direct local elections was to prevent vote buying in the

new spirit of democracy. However, the realization of this objective was far from problem-

free. Rather than restrict vote buying, the direct local elections tended to amplify the practice.

This section discusses the potential causes and effects of transactional politics in North

Sumatra.

The open space of the political arena invites candidates from very different

backgrounds. These candidates differ from each other by their financial capacity, popularity,

personal identity, social networks, or their experience in the political or bureaucratic domains.

However, if liberal democracy is understood as the mechanism of “one man, one vote,” then

candidates must be elected by obtaining as much popular support as possible. On the other

hand, this “one man, one vote” system comes without any serious consideration of its

essential prerequisites. Two basic conditions for democracy are always discussed in scholarly

literature: a certain economic level and political culture, in particular education of the people

(Lipset 1959; Przeworski et.al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Welzel and Inglehart

2008). In North Sumatra, these basic requirements have still not been fulfilled adequately

enough to foster democratization. More than 11 percent of the region’s population is defined

as poor and the number of people that have acquired a higher level of education is just 3.8

percent (BPS Provinsi Sumatra Utara 2011). Consequently, the market mechanism works

well: the political demand of candidates for votes is determined by the supply of votes from

the constituents for money. In short, transactional politics seems to emerge as an integral

aspect in the presence of hurried political reform and persisting poverty.

Fadly Nurzal, the North Sumatran PPP chief quoted already before, described the

chain of transactional politics in the region as having its roots in the poor living conditions of

113

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011.

112

most people, who would prefer to choose candidates that give them financial rewards.114

His

argument was also corroborated by one senior politician, Hasrul Azwar, who stated that the

election comes with high political costs, and this is mostly driven by poor economic

conditions among the people. Hasrul Azwar of the PPP described his experience as follows:

“… if we want to become a member of the DPR without money, people will not elect

us. If we don’t give them them rice, peoples’ choice will change, although they are

PPP constituents. People change their preference according to who gives them rice.

So, the stimulant is the economic factor …”115

After candidates are elected, they must recover their costs from the election. Thus,

local budgets often become the object of misuse. For this reason, rampant political corruption

and rent-seeking practices have occurred in almost all regions in Indonesia as a direct

consequence of this chain of transactional politics. In short, it can generally be stated that

transactional politics is driven by the “supply and demand” mechanism or the symbiotic

relationship between elites and the masses. On the one hand, elites need political support from

the masses and mobilize their constituents through financial and material incentives, while, on

the other hand, the poor masses need money.

Transactional politics occurs not only between candidates and voters; this practice has

expanded to other sectors of the political process as well. One important development

associated with direct local elections is the emergence of the political brokerage. This system

played an important role in the process of political mediation between elites and the

masses.116

In the elections, the role of political brokerage can be identified in the form of the

“campaign team” (tim sukses) of the candidates.

The phenomenon of the campaign team arose concurrently with the beginning of

direct local elections in 2005. Members of campaign teams can be functionaries of political

parties who nominate the candidates, leaders of mass organizations, religious leaders, high-

ranking local bureaucrats, and informal elites in society. Below this structure of political

mediation are the lower level supporters. They are coordinated by the higher echelons of the

brokerage structures. For some of them, elections are a commercial event through which to

find and gain money, alleviating pressure caused by their difficulties in finding jobs. For the

lower level members of the successful team, being a member of this team means an increase

in social standing. They make themselves appear more “educated,” more elegant, and more

affluent. Many of them have worked as commercial motorcycle-riders (tukang ojek),

114

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 115

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 116

For the concept and empirical study of political mediation, see Auyero 2000.

113

schoolteachers, party functionaries at the sub-district level, or low-level bureaucrats. The

regular, direct local elections, however, inaugurate them as “political professionals” in the

local political arena. What is more, direct local elections have increased their instrumental

political shrewdness in relation to their political patron. On the one hand, they are able to

“exploit” the elite candidates who dole out money in an effort to mobilize electoral support.

On the other hand, however, one often finds these people to be double-crossing their patrons

in election campaigns.

When examining past political activities of local elections held in local parliaments, it

can be seen that civil society support for political candidates had already emerged. The

support was provided in the form of a “letter of support” that was addressed to the local

parliament. The objective of this societal support was not only to show the popularity of

candidates, but also to pressure political parties into nominating certain candidates. However,

this practice was regarded as having transactional motives. One local political scientist,

Ahmad Taufan Damanik, stated:

“… in the past, in the elections (of local executives) in the DPRD, the political parties

had a right to nominate candidates, and this process usually depended on societal

pressures. Two people can create twenty social organizations. They can

interchangeably act as the head or secretary (of organizations) and make statements.

One stamp costs 25,000 rupiahs and it can generate 1.5 million rupiahs, and getting

support can cost up to 25 million rupiahs …”117

Furthermore, transactional politics have not only influenced candidates, voters, and

political brokers as described above, but the local electoral commission (KPUD) as well. As

the organizer, administrator and also arbiter of the elections, the position of the commission is

vulnerable to transactional practices. This vulnerability, in fact, increases in conditions of bad

administration, poor database management, and lack of capability the commissioner. The poor

management and database system of elections in Indonesia actually facilitates vote buying

and other types of electoral fraud. This became a much greater problem when Indonesia

shifted its electoral system from a closed list proportional representation system to an open-

list proportional representation system in general elections in 2008 (Nurhasim 2009). In the

latter system, competition not only takes place between candidates of different parties, but

also among candidates within one party. In this system only the candidate with the greatest

popular support (winner takes all) gets elected as legislator. The severe impact of

transactional politics on political actors, voters and the commission was succinctly described

by Ahmad Taufan Damanik as follows:

117

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011.

114

“… What is the purpose of a political campaign in the elections? You just give money

to the PPK (sub district electoral commission) and the KPU (provincial/district

electoral commission), and you will get elected as a legislator. Many candidates who

didn’t conduct campaigns suddenly got elected, (because) they paid the PPK, the

KPU, and voters.”118

Although most political actors at the local level believed that transactional politics

were a new habit brought on by the era of democratization, the seeds of these practices were

nurtured in the New Order. In this era, the regime had coopted political parties through social

privileges and by granting economic access for the parties’ elites. As a consequence, the state

was able to control these elites and gained their loyalty. Similar political treatment was

applied to the leaders of corporatist mass organizations where the state financed their

activities but controlled them through the Ministry of Home Affairs and its apparatus at the

local level. In addition, the regime had operated with material inducement when political

parties faced a dispute or friction among their elites, as evidenced in the case of internal

conflict in PDI in 1992. The regime had developed a mechanism of providing political

rewards to its supporters, on the one hand, and political punishments to its opponents, on the

other. Liddle confirmed this mechanism, stating that material inducement was a key strategy

upon which the regime ensured its survival (Liddle 1996c, 249). This strategy was not only

directed at the upper layer of socio-political elites, but also at the grassroots through

governmental programs such as the Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden/INPRES),

which expressed the generosity of the government and, in particular, that of the President. For

this reason, the survival of the regime for 32 years relied not only on its cohesive political

structure, but also on its popular reputation as the regime of “benevolent-obedience” (Liddle

1996, 80; Robertson-Snape 1999, 597). The belief that transactional politics is one of the

backbones of and corresponds to the New Order regime is strengthened by the fact that in

previous regimes transactional politics was insignificant. In the era of Parliamentary

Democracy or Guided Democracy, Indonesia’s politics was primarily characterized by the

ideological divisions of political parties (see Chapter 3).119

Furthermore, transactional politics in the post-New Order era have considerable

consequences for political life at the local level. For political actors, it has generated the

impression that politics is an instantaneous process that leads to power and prosperity alone.

They believe that they can develop their political career rapidly with the use of money. The

widespread practice of transactional politics and its contagion effects has inaugurated this

118

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 119

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012; interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April

2011.

115

phenomenon as a decisive factor in the political arena. As a consequence of this, politicians

who honestly and seriously engage in political work with their constituents have become

discouraged and demoralized; their efforts appear useless in the midst of this extensive

practice of transactional politics. The hegemonic structure of transactional politics has

coerced them into adopting the same practices in order to get electoral support. Quoting one

of his political supporters, one senior politician, the PPP’s Hasrul Azwar, described the

prevailing sentiment of local politicians:

“Bang (old brother)… in the next general election in 2014, we don’t need to campaign.

From now on, you just prepare new money of 20 thousands, 50 thousands, and 100

thousands. For what do we spend so much money on campaigning? Just distribute it in

the night (before the voting day) …”120

Hasrul Azwar confirmed that transactional politics has indeed a damaging effect on the

serious political work of politicians.121

However, the impact is related not only to the political

actors, but also to the public at the grassroots level. There is a general consensus among

political observers and politicians that the public’s behavior and its sense of morality have

been influenced by money politics. As the voting day approaches, people know that

candidates frantically scrambling for votes distribute money. One practice that provides a

good example of money politics at a grassroots level is the tendency of voters to leave their

doors open the night before the election. This is intended to show that the inhabitants are not

sleeping; rather, they are waiting for a possible payoff. This expresses people’s acceptance of,

or at least indifference to, money politics.122

As Fadly Nurzal of the PPP points out, this

behavior of ordinary people is new. He later worried that this practice may become the new

model of political behavior in post-New Order Indonesia, endangering the prospects of

Indonesia’s democracy.123

Although there are widespread practices of transactional politics, particularly in local

elections, the system does not guarantee the success of candidates on financial grounds alone.

Social relationships also play an important role in gaining popular support and, naturally,

candidates who are perceived as paying attention to their voters are regarded as good leaders.

This reputation can be attained through good deeds in the past or present political activities,

social network building, and a close social relationship with the people. Of course, this social

engagement is easier to display for incumbents since they are in the ideal position from which

to build social relations. Accordingly, this social capital can help candidates to minimize their

120

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 121

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 122

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 123

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011.

116

costs in the competition. Tengku Eri Nuradi, Regent of Serdang Bedagai for two periods,

described this circumstance as follows:

“… the costs of local elections depends. If we are known by the public, we don’t need

to spend much, although this (expenditure) can be divided into two categories. First

are the formal costs, which are regulated by our local budget (APBD) and managed by

the KPUD, such as the costs for ballots and officials. Second are non-formal costs

from candidates such as those needed for campaigning, T-shirts, and for socialization.

For the challengers in local elections, since they haven’t been socialized, they have to

spend more. For the incumbent, he does not need socialization because the public

knows him, particularly if he simultaneously works for the grassroots …”124

B. Elite Networks and Alliance Building

This section portrays elite networks and their alliance building in the local arena, particularly

during the local elections themselves. The discussion will be classified into three categories of

elite networks and alliances: (1) party networks and national elite networks; (2) ethnic-and

religious-based politics; and (3) patronage and personal networks.

1. Party Networks and National Elites Networks

In direct local elections, political parties play an important role in nominating the candidates.

As stipulated in Law No. 32/2004, the candidates have to obtain the support of political

parties which have received at least 15 percent of the total votes or 15 percent of the total

seats in the local parliament. The support of each party is measured based on the results of the

last general election. In the previous systems of decentralization (based on Law No. 5/1974

and Law No. 22/1999, respectively), there was no specific regulation on the role of political

parties. Under these laws, the right to nominate candidates rested entirely with local

legislatures (DPRD) at the provincial, regency, or city level. However, the local parliaments

had the right to regulate the requirements for nomination. For example, the candidates had to

get support from at least two factions in the local parliament.

Despite having an important role in nominating the candidates, the role of political

parties is generally believed to play a minor part in helping candidates to succeed. Direct local

elections have a different character compared to indirect elections by the legislature in relation

to the function of political parties in the electoral contest. In direct local elections the

individual characteristics of the candidate counts, whereas in indirect elections by the

legislature party identification is usually a more significant factor. However, most of the local

political actors and observers believe that political parties make it easier for candidates to gain

124

Interview with Tengku Eri Nuradi, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011.

117

popular support.125

This opinion was aired by Tengku Eri Nuradi, twice Regent of Serdang

Bedagai:

“… I have observed that in direct local elections people have not noticed which

political parties the candidates come from. Parties are recognized in legislative

elections. The voice of political parties is insignificant when they nominate unpopular

candidates or candidates without popular support from the people …”126

Moreover, several political parties have encountered difficulties in local elections.

Most of the post-New Order political parties are newcomers to the political arena and,

consequently, most of them are not well-prepared in terms of arranging their ideologies,

platforms and programs, or even having qualified or experienced personnel. Therefore, in the

first wave of local elections, such as in the gubernatorial election of 2003, candidates without

affiliation to any party still dominated the nominations. In this local election, candidates were

mostly bureaucrats or military officers. Most party politicians had positioned themselves as

candidates for vice governor. Problems arose when members of political parties nominated

themselves in the contest, resulting in one political party having several candidates in the

same election, as was the case in 2003 when Rudolf Pardede and Baskami Gintings, both

members of PDI-P, ran as candidates for vice governor.

Five years later, in the 2008 gubernatorial election, political parties faced serious

factionalism and strong competition among local leaders. In the two largest parties, Golkar

Party and PDI-P), this tension could not be resolved despite the fact that the central party

authorities in Jakarta sought to address the problem. In the case of PDI-P, the conflict erupted

between the regional authority (DPD) and the central authority (DPP). The Regional

Chairman of the party, Rudolf Pardede, nominated himself as a candidate for governor, while

the central board under Megawati’s leadership preferred another candidate, Tri Tamtomo

(who was not a member of this party at that time). This tension led to a conflict between

supporters and members of the party when the central authority decided to discharge Pardede

from his position as Chairman of the Regional Board and appointed a central party

functionary, Panda Nababan, as Acting Regional Chairman.127

A similar internal conflict

arose in the Golkar Party. Ali Umri was the candidate of choice for the central board, but

some party members in local party units chose to endorse alternative candidates, therefore

causing serious friction within the party between the supporters of each of its candidates.

125

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012; Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011. 126

Interview with Tengku Eri Nuradi, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011. 127

“DPP PDIP: Rudolf Tak Direstui Karena Terganjal Pendidikan,” available at: news.detik.com, 25 January

2008, (accessed 4 April 2013); “Pengurus PDIP Sumut di Bawah Nababan, Bertekad Ulang Sukses Pemilu

1999,” available at: www.inimedanbung.com, 18 May 2008, (accessed 4 May 2013).

118

Furthermore, the development of political parties in local elections can be observed in

three areas: candidacy, the election, and conflict and competition among local elites. In terms

of candidacy, in the gubernatorial election of 1998 the three candidates for governor were

selected from non-party members or non-politicians, with military, academic, and

bureaucratic backgrounds. In the 2003 contest, there was a combination of non-party and

party politicians. The external non-party candidates ran for governor, while the party

politicians ran for vice governor. In 2008, this combination still existed, but politicians started

to run as candidates for governor. With the exception of Ali Umri (Golkar), most politicians

who ran were not nominated by their parties. This situation changed significantly in 2012

when the region prepared for the gubernatorial election of 2013.128

After approval by the

KPUD, five pairs of candidates are set to compete. Of these five pairs of candidates, four were

members of political parties. In this election, political parties tended to nominate candidates

from among their cadres rather than external contenders. The complete background of

candidates in four gubernatorial elections can be seen in Table 8 below.

Table 4. 7 Backgrounds of Candidates in Gubernatorial Elections

1998 2003 2008 2013

Tengku Rizal Nurdin

(M)

Tengku Rizal Nurdin

(M)

Rudolf Pardede (P)

Syamsul Arifin (P)

Gatot Pujo Nugroho (P)

Gus Irawan Pasaribu

(Pro)

Soekirman (P)

Usman Pelly (A) Amrun Daulay (B)

Baskami Gintings (P)

Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe (P)

Raden Muhammad

Syafii (P)

Chairuman Harahap

(P)

Fadly Nurzal (P)

AM Situmorang (B) Chairuman Harahap (B)

Serta Ginting (P)

Ali Umri (P)

Maratua Simanjuntak

(O)

Effendi Simbolon (P)

Djumiran Abdi (B)

Tri Tamtomo (M)

Benny Pasaribu (P)

Amri Tambunan (P)

RE Nainggolan (B)

RE Siahaan (P)

Suherdi (P)

Gatot Pujo Nugroho

(P)

Tengku Eri Nuradi

(P)

Abbreviation: (M) military officer, (A) academician, (P) politician, (B) career bureaucrats, (O) mass

organization, (Pro) professional.

Source: Own compilation.

The recent trend of nominating party members in local elections is viewed as a

128

This thesis was written prior to the gubernatorial election of 2013. At the time of writing, five pairs of

candidates had been approved by the provincial election commission (KPUD) and these candidates were based

on the nomination of political parties.

119

positive development in political parties. It can be attributed to a more regularized political

recruitment process within political parties. In the previous elections of 1998 and 2003,

political parties nominated candidates from outside the party due to the lack of competence

and popularity of the party’s personnel. In the gubernatorial election of 2008, this tendency

still prevailed, partly due to the continued lack of popular candidates, but also due to other

reasons such as the rise of transactional politics between parties and candidates.

Also the roles of political parties in the local electoral process changed. In the

elections of 1998 and 2003, it seems that political parties were more marginal as they only

nominated external candidates for the governor’s position and fielded their own members for

the position of vice governor. In the 2008 gubernatorial election political parties developed a

more instrumental role which was indicated by the strong tendency towards money politics.129

But while in the 2008 election money politics favored external candidates, in 2013 political

parties supported internal candidates to compete in the gubernatorial election of the following

year.

A third major change is the increasing tension among party leaders in local elections.

In 1998, internal conflict was low and almost without serious friction both within and between

political parties. In 2003, the tension was higher than in the previous gubernatorial elections,

although it could be classified as moderate. In this gubernatorial election, there was some

competition among local elites to get the ticket from the Golkar Party. Elsewhere competition

occurred at the top level of the provincial bureaucracy between the incumbent Governor,

Tengku Rizal Nurdin, and his subordinate, the Secretary of the Province, Amrun Daulay. The

internal frictions with the greatest tension in political parties occurred in the gubernatorial

election of 2008, particularly in the Golkar Party and PDI-P. Two forms of friction emerged:

tension between the regional and central board of the party in the PDI-P and the high tension

of inner-provincial elite competition in the Golkar Party. In the 2013 gubernatorial election,

the level of internal conflict in political parties seemed to be lower than in the 2008 election.

This decrease in tension might correspond to the more inclusive approach of political parties

in promoting their own personnel as candidates. Table 9 below illustrates the three trends

discussed above.

129

The existence of transactional practices in local elections was revealed (covertly or overtly) in interviews,

personal communication, and participant observation during the process of field work.

120

Table 4. 8 The Position of Political Parties in the Gubernatorial Elections

of North Sumatra

1998 2003 2008 2013

Candidacy External Mixed Mixed Internal

Role Superficial Superficial Instrumental Substantial

Internal conflict Low Moderate High Moderate

Source: Own compilation.

Any analysis of local elite networks must take into account the role of national elites.

Particular in local elections, local elites have a dependent position toward their political

superiors in Jakarta. For instance, the decision to nominate candidates was highly dependent

on the endorsement of national elites. Party functionaries at the provincial or regency level

(DPD/DPC) usually played a less prominent role in the recruitment of candidates. By contrast,

central party authorities and national elites had veto power to accept or reject candidates. If

the local branches and central authorities could not reach an agreement on candidates, tension

or internal conflict was often the result. For instance, Rudolf Pardede’s self-nomination in the

gubernatorial election of 2008 caused substantial internal friction in the PDI-P. A similar case

occurred in the Golkar Party, when the nomination of Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe and Syamsul

Arifin as regional leaders of the party encountered opposition from the Central Board of the

Golkar Party, which ultimately decided to choose Ali Umri as the candidate.

The connection between local and national elites was greatly determined by personal

relationships among them. Ali Umri owed his success in obtaining the ticket from the Golkar

Party not only to his formal position as the Regional Chairman of the party, but also to his

close relationship with Surya Paloh, the National Chairman of the Advisory Council of the

party. Their close personal relationship was also supported by the fact that Umri’s wife is a

close relative of Paloh.130

This connection became clearer when Ali Umri followed Surya

Paloh in quitting the Golkar Party and joining Paloh’s new party, the National Democrat

(Nasional Demokrat) party. In this new party, Ali Umri holds the position of Regional

Chairman of the party in the province. Personal bonds were also crucial in the case of Abdul

Wahab Dalimunthe when he got the ticket from the Democrat Party. As pointed out in the

previous sub-chapter on the 2008 gubernatorial election, Dalimunthe had a personal

relationship with Akbar Tanjung, a former central leader of the Golkar Party, and benefited

from the competition between Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (President and the Chairman of

the Advisory Council of the Democrat party) and Jusuf Kalla (Vice President and the

Chairman of the Central Board of the Golkar Party) in the presidential election of 2009. As a

130

“Rini Sofyanti Paloh: Percaya Suami Sepenuhnya,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 30 March 2009

(accessed 11 October 2009)).

121

result, Wahab got the ticket from the Democrat party.

Nevertheless, the ties between local and national elites were not solely determined by

personal bonds; they were also influenced by a more pragmatic and instrumental political

culture. An example is the attitude of the Golkar Party towards Syamsul Arifin. Before the

gubernatorial election, the party fired Syamsul because he run without the party’s blessing.

Shortly after he was elected as governor, the party reinstated him as its member and later on

even inaugurated him as the Chairman of the Regional Board of the Golkar Party.131

Syamsul’s comeback as the top regional leader of the Golkar Party was supported by changes

in the party’s central board. At the 2009 national party meeting (Musyawarah Nasional),

Jusuf Kalla and Surya Paloh were defeated by Akbar Tanjung and Aburizal Bakrie. The latter

two were elected as the Chairman of the Advisory Council and the Chairman of the Central

Board of the party, respectively.

Personal networks between local and national elites also existed for the PDI-P. In the

2008 gubernatorial election, the party’s Central Board supported Tri Tamtomo and, at the

same time, rejected the nomination of Rudolf Pardede. During his post as Rizal’s vice

governor, Rudolf acquired the reputation of lacking managerial capabilites. Another

significant barrier for Pardede in his nomination was the issue of his alleged fake diploma.132

By contrast, the party’s decision to nominate Tri Tamtomo was not only backed by his

prominent position as a former regional military commander, but also by the personal network

of his brother, Bambang Hendarso Danuri, and the PDI-P’s central board members. At that

time, Danuri held an important position in the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) and had

wielded strong influence to propose Tri Tamtomo to the party’s leadership.133

The PDI-P's

decision to promote Tri Tamtomo was evidence for the instrumental role of political parties in

nominating candidates and the importance of personal networks. Tri Tamtomo was allegedly

involved in the 27 July 1996 riots, when the PDI headquarters were attacked by the military.

At that time, Tri Tamtomo held the important military position of Regional Commander of

Jakarta Raya (Kodam Jaya) and Megawati was a victim of this riot. Nevertheless, 12 years

later, Megawati supported Tri Tamtomo as a candidate in the gubernatorial election, which is

testimony to the opportunistic behavior of political parties and their leadership.

131

“JK Dituntut Mundur: Kalla Akui Syamsul Arifin Kader Golkar yang Diusung Partai Lain,“ available at:

www.waspada.co.id, 19 April 2008 (accessed 11 October 2009); “Musda Golkar Sumut Pilih Syamsul Arifin

Secara Aklamasi,” available at: www.medansatu.com, 23 November 2009 (accessed 12 December 2011). 132

“DPP PDIP: Rudolf Tak Direstui Karena Terganjal Pendidikan,” available at: news.detik.com, 25 January

2008, (accessed 4 April 2013). 133

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012.

122

2. Ethnic and Religious Politics

As a region with a multi-cultural identity, North Sumatra is a laboratory for the study of the

relationship between political life and socio-cultural identities. One important aspect of the

elite network that has emerged in local elections is the use of ethnic and religious sentiments.

However, this aspect has a contradictory element. On the one hand, ethnic- and religious-

based politics seem to be sensitive issues and elites who compete in the local elections usually

exploit these issues as part of their political strategy for mobilizing popular support. Part of

this strategy is a campaign that instrumentalizes divisions in the ethnic and religious

backgrounds of the candidates. On the other hand, direct local elections or local elections in

general, tend to prevent social conflict (Aspinall 2011; Aspinall et al. 2011; Mietzner 2011).

Competing political parties often avoid nominating candidates with similar ethno-religious

backgrounds. They frequently create tickets representing the country’s socio-cultural

heterogeneity.

As described in section 4.1, North Sumatra is a highly diverse province in terms of

ethnicity and religion. In addition to the national revolution in the second half of the 1940s,

there was also a social revolution in the province. Driving this social revolution was fierce

ethnic competition between the non-Malay ethnic groups and the Malay (Reid 1979; van

Langenberg 1982; Said et.al. 1973). Before, when the old kingdoms and traditional elites still

existed, the Malay had dominated the socio-political and economic life of the province. The

social revolution markedly changed social structures and ended the domination of the Malay

ethnic group in socio-political life. The legacies of this social revolution still left their imprint

on the New Order era. During this period, Mandailing Bataks were the dominant ethnic group

in political and bureaucratic structures. With two distinct identities as Batak and Muslim, the

Mandailing Bataks were pictured as the “winners” of the social revolution. This group differs

from other Batak groups because of its Islamic identity, which corresponds to the majority of

the population in the region.134

During the New Order era, the domination of Mandailing

Batak was expressed by the term “Rehap Lunas” - an acronym of the four big Mandailing

clans of Siregar, Harahap, Lubis and Nasution - that dominated local politics and

monopolized the governor position (Aspinall et. all 2011, 34 ; Nuryanti 2004, 208). Of the

five governors during the New Order era, three were Mandailing Batak from the clans of

Harahap, Nasution, and Siregar. Nevertheless, the last governor in the New Order period was

Tengku Rizal Nurdin, a person from Malay ancestry.

134

The concept of the superiority of Mandailing Batak based on its two peculiar identities is a result of personal

communication with Anthony Reid, Freiburg, 9 November 2012.

123

The emergence of Tengku Rizal Nurdin, however, was followed by several symbolic

Malay appearances in the public sphere. One historian claimed that Nurdin's rise to

prominence was reminiscent of the glory and domination of the Malay in the past and

accordingly triggered the aspiration of the Malay people to regain their power in the new

political environment.135

This expectation was strengthened by the rule of Bachtiar Jafar, a

Malay with a military background who held an important position as the Mayor of Medan

from 1990 to 2000. Moreover, the rise of Malays in the political arena culminated in the

emergence of Abdillah as Mayor of Medan, replacing Bachtiar Jafar. During the time he held

the position of Mayor, the popularity of Abdillah increased both among the political players

and the people of the region. Many political observers or political actors in this region

acknowledged his popularity, and shared a common perspective that if Abdillah implicated in

corruption and were subsequently nominated as a candidate for governor in 2008, nobody

could possibly defeat him in the competition.136

After Abdillah's fall from power, the Malays

found a new popular leader in the figure of Syamsul Arifin who won the gubernatorial

election in 2008. However, after 2 years in power, Syamsul faced a similar problem as

Abdillah and was subsequently replaced by the vice governor, Gatot Pujo Nugroho, a

Javanese.

Before the gubernatorial election of 2008, ethnic and religious sentiments emerged as

a response to the replacement of Tengku Rizal Nurdin by his deputy, Rudolf Pardede. Rudolf

is Toba Batak and Protestant; this combination of ethnicity and religion, despite representing

a remarkably large proportion of the population, was met by resistance from the majority of

the Muslim population. The resistance was not only directed against Rudolf’s ethnic identity,

but was also related to the public’s impression that he lacked governing capabilities. As

pointed out previously, Rudolf’s public image also suffered from the issue of his fake alleged

diploma in the gubernatorial election of 2003. The controversy continued in the Medan

mayoral election of 2010 when the local electoral commission rejected his candidacy due to

the alleged illegality of his high-school diploma. The growing aversion of and resistance to

Rudolf’s leadership was evidenced by the development of a coalition of Islamic political

parties (particularly PKS and Partai Bintang Reformasi/Star Reform Party PBR, later

extended to PAN and PPP) specifically for gubernatorial elections. Part of this coalition

supported Syamsul Arifin-Gatot Pujo Nugroho (Syampurno) in the gubernatorial election of

135

Interview with Ichwan Azhari, Medan, 4 May 2011. 136

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012; interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 16

April 2011; interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011; interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April

2011.

124

2008.

The significance of ethnic and religious issues in electoral competition became clear in

the first direct election for governorship in 2008. The five pairs of candidates represented

combinations of ethnic groups and religions. Table 10 below details the backgrounds of the

candidates in terms of ethnicity and religion.

Table 4. 9 Ethnic and Religious Background of Candidates in Gubernatorial Election

of 2008

No. Candidate Ethnicity Religion

1 Ali Umri Malay Islam

Maratua Simanjuntak Toba-Batak Islam

2 Tri Tamtomo Javanese Islam

Benny Pasaribu Toba-Batak Protestant

3 R.E. Siahaan Toba-Batak Protestant

Suherdi Javanese Islam

4 Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe Mandailing-Batak Islam

R.M. Syafi’i Javanese Islam

5 Syamsul Arifin Malay Islam

Gatot Pujo Nugroho Javanese Islam

Source: Own compilation.

During the contest, the candidates tried to use ethnicity and religion as instruments to

attract popular support by combining ethno-religious backgrounds as shown in Table 9. The

combinations themselves were popularly known as “rainbow pairs” (pasangan pelangi).

Syamsul Arifin not only used his background as a Malay and his membership in the Malay

Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu Indonesia, MABMI), of

which he was a Chairman, but he also sought association with the Batak by joining the clan

(marga) of Silaban.137

He used the popular slogan in his campaign, “Friend of All Ethnic

Groups” (Sahabat Semua Suku). The other candidate, Tri Tamtomo, was regarded as an

“outsider,” even though he was Javanese (the largest single ethnic group in the region). Tri

was not seen as a “son of the region” (putra daerah), because he held the position of Regional

Army Commander for only a short period. To compensate for this disadvantage, Tri Tamtomo

made use of his ties with the Toba-Batak clan of Panggabean. Gatot Pujo Nugroho, a

Javanese, faced a similar problem as he, too, was not born in North Sumatra. However, unlike

Tri Tamtomo, Gatot Pujo Nugroho, starting in 1986, had established his career in the region

as a lecturer at Medan Polytechnic and he later joined the PKS. More than his Javanese

ethnicity counted that Gatot was not born in the region, a fact that his contenders exploited in

137

“Pengetua Adat Negeri Limbong Restui Raja Batak H. Syamsul Arifin, SE Jadi Gubsu,” available at:

www.silaban.net, 21 May 2007 (accessed 11 October 2009); “Syamsul Arifin Silaban Ziarah ke Makam Raja

Silaban,” Analisa, 5 April 2008.

125

their campaign rhetoric. Within the region it is publicly known among political actors that the

“insider” term also includes Javanese born in the region. This fact can be related to a major,

long-established organization of the Javanese ethnic group of Pujakesuma, known as Sons of

Java Born in Sumatra (Putera Jawa Kelahiran Sumatra). If one was not born in, but lived in,

Sumatra, the Pujakesuma term would change to have a pejorative meaning: “Sons of Java

‘Hang Around’ in Sumatra” (Putera Jawa ‘Keliaran’ di Sumatra).

The election results corroborated the obvious connection between ethnicity and

religion, on the one hand, and voting behavior, on the other. This evidence, moreover,

intertwined with another geopolitical dimension in the region. Three pairs of candidates with

Islamic backgrounds received support from regions with Muslim majorities. These regions

were dominated by several ethnic groups associated with Islam such as Javanese, Malay,

Batak-Mandailing and Batak Angkola. The victors, Syamsul Arifin and Gatot Pujo Nugroho,

won in some regencies at the East Coast, which were dominated by the Malay-Islam

population: Langkat, Binjai, Medan, Deliserdang, Serdangbedagai, Tebingtinggi, Batubara,

Asahan and Tanjungbalai. Ali Umri and Maratua Simanjuntak won only in Mandailing Natal,

while Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe won in Labuhanbatu, South Tapanuli (Tapanuli Selatan),

Padangsidempuan, Nias and South Nias (Nias Selatan) (KPUD, 2008). The rainbow pairs

consisting of candidates combining Islam and Christianity won in the regions that were highly

populated by Christians and with the ethnic configurations of Toba-Batak, Karo, Simalungun,

and Pakpak. Tri Tamtomo and Benny Pasaribu won in the regencies of Simalungun,

Pematang Siantar, Karo and Samosir, while R.E. Siahaan and Suherdi won in the regions of

North Tapanuli (Tapanuli Utara), Humbang Hasundutan, Toba Samosir, Dairi, Pakpak

Bharat, Central Tapanuli (Tapanuli Tengah) and Sibolga (KPUD, 2008).

The victory of Syamsul Arifin was, indeed, supported by his domination of the East

Coast regions (daerah Pesisir Timur) which are also populous regions. Additionally, Tri

Tamtomo’s second place was related to the solid support of the Christian communities as well

as the north and central regions (Tapanuli Bagian Utara dan Tengah). But part of the

electoral support in this region went to R.E. Siahaan who was also a Christian candidate. By

contrast, Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe and Ali Umri had to share their electoral support in the

regions of the South (Tapanuli Bagian Selatan), the West Coast (Pesisir Barat), and Nias.138

138

Riza Fakhrumi Tahir, “Potensi Etno-Religiopolitik Pilkada 2013,” Waspada, 23 April 2013.

126

Figure 4. 1 The Result of 2008 Gubernatorial Election (based on regions)

Source: KPUD Sumatra Utara 2008

If one considers the configuration of ethnicities in the region, the Javanese constitute

the largest ethnic group, followed by Toba-Batak and Mandailing-Batak/Angkola. However,

the result of the 2008 gubernatorial election showed different patterns of voting behavior

among the three largest ethnic groups. The Toba-Batak gave their support to their own

political representatives (Toba’s candidates) as shown in the popular support for the pair of

Tri Tamtomo (Javanese) and Benny Pasaribu (Toba) and the pair of R.E. Siahaan (Toba) and

Suherdi (Javanese). Less consistent was the electoral support of the Mandailing Batak. On the

one hand, Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe (Mandailing) and R.M. Syafii (Javanese) obtained

significant support from this ethnic group if one considers Wahab as the representative of the

Mandailing Batak. Nevertheless, this ethnic group had also supported “outsiders” Ali Umri

(Malay) and Maratua Simanjuntak (Toba), who gained significant support in the Mandailing

regions. But the weakest correlation existed between the Javanese and their candidates. The

127

fact that Tri Tamtomo enjoyed significant success in the regions highly populated by Toba

could refer to the appeal of his running mate, Benny Pasaribu (Toba). Also the running mates

of RE Siahaan, Suherdi, and of Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe, RM Syafii, seemed to have

received only weak support from the Javanese living in North Sumatra, as their poor electoral

performance in regencies with strong Javanese population share seem to suggest.

Moreover, the weak affinity of the Javanese towards their own leaders is further

evidenced in the election of the region’s representatives for the National Senate (Dewan

Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). In the so far two terms of its existence (2004-2009 and 2009-

2014), Toba-Batak and Mandailing-Batak dominated the region’s members in the DPD, while

no Javanese leaders were elected.

According to one influential anthropologist, Usman Pelly of the State University of

Medan, the different patterns of ethnic support were driven by two important socio-

anthropological factors, particularly among the Toba-Batak and the Javanese. The first factor

is related to the difference in their communal structures. The Toba-Bataks are identified as

having great social cohesion, while the Javanese have a looser social structure. The second

factor is associated with the different mentalities of the Toba-Batak and the Javanese. The

Toba-Bataks have always been dominant and desired to be number one, while the Javanese

have been stereotyped by other ethnicities as having the character of a “silent-safety-

majority.” With this term Usman Pelly seeks to express that the Javanese are an ethnic group

which prefers to be silent, attributes great importance to safety and always seeks to constitute

the majority. This is related to the historical legacies of bitterness and trauma stemming from

the Javanese migration to the region, in the view of anthropologist Usman Pelly an important

factor for the Javanese feeling of “inferiority.”139

While historical legacies may explain the marginalized social position of the Javanese

in North Sumatra, so does history account for a markedly greater social cohesion of the Toba

Batak. Crucial is here the social revolution of 1946 and the subsequent Malay attempt to

create the State of North Sumatra (Negara Sumatra Timur) which resulted in fierce ethnic

violence. Van Langenberg (1982, 25) described this as follows:

“… considering the Javanese as uneducated, politically naive and hence, easily

“managed” by whoever controlled the political system as a whole, they (i.e. the

Malays in support of the NST, P.A.) saw little need for anything more than token

gestures. The Toba Batak were a much more immediate threat to the communal

interests which the NST sought to protect. Socially aggressive, relatively well-

educated, and communally cohesive via the mutually reinforcing institutions of clan

and church, the Toba Batak had begun moving in increasing numbers into East

139

Usman Pelly, “Mengapa Harus Jawa dan Batak Toba?,” Waspada, 27 March 2008.

128

Sumatra since the Japanese occupation."

“… consequently, so far as the NST elite were concerned, the Toba had to be denied

access to any real political power within the NST, but at the same time sufficiently

accommodated to minimize their alienation …”

Moreover, the cynical stereotype that has labeled the Javanese as low-class plantation contract

workers (Jawa Kontrak/Jakon or Jawa Deli/Jadel) adds to the lack of confidence on the part

of the Javanese in their social life.140

Historian Ichwan Azhari concurred with Pelly’s and

Langenberg’s argumentation, describing the Toba-Batak as follows:

“… the Tobas have a strong kinship system. The modern political systems can be

elastic, but this kinship system is far stronger. This kinship solidarity is stronger than

the political parties’ bond. As an example, we can find that someone from this group

could change their membership from one party to another, or could directly become

the member of one political party by using the kinship system to join this party. So, the

change of political regime from the New Order to the Reform era occurred, but the

kinship system still survived ...”

“… so they were not being adapted to the political system, but the political change can

be adapted into their social system. None of the ethnic groups in Indonesia is as great

as the Toba [in terms of adaptation and domination, P.A.].”141

Another related element is the strong kinship system among the Toba Batak that shapes their

political behavior and influences the aspiration to form their own province under the name of

Protap (Provinsi Tapanuli/the Province of Tapanuli). The decentralization policy in Indonesia

during democratization intersected with the growing desire for the creation of new local

governments, both at the provincial and regency levels. By the end of 2010, seven new

provinces, 164 new regencies, and thirty-four new cities had been established (Prasojo 2011).

The idea of forming the Protap and therefore being separated from the Province of North

Sumatra, however, failed after a tumultuous demonstration by its supporters which led to the

death of Azis Angkat, the chairman of the provincial parliament of North Sumatra.142

This

incident caused the central government to re-evaluate the policy of creating new local

governments (pemekaran).

Nevertheless, ethnic- and religious-based politics alone did not shape electoral

preferences. This can be seen in the strong support for Syamsul Arifin and Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe. The former was an experienced politician and the latter was a bureaucrat who

had strong networks both in social organizations and with political players. In both cases,

patronage and personal networks of the elites influenced their success at the polls. Another

140

“Ramai-ramai Memanipulasi Etnisitas,“ Kompas, 7 April 2008. 141

Interview with Ichwan Azhari, Medan, 4 May 2011. 142

“Massa Pendukung Provinsi Tapanuli Duduki DPRD Sumut,“ Kompas, 3 February 2009; “Usai Didemo,

Ketua DPRD Sumut Meninggal,” Kompas, 3 February 2009.

129

case was the success of Ali Umri-Maratua Simanjuntak in the southern part of the region,

which was dominated by Mandailing-Batak, an ethnic group with which none of the

candidates was affiliated. In this case, it appeared that the personal network of Amrun Daulay

(the Regent of Mandailing Natal and an influential member of the Golkar Party) had played

an important role in attracting popular support.143

Another event strongly characterized by ethnic and religious tension was the Medan

mayoral election of 2010. Tension was here related to the running of one Chinese-Buddhist

candidate, Sofyan Tan. Although the Chinese were the third largest ethnic group in the city

with 11.2 percent, after the Javanese (31.9 percent) and the Toba-Batak (14.7 percent), in the

political arena Chinese presence was marginal. Partly this must be attributed to the traumatic

experiences of the Chinese in the past. The communist coup in 1965 as well as the anti-

Chinese riots following the process of democratization could be seen as two reasons for their

low profile in the political arena. Therefore, in order to distance themselves from “political

turbulence” they preferred to distance themselves from political life. Although the Chinese

were alienated from the political arena, they dominated the economy. Moreover,

democratization provided an opportunity for them to enter the political system by running for

legislative and executive positions. Under these circumstances, Sofyan Tan, who was

previously known as a social activist, tried to compete in the mayoral election.

According to Aspinall, Detmann and Warburton, this mayoral election was

characterized by two stages with different patterns: In the first round of the elections, coalition

building and bargaining with regard to the ethnic background of the candidates dominated the

competition (Aspinall et al. 2011, 29). The second round was characterized by a high degree

of ethnic and religious contestation. In the first round, ten pairs of candidates were trying to

present a cross-ethnic background in order to attract popular support, while in the second

round the candidates competed by exploiting the issues of ethnicity and religion (Aspinall et

al. 2011). The second round saw competition between the pair of Rahudman Harahap and

Dzulmi Eldin and that of Sofyan Tan and Nelly Armayanti. Rahudman Harahap and Dzulmi

Eldin were both career bureaucrats and Muslims. The former was a Mandailing Batak, while

the latter a Malay. Sofyan Tan was an ethnic Chinese and Buddhist. Sofyan’s running mate,

Nelly Armayanti, was a university lecturer, a former commissioner of the local election

commission, and a woman of Minang ancestry. The major issue during the second round of

the election was Sofyan's Chinese background.

Although he faced corruption charges during his time in South Tapanuli (Tapanuli

143

Riza Fakhrumi Tahir, “Potensi Etno-Religiopolitik Pilkada 2013,” Waspada, 23 April 2013.

130

Selatan), Rahudman was backed by major political parties and influential political elites,

including the Governor, Syamsul Arifin. In contrast, Sofyan was backed by his party (PDI-P)

and was free from any allegation of corruption, since his career centered on social activism.

During the competition, therefore, he proposed a program to combat corruption.144

When the

voting day approached, both candidates intensively utilized religious symbols in order to gain

support and discredit their contenders.145

Religious activities in mosques around the city were

used as an effective instrument to attack the non-Muslim candidate, Sofyan Tan.146

Sofyan

also activated his Muslim supporters and Islamic religious teachers (ustadz) to counter the

campaign of his opponent. However, this counter-attack was ineffective as it was ineffective

to use Islamic scriptures to discredit his rivals. A supporter of Sofyan Tan acknowledged this

problem and told one local observer, Ahmad Taufan Damanik, the following:

“Which verses in the Qur’an should I use to convince the masses? We could use no

verses in the Qur’an. On the other hand, their religious teachers (who support

Rahudman) have used the effective verses, those who tell voters that Moslems have to

choose Muslims (leaders). How could we counter it, brother …?”147

The result of the election itself, as explained above, underscored a significant

difference in popular support for these two pairs of contestants. Rahudman-Dzulmi obtained a

comfortable majority and won the competition with 65.88 percent of the vote, while their

competitors received only 34.12 percent.

Public sentiment regarding Sofyan Tan’s Chineseness seemed to be the predominant

factor facilitating Rahudman’s victory. However, the issue was not wholly limited to Sofyan’s

ethnic identity as Chinese or Buddhist, which eventually induced Muslim voters to vote for

Rahudman. Public sentiment centered on the current dominant position of ethnic Chinese in

the economy. What if they conquered a superior position in the political domain? Besides, the

anti-Chinese riots during the process of democratization in 1998 that had resulted in most

Chinese leaving Medan and fleeing to neighboring countries had particularly become part of

the collective memory. This memory created sympathy for the Chinese, but also antipathy

since the Chinese exodus was interpreted as capital flight and, hence, an unpatriotic and

opportunistic attitude.148

This collective memory also provided people with a legitimation for

attacks on Sofyan Tan, even though his track record was clean and his programs were more

substantive compared to other candidates. One can thus argue that the track record, vision,

144

“Sofyan Tan Siap Digantung Jika Korupsi,” Waspada, 8 May 2010. 145

“Calon Walikota Medan Mainkan Isu SARA,” Waspada, 14 June 2010. 146

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 147

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 148

“WNI Turunan Eksodus ke Luar Negeri dan Hotel,” Waspada, 7 May 1998.

131

and programs of candidates can be overarched by the power of collective memory and

perception regarding ethnic identity.

Nevertheless, ethnic and religious politics could not exclusively explain the success of

Rahudman, although these factors surely contributed to his victory. These primordial

sentiments were closely related to transactional politics. Societal organizations, in particular

religious and ethnic-based organizations, served as intermediaries between elites and the

masses and could thus not become an independent or autonomous representation of civil

society. Local elites employed them as vehicles for mobilization when they needed symbolic

legitimation. On the other hand, the widespread concern over identity was useful for local

elites because of their desire to identify themselves as a part of their groups. Identity became a

requisite and a part of social legitimacy in order to gain popular support. What is more,

identities could also be manipulated by local elites who had not performed well in office or

who had violated the law and been charged with corruption, by arguing “he is our man.”149

3. Patronage and Personal Networks

The relationship between elites and their political clients in democratization was

theoretically elaborated by James Scott. Following modernization and the change in electoral

politics, patronage in the contemporary era, as compared to the traditional patron-client ties, is

characterized by less durable bonds, a lower ratio of affective to instrumental ties, and to

being more office-based (Scott 1972, 106). Evidence of the above-mentioned modern

character of patron-client relations could be observed in the relationship between Syamsul

Arifin and his confidants and clients. When Syamsul was the Regent of Langkat, he had two

close subordinates: M. Idaham, the head of the district-level office (Kepala Dinas) and Danny

Setiawan, his personal assistant in the regent’s office. With the success of Syamsul Arifin in

the gubernatorial election, these two close clients obtained new strategic posts. Idaham served

in the position of head of the district level (Kepala Dinas Pertamanan) in the capital, Medan,

while Danny earned a position as one of the Special Staff of the Governor (Staf Khusus

Gubernur). In 2010, these two subordinates of Syamsul competed in the mayoral election of

Binjai. They ran with the support of Syamsul Arifin, particularly financial backing and

provision of political party support. The competition itself resulted in the victory of Idaham as

Mayor and the disappointment of Danny. Danny’s defeat, according to a personal

conversation with him, was predominantly caused by Syamsul Arifin’s half-hearted support

of him. Danny also thought that Syamsul ultimately gave his support to Idaham. Just months

149

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011.

132

after Idaham’s victory in 2010, Syamsul Arifin was arrested on charges of corruption.

The corruption of Syamsul Arifin was closely related to elite competition, including

that of his running mate, Gatot Pujo Nugroho. Syamsul and his supporters believed that Gatot

and his party, PKS, were behind the plot to send Syamsul to jail, although Gatot and his

supporters denied this claim.150

Idaham, for his part, after Syamsul Arifin went to prison, tried

to restore his relationship with Gatot151

who after Syamsul was imprisoned, became Acting

Governor. At that time Idaham served as mayor of Binjai. Idaham’s move could be easily be

seen as a shift of political loyalty and an effort to align himself with the most powerful

politician in order to secure his own position. This case illustrated why patronage networks

can be characterized as fluid, instrumental, coercive, and non-durable. On the other hand, the

rise and fall of political patrons correspondingly influenced the ensuing patronage pyramids.

Persistent alignments and re-alignments also characterized the political careers of Ali

Umri, Syamsul Arifin and Abdillah. As the candidate of the Golkar Party in the gubernatorial

election of 2008, Umri formally received support by the majority of Golkar politicians and

was also backed by the DPP’ national board due to his position as the party‘s Regional

Chairman. Nevertheless, after his electoral defeat by Syamsul Arifin, Umri also had to give up

his position as Regional Chairman of the party, which then went to Syamsul. Interestingly,

Syamsul was fired from the party because he ran for the governorship as a nominee of other

political parties. Most politicians, who previously supported Umri, shifted their loyalty to

Syamsul.

A similar situation occurred when Syamsul Arifin was imprisoned. Some of his clients

shifted their support to the new Acting Regional Chairman, Andi Ahmad Dara. Other clients

and followers continued supporting Syamsul. This situation led to high tension, internal

conflict, and factionalism in the party. As a result, the DPD (regional board), with the backing

of the DPP (central board), fired some of Syamsul’s followers due to their demand for an

extraordinary party congress (Musdalub, Musyawarah Daerah Luar Biasa) to replace Andi

Ahmad Dara as the local party leader.152

A similar trajectory of events can be observed in the case of Abdillah. When Abdillah

held the position of mayor of Medan, his clients admired him, but after he was charged with

corruption some of his followers shifted their loyalty to Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe or Syamsul

150

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Hardi Mulyono, Medan, 3 May 2011;

interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Medan, 2 May 2011; interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 24

April 2011. 151

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 24 April 2011. 152

“Panas Menjelang Pilgubsu 2013: Golkar Sumut Terbelah Tiga,” Sumut Pos, 3 April 2012; “Kelompok 55

Desak Musdalub,” Sumut Pos, 4 April 2012,

133

Arifin.153

The reasons for this shift must be attributed to material benefits and concern for

securing their political positions. This highlighted the opportunistic attitude of his clients

toward their political patron.154

These scenarios encourage one to rethink the conventional

wisdom in patronage analyses, which often highlight the superior position of political patrons

towards their clients. Democratization provides a political opportunity for clients to improve

their bargaining position in relation to their patrons by applying temporary or short-term

loyalty with fluid, opportunistic, volatile and fluctuating political bonds.

Moreover, short-term patronage ties also shaped the relationship between Syamsul

Arifin and Rahudman Harahap. Syamsul was known as a politician who had an established

and strong personal network with politicians, leaders of social organizations, and local

journalists, which thrived on material inducements and affective engagements. Idaham and

Danny, for instance, had been closely and personally related to Syamsul for a long time.

However, Syamsul’s relationship with Rahudman was different. Since they were

developing political and bureaucratic careers in different regencies, Syamsul and Rahudman

had never had direct contact or a personal relationship. Before Rahudman moved to Medan

for a new bureaucratic position, he was part of the inner-elite nucleus in Medan and North

Sumatra. As governor, Syamsul promoted Rahudman to Acting Mayor of Medan, which

invited speculation among observers regarding Syamsul’s motives. According to one local

observer, Ahmad Taufan Damanik, material and transactional motives played a major role. By

appointing a newcomer, Syamsul could more freely gain material benefits from Rahudman

because they were not personally close. If he had asked for such material benefits directly

from his close associates, he would have needed to be more restrained.155

This argument is

quite persuasive in light of Syamsul’s choice of another new political player, Gatot Pujo

Nugroho, who became his running mate in the 2008 gubernatorial election. By promoting

newcomers, it appeared to Syamsul that he could more easily control them without

jeopardizing his position as primus inter pares in regional politics. In contrast to this

argument, one local politician who had a close relationship with Syamsul Arifin, Fadly Nurzal

of the PPP, stated that the appointment of Rahudman reflected a blunder on the part of

Syamsul and showed Rahudman’s shrewdness. That is to say that Syamsul was being cheated

by Rahudman.156

However, both arguments were challenged by another local observer, Muryanto Amin,

153

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 154

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 155

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 24 April 2011 and 30 April 2011. 156

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011.

134

who proposed that both actors - Syamsul and Rahudman - were mutually exploiting each

other and both had taken political advantage of the other.157

While Syamsul obtained material

benefits and loyalty from Rahudman, Rahudman gained political support from Syamsul. This

argument is plausible due the fact that both leaders were long-experienced political players in

different regions. Their relationship was instrumental and characterized by short-term strategy

and a lack of affection.

The changing characteristics of patronage cannot be treated as an isolated

phenomenon. However, to generalize regarding the pattern of patronage is rather difficult due

to the existence of contradictory evidence. Despite the volatile and opportunistic nature of

these relationships, patronage networks may also be marked by political ethics and affective

imperatives among political actors. This can be observed in the attitude of clients who did not

offensively attack their former patron, but simply shifted their loyalty to a new patron.

Empirical evidence of affective ties existed between Abdillah and al-Washliyah (one of the

biggest Islamic organizations in North Sumatra) and also between Syamsul Arifin and several

local politicians and journalists. Although Abdillah was left powerless after he faced

corruption charges, Al-Washliyah has never showed an intention of attacking him.158

A

similar situation occurred in the relationship between Syamsul Arifin and several local

politicians who still supported him. For them, Syamsul’s corruption had not eradicated his

appeal as a popular leader, a man perceived as having a close relationship with the people.159

In another example, several local journalists had established personal relationships with

Syamsul over a long time and accordingly identified themselves as his supporters. Syamsul’s

ability to build an inclusive relationship strengthened their affective bonds. This ability to

create affective bonds could not instantly be imitated or copied by his successor, Gatot Pujo

Nugroho, who practiced a different leadership style and was seen also as a newcomer and an

“outsider” in the local political arena. Ahmad Taufan Damanik, who was close to Nugroho,

explained:

“In the past, when Syamsul was nothing, he was our friend. When some local

journalists met Gatot, they simply talked: ‘Sorry Mr. Gatot, we are supporting Mr.

Syamsul because he is our friend …’ So, this means that they have a loyalty, although

they were also rational and could replace their loyalty. However, to a certain limit,

they would keep their loyalties and they do not want to attack Syamsul …”160

This statement clearly shows that the duration and quality of relationships influence patronage

157

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2011. 158

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 159

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011; interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011;

interview with Hardi Mulyono, Medan, 3 May 2011; interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011. 160

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011.

135

networks. To some extent, patrons are not only seen as the guarantor or protector of clients’

interests, but also as an embedded part of their group’s identity. Patrons are also “friends.”

Another episode from the gubernatorial election of 2008 centers on Truna Jasa Said,

the owner of the oldest and the most influential local newspaper in the region, Waspada.

During the campaign, Truna supported Ali Umri, and this support was perceived to be based

on material benefits.161

However, Truna also had a close personal relationship with Syamsul

Arifin. Because of this, Truna did not attack Syamsul during the campaign. After Syamsul’s

victory, Truna defected to Syamsul without discrediting Ali Umri, and the reasons for this

shift of support were presented in his newspaper.162

We may thus conclude that patronage networks have functioned by combining the

material or transactional bases and affective bonds. Political actors have bound themselves to

this network not only for material reasons, but also out of respect and ethical concerns. These

findings suggest that patronage in democratic regimes adopts a more problematic and

complex nature.

Conventional wisdom among scholars regards patronage, personal networks and

informal institutions as impairing democratic consolidation (O’Donnell 1996; Fox 1994).

According to these beliefs, patronage and informal institutions strongly erode formal

democratic institutions. However, less attention has been paid to the social construction of

patronage itself. The phenomenon of patronage in North Sumatra cannot be considered

without a discussion on the concept of populism (a more in-depth discussion can be found in

the subsequent section on ideational contestation). An anthropologist, Usman Pelly, best

captured this aspect on the relation of patronage and populist leadership of Syamsul Arifin

and Abdillah as follows:

“… So, we have to make a difference between Robin Hood and the mafia. Syamsul is

a Robin Hood who robs money and shares it. Most of those who received that money

were religious leaders. And they just simply thought that the money was useful for the

good of everyone, to build mosques, and other things. So, they thought it was not

important to talk about from where that money came. The most important thing was

that we need that money for people who are sick and poor. They need help. Syamsul

was also aware that the money came from corruption. Therefore, for the religious

leaders, that money was not forbidden (haram) and not un-forbidden (halal), that was

money in the middle. So, it was unclear (makruh) money and could be justified to be

used and just take it. Therefore, Syamsul offered this unclear money. So, he was

known as a Robin Hood although he was not our man, but his disappearance made us

miss him. This is like solidarity. There was no mosque without attention, no religious

leader who died because of hunger, same for the poor. So, these kindnesses have

161

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 162

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011.

136

dominated the religious consciousness …”163

“… Abdillah, in the perception of religious leaders, was a Godfather. There were no

activities in the mosques without his donation, no difficulties without solution, and

also the attention to the poor and the religious leaders. In this context, he was seen not

as the mafia, but as a Robin Hood …”164

Usman Pelly’s account of the religious leaders’ perception of Syamsul Arifin and Abdillah

shows the deeply rooted societal consciousness regarding patronage. Relevant to this context,

public perception of local elites was highly dependent on whether and how far they provided a

rapid solution for the basic needs of the people through their patronage network. This means

that patronage has emerged and survived because the patrons have offered a shortcut that is

perceived as legitimate, could be normatively accepted, and is not sophisticated.165

Moreover,

patronage more likely flourished due to the weak capacity of the state to provide the basic

needs and care for the social welfare of the people. Yet, democracy is seen simply as

complicated and failing to accommodate the urgent and real needs of the people. In short,

patronage could be treated as one solution to provide for the basic needs of the people. Usman

Pelly continues his description as follows:

“… He [Syamsul Arifin, P.A.] was always been seen as a solution to the problems

which could not be solved by the central government, and the central government was

regarded as paying no attention to the people in the region …”166

Furthermore, religious leaders and informal leaders as well as ordinary people by their

prayers showed their sympathy and attention for Syamsul Arifin and Abdillah when they were

charged with corruption.167

The affective relationship was manifested the moment Abdillah

was freed from prison in Jakarta. His arrival at the Polonia Airport in Medan was greeted by

an enthusiastic and emotional response from the gathered crowd.168

Some of the people even

cried. It is entirely clear that populist leadership coupled with a strong personal network has

become one important indicator for the success of local elites in the region. This populism,

combining the characteristics of personal generosity, the lack of state distributive capacity,

and the corruptive local elites, resembling the story of Robin Hood, emerged in the era of

democratization. Despite the fact that clientelism is generally viewed as endangering the

163

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011. 164

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011. 165

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011. 166

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011. 167

“Jamaah Haji Doakan Syamsul,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 24 October 2010 (accessed 12 December

2011); “Langkat Doakan Syamsul Arifin,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 1 November 2010 (accessed 12

December 2011); “Tukang Becak Doakan Syamsul,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 24 October 2010

(accessed 12 December 2011). 168

“Abdillah Masih Dicintai,” Waspada, 3 June 2010.

137

future of democracy, its structure still works at least unconsciously in the minds of elites and

the masses.

One can thus state that patronage is a product of the inadequate distributive capacity of

the state. The patrons did not behave as the representatives of the state, but rather as leaders

relying on their personal charisma. Therefore, the services of patrons providing material

incentives and protection elicit a response in the form of client loyalty. Additionally, since

patronage networks were not established in the short term and require a reciprocal and

continuous relationship, the notion of material interest as the one and only independent

baseline of these social ties seems to be an oversimplification. These networks are intertwined

with both instrumental and affective motives. On the one hand, this becomes evident when

local elites provide material benefits for clients; on the other, clients express their sympathy to

their patron when they face legal issues.

4. The Hobbesian Nature of Inter-Elite Competition

As previously described, competition among local political elites became more evident

following the process of democratization. Mietzner concludes that “the local elections

empowered Indonesian voters to have a significant say in the outcome of inter-elite

competition for political and economic power” (Mietzner 2010, 189). In the New Order era,

political recruitment for formal political offices was largely restricted to military officers and

local bureaucrats. In the post-New Order era, the candidates who competed in the direct local

elections came from various backgrounds ranging from local bureaucrats, military officers,

businesspersons, politicians, professionals, academicians, and NGO activists. However, this

enhanced political opportunity did not translate into an equal chance of winning the contest.

The reason behind this is that direct local elections demand superior financial resources,

popularity of the candidate, an established social network, and a trustworthy track record of

the candidate. As a result, most local chief executives came from the established groups of

local elites.

Inter-elite competition had a character of open competition that often led to a zero-sum

game situation. The corruption of local elites that emerged during the process of

democratizing the local political arena is one crucial instrument in the competition. In

Syamsul Arifin’s corruption case, two relevant issues of inter-elite competition could be

identified. The first issue is connected to the conflict between Syamsul and his vice governor,

Gatot Pujo Nugroho, which also involved their supporters, in particular the Golkar Party and

PKS. The second issue is related to the conflict between Syamsul and Rahmat Shah, a

138

businessperson from the Shah family and a member of the National Senate (Dewan

Perwakilan Daerah/DPD) from North Sumatra.

The charge of corruption against Syamsul began with the findings of the Financial

Inspection Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/BPK) regarding the misuse of the local budget

of the Regency of Langkat where Syamsul held the position of Regent for two terms from

1999 to 2007. The embezzled money amounted to about 98.7 billion rupiahs, and according to

the prosecutor, Syamsul used the money for personal and family purposes as well as sharing it

with local politicians, leaders of social organizations, local journalists, and other people in his

political network.169

After the investigation of the BPK, his case was later transferred to the

Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK) and this

commission investigated Syamsul in October 2010, convicting him of corruption related to

the local budget of Langkat.170

As a result of the trial, the KPK decided to send him to jail on

22 October 2010.171

Responses from local politicians, leaders of social organizations, and

common people emerged regarding Syamsul’s detention. Most of them expressed their

sympathies to Syamsul, and some local politicians and local leaders came to Jakarta to visit

him in prison.172

Beyond the fact that Syamsul was convicted and sentenced by the court,173

there were

rumors and speculation among political actors in the region about the desire of Syamsul’s

political enemies to outmaneuver him and take advantage of his corruption case. Gatot Pujo

Nugroho, the vice governor, his party leaders of PKS, and Rahmat Shah stood to benefit from

Syamsul’s demise. Beyond these two parties, several local elite personalities promoted the

169

“Syamsul Arifin Didakwa Korupsi Rp. 98.7 M,” available at: www.suarapembaruan.com, 14 March 2011,

(accessed 12 December 2011)). 170

“KPK Periksa Tersangka Syamsul Arifin 11 October,“ available at: www.news.detik.com, 7 October 2010,

(accessed 12 December 2011). 171

“Syamsul Arifin Akhirnya Ditahan,” available at: www.kompas.com, 22 October 2010, (accessed 12

December 2011)). 172

“Sejumlah Tokoh Terkejut Syamsul Arifin Ditahan,” available at: www.antaranews.com, 22 October 2010,

(accessed 12 December 2012); “Penanahan Syamsul Arifin Tuai Keprihatinan,” available at:

www,waspada.co.id, 24 October 2010, (accessed 12 December 2011); “DPRD Sumut dan MUI Prihatin,”

www.seputar-indonesia.com, 24 October 2010, (accessed 12 December 2011); “I miss governor Syamsul’s

figure, Gatot says,” www.waspada.co.id, 28 October 2010 (accessed 12 December 2011); “Langkat Doakan

Syamsul,”www.waspada.co.id, 1 November 2010 (accessed 12 December 2011); “Jamaah Haji Doakan

Syamsul,” www.waspada.co.id, 24 October 2010 (accessed 12 December 2011); “Langkat Doakan Syamsul

Arifin,” www.waspada.co.id, 1 November 2010 (accessed 12 December 2011); “Tukang Becak Doakan

Syamsul,” www.waspada.co.id, 24 October 2010 (accessed 12 December 2011). 173

Syamsul was sentenced for two-and-a-half years in the corruption court (Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi)

on 15 August 2011. After his appeal to the court, the court’s sentence was extended to 4 years. Finally, in the

Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung), his case was rejected, and the Court issued an even longer sentence of 6

years. For all this information, see, “Syamsul Arifin Divonis 2 Tahun 6 Bulan,” www.kompas.com, 16 August

2011 (accessed 13 December 2011); “Hukuman Syamsul Arifin Jadi 4 Tahun,” www.kompas.com, 13 December

2011 (accessed 13 December 2011); “MA Perberat Hukuman untuk Syamsul Arifin,” www.kompas.com, 5 May

2012 (accessed 2 April 2013); “Divonis Korupsi, Gubernur Sumut Diberhentikan,” www.kompas.com, 1

November 2012 (accessed 13 December 2012).

139

charge of corruption against Syamsul such as Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe who was defeated by

Syamsul in the gubernatorial election of 2008. Nevertheless, the behavior of Gatot and

Rahmat is quite illustrative for the discussion of local elite competition.

Under the slogan of Syampurno (an abbreviation of their two names), the pair of

candidates Syamsul Arifin and Gatot Pujo Nugroho ran for gubernatorial election in 2008.

However, the tension between them and their supporters began already during the candidacy.

Responding to the rejection of the Golkar Party, Syamsul tried to build a new coalition of

political parties to nominate him in the election. Major support came from Islamic parties, in

particular PPP, the Crescent Moon and Star Party/ Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), PAN and

PBR, but another nationalist party (the Patriot Party) also initially supported Syamsul’s

candidacy. Nevertheless, PAN and PBR eventually moved their support to Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe. The problem came when the coalition discussed the candidates for vice

governor. PKS itself was the party that seriously built the coalition among the Islamic

political parties, and therefore had to decide whether to support Syamsul Arifin or Abdul

Wahab Dalimunthe. After negotiation, PKS joined the coalition of Islamic parties and

proposed Gatot Pujo Nugroho as a candidate for vice governor. At that time, Gatot held a

strategic position in PKS as the Regional Chairman of the party. The nomination of Gatot

itself was seen as a success of PKS in the negotiation, because other parties such as PPP and

PBB, which had joined the coalition earlier, failed to promote their candidates. It is widely

believed that Syamsul spent a large amount of money to buy the ticket from the coalition and

Gatot’s proposal to be his running mate seemed to be an optimal political bargain for PKS.

This initial phase of the candidate recruitment triggered a side effect. While Gatot and

PKS had profited from the deals described above, the other members of the coalition became

envious. With the inclusion of one of their members in the election ticket and material

inducements, in the view of some political parties (particularly PPP-affiliated local elites)

PKS gained too much, whereas other parties only obtained minor pay-offs for supporting the

Syamsul-Gatot ticket. For Syamsul, the benefits given to Gatot and PKS were meant as the

ultimate compensation. With this, Syamsul hoped that PKS would support the government

under his rule and that they would not get involved in politicking and interfere in the

distribution of governmental largesse that he would allocate to his clients.174

Syamsul’s choice of Gatot as his running mate might also be related to the fact that

Gatot was a political novice. Gatot’s lack of political experience could benefit Syamsul as it

174

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 24

April 2011.

140

would impair risky political maneuvers by his running mate once they were in power.175

It

seemed that Syamsul sought to control all strategic decisions in the province and hoped that

Gatot would follow his instructions. But also for Gatot and the PKS the decision to choose

Syamsul as a partner was a cunning move which was seemingly related to Syamsul’s

readiness to provide a dowry (mahar) as reward for their support. Syamsul was perceived as a

popular figure with strong political networks, which would increase the prospects for victory.

In short, the relationship between Syamsul, on the one hand, and Gatot-PKS, on the other,

was strongly motivated by pragmatic reasons, rather than personal or ideological ties.

Nevertheless, after the Syamsul-Gatot ticket was eventually elected and started to

govern, Syamsul’s original high expectations of Gatot did not materialize. Gatot and the PKS

behaved disloyally towards him and wanted a greater part in managing governmental affairs.

This feeling increased when Syamsul was charged with corruption. In his view, and that of his

supporters, Gatot and PKS politically maneuvered to increase the difficulties for Syamsul.

More than that, they perceived Gatot and the PKS as playing an active role in discrediting

Syamsul.176

This perception was discussed among political actors and even published in the

local media, even though Gatot and PKS refuted these allegations.177

However, the conflict

between these two political camps could not be resolved easily, even with Syamsul in prison.

Several issues emerged following the transfer of power from Syamsul Arifin to Gatot

Pujo Nugroho. The central issue was the replacement of personnel in the local bureaucracy.

After taking the position of Acting Governor, Gatot replaced some of the heads of provincial

offices (Kepala Dinas/Kepala Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah). According to him, they were

not qualified for office.178

Gatot’s decision to replace his bureaucratic subordinates and

initiate bureaucratic reform gave credence to the widely circulating rumor that under his

predecessor bureaucratic offices were for sale.179

Syamsul and his supporters denied these

accusations. Syamsul and his supporters considered Gatot’s own political scheming as a form

of disloyalty and opposition to Syamsul.

However, Syamsul’s rift with Gatot was related also to other issues with financial and

political implications. Control over bureaucratic structures has long been perceived as

strategic in the allocation of local government projects as the heads of provincial offices may

175

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 24 April 2011. 176

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Hardi Mulyono, Medan, 3 May 2011;

see also “Syamsul Dicekal, KPK Asal-Asalan!,” Waspada, 10 May 2010; Riza Fakhrumi Tahir, “Disharmoni

Gubsu-Wagubsu,” Waspada, 3 March 2011. 177

Interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Medan, 3 May 2011, interview with Sigit Pramono Asri, Medan, 3 May

2011, interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011 and 30 April 2011. 178

Interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Medan, 3 May 2011. 179

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011.

141

create new projects or at least retain their previous programs. This means that the position of

Head of Provincial Offices (Kepala Dinas) under the governor’s authority was an important

post to control. Among political observers it was widely believed that local political elites had

intervened in the bureaucratic projects for the benefit of their political and economic interests.

This became especially evident as money politics and the sale of strategic positions grew.180

In addition, when corruption charges against Syamsul emerged, observers believed that gains

derived from the recruitment of top-level local bureaucrats were on the rise. This assumption

was further confirmed by the fact that Syamsul had to return the money which had been

embezzled - more than 60 billion rupiahs from the total of 98.7 billion rupiahs (approximately

US$8.6 million) allegedly squandered.181

This means that bureaucratic posts had become an

important commodity that could generate additional revenues for political elites. Accordingly,

the projects allocated by these officials would also contribute to the long-term financial gain

of political elites.

The conflict between these two political camps spread to another issue. After

criticizing Gatot’s decision to replace some heads of provincial offices, Syamsul’s supporters

publicly portrayed Gatot as a disloyal person182

who could not show gratitude in response to

the kindness of Syamsul, his political superior, who promoted Gatot’s political career. More

than that, Gatot was branded a traitor,183

who lacked political ethics because he did not come

and visit Syamsul in jail, even just to show his sympathy. These charges circulated in the local

media and seemed to be an effective instrument for politically pressuring Gatot and the PKS.

Gatot and the PKS elites responded by stating that this political attack was related to a hidden

agenda of preserving the economic interests of Syamsul’s group.

Consequently, the conflict following the change in the position of governor dragged

on for quite some time and eventually led to a new political equilibrium. Initially Gatot’s

camp guaranteed Syamsul’s group a part in the allocation of projects in exchange for not

openly attacking Gatot in the public media. Yet since Gatot held the formal position of Acting

Governor, slowly but surely his grip on power strengthened. Contributing to this situation was

the fact that most of the big political parties in the provincial parliament, such as the PDI-P,

the Demokrat Party, or the PPP, tended to be more willing to accept Gatot’s leadership. In the

180

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011. 181

“Gubernur Sumut Syamsul Arifin Pernah Kembalikan Uang Rp. 60 M,“ available at: www.news.detik.com, 20

April 2010, (accessed 2 April 2013); “KPK Dalami Kasus Syamsul Arifin,” available at:

www.suaramerdeka.com, 22 April 2010, (accessed 2 April 2013). 182

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Hardi Mulyono, Medan, 3 May 2011;

Riza Fakhrumi Tahir “Miskalkulasi Syamsul Terhadap Gatot,” Harian Analisa, 14 May 2011. 183

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Hardi Mulyono, Medan, 3 May 2011;

see also Riza Fakhrumi Tahir, “Miskalkulasi Syamsul Terhadap Gatot,” Harian Analisa, 14 May 2011.

142

Golkar Party, of which Syamsul was the leader, his die-hard followers still took a defying

stance toward Gatot. However, the political situation became more difficult for them when the

central party appointed Andi Ahmad Dara as Acting Regional Chairman, replacing Syamsul.

Andi himself was neither a local politician from North Sumatra, nor a person who had a

personal relation with Syamsul. This condition led to an internal conflict between Syamsul’s

followers in the party and Andi Ahmad Dara who was supported by a set of new functionaries

loyal to him. Under the leadership of Hardi Mulyono, Syamsul’s followers responded to this

unfavorable situation by demanding that the central party convene an extraordinary party

congress (Musyawarah Daerah Luar Biasa) to replace the leadership of Andi.184

The conflict

ended with the dismissal of Syamsul’s followers in the party shortly before the nomination for

the candidates in the gubernatorial election of 2013.185

These developments suggest that following his imprisonment Syamsul’s and the

Golkar Party’s power dwindled. This development was further corroborated by the permanent

verdict of the court to punish Syamsul for corruption, which consequently led to the

enactment of the Presidential Decision No.95/P/2012 in October 2012 to formally dismiss

Syamsul Arifin from the position of governor. This decision further accelerated Syamsul’s

political decline.186

It led to the need for the inauguration of Gatot as Governor which was

approved in the plenary session of the provincial parliament on 27 November 2012. All

factions in the provincial parliament agreed to inaugurate Gatot as Governor.187

However, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at the opinions of local legislators.

Some of them still had esteem for Syamsul. Parluhutan Siregar from PAN, for instance,

agreed to support the presidential decision, but expressed his thanks for Syamsul’s

commitment for the province. Similarly to Siregar, one PPP politician, Ahmad Hosen

Hutagalung, also complied, but urged Gatot to keep open communication channels

(silaturahmi) with Syamsul Arifin. Yan Syahrin from the Gerindra Bulan Bintang Reformasi

faction likewise agreed to vote for Gatot as governor.188

Yet he thanked Syamsul for his

leadership and insisted that the provincial parliament should also take note of Syamsul’s legal

fight to prove his innocence in the corruption case. In short, it can be stated that although

184

“Kelompok 55 Desak Musdalub,” Sumut Pos, 4 April 2012, “Golkar Sumut Terbelah Tiga,” Sumut Pos, 3

April 2012. 185

“12 Pengurus Golkar Sumut Dipecat,” 5 May 2012, available at: www.jppn.com, (accessed 2 April 2013);

“Belasan Pengurus Harian Golkar Sumut Diberhentikan,” available at: www.analisadaily.com, 5 May 2012,

(accessed 2 April 2013). 186

“Syamsul Arifin Dicopot dari Jabatan Gubernur Sumut,” available at: www.us.nasional.news.viva.co.id, 1

November 2012 (accessed 2 April 2013). 187

“DPRD Sumut Usulkan Gatot jadi Gubsu,” available at: www.inimedanbung.com, 27 November 2012

(accessed 2 April 2013). 188

Ibid.

143

Syamsul’s political influence lessened due to the loss of his formal position as Governor, he

still commanded respect from local politicians in the region. This fact confirms the paramount

aspect of longstanding and affective relational ties among political actors to which I have

referred already above.

Furthermore, the corruption case of Syamsul cannot be discussed in isolation from his

conflict with Rahmat Shah, a member of the National Senate (DPD) from North Sumatra.

Rahmat was known as a businessperson who came from a wealthy business family. During

the gubernatorial election in 2008, the members of this family supported different candidates.

According to some local politicians and political observers, the oldest member, Anif Shah,

supported many candidates, but particularly showed his support to Syamsul.189

Maherban

Shah, his younger brother and leader of the youth organization Community for Indonesian

National Principles (MPI/Masyarakat Pancasila Indonesia) supported Ali Umri. Anuar Shah

(the leader of the Pancasila Youth/Pemuda Pancasila) and Ajib Shah (a local legislator)

reportedly supported Syamsul, while Rahmat Shah supported Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe.190

Conflict between Syamsul and Rahmat was triggered by a land dispute. North Sumatra

is one of the regions with a high rate of land disputes that are either fought between the state

and its citizens or citizen against citizen. Arguments regarding land ownership between

Rahmat (a private citizen) and Syamsul (the Governor) led to a personal conflict. The conflict

peaked when local media published a story stating that Rahmat came to meet Syamsul in his

office and brandished a gun as a means to threaten Syamsul.191

After this event, both men

attacked each other in the local media. Syamsul claimed that Rahmat threatened him with a

gun, while Rahmat denied the allegations, calling Syamsul a liar.192

Their conflict intensified

when Rahmat became one of Syamsul’s detractors.193

More than that, Rahmat even admitted

that he took an active role in publishing Syamsul’s corruption case and being the one who

sent the report to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).194

For Rahmat, Syamsul

was not only a corrupt politician but also a public liar and one who created disunity among

189

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011; interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 190

Interview with Rahmat Shah, Medan, 20 February 2012, this information was also confirmed by Syamsul

Arifin in an interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 191

“Pistol Rahmat Shah untuk Syamsul,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 22 April 2010 (accessed 2 April

2013). 192

“Syamsul ‘anaktirikan’ Sumut,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 30 April 2010, (accessed2 April 2013);

“Rahmat Shah: Syamsul Arifin Pemfitnah, Pantas Diadili,” available at: www.medanpunya.com, 24 April 2010,

(accessed 2 April 2013); “Rahmat Shah: Fitnah Syamsul akan Terungkap,” available at: www.waspada.co.id, 29

April 2010, (accessed2 April 2013); “Rahmat Shah: Syamsul Munafik,” available at: www.sumutcyber.com, 24

April 2010, (accessed 2 April 2013); “Rahmat Shah vs Syamsul Arifin,” available at: www.medansatu.com, 23

April 2010, (accessed2 April 2013). 193

“Anggota DPD Sumut Ikut Beberkan Bukti Korupsi Syamsul Arifin,” available at: www.news.detik.com, 24

April 2010, (accessed 2 April 2013). 194

Interview with Rahmat Shah, Medan, 20 February 2012.

144

social leaders.195

The conflict ended, as we have seen, with the decision of the KPK to

examine Syamsul as a suspect charged with corruption and, later, the central board of the

Golkar Party temporarily discharging him as the party’s Regional Chairman in April 2010.

Syamsul believed that his imprisonment was celebrated by Rahmat and his brother, the leader

of MPI, Maherban Shah:

“… when I got arrested, there was one youth organization which held a celebration of

‘cut the buffalo’. Was it the Pancasilaist attitude? Was it in consonance with religious

values? And I read in a newspaper that one senator even paid for the meal for one

week in a tavern because he was happy that I was discharged as the Chairman of the

Golkar Party. What was his business; he was not a member [of the Golkar Party,

P.A.]. And this was connected to the ‘cut the bull’ celebration …”196

The celebration over Syamsul’s prosecution as a suspect of corruption and his discharge from

the leadership of the Golkar Party was published in the local media. The Branch of Langkat of

the Community for Indonesian National Principles (Masyarakat Pancasila Indonesia, MPI),

the region where Syamsul had served as Regent, celebrated Syamsul’s prosecution and

discharge from the Golkar Party by distributing food (sembako) to the poor.197

However,

Rahmat retorted by stating that the celebration never occurred.198

To conclude, Syamsul

Arifin’s corruption case cannot be isolated from the political interests of local elites in the

region. In this corruption case, various political enemies had a single short-term goal: the

removal of Syamsul from his position as Governor.199

IV. Elite and Ideational Contestation

The following section – in line with the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2 – leaves

the material perspective of analysis highlighted by structural and actor-centered approaches to

the theme of elite adjustment. It argues that elite behaviour also strongly rests on ideas and

norms, which in a dynamic process are negotiated among elites and which, hence, are prone

to change. In how far elite adjustment after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime is

also the result of ideational change is discussed in this section.

A. Proximity to the People

North Sumatra is home to various local beliefs stemming from its cultural diversity.

Therefore, it is difficult to simply state that one cultural identity is representative of the whole

195

Interview with Rahmat Shah, Medan, 20 February 2012. 196

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 197

“MPI Buat Syukuran Untuk Syamsul,” available at: www.sumutcyber.com, 9 August 2010, (accessed2 April

2013). 198

“Rahmat Shah Membantah,” www.medansatu.com, 23 April 2010, (accessed 2 April 2013). 199

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011.

145

population. However, people in North Sumatra share, to some extent, a general normative

baseline, particularly with regard to political issues and their elites. Moreover, social norms

and traditional customs are not only naturally present in politics, but have also influenced it.

Inter-generationally inherited local traditions are preserved as standard norms and have

become a part of local social identity. These local norms have entered, influenced and

determined political activities including the daily political activities of political actors, their

political communication, political competition, the working of formal institutions, and the

decision-making process. Moreover, these local traditions and norms have influenced the

public mindset toward elites, including how the public interprets the behavior of political

elites.

Based on the empirical findings, I argue that the region has particularly important local

norms regarding the relationship between elites and the masses. The most important cognitive

element in the region is proximity to the people, which is strongly interconnected with other

local norms: the notion of generous leaders, the centrality of egalitarian social relations,

informality and simplicity in the communication, shared identities for the achievement of

symbolic legitimacy, the image of elites as religious persons, and a non-offensive political

approach.

In direct local elections in the region, proximity to the people and elite social

engagement are identified as being among the most important aspects in gaining popular

support. This means that neither the strength of political machines such as political parties,

mass organizations, or media support, nor the involvement in transactional politics alone, are

considered sufficient for the success of local elites in their competition. The local political

actors usually expressed this condition in simple terms: “... although everything needs money,

money obviously is not everything …”200

Proximity to the people and people-orientation can be seen as a paramount feature of

social relations in most collectivist societies (see above, Chapter 3). In this type of society,

leaders are perceived as “fathers” by members of the community. As the fathers, elites are

considered to be social protectors and economic helpers of the people. This local conception

is considerably different from the Western concept of political elites, who normally work as

public servants and are bound by impersonal and legal-formal regulations. This idea of

proximity to the people has emerged in local elections where local elites have attempted to

build social engagement and personal intimacy with the people in the region. During the

gubernatorial election of 2008, almost all candidates cultivated an image of people-oriented

200

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011.

146

leadership through discursive political practices, trying to make the impression that they were

attentive to the poor and would improve their condition. The pairing of Syamsul Arifin and

Gatot Pujo Nugroho promised that their leadership would create conditions where people

were not hungry, sick, or uneducated, and where they have a future.201

Of all the candidates,

Syamsul was the one with the strongest image as a people-oriented leader. During the

campaign he not only delivered political messages through words and promises, but he also

dramatized his populist character by shedding tears to show his sympathy for the poor, eating

food that is usually consumed by the poor, and talking about his past personal story of poverty

when he worked as a street cake seller or a skiff cleaner.202

Similarly to Syamsul, and to a

lesser degree, Ali Umri, developed an image of caring for the poor as shown in their

campaign to help the poor get medical treatment in Penang or to finance pilgrimages to

Mecca.203

Pro-poor leadership is strongly related to the notion of generous and benevolent

leaders which is evident in a characteristic social custom: gifts. In North Sumatran local

tradition and social norms, gifts are perceived as one important aspect that cannot be

separated from the spirit of social benevolence and collectivism. In the context of North

Sumatra, the Malay tradition, for instance, places a high value on this practice as a part of the

religious belief that “the giver” should thank God for his or her prosperity and fortune. As part

of their gratitude to God, they share their prosperity with others. In the tradition of the

Malay’s kampung world, the social account of community members is determined by their

attention to their social surroundings, social attachment and engagement, as well as social

benevolence.204

Under these conditions, as explained by Willner (1966), somebody who holds

a prominent position in the community is socially expected to pay attention to his or her

surroundings by sharing prosperity.

Furthermore, the norm of giving has infiltrated everyday political activities and

consequently this practice is envisioned as befitting the values of North Sumatran societies.

Two of the most influential local elites in North Sumatra, Abdillah (former Mayor of Medan)

and Syamsul Arifin (former Governor) are noted in the region as being generous personalities.

201

“Rakyat Sumut Tak Butuh Pemimpin yang Pura Pura,” Analisa, 5 April 2008; “Ribuan Massa Hadiri

Kampanye Syamsul-Gatot,” Waspada, 5 April 2008. 202

“Syamsul Arifin Pemimpin yang Merakyat, Ingin Bangkit Bersama Rakyat,” Analisa, 9 April 2008; “Syamsul

Arifin Diyakini Bawa Pencerahan Bagi Masyarakat Sumut,” Analisa, 31 March 2008; “Cagubsu Syamsul Arifin

Diarak Ratusan Abang Becak,” Analisa, 24 March 2008; “Pilih Syamsul Arifin Melalui Tahapan Demokratis,”

Waspada, 28 March 2008. 203

“Orang Madina Optimis Umri Pembela Masyarakat Miskin,” Waspada, 5 April 2008; “Sumut Rindu

Pemimpin Muda, Intelektual,” Waspada, 3 April 2008; “Umri Kembali Berangkatkan 40 Warga Sumut Umroh,”

Waspada, 6 April 2008. 204

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011.

147

Their kindness is devoted not only to their supporters, inner circles, bureaucratic officials,

local politicians, the leaders of mass organizations, and mass media, but also to ordinary

people. Additionally, their practice of sharing is not just employed during the time in which

they hold office, but is also anchored in their family tradition. The father of Abdillah, H. Said,

is known as a generous traditional merchant who regularly assisted the dakwah activities of

the Al-Washliyah organization.205

The evidence of local elites’ generosity was also manifested in the direct local

elections. In the North Sumatran gubernatorial election of 2008, for instance, almost all

candidates had a similar program of distributing food (bagi-bagi sembako) or money to the

people in the region.206

However, elections are only one opportunity for the local elites to

portray themselves as generous and attentive to the people in order to get public sympathy.

Therefore, local elites’ generosity prior to the local elections is regarded as important

information for gauging if a candidate possesses a genuinely generous attitude. The tendency

of Syamsul Arifin to give money to the people, for instance, was known long before the

gubernatorial election of 2008.207

While generous local elites obtained public appreciation,

others who are labeled as “stingy” earned antipathy. One who was perceived as stingy,

arrogant, and rude in his communication style received rejection from political actors or from

a wider public audience.208

Thus, the practice of transactional politics in the local elections

cannot be understood without recourse to local norms, social customs, and traditions which

have been evident for a long period in the region.

The idea of giving or sharing material properties to or with ordinary people could

simply be regarded as the practice of transactional politics, which creates a modicum of

egalitarianism. The people of North Sumatra are stereotypically considered to have egalitarian

characters and to be overt in their social relations. This can be linked to their heterogeneous

social backgrounds and the lack of a dominant ethnic group in the region. Moreover, the

stereotype can also be linked to the large numbers of Batak people, who are usually

characterized as being overt, dominant, egalitarian, and even aggressive in their social

relations (van Langenberg 1982, 25).209

This egalitarian credo might correspond to two antecedents. The first condition

205

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 206

“Triben Serahkan Bantuan Sembako Bagi Korban Kebakaran di Belawan,” Analisa, 5 April 2008; “Bantuan

1.2 Ton Beras dan Uang Tunai Rp. 2 Juta dari Ali Umri di Tegal Sari Mandala,” Analisa, 1 April 2008;

“Syamsul Arifin Diyakini Bawa Pencerahan bagi Masyarakat Sumut,” Analisa, 31 March 2008. 207

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011; “Tokoh Pemuda Dirikan Tim Kota Matsum Bersatu,”

Analisa, 10 March 2008. 208

Interview with Muryanto Amin, Jakarta, 1 March 2012. 209

See also Usman Pelly, “Mengapa Harus Jawa dan Batak Toba?,” Waspada, 27 March 2008.

148

considers the nature of the Batak’s social system. In contrast to the Malay, who had a strong

feudal system through the existence of kingships in their history, the Batak people had,

according to Castles, a nearly stateless system and a somewhat loose social structure of

chieftainships (Castles 1972). The second condition involves the events of national and social

revolution in the region after Independence. These two revolutions resulted in both the

collapse of colonial power and the feudal-traditional structure. The social revolution can be

seen as a critical juncture in which the people in the region radically transformed the previous

feudal system into a modern republican setting. Included in this transformation were the more

equal positions of social classes following the removal of the Malay aristocratic class, the

change of land ownership, and the increased balance of ethnic configurations in social life.

Social revolution also led to a decline in the social status of the Malay and the rise of non-

Malay groups, in particular the Batak.210

Therefore, shared ideas of egalitarianism have

strengthened the important values of people-oriented leadership and social intimacy between

the leaders and their followers.

In most direct local elections in the region, local elites tried to portray themselves as

being close to the people, having informal relationships and being part of grassroots

movements. This was intended to create an image of egalitarianism. This combination of

social engagement, informality and simplicity of communication style can be seen in the

gubernatorial election in 2008. Based on several accounts by local political actors, Ali Umri

stood out as a financially extraordinarily well-positioned candidate and he accepted support

from the long-established Golkar political party, which also obtained wide popular support at

the national and regional level. Nevertheless, Umri was defeated by Syamsul Arifin who had

previously been discharged from his position as Chairman of the Regional Advisory Council

of the Golkar Party in the region. During the election, Syamsul’s popularity could not be

tarnished due to his ability to gain public sympathy. His informal communication style, using

simple and clear language, further supported by his humility and friendliness, were perceived

by some local elites as the keys to his victory.211

In other words, Syamsul succeeded in

developing an emotional bond with the voters by employing what he termed his “natural”

style.212

It was not only his populist leadership style that contributed to the success, but also

his widespread personal networks and social engagement with various community

organizations.213

These networks with variegated groups of local politicians, local

210

Interview with Ichwan Azhari, Medan, 4 May 2011. 211

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011; Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 212

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 213

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011.

149

bureaucrats, leaders of social organizations, religious and ethnic group leaders, journalists,

and with the ordinary people, were based on long-term relationships. Moreover, he did not

allow any distance in his personal relations. In short, it can be said that Syamsul had the

complete package of political tools ranging from a people-oriented style of leadership to

social engagement and financial capital.

Furthermore, more than any other candidate, Syamsul had an ability to “touch the

heart of the people”214

with his style of communication and informal-personal approach. His

people-oriented style contributed to his success in competing with the more experienced and

senior figures, such as Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe. Although Wahab had much political

experience as well as personal and social networks, he lacked the populist demeanor and

personal and informal style of communication of his opponent. Syamsul, in contrast, rejected

a formal style of communication. He embarked on the political campaign with simple and

understandable speeches including some humorous stories. The sources of his political

communication were not academic literature or formal regulations, but primarily religious and

ancestral messages and traditional proverbs which were anchored in the daily life of the

people.215

With this style of communication, Syamsul was closely connected to the people.

Moreover, in order to stress his emotional bond with the people, and in addition to his

short and simple campaign slogans, Syamsul also emulated the physical appearance and

dress-style of ordinary people. One of the local elites, PPP-member Fadly Nurzal, who had a

close personal relationship with Syamsul, illustrated this in the following manner:

“… Syamsul reached out to the hearts of the people. So, his language is a popular

language and his appearance is a people’s appearance. At home, he usually wears a

sarong and also uses it when he receives visitors. Unlike public officials who usually

wear a batik, he wears a sarong. However, people do not complain because they feel

accepted, and they feel proudly treated by his humility. And after that, people go home

and Syamsul gives them money. Therefore, in the local election, he did not need to

distribute a lot of money, because he had been distributing it for long time (even

before the local election) …”216

Another element of this proximity to the people is the use of shared identities in order

to generate the symbolic legitimacy of local elites, with the objective of achieving popular

support. As was explained in the previous section, the religious and ethnic backgrounds of

candidates are among the most important aspects of mobilization. Local elites not only

connected their various backgrounds with their own original identities, but also tried to

strengthen their affiliations with other ethnic groups. Syamsul Arifin, for instance, who is an

214

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 215

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011. 216

Interview with Fadly Nurzal, Medan, 28 April 2011.

150

ethnic Malay, tried to affiliate himself with the Toba Batak’s Silaban clan.217

Ali Umri

exhibited similar behavior. Ali traced his ethnic affiliation not only to his Malay ancestry, but

also to the Mandailing Batak, Karo Batak and Javanese ethnic groups.218

Another Javanese

candidate, Tri Tamtomo, added to his name the name of one of Toba Batak’s big clans,

namely the Panggabean.219

Another aspect regarding the question of symbolic legitimacy was the elites’ attempt

to present themselves as devout people. The devotion and attachment of local elites to

religious faith seemed to be a symbolic attempt to create the impression of being a good and

trustworthy person. In this setting, if one is perceived as religious, it means that he or she can

hold a social mandate as a good political leader. The evidence of this symbolic legitimacy can

be traced to various manifestations in local elections: the adoption of religious language in the

campaign, direct involvement in religious activities, the use of houses of worship such as

mosques and churches as locations for campaigning, candidates supporting religious

activities, support from religious organizations toward candidates, etc.220

The last attribute of local norms is a non-offensive political approach. In the new

democratic era, the local political arena was characterized by a high degree of elite

competition. This competition often led to violence, the mobilization of the masses, or attacks

on political contenders through the use of direct and offensive language. Following the

breakdown of the New Order, political violence overshadowed the process of transition in the

region. North Sumatra is known as a region with various mass and youth organizations, some

of which were associated with thugs, and these organizations were actively involved in the

local political arena. These organizations survived during the New Order regime (Amin 2007;

Ryter 1998; Hadiz 2003) and continued their political involvement in the transitional phase.

However, this became less important after transition, in particular in the gubernatorial election

of 2008. Some local elite members who were believed to be involved in acts of violence, or at

least in the mobilization of the masses for their political objectives, obtained less public

sympathy in local elections. According to Ahmad Taufan Damanik, the public remembered

this and responded negatively to their involvement in violence, physical encounters, and mass

217

“Pengetua Adat Negeri Limbong Restui Raja Batak H. Syamsul Arifin, SE Jadi Gubsu,” available at:

www.silaban.net, 21 May 2007, (accessed 11 October 2009); “Syamsul Arifin Silaban Ziarah ke Makam Raja

Silaban,” Analisa, 5 April 2008. 218

“UMMA Prioritaskan Pembangunan Infrastruktur, Pendidikan Gratis dan Kesehatan,” Analisa, 9 April 2008;

“Cagubsu Ali Umri Ditabalkan Marga Daulay,” Analisa, 10 March 2008. 219

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 220

“Abah Wahab Berzikir Bersama Ribuan Kaum Ibu,“ Waspada, 25 February 2008; “Umri Kembali

Berangkatkan 40 Warga Sumut Umroh,“ Waspada, 6 April 2008; “Syamsul Arifin Silaturahmi di Ponpes AHJ,“

Waspada, 26 March 2008; “Syamsul-Gatot Jadikan Masjid Raya Sebagai Titik Awal Pemasangan Alat Peraga,“

Analisa, 1 April 2008; “Forum Umat Muhammadiyah Medan Dukung UMMA,” Waspada, 15 March 2008; “Al

Washliyah Siap Menangkan Abdillah-Ramli,” Waspada, 9 June 2005.

151

exposure as crude and aggressive political expressions.221

Furthermore, several examples of elite competition showed elites’ efforts to adopt a

non-offensive political approach in dealing with their contenders. Rather than being labeled as

superior, aggressive, crude, or as having an unpolished manner, local elites tried to represent

themselves as victims and weak in order to get public sympathy. In the conflict between

Syamsul Arifin and Rahmat Shah, Rahmat’s political attacks in the local media and the

alleged incident where he threateningly pointed a gun at Syamsul generated antipathy rather

than an affirmative response, at least from political actors.222

In another case of conflict

between Syamsul Arifin and Gatot Pujo Nugroho, the former’s supporters tried to depict

Syamsul as a victim, while at the same time branding Gatot as disloyal and a hypocritical

traitor.223

Included in this image-building was the issue of disharmony between Syamsul and

Gatot in which the latter was described as ungrateful and attention was drawn to the fact that

he did not show his sympathy by visiting Syamsul in prison. According to Ahmad Taufan

Damanik, in order to dramatize Gatot’s negative image and build up public sympathy,

Syamsul caustically stated that if Gatot would not meet him because of his body odor, Gatot

could come to the prison with a closed nose.224

This construction of a negative image of Gatot continued in the build up to the

gubernatorial election of 2013. Syamsul delivered a message advising the electorate not to

elect a hypocritical, ungrateful, and avaricious leader, an allusion believed to refer to Gatot.225

Rather than being provoked by Syamsul’s group, Gatot and his entourage responded to the

attack circumspectly, unemotionally, and even with silence. This attempt can be seen as a way

of preventing them from invoking public antipathy and of impeding Syamsul’s attempts to

gain the public's sympathy. The source of this response can be traced back to other ideational

elements. This might relate to the personal affection of Gatot to Javanese values in which

harmony, loyalty, and emotional detachment were paramount.226

As described by Willner

(1966), traditional Indonesian society is influenced by two interrelated shared ideas: control

and minimization of conflict; and control and restraint of emotions (Willner, 1966). The first

221

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 222

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011; “Pistol Rahmat Shah untuk Syamsul,”

available at: www.waspada. co.id, 22 April 2010, (accessed 2 April 2013). 223

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Hardi Mulyono, Medan, 3 May 2011;

see also “Syamsul Dicekal, KPK Asal-Asalan!” Waspada, 10 May 2010; Riza Fakhrumi Tahir, “Disharmoni

Gubsu-Wagubsu,” Waspada, 3 March 2011; Riza Fakhrumi Tahir “Miskalkulasi Syamsul Terhadap Gatot,”

Harian Analisa, 14 May 2011. 224

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011. 225

Waspada, 12 January 2012. 226

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 26 April 2011; Interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Medan,

2 May 2011.

152

norm is aimed at maintaining harmony and unity, while the second is involved in seeking

social agreement and inhibiting possible frictions (Willner, 1966). Consequently, a person

who can achieve this emotional detachment is considered to have spiritual force and moral

strength (Willner, 1966; Magnis-Suseno 2001), and this can potentially result in gaining

public sympathy.

The above examples strengthen the argument that the use of transactional politics is

not a sufficient condition for success in local elections. Public preferences are not necessarily

driven only by material considerations at the time of local elections. A fitting example here is

the success of Syamsul Arifin in the gubernatorial election of 2008. Syamsul - who is

acknowledged as being a generous leader - had made use of material incentives for a long

time, and this was not limited to the time of the elections. He later combined this strategy with

a communication approach (i.e. informality and personal relationship), and added a cultural

dimension (i.e. the use of ethnicity and religion in the campaign), and popular symbolism (i.e.

people-oriented campaign slogans). It can be stated that proximity to the people is a social

construct that amalgamates the dimensions of material inducement, cognitive elements, and

historical artifacts of social events through the continued process of social interactions. In

short, the social construction of popular leadership cannot immediately emerge at the time of

local elections alone.

Furthermore, the social construction of popular leadership in the region leads to the

issue of interactions between the elites and the masses. The masses’ perceptions of elites are

rooted in their traditional beliefs. The people have perceived their elites as the figures who

possess some extraordinary capacities and as being protective, generous, populist, people-

oriented, and part of their own identities. In short, elites must be a reflection of the people and

mirror their own identity. This means that elites can be successful if they can appropriately

conform to the social norms. Elites must achieve popular sympathy, represent the people, and

exploit the symbolic images that are of concern for the people.

Nevertheless, people-oriented leadership can be a paradox when political elites are

corrupt. North Sumatra is also a province where corruption is endemic: as a matter of fact, the

political elite members, Syamsul Arifin and Abdillah, were recalled from their office because

of corruption and were imprisoned in Jakarta. Although they were convicted of corruption,

they were still popular as local leaders, but the motivation behind their popularity has been

questioned by their detractors: their opponents argue that their popularity is supported by

those groups that benefit materially from Syamsul Arifin and Abdillah.227

This argument can

227

Interview with Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Medan, 30 April 2011.

153

be accepted if the massive transactional politics which allow local elites to buy public support

are taken into account. Nevertheless, if one examines public support of elites, a transactional

motive alone seems insufficient. One example in this respect is the moment when Abdillah

was released from jail in early June 2010. Thousands of people gave him a hero’s welcome at

the Polonia Airport in Medan.228

For these supporters, the popularity of Syamsul and Abdillah

persisted due to the emotional bond they had created with the people. Therefore, they were

still perceived as good leaders, even though they had been charged with corruption.

Subsequently, corruption was euphemistically labeled as “sharing with the people.”229

The traditional conception of local elites as generous and attentive “fathers” providing

social protection became intertwined with changes in the political system. As part of the new

system, direct local elections demanded that elites gain a certain degree of popularity in order

to increase their chances of being elected. This mechanism paved the way for local elites who

held formal bureaucratic positions or prominent positions in political institutions and social

organizations to pursue greater social engagement. In addition, those positions have helped

them to build positive images as sympathetic leaders and thereby elevate their popularity.

This section showed that popularity and eligibility are important features with regard

to local political competition. In general, local elites managed their image in accordance with

popular ideas. For the grassroots, it seemed that several local norms existed, such as the

importance of social engagement, a close and generous relationship with the people, and a

communicative and informal leadership style with an emphasis on religion and humility.

B. The Rise of Oppositional Ideas

Despite the continued impact of traditional norms and beliefs on political life in Sumatra,

democratization paved the way for the rise of new ideas. Political change provided an

opportunity for new elites to emerge, who had no links to the past and even represented ideas

opposed to traditional notions. They believed that local government functioned as a public

service agency which had the responsibility of guaranteeing the smooth running of

governmental affairs. Rather than rhetorically using the paternalistic rhetoric of “father” of a

community, they frequently identified themselves as modern organizers of local government.

Other issues important to note are the ideas of entrepreneurial leadership, pluralism, and anti-

228

“Abdillah Masih Dicintai,“ Waspada, 3 June 2010; “Abdillah Disambut Bagai Pahlawan,” Harian Sumut Pos,

3 June 2010; “Kepulangan Mantan Walikota Medan Abdillah Disambut Ribuan Warga,” available at:

www.news.detik.com, 2 June 2010, (accessed 13 December 2011); “Abdillah Disambut Ribuan Warga,”

available at: www.sumutcyber.com, 3 June 2010 (accessed 13 December 2011). 229

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011.

154

corruption campaigning.

Political reforms facilitated the emergence of a wide variety of elite backgrounds.

With direct local elections, political privileges enjoyed by local executives were no longer the

sole domain of bureaucrats or military officers. In terms of elite backgrounds, the emergence

of businesspeople as local executives was a foreseeable development. This, in particular,

might correspond to the fact of high costs in local elections. The impact of the involvement of

businesspersons in local politics is twofold. On the one hand, it invigorated transactional

politics since the group had strong financial leverages. On the other hand, their involvement

led to new perspectives with regard to governing the public sector. The diffusion of

entrepreneurial ideas into governmental affairs can be traced back to several local elections in

the region. Several local elites who were once businesspeople, such as Abdillah, Rudolf

Pardede, Tengku Eri Nuradi and Ali Umri, cultivated the image of successful businesspeople

in their campaigns. In his debut in the mayoral election of 2000, Abdillah's image as a

successful businessperson strongly influenced public opinion.230

In one poll, businesspeople

were perceived as being innovative and energetic.231

This helped Abdillah win against two

local bureaucrats.232

During his rule, infrastructure development in Medan progressed

enormously and this became one underlying source of his popularity. This success

strengthened the positive image of businesspeople in managing bureaucracy, as evidenced by

the success of Abdillah in his re-election bid in 2005.233

The diffusion of entrepreneurial ideas into the bureaucracy can also be seen in the

example of how local executives with a background in business supervised the lower-ranking

bureaucrats. Tengku Eri Nuradi, Regent of Serdang Bedagai, for instance, always supervised

his staff to make the work of the bureaucracy more efficient.234

Nevertheless, according to

Eri, the work of the public sector was different to that of the private sector. Hence, Eri claimes

that a businessperson can work faster in the private sector, since there are no significant

barriers comparable to the regulations which the public sector has.235

Therefore, once

businesspeople are elected into public office, they have to adjust to regulation, hierarchy, and

the institutional arrangement of government. This means that they cannot tangibly accelerate

the development in the region, though they might have a chance of introducing and insisting

on entrepreneurial ideas.

230

“Abdillah di Atas Angin,” Waspada, 8 March 2000; “Abdillah Menang Mutlak,” Waspada, 21 March 2000. 231

“Abdillah-Maulana Pasangan Walikota Paling Diinginkan,” Waspada, 18 March 2000. 232

“Pemilihan Abdillah Sah,” Waspada, 23 March 2000. 233

“Orang Medan Inginkan Pengusaha,” Waspada, 10 June 2005; “Dukungan Terhadap Abdillah dan Ramli

Semakin Meluas,” Mimbar Umum, 13 June 2005. 234

Interview with Tengku Eri Nuradi, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011. 235

Interview with Tengku Eri Nuradi, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011.

155

In contrast to entrepreneurial ideas, which were only relevant for the local bureaucratic

organization, the new ideas of pluralism were much more influential for the public discourse.

As was elucidated above, in order to gain large popular support, several local elites tried to

enlarge their association with various ethnic groups in the region. This was not the case for

Sofyan Tan, who had a Chinese identity. Although the Chinese had settled in the region for a

long time, their involvement in politics was marginal compared to other ethnic groups.

Therefore, Sofyan Tan’s candidacy in the mayoral election of Medan in 2010 was surprising.

More than that, Sofyan brought the idea of pluralism to his campaign. Seeking to overcome

the obstacles created by his personal background, Sofyan proposed the idea of choosing a

leader based on his or her program rather than identity. He did not deny his Chinese identity,

but claimed that he was also an indigenous Indonesian.236

Through his slogan of “renewal and

assimilation” (pembaruan dan pembauran), Sofyan posited the new idea of pluralism in an

attempt to fight discrimination.237

As previously stated, this mayoral election was

overshadowed by the ethnic slights against Sofyan, intended to exploit anti-Chinese

sentiment.238

In order to counter this sentiment, during the campaign Sofyan not only posited

the idea of pluralism, but also grafted it onto the local belief of “Bhineka Tunggal Ika” (unity

in diversity).239

For Sofyan, his defeat in this election was caused by a combination of

electoral fraud by his opponent and the negative campaign in regard to his Chinese identity.240

Nevertheless, he believed that election itself would become an arena for ideational discourse

about pluralism. According to Sofyan, this mayoral election was “the largest seminar in the

world on pluralism” where citizens could freely discuss their choice and debate the possibility

of choosing a person belonging to an ethnic minority like him as the local leader.241

Although

he was defeated, he felt he was successful in bringing pluralism into public discourse. For

Sofyan, his attempt was effective due to enthusiastic public support, and he believed that had

this election been held fairly, he would have achieved a better result. Throughout this mayoral

election, Sofyan believed that people could accept difference. However, major obstacles in

bringing people towards accommodating pluralist ideas are: elite unfairness in political

competition, low educational levels and poor living standards of the people.242

The strongest oppositional idea to local normative orthodoxies was the norm of anti-

236

“Sofyan Tan Menjawab,” Waspada, 16 June 2010. 237

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012; “Sofyan Tan: Tak Mau Tendang Kaki Orang,”

Waspada, 1 June 2010. 238

“Calon Walikota Medan Mainkan Isu SARA,” Waspada, 14 June 2010. 239

“Sofyan Tan Siap Kalah secara Kesatria,” Waspada, 20 June 2012. 240

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 241

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 242

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012.

156

corruption and the concomitant campaign to develop a clean government. There was no

significant anti-corruption campaign in the local elections under study (gubernatorial elections

and mayoral elections of Medan) from 1998 to 2005. Although there was a strong tendency

towards money politics (between candidates and local legislators) in the mayoral election of

Medan in 2000 and in the gubernatorial election of 2003, complaints about the practice were

only voiced by small groups of NGOs, students, and local media.243

A similar situation occurred in the mayoral election of Medan in 2005, where the

newly-introduced local elections led to the widespread practice of vote buying. In the

gubernatorial election of 2008, few candidates engendered the idea of anti-corruption and the

need for a clean government in their campaign. Several candidates grafted the idea of “anti-

corruption” with local norms, such as developing an image as an honest (jujur), a truthful

(amanah), or a whole-hearted (ikhlas) leader.244

Syafii, the running mate of Abdul Wahab

Dalimunthe, for instance, stated during his campaign that the two candidates would refuse to

accept financial assistance in their campaign. He continued that if they received financial

support, they would most likely become corrupt because their financiers would expect

something in return for their money.245

The framing of anti-corruption in terms of orthodox

local notions of leadership, to some extent, might correspond to the rise of candidates for

governorship with a background as reformists ankered in civil society. While – as shown

above - corresponding with entrenched local norms, it gives the populist tendencies in North

Sumatra a new meaning, making them more palatable or a modern democracy.

The most momentous event of the campaign against corruption occurred in the

mayoral election of Medan in 2010. Sofyan Tan and his running mate Nelly Armayanti stated

in their campaign that they would start bureaucratic reform by introducing a clean

government. Part of this program was combating the practice of nepotism as the mechanism

of bureaucratic recruitment. In the region, it was widely believed that fundamental or personal

bonds were essential for bureaucratic recruitment and promotion. Since there were almost no

Chinese people in the city’s bureaucracy, Sofyan guaranteed that there would no nepotism if

he governed the city.246

243

“Pemilihan Abdillah Sah,” Waspada, 23 March 2000; “Abdillah Menang Mutlak,” Waspada, 21 March 2000;

“Pelantikan Gubsu-Wagubsu 16 Juni 2003, Penggunaan HP Foto Melanggar Hukum,” Waspada, 14 May 2003;

“Uji Publik Terbatas Pada Pengaduan Politik Uang,” Waspada, 28 May 2003; “Rizal-Rudolf Bakal Lolos Uji

Publik,” Waspada, 29 May 2003. 244

“Pilih Pemimpin yang Amanah, Jujur, dan Teruji,” Analisa, 3 April 2008; “Hadi Utomo: Waras Pasangan

Paling Tepat Pimpin Sumut ke Depan,” Analisa, 9 April 2008; “Kaum Ibu Diimbau Memilih Calon Gubsu yang

Ikhlas,” Analisa, 4 April 2008. 245

“Pilih Pemimpin yang Amanah, Jujur, dan Teruji,” Analisa, 3 April 2008; “Hadi Utomo; Waras Pasangan

Paling Tepat Pimpin Sumut ke Depan,” Analisa, 9 April 2008. 246

“Kampanye Sofyan Tan Membludak,” Waspada, 3 May 2010.

157

Another issue that is important to note is the campaign to combat the sale of

bureaucratic positions. Sofyan was committed to stop this practice and to promote a merit

system in which the recruitment and promotion of local bureaucrats would be determined by

bureaucratic capability and professional assessment.247

Sofyan and Nelly also framed the anti-

corruption norm by demanding the cessation of the practice of illegal levies (pungutan liar),

which refers to illegal transactions between bureaucrats and businesspersons. This may cause

a high economic cost which would negatively affect the business climate, create

unemployment, and contribute to increasing criminality.248

Prior to the second round of the election, Sofyan dramatized his anti-corruption

agenda. In the presence of thousands who attended his campaign rallies, he exhibited a replica

of a gallow and stated that he would be ready to be hanged if he was found guilty of

corruption.249

This statement and his symbolic exposure strengthened his anti-corruption

rhetoric.250

However, in contrast to the more established local elites, the advocates of new

oppositional ideas had less popularity and weaker personal networks in the political arena.

Although they proposed more substantial reformist agendas, such as that of anti-corruption (as

in the case of Sofyan Tan in the Medan mayoral election), they were defeated by established

local elites who abused traditional local norms or propagated and reproduced old-fashioned

issues of social identity.

C. External Challenge and Elite Perception: Local Elites as Ideational

Carriers and Barriers

Since local elites have a prominent position in society and a capacity to sway public opinion

on political change, it is important to examine the perception of local elites regarding political

change. In local politics, political change is associated with three major aspects: democracy

and democratization, decentralization policy, and the local electoral system. In this section, I

will discuss these three dimensions of local political change, with local elites being at the

centre of the analysis.

Most local political elites believed that the new democratic political system needed a

gradual process of adjustment. However, within this general perspective two different

247

“Sofyan Tan Janji Hapuskan Jual Beli Jabatan PNS,” Waspada, 14 June 2010. 248

“Sofyan Tan-Nelly Akan Gerakan Perekonomian,” Waspada, 1 May 2010. 249

“Sofyan Tan Tunjukkan Tiang Gantungan Kalau Korupsi,” Waspada, 16 June 2010. 250

“Sofyan Tan Siap Digantung Jika Korupsi,” Waspada, 8 May 2010.

158

viewpoints can be found: those of old established elites and those of the new local elites.

Although both shared the opinion that democracy required a long-term transitional stage, the

majority of old elites viewed democracy with skepticism. By contrast, the new local elites

held an optimistic view of democracy. Generally, most old elites refer to the basic

prerequisites of socio-economic conditions and citizens’ educational level as the major

impediments to installing democracy. This typical argument was best expressed by Syamsul

Arifin:

“… something right is not necessarily appropriate, but what is appropriate usually is

right. That is the simple solution that I have from our ancestors. What is right from our

perspective is not necessarily appropriate based on others. Nowadays, we talk about

the condition of the state, while at the same time others talk about their families’ basic

needs and that is hard for them. This means it is not appropriate; people are still

talking about how they can buy the food for today’s afternoon and the food is still

absent …”251

Other established local elites saw the problem as essentially due to the inadequate

level of education of the masses, which also contributed to the lack of a democratic culture.

Hasrul Azwar of the PPP viewed the relationship between democracy and education in these

terms:

“… democracy relates to people’s education. We are still reluctant to accept

differences, (so that) defeat in competition becomes revenge, the office of KPU was

burnt, and students damaged their campus. Why? Because we are not ready to accept

defeat. Democracy requires a gradual process after the people have been well-

educated. See what happened in America, just at the moment of Obama’s victory,

McCain congratulated him. What is more, Obama appointed Hillary Clinton as the

Minister of Foreign Affairs even though she was his contender. We still have difficulty

understanding those differences, and what is the source of problem? Our education,

more specifically our political education …”252

Furthermore, a well experienced local bureaucrat, Affifudin Lubis, believed that there

is a problem of assumptions with regard to the implementation of democracy in Indonesia.

Democracy assumes that people know their leaders well. However, this assumption is not

relevant on a practical level due to the common practices of transactional politics and money

politics in almost all elections in Indonesia. It is the power of money that has significantly

decided about success or failure of many local leaders.253

Therefore, this contradictory

assumption leads to the widespread belief that the good leaders are those who are able to

provide money for the people, and not those who have clear political ideology or political

251

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 252

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 253

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012.

159

program.254

As a consequence, according to Affifudin Lubis, democratization in the post-New

Order era can be interpreted as a serious political set-back in terms of the absence of political

ideologies, values, ethics and morals of the politicians. What is more, compared to the Old

Order in the Soekarno era or the New Order of Soeharto, transactional politics and the decline

of ideology are regarded as the worst in the history of the Indonesian political system.255

Accordingly, this creates a snowball effect in the wider public across the country, giving rise

to the belief that elected local leaders lack credibility and would win local elections only

because they have strong financial support. It seems that transactional politics is perceived as

an instant way for political elites to win elections and at the same time to create a justification

for corruption. Additionally, the reiteration of the practice in every election has influenced the

meaning of corruption itself. Popular local leaders who were incriminated in cases related to

corruption were not necessarily portrayed as enemies of the people. Instead they continued to

be welcomed by the people as previously pointed out in the cases of Syamsul and Abdillah

(see sub-chapter IV. A). In this context, it is clear that public perception of corruption is

ambiguous, or that people tend to have permissive attitudes. Corruption is not, in many cases,

recognized as a crime but it can be re-interpreted as a consequence of elite competition. Thus,

corrupt leaders can be perceived as (more or less) the victims of the political process.256

Finally, for most long-established local elites, who are generally skeptical of

democratization, its various problems are rooted in the radical mode of transition. They regard

political change in Indonesia as a deep break from the past and the implementation of a new

political format without any consideration of the past political structure and traditional norms

as elaborated before. Thus, in their view, Indonesian democracy suffered from contradictions:

freedom of speech was used as a means for character assassinations, while freedom of the

press was employed without any public responsibility.257

In contrast to the aforementioned skeptical perspectives, most new local elites were

more optimistic. Although most of them were still addressing some major impediments to the

process of change, they generally viewed these problems as a natural challenge. While taking

these problems seriously, they emphasized the opportunities for political change. Most were

reform-oriented and shared a greater appreciation of recent political change. At least three

developments were noted by this group of elites as a result of democratization: the progress in

political participation and political openness, positive developments in elite recruitment, and

254

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012. 255

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012. 256

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012; “Golkar Yakin Syamsul Korban Konspirasi

Politik,” Waspada, 1 May 2010. 257

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012.

160

the improvement of political accountability.

Sigit Pramono Asri, a young politician from PKS, three-time member of the provincial

legislature and two-time mayoral candidate in Medan, appraised democratization as an

opportunity for political change that was characterized by flourishing political participation

and increasing political openness. However, he argued that nevertheless the system needed

simultaneous improvements to curtail its negative effects such as social disorder, a long

period of transition, and the high cost of the political process.258

Furthermore, Sigit stated that

the conservative elites still had political power, but their attempt to retain an authoritarian

milieu in which political stability is the basis of political order weakened as a result of the

advancement of information and technology, and the rise of a new, dynamic generation of

political leaders.259

However, the old conservative ideas were also transmitted to the more

recent generation of politicians through communication. Nonetheless, Sigit believed that

conservative ideas would gradually be weakened because most local politicians understood

that the new political environment needed fresh political ideas.

Other members of the new local political elite focused on the progress made in elite

recruitment and elite mobilization. For them, democratization opened the way for political

mobilization and elite circulation. In other words, it facilitated the birth of a new generation of

political leaders with variegated social backgrounds and hence made the political contest

more inclusive.260

Political reform had given people the sovereignty to elect their leaders and

the selection of candidates from which to choose was not as restricted as it had been in the

past. Political reform, strictly speaking, ended the era of discrimination in electing local

leaders. A good example is Sofyan Tan, who previously could not have imagined that, as an

ethnic Chinese, he would ever have the opportunity to compete in local elections.261

What is

more, for Sofyan, democratization is an important part of the people’s political education for

the purpose of electing their leaders, although there are still the serious problems of poverty

and low levels of education. Sofyan believed that people would gradually learn from their

mistakes in electing irresponsible leaders.262

More important for him is that the role of the

idealist elements in the middle classes needed to be strengthened to defend democracy from

its enemies.263

Another element of progress is related to the political accountability of local leaders.

258

Interview with Sigit Pramono Asri, Medan, 3 May 2011. 259

Interview with Sigit Pramono Asri, Medan, 3 May 2011. 260

Interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Medan, 2 May 2011; Interview with Ali Umri, Medan, 29 April 2011. 261

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 262

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 263

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012.

161

Democratization and political openness have impelled local executives to conduct their

governmental affairs in line with public demands and in a more transparent way. This has also

induced local leaders to try to work competently and avoid mistakes. Nowadays, political

accountability must be established in conditions where the local political scene is markedly

influenced by other political players such as political parties, parliaments, local NGOs, and

mass media. This means that the structure of domination by the executive, as had been evident

in the New Order era, has disappeared and been replaced by competition between many

political players. Tengku Eri Nuradi, the Regent of Serdang Bedagai, acknowledged this

aspect as follows:

“… nowadays it is certainly difficult to hold a position as local executive, we live like

in the aquarium. Everybody can see everything and we are forced to be perfect,

although we are not perfect …”264

Regarding decentralization, local elites interpreted it differently. They were concerned

with several issues, such as the conditions under which this policy was started, the problems

of its design, the problems of its implementation, and its revision. Several local elite members

considered the growing concern over the issue of federalism in the last days of the New Order

as the catalyst for decentralization. At the local level, the idea of federalism has had a

considerable resonance that local elites thought could not be restrained.265

On the other hand,

concern about federalism stimulated the central government to create the decentralization

policy, which redistributed local political power from the provincial government to the

district/municipality level.266

This is also related to the historical fact that almost all separatist

movements in Indonesia had emerged at the regional/provincial level.

Nevertheless, focusing on the district level, some local elites found several dilemmas.

Some of them argued that decentralization would be better if it applied to the provincial level,

since it would provide more effective control and central supervision. With more than 500

regencies and municipalities in Indonesia, it is difficult to implement, evaluate and control the

policy.267

Others argued that it should be implemented gradually, starting at the provincial

level and progressing to regency level afterwards.268

Furthermore, by strengthening the regency level, the problem of coordination between

provincial and regency governments emerged. Provincial governments had no strong

authority with which to implement central government policy due to the fact that regency

264

Interview with Tengku Eri Nuradi, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011. 265

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 266

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011. 267

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 268

Interview with Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Medan, 2 May 2011.

162

governments had their own political power. As a consequence, the appreciation of the

provincial government is low, particularly in response to its regional policies and coordinating

function.269

As a solution to this problem, they suggested the idea of strengthening the

authority of the governor.270

Others argued for replacing direct local elections with a system

where the governor is appointed by the president and is the representative of the central

government.271

Numerous problems also surfaced in implementation. Most local elites who had been

affiliated with the New Order argued that decentralization, in general, failed to improve local

governmental affairs, particularly when compared with the New Order system. They claimed

that the system of local autonomy in the New Order era was better than the present system.

The rampant corruption and collusion between local executives, local legislatures, and local

bureaucrats was widely considered to be the most annoying problem resulting from the

implementation of decentralization, particularly in its initial phases. By assessing political

power and budgetary authority, local elites had unlimited freedom in deciding upon the use of

the local budget, which was frequently employed for non-public purposes. With their

privileges, they allocated the money for personal use.

Another problem was the practice of misallocating funds to programs that had no

relation to public services.272

Additionally, Law No. 22/1999 had given enormous power to

the local legislatures, and the members could freely criticize local executives and local

bureaucrats. With the involvement of local media as an instrument of control, politicians in

parliaments could easily intimidate local officials. As a result, in order to prevent unwanted

media exposure, local officials tended to compromise with the local legislators. Before public

hearings in the local legislatures, local bureaucrats would meet the local politicians in order to

“synchronize the perception” (menyamakan persepsi) of the policy issues, which inevitably

involved a material transaction.273

However, the practices of corruption, collusion or

backstage deals were not restricted to only one region, but rather took place in nearly every

region in the country. This was also intensified by the lack of supporting regulations of the

decentralization policy itself.274

An additional aspect of implementation was related to the deficiencies in the planning

system. One experienced career bureaucrat, Amrun Daulay, stated that compared to the

269

Interview with Tengku Eri Nuradi, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011. 270

Interview with Rahudman Harahap, Medan, 17 February 2012; Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20

February 2012. 271

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012. 272

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 273

Interview with Affifudin Lubis, Medan, 20 February 2012. 274

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011.

163

planning system of the New Order, the recent system of decentralization could be seen as a

setback. In the New Order era, the government had developed a well-devised planning

system, and this was carried out at the levels of villages, sub-districts, districts, provinces and

central government.275

This planning system had succeeded through the implementation of the

Deliberation Planning of Development (Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangungan,

Musrenbang) and the central role of the Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan

Daerah/Bappeda and Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Bappenas) at all levels of

government. In contrast to that mechanism, the planning system under the decentralization

policy of the post-New Order era seems to be without any guidelines, coordination, or

institutional support. Each local government tended to develop its own policies and programs

without any clear consideration for the national interest.

Nevertheless, the decentralization policy also had advocates in North Sumatra such as

academician Usman Pelly and politicians Chairuman Harahap and Sofyan Tan. Yet the latter

shared with opponents the critique of the way the policy was implemented. For these

advocates of decentralization, the decentralization policy, and in particular its radical form

established in Law No. 22/1999, failed due to the half-hearted implementation by the central

government. This policy was not supported by thorough regulations and this led to chaotic

implementation.276

Eventually, this caused problems in the financial sector, particularly in

terms of local elite corruption.

The central government’s and, here, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs’ half-

hearted reforms, may have come about for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the lack of

supporting regulation was part of an attempt of Jakarta-based officials to discredit

decentralization and bring local elites into disrepute. Jakarta would then have a valid reason

for taking away regional authority and restoring power to the central government.277

Jakarta,

according to the advocates of decentralization, was not seriously willing to transfer the power

to manage the economic resources and political authority of the regions because this meant

that the power of national political elites would be reduced significantly. The motives of these

national political elites were in sync with the interests of central bureaucrats, who also lost

their authority in administrative affairs, personnel and budgets through the implementation of

decentralization.278

On the other hand, the failure of the decentralization policy was also

275

Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011. 276

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011; interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May

2011. 277

Interview with Usman Pelly, Medan, 25 April 2011; interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May

2011. 278

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011.

164

related to the persisting ideational structure of the New Order regime, which had mostly been

adopted by bureaucrats and politicians at the regional and central government levels.279

In

their minds, they were still living in the centralistic order, with stability and hierarchy. In

short, for the proponents of the decentralization policy, the replacement or the re-

conceptualization of Law No. 22/1999 into Law No. 32/2004 represented political regression

in the regulation of central-local relations.280

Finally, the last subject of ideational change to be discussed is the mechanism of local

elections. Since the political restructuring in Indonesia, local elections have become one of the

primary issues in the project of democratization. After the implementation of direct local

elections as prescribed by Law No. 32/2004, this subject became a topic of intense debate in

the public sphere. In general, there are two opposing views related to the electoral system:

either direct local elections are defended, or a return to the previous practice of election by

local parliaments is demanded. However, either solution represents a compromise as each has

its political trade-off. The former mechanism seems to be good at guaranteeing popular

participation and people’s political education. However, this system has also created the

massive transactional politics which reach down to the grassroots. In contrast, the latter

system is perceived as imposing greater restrictions on the rampant transactional politics, but

is lacking in popular participation. The more variegated perspectives of local elites on the

mechanisms are illustrated in the subsequent paragraphs.

The high cost of politics is the most noticeable pitfall of direct local elections, as stated

by local political elites - in particular the old, established ones. According to them, part of

these costs stems from national or local budgets that are formally regulated by law. One local

elite member noted that the implementation of direct local elections has resulted in the

wasteful spending of local budgets.281

Other parts of electoral expenses are covered by the

candidates, political parties, and supporters. The costs are not only incurred in the course of

campaign activities, paying political parties to gain support, or distributing money to social

organizations and local media, but also as a result of legal challenges in the Constitutional

Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) in cases where the candidates dispute the election results. This

assessment is corroborated by data from 2010, which stated that 94 percent of local elections

end with legal disputes in the Court, although this number decreased to 76 percent in 2012.282

279

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011. 280

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011. 281

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 282

“Sengketa Pilkada Harus tetap di MK,” available at: www.kompas.com, 12 April 2011, (accessed 24 May

2013); “MK Keteteran Sidangkan Gugatan Pilkada?” available at: www.republika.co.id, 8 January 2013,

(accessed 24 May 2013).

165

This illustrates how in the midst of poor electoral management or the existence of electoral

fraud, there is also an indication of the refusal of candidates to accept the defeat in the race.

This unfair attitude, according Syamsul Arifin, was also driven by the high costs that the

candidates have incurred.283

Moreover, as he pointed out, in order to avoid litigation, the

losers and the winners of local elections can negotiate financial settlements.284

Commenting

on this problem, he demanded that the mechanism of direct local elections should be

terminated and replaced by the mechanism of appointment by the central government:

“… so it can be simply done by appointment, if we still cannot do that (direct local

elections). Our people still do not understand and we don’t force ourselves to follow

what others can do …”285

The high cost of direct local elections has resulted in the misuse of local budgets by

local elites. Since the candidates need a huge amount of money, they are usually forced to go

into debt. Most local elites who had experience in direct local elections acknowledged this

practice as an instant solution for the need of huge amounts of cash.286

Therefore, as pointed

out by interview respondents, for the public officials who run in the election, stealing from the

local budget is the most feasible way to pay back their debts or to finance their election

campaign.287

One of the categories of local budgets most vulnerable to manipulation is the

social services’ budget (anggaran bantuan sosial).288

However, malpractices allegedly do not only occur during the election, but also after

the event. In order to pay back their debts, candidates who were elected as the local chief

executive might sell bureaucratic positions like the heads of district-level offices (Kepala

Dinas) or even those of civil servants (Calon Pegawai Negeri Sipil).289

Critics of

decentralization thus see the qualities of the system of recruitment and the professionalism of

local level bureaucrats compromised. From their view, in comparison to the recruitment

system in the New Order era, this last development is a serious setback. What they overlook

thereby is that already during the New Order the sale of bureaucratic positions was endemic in

Indonesia (McLeod 2000, 101-103; McLeod 2011, 45-63; Kristriansen and Ramli 2006;

Goodpaster 2002; Cassing 2000).

Another negative perspective of the conduct of direct local elections is related by local

283

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 284

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 285

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011. 286

Interview with Rahudman Harahap, Medan, 17 February 2012; interview with Danny Setiawan, Medan, 28

April 2011. 287

Interview with Rahudman Harahap, Medan, 17 February 2012. 288

Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011. 289

Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011.

166

elite members to the potential for horizontal conflicts. One long-established elite member,

Hasrul Azwar, stated that the direct local elections may damage the kinship system in North

Sumatra.290

This may occur when members of a similar kinship group (marga) support

different candidates in local elections. This assessment contrasts sharply with the political

situation as perceived under the floating mass system of the New Order, in which people at

the grassroots level were not actively involved in politics. In short, most old elites had an

embedded idea of political stability and sometimes had a more positive view of the socio-

political situation during the period of authoritarianism compared to the Reform Era. This

phenomenon is best captured by Huntington as “authoritarian nostalgia” (Huntington 1991),

one feature of democratic transition.

Another problem that has been addressed by skeptical local elites is that of local

executives’ capabilities and experiences. In their view, direct local elections cannot

systematically and persistently provide candidates with bureaucratic skills and experience in

governmental affairs. Candidates can simply gain the political support of political parties

which, in fact, select their candidates based on popularity, electability, or financial capacity.

The condition sometimes even worsens when the candidates are nominated without a basic

assessment of their popularity or eligibility, but merely based on material transaction. If this

happens persistently, the circle of transactional politics and corruption cannot be broken. If

these elite perceptions are valid, a paradox exists in the case of elite recruitment in direct local

elections: On the one hand, it paves the way for more inclusive elite recruitment from various

backgrounds compared to the New Order system, but, on the other, it is an exclusive

mechanism of elite recruitment for the reason that most of the candidates must have huge

financial resources (Mietzner 2008; Mietzner 2011, 123-138).

However, the professional career path requirements of the local chief executives in

direct local elections become uncertain. In the New Order era, in contrast, someone who was

nominated as a local chief executive had to qualify in terms of their career path, educational

background, rank in the system, or track record in a bureaucratic or military career.291

For

local executives, instantly making a career in the New Order era was very difficult, if not

impossible. The New Order had developed a closed-recruitment system, but also paid

attention to the criteria of bureaucratic skills, administrative capability, and work experience

in governmental affairs (Emmerson 1978, 82-136; Emmerson 1983; Logsdon 1992).

Furthermore, as pointed out by Rahudman Harahap, the mayor of Medan, introducing

a pair of local chief executives created other problems. Since both leaders command political

290

Interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011. 291

Interview with Amrun Daulay, Jakarta, 11 May 2011.

167

legitimacy that was obtained in direct local elections, the relationship between the head and

the vice head of executive tend to be characterized by disharmony, friction, and this

sometimes lead to open political competition.292

As a result, it may be concluded, the

programs of local governments were not well implemented. This problem occurred not only

in one region, but spread to almost all regions of the country. Finally, another doubtful

perspective on the conduct of direct local elections is the cliché of the low level of education

and the poor economic condition of the people. Generally speaking, most old elites have

argued that the solution for the above mentioned problems is the termination of the

mechanism of direct local elections and a return to the previous system of election by local

parliament or simply by appointment from the central government.293

Nevertheless, besides the skeptical arguments, some more optimistic perspectives

were articulated by a few local elites. Responding to the issue of the direct local elections,

they generally agreed with the obstacles as previously described. However, they believed that

most of the problems have emerged as a consequence of political changes that required taking

into account the behavior of local actors, the process of political education of the people, and

also the search for the appropriate political format. Direct local elections for this group of

local elites cannot be separated from the wider project of democratization. Chairuman

Harahap, for instance, disagreed that direct local elections had to be replaced by the previous

system of elections by local parliaments. To solve the problem of high costs in direct local

elections, he suggested a more serious approach to law enforcement. If necessary, political

actors or candidates who conduct money politics should be disqualified from the

competition.294

Moreover, for Chairuman, high cost may not be a problem where candidates

have a high reputation from their previous career and a track record of strong social

engagement.295

In addition, he rejected the argument that people are not ready to be involved

in direct local elections due to lacking education and economic prosperity. For him, people

can be persuaded by money politics because they see this practice as an instantaneous way

through which to interact with political elites.296

In general, Chairuman argued that direct

local elections provided a good opportunity for the people to learn how to choose their

leaders. He optimistically commented that political change could occur successfully if it was

292

Interview with Rahudman Harahap, Medan, 17 February 2012. 293

Interview with Syamsul Arifin, Jakarta, 12 May 2011; interview with Hasrul Azwar, Medan, 24 April 2011,

interview with Ali Umri, Medan, 29 April 2011. 294

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011. 295

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011. 296

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011.

168

supported by law enforcement.297

Another positive assessment of direct local elections came from Sofyan Tan. In his

opinion, the new electoral system has compelled local leaders and politicians, who want to be

elected, to become acquainted with the people.298

However, this system still had its

drawbacks, in particular for the process of candidate recruitment in political parties. If the

political parties continued to engage in transactional practices in recruiting candidates, it

would be difficult to obtain qualified candidates with integrity.299

Therefore, he suggested

reforming the recruitment system in political parties in order to improve the quality of local

elections.

V. Conclusion: Tracing the Process of Elite Adjustment in North Sumatra

This conclusion will summarize the causal mechanisms and causal configurations which lead

to the outcome of this study: local elite adjustment in the region. As previously argued in the

hypothesis of this study, local elite adjustment, in general, is influenced by the interaction of

institutional structure, actors’ strategic moves, and ideational contestation.

From the perspective of the institutional structure, there are three conditions important

to note: historical antecedent, authoritarian collapse, and democracy and decentralization. The

historical antecedent of social revolution in the region and the political structure under

authoritarianism provide a distinctive basis for regional socio-political structures. With the

withdrawal of old aristocracies, social revolution provides a more balanced social structure, in

particular with regard to ethnicities and religion. In addition, the revolution brought ethnic and

religious sentiments in the local political arena to the fore, and these sentiments have become

greater in the post-New Order setting. This historical antecedent was strengthened by the fact

that after Independence there were no political parties (except Golkar under the authoritarian

New Order) that could attain a dominant position. The conjunction of these two conditions

leads to the competing nature of regional socio-political power.

Furthermore, the collapse of the authoritarian New Order was followed by two

conditions. On the one hand, the established local elites responded to the regime change by

activating three forms of initial adjustment. When the institutional pressure on authoritarian

elements was strong, as shown in the moment of authoritarian regime breakdown, established

local elites demonstrated the strategy of acquiescence (conformity). In other words,

297

Interview with Chairuman Harahap, Jakarta, 10 May 2011. 298

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012. 299

Interview with Sofyan Tan, Medan, 21 February 2012.

169

established local elites conformed to democratic aspirations. After the euphoria had

disappeared and the local political arena was brought back to its political equilibrium, the

established local elites began to utilize strategies of persuasion, inducement, and absorption of

oppositional power. Once institutional pressure weakened, established local elites became

more actively involved in the local political arena by infiltrating new political institutions and

retaking strategic positions in local parliament and bureaucratic structures. But the

authoritarian collapse also resulted in the persistence of old political beliefs and norms. This

condition stems from the mode of negotiated transition in which political reform was the

product of cooperation between reformers and authoritarian defenders.

The third and final institutional context is the nature of the installation of

democratization and decentralization in the region. This is characterized by three basic

elements: the negotiated democratic transition, the hurried and emotional political reform,

which consequently impacted on the third and final element: a negotiated and pragmatic

democratic arrangement. This negotiated transition has resulted in the absence of intrinsic

elements of democracy and thus led to what in theoretical terms was described as isomorphic

change (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

Nevertheless, the above institutional context (in particular democratization and

decentralization) paved the way for a significant change of local elite adjustment. The critical

juncture is here the changing mechanism of local elections into direct local elections.

Therefore, direct local elections can be treated as a crucial intervening variable within the

category of institutional contexts.

Direct local elections generate three conditions related to the circumstances which

define actors’ material interest. First, direct local elections significantly influence the change

of local elite configuration. The first change in the local election mechanism (the decentralist

election in local parliaments) created the opening space for elite recruitment, but direct local

elections have a tremendous effect on creating an inclusive form of elite recruitment from

varying backgrounds.

As a result, local elites can be classified into two groups of elites based on their track-

record: the old and the new. The old consists of local elites who had political experience from

the authoritarian New Order in various strategic positions. Benefitting from their long

involvement in the local political arena, this group of local elites has strong political networks

and political skills. Furthermore, the new elites can be divided into two groups. The first

group of new elites is the one, which entertained patronage relationships with the old elites,

were members of established families, or were a product of the state corporatism of the New

170

Order. The second group is the group of “genuine” new elites, which had no connection to the

previous political system and its authoritarian elements. Compared to the old elites, this group

is much weaker in terms of its political networks and skills. The reconfiguration of local elites

has contributed to the process of ideational contestation which is based on different cognitive

maps in perceiving political change.

The second impact of the conduct of direct local elections is the widespread practice of

transactional politics. By and large, transactional politics can be seen as a consequence of the

candidates’ campaign expenditures, buying the ticket of political parties, and bribing voters

by conducting money politics. The logical consequence of this practice is an extensive

political corruption which creates a Hobbesian nature of inter-elite competition.

However, direct local elections are not the only supporting factor for this “zero-sum

game” situation. Contributing to the high degree of elite competition are socio-political

characteristics of candidates such as ethnicity, religion, and party composition, which h are

instrumentalized in electoral campaigns. Paradoxically, however, the high degree of inter-elite

competition drives actors to scrutinize the abusive and corrupt behavior of their contenders

and leads to a situation where the track record of political elites has become important to be

publicly known.

Furthermore, the second category of circumstances defining actor’s behaviour (the

change of elite configuration, widespread transactional politics and political corruption,)

provides a necessary condition for the subsequent pathway of ideational contestation. As

previously described, two groups of elites have their own peculiar perception of political

change. For the old, established elites and the new elites with close connections to the ancien

régime, their political experience during the New Order era became a “manual” of reference

on how to behave in the local political arena. They had deeply absorbed the core values of

authoritarianism at the time regime change took place. The internalization of this authoritarian

tradition is evidenced in the use of money politics and other forms of political corruption in

direct local elections or in other political events. In contrast, the more “genuine” new local

elites, who had fewer cognitive distractions from the authoritarian culture, faced fundamental

political barriers in terms of their weaknesses in political networks and experiences.

Nevertheless, this group of local elites has started to reconstruct the new oppositional ideas,

particularly in direct local elections. As a result, conflicts occur between the cognitive prior

and new oppositional ideas.

Following another path, widespread transactional politics and political corruption -

which is generally conducted by old, established elites - caused a situation which did not meet

171

“social expectation or the socially desired result” (Legro 2000). This situation can be treated

as the second critical juncture that potentially leads to a new form of local elite adjustment,

namely a situation in which political corruption - as generally practiced by long-established

elites - and the local established elite’s use of traditional norms are strongly related to this

unmet social expectation. This situation can lead to significant decrease in the social

legitimacy of old elites and traditional norms simultaneously. Meanwhile, this situation can

have a stronger impact on substantial change of elite adjustment if new local elites can

strengthen and enrich the method of propagating the new oppositional ideas into society.

Finally, the crucial condition for new local elites to obtain symbolic legitimacy rests on their

ability to fulfill social expectations by creating good local government.

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Chapter Five

Elite and Democratization in East Java

I. Introduction

This chapter examines elite adjustment in East Java. Like in the previous chapter, the analysis

takes into account the institutional structure, actors’ strategies and ideational contestation. The

chapter will be organized into five sections. The introductory section will be followed by a

section studying the socio-economic condition of the region, the dynamics of local political

power, elite continuity, and the early processes of elite adjustment as an outcome of a

changing institutional structure. The third section portrays elite behavior from an actor-

centered perspective and the “material basis” of elite interactions. Therefore, the analysis will

provide an in-depth look at pact- and alliance building and strategies of local elites. The

fourth section discusses the ideational dimension, including the idea of Javanese ideas of

stability and harmony, paternalistic leadership, the rejection of the notion of liberal

democracy by local elites, and the new “oppositional” ideas. Finally, the last section will

summarize the results and provide a pattern of local elite adjustment in the region.

II. Elite and Institutional Context

This section discusses as to what extent local politics in the province of East Java is

determined by structural factors. It provides some overview about the provinces socio-

economic and socio-cultural background data before it turns to the government structures and

electoral regulations shaping the outcome of local elections, before finally the impact on elite

composition is discussed.

A. Socio-Economic Condition

East Java is one of the most populous provinces in Indonesia. With 37.68 million inhabitants

East Java is the second largest province in Indonesia after West Java (BPS Provinsi Jawa

Timur 2012, 46).300

In terms of religion, Islam is the majority in the province with 95.53

percent of the population, while Protestants make up for 2.20 percent of inhabitants and

Catholics 1.32 percent of inhabitants. Other religions are not significant as they only make up

for 0.62 percent of the population (BPS Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012, 74). Geographically, the

province can be divided into two main regions: the mainland and Madura Island. The

mainland covers 90 percent of the total area of the province, Madura only 10 percent (BPS

300

The largest province is West Java with a population of 43,053,732 (BPS, Statistik Indonesia 2011, 74).

173

Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012, 3). These two regions are subdivided into twenty-nine regencies

and nine cities, making East Java the largest province in the country in terms of the number of

regencies or cities. Surabaya, the capital, is the biggest city with 2.798 million inhabitants and

the second largest city in Indonesia (BPS Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012).

The economic performance of the province is relatively good compared to other

provinces. For example, the province enjoyed the highest economic growth in 2011 with 7.22

percent and also has strong financial capacity with total local government revenues of 11.49

trillion rupiahs (approximately US$1 billion).301

77.42 percent of the total revenue is locally-

generated revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah), while 22.32 percent is made up of transferred

revenues, including revenue from the central government such as block grants and specific

allocation funds (BPS Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012). The province is still dominated by

agriculture, although industry is growing. Around 39.70 percent of the population still work in

the agricultural sector, compared to the sectors of trade and industry that contribute around

20.36 percent of employment, followed by the mining sector which makes up 13.81 percent

(BPS Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012).

However, despite its economic success, the province still faces problems of

unemployment with a rate of 4.16 percent (open unemployment, tingkat pengangguran

terbuka) (BPS Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012). In education the record is also mixed. The

province enjoys a high rate of school attendance of 90.04 percent of the population. In fact,

the figure is only for those who attended elementary-secondary school in 2011 (BPS Provinsi

Jawa Timur 2012). Looking at the level of higher education, the figure fell to 5.55 percent in

2011 for those who obtained a degree in higher education (BPS Provinsi Jawa Timur 2012).

These factors contributed to the high poverty rate as 13.40 percent of the population was

categorized as poor in 2012 (BPS 2012, 111).

While the province is dominated by Javanese and Madurese, there are also several

distinctive sub-cultures, although scholars differ in identifying their exact number (Zuhro

2009; Pribadi 2013).302

Broadly speaking, there are three dominant sub-cultures that should be

mentioned here. The first sub-culture is Madurese and Pandalungan which refers to the sub-

culture of the Madurese in Madura Island and the Madurese who migrated to the “boundary

areas” in the north coast of East Java (called Tapal Kuda region).303

Several regencies are

included in this Tapal Kuda region such as Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Bondowoso, and

301

Based on a currency rate of 1 USD= 11,490 rupiahs. 302

Interview with Airlangga University sociologist Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 303

Tapal Kuda literally means horseshoe. This name refers to the north coast region of East Java which

resembles a horseshoe.

174

Situbondo (Zuhro 2009, 38). The second sub-culture is called Mataraman which refers to the

people of East Java who speak Javanese with central Javanese dialect. This sub-culture exists

in some districts, including Pacitan, Magetan, Madiun, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Nganjuk, Kediri,

Blitar, Tulungagung, Trenggalek, and Ponorogo (Zuhro 2009, 38). The last sub-culture is

Arek which refers to several regions around Malang, Mojokerto, Sidoarjo, Lamongan, Gresik,

and Surabaya (Zuhro 2009, 38) where different dialects of Javanese language are found.

According to Pribadi (2013), the areas of Mataraman are influenced by syncretic Islam

or abangan (Geertz 1976) as a result of the long rule of the Mataram Kingdom (sixteenth to

nineteenth century). The Madurese and Pandalungan are more influenced by more orthodox

or santri Islam (Geertz 1976; Hefner 1987), while the Arek sub-culture is placed in a

metropolitan or urban area that other sub-cultures migrate to and have a more rational and

pragmatic religious orientation (Pribadi 2013, 58). Although there is a belief that the regions

of Mataraman and Arek are historically influenced by nationalist and communist political

ideologies, the areas of Madurese and Pendalungan are strongly connected to the traditional

Islam.304

However, it is not entirely clear what the relationship between the above sub-

cultures and their political orientation is. Abdul Chalik (2010 cited in Pribadi 2013, 59), for

instance, found that the religious teachers of the NU – dependent upon the respective sub-

culture - have distinctive preferences when they support political parties (Pribadi 2013, 59).

However, according to sociologist Hotman Siahaan, the distinctive feature of sub-cultures in

East Java is that they only provide a cultural orientation, but they do not serve as a yardstick

for any kind of political orientation, let alone political competition.305

B. The Dynamics of Local Political Power: Parties and Elections

1. General Elections

The General Election of 1955

East Java is the province where the Nahdlatul Ulama, the biggest Islamic organization with a

traditionalist stream (aliran), obtained the largest popular support in the first general election

in 1955. In contrast to the results at the national level where the Indonesian Nationalist Party

(PNI) became the strongest political party, in this province the Nahdlatul Ulama ranked first

with 34.13 percent of votes. The PNI was positioned third with 22.79 percent of votes after

the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with 23.38 percent of votes. With 11.24 percent, the

Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masyumi),

304

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 305

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012.

175

a modernist-Islamist party, came in fourth. Based on these figures, the province shows two

distinct characteristics. First, East Java is home for the “green” and the “red” political parties

in Indonesia.306

Second, despite the existence of the Masyumi with its significant votes, East

Java was the home-base for the traditionalist Islam. Table 1 below exhibits the result of the

1955 general election, both at the national level and the result in East Java.

Table 5. 1 The Result of 1955 General Election, National Level and East Java

(in percent)

Political Parties National Level East Java

PNI 22.32 22.79

Masyumi 20.92 11.24

Nahdlatul Ulama 18.41 34.13

PKI 16.36 23.38

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 2000, 18, 25.

The General Elections in the New Order Era

During the six general elections of the New Order period, Golkar always won.

However, the support of the Golkar in East Java was always below its votes at the national

level. Golkar’s main competitors were the NU and later on the United Development Party

(PPP),307

which commanded a large number of followers in the region irrespective of the fact

that Golkar was backed by the regime. Given the fact that the New Order’s elections were

manipulated in many ways, this achievement is outstanding. The performance of the NU and

later on the PPP in general elections cannot be separated from the support of the abundant

Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and their religious teachers (kyai) which were affiliated

with the Nahdlatul Ulama (Ward 1974; Hefner 1987; Liddle 1988; Jones 1984).

In the first general election under the New Order in 1971, as a new party Golkar won

the election in East Java with 54.91 percent of popular votes. However, despite the clear

Golkar victory, the NU still obtained 35.17 percent of votes. Therefore, the NU had shown its

enduring influence in the province as the party’s support even increased compared to the

general election of 1955 where it had gained 34.13 percent of the votes. However, in the

election, the gap between its national and provincial support was quite significant. At the

national level, the NU only received 18.68 percent of votes. The results for its nationalist

contender, the PNI, were disastrous as the latter only received 5 percent of the votes.

306

In Indonesian political terminology (particularly in the 1950s), “green“ usually refers to the Islamist parties,

while ”red“ refers to nationalist or communist parties. For political streams in Indonesia in the 1950s, see Feith

and Castles 1970. 307

In 1973, the regime merged all Islamic parties into the PPP, including the Nahdlatul Ulama (Haris and Saidi

1991; Mandan 2009, 91-114; Radi 1984, 61-103).

176

Compared to the 1955 general election, when it had obtained 22.79 percent of votes in East

Java, this was a steep decline.

These two conditions, the relatively persistent performance of the NU and the sharply

decreased number of votes for the PNI, led to the assumption that Golkar successfully

mobilized the supporters of the PNI to vote for Golkar. Also the former supporters of the PKI

are believed to have shifted their support to Golkar after the Soeharto government banned the

party in 1965, accusing it of orchestrating the aborted communist coup (G/30S-PKI) in 1965.

Mercilessly prosecuted by the emerging New Order regime, PKI sympathizers might have

thought that the only possible way to avoid state repression or becoming a victim of military-

orchestrated massacres was joining Golkar as the government’s party. According to Kenneth

Ward who investigated the general election of 1971 in East Java, it is undeniable “that

Golkar’s vote was derived in good measure from the PKI constituency, and from the

supporters of the PNI” (Ward 1974, 165). He also stressed that “Golkar’s inheritance of the

PKI vote was evident in all other regencies,” where PKI had attained majorities in 1955”

(Ward 1974, 166). Hence the result of the 1971 general election in East Java could not

guarantee Golkar to fully control the local political arena, even though the party attained a

convenient majority. The reason is simply that it could not make inroads into the support base

of the NU. Table 12 shows the result of the 1971 general election both at the national and

provincial levels.

Table 5. 2 The Results of 1971 General Election, National Level and East Java

(in percent)

Political Parties National Level East Java

Golkar 62.82 54.91

NU 18.68 35.17

Parmusi 5.36 2.73

PNI 6.93 5

PSII 2.39 1.24

Parkindo 1.34

Katolik 1.10

Perti 0.69 0.95

IPKI 0.61

Murba 0.08

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 2000, 52-63.

In 1973, the New Order regime implemented a policy for political parties to merge. Only

Golkar was exempted from this policy. As a result, there were only two political parties and

one functional group (Golkar) to contest in the next general election in 1977 until the last

elections took place under the regime in 1997. All Islamic parties (the NU, Parmusi, PSII, and

PERTI) were forced to merge into the United Development Party (PPP), while the nationalist

177

and Christian parties (the PNI, Parkindo, Katolik, IPKI, and Murba) were forced to merge into

the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). However, this fusion did not significantly change the

general pattern of popular support as shown in the 1971 general election. In East Java, Golkar

increased its support by almost 4 percent in the general election of 1977. The increase of

Golkar came at the expense of a decrease for the Islamic parties (PPP) and the nationalist and

Christian parties (PDI). However, the results of the general election in 1977 and 1982

appeared to be similar to the 1971 general election (before the fusion). In these two general

elections, Golkar could not significantly increase its votes, and support for the Islamic parties

(PPP) and the nationalist and Christian parties (PDI) also remained stable.

A significant change occurred in the subsequent general election in 1987. At the

national and provincial levels, the support for Golkar increased significantly (by almost 15

percent), while at same time the PPP lost almost 16 percent of votes, and the PDI increased by

only 1.5 percent. One of the reasons for this change is strongly related to the shifting political

stance of the Nahdlatul Ulama as a social organization. In 1984, the Nahdlatul Ulama under

the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid proclaimed to return to its basic mission (khittah) as a

socio-religious organization (Anam 2010). The NU subsequently took an equidistant position

towards all political parties and would not give political support to a specific political party as

it did to the PPP. The political impact of this decision was significant as the improved

performance of Golkar and the decreasing support for the PPP suggest. The decision of the

NU to return to a socio-religious organization was also driven by its disappointment over the

dominant position of the Muslimin Indonesia faction within the PPP, following the fusion

(Haris and Saidi 1991). Benefitting from this situation, the regime persuaded the NU to

support Golkar in the general election of 1987 (Liddle 1988, 184).

In the general election of 1992, there was another change in terms of the electoral

performances of the three contestants. Golkar lost almost 13 percent of support in East Java.

In contrast, the votes for the PPP increased slightly and even more significantly for the PDI,

which obtained more than of 8 percent in the province. The growing popularity of the PDI

seemed related to a clearer position of this party as opposition to the regime as well as the

involvement of Soekarno family members in the party, particularly Soekarno’s daughter

Megawati Soekarnoputri. The involvement of the Soekarno family in the PDI as the vote-

getter succeeded in elevating the party’s performance in this general election. Supported by

the young generation with anti-establishment sentiment, this party became an irritant for

Golkar and the regime.

178

The popularity of the PDI became even greater when Megawati got elected as the

Chairman of the party in an Extraordinary Party Congress (Kongres Luar Biasa) in 1993 in

Surabaya, the capital of East Java. Responding to this development, the regime tried to

obstruct the increasing popularity of Megawati and the PDI. By supporting a rival, that is,

Soerjadi as the new Chairman in the National Congress in 1996 in Medan, the regime

succeeded in splitting the party into two groups: Megawati’s group and Soerjadi’s group. This

internal conflict culminated in the riots on 27 July 1996 in Jakarta where the supporters of

these two groups fought over the headquarters of the party in Menteng, Jakarta (Bhakti 2001,

Priyono 2001, 199-228; Putranto et.al. 2006, 71-110).308

As a consequence of this conflict, the

votes of the PDI in the general election of 1997 decreased dramatically, and in East Java, the

party lost more than 12 percent of the votes. However, the decreasing votes of the PDI did not

correlate with a significant increase on the side of Golkar. The votes for Golkar increased by

only 4 percent in the region. A significant increase occurred for the PPP with more than 11

percent additional votes in the region. Many loyalists and sympathizers of Megawati were

disappointed when the regime intervened in the internal affairs of the PDI, and they

subsequently supported the PPP. This support was for example expressed in the slogan of

“Mega-Bintang,” which also became a symbol for the “informal” coalition between Megawati

supporters and the PPP (Legowo and Harjanto 1997). Table 13 below details the result of

general elections during the New Order (from the general election of 1977 to general election

of 1997).

Table 5. 3 The Results of The New Order’s General Election, National Level and East

Java (in percent)

Political

Parties

1977 1982 1987 1992 1997

National

Level

East

Java

Nat.

Level

East

Java

Nat.

Level

East

Java

Nat.

Level

East

Java

Nat.

Level

East

Java

Golkar 62.11 58.84 64.34 56.78 73.16 71.21 68.10 58.82 74.51 62.97

PPP 29.29 36.05 27.78 36.63 15.97 20.78 17.01 25.21 22.43 33.88

PDI 8.60 5.11 7.88 6.59 10.87 8.01 14.89 15.97 3.06 3.15

Source: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 2000, 73- 174.

The General Elections in the Post-New Order Period

After the fall of the New Order regime, the political constellation in the province changed

markedly. With the introduction of a democratic system, the dominant role of Golkar as the

government’s party in the New Order collapsed. With the new multi-party system, political

competition among political parties became much more open. Benefitting from its role as the

308

It was widely believed that the regime was actively involved in this conflict when military officers backed

Soerjadi’s group during the riots.

179

strongest opposition party in the last days of the New Order regime, the PDI-P309

won the

general election of 1999 at the national level with 33.7 percent of votes. However, in East

Java, with 35.41 percent the PKB as the main political representation of the Nahdlatul Ulama

obtained the highest popular support. This result was significantly higher than its national

result which was only 12.6 percent of votes. In the province, the PDI-P came in second with

33.81 percent of votes, slightly higher than its national result. Meanwhile, the Golkar Party

only obtained 12.66 percent in the province, which was notably lower than its national result

with 22.4 percent of popular support. In short, this first general election in the post-New

Order established the PKB and the PDI-P as the two most powerful political powers in the

region.

In the general election of 2004, the results were quite different compared to the 1999

general election, particularly for the PDI-P. The party lost more than 13 percent of its votes in

the province, down from 33.81 percent in 1999 to 20.56 percent in 2004 and paralleling the

results at the national level. By contrast, the PKB remained stable and repeated its success as

the most popular party in the province, although the party lost about 4 percent of its votes.

The Golkar Party also stayed in third place with 13 percent of votes. The results for some

medium-sized parties such as the PAN and the PPP also remained stable. The PAN was

relatively constant with 4.64 percent (compared to 4.74 percent in 1999), while the PPP

slightly increased the votes from 6.09 in 1999 to 7.32 percent in 2004. At the same time, the

province also witnessed the emergence of a new political party - the Democrat Party - that

obtained significant support in its first election with 7.52 percent of popular support.

After two elections in the post-New Order era with the domination of the PKB and the

PDI-P, the province experienced dramatic changes in the 2009 national election. The

popularity of the Democrat Party increased markedly to win the greatest support in the region

with 21.99 percent of votes. It is not surprising that the rise of the party occurred at the

expense of other major parties. The PDI-P was still able to finish in the second place with

16.16 percent although it lost more than 4 percent compared to 2004. The impact was even

more pronounced in the case of the PKB because, for the first time, the party was forced to

accept defeat and came in third with only 11.83 percent. The party lost more than 20 percent

of votes compared to the previous election.

There are several explanations for the decline of the PKB in the province. The most

obvious is the severe conflict within the party since 2008. This conflict has divided the party

into three camps, led by three prominent figures: Muhaimin Iskandar, Abdurrahman Wahid

309

The PDI-P (the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) is the continuation of a party’s faction under

Megawati’s leadership following the internal conflict of the PDI from 1993 to 1997.

180

(Gus Dur), and Choirul Anam who then established his influence in the Ulema National

Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama/PKNU).

Also other parties suffered major setbacks. The result of the Golkar Party was also

worse compared to the 2004 election. In 2009, the party only garnered 9.69 percent of the

votes, which means that it lost more than 3 percent. This is surprisingly different from the

performance of some medium-sized parties such as the PAN and the PPP whose electoral

results were relatively stable, hovering around 5 percent of popular votes. The PKS, a new

party with modernist Islamic orientation, improved its performance in the region in 2004 from

0.34 percent in 1999 to 5.33 percent of the votes.

New parties that emerged in the 2008 election were the Greater Indonesia Movement

Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya/ Gerindra) and the People’s Conscience Party (Partai

Hati Nurani Rakyat/ Hanura), both led by the former high ranking military officers. In East

Java, Gerindra obtained 5.06 percent of votes, while Hanura got 3.5 percent of votes in the

province. Table 14 provides an overview about the performance of the parties in the three

general elections of the post-New Order period (at the national level and East Java).

Table 5. 4 Results of the General Elections in the Post-New Order Era, National Level

and East Java (by percent of popular vote

Political

Parties

1999 2004 2009

National

Level

East Java National

Level

East Java National

Level

East Java

Demokrat * * 7.5 7.52 20.81 21.99

Golkar 22.4 12.66 21.6 13 14.45 9.69

PDI-P 33.7 33.81 18.5 20.56 14.01 16.16

PK(S)** 1.35 0.34 7.3 2.9 7.89 5.33

PAN 7.1 4.74 6.4 4.64 6.03 5.58

PPP 10.7 6.09 8.2 7.32 5.33 5.31

PKB 12.6 35.48 10.6 31.11 4.95 11.83

Gerindra * * * * 4.46 5.06

Hanura * * * * 3.77 3.5

Other 12.15 19.9 12.95 18.2 15.55

Sources: Indonesian National Election Commission (KPU) 1999, 1999a, 2000, 2004, Yatim et.al.

2010; The Provincial Agency for Social and Political Affairs of East Java (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa

Jawa Timur) 2007, 2010; Ananta et. al. 2004.

*Did not participate.

** In the 1999 general election, the name of the party was PK (Partai Keadilan), while in the

subsequent general elections of 2004 and 2009, it was changed to PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)

181

2. Local Elections

The Gubernatorial Election in 1998

The gubernatorial election of 1998 was held based on the Law No. 5/1974. According to the

Law, local legislatures elect three to five candidates and they must report the result to the

central government. The central government via the Ministry of Home Affairs then chooses

one of the candidates as a local chief executive. The result was a “central-ordered candidate”

(calon pesanan dari pusat, see also Chapter 4) with great involvement of the President, the

Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Military Headquarters (Markas Besar ABRI).

In the initial phase, there were five candidates who took part in the gubernatorial

election of 1998. They were Major General (ret.) Basofi Sudirman (the incumbent Governor),

Major General Imam Utomo (former Regional Commander of Brawijaya and member of the

national legislature/ DPR), Major General (ret.) Haris Sudarno (former Regional Commander

of Brawijaya), Prof Dr Bambang Rahino (former Rector of the University of Airlangga and

member of DPR), and Syumli Syadli (Vice Chairman of the Provincial Legislature/ DPRD

and the politician from the PPP). These five candidates were the result of a pre-selection in

the provincial legislature. However, after this pre-selection had been conducted, the central

government only approved three candidates that could continue. The candidates for election in

the local legislature were Imam Utomo, Syumli Syadli, and Bambang Rahino. Imam was

supported by the factions of PDI, ABRI, and the Golkar Faction. The latter supported Imam

after the failure of Basofi’s candidacy. Syumli Sadli was the candidate of the PPP, while

Bambang Rahino was the candidate of some members in the Golkar Faction.310

During the downsizing of the number of five candidates to three, local politics was

quite dynamic. After his rejection by the central government, Basofi Sudirman mobilized his

supporters to demonstrate in front of the building of the provincial legislature. They

demanded the provincial legislature to accept Basofi as one of the three candidates. Their

demand was not only voiced in Surabaya, but they also went to the Ministry of Home Affairs

in Jakarta. Nevertheless, his strategic position as incumbent could not help Basofi to get the

ticket from Jakarta. The Minister of Home Affairs, Syarwan Hamid, stated that the reason

behind Basofi’s rejection was related to the central government’s decision to support a

governor for only one period of governorship. Only for those showing an excellent

performance, the central government would support them for the second term, as in the case

of the governor of East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur).311

The other reason was

310

“Dan, Pemenangnya Adalah…,” Jawa Pos, 31 July 1998, ”Terobosan Pada Injury Timepun Gagal,“ Jawa

Pos, 5 August 1998, “Syumli ‘GR’, Bambang Emoh Disebut Pendamping,” Jawa Pos, 5 August 1998. 311

“Dicoret Bukan Berarti Basofi Gagal, Syarwan: Untuk Dua Kali Harus Excellent,” Jawa Pos, 28 July 1998.

182

related to the consultation between the Minister of Home Affairs with the Commander of the

Armed Forces (Panglima ABRI) who proposed only one military/ former military officer in

the competition, and Basofi was not chosen.312

The three remaining candidates fiercely competed for the support of the provincial

legislators. At that time, the provincial legislature consisted of four factions: Golkar’s

Functional Group Faction (Fraksi Karya Pembangunan) with fifty members, the United

Development Faction (Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan) with twenty-seven members, the

Indonesian Democratic Party Faction (Fraksi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) with three

members, and the Military Faction (Fraksi ABRI) with twenty members. Altogether, these

four factions made up for the 100 members of the provincial legislature (see Table 15 below).

In the final stage, members of the local parliament voted on each candidate and the result of

this election that was held on 5 August 1998 showed that the majority of provincial legislators

supported Imam Utomo. Imam received 65 votes, Syumli Syadli 25 votes and Bambang

Rahino obtained ten votes (see Table 16 below). The result demonstrated a solid support of

the factions of PDI and ABRI to Imam, a dominant support of the Golkar Faction to Imam,

and possibly the disloyalty of some members of the PPP faction toward their candidate,

Syumli Sadli.313

With this result, Imam Utomo was inaugurated as a new leader, replacing

Basofi Sudirman as the governor of East Java.

Table 5. 5 Composition of Political Parties/ Factions in the Provincial Legislature in the

Gubernatorial Election of 1998

Political Parties/ Factions Number of Seats

The Functional Group Faction (Fraksi Karya Pembangunan) 50

The United Development Faction (Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan) 27

The Indonesian Democratic Party Faction (Fraksi Partai Demokrasi

Indonesia)

3

The Military Faction (Fraksi ABRI) 20

Total Seats 100

Source: Document of Gubernatorial Election, Period 1998-2003, the Regional People’s Representative

Council/ the Provincial Legislature of East Java Province (DPRD Provinsi Jawa Timur), 1998.

312

In an interview Imam Utomo acknowledged that he accepted the order from the Commander of Armed Forces

to run in this gubernatorial election. Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 313

“Pembelot dan Pengkhianat FPP Terus Dilacak,” Jawa Pos, 7 August 1998.

183

Table 5. 6 The Results of the Gubernatorial Election of 1998

Candidates Votes

Imam Utomo 65

Syumli Syadli 25

Bambang Rahino 10

Total Votes 100

Source: Document of Gubernatorial Election, Period 1998-2003, the Regional People’s Representative

Council/ The Provincial Legislature of East Java Province (DPRD Provinsi Jawa Timur), 1998.

The Gubernatorial Election in 2003

The gubernatorial election of 2003 was held in more complex circumstances than the one in

1998. This condition, to a certain degree, was related to the enactment of the Decentralization

Law No. 22/1999, by which central government has lost its authority to intervene in the

electoral process. The provincial legislature, the political parties (at the provincial level and

the national level) and candidates then became the main actors of the election, replacing the

dominance of the central government. Yet elites of the political parties in Jakarta still

possessed crucial power in deciding which candidates could run in the race.

Competition among candidates to receive party support was particularly high in three

major political parties in the region: the PKB, the PDI-P, and the Golkar Party. However, in

the PDI-P and the Golkar Party, the tension among their politicians in promoting their

candidates was significantly less compared to what happened in the PKB. In the Golkar Party,

the Regional Chairman of the party, Ridwan Hisyam received the ticket as candidate of vice

governor, running with his partner, Abdul Kahfi who was supported by the PKB. For the

Golkar Party, the decision to offer Ridwan Hisyam the position of vice governor can be seen

as the maximum bargaining position since the party had only eleven seats in the parliament,

far behind the seats of the PKB which possessed thirty-three seats. In the PDI-P, the party’s

decision to support Imam Utomo-Soenarjo did not get significant resistance from the party’s

politicians, although some party cadres expressed reservation that Imam was not a party

member and recalled his repressive attitude towards the party at the time when Imam held the

position of the Regional Military Commander.314

Tension in selecting candidates was greater in the PKB. In order to find candidates, the

party formed a selection committee which was called the 10 Team of the PKB-NU (Tim 10

PKB-NU). This team had chosen ten candidates from the members of the party, members of

the Nahdlatul Ulama, and candidates from outside of the party and the NU. Amongst the

314

“Posisi Imam Utomo Terancam dalam Bursa Gubernur,” available at: www.tempo.co.id, 5 May 2003,

(accessed 6 August 2013).

184

candidates were Imam Utomo, Soenarjo, Saifullah Yusuf, Choirul Anam, and Ali Machsan

Musa. The first two were the incumbent governor and the secretary of the provincial

government, while the others were members of the party and the Nahdlatul Ulama. The work

of the team then converged on two candidates: Imam Utomo for the candidate of governor,

and Saifullah Yusuf, the Secretary General of the party as the candidate of vice governor. A

report on the committee’s deliberations was then sent to the Central Board of the party in

Jakarta. Responding to this report, the Central Board, in particular the Chairman of the

Supreme Board of the PKB (Ketua Dewan Syuro PKB), former Indonesian President

Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), rejected the proposal and proposed other candidates: Abdul

Kahfi, the former vice governor of Jakarta, as candidate for the position of governor, and

Ridwan Hisyam, the Regional Chairman of the Golkar party as candidate for the position of

vice governor. Gus Dur’s proposal to pair Abdul Kahfi with Ridwan Hisyam also signaled the

beginning of a coalition of the PKB with the Golkar Party. This decision was taken to enlarge

the parliamentary support by arranging a coalition from which the PKB (thirty-three votes)

could add the eleven votes from members of the Golkar Party in the local parliament. The

coalition was formally formed during a meeting between Gus Dur and Akbar Tanjung (the

National Chairman of the Golkar Party) in Jakarta.315

Nevertheless, Gus Dur’s proposal met resistance from some members of the party. The

Secretary General of the party, Saifullah Yusuf - the nephew of Gus Dur - stated that Gus

Dur’s proposal had violated party procedures. Further, Saifullah said that Abdul Kahfi was

unknown to the people in East Java. In fact, it was not only Saifullah alone who refused the

proposal, but also some influential local religious teachers (kyai). One among them was Kyai

Masduki Mahfudz, the Chairman of the Provincial Supreme Board of Nahdlatul Ulama

(Ketua Syuriah Pengurus Wilayah NU). Masduki stated that the Nahdlatul Ulama did not

approve of Abdul Kahfi yet and continued his covert resistance by saying that Abdul Kahfi

was neither a member of the NU nor the PKB, but that, in contrast, he was believed to be a

member of Muhammadiyah.316

Despite internal disputes and divisions, the PKB and the Golkar Party continued to

support the Abdul Kahfi-Ridwan Hisjam candidacy. This unfavorable situation improved the

chances for their contenders, the Imam Utomo-Soenarjo team. Imam Utomo could also build

on his active engagement with religious teachers, the NU and the Islamic boarding schools

315

“Gus Dur-Akbar Bertemu Membahas Calon Gubernur Jatim,“ available at: www.news.liputan6.com, 7 July

2003, (accessed 6 August 2013). 316

“Calon Gubernur Jatim Abdul Kahfi, Belum Minta Restu NU,“ available at: www.tempo.co, 18 June 2003,

(accessed 6 August 2013).

185

(pesantren) during his governorship. Kyai Masduki Mahfudz, the Chairman of the Provincial

Supreme Board of NU, acknowledged that Imam frequently met him and requested his

support, and he approved Imam’s leadership. For Masduki, one of the reasons behind his

support for Imam was that Imam had never disappointed the members of the NU.317

As a result of the selection process, by the end of June 2003, five factions in the

provincial legislature formally decided on their candidates. The PDI-P and the Joint Factions,

composed of PPP, PAN and several six small parties, proposed Imam Utomo-Soenarjo as

their candidates.318

The PKB and the Golkar Party factions submitted the Abdul Kahfi-

Ridwan Hisjam ticket.319

The Military and Police Faction took a neutral position without

proposing any candidates.320

In the 100-member provincial legislature (see Table 17 below), the PKB was the

strongest faction with thirty-three seats and followed by the PDI-P with thirty-one seats. The

Golkar Party (previously the biggest faction in parliament with fifty seats) had only eleven

seats, an almost comparable number of seats to that of the Military-Police Faction (ten seats).

The fifteen remaining seats belonged to the Joint Faction (Fraksi Gabungan) in which the

PPP had five seats, PAN four seats, and the other six parties one seat each.

Table 5. 7 Composition of Political Parties/ Factions in the Provincial Legislature in the

Gubernatorial Election of 2003

Political Parties/ Factions Number of Seats

The PKB Faction (Fraksi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) 33

The PDI-P Faction (Fraksi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) 31

The Golkar Party Faction (Fraksi Partai Golkar) 11

The Military-Police Faction (Fraksi TNI-POLRI) 10

The Joint Faction (Fraksi Gabungan) 15

Total Seats 100

Sources: Document of Gubernatorial Election, Period 2003-2008, the Regional People’s

Representative Council/ The Provincial Legislature of East Java Province (DPRD Provinsi Jawa

Timur), 2003, various media sources.

The election result was consistent with the dynamics and tensions in political parties as

317

“Calon Gubernur Jatim Abdul Kahfi, Belum Minta Restu NU,“ available at: www.tempo.co, 18 June 2003,

(accessed 6 August 2013). 318

Document of Letter Number 104/Ex/F.PDI-P/DPRD JATIM/VI/2006 on “Penetapan Pasangan Calon

Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Jawa Timur Periode 2003-2008 dari Fraksi DPI Perjuangan,” 27 June 2003;

Document of Letter Number 46/F.Gab/DPRD/VI/2003 on “Nama Pasangan Calon Gubernur dan Wakil

Gubernur Jawa Timur periode 2003-2008,“ Surabaya, 26 June 2003. 319

Document of Letter Number 127/ FKB/ DPRD-JATIM/ VI/ 2003 on “Penetapan Pasangan Calon Gubernur

dan Wakil Gubernur Jawa Timur 2003-2008,” Surabaya, 26 June 2003; Document of Letter Number 215/ FPG/

DPRD Jatim/ VI/ 2003 on “Penetapan Pasangan Calon Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Jawa Timur Periode 2003-

2008,” Surabaya, 26 June 2003. 320

Document of Letter Number B/ 85/ VI/ 2005 on “Penetapan Pasangan Calon Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur

Jawa Timur Periode 2003-2008 Fraksi TNI & POLRI,“ Surabaya, 26 June 2003.

186

previously described. Abdul Kahfi and Ridwan Hisjam only obtained thirty-four votes out of

100. This result was lower than the number of seats which the PKB and the Golkar Party

factions actually had in the parliament. The two factions should have obtained at least forty-

four seats in total. In fact, the pair did not only fail to broaden political support from other

factions, but also lost coalition support. In contrast to the results of Abdul Kahfi and Ridwan

Hisjam, Imam Utomo-Soenarjo received more votes from the members of the legislature than

their coalition should have received. The pair received sixty-three votes which was a higher

number than the actual seats of the PDI-P and the Joint-Faction which only had forty-six

seats. It is clear that the pair could enlist political support from the Military-Police Faction

and some politicians from the PKB and the Golkar Party. Table 18 below exhibits the result of

the gubernatorial election of 2003.

Table 5. 8 The Result of the Gubernatorial Election of 2003

Candidates Votes

Imam Utomo-Soenarjo 63

Abdul Kahfi-Ridwan Hisjam 34

Abstain 1

Invalid 2

Total Votes 100

Source: Document of Gubernatorial Election, Period 2003-2008, the Regional People’s Representative

Council/ The Provincial Legislature of East Java Province (DPRD Provinsi Jawa Timur), 2003.

The Gubernatorial Election in 2008

The gubernatorial election of 2008 was the first direct election of governor in East Java. It

was held in the new atmosphere of democratization. Based on the general election in 2004,

the PDI-P and the PKB were the two most powerful political parties in the region. However,

their domination was overshadowed by the rapid rise and increasing popularity of the

Democrat Party, following the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the President who

was also the figurehead of the party. While the popularity of the Democrat Party grew, the

PDI-P and the PKB faced a decline. In contrast to the Democrat Party, the PDI-P encountered

a lack of political and economic resources as an opposition party. The PKB had to deal with

serious internal friction of its elites both at the national level and provincial branch in East

Java.

The election was also characterized by the absence of Imam Utomo (the incumbent

governor) as one of the most prominent local elites. Imam Utomo had been in office for two

terms and thus reached the maximum duration a local chief executive could hold office. Also,

187

this gubernatorial election had its peculiarity compared to other gubernatorial elections in the

country because it went into three “rounds.” In addition, this gubernatorial election was not

only the most exhausting, but also the most expensive local election since the enactment of

direct local elections. Total government expenses for this gubernatorial election amounted to

more than 830 billion rupiahs (US$72.2 million),321

not including the expenses of candidates

and political parties for campaigning.

There were five pairs of candidates who participated in this gubernatorial election in

the first round. Looking at their background, six of them were politicians, while the other four

were senior local bureaucrats and former high-ranking military officers. Two candidates were

former ministers (Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Saifullah Yusuf) and the other four were

member of national parliament (Sutjipto), the incumbent vice governor (Soenarjo), the

Secretary of the provincial government (Soekarwo) and the regent of Mojokerto (Achmady).

One candidate was the former regional chairman of the Golkar Party who was also a member

of the provincial legislature (Ridwan Hisyam). In addition to the civilian candidates, there

were two former military officers who were former Chiefs of Staff of the Military Regional

Command of Brawijaya (Mujiono and Soehartono). Among these ten candidates, four

candidates were affiliated with the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul

Ulama (Khofifah, Ali Machsan Musa, Achmady, and Saifullah Yusuf). Only four out of ten

candidates can thus be classified as new elites (Khofifah, Saifullah, Ali, and Soetjipto) who

were not involved in, or had any connections to, the political institutions of the New Order. In

the case of Soetjipto, he was an experienced politician of the PDI-P and became the

opposition leader to the regime, in particular in the last days of the New Order.

Competition among candidates started with the process of nomination by political

parties. Based on the Law No. 32/2004, candidates must be nominated by a political party or

coalition of political parties with at least fifteen percent of total votes or fifteen percent of

total seats in the local parliament based on the previous general election. According to this

regulation, there were only three parties that could nominate candidates without forming a

coalition: the PDI-P, the PKB, and the Golkar Party. In the Golkar Party, the decision to

nominate candidates was not so problematic. The regional chairman of the party, Soenarjo

had secured his position as the strongest candidate of the party. Nevertheless, another party

leader, Ridwan Hisjam who held the position of Vice Chairman of the Provincial Legislature

and who was also a former Chairman of the Provincial Board of the Golkar Party, was

nominated by the PDI-P as candidate of vice governor, to be paired with Sutjipto as the

321

Based on a currency rate of 11,490 Rupiah for 1 US$. See also “Biaya Pilkada Berlebihan,” Kompas, 24

January 2009.

188

candidate of governor of the PDI-P.

The constellation was even more complex in the PKB and the PDI-P. In 2008, the

PKB experienced an internal conflict, in particular between the Chairman of the Advisory

Board (Ketua Dewan Syuro) Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and the Chairman of the

Executive Board (Ketua Dewan Tanfidz) Muhaimin Iskandar.322

This conflict had resulted in

dual management structures in the party. The Gus Dur’s camp appointed Ali Masykur Musa

as the Chairman of the Executive Council, while Muhaimin Iskandar’s camp chose Muhaimin

as the Chairman. The impact of this conflict at the national level influenced the composition

of the provincial board in East Java. Gus Dur’s camp chose Hasan Aminudin as the Chairman

of the Provincial Board, while his opponent decided that Nahrawi was the chairman in the

province. This conflict eroded the internal cohesion of the party.323

It significantly influenced

the nomination of candidates in the gubernatorial election where each conflicting group

supported different candidates. Muhaimin proposed Syamiatun (a businesswoman and the

Chairwoman of the Indigenous Cooperative Association, Asosiasi Koperasi Pribumi, IKOPI)

and Arifin Darmawan, a university professor, as candidates of governor and vice governor of

East Java, while Gus Dur nominated Achmady and Soehartono as the candidates.324

After

legal verification, the Local Election Commission (KPUD) eventually decided that Achmady

and Soehartono are the authorized candidates of the PKB.325

Achmady had eliminated other

candidates from Gus Dur’s camp such as Haris Sudarno and Djoko Subroto (both were former

Regional Military Commanders of Brawijaya), Hermawan Sulistyo (researcher at LIPI) and

Ali Machsan Musa (former Chairman of the Regional Board of Nahdlatul Ulama/ PWNU).326

Following the the KPUD’s decision, Muhaimin’s camp supported Soekarwo-Saifullah

Yusuf.327

While the PKB encountered internal conflict and split support, the PDI-P faced similar

tensions. Key competitors for the party’s ticket were Sutjipto and Soekarwo. Sutjipto was the

322

“Jalan Panjang Konflik PKB,” available at: www.kompas.com, 19 July 2008, (accessed 4 September 2013);

Yohan Wahyu, “Pertarungan Popularitas dan Ujian PKB,” available at: www.kompas.com, 7 July 2008,

(accessed 4 September 2013); “Didera Konflik, PKB Tetap Yakin Menang di Pilgub Jatim,” available at:

www.newsdetik.com, 27 April 2008, (accessed 4 September 2013). 323

“PKNU Resmi Dideklarasikan,” available at: www.arsip.gatra.com, 31 March 2007, (accessed 4 September

2013). 324

“Tandingi Khofifah, PKB Muhaimin Calonkan Bu Syam,” available at: www.news.detik.com, 12 May 2008,

(accessed 4 September 2013) 325

“KPUD Tetapkan 5 Pasangan Cagub,” available at: www.news.detik.com, 15 June 2008, (accessed 4

September 2013). 326

“Gus Dur ‘Jatuh Hati’ ke Bupati Mojokerto?” available at: www.news.detik.com, 15 July 2007, (accessed 4

September 2013); “Daftar Cagub Jatim Lewat PKB Hanya Rp. 999.000,” available at: www.news.detik.com, 18

April 2007, (accessed 4 September 2013). 327

“PKB Muhaimin Dukung Karsa, Gus Dur Abstain,” available at: www.tempo.co, 26 October 2008, (accessed

4 September 2013).

189

former Chairman of the Provincial Board of the PDI-P, who was serving as the Secretary

General of the party, and member of the national parliament. Meanwhile, Soekarwo was the

Secretary of the Provincial government who had no formal position in the party, although he

was a former activist of the National Student Movement of Indonesia (GMNI) that was

closely linked to the PDI-P and the PNI in the past. Both local politicians possessed political

channels to the Central Board of the party and to the cadres of the party at the local branches.

In the case of Sutjipto, he was the leader of the supporters of Megawati and the

Chairman of the Central Board, when the New Order regime tried to annul the victory of

Megawati as the chairman of the party in the Extraordinary Congress (Kongres Luar Biasa) in

1993 and proposed Soerjadi as the chairman 3 years later in the party congress in Medan.

Sutjipto and his followers under the banner of the “PDI Promeg” (PDI Pro-Megawati)

continued their resistance towards Soerjadi and the regime until the conflict culminated in the

riots of 27 July 1996 in Jakarta between Megawati’s supporters and Soerjadi’s supporters

(Bhakti 2001; Priyono 2001, 1999-228; Putranto et.al., 2006, 71-110).328

With this emotional

and personal relationship between Sutjipto and Megawati, it was not surprising to see Sutjipto

serving several strategic positions in the party after the fall of the New Order. Given this

background, the chance to get the party’s ticket was relatively great.

Nevertheless, Soekarwo had also his “trump card” to get PDI-P support as he was

close to the incumbent governor, Imam Utomo. In the previous gubernatorial election, Imam

was supported by the PDI-P and his relationship with the party’s national leadership was

good. Having a direct access to Megawati, it was believed that Imam could promote

Soekarwo as his successor. By pledging that Imam and Soekarwo would support Megawati

and the PDI-P in the upcoming 2009 general election and presidential election, the prospects

of Soekarwo for getting Megawati’s blessing seemed favorable.329

Furthermore, Soekarwo’s

good position was not only a result of securing his support by the national party elite; he also

travelled around the local party branches, drumming up support from party’s cadres.330

As a

result, in the Special Regional Meeting (Rapat Kerja Daerah Khusus/ Rakerdasus) on 24

February 2007, the Provincial Board of the party (DPD PDI-P) decided to nominate Soekarwo

and Sutjipto as candidates. In this meeting, Soekarwo won the branches’ support over

Sutjipto. From the thirty-eight branches of the party, Soekarwo obtained the support of

twenty-two branches, while Sutjipto received only support from eleven branches. Five

328

See also footnote 308 above. 329

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 330

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012.

190

branches supported both candidates.331

This result has shown the positive impact of

Soekarwo’s persistent efforts in approaching party cadres at the local level, although he was

not a member of the party. Nevertheless, Soekarwo’s victory did not mean that he would get

the party’s ticket, since the final decision was in the hands of the party’s Central Board.

Almost a year after this meeting and marked by tension between Soekarwo and

Sutjipto and their followers, on 26 January 2008, the Central Board decided that Sutjipto

would be the candidate of the party. According to Pramono Anung, the General Secretary of

the party, Sutjipto got the party ticket as he was a cadre of the PDI-P and had served in

strategic positions in the party, especially as General-Secretary and the regional head.332

One

month later, the Central Board nominated Ridwan Hisyam as the candidate for vice

governor.333

After having been rejected by the PDI-P, Soekarwo tried to marshal support from

different parties, and he finally received it from the Democrat Party and PAN. Another

candidate, Khofifah, received party support from a coalition of PPP and eleven smaller

political parties (Hasan, 2010, 31-38).

After the pre-election when candidates sought party support, the Local Election

Commission admitted five pairs of candidates on 15 June 2008.334

Khofifah and Mudjiono

were nominated by a coalition of political parties (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/United

Development Party, PPP; Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah/United of Nahdlatul Ummah

Party, PPNU; Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaen/Indonesian National Party-Marhaen; PNI-

Marhaen); Merdeka Party; Pelopor Party; Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru/New

Indonesia Alliance Party, PIB-Party; Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan/Freedom Bull

National Party, PNBK; Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia/Indonesian Justice and

Unity Party, PKPI; Partai Bintang Reformasi/Star Reform Party; PBR; Partai Damai

Sejahtera/Prosperous Peace Party, PDS; Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa/Concern for the Nation

Functional Group Party, PKPB; and Patriot Pancasila Party), Soenarjo and Ali Machsan Musa

were backed by the Golkar Party, Sutjipto and Ridwan Hisjam were supported by the PDI-P,

Achmady and Soehartono were nominated by the PKB, and Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf

were promoted by the Democrat Party and PAN.335

In the first round of the gubernatorial elections, Soekarwo and Saifullah won the

331

“PDI-P Jawa Timur Tetapkan Calon Gubernur,” available at: www.tempo.co, 25 February 2007, (accessed 5

September 2013). 332

“Sutjipto, Cagub Jatim dari PDIP,” available at: www.nasional.kompas.com, 26 January 2008, (accessed 5

September 2013). 333

“PDIP Tetapkan Ridwan Hisyam Cawagub Jatim,” available at: www.news.okezone.com, 26 February 2008,

(accessed 5 September 2013). 334

“KPU Jawa Timur Tetapkan Lima Pasangan Calon Gubernur,” available at: www.tempo.co, 15 June 2008,

(accessed 5 September 2013). 335

Ibid.

191

election with 26.44 percent of votes. Since the regulation stated that the winner must obtain a

minimum of 30 percent of votes, they had to run in a second round of elections. Their

contenders were Khofifah and Mujiono (Kaji) who received 24.82 percent of the popular vote.

Sutjipto and Ridwan Hisjam who were backed by the PDI-P received 21.19 percent of votes,

while the Golkar Party’s candidates, Soenarjo and Ali Machsan Musa, garnered 19.34

percent. The candidates of the PKB, Achmady and Soehartono only gained 8.21 percent of

votes, far from the PKB’s result in the 2004 general election which was 31.11 percent. On the

one hand, the results of the first round revealed the impact of the internal conflict within the

PKB that significantly influenced the support at the ballot box. On the other hand, the victory

of Soekarwo demonstrated a partial support from the PDI-P, particularly from the local

branches where disappointment over the nomination of Sutjipto by the Central Board was

sizeable. Saifullah as the leader of the Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor), one

of the mass organizations of the Nahdlatul Ulama, also contributed to their victory. In

addition, the success of Khofifah in the first round proved that she was in possession of wide

networks and support, in particular from Nahdlatul Ulama’s religious teachers (kyai). Besides,

Khofifah could effectively mobilize the organization under her leadership, the Muslimat NU,

another sub-organization of the Nahdlatul Ulama in which the members were women and had

a strong presence in East Java.

In the second round, party support changed. After its defeat in the first round, the PDI-

P supported Khofifah in the second round.336

This support cannot be separated from the

upcoming presidential elections in 2009, when Megawati as the leader of the party was

expected to run against Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) of the Democrat Party who

backed Soekarwo.337

Another factor behind the PDI-P’s support to Khofifah was related to the figure of

Hasyim Muzadi, the National Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama, as the main-supporter of

Khofifah. Hasyim was the running mate (and candidate for vice president) of Megawati in the

presidential election of 2004. Other parties - the Golkar party (in particular with support from

the local branches) and the PKB - supported Soekarwo in the second round, although there

were rifts within both parties.338

Therefore, in Khofifah’s camp, the PPP and several small

336

“PDIP Dukung Khofifah-Mujiono,” available at: www.nu.or.id, 24 October 2008, (accessed 6 September

2013). 337

“PDIP Dukung Khofifah, Agar Megawati Sukses Jadi RI 1,” available at: www.kompas.com, 27 October

2008, (accessed 6 September 2013); “PDIP Dukung Khofifah Untuk Muluskan Megawati,” available at:

www.tempo.co, 23 October 2008, (accessed 6 September 2013). 338

“Golkar Dukung Karsa,” available at: www.regional.kompas.com, 17 October 2008, (accessed 6 September

2013); „PKB Resmi Dukung Karsa,“ available at: www.m.inilah.com, 16 October 2008, (accessed 6 September

2013); “PKB Nachrawi Dukung Karsa,” available at: www.nasional.kompas.com, 31 October 2008, (accessed 6

192

parties built a coalition with one of the largest parties in the region, the PDI-P. In the case of

Soekarwo, the coalition of the Democrat Party and PAN was strengthened by new partners,

namely the PKB and the PKS. With the composition of party supporters and the strong

popularity of the candidates, the second round of the gubernatorial election was predicted as

becoming highly competitive and outcome uncertain.

This prediction came true on the voting day of 4 November 2008 when some pollsters

announced the result, based on both real count and quick count. The Indonesian Survey

Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia), for instance, announced the result with 50.44 percent

of votes for Khofifah and Mujiono and 49.56 percent of votes for Soekarwo and Saifullah.339

Other pollsters such as the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) announced

as result 50.76 for Khofifah and Mujiono and 49.24 percent for Soekarwo and Saifullah, while

the National Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Nasional) saw Khofifah and her running mate

win the elections with 50.71 percent against 49.29 percent for the Soekarwo and Saifullah

team.340

A week after voting day, the Local Election Commission eventually announced the

final result: The Soekarwo-Saifullah ticket obtained 50.2 percent of votes, while Khofifah and

Mujiono received 49.8 percent of the votes.341

This formal result contradicted the results of

the pollsters and became one of the reasons why Khofifah complained that the election was

rigged.342

Khofifah therefore filed a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah

Konstitusi) against the Local Election Commission.

In early December 2008, the Constitutional Court decided to accept the lawsuit, even

though not ruling on all complaints of Khofifah. It ruled that the Local Election Commission

had to re-conduct the vote (re-election) in the two regencies of Bangkalan and Sampang, and

that it should organize the process of re-counting of ballots in the regency of Pamekasan. All

of these regencies were located on Madura Island which was found by the Court to have been

the place of a systematic, structured, and massive electoral fraud (Hasan 2010, 106). The two

re-elections were to be held during one month, from the end of December 2008 to the end of

January 2009, and it ended with a victory of Soekarwo and his running mate, although their

votes slightly decreased. In this final round, Soekarwo and Saifullah obtained 50.11 percent of

September 2013); “ PDIP, Golkar, dan PKB Terbelah di Putaran II,” available at: www.nasional.kompas.com, 23

October 2008, (accessed 6 September 2013). 339

“Quick Count: Jawa Timur,” 5 November 2008, available at: http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/353/quick-count-jawa-

timur, (accessed 5 September 2013). 340

“Pasangan Kaji Unggul Sementara Atas Karsa,” available at: www.suarakarya-online.com, (accessed 19

September 2013). 341

“Karsa Menang!” available at: www.megapolitan.kompas.com, 11 November 2008, (accessed 7 September

2013). 342

“Menang-Kalah Kaji Akan Gugat ke MK,” available at: www.megapolitan.kompas.com, 11 November 2008,

(accessed 7 September 2013).

193

votes, while their opponents received 49.89 percent. Again, Khofifah’s side rejected the result

and filed another lawsuit at the Court. This second lawsuit was also filed because the Chief of

Provincial Police (Kepala Kepolisian Daerah), Herman S. Sumawireja, had found indications

of fraud in the final round.343

However, the Court rejected this second lawsuit and this

decision finally ended the longest, the most expensive and the most exhausting local election

ever held in the country with the victory of Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf. The following

Table 9 details the results of this gubernatorial election.

Table 5. 9 The Results of the Gubernatorial Election of 2008 (in percent)

No. Candidates Political Parties Votes (1st

Round)

Votes (2nd

Round)

Re-Voting

and Re-

Counting

1 Khofifah IP

Mujiono

PPP and others 24.82 49.80 49.89

2. Sutjipto

Ridwan Hisjam

PDIP 21.19 - -

3. Soenarjo

Ali Machsan Moesa

Golkar Party 19.34 - -

4. Achmady

Soehartono

PKB 8.21 - -

5. Soekarwo

Saifullah Yusuf

Democrat Party,

PAN 26.44 50.20 50.11

Sources: The Election Commission of East Java (KPUD Jawa Timur) 2009, The Provincial Agency

for Social and Political Affairs of East Java (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa Jawa Timur) 2010.

The Mayoral Elections of Surabaya in 2000, 2005, and 2010

This section will discuss three mayoral elections in the capital of the province, Surabaya. The

mayoral election of 2000 was held in the city parliament where the members of parliament

elected the mayor, while the mayoral elections of 2005 and 2010 were based on direct local

elections. The city parliament elected a single candidate of mayor, while in the direct

elections a pair of candidates (mayor and vice mayor) was up for voting.

The mayoral election of 2000 was conducted during the era of democratic transition.

After the breakdown of the New Order regime, the general election of 1999 had resulted in a

significant change of the political constellation in Surabaya. The New Order’s ruling party,

Golkar, was no longer dominant and was replaced by the PDI-P as the leading party. The

latter was perceived as the main opposition party under the ancien régime. Prior to the 2000

elections, the PDI-P controlled twenty-four seats (53.3 percent) in the city parliament. Second

rank was the PKB, which had seven seats (15.6 percent). The Golkar Party had only two

343

“Irjen Herman Bertemu Parpol,” Kompas, 19 March 2009; “KPU Tetap Ragukan DPT yang Dilaporkan,”

Kompas, 21 March 2009; “Istana Panggil Pejabat Polkam,” Kompas, 20 March 2009.

194

seats, less than PAN and the PPP that controlled three seats, respectively. The remaining five

seats were reserved seats of the Military and Police Faction and hence not up for election. The

PDI-P thus enjoyed a simple majority in the parliament and the party seemed geared for

victory in mayoral elections.

Nevertheless, the political situation at that time was more complex than the

composition of the local parliament suggested. The incumbent mayor, Sunarto Sumoprawiro,

a former military officer who later on joined the Golkar Party, remained strong as a candidate.

More than that, one year before the election, the city parliament started the nomination

process. This nomination had resulted in three mayoral candidates: Sunarto Sumoprawiro,

Mukayat, and Prof Muchsin. These candidates were also approved by the Ministry of Home

Affairs. However, the nomination by the “old parliament” raised criticism from the PDI-P, its

sub-organizations, and some NGOs as well as student organizations. Their basic objection

was related to the transitional status of the old parliament and that it did not have the authority

to decide on mayoral candidates. Others criticized Sunarto’s background as a military officer

and accordingly called for a civilian leader. Also, charges of corruption were aired against

Sunarto’s administration by NGOs, students and PDI-P followers. As a result of these

criticisms, the new city parliament elected in the 1999 election annulled the previous

nomination and began a new nomination.

Following the new nomination, the PDI-P faced internal frictions, in particular

between Sutikno and Bambang Dwi Hartono. Sutikno was the then-Chairman of the District

Board (DPC) and Bambang was the Secretary of the District Board of the PDI-P of Surabaya.

Both were willing to be nominated by the party and competed for internal support. After the

internal selection, the party decided that Sutikno would be the candidate and this decision was

approved by the Central Board (DPP) of the party in Jakarta. Bambang subsequently crossed

over to Sunarto and became the candidate of vice mayor. This pair of candidates was

supported by the PKB and the Golkar Party. Furthermore, the candidacy of Sutikno - the

candidate of the PDI-P - was annulled due to criminal indictments in his past (Nurhasim et. al

2005, 105). The annulment of Sutikno’s candidacy forced the party to find a replacement. The

Central Board of the party (DPP) then recommended Bambang as the only candidate (for

mayor or vice mayor), but the District Board under its new leader Basuki did not follow this

instruction (Nurhasim et. al. 2005, 109-110). Basuki and his group supported other candidates

– i.e. Mukayat and Unggul Ruseno - who were initially supported by the Joint Faction (Fraksi

Gabungan). The internal conflict of the PDI-P could not be resolved, and some of the

members supported Bambang, while others backed Mukayat and Unggul. As a result of this

195

election, the pair of Sunarto-Bambang won the election by obtaining eighteen votes, narrowly

defeating Mukayat and Unggul by only one vote. Other pairs - Budhiarto Machruf and Gatot

Sudjito of the Military and Police Faction gained ten votes, while the Muchsin-Ismail Syarif

team did not even obtain a single vote. The Table 10 below lists the result of mayoral election

of Surabaya in 2000.

Table 5. 10 The Results of the Mayoral Election of Surabaya in 2000

No Candidates Political Parties/ Factions Votes

1. Sunarto Sumoprawiro

Bambang DH

PKB and Golkar Party (and later on

the PDI-P)

18

2. Mukayat

Unggul Ruseno

Joint Faction 17

3. Budhiarto Machruf

Gatot Sudjito

Military and Police Faction 10

4. Muchsin

Ismail Syarif

Joint Faction (except the Golkar

Party)

0

Source: Nurhasim et al. 2005, 111

The mayoral election of Surabaya in 2000 showed the political proficiency of the long-

established elite (Sunarto Sumoprawiro) in gaining political support in the city parliament. In

addition, the Golkar Party as the representation of the ancien régime also showed its

capability to manage local power, although the party had only two parliamentarian seats at

that time. With the support of the PKB that had seven seats, Sunarto and the Golkar Party

were able to take away support from the PDI-P, benefitting from the conflict in the latter. By

having Bambang join his camp, Sunarto obtained more political support from Bambang’s

supporters in parliament. The success of Sunarto and the Golkar Party proved that there was a

lack of political experience in the PDI-P and its local elites. It also showcased that obtaining a

simple majority in the city parliament did not automatically guarantee the success in a

political contest. In addition, the defeat of the PDI-P in this mayoral election indicated that

Sunarto and his camp including some local leaders of the PDI-P had resorted to money

politics. This issue emerged at least once when two members of the city parliament from the

PDI-P - Baktiono and Heru Rusianto – were beaten by party’s cadres after rumors surfaced

that they had supported a different candidate in the election (Nurhasim et al. 2005, 111). It

was assumed that they were involved in money politics to support Sunarto-Bambang

(Nurhasim et al. 2005, 112).

After the mayoral election of 2000, Sunarto tried to accommodate his contender in the

election, in particular inside the PDI-P under its leader Basuki. Sunarto succeeded in his

efforts by using material inducements. However, the situation changed after two important

196

events: Basuki was charged with corruption and Sunarto’s illness that led to the change of the

political constellation in 2002. The serious illness of Sunarto led to the impeachment of

Sunarto in the city parliament.344

Bambang subsequently replaced him. With this situation,

Bambang had the opportunity to prepare for the next mayoral election in 2005 as an

incumbent. With his new position as mayor of Surabaya, Bambang installed himself as a new

local elite member in Surabaya. In addition, after Basuki’s imprisonment due to the corruption

charges, Bambang’s group faced no rival in the PDI-P. With the support of Soetjipto,

Chairman of the Provincial Board of the party (DPD PDI-P), the party came under the

leadership of the group of Soetjipto-Bambang, which was known as the Pandegiling group.345

The mayoral election of 2005 was conducted through direct local elections. With this

mechanism, members of the city parliament were no longer playing a fundamental role in

deciding who would govern the city. Nevertheless, this mechanism still gave a crucial

function to political parties in the nomination of the candidates. After the search for

candidates ended, the political parties or a coalition of political parties promoted their

candidates. The PDI-P proposed the pair of Bambang Dwi Hartono and Arif Afandi. The PKB

nominated Alisyahbana and Wahyudin Hussein, while a coalition of the Democrat Party (PD)

and PAN supported Erlangga Satriagung and AH Thony. The last pair of candidates was

Gatot Sudjito-Benyamin Hilli who were nominated by the Golkar Party and the PDS. Most of

these candidates were politicians (Bambang, Erlangga, AH Thony, Wahyudin Husein and

Gatot Sudjito), while others were either professionals or bureaucrats. Arif Afandi was a

journalist and editor-in-chief of the Jawa Pos, the biggest daily newspaper in East Java.

Alisyahbana was the former Secretary of the City (Sekretaris Kota) of Surabaya, while

Benyamin Hilli was an elder of the Protestant Church and also a city planning expert. Without

any significant difficulties, Bambang-Arif won the election and obtained a simple majority

with 51.34 percent of votes already in the first round.346

The candidates of the PKB, the

Alisyahbana-Wahyudin Hussein ticket received 20.73 percent, while the Erlangga-Thony

team garnered 18.67 percent of the votes. The Gatot-Benyamin team obtained only 9.26

344

“Cak Narto Dipecat, Wakil Walikota Naik,” available at: www.arsip.gatra.com, 15 January 2002, (accessed

on 25 August 2013). 345

Pandegiling is the name of region in Surabaya where the PDI-P’s headquarter is located. During the New

Order regime, this place became the center of opposition for the supporters of Megawati (Promeg), in particular

when the regime imposed a new leadership on the party and met resistance from Megawati’s supporters.

Pandegiling refers to a group of Megawati’s loyalists and Soetjipto and Bambang Dwi Hartono were among the

leaders of this group. 346

”KPUD Tetapkan Bambang Walikota Surabaya,“ available: www.tempo.co.id, 7 July 2005, (accessed 26

August 2013). There is a slight difference in the results of the mayoral election between what was published in

this source (media) and the official result of the provincial government. For the official result, see Table 11

below.

197

percent of the votes.347

With this result, Bambang got a “second term” as mayor. Table 20

details the election results.

Table 5. 11The Results of the Mayoral Election of Surabaya in 2005 (in percent)

No Candidates Political Parties Votes

1. Bambang DH

Arif Afandi

PDI-P 51.39

2. Alisyahbana

Wahyudin Hussein

PKB 20.87

3. Erlangga Satriagung

AH Thony

Democrat Party and PAN 18.6

4. Gatot Sudjito

Benyamin Hilli

Golkar Party and PDS 9.14

Source: The Provincial Agency for Social and Political Affairs of East Java (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa

Jawa Timur) 2007.

The mayoral election of 2005 stood for the rise of new elites in Surabaya. Most candidates

were new politicians in the local political arena. Bambang and Thony were known as PDI-P

acdres and were opposition leaders during the New Order regime in Surabaya. Wahyudin was

the leader of the PKB, a new party that was established after the breakdown of the New

Order. Arif and Benyamin had no previous political experience, while some other candidates

did have. Erlangga and Gatot were politicians of the Golkar Party, Alisyahbana was a career

bureaucrat. In addition, this mayoral election strengthened the domination of the PDI-P and

Bambang as the leader in Surabaya.

The mayoral election of 2010 was preceded by a changing political constellation in the

city. The PKB and the PDI-P could no longer maintain their domination in the local political

arena. The PDI-P, which received the strongest support in the general elections of 1999 and

2004, lost its dominant position to the Democrat Party in the 2009 general election. In the

general election of 2009, the Democrat Party obtained 31.35 percent of the votes, while the

PDI-P gained only 19 percent. However, the PKB suffered a shock decrease of votes, from 22

percent in 2004 to 6.46 percent in 2009. Therefore, the result of the 2009 general election

influenced the composition of candidates as described in the following paragraphs.

Five pairs of candidates participated in the mayoral election of 2010. The first pair was

Bagio Fandi Sutadi and Mazlan Mansur who were supported by the PKB and the Gerindra

Party. The second pair was Fandi Utomo and Yulius Bustami, the candidates from the

coalition of the PKS, the PPP, the Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama/Ulema National

347

”KPUD Tetapkan Bambang Walikota Surabaya,“ available at: www.tempo.co.id, 7 July 2005, (accessed 26

August 2013).

198

Awakening Party, (PKNU), and the Partai Damai Sejahtera/Prosperous Peace Party (PDS).

The third pair was Arif Afandi and Adies Kadir, candidates of the Democrat Party and the

Golkar Party. The fourth pair was Tri Rismaharini and Bambang Dwi Hartono from the PDI-

P. The last pair of candidates included Fitradjaja Purnama and Naen Soeryono as non-party

candidates. Their backgrounds varied, ranging from local bureaucrats (Bagio, Tri

Rismaharini), local politicians (Bambang DH, Mazlan Mansur, Adies Kadir, Fandi Utomo,

Arif Afandi), a former military officer (Yulius Bustami), a lawyer (Naen Soeryono), to a

former student activist (Fitrajaya Purnama). Almost all candidates were new elites, although

some had connections with the New Order. Bagio and Tri Rismaharini (Risma) were career

bureaucrats, while Yulius was an officer in the navy during the New Order.

This mayoral election was characterized by a unique phenomenon as Bambang DH,

the incumbent mayor, was nominated as the candidate of vice mayor. Bambang was formerly

officiating as mayor for two terms: the first when he continued the office after the

impeachment of Soenarto in 2002, and the second when he won the 2005 mayoral election.348

Nevertheless, Bambang and the PDI-P did not accept that he was prohibited from running in

the 2010 elections due to the fact that he had served already two terms. They filed a lawsuit

with the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). The Court ruled that Bambang had

already served two terms as mayor. After the court’s decision, the PDI-P sought other

candidates and this task was not easy since Bambang had become an icon of the party in

Surabaya. The popularity of some PDI-P’s leaders such as Saleh Ismail Mukadar and Wisnu

Sakti Buana was considered as trailing the one of Bambang. Based on the Special Branch

Meeting of the party (Rapat Kerja Daerah Khusus), Bambang, Saleh, and Wisnu were

nominated as prospective candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor by the PDI-P.

Responding to this dilemma of the branch party’s decision on the one hand and the low

popularity of its local elites (except Bambang) on the other, the PDI-P nominated Tri

Rismaharini (Risma) as mayoral candidate. This was decided after pairing Bambang and

Saleh under the slogan of “Saleh Bambang Yes (SBY)” failed, a thinly veiled attempt of

benefiting from the then high popularity values of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono.349

Risma who at that time belonged to Bambang’s staff at the city government, held a

position as one of the heads of the city agencies (Kepala Dinas) and enjoyed popularity as a

348

Law No. 12/2008 on the Revision of Law No. 32/2004 stated that one requirement for being a candidate of

mayor or vice mayor is that the person never held a similar position for two terms. 349

This slogan must appear as even more odd as the PDI-P at the time stood in opposition to the SBY

administration.

199

successful bureaucrat with her programs, particularly in managing the parks of the city and

maintaining the cleanliness of the city. Since Risma was not a PDI-P cadre, the decision about

the candidate of vice mayor became a contentious issue. According to Bambang, his name

emerged as the strongest candidate for this position, based on a survey of a pollster.

According to this particular survey, he even obtained high approval rates when he paired with

Risma.350

Bambang himself could not reject the candidacy as vice mayor either, because it

was an official decision by the Central Board of the party (DPP).

Another strong pair was Arif Affandi-Adies Kadir. Arif was the incumbent vice mayor

with a long experience as a local journalist and Adies was a politician of the Golkar Party.

With the support of the Democrat Party (which was the strongest political party at that time)

and the Golkar Party (the party with the longest experience), this pair was regarded as the

strongest contender for Risma-Bambang. The candidacy of Arif from the Democrat Party

thwarted the effort of Wisnu Wardhana, the chairman of the party’s branch, to run as a

candidate. While Wisnu Wardhana could accept the party’s decision to propose Arif and

Adies, another politician of the Democrat Party, Fandi Utomo, ran with the support from the

PKS, PPP, PKNU and PDS. Fandi Utomo was then the Secretary of the Provincial Board of

the party (Sekretaris DPD), while Arief was the Vice Head of the Division of Information and

Public Relation at the Provincial Board (Wakil Ketua DPD Bidang Informasi dan Humas).351

The result of the mayoral election of 2010 was unsurprising. Risma and Bambang

obtained 39.62 percent of the votes, Arif and Adies received 34.42 percent, Fandi and Yulius

13.84 percent, Bagio and Mazlan 6.55 percent, and Fitradjaya and Naen 5.58 percent. With

this result, Risma and Bambang won the electoral contest. However, the pair of Arif and

Adies challenged the election result. Their objection was based on the suspicion that Risma

and Bambang, the winners of the election, mobilized local civil servants to support them.

Therefore, Arif and Adies filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court. Responding to this

lawsuit, the Court decided that the Local Election Commission (KPUD) had to organize a re-

vote in several city sub-districts (kecamatan) and a re-count of the ballots.352

However, the re-

election did not change the previous results significantly. Risma and Bambang still won the

election and in total received 38.45 percent of the votes. The following Table 12 shows the

results of the mayoral election of Surabaya in 2010.

350

Interview with Bambang Dwi Hartono, Surabaya, 1 February 2012. 351

”Fandi Utomo Jadi Sekretaris PD Jatim,“ Radar Surabaya, 24 February 2010. 352

”Lebih Dalam Tentang Putusan MK Soal Pilwali Surabaya (1),“ available at: www.jawapos.com, 7 July 2010,

(accessed 4 February 2012); “Lebih Dalam Tentang Putusan MK Soal Pilwali Surabaya (5),“ available at:

www.jawapos.com, 11 July 2010, (accessed 4 February 2012).

200

Table 5. 12 The Results of the Mayoral Election of Surabaya in 2010 (in percent)

No Candidates Political Parties Votes Re-Voting and

Re-Counting

1. BF. Sutadi

Mazlan Mansur

PKB and Gerindra Party 6.55 1.70

2. Fandi Utomo

Yulius Bustami

PKS, PPP, PKNU, and PDS 13.84 4.21

3. Arif Afandi

Adies Kadir

Democrat Party, Golkar

Party, and PAN

34.42 43.13

4. Tri Rismaharini

Bambang DH

PDI-P 39.62 49.51

5. Fitradjaya Purnama

Naen Suryono

Independent 5.58 1.46

Source: The Provincial Agency for Social and Political Affairs of East Java (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa

Jawa Timur) 2010.

Notes: The result of re-voting and re-counting is only for the city sub-districts affected by the

Court decision.

The mayoral election of 2010 paved the way for the rise of Risma as a new elite member in

Surabaya. Although her previous position as a career-bureaucrat provided her with a certain

degree of political experience, her position as mayor posed new political challenges. After

assuming office she had to grapple with a much more experienced vice mayor. Another

problem arose due to the fact that the success of Risma was due to the support of the PDI-P

which had resulted in unrest within the party. On the one hand, Risma faced resistance from

some PDI-P leaders who failed to become candidates. On the other hand, she had to deal with

a potential threat from the local parliament because the PDI-P was not in a dominant position.

Contenders from other political parties, in particular the Democrat Party as the biggest party,

could also pose a threat to her position as mayor, as the analysis of section 5.3 shows.

C. Elite Continuity

One important feature of the transition from the New Order to democratic regimes in East

Java was elite continuity, which is exemplified by the perseverance of two prominent local

members: Imam Utomo and Soekarwo. The former was a two-term governor from 1998 to

2008, and the latter was his successor, who was elected in the direct gubernatorial election in

2008. During Imam’s governorship, Soekarwo was one of his assistants, first as the Head of

the Provincial Revenue Service (Kepala Dinas Pendapatan Daerah/ Kepala Dispenda) and

then as the Secretary of the Province (Sekretaris Daerah/ Sekda). However, the transfer of

power from Imam to Soekarwo was conducted by by-passing Soenarjo, Imam’s vice

governor.

The entrance of Imam Utomo into the political arena started when he received a

201

formal recommendation from the military (ABRI) commander to run as a candidate for

governor in 1998. The recommendation was a requisite for a military officer for being able to

run. Previously, Imam had been the Regional Commander of Brawijaya, the military region of

East Java. This recommendation crushed the ambitions of Basofi Sudirman (the incumbent

governor at that time) to run for re-election in 1998 as a tradition existed in the military to

recommend only one candidate. After the recommendation, the military headquarters

organized the election strategy through Golkar. As a result of the firm support from the

TNI/Police and Golkar factions, Imam won the race in 1998 and repeated this success in the

gubernatorial election of 2003.353

During his 10 years of governorship, Imam’s achievements included not only

maintaining political stability during the process of transition, but also improving the

economic condition of the people in the province and accelerating economic growth,

particularly by giving more attention to the agricultural sector.354

However, of all his

achievements, his most significant one was his ability to develop social and political

networks. The latter became his social and political capital, which could be used to engineer

the succession as he wished. Imam was known as a leader who had close relationships with

local politicians from various political parties, religious teachers (kyai) of the Nahdlatul

Ulama (NU), local media and also academicians. He routinely visited various social groups in

the community, in particular the religious teachers.

In the beginning of his second term as governor (2003-2008), Imam started to pave the

way for his anointed successor. Imam and his vice governor Soenarjo had a prolonged

discussion about possible future candidates and the first choice for Imam’s successor was

Soenarjo himself.355

This option appeared plausible since Soenarjo was Imam’s vice governor

during his second term. Imam introduced Soenarjo to various local leaders in East Java as his

successor.356

Nevertheless, this option changed after both leaders fell out with each other in a

silent conflict. Imam blamed Soenarjo for disloyalty as the latter always attacked his policies

in the provincial legislature, thereby using his position as the Regional Chairman of the

Golkar Party.357

Commenting on his strained relationship with Soenarjo, Imam stated:

“… Initially I said to Mr. Vice Governor (Pak Wagub) to replace my position and I

would pair him with Soekarwo. However, after only one year (of our governorship),

353

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 354

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 355

Interviews with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012 and Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February

2012. 356

Interviews with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012 and Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February

2012. 357

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

202

Mr. Vice Governor was always attacking us through the Golkar Party. He did that by

using the position as the Regional Chairman of the Golkar Party and he thought that I

did not support him. Previously I was quite calm and I would support him because I

promised him already. However, since he behaved like that, I searched for another

candidate …”358

Imam concluded that Soenarjo’s attacks expressed distrust about his commitment to promote

him as successor.359

Nevertheless, Soenarjo believed that Imam was half-hearted in

supporting him as the successor for governor. Soenarjo believed that Imam and Soekarwo

were in collaboration since Imam’s first term governorship.360

In addition, one scholar who

was close to Soekarwo stated that in the position as the Head of the Provincial Revenue

Service, Soekarwo financially supported the candidacy of Imam and Soenarjo in the

gubernatorial election of 2003.361

Furthermore, the political attacks of Soenarjo and the

Golkar Party alone did not irritate Imam, but also Soenarjo’s personal statements and sarcastic

comments about Imam accelerated the deterioration of their personal relationship.362

Soekarwo described the relationship between Imam and Soenarjo as follows:

“… Besides being a soldier, Mr. Imam was also a man of Javanese culture. He wanted

that the person to replace him either be like a “son,” or at least like a “young brother.”

This was very natural. But Mr. Naryo’s words were usually harsh. As a soldier,

(Imam) did not like it …”363

Following the political and personal tensions between Imam and Soenarjo, Imam shifted his

support to Soekarwo as his successor. Afterwards, Imam frequently gave Soekarwo the task

of representing the governor in many governmental programs.364

Soekarwo described the

delegation of these tasks to him as follows:

“… Mr. Imam, the governor, delegated all managerial affairs to me. For me, I was

appointed in order to help the principal. I did not come to ask his direction, but I came

when everything was solved. There was a task to talk to the Chief of Provincial Police,

the Military Commander, the Ministry of Home Affairs, this was the task of the

governor. We prepared it …”365

Moreover, Imam began to introduce Soekarwo as his successor to local leaders in East Java,

particularly to the NU’s religious teachers. Soekarwo himself started to prepare campaigning

for the upcoming gubernatorial election in 2008 by promoting his popular name of “Pakde”

358

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 359

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 360

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 361

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 362

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 363

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 364

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 365

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

203

through local media, governmental programs, sports tournaments, and even as a brand of

peanuts.366

Therefore, the introduction of Soekarwo to Imam’s political networks can be seen

as a preliminary stage of the transfer of local leadership in East Java.

This first phase of building up Soekarwo’s candidacy was followed by Imam’s support

for Soekarwo in the nomination process. Soekarwo himself described this second phase as

follows:

“… I was the Secretary of the Province and I was unpopular. I was pushed to run as

the governor. When Mr. Imam asked me, I did not want, I felt unable, because in the

survey I had only 0.4 percent (of support) in the beginning. That was in August. In

November, I was summoned again (by Mr. Imam), (and he said) bismillah [In the

name of God, P.A.] wo …”367

After convincing Soekarwo, Imam then became involved in the seeking of political parties (as

the political vehicle) that could formally support him. Imam started with the PDI-P, the party

that had supported him in his two previous elections. The prospect of getting the support of

this party was quite high since Soekarwo had won the majority votes as the party’s candidate

in 2007. However, he needed to get the approval of the Central Board of the party (DPP PDI-

P), particularly Megawati Soekarnoputri as the National Chairman. Thinking that he had a

good personal relationship with Megawati, Imam directly asked her to support Soekarwo as

the party’s candidate. Iman described these efforts as follows:

“… in the last gubernatorial election (of 2008), Soekarwo (was initially supported) by

the PDI-P. I was in agreement with Bu Mega, I recommended him to Bu Mega. I

guaranteed her that I could keep Soekarwo. It was like begging Bu Mega, but she did

not give in …”368

As his effort failed and Megawati lent her support to Sutjipto, a party cadre and Megawati

loyalist, who had served as the Regional Chairman of the party in East Java and the General

Secretary of the party, not discouraged, Imam sought another option and the most feasible

choice was seeking the support of the Democrat Party (PD). Therefore, he approached

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the figurehead of the Democrat

Party, and persuaded him to support Soekarwo. Since the Democrat Party could not single-

handedly support the candidates, it was necessary to build a coalition and find a running mate

for Soekarwo. The first offer for coalition came from the Chairman of the United

Development Party (PPP), Suryadharma Ali. Suryadharma offered Imam a coalition with the

366

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012;

“Turnamen Sepakbola Pakde Open U-17 Dibuka,” Bhirawa, 11 April 2006; “Pakde Karwo Dikukuhkan Bapak

Pendidikan Jatim,” Bhirawa, 4 August 2006. 367

Interview with Soekarwo, 26 January 2012. Bismillah in this context means “go ahead.“ 368

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

204

PPP and suggested Khofifah Indar Parawansa as a candidate for vice governor. Imam agreed

to this proposal, but Khofifah refused to become the candidate for vice governor, because she

wanted to run as a candidate for governor.369

After this proposal failed, Imam accepted a

proposal from Sutrisno Bachir, the National Chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN)

to pair Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf.370

Therefore, the candidacy finally succeeded when

Soekarwo-Saifullah were supported by the Democrat Party and the National Mandate Party

and later on the Prosperous Justice Party/ PKS also joined the coalition. Khofifah herself was

supported by the PPP and several small parties and thus also met the requirements for the

candidacy to governor (Hasan 2010, 31-38).

This description of Soekarwo’s candidacy displays the crucial role of Imam in

supporting Soekarwo. What is more, this support was continued by Imam’s support in

campaigning and voting. He travelled and campaigned in the region to support Soekarwo, by

approaching politicians and the NU’s religious teachers. Moreover, Imam was believed of

helping Soekarwo in the second and third rounds of the election when the financial resources

of Soekarwo significantly decreased.371

In short, according to a local scholar who was also

involved in the campaign of Soekarwo, Imam was the real head of the support team for

Soekarwo.372

In other words, Imam played a crucial role of in Soekarwo’s candidacy.

After Soekarwo won the election in 2008, the relationship between Imam and

Soekarwo entered a new phase. Although they kept a formally harmonious relationship and

there was no significant conflict among them, many believed that their coalition weakened.

Although Imam played a significant role in supporting Soekarwo during the election,

Soekarwo slowly but surely became more independent from Imam.373

According to one local

elite member and political observer, Soekarwo seemed to abandon Imam as his political

mentor.374

More than that, after taking over power, Soekarwo replaced several heads of

provincial offices (kepala dinas) who were known for having close relations with Imam.375

This action raised speculation that Soekarwo had acted against Imam’s interests and that

tensions between them mounted.

The climax of the growing tensions between these two local elites occurred with the

election of the Regional Chairman of the Democrat Party of the Province (Ketua DPD Partai

Demokrat) in 2011. In this event, although Soekarwo was running, Imam supported another

369

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012; see also Hasan 2010, 19-20. 370

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 371

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 372

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 373

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 374

Interviews with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012 and Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 375

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.

205

candidate, Bagus Haryo Suseno. Imam’s support for Bagus was highlighted in the local media

and became especially apparent when Imam attended the official declaration of Bagus’

candidacy.376

Since Soekarwo was running as a candidate, other local party elites such as

Fandi Utomo, Imam Sunardhi and also Bagus Haryo Suseno withdrew their candidacies.377

As a result, Soekarwo was elected as the regional chairman of the party without voting since

he was the only candidate for the position. Nevertheless, Soekarwo’s new position raised

objections from his supporters and political allies. Some leaders of the political parties in East

Java took issue with Soekarwo’s decision to become regional chairman of the Democrat Party

since they worried that Soekarwo could no longer maintain his fairness in treating all political

parties equally within the coalition.378

Especially Imam believed that it would be better if Soekarwo played a role as a patron

or “umbrella” for all political parties, without taking up the leadership of a particular one.379

Imam expected Soekarwo to behave like him during his governorship, being neutral to all

political parties.380

Although Soekarwo’s decision did not seriously harm his relationship with

Imam, this political event was believed by several observers of having been the one important

moment that marked the beginning of their estrangement. This was exacerbated by

Soekarwo’s decision to invite some of his competitors in the 2008 gubernatorial election into

his camp.381

The aforementioned events showed that Soekarwo attempted to emancipate

himself from his erstwhile political mentor.

In sum, the examination of the structural conditions for elite adjustment in East Java

shows that - unlike in North Sumatra – there was a much greater continuity of the old

established elite. Also in the new electoral system inaugurated in 2005 political leaders

prevailed who were politically socialized during Soeharto’s New Order period. In

combination with other factors as will be elaborated in the subsequent sections, the greater

continuity of political elites in this province contributes to a peculiar pathway of elite

adjustment.

376

“Bagus Haryosuseno, Calon Kuat Ketua PD Jatim,” available at: www.jurnalberita.com, 27 February 2011,

(accessed on 18 October 2013); “Imam Utomo Dukung Bagus Rebut Demokrat Jatim,” available at:

www.surabayapagi.com, 12 May 2011, (accessed on 18 October 2013). 377

„Soekarwo, Calon Ketua Demokrat Jatim?“ available at: www.regional.kompas.com, 12 May 2011, (accessed

9 October 2013); “Musda Partai Demokrat Jatim, Soekarwo vs Bagus Haryosuseno?” available at:

www.news.detik.com, 9 June 2011, (accessed 9 October 2013); “Gubernur Soekarwo Bakal Mulus Jadi Ketua

Demokrat Jatim,” available at: www.poskota.co.id, 8 June 2011, (accessed 9 October 2013). 378

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 379

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 380

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 381

Interviews with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012 and Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012.

206

III. Elite and Strategic Actions towards Democratization

While structural factors have a sizeable impact on local politics in the province, they are less

decisive than in the North Sumatran case. Yet structural factors are only one determinant of

elite adjustment to major political change. Also central for elite responses is the behavioral

dimension and the strategies they apply either to preserve their privileges or to gain a foothold

in the political system as newcomers. This section chiefly shows that especially the old elites

in East Java sought to retain their grip on power in local institutions to the best of their

abilities by at least formally complying with the political requirements of the new democratic

order.

After the breakdown of the New Order, most local political elites “accepted” the

agenda of political reform. This position was driven by the fact that democratization was seen

as given, and opposing political reform was seen as futile. In other words, local elites who

resisted reform and preserved anti-democratic behavior would be criticized by the people.382

As a consequence, they felt it necessary to convey a democratic political attitude, at least in

their gestures and rhetoric. From this standpoint, (old) local political elites changed their

direction and approach from what they had done in the previous authoritarian regime.

The re-orientation of local elites in responding to political change can be observed

in the political views and attitudes of two prominent local elites during the transition, Imam

Utomo and Soekarwo. According to Imam, as a governor in the transitional period he could

not continue to behave like a military officer giving commands to his subordinates, as the

previous governors had done or as he was used to do as a military-officer in the New Order.383

He therefore altered his behavior to be more appropriate with the spirit of democratization and

freedom.384

Imam stated that since beginning a civilian life (as governor), he had removed all

his military approaches in dealing with political actors.385

As stated by Imam, during the

transition period, he sought to maintain political stability and overcome the economic crisis.

The most effective way of moving toward this goal was by approaching local leaders and

religious teachers in all areas of East Java, no matter how far away these were. He routinely

met them, communicated with them intensely, and listened to the wishes of his constituents.

In dealing with political parties, Imam maintained a neutral position towards all.386

Communication and participatory government (although limited to local leaders) seemed to be

382

Interview with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 383

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 384

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 385

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 386

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

207

the salient characteristics of Imam’s governorship.

Soekarwo also adopted these two basic leadership traits. According to Soekarwo, he

always sought communication and dialogue with various groups in society. He was known as

a member of the local elite employing a democratic approach in accommodating public

demands, including demonstrators.387

According to Soekarwo, the rule of the people was vital

in the era of democratization. The manifestation of this development was enormous public

demands that needed to be accommodated and channeled by provincial governments in the

form of public policies.388

In order to comply with these expectations, Soekarwo started his

governorship by coming to an agreement with the demonstrators, as shown when he dealt

with the labor movement. He requested that the demonstrators inform him about their

problems so that they could discuss their complaints,389

and if their demands were related to

the authority of the provincial government, he could directly take action. If the protests were

directed at local government authorities (at the regencies or municipality), he could put them

into contact with the local governments. But if the protests were addressed to the central

government, he advised and enabled them to go to Jakarta.390

In short, Soekarwo believed that

the local government could not prohibit demonstrations. Therefore, accommodation or

channeling was the way to deal with public aspiration.391

This example shows how local elites responded to political change. Local elites, in

particular local established elites, adapted to democracy in different political situations.392

Political change chiefly influenced their attitude, although – as shown in section 5.4 - it

cannot be deduced that they fully accepted democracy. To some degree, established local

elites accepted democracy because it became unavoidable and this acceptance was combined

with their political maneuvering to serve their political and economic interests.393

Following

this argument, established local elites could adopt this political attitude by applying a double

standard. In other words, their political attitude could be different or flexible depending on

with which social or political groups they interacted. This group of political elites presented

themselves as democrats and used the rhetoric of democracy such as participation,

accountability, transparency, and freedom towards pro-democratic activists or social groups

which had a high commitment to democracy.394

Vice-versa, they could also behave extremely

387

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Faishal Aminuddin, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 388

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 389

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 390

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 391

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 392

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 393

Interview with Faishal Aminuddin, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 394

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011.

208

skeptically towards democracy when they interacted with anti-democratic elements.395

One

local politician and the leader of the Ulema National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan

Nasional Ulama/PKNU), Choirul Anam, concluded:

“… So, these elites were clever. Toward one group, they behaved like this, but to

another group they behaved differently. They collaborated with different groups and

they could be accepted because they knew the characters of each group.”396

This kind of chameleonic adjustment of the local established elites was possible by political

cooptation and personal approaches to each social group such as student movements,

university intellectuals, religious teachers, and NGOs. As a consequence, they pre-empted the

criticism of social movements, and they were able to co-opt potentially critical intellectuals

through inclusion in expert teams, advisory bodies and the allocation of research projects.397

In the case of religious teachers, established local elites approached them by providing

facilities, such as financial assistance for the development and modernization of Islamic

schools or for supporting Islamic school-teachers to continue their studies.398

The most

important aspect for the religious teachers of the NU was that the political elites were able to

protect Islamic law (syariah) and they would not permit any religious heresies.399

Therefore,

it can be concluded that the local political arena in East Java lost its socio-political dynamics

compared to the initial phase of the transition in 1998 when the original demand for political

reform and criticism towards authoritarian elements were strong.

Nevertheless, some political actors argued that the structural factors (political change

or political reform) cannot be treated as the only factors for elite’s adaptation to democratic

notions, as mentioned above. Some referred to the personality of local elites as another

important factor. One of the local elites, Arif Afandi, highlighted the personality of local elites

as one of the core reasons for their approach towards democracy. For instance, Arif assumed

that Soekarwo’s ability to adjust to the new democratic environment was driven by his open

and accommodating personality.400

This argument was supported by Martono, the regional

head of the Golkar Party, who argued that the success of local elites in surviving in the local

political arena was highly dependent on their personality and style of leadership, and these

elements were even more important than the issues of political and bureaucratic

395

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 396

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta 13 May 2011. 397

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 398

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011; “Kyai Kampung Dirikan Posko Karsa,” available at:

www.surabayapagi.com, 4 April 2013, (accessed 23 December 2013); “Jatim Kembangkan Sekolah Mini di

Pondok Pesantren,” available at: www.republika.co.id, 3 November 2013, (accessed 23 December 2013). 399

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 400

Interview with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012.

209

experiences.401

A. Political Networks: Local Elites and Three Political Machines

As has been discussed in chapters 1 and 3, democratic transition in Indonesia has contributed

to the changes in local political constellations. During the New Order when the political

structure was predominantly centralized, local elites strongly depended on the central

authority and bureaucracy, central military headquarters, and Golkar. During the process of

political transition, this political structure changed dramatically, mainly due to the changes in

the party system, the reform of the electoral system and the introduction of direct local

elections. The change from a “hegemonic party system” into a multi-party system in

Indonesia has resulted in political power being more fragmented, and a system in which the

domination of a political party in the political arena is determined by popular support. One

major impact of this change was that Golkar did no longer obtain political privileges.

Moreover, the return of the military to the barracks also markedly influenced the political

setting in the local political arena (Honna 1999, 2006; Mietzner 2003, 245-258). The last

element of structural change is the influence of the decentralization policy in which the

central authority does not have the authority to dictate local government, as was the case

during the New Order (Aspinall and Fealy 2003, 1-11; Rasyid 2003, 63-71; Crouch 2010).

Yet, as we have seen in the previous section, the composition of the local elite in East Java

did not change decisively. How established elites in the province managed to remain in

power, how they built their alliances and which strategies they applied to stay in power, will

be the theme of this section.

Based on observations of the two governors in the era of transition, the new political

format in East Java was predominantly determined by three political machines. These three

political machines were the local bureaucracy, the PDI-P, and the Nahdlatul Ulama.402

Local

bureaucracy was always important in all situations since it had a monopoly on information,

knowledge of regulations, and access to resources. Its importance is even greater in the

context of electoral politics. The access to information, in particular the database of elections,

could help local elites in the campaign to win local elections. However, the greatest influence

of bureaucracy on the electoral process was due to its function as an instrument of political

mobilization. In general elections during the New Order, the success of Golkar also relied on

the use of the bureaucracy as an electoral mobilization machine (Emmerson 1978, 105-109;

401

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 402

Interview with Faishal Aminuddin, Surabaya, 24 January 2012.

210

Suryadinata 1992, 52-53; Boileau 1980; Fatah 1994, 191-192). This practice has continued in

the era of democratization. The difference in the use of the bureaucracy as an electoral

instrument in the Post New Order centered on the access local elites had in appropriating the

services of the local bureaucracy. The second political machine - the PDI-P - had always

come in second in all three general elections in East Java in the post-New Order period. This

achievement could be seen as evidence that the party had a strong political organization and

solid support at the grassroots. Although the PKB had achieved two consecutive successes in

the general elections of 1999 and 2004, internal conflicts led to its declining political

influence in the province. Therefore, rather than the PKB, it is the patron organization of the

PKB, the Nahdlatul Ulama, which can be seen as the key political player in the local political

arena alongside the local bureaucracy and the PDI-P.

Since Imam Utomo was sworn into office, these three political machines have been the

political base of his political alliances. Soekarwo continued this tradition by also maintaining

a good relationship with these three political machines. Soekarwo was a career bureaucrat, but

neither a member of the PDI-P nor the Nahdlatul Ulama. Soekarwo started his career in the

bureaucracy after he graduated from the Faculty of Law, the University of Airlangga,

Surabaya. He was first a junior staff in 1979, and between 1983 and 1994 he served as the

Head Office of the Revenue Service of the Local Government of Surabaya. After 11 years of

service in this position, he continued as the Head of the Sub-office of Planning and

Development at the Provincial Government (Kepala Sub-Dinas Perencanaan dan

Pembangunan) from 1994 to 1997. This position enabled him to attain a more influential post

as Head Office of Revenue Service at the Provincial Government (Kepala Dinas Pendapatan)

from 1997 to 2003. He accomplished his highest achievement in the civil service by serving

as the Secretary of the Province (Sekretaris Daerah) from 2003 to 2008.

Soekarwo’s remarkable career in the local bureaucracy not only provided him with

many experiences, knowledge, and a better understanding of norms, conduct, and regulations,

but also gave him an understanding of bureaucratic organizational culture and how to deal

with it. During his 5-year position as the Secretary of the Province, he was able to become

familiar with - and consolidate his influence in - the local bureaucracy. His position as the

East Java Chairman of the Indonesian Civil Service Corps (Korp Pegawai Negeri Republik

Indonesia/ KORPRI) along with his position as the Secretary of Province in 2003-2008

strengthened these efforts.403

The KORPRI organization itself, particularly in the New Order,

became an effective instrument for Golkar in its mobilization strategy in electoral

403

“Tentang Soekarwo,” Jawa Pos, 5 July 2008.

211

competition.

However, there was not only Soekarwo who had a long experience as a civil servant,

but Soenarjo also had it. The difference in influence between them seemed to relate to the role

of Imam Utomo in supporting Soekarwo and the more comprehensive approach of Soekarwo

in gaining the support of the local bureaucracy. Imam’s support became apparent by his

delegation of certain governor’s tasks to Soekarwo as the Secretary of the Province, a few

years before the 2008 gubernatorial election. The competition between Soekarwo and

Soenarjo resulted in a split of support from the local bureaucracy, particularly from the mid

and high levels of local bureaucrats. Many heads of provincial offices (kepala dinas) were

believed to have given support to Soenarjo in the gubernatorial election, while others backed

Soekarwo.404

Nevertheless, with his position as the Secretary of the Province, Soekarwo

intensely built political networks especially with the low-ranking “bureaucrats” in the

villages. Although they had no formal position as civil servants, the village headmen (kepala

desa) had direct access to the people in the rural areas. Soekarwo approached the village

headmen almost every weekend, particularly in the 2 years prior to the election.405

With this

network, he got an important instrument for mobilizing the grassroots as in the rural areas of

East Java, the authority and legitimacy of village headmen were still strong.406

In short,

compared to Soenarjo, Soekarwo seemed to be better positioned since he projected his

influence not only to the top-ranks of the local bureaucracy as Soenarjo did, but also to the

lower ranks of the local bureaucracy.

Furthermore, the relationship between Soekarwo and the second political machine, the

PDI-P has to be considered. As previously mentioned, Soekarwo was not a member of the

party, but there was a connection with the party from the time in which he was actively

involved as an activist of the National Student Movement of Indonesia (Gerakan Mahasiswa

Nasional Indonesia, GMNI), a mass organization of the party. During his time as a student at

the University of Airlangga, Soekarwo was the Coordinator of the GMNI between 1976 and

1978. However, his involvement in political activism continued in Golkar because of his

status as a civil servant.407

His activity in this party facilitated his appointment to Head of the

Bureau of Internal Education for Cadres (Ketua Biro Kaderisasi) between 1983 and 1997.408

404

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 405

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 406

The involvement of village headmen in the gubernatorial election of 2008 became evident when the

Constitutional Court confirmed that the village headmen and the association of village headmen also committed

electoral fraud, see Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008 (point 3.24.1; 3.24.2; 3.24.3;

3.24.4), 2 December 2008. 407

During the New Order, civil servants could only be (formally) affiliated with Golkar. 408

“Tentang Soekarwo,” Jawa Pos, 5 July 2008.

212

Nevertheless, his involvement in Golkar did not interfere with his relationships with

local party elites of the PDI-P. Imam as the governor and Soekarwo as the Secretary of the

Province were known as formal leaders who had a close relationship with the PDI-P. As one

of the strongest political parties in the region, it made sense that both local elites treated the

party in a special manner. In fact, according to one scholar, Soekarwo supported the PDI-P

even before he ran as a candidate of governor.409

In addition, Imam and Soekarwo did not

take on any formal positions in any political parties during this time. Thus, they could be

considered “neutral” leaders. The situation was very different in the case of Soenarjo who

served as the Regional Chairman of the Golkar Party from 2004 to 2009.410

The strong influence of Soekarwo within the PDI-P became evident when he won

against the leader of the party, Sutjipto, in the Special Regional Meeting (Rapat Kerja Daerah

Khusus/ Rakerdasus) of the party in 2007. Due to this meeting, he was nominated as a

prospective candidate of the party for the gubernatorial election of 2008. This victory

demonstrated the extent of Soekarwo’s influence on the party grassroots in East Java. Even

after the Central Board of the party rejected his nomination as a candidate, Soekarwo still

engaged with local party’s elites and the branches.411

From this it can be concluded that

although he did not obtain the party ticket, he could, at least, siphon off support from this

political machine.

The third significant political machine is the Nahdlatul Ulama. The statistical data

from the previous section show a significant position of the Nahdlatul Ulama in East Java’s

electoral politics. The organization won the general election of 1955 and contributed to the

survival of the PPP during the New Order.412

The disengagement of Nahdlatul Ulama from

the electoral politics in 1984 resulted in the significant decrease of the electoral power of the

PPP, in particular in the 1987 general election. This pattern of political influence of the NU

repeated itself in the post-New Order. In the province, the PKB, which was created by the

Nahdlatul Ulama, won the two general elections in 1999 and 2004. The significant loss of the

PKB in the general election of 2009 must be seen in light of the fact that some influential

religious teachers of the Nahdlatul Ulama withdrew their support from the party. In short, the

Nahdlatul Ulama was clearly important for the success of local elites in the process of

governing, as well as during electoral competition.

Soekarwo also successfully applied the strategy of taking away support from the

409

Interview with Faishal Aminuddin, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 410

”Mantan Pelawak yang Jadi Pejabat,“ Jawa Pos, 3 July 2008. 411

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 412

In 1973, the NU merged into the PPP, see the discussion on this issue in the previous section.

213

Nahdlatul Ulama. This was due to the fact that there were several members of this

organization who ran as candidates in the gubernatorial election in 2008. Moreover, internal

conflict within the PKB, particularly in 2008, resulted in Nahdlatul Ulama splitting its support

among several candidates. Among the candidates in the gubernatorial election of 2008, four

candidates were affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama: Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Saifullah

Yusuf, Achmady (as the formal PKB’s candidate),413

and Ali Maschsan Moesa.414

In the case

of Soekarwo, he could not expect full support of this organization since he had no direct

affiliation. Nevertheless, he benefitted from his access to the NU by activating two major

political channels. The first was the network that had been maintained by Imam Utomo during

his governorship. Imam was known as having a close relationship with influential religious

teachers of the Nahdlatul Ulama ever since he had served as the Regional Commander. As

Soekarwo stated, he was introduced to the religious teachers of the Nahdlatul Ulama by Imam

before he ran for office.415

According to Soekarwo, the political support of the religious

teachers of the Nahdlatul Ulama was divided between himself and Khofifah.416

However,

Soekarwo claimed that, in contrast to Khofifah, he was backed by those religious teachers

who had no interest in political activities.417

The second channel was Saifullah’s networks

within the Nahdlatul Ulama. Being a descendant of a religious teacher, Saifullah could claim

a genuine proximity to the Nahdlatul Ulama. Saifullah was also the Chairman of the Ansor

Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor), one of the mass organizations of the Nahdlatul

Ulama. With these two political assets, Soekarwo and Saifullah could expect to gain political

support from the religious teachers and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) of the Nahdlatul

Ulama, which were believed to have a significant number of followers. The decision to

choose Saifullah as Soekarwo’s running mate was intended to increase their electoral appeal,

in particular with the followers of the Nahdlatul Ulama. Only by joining Saifullah, Soekarwo

could balance the popularity of Khofifah within this organization.

Furthermore, beyond these three electoral machines, the Democrat Party’s position as

the winner of the general election in 2009 needs to be taken into account. As a new party,

whose growing popularity relied on the personal charisma of President Yudhoyono, the

413

When he ran as candidate of governor, Achmady was the regent of Mojokerto. Achmady had a background as

a career bureaucrat and claimed to be a member of the NU, “Cagub Achmady Juga Mengaku Yakin Didukung

Warga NU,” available at: www.nu.or.id, 26 April 2008, (accessed 7 November 2013). For the background of

Achmady, see “Bupati yang Mantan Tukang Sapu Pasar,” Jawa Pos, 4 July 2008. 414

Ali Maschan Moesa was a candidate for vice governor and he ran with his running mate Soenarjo. When he

ran as a candidate, Ali held a position as the Regional Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama, see “Tentang Ali

Maschan Moesa, Jawa Pos, 3 July 2008. 415

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 416

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 417

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

214

Democrat Party faced various problems such as the lack of qualified cadres, loose party

discipline, and weak organization and management. However, the existence of this party is for

Soekarwo important on three accounts. The first concerns Soekarwo’s need to get on the

party’s ticket as the basic requirement for his candidacy. His chances were high since he was

a popular figure and served as the Secretary of the Province, something that the party

searched for given its lack of popular cadres. The second aspect is related to the position and

power of Yudhoyono as the President. With the support of President Yudhoyono, Soekarwo

could expect many things ranging from the involvement of Yudhoyono, his family and aides

in his campaign,418

the support of Yudhoyono in approaching other national and local elites,

to the possible mobilization of the state apparatus to support his candidacy. Finally, the third

point concerns Soekarwo’s search for a political buffer in the formal political process,

particularly in the provincial parliament. Soekarwo had no formal affiliation to any political

parties and by joining the Democrat Party and becoming its regional chairman, he seemed to

be more secure in his position. Another reason for joining the party was his anticipation that

once direct local elections were replaced by a mechanism of local elections of the provincial

parliament, as currently discussed in the Indonesian legislature,419

he could secure re-election

more easily.

B. Personal Networks: Friends and Alliances

It was not just the above mentioned political machines which influenced the political

strategies of local elites. In the case of Soekarwo, he also encroached on the other political

parties and infiltrated strategic groups in the society in the gubernatorial election of 2008. In

order to achieve this objective, he relied on his personal relationship with the local party

elites, the religious teachers of the NU, university scholars, business people, regents, and local

media. Therefore, the Golkar Party was the most logical political party that could be

influenced as Soekarwo had a long experience as a party member during the New Order. In

the post-New Order general elections in East Java, the Golkar Party consistently ranked as the

third or the fourth largest party. As a consequence of more than three decades as the ruling

party during the New Order, its political infrastructure and organization was seen as one of

the strongest. Thus, gaining support from elites of this party was a necessary strategy for

ruling elites.

In the party itself, an important division occurred when two local party elites ran as

418

“Putra SBY Kampanye Untuk Duet Karsa,” Jawa Pos, 15 July 2008. 419

See The Jakarta Post, 11 September 2014.

215

candidates: Soenarjo (the Regional Chairman) and Ridwan Hisjam (the former Regional

Chairman). Soekarwo himself had no formal position in the party anymore, stemming from

the fact that the only way of gaining support was through personal ties. He possibly had had

such personal ties ever since he had served as the Head of the Bureau of Internal Education of

the Cadres (Ketua Biro Kaderisasi) in the party for 14 years. Evidence of this was that

Martono, a leader of the Golkar Party,420

became the head of the campaign team for Soekarwo

and Saifullah Yusuf in the gubernatorial election of 2008. The personal connection of

Soekarwo and Martono was not new. Since the New Order they had had a close relationship

and both regarded each other as close friends.421

According to Martono, he and Soekarwo

were actively involved in one political discussion forum in Surabaya in which the participants

came from various backgrounds and which had been maintained since 1994.422

Another important point was that local politicians, local bureaucrats, businesspersons,

local journalists, university scholars, and members of other professions participated in this

discussion group. This forum was held in an informal style, but it discussed many political

issues such as democratization and political party reform.423

Soekarwo had been actively

involved in this group since he had served as the Head of the Revenue Office (Kepala Dinas

Pendapatan Daerah).424

Thus, it seemed that this group was founded in the New Order era

and continued its existence at the beginning of the transition. According to Hariadi, it became

an important strategic group which later supported Soekarwo, both during the candidacy and

his governorship as well.425

The involvement of Soekarwo in this group led to a personal

relationship with some prominent scholars of the University of Airlangga such as Hotman

Siahaan, Priyatmoko, and Hariadi. Hotman, the former Dean of the Faculty of Social and

Political Science, was one of the main supporters of Soekarwo during the election campaign.

According to Hotman Siahaan, he and Soekarwo initially built a relationship through a group

discussion called the Study Group for Social Change (Lembaga Studi Perubahan Sosial/

LSPERS).426

This relationship became increasingly closer when Soekarwo announced his

intention to run for office of governor. Along with several scholars, they developed a strategy

for Soekarwo’s campaign, for instance, socializing in the media, building social and political

420

Martono was the head of the campaign team during Soekarwo’s candidacy. After the gubernatorial election in

2008, Martono was elected as the regional chairman of the Golkar Party. 421

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012, Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 422

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 423

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 424

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 425

Interview with Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 426

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012.

216

networks, and promoting Soekarwo through a media called “Derap Desa.”427

Included in this

was a discussion of how to gain the recommendation from the Central Board of the PDI-P and

approaching the thirty-eight local branches of the party.428

After the victory, Hotman went on

to hold a position as the Chairman of the Provincial Research Council (Dewan Riset Daerah/

DRD). He was also included as a social expert in a poverty alleviation program of the

provincial government, called “Another Way to People Welfare” (Jalan Lain Menuju

Kesejahteraan/ Jalinkesra). In addition, because of Soekarwo’s involvement in this

discussion group, he was able to come close to another figure such as Anton Prijanto who was

the former Rector of the University of Surabaya and a Golkar politician in the New Order.

The personal connections with the members of this strategic group suggest that the

networking of Soekarwo was not simply restricted to the circles of political parties, but also

extended to the various groups mentioned above. He indeed believed that this network could

help him in regards to public opinion making, business and financial support, and association

with local and national political elites. According to one member of this group, Martono, this

group still existed during the governorship of Soekarwo and played a role in providing policy

recommendations to the provincial government.429

The personal relationship of Soekarwo with some university scholars was not a new

phenomenon in the transitional setting. During the New Order, local elites, including the

governors or regional commanders of the military, considered the universities as one of the

supporting bases for their power. There were two forms of relationships which existed during

that time. First, the local elites would intervene in the selection of university leadership and

second, they co-opted the university scholars through their involvement in the government’s

projects by serving, for example, as an expert team.430

This pattern of co-optation, according

to one university scholar, Kresnayana Yahya, was a replication of the regime (at the national

level) where academicians from universities formed the linchpin of the regime’s

technocracy.431

Another strategic relationship existed with the mass media in its role as public opinion

maker. In East Java, and in particular in the capital, Surabaya, the media group of Jawa Pos

played a role as one of the most important public opinion makers. Soekarwo followed in the

footstep of Imam Utomo and previous governors who always tried to form good relationships

with the leaders of this media group, whose owner, Dahlan Iskan, was known as a “silent

427

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 428

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 429

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 430

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 431

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.

217

supporter” of Imam and Soekarwo. Besides his position as owner, Dahlan held a position as

the President Director of the Wira Jatim Group (Panca Wira Usaha), a holding company with

interests in property (hotels), medical equipment, port development, rubber products, agro

industry and printing owned by the provincial government.432

The appointment to this

position depended on the governor. After the retirement of Dahlan from this holding company

and his discontinued involvement in the Jawa Pos, the relationship between the Jawa Pos and

the local elites was continued by Arif Afandi. Arif, who was the editor in chief of the Jawa

Pos newspaper and later on became the vice mayor of Surabaya in 2005, had also a close

connection with Soekarwo and his political circles. Both Soekarwo and Imam Utomo

supported Arif in the Surabaya’s mayoral election in 2010.433

After Arif was defeated by

Rismaharini-Bambang DH in this mayoral election, he no longer had a position, so Soekarwo

gave him a post as the President Director of the Wira Jatim Group, the post that Dahlan had

occupied in the past.434

Another important strategic alliance existed with businessmen. Direct local elections

required greater reliance on financial capital compared to the local elections in the local

parliaments. In order to get financial support for their campaign, candidates had to maintain

good relations with businesspeople. East Java is a province where big companies and

businessmen had interests in different sectors. Among others, two business groups were

known as having an especially close relationship with Soekarwo and his circles: the Maspion

Group, owned by Alim Markus with interests in economic sectors such as plantations, timber,

consumer goods, engineering, information technology, power plant energy, heavy equipment,

manufacturing and trading and the Murdaya Group owned by Murdaya Poo with interests in

consumer products, trading, construction material, property and industry.435

However, there

were not only pure businessmen such as Alim and Murdaya who maintained a close

relationship with the local elites. Other businessmen-cum-politicians such as the Chairman of

the Golkar Party, Aburizal Bakrie - who owned the Bakrie Group -, had business interests in

the region. In the case of the mudflow disaster in Sidoarjo for which PT Lapindo Brantas (one

branch of the Bakrie Group) was widely held responsible, a long process of negotiations

between Bakrie and the central government took place. This negotiation over the relief

432

“Dahlan Iskan Mundur Sebagai Dirut PT Panca Wira,” available at: www.tempo.co, 24 November 2004,

(accessed 8 November 2013); “Dewan Desak Pengganti Dahlan Iskan,” available at: tekno.kompas.com, 26 July

2010, (8 November 2013). 433

Interviews with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012 and Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 434

“Arif Afandi Gantikan Dahlan Iskan Pimpin BUMD,” available at: us.politik.news.viva.co.id, 23 September

2010, (accessed 8 November 2013); “Penunjukan Arief Afandi Jadi Dirut PWU Lewat Fit and Proper Test,”

available at: kominfo.jatimprov.go.id, 29 September 2010, (accessed 8 November 2013). 435

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.

218

process of the victims could not be separated from “the context of elite political interests and

competition” (Schiller, Lucas, Sulistiyanto 2008, 59).

The relationship between local elites and businesspeople is an important aspect with

regard to strategic decisions of the provincial government. During his governorship,

Soekarwo was known as a local elite member who opposed the central government’s policy

regarding importing agricultural products such as sugar, garlic, and beef. This policy of the

governor was praised in some circles, insinuating that this was a pro-poor vision or a

nationalist policy orientation.436

Nevertheless, besides this positive appraisal, there is another

possible explanation regarding the governor’s policy in terms of connections with business

circles. A more skeptical assessment came from Kresnayana Yahya who argued that the

governor’s policy to block the import was related to his intention to provide protection to

some industrialists in the region, particularly those who produce sugar.437

According to

Kresnayana, East Java is the greatest producer of sugar in Indonesia (around 70-80 percent of

the total production) and the price setter for this industry were Chinese businessmen, known

as “the Nine Samurai.”438

A similar treatment, though with a different objective, took place in the case of the

provincial government’s rejection of beef imports. East Java is known for being an important

supplier of beef in Indonesia. In the past, people in the region used cows for plowing rice

paddies, but nowadays cows are also used as an investment.439

In the region, people in the

rural area are usually affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama, and the religious teachers of the

organization, usually wealthy persons, possess cows in large numbers. In short, Soekarwo’s

rejection of the imports can best be interpreted with his intention to please his mass supporters

in the villages and his supporters of the Nahdlatul Ulama.440

However, this case is not directly

connected to any business personalities and thus cannot be considered as favoritism. In this

case, Soekarwo might have gotten political credit, but he might also have intended to protect

the economic wellbeing of the people in the region.

A final important aspect regarding Soekarwo’s personal networks concerns the figure

of Fuad Amin, Regent of Bangkalan (Madura), who became his strong supporter in the

gubernatorial election of 2008. Fuad served as regent for two terms and had a strong position

in Madura, particularly in Bangkalan regency. He inherited this strong influence in Madura

from his late grandfather, Kyai Muhamad Kholil (Bangkalan), who was the teacher of many

436

Interviews with Sirmaji, Surabaya, 27 January 2012 and Choirul Anam, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 437

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 438

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 439

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 440

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.

219

religious teachers, including the founders of the Nahdlatul Ulama such as Kyai Muhammad

Hasyim Asy’arie.441

Because of this anchestry, Fuad Amin was actively involved in the

Nahdlatul Ulama and the PKB. In the latter and during the time of conflict in the PKB, Fuad

Amin served as the Chairman of the Regional Advisory Council (Ketua Dewan Syuro, DPW

PKB Jawa Timur) from the camp of Abdurrahman Wahid, although he later resigned from

this position following an unresolved internal conflict in the party.442

After he retired as

regent, his son Muhammad Makmun Ibnu Fuad took over the position after winning the

regent election in 2012.443

Afterwards, Fuad Amin joined the Gerindra Party and became a

candidate for local legislature for this party in 2013.444

In the gubernatorial election of 2008, Fuad Amin supported Soekarwo.445

This support

was not only a result of his influence in the NU, but also of his position as regent. According

to a report from “Kaji’s” legal team to the Constitutional Court, Fuad Amin intervened in the

local bureaucracy and instructed the village headmen to support the Soekarwo-Saifullah

ticket. It was believed that he had given instructions to commit electoral fraud (Hasan 2010,

213-214). Bangkalan itself was among the regions where elections had to be re-conducted

after the Constitutional Court had ruled that the second round of elections had suffered from

massive, systematic, and structured electoral fraud.446

However, after the elections had been

re-conducted, the Soekarwo-Saifullah team still dominated the votes in Bangkalan (KPUD

2009) and thus demonstrated the strong influence and political basis of Fuad Amin in this

regency. According to Khofifah, Fuad Amin asked for her forgiveness for the electoral fraud

after the election was over.447

After Soekarwo ran for governor, the relationship with Fuad deteriorated. In 2008, the

central government initiated the establishment of the Regional Development Agency

Surabaya-Madura (Badan Pengembangan Wilayah Surabaya-Madura/ BPWS). The objective

of this organization was to accelerate socio-economic development and to upgrade spatially

lagging regions in Madura Island.448

Bangkalan is the region that was directly influenced by

441

Kyai Hasyim Asy’arie is the founder of the Nahdlatul Ulama, see Anam 2010, 61-116. On Kyai Cholil, see

also Anam 2010, 14. 442

“Fuad Amin Surati Gus Dur, Mundur dari Ketua Dewan Syuro PKB Jatim,” available at:

surabaya.tribunnews.com, 8 June 2009, (accessed 7 November 2013). 443

“Anak Bupati Bangkalan Dipastikan Menang,“ available at: www.tempo.co, 18 December 2012, (accessed 7

November 2013). 444

“Mantan Bupati Bangkalan Daftar Caleg Gerindra,” available at: www.antarajatim.com, 27 April 2013,

(accessed 7 November 2013). 445

“Tanpa Restu Gus Dur PKB Jatim Dukung Karsa,” available at: www.m.inilah.com, 2 November 2008,

(accessed 7 November 2008); “Kyai Khos dan Ulama Semadura Dukung Penuh Pasangan Karsa,“ available at:

www.berita8.com, 17 January 2009, (accessed 7 November 2013). 446

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008, 2 December 2008. 447

Personal communication with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Jakarta, 25 May 2010. 448

“Background of BPWS” available at: www.pu.go.id/satminkal/index, (accessed 7 November 2013).

220

this initiative as it is the region closest to Java Island. Problems occurred when the BPWS

began with land acquisition from the people of Bangkalan the land price was higher than

previously predicted by a standard measurement. It was believed that Fuad Amin owned a

large amount of land in Bangkalan which he had collected or bought from the people.449

Therefore, he could increase and dictate the price once the BPWS wanted to buy the land.

Since there was no consensus about the price, Fuad Amin opposed the project and asked the

provincial and local governments to take over the initiative.450

The progress of this initiative

was unclear, but Fuad Amin consistently rejected the project, and a mass demonstration at the

office of the governor was organized.451

The demonstration resulted in the destruction of

some office facilities.452

This incident upset Soekarwo and he wondered why he was blamed

for the project since it was the initiative of the central government.453

Many believed that

Fuad Amin was behind this protest.454

Although he was upset with the demonstration,

Soekarwo stated that the initiative should be delegated to the local government (city and

regency level), including the negotiation for the land acquisition.455

The impact this event had

on the relationship between Soekarwo and Fuad Amin can be seen in the nomination of the

candidates for the 2013 gubernatorial election. Fuad Amin did not clearly state whom he

would support, even if he initially wanted to support Khofifah to whom, as he claimed, he felt

guilty.456

C. Party Networks: Inclusion and Accommodation

The success of Soekarwo in the gubernatorial election of 2008 raised questions of how he

managed his government politically. During the elections, he effectively activated powerful

political machines, alliances and personal ties and thereby won the contest. During his term as

governor his approach to manage politics basically relied on accommodation. Starting his

term with a “controversial victory,” he began to follow an approach of inclusion towards

449

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and interview with Hariadi, Surabaya, 9 January 2012. 450

“Regencies fear massive authority of new body,” available at: www.thejakartapost.com, 15 July 2009,

(accessed 7 November 2013); “Pengembangan Suramadu Lamban, BPWS Tidak Becus,” available at:

www.surabayapagi.com, 20 January 2011, (accessed 7 November 2013). 451

“Ratusan Santri se Kabupaten Bangkalan Tuntut Pembubaran BPWS,” available at: news.detik.com, 19

January 2012, (accessed 7 November 2013). 452

“Demo Penolakan BPWS Suramadu di Kantor Gubernur Ricuh,” available at: news.detik.com, 16 January

2012, (accessed 7 November 2013). 453

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 454

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012, Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012 and

Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. See also ”Gus Ipul Minta Fuad Amin Redakan Situasi,” available at:

jatim.tribunnews.com, 20 January 2012, (accessed 7 November 2013). 455

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 456

“RKH Fuad Amin All Out Menangkan Khofifah!” available at: beritajatim.com, 29 April 2013, (accessed 7

November 2013); “Khofifah Gandeng Herman, Fuad Amin Cabut Dukungan,” available at: jaringnews.com, 15

May 2013, (accessed 7 November 2013); “Fuad Amin: Tunggu Istikharah, Saya Netral Dulu,” available at:

beritajatim.com, 15 May 2013, (accessed 7 November 2013).

221

political parties and build a grand coalition. Most local elites who competed against him in the

race were included in the coalition and invited to contribute to his government. An exception

in this case was Khofifah who, according to Soekarwo, was redirecting her activity to Jakarta

after the election.

Nevertheless, before he began the process of accommodation towards political parties,

he paid special attention to three political parties which were in fact instrumental in

determining formal political decisions in the provincial parliament. These three political

parties were the Democrat Party, the PDI-P, and the Golkar Party. In the case of the Democrat

Party - before he held a position as the Regional Chairman -, he had joined the party as the

member of the National Advisory Council and the Chairman of the Advisory Council in the

province.457

However, both positions did not provide him with executive power in the party,

unlike his position as chairman of the party. This lack of executive power can be seen as one

of Soekarwo’s motives to become the regional chairman of the party in 2011. Some political

observers argued that the reasons behind Soekarwo’s decision were driven by two intentions.

Firstly, he tried to secure his political position in the provincial parliament. Secondly, this

decision could be seen as indicating Soekarwo’s anticipation that once the mechanism of local

elections was replaced by a return to elections in the local parliaments, he would gain more

power.458

By taking the position as the leader of the largest party in the region, Soekarwo felt

that he could hold onto power more firmly, a position he however denied in the interview with

me.459

Initially, he refused Yudhoyono’s offer of becoming the Democrat Party’s regional

chairman, but as a Javanese he did not want to be judged as being impolite after being offered

the position several times. Despite his unwillingness, he accepted the request of Yudhoyono

to manage the party at Yudhoyono’s “home.” Soekarwo claimed that Yudhoyono’s request

showed that Yudhoyono had trust in him.460

His decision was rejected by his supporters and

the coalition of political parties, but he intended to show his loyalty to Yudhoyono. In short,

Soekarwo’s intention to lead the Democrat Party highlights two interrelated aspects: first, he

tried to secure his position in the local political arena, and second, he wanted to maintain his

personal relationship with Yudhoyono.

In the PDI-P, the intention of Soekarwo in gaining its support did not succeed quite as

smoothly. However, he benefitted from the internal factionalism within the party. In the

457

“Maju Ketua PD Jatim, Soekarwo Tunggu SBY,” available at: vivanews.co.id, 20 May 2011, (accessed 29

October 2013); “Soekarwo ‘Pamerkan’ Kartu Anggota Demokrat, Siap Dicalonkan Ketua DPD,“ available at:

www.republika.co.id, 13 May 2011, (accessed 29 October 2013). 458

Interview with Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 459

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 460

President Yudhoyono was born and grew up in Pacitan, a small regency in East Java. Interview with

Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

222

gubernatorial election of 2008, the party was divided in its support of Sutjipto and Soekarwo,

with the Central Board finally giving a formal endorsement for Sutjipto. According to one

party elite member, Bambang DH, the defeat of Sutjipto in the race could not be separated

from the defection of some party leaders.461

His statement can be interpreted as referring to

the regional chairman of the party, Sirmaji, who was known as having a close relationship

with Soekarwo. Nevertheless, Sirmaji refuted the speculation that he was supporting

Soekarwo in the gubernatorial election. He only gave his assessment of Soekarwo and

Sutjipto to the Central Board in very general and vague terms. According to him, Soekarwo

had a greater chance to win the election, but if the PDI-P nominated him, it would give the

impression of a party sell out. On the contrary, there was little possibility for Sutjipto of

getting elected, but when the party chose him as a candidate there was no risk of being

accused of selling out the party.462

Sirmaji assumed that the decision by the central board to

back Sutjipto was driven by Sutjipto’s militancy and loyalty to the party and in order to

maintain the party’s cohesion.463

According to his observation, all branches of the party were

all-out in supporting Sutjipto, although there was a possibility that some supported

Soekarwo.464

Furthermore, the death of Sutjipto in 2011 had further weakened the Pandegiling

Group, a faction within the regional PDI-P. The only prominent figure of this group was

Bambang DH, who had served as the mayor of Surabaya for two terms. This condition also

strengthened the position of Sirmaji in the party, as was shown in his successful re-election as

the regional chairman of the party in 2010.465

With this result, Soekarwo could benefit from

the connection with the PDI-P. Nevertheless, the relationship between Sirmaji and the

Pandegiling Group was not good and tensions between them existed due to at least three

factors. The first was related to the disappointment of the Pandegiling Group over the half-

hearted support of Sirmaji towards Sutjipto’s candidacy in the gubernatorial election of 2008.

The second was related to the refusal of Sirmaji to participate in the impeachment attempt of

Rismaharini which was believed to have been initiated by Bambang DH and Wisnu Shakti

Buana.466

The last factor seems related to Sirmaji’s close relationship with Soekarwo. These

461

Interview with Bambang DH, Surabaya, 1 February 2012. 462

Interview with Sirmaji, Surabaya, 27 January 2012. 463

Interview with Sirmaji, Surabaya, 27 January 2012. 464

Interview with Sirmaji, Surabaya, 27 January 2012. 465

“Sirmaji Kembali Pimpin PDIP Jatim,” available at: viva.co.id, 7 March 2010, (accessed 29 October 2013);

“Sirmaji Kembali Terpilih Sebagai Ketua DPD PDIP Jatim,” available at: www.news.detik.com, 7 March 2010,

(accessed 29 October 2013). 466

Both are leaders of the PDI-P from the Pandegiling Group. While Bambang served as mayor of Surabaya,

Wisnu Shakti Buana was the Branch Chairman of the PDI-P in Surabaya, the Vice Chairman of the Local

Legislature (DPRD Surabaya) and a son of Soetjipto.

223

tensions culminated when some members of the party demonstrated against Sirmaji’s

leadership and demanded his resignation from the position of regional chairman. This

demonstration turned violent and resulted in the destruction of the regional headquarters of

the party. This event could not be separated from activities of some party leaders from the

Pandegiling Group who were believed to support a mass demonstration against Sirmaji.

Nevertheless, it was not just the Pandegiling Group which had a political interest in

Sirmaji’s resignation. At that time, the chairman of the Malang party branch and the mayor of

this city - Peni Suparto - competed with Sirmaji. After being elected for two terms, Peni

proposed his wife to run as mayoral candidate to replace him.467

Additionally, Sirmaji’s wife

who was also the member of the national parliament nominated herself to run in the race.468

Both wives were intent on getting the party ticket. Against this backdrop, Peni backed the

demonstration and criticized the leadership of Sirmaji.469

Nevertheless, the central board

decided to fire Peni from the party and gave the ticket to Sirmaji’s wife.470

The conflict ended

with Sirmaji keeping his position of regional chairman and indirectly influenced the good

relationship between the PDI-P and the provincial government.

Compared to the case of the PDI-P above, Soekarwo was more involved in the Golkar

Party. Having a track record as a functionary of the party during the New Order, Soekarwo

was still connected to several party leaders. In 2009, his long-time friend and head of

campaign team in the gubernatorial election, Martono, was elected as the regional chairman of

the party. It cannot be denied that the success of Martono to be elected as the regional

chairman of the party had also to be attributed to Soekarwo. According to Hotman Siahaan,

Soekarwo’s aide-de-camp, Martono became the chairman with the help of Soekarwo and

himself.471

It was believed that the position of Martono came about as part of the negotiation

between Soekarwo and Aburizal Bakrie, the Chairman of the Golkar Party. This was a move

to protect Bakrie’s business projects in East Java, particularly a project of geothermal energy

in Trenggalek.472

For Soekarwo himself, the appointment of Martono strengthened his

political coalition since the latter was his close friend and loyalist.

The ascension of Martono as the regional chairman, nevertheless, resulted in internal

467

“Berkampanye Dukung Istri, Walikota Malang Ajukan Cuti,” available at: www.tempo.co, 30 April 2013,

(accessed 8 November 2013). 468

“Istri Ditarget Malang 1, Sirmaji Diusulkan Dipecat,” available at: surabayapagi.com, 18 April 2013,

(accessed 8 November 2013). 469

“31 DPC PDIP Kompak Lengserkan Sirmaji,” available at: surabaya.tribunnews.com, 3 February 2013,

(accessed 8 November 2013). 470

“Peni Suparto Dipecat, DPP PDIP Rekom Istri Sirmaji Jadi Cawali Malang,” available at:

www.lensaindonesia.com, 17 February 2013, (accessed 8 November 2013); “Sri Rahayu Resmi Mendaftar Calon

Walikota Malang,” available at: www.tempo.co, 18 February 2013, (accessed 8 November 2013). 471

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 472

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012.

224

conflict within the party. His rival, Gatot Sudjito, resisted the leadership of Martono.473

One

indication of the conflict among them was the replacement of Gatot by Hasan Arsyan as the

Head of Faction of the Golkar Party in the provincial parliament in February 2012.474

In

addition, further tensions also occurred between Martono and Ridwan Hisjam regarding the

support of Golkar Party for Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf in the gubernatorial election of

2013. Martono insisted on supporting both leaders, while Ridwan preferred to support only

Soekarwo.475

However, several months prior to the gubernatorial election of 2013, Martono

was fired by the central board of the party when he resisted their direction regarding the

arrangement of candidates in the legislatures for the 2014 general election.476

The dismissal of

Martono as regional chairman occurred during the run-up to the gubernatorial election of

2013, when Soekarwo ran again and Martono became the head of campaign team of

Soekarwo for a second time.477

Additionally, the dismissal of Martono elevated his opponents

in the party – such as Gatot Sudjito - to be nominated as the regional chairman. By and large,

Martono’s dismissal weakened the political alliance of Soekarwo, in particular in the Golkar

Party.

Besides the above-mentioned three political parties, Soekarwo was actively engaged

with other political parties, in particular the political parties which nominated him as

governor. In order to keep close contacts with political parties, Soekarwo held regular

meetings. There were two types of meetings which were conducted. The first meeting was

among political parties that had seats in the provincial parliament (twelve political parties),

which was held once a month and attended by the chairmen and the general secretaries of

each party. In this forum, Soekarwo placed himself as the chairman of the Democrat Party and

not as the governor.478

The second was the meeting of all political parties in East Java (either

with seats or no seats in the provincial parliament) and was held once every 2 months. In this

forum, Soekarwo acted as the governor.

473

In the regional party meeting, Gatot Sudjito withdrew his candidacy as the regional chairman of the party, see

“Ketua DPD Golkar Jatim Resmi Dilantik,” available at: www.tempo.co, 29 November 2009, (accessed 30

October 2013); “Aklamasi Bukan Berarti Nafikan Beda Pendapat,” available at: www.suarakarya-online.com,

(30 November 2009, (accessed 31 October 2013). 474

“Ketua Fraksi Golkar Diganti,” available at: www.surabayapost.co.id, 22 February 2012, (accessed 24

September 2013). 475

“Tak Gubris Ancaman Ridwan Hisjam, Martono Mantap Dukung Karsa,” available at:

www.lensaindonesia.com, 1 February 2013, (accessed 24 September 2013). 476

“Ketua DPD Golkar Jatim Dinonaktifkan Gara-Gara DCS,” available at: regional.kompas.com, 16 July 2013,

(accessed 30 October 2013); “Gara-Gara Tak Mau Ubah DCS, Ketua DPD Golkar Jatim Dipecat,” available at:

www.lensaindonesia.com, 16 July 2013, (accessed 30 October 2013); “Martono Dicopot, Kerugian Besar Bagi

Golkar Jatim,” available at: beritajatim.com, 17 July 2013, (accessed 30 October 2013). 477

“Dicopot Dari Ketua Golkar Jatim, Martono Angkat Bicara,” available at: news.detik.com, 16 July 2013,

(accessed 30 October 2013). 478

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012.

225

In both forums, several strategic decisions of the provincial government were

discussed and Soekarwo frequently became the target of criticism of political parties.479

Martono played a crucial role in the first forum as the coordinator of the meeting, and

afterwards when the Golkar Party dismissed him, Soekarwo took over this position.480

In

addition, during his governorship, Soekarwo organized informal meetings with the members

of the national parliament (DPR) who represented East Java.481

The topics in these meetings

were usually over issues of development in East Java, such as a plan for the development of

the “South Ring Road Highway” (Jalur Lingkar Selatan/ JLS).482

Organizing regular meetings of political parties in East Java seems to be one

distinctive approach of Soekarwo in managing the local political arena in an informal and

personal manner. Furthermore, this approach demonstrates Soekarwo’s political agility and

his flexibility in running the local government. Not only could he control criticism which

could eventually galvanize into political actions, but he could also understand what the

interests and needs of major local political actors were and accommodate them accordingly.

This assessment is also shared by Arif Afandi, one of Soekarwo’s supporters, who stated that

Soekarwo had the ability to accommodate the interests of political parties and other

institutions such as the police and the military in the distribution of government funding.483

This ability was strongly related to his expertise and past experience.

According to Martono, the aforementioned manner of communication among political

parties could be applied smoothly since most political parties did not have any concise

political ideologies.484

Since then, rivalries among political parties have not led to a zero-sum

situation or, according to Martono, “cut-throat political competition.”485

The parties could

cooperate as long as their interests were accommodated.486

This cooperation through regular

communication with political parties contributed to political stability in the local political

arena. However, this form of cooperation among political parties tended to create a local

oligarchy. The cooptation of political parties into the decision-making process had the

potential to limit critical views of political parties towards the provincial government. As a

consequence, it became difficult to develop a democratic regime in the absence of political

competition.

479

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 480

“Soekarwo Pegang Kendali,” available at: www.surabayapagi.com, 18 July 2013, (accessed 31 October

2013). 481

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 482

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 483

Interview with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 484

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 485

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 486

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012.

226

Several members of the local elite confirmed that this grand-coalition type of

governance487

jeopardized democratic government in the region. Soenarjo, for instance,

claimed that the political conditions in East Java resembled more a “guided democracy”

where all political parties were obedient to the provincial government.488

As a result, it was

difficult to find fair evaluations or critical assessments from political parties toward the

provincial government.489

In addition, the local media and university intellectuals were also

included in this development which, as Soenarjo stated, had become less critical towards the

provincial government.490

In the case of university scholars, Soekarwo provided material

incentives in the form of research projects which were connected to government programs.491

As a result, this group was less critical since they were absorbed in the local oligarchy.492

According to Soenarjo, this high level of political inclusiveness had contradictory effects: on

the one hand, it created political stability; on the other hand, it caused a setback for local

democratic life.493

Soekarwo for his part rejected the notion that cooperation among political parties and

the existence of his political networks would lead to the formation of a local oligarchy.494

He

argued that his rule relied on the political participation of as many groups as possible.495

He

emphasized that his governorship paid attention to the involvement of political parties and the

public in the decision-making process since it had become a way of gaining “political

trust.”496

Soekarwo even stated that although participatory democracy was exhausting, time-

consuming, and needed the competence of a leader, he did not question participatory

democracy because he was the elected official who had gained a political mandate from the

people.497

Soekarwo also mentioned that he always put emphasis on implementing public

participation during his governorship and stated that “the potential victims should be asked

first.”498

487

For the role of grand coalitions in Indonesian Era Reformasi politics, see Slater 2004. 488

Interview with Soernarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 489

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 490

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. For the detail analyses on the alliance of

ruling elites, local media, and university intellectuals, see Kusman 2015, in particular his chapter four and five. 491

Interview with Choirul Anam, Surabaya 30 January 2012. See also Kusman 2015, chapter four and five. 492

Interview with Choirul Anam, Surabaya 30 January 2012. See also Kusman 2015, chapter four and five. 493

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 494

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 495

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 496

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 497

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 498

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

227

D. Elite Cunning, Money Politics, and Political Corruption

The coalitions and political networks of Soekarwo were an outcome of his political

skills and experiences, material cunnings, and strategic capacities to accommodate many

political and economic interests around him. He cleverly accumulated political capital through

the networks of local political machines as well as friends and alliances. As described above,

his political networks ranged from the local bureaucracy, the Nahdlatul Ulama, mass media,

business groups, university intellectuals to the leaders of numerous political parties.

These wide-ranging political networks severely weakened political opposition in the

province. It was this oligarchical network controlled by Soekarwo that, by and large,

contributed to the lack of legal or formal evidences of political corruption. According to

Choirul Anam, the critical groups such as intellectuals, NGOs, and religious teachers (kyai)

had been absorbed into the political power and therefore behaved pragmatic.499 With this,

there was no significant contender who could assail or exploit political mistakes or blunders

in managing local government.

Nevertheless, coalition building and political networks of Soekarwo are not the only

factors explaining the success in preserving political power. His bureaucratic capabilities,

expertise, and experiences also served well his ability of managing power. Soekarwo

capitalized on his expertise and experience in bureaucratic matters (as an expert of financial

management) in maintaining his political position and avoiding the traps caused by a jungle of

bureaucratic regulations. Having long experiences as a career bureaucrat, he was highly

versatile in managing local government, in particular the local budget.

Both factors - strong coalition and personal networks as well as bureaucratic

capabilities and experiences - explain why there is less evidence of legal prosecution of

established local elites in East Java. Yet less legal evidence does not mean that the provincial

ruling elites were free of allegations of corruption and money politics. It is entirely clear and

has become a consensus among students of local politics in Indonesia that one remarkable

problem following decentralization and direct local elections are corruption and money

politics in local authorities (Hidayat 2009; Mietzner 2011; Buehler 2007; Hadiz 2007; Tans

2011; Hadiz and Robison 2013). Therefore, it is important to consider the question of how the

ruling elites that ruled in the province financed their political campaigns and maintained their

political networks.

While corruption and money politics were much less an issue in the local governments

of East Java than in North Sumatra, their complete absence would be an anomaly in

499 Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta 13 May 2011.

228

Indonesian politics. Indeed, there are allegations suggesting that they are a reality in East Java

as well. For instance, Khofifah’s lawsuits in the Constitutional Court suggest that the

gubernatorial elections of 2008 and 2013 were not free from money politics. Other allegations

included electoral fraud in several districts in the 2008 gubernatorial election, alleged money

politics in the 2013 gubernatorial election through the social assistance fund (bantuan

sosial/bansos), suspected budgetary mismanagement in the “Socio-Economic for Community

Treatment Program” (Program Penanganan Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat/P2SEM) and the

“Another Way to People Welfare” (Jalan Lain Menuju Kesejahteraan/Jalinkesra) program.

Finally, there is the statement of the Chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission

(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK), Abraham Samad, claiming that “there is a number

one class robber in East Java.”500

Allegations of political corruption and money politics towards Soekarwo surfaced for

the first time in the gubernatorial election of 2008. It was the tight electoral contest between

Soekarwo and Khofifah which raised the specter of money politics. Such allegations not only

appeared in the national and local mass media,501

but also became an issue in the lawsuits

which Khofifah and her lawyer team filed with the Constitutional Court. The Court

eventually decided that there were indeed occurrences of systematic, structured, and massive

electoral fraud in three Maduran districts of Bangkalan, Sampang, and Pamekasan. Evidence

to which the Court referred was the contract program between Soekarwo and Moch.

Moezamil, the Secretary General of East Java Association of Village Heads, transcripts of

telephone communication, and testimonies of some witnesses in the trial.502

Allegations of

money politics occurred when Soekarwo promised to allocate public funds to villages, if the

village heads supported him in the race. The financial support would range from 50 to 150

million rupiahs (approximately 4.351-13.054 US$),503

depending on the vote percentage that

village heads could garner in their villages.504

In the process village heads were confronted

with charges accusing their staff with partisanship or casting blank ballot papers for the

500

“Abraham: Ada Perampok Kelas Wahid di Jawa Timur,” 12 December 2013, available at:

www.nasional.kompas.com, (accessed 9 November 2016). 501

See among others “Abraham: Ada Perampok Kelas Wahid di Jawa Timur,” 12 December 2013, available at:

www.nasional.kompas.com, (accessed 9 November 2016); “Abraham Samad Beri Penjelasan Lagi Soal Koruptor

Kakap di Jatim,“ available at: www.jppn.com, 30 December 2013, (accessed 9 November 2016); “Misteri

Koruptor Kelas Wahid Jawa Timur,” Gatra, 6 January 2014; “Kasus P2SEM Fathorrasjid Tuding Gubernur dan

Mantan Kejati Terlibat,” 27 January 2015, available at: www.surabayanewsweek.com, (accessed 9 November

2016); “Giliran Samad-Zul Dipolisikan,” Duta Masyarakat, 27 January 2015; “Dituduh Suap Zulkarnain KPK,

Begini Kata Soekarwo,” available at: www.m.tempo.co, 27 January 2015, (accessed 10 November 2016). 502

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008, 2 December 2008. 503

Based on a currency rate of 1 USD= 11,490 rupiahs. 504

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008, 2 December 2008.

229

advantage of Soekarwo.505

The Chairman of Local Electoral Commission, Wahyudi Purnomo,

was also reported to the police for manipulating the voters list (Daftar Pemilih Tetap,

DPT).506

However, the decision of the Chief of Provincial Police, Herman S. Sumawireja, to

declare Wahyudi a criminal suspect resulted in his replacement from the position as the Chief

of the Provincial Police.507

Some police leaders in Jakarta immediately responded to

Herman’s decision of declaring Wahyudi a suspect by stating that the decision was premature

and thereafter annulled Wahyudi’s statust as suspect.508

The replacement of Herman,

therefore, raised speculation that something went wrong with Herman’s attempt to uncover

the fraud. The case also suggested that Jakarta’s police leaders and ruling elites intervened the

process of election in East Java in favor of Soekarwo.509

The involvement of Jakarta’s elites in

East Java’s 2008 election was also explained in the light of the fact that the event was very

close to the 2009 national legislative and presidential elections. The vote-rich province was

seen as an important electoral battleground, especially by Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-P

and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party.510

Their competition was foreshadowed

by their support for their local allies in the province: while Megawati supported Khofifah,

SBY backed Soekarwo in the race.

The rematch of the gubernatorial contest in 2013 between Soekarwo and Khofifah

reactivated the issue of money politics. With her running mate, the former Chief of Provincial

Police, Herman S. Sumawireja,511

Khofiffah filed a lawsuit challenging the electoral result in

the Constitutional Court after their defeat in the 2013 gubernatorial election by the incumbent

pair, Soekarwo and Syaifullah Yusuf. At that time, Khofifah’s camp attacked Soekarwo for

his alleged involvement in money politics as practiced in the allocation of the social

assistance fund (bantuan sosial/bansos) prior to the gubernatorial election. In particular,

Khofifah’s lawsuits targeted a program called “Another Way to People Welfare” (Jalan Lain

505

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008, 2 December 2008. 506

“Ketua KPU Jatim Jadi Tersangka,“available at: www.kabarbisnis.com, 18 February 2009 (accessed 31

October 2016). 507

“Mabes Polri: Mutasi Herman Tak Terkait Pilkada Jatim,” available at: www.kompas.com (accessed 31

October 2016), “Mantan Kapolda Jatim Mundur dari Polri,” available at: www.kompas.com, 16 March 2009

(accessed 31 October 2016). 508

“Kapolda Baru Anulir Status Tersangka Ketua KPU Jatim,” available at: www.kompas.com, 27 February

2009 (accessed 31 October 2016), “Kapolda: Mantan Ketua KPU Jatim Belum Tersangka,” available at:

www.republika.co.id, 28 February 2009 (accessed 31 October 2016), “Polri: Bukti Pemalsuan DPT Tak Cukup

Kuat,” available at: www.kompas.com, 17 March 2009 (accessed 31 October 2016). 509

“Irjen Herman SS: Saya Kecewa Diintervensi,” available at: www.kompas.com, 17 March 2009 (accessed 31

October 2016). 510

This perspective was, at least, reflected in Khofifah’s view, as available in Hasan 2010, 163. See also “Pilgub

Jatim Jadi Patokan untuk Pileg dan Pilpres,” available at: www.rmol.co, 19 August 2013 (accessed 7 November

2016). 511

After his replacement as the Chief of Provincial Police in 2009, Herman resigned as a police officer in the

same year. In the gubernatorial election of 2013, Herman ran as a candidate of vice governor, pairing with

Khofifah Indar Parawansa.

230

Menuju Kesejahteraan/Jalinkesra), the implementation of which started in 2010.512

In her

lawsuit, Khofifah claimed that the allocations of the provincial budget for the social assistance

fund increased substantially, from only 800 billion rupiahs (approximately more than 69

million US$) in 2010 into 5 trillion rupiahs (approximately more than 435 million US$) in

2013.513

According to Khofifah’s lawsuit, the fund had been utilized for Soekarwo’s personal

advantage (by declaring it as the Governor’s Social Fund, rather than the Provincial

Government’s Fund) close to the election.514

Yet the Court rejected Khofifah’s lawsuits and

stated in its ruling that the program has a legal basis and that no evidence exists that the

program influenced the voters’ choice in the gubernatorial election.515

The last allegation of political corruption and money politics of the ruling elite was

raised by the Chairman of the Corruption Eradication Corruption (Komisi Pemberantasan

Korupsi/KPK), Abraham Samad, who somewhat cryptically stated that “there is a number one

class robber in East Java.”516

The statement was made on 12 December 2013, only two

months after the Court decision on Khififah’s law suit. It is interesting that Abraham made the

charge during a year-end meeting of the International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS).

The meeting was chaired by Hasyim Muzadi, the former Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, who

also became a supporter of Khofifah and opponent of Soekarwo since the gubernatorial

election of 2008. Clarifying his statement, Samad said that it was related to the question of a

participant in the ICIS meeting and also the question of Hasyim Muzadi who asked him why

the KPK could not arrest corruptors in East Java. Samad replied that professional,

sophisticated, and well-planned corruption seems to exist in the province. As the corruptor

perfectly anticipated all possibilities, he did not leave any accurate evidence for corruption.517

Given the context the remark was made, speculation subsequently abounded whether

Soekarwo was the target of the allegations.

Only two weeks after Samad’s statement, Fathorrasjid, the former chairman of the

provincial legislature, who was convicted and imprisoned for mismanaging the Socio-

512

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 117/ PHPU.D-XI/2013, 7 October 2013, see also “Khofifah Resmi

Gugat Hasil Pilgub Jatim ke MK,” available at: www.daerah.sindonews.com, 11 September 2013 (accessed 8

November 2016), “Ini Alasan Khofifah Gugat Hasil Pilgub Jawa Timur,” available at: www.m.tempo.co, 24

September 2013 (accessed 8 November 2016), “Mainkan Bansos Jelang Pilkada,” Gatra, 6 January 2014. 513

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 117/ PHPU.D-XI/2013, 7 October 2013. 514

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 117/ PHPU.D-XI/2013, 7 October 2013. 515

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 117/ PHPU.D-XI/2013, 7 October 2013, see also “MK Tolak Gugatan

Khofifah,” available at: www.sindonews.com, 7 October 2013 (accessed 8 November 2016), “MK Tolak

Gugatan Khofifah-Herman,” available at: www.antarajatim.com, 7 October 2013 (accessed 8 November 2016). 516

“Abraham: Ada Perampok Kelas Wahid di Jawa Timur,” 12 December 2013, available at:

www.nasional.kompas.com, (accessed 9 November 2016). 517

“Abraham Samad Beri Penjelasan Lagi Soal Koruptor Kakap di Jatim,“ available at: www.jppn.com, 30

December 2013, (accessed 9 November 2016).

231

Economic Community Treatment Program (Program Penanganan Sosial Ekonomi

Masyarakat/P2SEM) was released from prison.518

He vowed that he would expose the

P2SEM corruption case, including the involvement of ruling elites. Fathurassjid claimed that

there was bribery to stop the case of P2SEM between Soekarwo and Zulkarnaen, who at the

time held the position of the High Attorney (Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi) of East Java and later

became the Vice Chairman of KPK.519

Soekarwo responded calmly to Samad’s allegations,

stating that he would help KPK to find the aforementioned corruptor in East Java.520

Later he

went on to declare that the provincial government had received technical assistance from KPK

and cooperated with it to develop an anti-corruption zone.521

With this statement, he indirectly

whitewashed the provincial government from corruption because KPK had been involved in

the former’s activities. Responding to Fathurrosjid, Soekarwo noted that the program was

launched by the previous governor, Imam Oetomo. Therefore, he stated that he was not

familiar with the case and felt not responsible for what later occurred.522

As a matter of fact,

there was no further investigation following Samad’s statement and Fathorrosjid’s corruption

charges, suggesting that beyond allegations legally relevant evidence for corrupt practices and

money politics did not exist.

IV. Elite and Ideational Structures

A. The Traditional Javanese Ideas of Stability and Harmony

The rise of Imam and Soekarwo and their political networks cannot be discussed without also

focusing on the ideational structures with regard to the Javanese conception of power and

leadership. As a person who came from the Javanese tradition and grew up in the

bureaucracy, Soekarwo’s political attitudes were influenced by traditional Javanese norms.

Nevertheless, not only Soekarwo alone was influenced by age-honored Javanese norms, also

his predecessor, Imam Utomo, was. Several Javanese traditional norms can be seen as having

provided guidance for Soekarwo and Imam for ruling. These beliefs were, among others, the

ideas of harmony and stability in managing power, the importance of gaining consensus from

518

“Misteri Koruptor Kelas Wahid Jawa Timur,” Gatra, 6 January 2014. 519

“Kasus P2SEM Fathorrasjid Tuding Gubernur dan Mantan Kejati Terlibat,” 27 January 2015, available at:

www.surabayanewsweek.com, (accessed 9 November 2016), “Giliran Samad-Zul Dipolisikan,” Duta

Masyarakat, 27 January 2015. 520

“Soekarwo Akan Bantu KPK Bongkar Koruptor Wahid di Jatim,” available at: www.daerah.sindonews.com,

13 December 2013, (accessed 10 November 2016), “Gubernur Dukung KPK Bongkar Korupsi di Jatim,”

available at: www.jatim.antaranews.com, 13 December 2013, (accessed 10 November 2016). 521

“Soekarwo Akan Bantu KPK Bongkar Koruptor Wahid di Jatim,” available at: www.daerah.sindonews.com,

13 December 2013, (accessed 10 November 2016), “Gubernur Dukung KPK Bongkar Korupsi di Jatim,”

available at: www.jatim.antaranews.com, 13 December 2013, (accessed 10 November 2016). 522

“Dituduh Suap Zulkarnain KPK, Begini Kata Soekarwo,” available at: www.m.tempo.co, 27 January 2015,

(accessed 10 November 2016).

232

political actors, and the concept of Javanese organicism which treats the leader as a “father.”

The Javanese conception of managing power is related to the objective of maintaining

a harmonious relationship among leaders, political actors, and the people. As a consequence

of this worldview, leaders usually try to minimize open conflict among political actors,

maintain political stability, and absorb as many political or social groups into their camp as

they can (Anderson 1972). Imam Utomo, for instance, confirmed the application of these

traditional beliefs into his leadership style. As he was taught by his parents, Imam

implemented the traditional Javanese doctrine of “among roso, noto roso, mijil tresno, gawe

karyo” during his leadership in East Java. “Among roso” (managing the sense) means that as a

leader, he should appreciate the ideas of others, even when the ideas are different from his

own. As a good leader, he always tried to prioritize other people’s ideas and accommodate

them. “Noto roso” (controlling the sense) means that as a leader, he should control his

personal emotions, trying not to impose his will on others. If a leader consistently combines

both qualities, these would lead to “wijil tresno” (love) between the leader and the people.

Beyond the feeling of love, this special relationship between the leader and the people can

create a good basis for effective work and cooperation (gawe karyo).

Political observers confirmed Imam’s personal attachment to the aforementioned

doctrine. According to them, he was a good listener, irrespective of his military

background.523

Because of this trait of his personality, anybody who knew Imam did respect

him. In addition, his personality enabled him to develop wide social networks.524

He was a

leader who actively built and maintained personal and social networks through permanent

communication, even after his retirement as the governor.525

Imam stated that he would

always first ask the people and find a solution based on communication, and this came from

his personal belief to the traditional Javanese values.526

According to Imam, all of the

problems during his governorship were solved by relying on this approach. These problems

included the implementation of the central government’s decentralization policy, the building

of the Suramadu Bridge, which connects East Java and Madura Island, and the aspirations of

several regencies in Madura Island such as Bangkalan, Sampang, and Pamekasan regencies to

create their own province (pemekaran).527

Imam’s successor, Soekarwo, continued to practice this style of leadership, although

he did not openly claim compliance with traditional Javanese norms. However, his political

523

Interviews with Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012 and Taufik Lamade, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 524

Interview with Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 525

Interview with Hariadi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 526

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 527

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

233

behavior and leadership style were clearly an expression of these traditional norms. Three

examples showed the existence of Javanese norms in his political behavior. First, Soekarwo

emerged as a new leader by representing himself as a “father,” “social protector,” and a

“helper” of the people. He started his public appearances by introducing himself with the title

of “Pakde” (the Javanese’s name for uncle). For the Javanese, this greeting is very popular

(particularly in the Mataraman region) and to some extent “Pakde” is used for a person who

provides a solution.528

In Javanese families, when children have a problem and cannot ask

their parents for help, they could ask their Pakdes. Pakde simply means the closest family

member after the parents.529

As stated by Martono, the leader of Soekarwo’s campaign team

and also a close aide to Soekarwo, the emergence of Soekarwo as a candidate of governor

occurred at a time of an economic and leadership crisis.530

This crisis led to a decrease of trust

of the people in the government, in particular the central government in Jakarta. Therefore

Soekarwo’s self-styled role as “Pakde” attracted people’s attention. In order to give a positive

“branding” to his appearance, Soekarwo added the Pakde title with other physical images

such as a moustache (popular in East Java, called brengos), the use of a Muslim cap (called a

kopiah), and the use of eyeglasses.531

All these physical attributes were utilized to give the

impression of Soekarwo as a charismatic, religious, and educated leader. These elements were

related to the idea of Javanese organicism, albeit in its modern interpretation.

Second, the manifestation of Javanese beliefs can also be traced back to Soekarwo’s

political attitudes, both to his political supporters and contenders. After his victory, he

continued to keep a good relationship with those political parties and strategic groups who

had supported him in the 2008 gubernatorial election. Rewards were given to his proponents

by involving them in policymaking, government projects, and their appointments to strategic

positions. However, his opponents in the race were not left out either. After the election, he

appointed La Nyala Mattaliti, a supporter of Khofifah, as the East Java Chairman of the

Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industries (Ketua KADIN Provinsi Jawa Timur).

Soekarwo claimed that he had always been open to accommodating his former contenders and

including them in policymaking or in business projects. His efforts included helping Sutjipto

(his contender in the gubernatorial election in 2008) when he came down with a serious

illness in the hospital. Soekarwo also played an important role in helping Soenarjo to be

elected as the vice chairman of the provincial legislature after he was defeated in the

528

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 529

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 530

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 531

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012.

234

gubernatorial election.532

According to Soekarwo, his aforementioned behavior was driven by

two reasons. First, he took the role of the “parent” of the people – or the local equivalent,

Pakde, as a close relative next to the parents - and therefore he was obliged to stay in contact

and look after them, even if they were his former opponents.533

Moreover, most of the

politicians or people in charge in various strategic groups in East Java were his friends or

juniors, and they had had personal relationships in the past.534

Third, the notion of managing power through a harmonious relationship is also

displayed in the relationship between Soekarwo and his vice governor, Saifullah Yusuf. These

two politicians were among a small number of local executives who could rule the local

government without serious conflict. During the direct local elections in Indonesia, a

disharmonious relationship between local heads and their deputies occurred frequently. With

regard to the ability of this tandem in managing a harmonious relationship, Soekarwo stated

that he positioned himself as an older man who nurtured the younger Saifullah.535

However,

according to Soekarwo, managing a harmonious relationship with Saifullah was relatively

easy since the latter filled the position of vice governor in a loyal manner. In Soekarwo’s

opinion, Saifullah had a positive attitude towards developing communication (silaturahmi)

with various social groups such as the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), local NGOs,

mass media, and he always extended Soekarwo’s greeting, thereby suggesting that he acted in

consonance with him.536

Therefore, Soekarwo felt comfortable to work with Saifullah.537

The

harmonious relationship between these two leaders was one important factor that strengthened

their resolve to re-run in the gubernatorial election in 2013.538

B. The Bureaucratic Politician

The era of democratization produced a new style of leadership compared to the previous

political system. The authoritarian system of the New Order and its politicians were closely

associated with a repressive or coercive approach to governing (Liddle 1992). In contrast to

the New Order, in the era of democratization, local elites could no longer use repressive

instruments in managing the local political arena. In this era, local elites had to rely on

persuasion as the main instrument of power. According to Arif Afandi, local elites who can

532

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 533

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 534

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 535

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 536

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 537

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 538

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

235

effectively persuade other political actors usually have an excellent knowledge of local

problems, a good capacity in understanding regulation and policy issues, and good

bureaucratic and policymaking skills.539

Without these qualities, it would be difficult for local

elites to influence other political actors. However, for those who possess these qualities but

are poor communicators, it is also difficult to mobilize political support.540

According to some political actors such as Arif Affandi, Soekarwo undoubtedly

possessed these qualities.541

He developed his bureaucratic career from a low rank up to the

position of the Secretary of the Province. With this background, he understood regulations,

policymaking, and the technicalities of the bureaucracy. Further supporting his leadership

qualities was his educational background which included a doctoral degree in Law from the

University of Diponegoro.542

Soekarwo also had previous political experiences. He was the

activist of the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional

Indonesia, GMNI), he joined the organization’s alumni (IKA-GMNI), he was a member and

functionary of the Golkar Party during the New Order, and he was actively involved in a

broad array of discussion groups. He built personal connections with non-state political

activists, politicians, student groups, and religious leaders during his formal duty as a career

bureaucrat. Hence he possessed the flexibility, informality and good communication skills

required for a successful politician. With this combination of bureaucratic capabilities and

political skills, Soekarwo was endowed with “political maturity” as a leader in managing local

power.543

Both personal qualities were rarely found among local chief executives in other

regions.

With a long experience as a civil servant, Soekarwo knew the basic problems in the

bureaucracy. According to him, bureaucracy in Indonesia had always faced two interrelated

fundamental problems. First, bureaucracy has a paternalistic character, and second, there is,

according to Soekarwo, a “normative-structural” problem. The first problem is connected to

the paternalistic culture of major parts of the Indonesian society, in which the lower ranking

bureaucrats are highly dependent on their superiors, which creates a bureaucracy with a low

potential for innovation. The second problem is related to the rigidity of the bureaucracy in

applying rules and norms without being able to find a solution. This rigidity often results in a

mechanistic and dysfunctional bureaucracy. With these fundamental problems, Soekarwo

mentioned that the key to improving the bureaucracy is strong leadership and a profound

539

Interview with Arif Affandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 540

Interview with Arif Affandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 541

Interview with Arif Affandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 542

“Tentang Soekarwo,” Jawa Pos, 5 July 2008. 543

Interview with Arif Affandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012.

236

understanding of the problems.544

In addition, the leader should shift the mindset from a

structural one (i.e. rigidity towards the application of regulations and norms) to a more

functional one (function and results-oriented).545

This statement refers to the impact of his

wide social network with various social groups in the local political arena, as he gained a lot

of knowledge from his interaction with non-bureaucratic circles.

The above combination of personal characteristics of Soekarwo made him a public

figure which possessed all necessary qualities of leadership. He was a professional career

bureaucrat and a politician who developed good personal relationships and possessed great

communication skills.546

In short, the combination of his notions of traditional Javanese

beliefs and his bureaucratic and political capacities made Soekarwo a leader who practiced a

new style of leadership.

C. Elite Resistance towards Liberal Democratic Ideas and Elite Perception

towards Political Reforms

Besides these traditional norms, local elites in East Java had their own understanding of

democracy as a political system. Although the majority of local elites accepted democracy

and political reform, either as a result of the pressures of political reform or as a personal

belief, they generally preferred a more collectivist/ consensual model of democracy to be

adopted in Indonesia (see chapter 3). The majority of local elite members from different

backgrounds rejected - or at least were skeptical about - the idea of majoritarian democracy,

which basically relies on individualism. However, this resistance had a variety of reasons,

although almost all local elite figures preferred consensual democracy in the form of the

Indonesian mutual consultation (musyawarah-mufakat) as the best model. One of the local

elite members, Arif Afandi, argued that the format of majoritarian democracy and the one

man, one vote voting system is inappropriate for the Indonesian culture which relies on

consensus.547

Along the lines of Arif’s reasoning, Soekarwo claimed that “the numerical

democracy” with a voting system as the basic element had resulted in the elimination of small

political parties. However, he believed that the aspirations of these groups should be taken

into account,548

and therefore he tried to accommodate the parties not represented in the

544

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 545

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 546

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 547

Interview with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 548

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

237

provincial parliament (around twenty-two political parties) in regular meetings.549

In addition,

Soekarwo stated that democracy deals with values and it does not make any sense to quantify

values, as the majoritarian democracy tends to do.550

He considers mutual consultation

(musyawarah-mufakat) as a form of participation in which everybody can express ideas and

opinions as the basic norm to be implemented in Indonesian democracy. 551

Also Imam Utomo emphasized the importance of mutual consultation (musyawarah-

mufakat). According to him, the core idea behind mutual consultation was the process of

communication (in his traditional Javanese belief, among roso).552

As a leader, he always

tried to avoid voting in decision-making. He argued that decision-making through voting

expressed the failure of a leader to communicate properly.553

The suitability of the mutual consultation principle was also addressed by politicians

who had a background as former activists in the pro-democratic movement, such as Bambang

DH and Choirul Anam. Bambang stated that the Pancasila (the Indonesian Five Principles),

mutual cooperation (gotong royong) and mutual consultation (musyawarah-mufakat) should

become the basic principles of Indonesian democracy. Comparable to a continuum in which

liberalism constitutes one extreme and socialism the other, these principles are positioned

somewhere in the middle of these extremes. According to Bambang, liberalism denies social

rights and socialism denies individual rights.554

In addition, the culture of the Indonesian

society relies on mutual cooperation and collectivism, which means that the notion of

individualism will at best only gradually gain acceptance while Indonesia is becoming

democratic.555

A similar perspective was also taken by Choirul Anam who rejected the notion

of majoritarian democracy and a voting system, which he regarded as the Western model of

democracy. He argued that Indonesian democracy should be based on Pancasila which is

determined by the search of the truth (hikmah) and not by judgments which rely on the

majority-minority principle.556

Based on this idea, he claimed that Indonesian democracy

should be based on the idea of mutual consultation (musyawarah-mufakat).557

The support of local elites for the Indonesian consensual model of democracy can be

549

The non-parliamentary parties (parties who have not be able to get seats in parliament) in East Java

established their own organization, called “The Alliance of Non-Parliamentary Parties of East Java” (Aliansi

Partai Politik Non Parlemen Provinsi Jawa Timur, APNP), consisting of twenty-two political parties. See

http://www.apnpjatim.com/2013/01/data-aliansi-partai-politik-non_13.html, (accessed 19 December 2013). 550

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 551

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 552

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 553

Interview with Imam Utomo, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 554

Interview with Bambang DH, Surabaya, 1 February 2012. 555

Interview with Bambang DH, Surabaya, 1 February 2012. 556

Interview with Choirul Anam, Surabaya, 30 January 2012. 557

Interview with Choirul Anam, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

238

traced back to those political reforms that had elements of individual rights. Martono gave the

example of the judicial reform where the rights of citizens were given legal status.558

The

individual right of judicial review, for instance, had never existed in the history of Indonesia’s

legal system, and it became a new legal right in which an individual citizen could appeal

decisions of the president and the parliament and have them annulled by the Court.559

This

change can be interpreted as the replacement of collectivism by individualism in the process

of democratization.560

Therefore, the era of transition, according to Martono, was

characterized by adaptation and the interplay between the old norm of collectivism and the

new norm of individualism.561

The general objection to the principles of liberal democracy and individualism as one

of its basic elements was not only aired by local elites or politicians. One academician,

Hotman Siahaan, argued that one fundamental problem in Indonesia’s democratization,

including East Java, was the use of individualism as its foundation. However, people were

still connected by communal bonds through religion or ethnicity. A long and difficult period

of adaptation was necessary in order to change people’s orientation. Thus, the most realistic

model for Indonesia was the communitarian or the consensual model of democracy.562

Furthermore, the aforementioned reluctance toward liberal democracy was strongly

related to the impact of the latter’s implementation, such as massive transactional politics

among political actors and the voters. One PDI-P local leader, Sirmaji, criticized the

majoritarian model of democracy as inappropriate for the social conditions of the people.

Since the majority of people were still struggling to meet their basic needs, democracy in

Indonesia only resulted in an increase of the number of vote-buyers in the local political

arena.563

Hotman Siahaan also supported this argument and claimed that the Indonesian

democracy was captured by elites and capitalists. Democratization in Indonesia had to

reconcile the existing economic scarcity of the people on the one hand and the interests of

political elites and capitalists on the other. During this time, the design of the political system

also dramatically increased the occurrence of money politics.564

Therefore, money politics can

be interpreted as a byproduct of structural change in Indonesia. Political elites themselves

could not avoid money politics, and they could not succeed in electoral mobilization without

558

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 559

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 560

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 561

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 562

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 563

Interview with Sirmaji, Surabaya, 27 January 2012. 564

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012.

239

financial support.565

An important aspect with regard to the effects of liberal democracy concerned the

enactment of direct local elections since 2005. Although most local elites resisted the idea of

the majoritarian principle and the voting system - as was clearly shown in the direct local

elections -, their opinions on the conduct of direct local elections were divided. Several local

elites voiced critical views about the impact of direct local elections on money politics.

Although most local elites criticized this aspect, they also considered the positive impact of

the direct local elections. These were believed to be an effective mechanism in developing

political accountability of leaders towards their voters. Because of this mechanism, local

leaders were driven to create populist and development-oriented policies.566

Direct local

elections were credited for creating opportunities for people to choose local leaders, and to

build trust between them.567

Other advantages of direct local elections were the promotion of

public participation and the stimulation of political education for the people.568

Nevertheless, most local elites also highlighted the shortcomings of direct local

elections. The problems ranged from the lack of law enforcement, especially in connection

with the rampant practices of money politics and vote buying to problems of recruiting

qualified candidates for public offices and the high potential for social conflict among

supporters.569

Moreover, according to Martono, without a serious and comprehensive reform

of the political party system, in particular regarding party financing and candidate

recruitment, direct local elections would always result in money politics. If a reform could not

be implemented, the reasonable choice, in his opinion, was to return to the previous

mechanism of elections by the local parliament.570

In short, direct local elections needed

systematic improvements.

Another crticial issue related to decentralization entails the implementation of the

liberal model of democracy. Two critical issues arose when local elites evaluated the

enactment of this policy: its design and the disharmony between the chief executive and

his/her deputy. Regarding the design, one local elite, Soenarjo, argued that the focus of this

policy should have been on the provincial level, not the regency level.571

The reason for this

argument was that strengthening the provinces would allow for better coordination and would

565

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012. 566

Interview with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012. 567

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 568

Interviews with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012 and Bambang DH, Surabaya, 1 February

2012. 569

Interviews with Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012, Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012, Soenarjo,

Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012 and Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 570

Interview with Martono, Surabaya, 24 January 2012. 571

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012.

240

facilitate development. However, as a consequence of focusing on the wrong level, the

implementation of the decentralization became uncoordinated and erratic. The provincial

government had only limited power in managing or coordinating regencies, and regencies

could completely ignore the governor’s directives since the exact nature of their relationship

was not stipulated in the decentralization law. Besides this problem, Soenarjo stated that the

source of all the problems in decentralization was a half-hearted commitment of the central

government in delegating its political authority.572

This low commitment of the central

government can be seen in the lack of supporting regulations for this policy. In addition, this

problem of low commitment was aggravated by the hurried implementation, without paying

sufficient attention to its weaknesses.573

Soenarjo also mentioned that particularistic political

interests among political elites were behind the failure of the decentralization policy.574

However, in order to deal with these weaknesses, some local elite members preferred to

strengthen the political authority of the provincial government (governor), and they also

wanted the central government to produce national guidelines for local development.575

The second issue dealt with the disharmonious relationship between the local chief

executives and their deputies. This issue was one among various problems in decentralization

and referred to the fact that many local leaders experienced conflicts after they ran local

governments. The local chief executives usually succeeded in cooperating with each other

during the election, but failed to maintain a good relationship upon getting elected. Assessing

the cause of this problem, Arif Afandi referred to two important factors: the first was the

absence of regulations which delineate the division of power among them, and the second was

the personal capacity of local leaders. With regard to the personal capacity, local executives

should avoid personal conflict by using accommodation and persuasion among each other.

Other local elite members such as Soekarwo and Soenarjo proposed the idea of eliminating

the position of deputies as elected officials. This means that only the positions of governor,

major, and regent should be up for direct election.576

The position of deputy of local chief

executives should be selected (one or two officials), depending on the size of the population

of the region. The candidates (vice head/ deputy head) themselves should be proposed by the

elected local chief executives to the provincial or local legislature, and the central government

572

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 573

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 574

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 575

Interviews with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012, Arif Afandi, Surabaya, 19 January 2012

and Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 576

Interviews with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012 and Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012.

241

would decide on one of them.577

This solution can be seen as a middle-way between

guaranteeing the political legitimacy of the elected officials and accommodating the aspect of

a “limited participation” by involving the local legislatures.

D. The Outsiders and Oppositional Ideas

Although East Java was characterized by elite continuity and witnessed the formation

of a local political oligarchy, this did not hinder the emergence of oppositional groups as

contenders for the ruling elites. These elite groups also differ in terms of their ideas. Although

limited, oppositional ideas have emerged to challenge traditional norms that stress stability,

harmony, consensus and deal-making, and resistance towards liberal ideas as paramount

beliefs and attitudes of established elites. There were at least two prominent figures who

became the “ideational opponents” of Soekarwo and his political networks: Khofifah Indar

Parawansa (Khofifah) and Tri Rismaharini (Risma). These two woman politicians have

become the bearers of oppositional ideas that stand in contrast to the ideational orthodoxies

discussed previously. The discussion of their oppositional ideas, however, will be related to

their political career and the political contest in East Java.

Khofifah was a persistent opponent of Soekarwo and his political networks. Their

political conflict started in the gubernatorial election of 2008. After they failed to join forces

as candidates, both ran in this election for governor. After her defeat, Khofifah claimed that

the election had been marred by electoral fraud. Therefore, she was convinced that as the

elected governor, Soekarwo would start his governorship with a tarnished reputation.578

Khofifah firmly believed she would have been elected as governor if there had not been a

high degree of money politics, the mobilization of the local bureaucracy, and the manipulation

of registered voters.579

Her complaint partially proved to be true when the Constitutional

Court upheld her lawsuits and stated that the election had been affected by a systematic,

structured and massive electoral fraud.580

But even after she was defeated again in the third

round, Khofifah continued to claim that the re-vote and re-count had been fraudulent.

Nevertheless, she could not file another constitutional complaint since the Court’s previous

decision was final.581

After the gubernatorial election of 2008, Soekarwo was able to improve his personal

577

Interview with Soenarjo, Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012. 578

Personal communication with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Jakarta, 25 May 2010. 579

Personal communication with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Jakarta, 25 May 2010. 580

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008, 2 December 2008. 581

Ketetapan Mahkamah Konstitusi No.41/PHPU.D-VI/2008, 3 February 2009.

242

relationship with all his previous electoral contenders, except Khofifah. According to

Soekarwo, it might be because Khofifah spent more time in Jakarta than in Surabaya or East

Java after her defeat.582

Nevertheless, after I met Khofifah three times and had other meetings

with her circle, I assume that a different reason than just Khofifah’s physical absence, had

been responsible for the bad relationship between the two leaders. While Khofifah did not

seem to be involved in the local political arena after her defeat, she nevertheless retained her

position as the leader of the NU’s women’s organization Muslimat NU. Through this

organization and her personal relationship with some of the NU’s leaders and religious

teachers, she could continue to cultivate her political networks in East Java.

In the gubernatorial election of 2008 Khofifah was only narrowly defeated by

Soekarwo, a fact that hinted at Khofifah’s strong political appeal. She was the former Minister

for Women Empowerment in President Abdurrahman Wahid’s cabinet, she was the leader of

the Muslimat NU, and she had wide political connections with national elites, local leaders,

and religious teachers. This all could be seen as political capital which could not easily be

marshalled by other political leaders in the region. Her political resources and her deep

disappointment with the result of the previous gubernatorial election were the basic reason for

her to run again in the gubernatorial election of 2013. Yet Soekarwo and his supporters

became aware of her intentions. Considering the result of the previous gubernatorial election,

it would have been very difficult for Soekarwo to beat Khofifah as a candidate in the

gubernatorial election of 2013. Therefore, the political strategy of Soekarwo and his

supporters was to gain the support of as many political parties as they could. In addition, they

tried to take away the support of political parties for Khofifah.583

Accordingly, it became clear

that political inclusion of political parties was one important part of Soekarwo’s electoral

strategy. In the gubernatorial election, there were only the PKB and several small political

parties without parliamentary seats which supported Khofifah. This resulted in a situation

where Khofifah almost failed to fulfill the minimum requirement of political party support

necessary to run as a candidate.584

The gubernatorial election of 2013 thus became a rematch

between Khofifah and Soekarwo.

582

Interview with Soekarwo, Surabaya, 26 January 2012. 583

“Hasyim Muzadi Tuding Soekarwo Jegal Khofifah,” available at: www.tempo.co, 26 May 2013, (accessed 12

November 2013); “Khofifah-Herman Dijegal Soekarwo?” available at: www.daerah.sindonews.com, 15 July

2013, (accessed 12 November 2013); “Soekarwo Bantah “Jegal” Khofifah-Herman,” availanble at:

www.daerah.sindonews.com, 5 June 2013, (accessed 12 November 2013); “Khofifah Buka-Bukaan Soal Politik

Borong Partai Jelang Pilgub Jatim,” available at: www.news.detik.com, 24 July 2013, (accessed 13 November

2013). 584

“Pasangan Kandidat Ini Terancam Batal Ikut Pilgub Jatim,” available at: www.metrotvnews.com, 7 June

2013, (accessed 12 November 2013); “Khofifah: Kenapa Takut Pada Saya?” available at. www.tempo.co, 12 July

2013, (accessed 12 November 2013).

243

Although Khofifah’s ideas and political actions have included political reform, anti-

corruption, and good governance, her name is always strongly associated with the idea of

women empowerment. The affinity of Khofifah to the idea of women empowerment was even

strengthened through her position as the leader of Muslimat NU and as the former Minister

for Women Empowerment.585

Her political communication style was persuasive, easily

understood by the people, and outspoken. In the last days of the New Order, as PPP legislator

in the DPR, Khofifah bravely criticized the New Order in the parliament and demanded

political reform (Hasan 2010, 6-9).

Khofifah’s ideas on women empowerment can be found in her writings on this theme

as well as in statements in the national parliament and as minister, candidate in gubernatorial

elections and leader of Muslimat NU. Her concern for women issues includes the need for

increasing the role of women in politics, gender equality and the patriarchal culture in

Indonesia, gender-based violence, women migrant workers, women education and health

(Parawansa 2003). Her ideas on women’s political participation ranged from increasing the

representation of women in political parties and legislatures through the quota system and

ensuring women’s access to strategic decision-making positions to enhancing women’s access

to media, and empowering women through education and training (Parawansa 2005, 88-89).

When she was appointed as the minister in Abdurrahman Wahid’s cabinet, Khofifah proposed

to change the name of the ministry from Women Ministry into the more dedicated and reform

minded title Ministry of Women Empowerment (Robinson 2004, 194).

Khofifah’s concerns for the idea of women empowerment, in particular the increasing

participation women in politics, was illustrated by her support of Megawati Sukarnoputri,

when the latter ran as the candidate in the presidential election of 2004. The issue of women

leadership had already emerged after the 1999 election where Megawati’s PDIP won the

election, but several Islamic political parties and mass organizations rejected a woman to be

the president. As a result, Abdurrahman Wahid was eventually elected by the People’s

Consultative Assembly as the president and Megawati took the position as the vice president.

At that time, Muslimat NU, Khofifah’s organization, represented a different position

compared to the majority of Islamic organizations (in particular the Indonesian Council of

Ulama/MUI), by declaring its support for women as national leaders (Robinson 2004, 189-

190; Blackburn 2008, 98). In a large Muslim populated country such as Indonesia, women

leadership in politics was and is still contested. As the leader of Islamic women organizations

and a politician of an Islamic party, Khofifah disagreed to the idea of exclusion of women

585

Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Jakarta, 3 June 2010.

244

from leadership. She clearly argued that the standpoint of the religious scholars (ulama) in the

MUI rejecting woman leadership was inconsistent with the decision of the Musyawarah

Nasional Alim Ulama (National Committee of Ulama) of the NU, which allowed women to

be a leader. She criticized the MUI’s recommendation to oppose woman leadership as a step

backwards, stating that “I am of the view that many of our ulama have not kept up with the

development of jurisprudence in relation to women (fiqh perempuan). They interpret the

Hadith (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad) without taking contemporary conditions into

consideration” (Robinson 2004, 190).

The issue of women leadership in politics was not exclusively experienced by

Megawati when she was nominated as the presidential candidate in 1999 and 2004. In the

East Java gubernatorial election of 2008, the issue re-appeared with the target of Khofifah

herself. In some districts such as Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Situbondo and Madura posters

appeared, stating that “it is prohibited (haram) to elect a woman as a leader” (Hasan 2010,

61). The sentiment against women leadership in the gubernatorial election of 2008 became

clearly evident, when some religious teachers (kyai) and leaders of Islamic boarding schools

(pesantren) held a meeting in Surabaya on 20 August 2008 and declared their rejection of a

woman leader in the election (Hasan 2010, 62-66). Khofifah replied calmly, believing that

voters will respond wisely to the hostility aired against women leadership (Hasan 2010, 66).

Khofifah is not the only elite member in East Java who represented oppositional ideas.

Rismaharini (Risma), who became the Mayor of Surabaya in 2010, also differs in her political

ideas from established local elites in the province. The most important idea of Risma is her

strong commitment to bureaucratic reform. With her experience as a career bureaucrat, she

fully understood that local developmental progress is highly dependent on the performance of

the local bureaucracy.586

In order to strengthen the capacity of the local bureaucracy, Risma

devised bureaucratic reform programs before and during her mayorship in Surabaya. With her

emphasis on reforming the local bureaucracy through digital systems, Risma acquired a

reputation as a leader successfully eliminating corruption and red tape in local governmental

institutions. She has utilized digital systems in managing business permits or licenses,

population and demography database, and the public school registration system.587

Risma’s dedication to bureaucratic reform can also be associated with her track record

as career bureaucrat. In this position, she initiated several programs, such as e-procurement in

governmental expenditures which minimized collusion between local bureaucrats and

586

Interview with Rismaharini, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 587

“Reformasi Birokrasi Melalui Inovasi Pelayanan Publik” available at: humas.surabaya.go.id., 8 January 2015,

(accessed 16 October 2016).

245

businesspeople, and she continued to develop an e-government system during her time as

mayor (Amalia 2011, 54).588

Furthermore, she was known for her gardening program in the

parks of the city which made Surabaya more green, livable and beautiful (Amalia 2011,

54).589

She also had a program to empower the poor through an urban-community pilot

project (program kampung binaan) and was actively involved in the program of returning

childhood dropouts to school (Amalia 2011, 54).590

Risma was known as a hard-working

bureaucrat with a solid educational background, who had work experience in various strategic

positions in the local bureaucracy.591

With this qualification, she emerged as a new political

elite figure in the provincial capital, which coincided with the inability of Bambang to run for

re-election.

Risma’s commitment to bureaucratic reform caused serious tensions with other

political elites, both with the provincial elites and the local legislature. The tension with the

provincial government occurred in the case of a highway development project in Surabaya

(Tol Tengah Kota). This project was initiated by the central government through the Ministry

of Public Works, with the provincial government assisting in its coordination. Risma opposed

the project and did not attend the meeting initiated by the governor, even though she was

invited.592

According to Risma, her opposition was based on her belief that the project lacked

feasibility and could potentially lead to an increase in traffic jams.593

Risma’s refusal

strengthened her image as a “stubborn” and uncompromising leader.

Previously, there had been an attempt to impeach her, on grounds of the rejection by

the local legislature of her decision to increase taxes on advertisement (Amalia 2011). In fact,

the PDI-P - the party who had supported Risma in the 2010 mayoral election - was involved

in the impeachment attempt. This lack of political loyalty of the PDI-P was caused by Risma

who disappointed some local PDI-P’s leaders, who felt that she had become quite detached

588

“Peneliti: Tri Rismaharini Sukses Mereformasi Birokrasi,” available at: www.republika.co.id, 10 September

2013, (accessed 8 November 2013); “Sistem Monitoring Pemkot Surabaya Diadopsi Pusat,” available at:

regional.kompas.com, 9 January 2012, (accessed 8 November 2013). 589

“Ini Cara Risma Sulap Surabaya Jadi Bersih dan Indah,” available at: news.detik.com, 28 October 2013,

(accessed 8 November 2013). 590

“Surabaya Raih Kota Layak Anak Tiga Kali Beruntun,” available at: humas.surabaya.go.id, 23 July 2013,

(accessed 8 November 2013); “Rismaharini: Kesempatan Wirausaha Milik Semua,” available at:

www.surabayapagi.com, 18 July 2013, (accessed 8 November 2013); Fu Handi, “Tri Rismaharini, Menata

Surabaya Dengan Konsep Home,” available at: beritadaerah.com, 29 October 2013, (accessed 8 November

2013). 591

Risma completed her bachelor degree in architecture and her master degree in Management of City

Development, both from the Sepuluh November Institute of Technology, Surabaya. Since 1997, she had

positions as head of division of the city government and also as head of city agencies in Surabaya. 592

“Pansus Gagal Lobi Risma,” available at: www.jawapos.co.id, 8 October 2010, (accessed 8 November 2013);

“Risma: Mau Bicara Apa Lagi?” available at: www.jawapos.co.id, 9 October 2010, (accessed 8 November

2013); “Tolak Tol Tengah, Titik!”, available at: www.jawapos.co.id, 3 August 2011 (accessed 8 November

2013). 593

Interview with Rismaharini, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.

246

from the party.594

In the end, the impeachment failed, due to its weak legal basis and lack of support by

the central boards of some political parties, among them the PDI-P and the Democrat Party

(Amalia 2011). In addition, the attempt was not supported by the central government, and the

Minister of Home Affairs had stated that it constituted an overreaction to the decision of the

mayor which could be revised.595

This argument was also supported by the governor,

Soekarwo, who facilitated a dialogue.596

The impeachment attempt, therefore, on the one

hand, was related to politico-economic interests of some members of the local legislature, in

particular local taxation. But, on the other hand, this experience also displayed Risma’s

stubbornness, since she was unwilling to communicate with the local legislature.597

Although Risma was perceived as lacking political skills and had little support from

political elite circles, she managed to gain sympathy from some political leaders, journalists

or academicians. Most local elite members who were skeptical of Risma stated that her

stubbornness added to her arrogant character and that this could create a difficult relationship

with political players in Surabaya.598

In addition to this argument, her refusal to establish

political communication with other political elite members showed her lack of understanding

of how politics worked.599

Nevertheless, some sympathizers pointed out that the impeachment

attempt showed that members of the local legislature suffered from political immaturity.

Rather than supporting the move, some observers defended Risma and stated that she had

been collectively attacked by local parliamentary politicians.600

Choirul Anam stated that

Risma was “threatened” by members of the local parliament, but that she demonstrated her

astuteness by opposing local politicians and that this made Risma obtain public support.601

According to Anam, Risma’s political attitude was driven by her resistance to accommodate

594

Interview with Bambang DH, Surabaya, 1 February 2012 and interview with Wisnu Shakti Buana, Surabaya,

2 February 2012. 595

“Mendagri Desak DPRD dan Walikota Rekonsiliasi,” available at: jawapos.co.id, 3 February 2011, (accessed

8 November 2013); “Konflik Walikota vs DPRD Surabaya: Mendagri Meminta Gubernur Jatim Soekarwo

Mengupayakan Rekonsiliasi,” available at: www.korannusantara.com, 2 February 2011, (accessed 8 November

2013). 596

“Gubernur Damaikan Walikota dan DPRD Surabaya,” available at: www.tempo.co, 25 January 2011,

(accessed 8 November 2013). 597

Interview with Hotman Siahaan, Surabaya, 25 January 2012; interview with Faishal Aminuddin, Surabaya, 24

January 2012; Interview with Whisnu Sakti Buana, Surabaya, 2 February 2012; interview with Bambang DH,

Surabaya, 1 February 2012. 598

Interview with Whisnu Sakti Buana, Surabaya, 2 February 2012, 599

In an interview,Rismaharini refused to be called “political official,” referring to her position as the elected

mayor. She was of the opinion that she was elected as mayor by the people and she did not credit the political

party that gave her a formal recommendation because she never asked for it. Interview with Rismaharini,

Surabaya, 2 February 2013. 600

Rohman Budijanto, “Risma Setelah Ontran Ontran,” available at: www.jawapos.co.id, 8 February 2011,

(accessed 8 November 2013). 601

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011.

247

the demands of political parties (in particular the PDI-P) and local parliament who asked for

favors in terms of projects and strategic positions in the bureaucracy.602

It is clear, according

to Anam, that the motive of pairing Bambang with Risma as candidates of the PDI-P was

driven by an intention to control and steer her once she had assumed office as mayor.603

However, this intention failed since Risma exhibited ideas and attitudes that were at variance

with traditional elite behavior. For Anam, Risma was a successful mayor, had a clean track-

record, and was not “contaminated” by the networks of the political oligarchy in East Java.604

For local politicians, Risma’s clean background made it difficult to topple her.605

Therefore,

from a political standpoint, she had nothing to lose. She refused political communication and

interaction with other local politicians that could be interpreted as political bargaining.606

Risma herself mentioned this last point, stating that she preferred to refuse the demands of

local politicians at whatever cost if these created drawbacks for public interests.607

Another of Risma’s advocates was Kresnayana Yahya, a university academician of the

Sepuluh November Institute of Technology (ITS). Kresnayana’s opinion of Risma’s political

prospects was even more favorable than the one of the aforementioned observers. For

Kresnayana, Risma could be seen as one potential challenger of the network of the political

oligarchy in East Java, based on her performance and political attitude. 608

He believed that it

was possible for Risma to move to higher political positions in the future. Therefore,

according to Kresnayana, Risma’s supporters requested her to stay in the position as mayor.609

This prospect became particularly evident when the PDI-P considered Risma as one of the

candidates for the gubernatorial election of 2013, although Risma refused to run and chose to

concentrate on her responsibilities in Surabaya.610

Kresnayana’s views on Risma’s promising

political future seemed reasonable, but it is also evident that if Risma decides to pursue higher

political office, she needs to “invest” more in her political skills and must broaden her socio-

political networks.

The above description of two East Java elite members, Khofifah and Risma, shows

that the oppositional ideas have grown in the province. The ideas of women empowerment,

602

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 603

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 604

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 605

Interview with Choirul Anam, Jakarta, 13 May 2011. 606

Interview with Choirul Anam, 13 May 2011. 607

Interview with Rismarahini, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 608

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 609

Interview with Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012. 610

“Tri Rismaharini Menolak Dicalonkan Sebagai Gubernur Jatim,“ available at: www.tempo.co, 27 February

2013, (accessed 8 November 2013).

248

bureaucratic reform, and anti-corruption have become alternatives, challenging established

local norms such as political stability, harmony, and mutual consultation (musyawarah-

mufakat). Nevertheless, the achievements of these two leaders differ. Khofifah failed to

become governor even after her almost endless court cases challenging the election result and

challenging the power of Soekarwo. Risma, in contrast, succeeded to achieve the position of

mayor in the provincial capital. However, the effort to implement political and bureaucratic

reform as a part of her personal belief provoked resistance from other politicians, ranging

from the creation of a negative image as “stubborn leader” who lacked communication skills

to the local legislature’s attempt to impeach her. However, Risma rejected to join the deal-

making with other local political leaders and stood for faithfully implementing existing

regulations and her firm motivation to work for public interests.

V. Conclusion: Tracing the Process of Elite Adjustment in East Java

This chapter dealt with local elite adjustment in East Java which took place in a new political

setting after the breakdown of the authoritarian New Order. The new political setting has

largely been determined by political reforms at the national level, such as the introduction of a

multi-party system, the withdrawal of the military from politics, the decentralization policy,

and the enactment of direct local elections. However, this radical change in the political

system could not completely eliminate the previous political structures. In short, a new

political setting in the region was characterized by both continuity and change.

This institutional context of continuity and change has manifested itself in the

constellation of local political power. As the second largest province in Indonesia, East Java

has always been the center of attention for political parties in the history of modern Indonesia.

In the 1950s, the Nahdlatul Ulama dominated the local political arena, followed by the PKI

and the PNI in the second and third rank. In the New Order, although Golkar won the simple

majority in all general elections in the region, the political influence of the Nahdlatul Ulama

survived. In the post-New Order, the PKB and the PDI-P replaced the dominant position of

Golkar, and both were then replaced by the Democrat Party in the last general election of

2009. However, the changing constellation of local political power in the post-New Order

period did not diminish the significance of the Nahdlatul Ulama. In the post-New Order, the

constellation of the local political arena in the post-New Order was influenced by the three

largest political powers: the Nahdlatul Ulama, the PDI-P, and the local bureaucracy. As a

consequence, these political structures were always of utmost importance for local political

elites who ruled the provincial government and in the context of electoral competition. The

closer they engaged with these political machines, the better were the political positions of the

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local elites.

In terms of the configuration of local elites, the change of political system created

mixed results. Direct local elections, no doubt, paved the way for new elites from various

backgrounds to enter the local political arena. Politicians from different political parties,

businesspeople, journalists, and former pro-democratic activists have emerged in the electoral

competition and even succeeded in taking on position as local chief executives, replacing the

established backgrounds of local elites such as former military officers and local bureaucrats.

Nevertheless, for the provincial elites, former military officers, bureaucrats and politicians

due to their widely intact networks had a stronger position in electoral politics. By and large,

the longevity of this group of local elite groups was greatly influenced by their previous

alignment with the New Order regime.

Furthermore, local elite adjustment in the region was strongly influenced by two

distinctive characteristics. The first was related to the strong evidence for elite continuity,

meaning that the established local elite guarded and orchestrated succession. Elite continuity

itself was characterized by four phases of succession. First, coming from Imam’s political

circle or from his loyalists, the predecessor started to consider and, later on, nominate a

potential candidate as his successor, i.e. Soekarwo. Furthermore, Imam tried to convince

Soekarwo to run in the direct local election. Therefore, the second phase was the process of

“inducting” the successor to the predecessor’s political networks. A decade of experience as

governor in the region contributed to Imam’s large social and political networks, a factor

which was vital in the era of open competition and popular democracy. This phase was

followed by the third stage when Imam actively groomed Soekarwo in the process of

candidacy, in particular by seeking the support of political parties and the running mate in the

race. The last phase was the support in the election itself, in the form of campaigning,

lobbying with other political elites, and financial assistance. The fact of elite continuity, in

turn, resulted in a low degree of political replacements, either in terms of people or networks

of local elites.

The second aspect, which largely contributed to the process of elite adjustment in the

region, is elite behavior in response to political change. Here, three interrelated elements of

elite behavior can be identified: formal acceptance of democracy, opportunistic behavior, and

resistance to the ideas of liberal democracy. The acceptance of democracy and political

change is part of the strategy of “acquiescence” (Oliver 1991, 152-153) when the public

demand for political reform was strong. Elites agreed to support political reform and behaved

democratically because they understood that democratization was unavoidable and resistance

250

towards political change would cause public antipathy. However, this conformist behavior

was not only the product of a strong structural pressure on local elites, but also related to their

personal qualities. Several established local elite members, including the ruling elite

personalities, were believed to have been convinced democrats.

The strategy of acquiescence was followed by the strategy of “compromise” or “partial

conformity” (Oliver 1991, 153-154) in which local established elites partially conformed to

democracy and treated various local actors differently. They applied a form of chameleonic

adjustment: they presented themselves as liberal and progressive towards the idea of

democracy when they discussed with pro-democratic groups, but they could also become

conservative and skeptical of democracy when talking to remnants of the ancien régime. Part

of this strategy of compromise was also the accommodation and absorption of various societal

groups into the camp of the local established elites. This was possible by applying “political

cooptation” and intensifying personal relationships.

Once political reforms were implemented, local elites realized that there was a gap

between institutional expectations (the democratic political system) and actual conditions.

Here, several political reforms, such as direct local elections, were perceived as leading to

excessive change. The source of the problem, according to most local political elite figures in

the region, was the model of liberal-majoritarian democracy, which relied on the fundamental

belief of individualism. Almost all local elites rejected this notion, although they could not

resist it openly and preferred the model of a consensual democracy and mutual consultation

(musyawarah-mufakat) as the most appropriate model of democracy to be implemented. This

rejection strengthens the above argument about local elites’ partial conformity towards

democracy. In addition, this resistance towards the liberal democratic model strengthened the

position of local established elites who, as will be explained below, managed their power by

applying a more consensual approach.

The success of local established elites in managing succession and their smooth

political adjustment was followed by their mastery in running local government. Here, the

ruling elites employed the strategies of political inclusion and accommodation towards

political parties and the provincial legislature in the local political arena. Rather than relying

on governorship to exercise a formal political approach, ruling elites created a regular,

informal, and more personal way of political control. Consistent with this approach, a series

of regular meetings were held as a method of building a grand coalition, which would greatly

contribute to political stability in the region. This political accommodation also created

benefits for ruling elites by avoiding potential critics and conflicts among the government, the

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provincial legislature, and political parties. In addition, the ruling elites maintained personal

networks with various strategic groups in society, ranging from religious teachers,

businesspeople, local media, university scholars, and other local chief executives. As a result,

political inclusion and accommodation brought about political stability and a strong position

of the ruling elites.

The mastery of local elites in managing government is also supported by a set of

ideational structures which are strongly related to maintaining a stable government. The

traditional Javanese notions of harmony, stability, a non-combative political style, and

communicative action became the ideational basis for their success in preserving local

political power. Ruling elites not only wooed their friends and political alliances to join their

camp, but political contenders were also invited and persuaded to join the coalition. This

development, consequently, minimized potential hostilities from growing stronger and

hindered opponents in building their own political block.

Nevertheless, the political skills of achieving political consensus can not only be seen

to be an important political resource of the ruling elite, but the bureaucratic skills also play a

significant role in their success. With a long experience in local bureaucracy, ruling elites

understood local problems, regulations, and how to find solutions for governmental issues.

This also included bureaucratic skills, which largely impacted on the ruling elite’s ability to

prevent themselves from the “trap” of violating the law, such as corruption. From the

aforementioned description, two particular masteries of the ruling elite in managing local

power can be clearly seen: political skills for building political consensus and bureaucratic

skills which aided them in avoiding breaking the law. In addition, the ruling elite succeeded in

implementing populist policies, such as an import barrier for domestic products, which was

greatly appreciated by local entrepreneurs and the majority of people.

The above development determined the circumstances in regards to ideational

contestation. Without any significant failure of established elites in managing the local

government and with a strong coalition building among local political players, it is difficult to

identify the ideational contestation in the region. Without high corruption incidence that could

be legally proven, for instance, there is no room for new opposition leaders or norm

entrepreneurs to “dramatize, call public attention” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 257) or

incite public outrage for the new norm emergence. In other words, there is no situation

favorable for a contradiction between the ideational orthodoxies and new norms. The survival

of the local established elites and the less favorable conditions for ideational contestation are

supported by a condition where local established elites were to a large extent able to fulfill the

252

“social expectation or socially desired result” (Legro 2000, 424-425). With the capability of

governing local politics seemingly without corruption or any other serious blunders, the local

established elites could avoid a condition of “unmet social expectation” (Legro 2000, 425-

426) which theoretically plays a role as a critical juncture for the emergence of the new norms

and ideational contestation. As in the case of the continuity in personnel, the process of elite

adjustment in the region is also strongly characterized by continuity in terms of ideational

structures, although – as we have seen above – alternative leadership with ideas deviating

from established elites also emerged.

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Chapter Six

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to explore the adjustments of political elites at the local level

in the provinces of North Sumatra and East Java during the period of democratization in

Indonesia. The time frame the research covered ranged from the collapse of the New Order

over the initial phase of transition in 1998 to recent developments of democratization in the

regions in 2013. Within this time frame, the study covered crucial events of institutional

reforms in Indonesia: constitutional amendments, the change of the party and electoral

systems, the enactment of the decentralization policy, and also the introduction and

implementation of direct local elections in the regions.

The research relied on the assumption that democratization does not occur in a

unidirectional and monolithic style. In other words, the implementation of democracy can

produce different outcomes in different contexts. Therefore, this research assumed that three

causal factors contributed to the process of elite adjustment, namely the institutional context

of democratization and changing socio-political structures, actor’s strategic action and

coalition building, and ideational structures.

With regard to the institutional context, I argued that the mode of transition in

Indonesia was characterized by a negotiated transition, a declining antagonism between

democrats and their opponents, the legacy of the authoritarian networks, and the impact of

these democratic arrangements on elite reconfiguration. In addition, institutional context dealt

with the early process of elite adjustment in the regions and examined the dynamic interaction

between the institutional pressure of democratization and the changes in strategic responses of

local elites.

Furthermore, the second causal factor of actor’s strategic actions examined the impact

of founding democratic arrangements, in particular transactional practices during the conduct

of direct local elections; the formation of elite networks, elite strategic actions and

maneuvering, coalitions, and competition; and the interaction of established local elites with

the new ones. The final causal factor investigated the ideational structures, particularly by

examining the dynamics of ideational change in the regions that also contributed to the pattern

of elite adjustment.

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I. Comparative Analyses: Similarities, Differences, and General Patterns

Against the backdrop of the aforementioned research objective, this study investigated two

cases. For this purpose, the study applied the methodology of controlled comparison in the

form of Mill’s most-similar design. Nevertheless, since a most-similar design has basic

weaknesses, it was combined with the method of process-tracing for capturing the rich

textures of causalities and intervening variables. Following this methodological approach, the

study uncovered a range of similarities and differences in both cases. As was explained in

chapter 2 with regard to the most-similar design, the two cases shared a whole range of

similarities, except for the outcome and the proposed independent variable. The following

description recaps their similarities and differences.

The two cases showed basic similarities in terms of their demographic setting since

both provinces had a large number of voters. Major similarity lies in a similar institutional

context, meaning that elite adjustment in both regions cannot be separated from the wider

institutional reform in the national political architecture. North Sumatra and East Java, as

parts of Indonesia, were directly influenced by several political reforms in the national

context, such as constitutional amendments, the changes in the political party system and

electoral laws, the enactment of the decentralization policy, and the implementation of direct

local elections. Both regions were affected by these founding democratic arrangements and

policies in newly democratizing Indonesia.

Another similarity is the high degree of transactional politics, in particular since the

introduction of direct elections in 2005. In addition, the enactment of direct local election in

both regions produced a similar effect in opening spaces for political participation for local

elites through direct local elections. However, this growing participation of elites from

various backgrounds in the election could not markedly alter the strong position of local

bureaucrats and politicians in the electoral competition. A final similarity can be seen in the

pattern of local elite adjustment in the process of transition. Established local elites in both

regions started to respond to the demands of democratization by applying the strategy of

passive conformity, but later on they changed their form of adjustment into a strategy of more

active resistance to political change. The latter was shown by their active involvement in

arranging the rules and conduct in democratic institutions such as local legislatures; actively

participating in gaining strategic positions such as the local chief executives, becoming

leaders of political parties, or chairmen of local legislatures. Their active involvement in the

local political arena became also evident in their infiltration of pro- democratic activist

movements, and they actively built personal networks with social or religious organizations.

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The short period of passive conformity was over after the euphoria of the regime breakdown

had subsided. In short, the strategies of local elites in responding to the demands of

democratization varied from strategies of acquiescence, over conformity, compromise,

absorption, inducement to the strategy of cooptation.

Nevertheless, the process of elite adjustment in both regions was characterized by at

least five major differences. Each case demonstrates its idiosyncratic pathway which

subsequently produced different outcomes of elite adjustment in both cases. First, there are

partial differences in both cases in terms of their historical and socio-structural formation.

North Sumatra has a distinctive configuration of competing cultural identities (ethnicities and

religions) which later on influenced the nature of political competition. East Java, by contrast,

is relatively homogeneous in its ethnicity and religiosity, with a dominating Javanese ethnic

group and Islam. In the case of North Sumatra, ethnicity and religiosity appear as one

important feature in the process of local elite competition and electoral contestation. In

addition, local elites frequently use ethnic and religious backgrounds as one instrument of

political mobilization or of gaining symbolic legitimacy.

The second difference is related to the nature of inter-elite competition. While local

elites in North Sumatra were faced with a high degree of political competition in the local

political arena (both in local elections and in managing local government), elite competition

in East Java was characterized by a comparatively low degree of political conflict. While both

past gubernatorial elections were characterized by a high degree of competition, the ruling

elites in East Java, nevertheless, succeeded in creating mechanisms of political

accommodation and achieving political consensus among major political actors after winning

the election. Different developments occurred in North Sumatra when ruling elites were faced

with personal frictions among themselves and inter-party political tension. The third

difference between the two cases lies in the presence and absence of elite continuity. In North

Sumatra, the ruling elites did not get involved in influencing political succession through local

elections during the transitional phase. The deaths of Raja Inal Siregar and Tengku Rizal

Nurdin (two governors in the New Order and during the era of transition) in 2005 created a

condition of “back to zero” in terms of elite configuration. Although most local elites who

competed in the gubernatorial election in 2008 had personal ties with these prominent figures,

the candidates in this election, in fact, relied on their own political networks to garner popular

support. In short, succession in North Sumatra was characterized by the feature of elite

discontinuity or “de-patronization.”

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In contrast to this feature, East Java’s ruling elite during the era of transition - Imam

Utomo - became actively involved in political succession. He selected the successor, groomed

him, and even used his political influence and networks for the benefit of the successor in

direct local elections. This active engagement of the predecessor elite to maintain the political

succession has resulted in the strong feature of elite continuity, both in terms of elite

personnel as well as elite political networks. The different features of elite continuity in two

regions demonstrated the presence or the absence of the previous prominent figures and their

political networks, which subsequently influenced the different patterns of elite adjustment.

The fourth difference between the two cases can also be found in the aspect of elite

capacities, particularly in their political proficiencies and bureaucratic capability. North

Sumatra’s ruling elites - or more specifically: the elected governor in 2008, Syamsul Arifin

and the mayor of Medan Abdillah -, both had backgrounds as local politicians and

businessmen. Although Syamsul served as the Regent of Langkat before his governorship, his

career developed as a politician of Golkar (in the New Order) and the Golkar Party (in the

post-New Order) and his involvement in this party’s mass organizations or the New Order’s

corporatist organizations such as the Indonesian Development Generation of Youth (Angkatan

Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia/ AMPI) and the National Committee of Indonesian Youth

(Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia/ KNPI). Abdillah had no foothold in political activities

during the New Order or afterwards. He was purely a businessman who had become the

business partner of local governments before he took on a position as mayor. This background

of ruling elites in North Sumatra affected their performance as local heads of executive. As in

the case of Syamsul, he might have been able to deal with political affairs and could have

gained political support from major local political players since he had a long experience in

the local political arena. Nevertheless, his non-bureaucratic background, by and large,

contributed to his inability in managing governmental affairs, as was shown by his poor

understanding of regulations and lack of bureaucratic capabilities. This lack of bureaucratic

skills – in combination with a high degree of transactional practices and a high degree of

inter-elite competition - led to their inability to avoid “the corruption trap”. By contrast, a

different feature emerged in the case of local elite performance in East Java. Taking into

account Soekarwo as the most prominent figure of the ruling elite in the region, he possessed

both properties of political skill and bureaucratic capability. Soekarwo started his bureaucratic

career as a junior staff in the local government, but he combined this with his initial political

activity as he was the leader of student activists of the GMNI. Furthermore, he retained a

foothold in the local bureaucracy and political activities. Besides his career in the

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bureaucracy, he left his political footprint in Golkar in the New Order and established his

socio-political networks with strategic groups in the region. Following the collapse of the

New Order, he became a high-ranking bureaucrat and formally left Golkar, but was still able

to maintain good relations with major political parties and strategic groups in the region. As a

result, he possessed both political and bureaucratic skills, which later on determined his

success in electoral competition, managing provincial government, and establishing and

cultivating political coalitions.

The difference analyzed above notably influenced the fifth difference: the presence

and absence of ideational contestation in both cases. The poor performance of North

Sumatran’s local elites in managing local government, which was supported by their

inadequate competence in bureaucracy such as the understanding of its regulations, became an

entry point for ideational contestation. Ruling elites in North Sumatra, as shown in the case of

Syamsul Arifin, committed corruption, partly supported by his poor managerial ability when

he served as Regent of Langkat. It is certainly clear that his lack of bureaucratic capability

could not alone be held responsible as the only one causal factor for his failure. There was a

combination of this factor with the high degree of inter-elite competition and the high degree

of transactional practices that led to his failure in sustaining power. Nevertheless, it seems that

the absence of his bureaucratic expertise and his non-bureaucratic background strongly

affected the “careless” behavior of Syamsul (or Abdillah) in managing local government. As a

result, the failure of ruling elites in managing local government (particularly as evidenced by

their corruption) paved the way for the emergence of new ideas such as anti-corruption or

clean government. But not only these ideas came to the fore; the reliance of local elites upon

the cognitive prior of traditional norms (such as ethnicity and religiosity) also led to the

emergence of oppositional ideas, such as the idea of pluralism. In short, it can be said that in

North Sumatra, the contestation of ideas occurred when the cognitive prior as used by local

elites was stripped of its social legitimacy. This was the case when the defenders of this

ideational legacy could no longer fulfill social expectations, as shown in the case of

corruption.

By contrast to North Sumatra, East Java’s ruling elites demonstrated their capacities in

the political and bureaucratic domains and the ability to avoid law violation such as

corruption. Bureaucratic skills that stemmed from long experience were able to protect them

from making wrong decisions in managing local government. The feature of the “careful fox”

(Pareto 1935, 1788-1795, sec. 2480) was representative for the performance of the ruling elite

in East Java. This situation was supported by their political expertise in maintaining political

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consensus and cooperation among major political actors in the region which led to a relatively

low level of inter-elite competition. Without any “big case” of managerial failure of ruling

elites, the ideational contestation occurred to a lower extent compared to the case of North

Sumatra. The proponents of new ideas faced difficulties in displaying and dramatizing the

need for ideational change, since the defenders of the cognitive prior, i.e. the ruling elites, did

not make any serious mistakes in managing local government. In addition, the ruling elites

could fulfill social expectations by championing populist policies. In short, no condition

existed that would have paved the way for a contradiction between the cognitive prior, the

behavior of its defenders, and events; all features that existed were in consonance with social

expectations.

The aforementioned similarities and differences produced different outcomes in terms

of the pathway of elite adjustment in both regions. After a similar pattern of adjustment

among the local elites had occurred in the early phase of transition (i.e. strategies in

responding to the demands of democratization), both groups of local elites went through a

divergent process of adjustment. Local elites from North Sumatra faced a more fragile elite

coalition which was characterized by high inter-elite competition. This high degree of inter-

elite competition was influenced by the nature of the competitive social structure (in terms of

ethnicity and religiosity) and also by the implementation of direct local elections which

resulted in high political costs for local elites who competed in the race. The high competition

among local elites even continued when the winner began his governorship and this resulted

in the difficult situation of building a robust political coalition. This unfavorable situation was

worsened by an inadequate expertise in managing bureaucracy, which later on led to their

inability to avoid law violations in the form of corruption. However, this pathway of elite

adjustment produced a greater possibility for ideational contestation where the behavior of

local elites was not compatible with social expectations. In short, this first case shows “the

failure” of local elite adjustment in democratization, but later turned out to be beneficial for

the ideational contestation to take place.

In contrast to the North Sumatran case, local elites or ruling elites in East Java could

manage the local political arena in a more firmly way. With dominant Javanese cultural

identities, the fact of elite continuity, the success of ruling elites in managing political

coalition, and the combination of political and bureaucratic skills, ruling elites succeeded in

positioning themselves in the new political system. However, their success in the process of

adjustment stymied ideational contestation.

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After assessing the idiosyncrasies of each case, it is important to highlight the

important generalizable findings in order to answer the basic research questions of how and

under what conditions local elite adjustment has taken place. The first issue relates to the

strategies of elites in responding to the institutional pressure exerted by democratization. For

this issue, it is important to note the general tendency of local elites to choose a strategy of

adjustment appropriate with the degree of institutional pressure: the stronger the institutional

pressure of democratization, the more likely it is for the elite to apply passive conformist

strategies; the weaker the institutional pressure, the more likely it is for the elite to employ

active resistance strategies. Following this first aspect, a major finding is that the process of

elite adjustment followed the range of the strategies of passive conformity to active resistance.

Political elites - and in particular established elites - were aware of how to behave

appropriately in the specific institutional context.

Although established elites generally employed the approach of passive conformity in

the initial transition phase, their more “active” involvement in the subsequent phase of

transition - such as in electoral competition and in managing government - depended on a

range of properties such as their social and political networks, their backgrounds, experiences,

and skills in different fields. Therefore, the second aspect refers to the capacities of political

elites in which their political skills in building political networks and coalition, and masteries

in bureaucratic fields highly influenced their failure or success to adjust in democratic

regimes. Included in this aspect are the networks of the ruling elites with elite predecessors

and the latter’s previous political networks. These qualities (skills, capacities, and

experiences) can produce different responses from political elites in behaving in the new

political environment. The old established elites who had political experiences in the

authoritarian regime possessed greater political resources compared to the new elites;

however, their success or failure in adjustment was also determined by a specific career path

or track record in the past. With this condition, political elites who had long bureaucratic

experiences and strong political networks adapted easier to the new political environment.

Elite capacities in managing the political arena affected ideational change. Political

transition in newly democratic countries such as Indonesia is generally characterized by a

sequence of the following events: a collapse of authoritarian rule, negotiated transition, and

the consolidation of procedural democracy. The authoritarian collapse, however, only resulted

in the revision or replacement of the political format of the authoritarian regime, but the

cognitive prior still persisted and was used by political elites as an instrument of maintaining

legitimacy. However, the use of the cognitive prior in domains such as ethnicity, religion, or

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populist rhetoric cannot solely be regarded as the only supporting factor for the success or

failure of elites in the political arena. This cognitive prior can survive in the political realm if

political elites can avoid conditions that may lead to a contradiction between appropriate

behavior of elites and social expectations. If established elites fail to manage their political

power properly and fail to avoid law violation such as corruption, the emergence of new

norms takes place. In contrast, if ruling elites succeed in reaching political consensus, avoid

excessive law violation, and fuse, that is, localize the democratization with the cognitive prior,

the emergence of new transformative norms and their ideational proponents is more restricted.

II. Understanding Elite Adjustment in Democratic Transition

While much of elite studies operate with one single approach-whether applying rationalist,

structuralist, or ideationalist approach exclusively- the novelty of this study is the eclectic

theorizing in the analysis of elite adjustment to political change. Thus, in this final discussion

I reconsider the contribution of the three major strands of arguing (structure, agency, and

ideas) in explaining elite adjustment. What does this eclectic approach explain well? And how

are these three major theoretical strands interconnected? Why does this approach have more

explanatory power in explaining the complexity of elite adjustment in Indonesia or other

transitional settings?

The merits of eclectic theorizing in understanding elite adjustment in Indonesia’s

democratic transition consist in the way of how causal mechanisms of each causal factors

interconnected. Structural factors originating from historical antecedents of authoritarianism,

its breakdown, and a negotiated transition, were followed by series of institutional reforms.

Here, democratization in Indonesia enabled institutional reforms in the form of constitutional

amendments, the enactment of decentralization policy, and the introduction of direct local

elections. However, this new institutional design, in fact, was double-edged. On the one hand,

it created a more pluralist background of local political elites, more competitive nature of

political contestation among political elites, and more political participation of the electorates.

On the other hand, this study corroborated a general consensus among students of Indonesian

politics that the new institutional design such as direct local elections also produced

transactional politics, money politics, political corruption, and preserving local oligarchical

power. From this point, this study revealed that both provinces under study experienced

similar development. As a result of the implementation of political reform, local political

elites had adjusted to the new political environment. In general, local elites pursued quite

similar responses by applying a high degree of conformity with the new system of

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government including the pertinent norms and values in the initial phase of transition, but then

they eventually changed the response into greater resistance towards democracy by practicing

money politics and political corruption.

Furthermore, from the structural elements, the study found that the institutional reform

starting from 1998 crucially affected the way of elite adjustment in the regions. However,

elite continuity or discontinuity in terms of their structural networks paved different pathways

to elite adjustment. Structural continuity from the elite’s New Order predecessors to their

successors in the democratic regime eased the process of structural adjustment, although it

had an impact on the persistence of local oligarchy. In contrast to this development, structural

discontinuity in terms of elite personnel and political networks had resulted in a high degree

of inter-elite competition. In addition, socio-cultural formation in the form of ethnic and

religious elements was an important source of legitimacy for local political elites, either in

their adjustment in general or in political contestation in particular.

Nevertheless, structural conditions could not throroughly influence elite adjustment to

the new democratic arrangements. Here, elite had to a certain degree their own political

choice. This strategic choice was driven by their capacities, skills, and experiences inherited

in the previous authoritarian regime. Later on, elite skills and capacities determined the ability

of political elites to develop political networks and coalition. All factors related to the agency

of political elites, by and large, determined their capacity to survive, strengthen their role, or

fail to manage their political power. Local elites were thus able to employ the logic of

consequentalism. In other words, they were not only passive actors responding to structural

constraints imposed on them by democratization, but also agents making their own choices

(Acharya 2004, 243-244).

The study also confirmed another aspect of actor-oriented approaches: elite adjustment

was also influenced by elites’ psychological propensities as enunciated by Pareto. To a certain

extent, elite qualities, personalities, and skills affected the success or failure of political elites

in managing their power. This research confirmed the relevance of Pareto’s thought on

“residue” or “sentiments” in assessing the right combination of elite psychological

propensities related to what he conceptualized as “fox and lion” characters. Elites who

possessed the right combination of political skills and bureaucratic capabilities tended to be

more successful in their adjustment and had a greater chance of preserving their political

power. The character of “fox” such as chicanery, guile, manipulation, and cunning had a

consequence not only in sustaining elite political power but also in adjusting to the new

environment and avoiding the “traps” produced by a more competitive local political arena.

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The character of “lion” prevailed when political elites forged coalition among local political

actors, activated political networks, negotiated with other political players, and maintained

political stability by controlling the oppositional potential effectively. Local elites who

possessed the right balance of political skills and bureaucratic masteries, of persuasion and

force, tended to be more successful in preserving their political power, no matter whether they

were committed to democracy or whether they formed a local oligarchy.

The last causal factor to be discussed concerns ideational elements that constitutively

affected the pathways of elite adjustment in democratization. The impact of ideas on elite

adjustment was not straightforward; it was linked to the structural elements and elite strategic

behavior. The way of local political elites adjusted to democracy can be traced to the mode of

negotiated transition following the collapse of authoritarian regime. The legacy of the

authoritarian collapse was “enduring ideas” (Legro 2000, 424), that is, old ideas that persisted

and had adherents and defenders. Authoritarian elements pertained to old elites and the new

elites which emerged from the former’s patronage network. This authoritarian continuity in

terms of ideas and personnel was made possible by the mode of negotiated transition.

One of the major findings of this study was the endurance of the cognitive prior in the

local political arena. Populism served as the dominant ideational structure and was widely

used as discursive practice. These normative frameworks have already been in place in the old

order and still existed after democratization, in North Sumatra and East Java. Although the

cognitive prior itself is not completely anti-democratic, it is nevertheless not conducive for the

development of democratic institutions. Therefore, this partially blurred boundary between

the cognitive prior and the new oppositional ideas had resulted in less antagonism between the

two normative orientations, and eventually led to elites’ ability to generate social legitimacy

for their political purpose. In fact, the endurance of the cognitive prior contributes to the fact

that the position of democratic norm opponents remains stronger than that of the adherents of

democracy, creating ideational barriers rather than facilitating the role of ideational carriers.

In addition, the strong position of the elite defenders of the cognitive prior rests on strong

socio-economic and political resources; they identified themselves as “insider proponents” of

local norms and presented themselves as the representative of the people; they had strong

personal and patronage networks; and they had experience in the local political arena.

Therefore, the symbiosis of the deep-rooted cognitive prior and the combination of strong

material and cognitive resources marshaled by the defenders of old autocratic norms

entrenched the ideational remnants of authoritarianism in the local arenas.

Nevertheless, recent developments in the two regions under study show a

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contradictory direction regarding the argument of enduring authoritarianism. As shown in the

case of North Sumatra and to a lesser degree in East Java, there is a tendency for the rise of

new oppositional democratic ideas, ranging from pluralism, good and clean governance to

entrepreneurial government and anti-corruption campaign. Some local elites tried to employ

these new ideas in the local elections and received a positive response from the public, as

shown by their substantial electoral support. However, the embryonic emergence of

oppositional ideas faced major obstacles on at least two accounts. First, the ideational

advocates of these norms are still limited, weak, and peripheral in the local political arena.

This lack of prominence in the local political arena went hand in hand with a lack of political

experience, weak personal networks, and and effort by established elites to discredit them as

not representing local identities (as in the case of Sofyan Tan as a Chinese). Second, these

carriers of new ideas lacked a method for constituting a process of localization in terms of

how can they frame, graft, or prune the issues in order to amplify the new ideas. The initial

process of ideational contestation, which was indicated by the emergence of new-oppositional

ideas and their advocates, can be seen as the embryonic step toward consolidation.

The above optimistic nature of ideational change is plausible when we discuss another

element of ideational consolidation, that is, the concept of “social expectation” or “socially

desired results to the new norms” (Legro 2000). This condition is important since this can be a

new focal point of consolidation and institutionalization (Legro 2000, 429-430). Assessing the

empirical findings of my study, the concept of social expectation could be significant for two

interrelated circumstances. First, since many old-established elites who used the cognitive

prior as their instrument of legitimacy faced the problem of law violation or charges of

corruption (as in the case of North Sumatran local elites), this might lead to a weakening of

the power of old established elites, and simultaneously delegitimize the cognitive prior. In this

context, law violation, corruption, or bad governance work against social expectations or

socially desired results. We may conclude from this insight that the less prominent the

ideational barriers of democratic ideas, the lower is the legitimacy of the cognitive prior. If

this condition occurs, and if there is a concomitant democratic discourse (for instance, in the

form of an anti-corruption campaign), the credibility of anti-democratic norms will decrease.

Under such conditions, the populist rhetorical jargon of local elites contradicts social

expectations and might be ignored by the people. This first precondition precedes the second

social setting when the norm advocates of new democratic ideas hold local political power. If

they can establish a clean government, increase the quality of life of the people and provide

good public services – goods which society expects -, this condition might lead to a greater

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credibility of democratic ideas and pave the way for their consolidation.

The above discussion shows the interconnectedness of institutions, agency, and ideas

in cases of elite adjustment in transitional settings. The interaction of these three causal

factors provides an explanation on how elite adjustment has taken place. The different

interaction of these three causal factors in the cases under study eventually produced different

outcomes of elite adjustment, although both experience similar democratic institutional

arrangements. Elite adjustment in North Sumatra, by and large, is characterized by “a

turbulent adjustment” indicated by elite discontinuity, heterogeneous socio-cultural structures,

a high degree of inter-elite competition, the lack of elite skills and capacities, but provide an

initially fertile ground for ideational change. East Java, by contrast, is characterized by “a

gentle adjustment” marked by elite continuity, homogeneous socio-cultural structures, a low

degree of inter-elite competition, superiority in political and bureaucratic skills, strong elite

networks and coalition, and a low degree of ideational contestation, thereby fostering the

continuity of a local political oligarchy.

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Zussamenfassung

Local Elite Adjustment in Indonesia’s Democratization:

Case Studies of North Sumatra and East Java, 1998-2013

Nach dem Zusammenbruch des autoritären Orde Baru Regimes von Präsident Suharto im

Jahre 1998 kam es in Indonesien zu einer Reihe grundlegender politischer Reformen.

Umfangreiche institutionelle Veränderungen wie die Durchsetzung eines weitreichenden

Dezentralisierungsprogramms und die Einführung von Direktwahlen auf lokaler Ebene haben

stattgefunden. Als Antwort auf diese Prozesse und um diese Entwicklung zu verstehen, wurde

den Auswirkungen des neuen institutionellen Gefüges auf die Positionen und die Rolle der

Eliten auf der lokalpolitischen Ebene besondere wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit

geschenkt.

Einige Studien unterstützen eine „Oligarchie-These“ und argumentieren, dass das neue

institutionelle Arrangement die oligarchische Struktur des vorherigen Regimes nicht

maßgeblich zu beeinflussen vermochte. Diese Studien betonen also das Phänomen einer

strukturellen Elitenkontinuität.

Im Gegensatz dazu argumentieren andere Studien, dass es signifikante Auswirkungen

des neuen institutionellen Gefüges auf kommunaler Ebene gibt. Diese Auswirkungen werden

durch eine verschärfte Konkurrenz innerhalb der Lokalpolitik, sowie eine gesteigerte

Diversität der lokalen politischen Eliten verkörpert. Während der erste Argumentationsstrang

größtenteils vom Strukturalismus beeinflusst wurde, betonte der zweite einen

akteurzentrierten Ansatz.

Nichtsdestotrotz haben diese Studien - abgesehen von der Annahme der Kontinuität

oder Diskontinuität - größtenteils die dahinterliegende Frage wie sich der Prozess

Elitenanpassung in der Demokratisierung entwickelt hat, übersehen. Diese Studie versucht

daher den Prozess der Elitenanpassung in Indonesien auf lokaler Ebene zu untersuchen.

Hierfür werden verschiedene Arten von Elitenanpassung anhand zweier sorgfältig

ausgewählter Fallstudien – den Provinzen Nordsumatra und Ostjava - betrachtet.

Ausschlaggebend hierbei ist die Frage, warum ähnliche institutionelle Reformen und

Konzepte von Demokratisierungsprozessen auf der lokalpolitischen Ebene zu

unterschiedlichen Resultaten bei der Elitenanpassung geführt haben.

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Um dieses Problem zu beantworten, wendet diese Dissertation den theoretischen

Ansatz des „analytischen Eklektizismus“ an und kombiniert struktur- und akteurzentrierte,

sowie reflexive Forschungsperspektiven, wobei vor allem letztere in der einschlägigen

Forschung bislang keine Rolle spielten und damit einen innovativen konzeptionellen Beitrag

Forschung über lokale Eliten allgemein und in Indonesien im Besonderen darstellen. Ich

argumentiere dabei, dass die Anpassung der lokalen Eliten von drei kausalen Faktorenbündeln

wie den strukturellen Faktoren – dabei insbesondere dem institutionellen Kontext -, den

strategischen Handlungen der Eliten sowie ideellen und kognitiven Prozessen beeinflusst

wird. Obwohl sie einen ähnlichen, durch die Demokratisierung entstandenen institutionellen

Hintergrund haben, führen die verschiedenen Mechanismen der Vernetzung, strategischen

Handlungen und ideellen Konzepte zu signifikant unterschiedlichen Anpassungen der Eliten.

Durch die Überprüfung dieser Zusammenhänge deckt diese Studie ein Muster von

„turbulenter Anpassung“ in einem (Nordsumatra) und „sanfter Anpassung“ im anderen Fall

(Ostjava) auf. Das bedeutet, dass in Nordsumatra Elitendiskontinuität zu konstatieren ist, die

durch die dort identifizierte Struktur politischer Netzwerke, die handelnden Personen,

soziokulturelle Heterogenität, einen hohen Grad an innerelitärer Konkurrenz, einem Mangel

an administrativen Kenntnissen und Fertigkeiten und dem Verlauf der ideellen

Auseinandersetzung zu einer Anpassung geführt hat, welche durch eine fragile Elitenstruktur

charakterisiert ist. Kontrastierend zu diesen Entwicklungen stehen die Bedingungen in

Ostjava, wo Elitenkontinuität, homogene soziokulturelle Strukturen, hohe administrative und

politische Kompetenz der Eliten, ein niedriger Grad an innerelitärer Konkurrenz, starke

Koalitionen und politische Netzwerke und ein geringer Grad an ideeller Auseinandersetzung

den Weg für einen reibungslosen und friedlichen Anpassungsprozess geebnet haben, welcher

allerdings die Herausbildung einer lokalpolitischen Oligarchie begünstigt.

267

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Appendix

(List of Interviewees)

Ichwan Azhari, Historian of Medan State University, Medan, 4 May 2011.

Amrun Daulay, Candidate for North Sumatra Governor 2003, Jakarta, 11 May 2011.

Muryanto Amin, Political Scientist of North Sumatra University, Jakarta, 1 March

2012.

Fadly Nurzal, Regional Chairman of PPP, Medan 28 April 2011.

Gatot Pujo Nugroho, Vice Governor of North Sumatra, 2 May 2011.

Chairuman Harahap, Candidate for North Sumatra Governor 2003 and Member of

DPR, Jakarta 10 May 2011

Sofyan Tan, Candidate for Mayor of Medan 2010, Medan, 21 February 2012

Ahmad Taufan Damanik, Political Scientist of North Sumatra University, Medan, 26

April 2011 and Medan, 30 April 2011.

Ali Umri, Candidate for North Sumatra Governor 2008, Medan, 29 April 2011

Hasrul Azwar, Former Chairman of PPP and Member of DPR, Medan, 24 April 2011.

Affifudin Lubis, Acting Mayor of Medan and Career Bureaucrat, Medan, 20 February

2012

Tengku Eri Nuradi, Regent of Serdang Bedagai, Serdang Bedagai, 26 April 2011.

Usman Pelly, Antropologist of Medan State University, Medan, 25 April 2011

Syamsul Arifin, Governor of North Sumatra, Jakarta, 12 May 2011;

Hardi Mulyono, Politician of Golkar Party, Medan, 3 May 2011

Sigit Pramono Asri, Politicians of PKS and Vice Chairman of North Sumatra DPRD,

Medan, 3 May 2011.

Rahmat Shah, Member of National Senate (Representative for North Sumatra),

Medan, 20 February 2012

Rahudman Harahap, Mayor of Medan, Medan 17 February 2012

Danny Setiawan, Candidate for Mayor of Binjai 2010, Medan, 28 April 2011

Kresnayana Yahya, Academician of ITS, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.

Taufik Lamade, Local Journalist of Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

Hariadi, Political Scientist of Airlangga University, Surabaya, 19 January 2012.

Imam Oetomo, Governor of East Java 1998-2008, Surabaya, 30 January 2012.

Sirmaji, Chairman of PDI-P East Java, Surabaya, 27 January 2012.

Martono, Chairman of Golkar Party East Java, Surabaya, 24 January 2012.

Arif Afandi, Vice Mayor of Surabaya 2005-2010 and Candidate for Mayor of

Surabaya 2010, Surabaya, 19 January 2012;

Soenarjo, Vice Governor of East Java and Candidate for Governor of East Java,

Surabaya and Jakarta, 6 February 2012.

Soekarwo, Governor of East Java, Surabaya, 26 January 2012.

Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Candidate for Governor of East Java (2008 and 2013)

Jakarta, 3 June 2010.

Hotman Siahaan, Sociologist of Airlangga University, Surabaya, 25 January 2012;

Faishal Aminuddin, Political Scientist of Brawijaya University, Surabaya, 24 January

2012;

Bambang DH, Mayor of Surabaya and Vice Mayor of Surabaya, Surabaya, 1 February

2012.

Whisnu Sakti Buana, Chairman of PDI-P Surabaya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012,

Choirul Anam, Chairman of PKNU, Jakarta, 13 May 2011 and Surabaya 30 January

2012.

302

Rismarahini, Mayor of Surabaya, Surabaya, 2 February 2012.