The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 6 | Issue 5 | Article ID 2762 | May 03, 2008

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Local Citizenship and Foreign Workers in Japan

Takeyuki Tsuda

Local Citizenship and Foreign Workers inJapan

Takeyuki TSUDA

Summary: While Japan has a significantpopulation of foreign workers, the nationalgovernment has done little to providecitizenship rights or social services for them. Ina number of cases, local municipalities andNGOs have stepped in to offer basic rights andsocial services to immigrants residing in theircommunities, leading to a type of localcitizenship. If localities are emerging asimportant sites for the struggle for immigrantrights and social integration, there remainserious limitations to such efforts in a milieu inwhich the national government sharplyrestricts the rights of immigrants.

Introduction: Localities as Sites forCitizenship in Recent Countries ofImmigration

In recent decades, Japan has joined a growingnumber of countries which recently beganaccepting immigrants, importing large numbersof foreign workers starting in the 1980s (otherexamples are Korea, Spain, and Italy).[1] All ofthese countries have suffered acute laborshortages caused by rapid economic growth,negative demographic trends (low fertility ratesand rapid population aging), and the depletionof previous labor sources (women, the elderly,rural workers).

Foreign Nationals in Japan 1950-2003.Ministry of JusticeE n l a r g e t h i s i m a g e( h t t p s : / / a p j j f . o r g / d a t a / 1 9 5 0 - 2 0 0 3fornatlsinjapan.gif)

The citizenship status of immigrants isfrequently precarious in such countries. Thesecountries generally grant immigrants fewerrights than do older countries of immigration,for a number of reasons. Because immigrantshave been in these countries for a relativelyshort period, few have become naturalizedcitizens or even denizens (permanentresidents). In addition, national governments inthese countries lack active social integrationprograms to grant basic rights and services toimmigrants who are not citizens or denizens.Because immigrants are recent arrivals, few innumber, and more likely to be sojournersrather than settlers, they are not consideredprospective long-term residents and potentialcitizens. Instead, they are frequentlymarginalized from the national community asboth temporary sojourners and culturally alienoutsiders, deemed unworthy to partake of therights and social services reserved for citizensof the nation-state.

Nonetheless, immigrants have become apermanent presence in many local communities

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in countries of recent immigration as some takeup long-term, if not permanent, residence andare jo ined by their fami l ies . Yet thegovernments of these countries, instead ofaddressing the citizenship rights and socialneeds of immigrant settlers and theirdependents, have increasingly focused onimmigration control and border enforcement inan attempt to keep their foreign populationssmall and avoid a flood of illegal immigrants.This situation was exacerbated by the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001, which causednational governments around the world totighten immigration controls in the name ofnational security. The Japanese and Spanishgovernments have also cracked down on illegalimmigration in response to the media-fueledpublic perception that immigrants areundermining public safety by increasing thecrime rate.

Moroccan immigrants arrive in SpainBecause national governments in countries ofrecent immigration have been largely obliviousto the social needs of immigrants, localgovernments and institutions have had to dealwith the foreigners already residing in theircommunities. A de facto division of labor has

emerged in which the national government isconcerned solely with immigration policy (theregulation of immigration flows and bordercontrol as well as formal processes ofpermanent residence and citizenship) whilelocal governments and nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) have taken care ofimmigrant policy (the provision of basicservices and rights that facilitate the socialintegration of immigrants). In Japan and SouthKorea, local governments and/or NGOs havebecome almost exclusively responsible forproviding basic social services to theirimmigrant residents. In Italy and Spain, theimplementation of the national government’simmigrant integration policies has beendelegated to local governments and NGOs,which have been granted considerableautonomy to develop their own programs. Therights and services that local governments andinstitutions offer immigrants includeemployment and housing assistance, languageprograms, cross-cultural activities, educationfor immigrant children, health care andinsurance, welfare benefits, and local politicalrepresentation. Immigrants’ rights have alsobeen improved in Italy, Japan, South Korea, andSpain through activism—direct politicalmobilization or through the courts—by localimmigrant advocacy groups and immigrantsthemselves.

The Concept of Local Citizenship

Local citizenship refers to the granting, by localgovernments and organizations, of basicsociopolitical rights and services to immigrantsas legit imate members of these localcommunities (cf. Andrew and Goldsmith 1998;Tegtmeyer Pak 2001). This includes socialintegration programs and policies, servicesoffered by local governments and NGOs, andlocal activism to demand and secure basicrights for immigrants. Although this type ofcitizenship is rarely discussed in the scholarlyliterature, it has had a significant impact on thelives of immigrants, especially in countries of

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recent immigration, which makes it imperativeto situate local citizenship within broaderanalyses of immigrant citizenship.

Despite citizenship’s inclusionary aspects (theconferral of rights to members of a specificcommunity), in the case of immigration,citizenship seems more exclusionary thaninclusionary (Joppke 1999: 630). Immigrantshave generally been denied the rights grantedto national citizens because of their status asoutsiders. Nevertheless, the lack of nationalcitizenship does not necessarily mean thatimmigrants lack substantive citizenship rightssince the nation-state also may confer rights onnon-national foreign residents. Immigrants whohave become permanent residents—referred toas denizens (Hammar 1990)—hold certainrights comparable to those of national citizensin many liberal democracies. Legal immigrantswho are not denizens have generally enjoyed amore limited set of rights, and certain liberaldemocracies have offered some basic rightseven to illegal immigrants (although theselatter two categories of immigrants havesometimes been referred to as “marginens”).Thus, immigrants’ access to rights hasfrequently come to depend more on residencestatus in the nation-state than on thepossession of national citizenship (Brubaker1989; Jacobson 1996: 70–72). If we think interms of formal citizenship (rights that thenation-state formally grants to individuals),citizenship appears to comprise gradations ofrights, with national citizens enjoying the mostrights and unauthorized immigrants enjoyingthe least.

However, as mentioned above, most foreignresidents in countries of recent immigrationhave not yet become national citizens or evendenizens, nor have they been granted rightsand services by the national governmentthrough social integration programs. Unliketheir counterparts in countries more familiarwith immigration, the immigrants’ mereresidence has been insufficient for them to be

considered as members of the nationalcommunity, whose basic rights are guaranteedby the nation-state. Nonetheless, their lack offormal citizenship rights does not mean thatthey are deprived of substantive citizenshiprights, because other institutions andorganizations besides the nation-state conferr ights on immigrants based on theirmembership in non-national communities.

Although the nation-state has been thepredominant framework used in analyses ofimmigrant citizenship, in recent decades (cf.Holston and Appadurai 1999: 2) non-nationalorganizations—both supranational andsubnational—have begun to challenge its statusas the exclusive purveyor of citizenship. Theresult is an increasing discrepancy between theformal citizenship rights granted by nation-states and the possession of substantivecitizenship rights. In this manner, citizenshiphas become somewhat delinked from nation-states, making it possible for immigrants toenjoy considerable rights even without formalcitizenship.

When scholars consider non-national forms ofcitizenship, they invariably refer to rightsgranted to immigrants by global organizationssuch as the United Nations, which haveproduced numerous international conventionsrelevant to migrant worker rights. Thesebroadly inclusive forms of postnational orglobal citizenship (see Bauböck 1994; Bosniak2001; Jacobson 1996; Soysa l 1994)challenge—and ultimately may supersede—themore limited formal citizenship rights offeredby the nation-state. However, the real power ofsuch international human rights regimesremains weak since there is no globalenforcement mechanism that can guaranteethe postnational/global citizenship rightsconferred upon migrant workers underinternational conventions. Therefore, nation-states remain the only political actors that canenforce international human rights regimes.Yet only thirty of the world’s two hundred

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countries—and none of the major countries ofimmigration—have ratified the United Nationsconvention on migrant rights. Although manymore governments, including Japan, haveratified the UN conventions against racialdiscrimination and on the status of refugees,few have seriously enforced the provisions ofsuch international conventions (cf. Castles andDavidson 2000: 18–19; Loescher 1993;Guiraudon and Lahav 2000: 167–68). As aresult, postnational/global citizenship is oftennot a form of substantive citizenship.

A more substantial form of supranationalimmigrant citizenship involves the rightsoffered by regional organizations, such as thetransnational citizenship extended by theEuropean Union. However, even the EuropeanUnion (where this type of citizenship is mostdeveloped) has no regional policy enforcementmechanism (Geddes 2000: 31), and individualmember states have not seriously implementedthe EU’s migrant and human r ightsconventions. Only the European Convention onthe Protection of Human Rights is legallybinding on signatory nations and has asupranat ional judic ia l enforcementmechanism—the European Court of HumanRights, which has had some impact on memberstates (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Hammar1992: 259). Although a regional Europeancitizenship is emerging, its rights remain quitelimited, and they do not apply to immigrantswho are not EU nationals (see Koslowski 2000).

Instead of focusing exclusively on supranationalcitizenship as an alternative to formalcitizenship, I argue that we need to seriouslyconsider subnational forms of citizenship. Infact, local citizenship is a more viable andindependent type of non-national citizenshipthan supranational citizenship for a number ofreasons. First, in contrast to transnational andglobal citizenship, the local citizenship rightsand social services conferred on immigrants bylocal governments and NGOs are actuallyenforced—by city and state ordinances, local

law enforcement officials, and the courts.Second, national governments sometimesdelegate considerable authority (and resources)to local governments and NGO serviceproviders to run their own immigrantintegration programs, as in Italy and Spain.Third, in some cases where a nationalgovernment has neglected the socialintegration of its immigrant residents (as inJapan and Korea), local authorities have shownconsiderable autonomous and independentpolicy initiatives by offering the immigrants intheir local communities the citizenship rightsand services denied by the nation-state.Therefore, even in the absence of formalcitizenship, immigrants have been able to enjoyconsiderable substantive rights in certainlocalities.

As a result, local citizenship has become aviable alternative that expands—and at timessupersedes—the more restrictive citizenship ofnation-states. Even when the state hasmarginalized immigrants from the nationalcommunity as non-citizen outsiders, manyimmigrants have been incorporated into localcommunities as residents and members entitledto rights—that is, as local citizens. As JosephCarens (1989) has argued, governments have amoral obligation to offer citizenship toimmigrants who are legitimate members ofsociety. Although they are frequentlysocioeconomically marginalized, it isundeniable that both legal and il legalimmigrants make important economic and civiccontributions to local communities as workers,taxpayers, consumers, and residents, and asethnic and institutional participants.

As a result, a number of scholars have begun tofocus on local cities (rather than nations) asimportant sites for the negotiation ofcitizenship and claims-making (Andrew andGoldsmith 1998; Holston and Appadurai 1999;Isin 2000a; Sassen 1999). As a result, citiesremain important in a globalized world, notonly as the s i tes where the f inancial

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management and support structures for globalcapital are concentrated (Sassen 2001) but alsowhere global migrants are incorporated aslocal citizens. In this manner, cities can bebetter articulated with and more responsive toglobal forces (whether involving the economyor immigration) than can the nation-state, andhence they have become increasingly drawninto the governance of the local diversityintroduced by globalization.

The Importance of Local Citizenship inJapan

Because of severe domestic labor shortages,Japan has accepted significant immigrationsince the late 1980s. The country’s immigrantpopulation is very diverse, with foreign workerscoming from East and Southeast Asia, LatinAmerica, and the Middle East. The totalnumber of legal and unauthorized immigrantsin Japan is close to 900,000, about 800,000 ofthem unskilled or semi-skilled.[2] Althoughimmigrants represent only 0.71 percent ofJapan’s total population of 127 million, theircurrent numbers represent a sharp increasefrom the late 1980s, when Japan’s foreignworker population probably numbered only inthe few hundred thousands. This population didnot decline appreciably during Japan’s decade-long economic recession, demonstrating thatthe demand for immigrant labor has becomestructurally embedded.

New immigrants to Japan 2000-2004 byoccupation. Ministry of Justice

Enlarge this image (https://apjjf.org/data/Statusof for.natls employment 2000-2004 .gif)

There are a number of reasons why localcitizenship is of particular importance in Japan.The Japanese government has a very restrictive(and disingenuous) immigration policy that hasplaced many foreign workers in a precarioushuman rights situation. This includes“entertainers” who are forced to become sexworkers and “trainees” who are exploited ascheap unskilled laborers. Even the legallyaccepted and ethnically privileged nikkeijin aresometimes deceived by labor brokers, whopromise them easier jobs and higher pay thanis actually available. Unauthorized immigrantsin Japan are sometimes forced to toil underpoor working conditions and receive low wageswithout standard worker rights and protectionsand do not have access to adequate medicalinsurance and care. Few recent immigrantsh a v e b e c o m e c i t i z e n s o rdenizens—naturalization remains difficult inJapan, and most immigrants have not residedthere long enough to become denizens. Recentdevelopments in immigration policy indicatethat the national government will remainalmost exclusively focused on restrictiveimmigration control, especially with concerns(fueled by the government and media) thatforeigners are increasing crime in Japan.Moreover, among recent countries ofimmigration, Japan has probably done the leastto socially integrate its immigrant residentsand promote their citizenship rights. As aresult, the immigrants’ only recourse forgaining citizenship rights and services has beenlocal governments, NGOs, and local activism. Instark contrast to Japan’s national government,a number of localities have been quiteproactive in incorporating foreign workers intotheir communities as local citizens.

National immigration policy

The Japanese government, which adheres tot h e m y t h o f J a p a n a s a n e t h n i c a l l y

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homogeneous nation that is not and never hasbeen a country of immigration, has one of themost restrictive immigration policies amongadvanced industrialized countries. It bases itspolicy on three fundamental principles:

• No unskilled foreign workers willb e a d m i t t e d . E v e n w h e nconfronting a crippling laborshortage in the late 1980s, theJapanese government refused toopen its doors to unskilled migrantworkers. The revised ImmigrationControl and Refugee RecognitionAct ( implemented in 1990)maintained Japan’s long-standingban on unskilled foreign workersand imposed tough penalties onemployers and labor brokers whoknowingly recruit and hire illegalaliens.

• The government should facilitatethe admission only of highly skilledand professional foreign workers.While forbidding the admittance ofunskilled immigrants, the revisedImmigration Control and RefugeeRecognition Act expanded thenumber of legal residence statuses(mainly skilled and professionalvisa categories) from eighteen totwenty-seven and simplifiedimmigration procedures in order tomeet the increasing demand forforeign managerial and technicalstaff, foreign language instructors,and high-tech workers.

• All foreigners should be admittedon a temporary basis only. Allforeign workers in Japan aregranted temporary visas, and noforeign workers are admitted aspermanent immigrants. Nor doesthe government permit theimmigration of family members of

foreign workers residing in Japan(except for the Japanese descentn ikke i j in ) because fami l yreunification would encourageforeigners to settle in Japan.

Although the Japanese government hasofficially prohibited the importation of unskilledforeign labor, it has not been as unresponsiveto the economic need for foreign workers as itofficially appears on the surface. The Ministryof Justice (responsible for immigration policy)has created various “side-door” mechanismsthat enable the legal importation of largenumbers of unskilled foreign workers undervisa categories officially intended for otherpurposes. With the front door officially closedto all but skilled and professional workers, overhalf of the estimated 800,000 unskilledimmigrant workers in Japan have enteredthrough a side door.

Japan’s company trainee program is oneimportant side door for importing migrantlabor. Although officially justified as a form ofoverseas development assistance that enablestrainees from developing countries to acquiretechnical skills at Japanese companies, theprogram is being widely abused as a source ofinexpensive, unskilled foreign labor. The mostnumerically important of Japan’s immigrationside-door mechanisms is the policy that allowsLatin American nikkeijin (individuals ofJapanese descent who were born and raisedoutside of Japan) to “return” migrate to Japan.Although the nikkeijin work exclusively asunskilled migrant laborers in small andmedium-sized Japanese factories (and weretacitly admitted for this purpose; cf. Kajita1994: 172), the government officially justifiedthe policy as an opportunity for the nikkeijin tolearn the Japanese language and culture, meettheir Japanese relatives, travel the country, andthus explore their ethnic heritage. Theadmission of foreigners on visas for pre-college“students” (shugakusei) represents another of

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Japan’s side-door immigration policies.Although ostensibly in Japan to learn thelanguage or participate in vocational trainingprograms, they can work part-time. However,most work illegally in excess of the allowedhours, and many are becoming full-time,unskilled foreign workers, particularly in theservice sector (see Komai 1995: 119). A finalside-door mechanism for bringing unskilledworkers to Japan is the “entertainment” visa.Many of these “entertainers” are from thePhilippines and actually work as bar hostessesin sleazy nightclubs or as prostitutes. Many ofJapan ’s immigrant sex workers areundocumented female migrants who areexploited by human traffickers and forced towork as hostesses or prostitutes.

It has become quite apparent that these side-door policies for importing unskilled foreignworkers have not sufficed to meet Japan’s laborneeds at a time of declining population.

Birth and death rates, 1950-2005

Because Japan has maintained its restrictiveimmigrant admissions policy despite the strong

domestic demand for foreign labor, manyimmigrants have simply entered Japan illegallythrough the “back door” in order to takeadvantage of the country’s abundance ofrelatively high-paying jobs. If we include thevarious different types of unauthorizedimmigration to Japan (visa overstayers, illegallysmuggled immigrants, and those who workillegally in violation of their visa’s activityrestrictions), the illegal immigrant workerpopulation is probably well over 300,000.

Undocumented workers perform manyunwanted and arduous jobsHuman rights, citizenship, and socialintegration

The Japanese government’s restrictiveimmigration policy prohibiting unskilled foreignworkers, as well as the disingenuousimportation of foreign workers through the sidedoor and back door, have led to serious humanrights abuses—”entertainers” who are forcedinto sex work and “trainees” who are exploitedas cheap, unskilled laborers. Even the relativelyprivileged nikkeijin are sometimes deceived bylabor brokers, who promise easier jobs andhigher pay than are available. Unauthorizedimmigrants in Japan sometimes toil under poorworking conditions, receive low wages, lackstandard worker rights and protections, and

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have no access to adequate medical insuranceand care.

To date, the Japanese government has donelittle to improve the human rights situation ofthese foreign workers. Very few of them haveobtained formal citizen or denizen status,which would accord them essential rights andprotections. Japan has a jus sanguinis (“right ofblood”) nationality law and therefore grantscitizenship only to the descendants of Japanesenationals. But it is even quite difficult forforeign residents to become naturalizedJapanese citizens. Although naturalizationrequirements seem uncomplicated, thepaperwork requirements are onerous,discouraging many from applying and causingothers to be turned down even beforesubmitting an application (Kashiwazaki 2000:442–43). In addition, Ministry of Justiceofficials continue to exercise considerablediscretion in determining whether applicantshave met the requirements for Japanesecitizenship. Even when an applicant’spaperwork is in order, these officials havedenied citizenship on the grounds that theindividual has not demonstrated good moralconduct (for instance, if a person has aprevious minor legal infraction such as a trafficviolation) or has not shown sufficientindications of cultural assimilation (especially ifthe applicant refuses to adopt a Japanese name,even though this is no longer legally required).As a result, few recent immigrants have beenwilling or able to naturalize.

In addition, it remains very difficult for“newcomer” immigrants to become denizens byacquiring permanent residence (which requiresten years of residence in Japan). Since the late1990s, the Ministry of Justice seems to haverelaxed the requirements, taking intoconsideration an appl icant’s overal lcontribution to Japanese society as well as hisor her personal situation (such as beingmarried to a Japanese national) and the numberof denizens has increased considerably.

As Christian Joppke notes (2001: 59–60), anation-state can have restrictive rights forimmigrants but grant liberal naturalizationopportunities, or it can make naturalizationrestrictive but grant considerable rights to non-citizen immigrants. Unfortunately, the Japanesegovernment has maintained a restrictive policytoward both naturalization and immigrantrights. Indeed, it seems to be increasinglyconcerned with maintaining a str ictimmigration control policy and strengtheningborder enforcement, and it has given no seriousconsideration to immigrants’ social integrationand rights. Since the revised ImmigrationControl and Refugee Recognition Act wasimplemented in 1990, there has been nodiscernable shift in the Japanese government’sclosed-door immigration policy. Therefore, thegovernment is unl ikely to consider aliberalization of its immigration, citizenship, ornaturalization laws in the near future.

Indeed, recent policy changes have focusedmainly on measures to tighten immigrationcontrol in order to reduce illegal immigration toJapan and to address domestic securityconcerns over international terrorism and thecountry’s rising crime rate (attributed in part toforeigners). In 1998 the government beganimposing draconian fines and prison sentenceson various types of immigrant smugglers (andthose who assist them). New penalties werealso implemented against visa overstayersbeginning in February 2000. Accompanyingthese measures, there have been stepped-upinspections at airports and seaports, increasedscreening of visa applicants and airlinepassengers, increases in the number ofimmigration officials, a pilot program tointroduce machine-readable visas at Japaneseembassies, and biometric scanning to preventillegal entry by foreigners. The governmentalso plans to institute new laws to crack downon human trafficking. Because of increasingpublic concern over rising foreigner crime(fueled by exaggerated media reporting), thegovernment has determined to halve the

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number of illegal immigrants in Japan bymobilizing immigration officers and police aspart of a plan (backed by the prime ministerand Cabinet) to keep Japan one of the safestcountries in the world.

Because of the government’s currentpreoccupation with immigration control, it willbe some time before immigrant socialintegration and citizenship rights will enter thepolicy-making agenda. In fact, the Japanesegovernment’s continued insistence that allforeign workers are strictly temporary hasallowed it to avoid providing them withextensive social services and rights. Regardlessof the government’s official stance, however,immigrants are beginning to settle for the longterm, if not permanently, in Japanese society(see Okuda 2000; Sellek 2001: 104–106; Tajima2000: 361). Immigrant settlement is mostadvanced among the nikkeijin; many havebrought their families to Japan and have beenliving there for years (Tsuda 1999). Amongother foreign workers, the average stay inJapan had already reached five years by 1996,and over half of the immigrants from thePhilippines, China, and Thailand wanted tosettle in Japan (1996 survey, in Komai 2001:66–67). Even among visa overstayers, nearlyhalf have been in Japan for at least three years(Komai 2001: 70–71). Highly visible immigrantcommunities have sprouted in parts of Tokyoand in outlying Japanese industrial cities andtowns in Gunma and Aichi prefectures. Thesepopulations are supported by a vast array ofethnic businesses, churches, employmentagencies, and ethnic media (see Okuda 2000;Okuda and Tajima 1992, 1993; Tajima 2000:361; Tsuda 2003).

Immigration children of Japanese descentin school celebrating Peru’s independenceday

Despite the long-term settlement of immigrantsin Japanese society, the economic and socialrights that the Japanese government hasgranted them remain very basic andinsufficient. Nominally, Japan’s labor laws andprotections apply to foreign workers regardlessof their legal status. In reality, however, severalfactors—unscrupulous employers, insufficientreport ing and oversight , and fear ofapprehension—make foreign workers especiallyvulnerable to labor law violations (seeTerasawa 2000). Most foreign workers areeligible for national or employer-providedhealth insurance as well as the national pensionplan and public housing. However, foreignworkers and their employers sometimes arereluctant to join these health insuranceprograms for a number of reasons, andimmigrants who are in Japan illegally areineligible for the national health plan.

Local government and social integrationprograms

Because the Japanese national government hasdone little to provide basic rights and socialservices to immigrants, it has been left to localgovernments to integrate the foreign residentswho have settled in their neighborhoods and

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communities (see Kashiwazaki 2000: 462–63;Tegtmeyer Pak 2000). Municipal governmentsin cities with large immigrant populations havegenerally been receptive, providing foreignworkers with language classes and translationservices, information handbooks andpamphlets, consultation services (for personal,legal, employment, and social welfare issues),public housing, health insurance andemergency medical coverage, assistance withalien registration, and even limited politicalrepresentation through foreigner advisorycouncils (see Miyajima and Kajita 1996;Tegtmeyer Pak 2000). In order to promoteinter-ethnic interaction and understanding inlocal communities, a number of localgovernments have a lso es tab l i shedinternational exchange offices, which organizespecial events, festivals, and cultural activitiesto bring Japanese and foreign residentstogether. Although immigrants are not legallyobliged to send their children to school, it iswidely recognized that foreign children have ar ight to receive educat ion and localcommunities have required immigrants toenroll their children in Japanese schools (Sellek2001: 201). Local schools with large numbersof foreign students have designed “Japaneseclasses” with specially trained teachers,developed teaching manuals, hired personaltutors and aides, and offered counseling andtranslation services for foreign students andparents.

Loca l munic ipa l governments havedemonstrated considerable independent policy-making initiative by granting such localcitizenship rights and services to their foreignresidents (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000: 245).Undoubtedly, this is partly by default, as thenational government has effectively withdrawnfrom this policy domain. Nonetheless, localgovernments’ willingness to take independentaction is quite remarkable given that they arepursuing a policy objective that conflicts withthat of the national government. By treatingforeign workers as settled residents and local

citizens, local governments are seeminglychallenging the national government, whichviews immigrants as only temporary laborpower. In this, Japan differs notably from Italyand Spain, whose national governments haveofficially endorsed the social integration ofimmigrants and delegated to local governmentsand NGOs the responsibility for crafting andimplementing specific programs.

Some scholars have questioned the ability oflocal governments to provide civic citizenshipbased on equal rights for all residents(Beauregard and Bounds 2000: 249; Borja andCastells 1997), noting a decline in localgovernments’ power and authority as well astheir relative inability to deal with globalchanges. However, local governments are notmerely subordinate service deliverers thatimplement national government policies. Theyhave become important and independentpolicymakers in their own right, especially interms of immigrant social integration (Body-Gendrot and Schain 1992; Isin 2000b: 8–9).Although Japan’s relatively centralizedgovernmental system limits independent actionby localities in a number of ways (more soperhaps than in some Euro-Americancountries), local governments have shownconsiderable autonomy in certain policy areas.Since the 1960s they have engaged inprogressive local policy making in areasignored by the national government or in activeopposition to national priorities (Jain 1989;Tegtmeyer Pak 2000: 245; Steiner 1980).Likewise, in terms of immigrant citizenship andsocial integration, localities in Japan haveemerged as innovative policymakers and themain source of rights and services for foreignresidents.

There are a number of reasons why localgovernments have become actively engaged inimmigrant social integration policy andcitizenship rights despite a lack of support orguidance from the national government (seeTegtmeyer Pak 2000, 2001). Unlike national

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governments, localities cannot ignore theforeign residents in their midst, who havesocial needs that cannot be neglected withoutnegative social repercussions on thesurrounding community. In particular, localgovernments are concerned about the potentialfor conflict between Japanese and foreignresidents, and they realize that proactiveimmigrant incorporation policies can do muchto relieve local tensions. In addition, localgovernments are legally responsible for thewelfare of all local residents (including foreignones), and they benefit from immigrants, whosupport the local economy as workers,consumers, and taxpayers. NGOs andacademics representing foreign workers havelobbied local governments for immigrant rights,especially because the national government hasbeen unresponsive in this area. Finally, localgovernments have created an autonomouspolicy-making space for themselves byconveniently appropriating and redefining thenational government’s project of “localinternationalization” to include immigrantincorporation programs.[3]

NGO service providers and immigrantactivism

Nongovernmental organizations have also beenactive in providing services and rights to localimmigrant residents. Although localgovernments have been much more inclusive offoreign workers than has the nationalgovernment, their citizenship still has limitsbecause it does not encompass the mostmarginalized of foreign workers—theundocumented. Local officials feel that theirsocial incorporation programs cannot includeundocumented foreign workers, who generallydo not register with municipal governmentsand are therefore not considered part of thelocal community (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000: 250). Infact, under Japanese immigration law, allgovernment officials are required to reportillegal immigrants to the Immigration Bureau(Komai 2001: 121). As a result, local NGOs

have stepped in to provide undocumentedforeigners with basic services and to protecttheir human rights, thereby granting them alimited form of local citizenship by implicitlyrecognizing them as legitimate local residents,even if municipal governments have not.

Shipper (2002) counts about two hundredNGOs assisting foreign workers in Japan. Manyare volunteer citizens groups supportedprimarily by donations, foundations,membership and service fees, and localgovernments. They assist unauthorizedimmigrants to resolve labor disputes andproblems with abusive employers; to gainaccess to medical services and coverage,education, and housing; and to handle issuesrelated to immigration status, arrest, anddetention. Others are faith-based (mainlyChristian) NGOs or women’s support groupsthat protect immigrant women fromprostitution, sexual exploitation, and violence(both at work and at home). In addition,Japanese Christian churches have welcomedforeigners into their congregations, providingan informal means of social support. Japanesecommunity labor unions[4] have also beensomewhat involved in the defense of migrantworkers’ rights, interceding in cases ofemployer exploitation, labor law violations, orworkplace accidents. Some professionalassociations also assist foreign workers. Theseinclude medical support groups that offer low-cost treatment, medical information,translation and consultation services, healthinsurance, and assistance in the case ofworkplace accidents. Lawyer associations havepublished human rights handbooks forimmigrants and offered legal consultationservices to resolve various types of disputes.Although many NGOs primarily assistunauthorized immigrants, they also serve legalforeign residents.

Although local governments and NGOs aregenerally serving two different immigrantconstituencies (legal versus illegal foreign

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workers), their efforts are not mutuallyexclusive. Local governments support NGOnetworks (sometimes including financialsupport), and NGO service providers lobbylocal governments, request their assistance,and work with them to develop programs (seeTegtmeyer Pak 2000; Shipper 2002). In fact,some local governments rely so heavily onNGOs for some immigrant service delivery andcommunity outreach, that they shirk theresponsibilities of local governments.

In addition, NGOs are not mere serviceproviders for marginalized foreign residents,but activist organizations that defend and fightfor these residents’ rights. In this sense,citizenship is not simply a conferral of rights; ithas an active, performative dimension in whichits boundaries are contested and challenged bymarginalized, excluded groups (cf. Chung2002; Isin 2000b; Marx 1996). Again, localcities have become the primary site for suchclaims-making and activism because they arewhere the socioeconomic inequalities producedby global capital are most concentrated,causing disadvantaged and marginalizedimmigrant groups to mobilize politically forcitizenship rights (Marx 1996; Sassen 1999,2000).

NGOs have struggled to improve immigrantrights in a number of ways. First, by offeringrights and services to unauthorized immigrantresidents, they have contested and expandedthe local government’s definition of who is alegitimate community member worthy of localcitizenship. Second, they have protected anddefended foreign workers whose human rightshave been infringed by unscrupulous employerswho violate labor laws or force women intoprostitution, by husbands who abuse theirimmigrant wives, by local businesses orlandlords that discriminate against foreigners,and by a national government that does notprovide health coverage or social welfare toundocumented immigrants and detains them ininhumane conditions. In addition, NGOs often

monitor compliance with laws and regulationsthat apply to foreign workers (especially in theworkplace), helping to ensure that they areproperly implemented. Finally, they havefought to expand foreign workers’ rightsthrough lobbying of local and nationalgovernments, legal action through the courts,appeals to international human rightsconventions and organizations, and grassrootspolitical mobilization.

The Limits of Local Citizenship andActivism in Japan and Other Countries ofRecent Immigration

Despite the dominant focus on nation-states asthe source of citizenship, localities in countriesof recent immigration have proven to be amuch more inclusive, effective, and reliablesource of rights and services for migrantworkers. In contrast to national governments,many of which continue to view immigrantsstrictly as temporary labor power and asculturally alien outsiders, local governmentsand nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)have welcomed foreign residents into theircommunities as local citizens even though thenation-state has refused to do so. When theguarantees of local citizenship have beeninsufficient, NGOs and local activists havestepped in to defend and expand the rights ofimmigrants. As a result, migrant workers havebeen able to enjoy substantive citizenshiprights even in the absence of nation-staterecognition.

As an alternative to the formal citizenshipgranted by the nation-state, local citizenship ismore substantial and viable than the nominaland ultimately unenforceable rights oftransnational and postnational citizenship.Nonetheless, our enthusiasm for localcitizenship should not blind us to its seriouslimits. When citizenship is left to localities,each with its own local conditions andcontingencies, it becomes subject to regionalvariation, ultimately sacrificing uniformity and

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quality. Even proactive local governments andNGOs have limited geographical jurisdictionand resources. In addition, foreign workersthemselves do not always claim and exercisetheir local rights, partly because of their senseof social and cultural marginalization in thehost country. Activism on behalf of migrantworkers also faces constraints that limit itseffectiveness.

Lack of uniformity: local variation inimmigrant rights

One of the hallmarks of formal citizenship isgeographical uniformity. National citizensreceive the same rights and privilegesregardless of where in the country they reside.Of course, citizens who are ethnic minorities ormembers of the underclass do not always enjoyequal rights, but the unevenness of nationalcitizenship derives from social groupmembership, not geographical location.Likewise, the formal citizenship rights thatnation-states grant to denizens and legalimmigrants are also constant acrossgeographical localities within the country’sborders.

In contrast, local citizenship rights lackgeographical uniformity, even within theborders of a single nation-state and can varyconsiderably from city to city. Because amunicipal government’s jurisdiction is limitedto a specific locality, it can only grant rightsand services to immigrants who reside in thelocal community. Although NGO serviceproviders are not strictly limited to the localcommunity (especially when they adviseimmigrants over the telephone or through Websites), most local NGOs have offices in only onelocation (at most, they have offices in a fewcities) and offer services only to immigrantsliving in their municipalities. There are veryfew nationwide NGOs that have branch officesin all major cities and localities.

Therefore, if immigrants move from a specific

community, they lose the rights and servicesthey were granted by that community’smunicipal government and local NGOs.Although they join a new community as localcitizens, the rights that the new localauthorities and organizations offer are likely tovary considerably in substance and quality.Therefore, in contrast to formal citizenshiprights, which remain constant across localities,local citizenship is geographically uneven andsubject to regional contingencies and variation.

There is substantial variation in citizenshiprights that different localities have offeredforeign workers in countries of recentimmigration, including countries in which thenational government has promulgated (andsubsidizes) a unified immigrant integrationpolicy that supposedly applies across regions.With implementation of national immigrantintegration policy delegated to the localities,considerable regional differences arise. In Italy,some regions have active and well-fundedprograms, while others have yet to implementlegislation for such a program. The disparitiesin local citizenship policies are even greater inJapan, which has no national immigrantintegration policy and no federal fundingearmarked for developing such programs.Certain cities, such as Kawasaki in KanagawaPrefecture, have promoted foreign residents’incorporation and civic participation throughactive welfare, language, counseling,educational, outreach, and interculturalprograms, as well as through municipalantidiscrimination ordinances and even limitedlocal political representation via advisorycouncils. Other cities with significantimmigrant populations, such as Kawaguchi inSa i tama Pre fec ture , have m in ima lincorporation programs that are limited toinformation brochures, language classes, andspecial events (see Tegtmeyer Pak 2000, 2001).Moreover, numerous migrant workers in Japanreside in cities with few foreign residents, citiesthat offer virtually no rights and servicesspecifically for this population.[5]

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There are multiple reasons for the unevennessof immigrant citizenship and integrationpolicies across localities in countries of recentimmigration. The first is the continuingstrength of regionalism. Italy and Spain wereamong the last Western European countries tobe formally unified as nation-states, and bothhave pronounced regional disparities ineconomic development, ethnic composition andculture, and local histories, which influencetheir reception of immigrants. Spain continuesto have semiautonomous ethno-national regionsthat have been granted more local authoritythan other regions to develop their ownimmigrant policies. In general, moreprosperous localities with greater need forforeign labor have implemented more proactiveintegration programs than have less developedregions. In addition, certain regions havereceived more central government funding forsuch programs, depending on the size of theirimmigrant populations, their proposed projects,and their political leverage.

Japan also has had a strong history ofregionalism. For most of its modern history, itwas divided into local kingdoms, and thecountry continues to display prominentregional differences in identities, dialects,cuisine, and local culture. In general, localitieswith more extensive historical experience withforeigners and immigrant minority groups, aswell as more active local internationalizationprograms in the past, have been more receptivetoward the recent wave of immigrants. Further,Japanese cities that have larger immigrantpopulations and that depend on and benefiteconomically from foreign workers generallyhave more developed immigrant citizenshippolicies and programs and a greater number ofactive NGO service providers. Undoubtedly,m o r e p r o s p e r o u s l o c a l i t i e s w i t hcorrespondingly greater tax revenues arewilling to commit more funds for immigrantprograms and for NGOs. Finally, localgovernments in cities where migrant workershave a more positive image and are more

locally visible (that is, more Japanese-descentnikkeijin, fewer illegals and sex workers) alsohave more active immigrant incorporationprograms (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000: 264–66).

In contrast, it could be argued that NGOs aremore active in cities with more undocumentedimmigrants and foreign sex workers. Becausethese immigrants are the most victimized butalso generally neglected by local governments,they have the greatest need for NGO servicesand protection. However, it is important to notethat NGO services vary in scope and quality notonly by locality but also from one organizationto another in the same locality, depending oninstitutional and financial resources, staffcompetence and experience, and localgovernment support.

Although local citizenship for immigrants willcontinue to be geographically uneven, therehas been considerable horizontal sharing ofimmigrant incorporation programs among localgovernments. According to Richard Samuels(1983), Japanese local governments have oftenrelied on horizontal linkages and cooperationwith other localities for policy-relevantinformation, and this “translocal policyinterdependence” has been just as important, ifnot more important, than policy guidance fromthe national government. The horizontaldissemination and adoption of policy ideas ismost prevalent among neighboring localgovernments (which create regional councilsfor information and policy exchange) andamong those with similar characteristics. It hasalso been driven by competitive rivalries amongmunicipal governments (Muramatsu 1988: 51).Such policy dissemination and sharing hasmade local immigrant citizenship more uniformacross localities and less subject to regionalcontingencies and variables. The result hasbeen an improvement in the quality andcoverage of local immigrant citizenshipnationwide.

A similar process is under way among NGOs

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that assist immigrants in Japan. They arebeginning to collaborate across cities in orderto share expertise and experiences, offersimilar services, and assist one another in fund-raising (Shipper 2002). Various NGOs havecreated support groups to accumulate andshare new knowledge about assisting foreignworkers and to strengthen their collectivebargaining power on behalf of immigrants(Shipper 2002: 60–63). Annual meetings andconferences for NGOs have also beenorganized, bringing organizations togetherfrom across the country. Finally, NGOs arecreating trans-local (and even national)networks to improve collaboration, informationsharing, and service delivery (see Shipper2002). These collaborative efforts have likelycreated more evenness in the quality of localcitizenship services that NGOs offer to foreignworkers in various localities in Japan. Similarprocesses of policy emulation and informationsharing may also exist among local NGOs inItaly, Spain, and South Korea, resulting inenhanced uniformity in local citizenshipprograms in these countries.

Lack of substantive citizenship: low civicparticipation among foreign residents

Another factor that hampers the effectivenessof local citizenship in countries of recentimmigration is foreign workers’ under-participation in integration programs andservices. Citizenship is not simply a bundle ofrights that governments or institutions bestowon individuals as members of a community.Unless these rights are actively claimed andexercised through individuals’ recognition oftheir civic belonging and commitment,citizenship is not substantive.

However, in many recent countries ofimmigration, foreign workers do not feel thestrong sense of civic attachment and belongingto their residential communities that isnecessary for effective local citizenship. Manyworker migrants, particularly recent migrants,

view themselves as temporary sojournerswhose primary objective is to save as muchmoney as possible in a short period of time.Their work-centered l ives make themuninterested in utilizing the immigrant servicesand programs that municipal governments andNGOs offer, except for basic necessities such ashealth insurance or emergency medical care.Their general status as migratory transientsalso means that they may be less concernedabout local citizenship issues than are long-term or permanent immigrants: issues such asrights to equal employment, education,institutional access, and local politicalrepresentation.

Moreover, foreign workers in recent countriesof immigrat ion tend to be cultural lyunassimilated and face significant cultural andlinguistic barriers in the host society. As aresult, they are socioculturally marginalized bythe native residents in local communities andself-segregate in immigrant enclaves, furtherdampening their sense of civic community andengagement as local citizens. In fact, a certainamount of cultural citizenship may be aprerequisite for active substantive citizenship.

In addition, foreign workers in countries ofrecent immigration often work on temporarycontracts and/or switch jobs frequently insearch of better wages or working conditions,leading them to move from one city to another.They do not remain anywhere long enough tofeel a sense of participatory belonging as localcitizens. Moreover, foreign workers in recentcountries of immigration tend to be culturallyunassimilated and face significant cultural andlinguistic barriers in the host society. As aresult, they are socioculturally marginalized bythe native residents in local communities andself-segregate in immigrant enclaves, furtherdampening their sense of civic community andengagement as local citizens.

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Brazilian immigrant children play neartheir homes in Izumi

Therefore, even if local governments and NGOsregard foreign workers as long-termcommunity residents entitled to citizenshiprights, many migrants view themselves much asdoes the national government—as temporary,transient outsiders who are in the host societysolely for economic gain. Although variousmunicipalities have accorded them localcitizenship, many of them have neither felt likenor acted like substantive citizens. Thiscontrasts with countries with longer anddeeper traditions of immigration, which havehad stable, settled foreign-born populations fordecades, along with growing numbers ofculturally assimilated second-generationimmigrant minorities. Not only have theseimmigrants developed long-term civiccommitments to their local communities, theyalso have more complex sociopolitical needsand have demanded a further expansion ofrights. In Japan, the experience of severalhundred thousand Korean residents (migrantswho came to Japan prior to 1945 and settled),may eventually motivate more recentimmigrants to become engaged as localcitizens.

Although there are no comprehensive statistics,one can surmise that only a small minority ofJapan’s total population of foreign workersparticipates in the programs and servicesoffered by local governments and NGOs. This is

certainly true for the Japanese-descentnikkeij in, the most settled immigrantpopulation in Japan with the highest level ofJapanese cultural competence (Roth 2002,Tsuda 2003). In fact, many immigrants in Japanare even unaware of the limited rights to whichthey are entitled under Japanese national law(Terasawa 2000) and the services offered bylocal governments. Apichai Shipper (2002: 60)reports, for example, that most migrantw o r k e r s h a v e n o t h e a r d a b o u t t h eapproximately two hundred NGOs that assistimmigrants in Japan. Similar situations mayprevail in other countries. For instance, manyforeign workers in South Korea are alsounaware of their immigrant rights and theservices offered by local NGOs. The situation isexacerbated for illegal immigrants, whose fearof apprehension and deportation often causethem to refrain from using government servicesor exercising worker rights even when they areaware of them (see, for example, Terasawa2000).

Demand for local citizenship programs mayalso be relatively low if local institutions arenot delivering the rights and services thataddress immigrants’ most pressing socialneeds. Even though some munic ipalgovernments in Japan have conducted surveysto identify foreign residents’ needs and havecreated foreigner advisory councils, their socialintegration programs are run by Japaneseofficials, with limited immigrant input andparticipation. In addition, NGOs that serveimmigrants are mainly staffed by Japanese (incontrast to NGOs in Spain, which activelyrecruit immigrants for their organizations).Many NGO volunteers are middle-classJapanese citizens who sympathize with themarginalized and dispossessed and arecommitted to social equality and human rights(Stevens 1997), turning these NGOs intolargely paternalistic organizations that bestowservices based on their own assumptions aboutwhat is best for their foreign residents.

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To date, Japan has few NGOs created and runprimarily by immigrants. Some immigrant-runorganizations have had difficulty sustainingactivities because of the transient nature oftheir members, internal conflicts overleadership and organizational objectives, andlack of interest among their own compatriots.Even “multicultural” NGOs in other countriesof recent immigration such as Spain which useimmigrant staff to deliver culturally sensitiveservices end up running highly specializedprograms tailored to a single immigrant group,and many of these programs are inferior to orduplicate the more generalized services offeredby governmental welfare agencies. However, inJapan, where few government welfare agenciesare assisting foreign workers, immigrant-runNGOs could serve a crucial function notcovered by Japanese NGOs or l oca lgovernments.

In addition, local citizenship in countries ofrecent immigration tends to be “episodic”; theforeign workers who do claim their rights andutilize services do so not as long-term civicparticipants, but in response to immediateproblems or emergencies. This is partly a resultof social integration programs that are as yetunderdeveloped and often limited to crisismanagement, and partly attributable to theintention of most foreign workers to repatriateafter a temporary sojourn, which causes themto draw on immigrant services only for short-term, instrumental purposes.

The services Japanese NGOs provide forundocumented immigrants offer the mostvisible example of this episodic citizenship.Instead of being active, contributing membersof these organizations, most foreign workersonly appear at NGO offices when they needhelp with a serious problem and leave quicklyonce the issue is resolved (Shipper 2002: 60,63). This is especially true for medical NGOswhich tend to focus on emergency assistancefor workplace accidents, sudden illness, or lackof medical access or insurance. For instance,

foreign workers enroll in these NGOs’ healthinsurance programs but may stop payingpremiums once their illness has been treated(Shipper 2002: 41–42). Japanese labor unionsthat welcome foreign workers have alsoexperienced episodic participation. Instead ofbecoming active union members working toimprove conditions for all immigrants, foreignworkers often join labor organizations in orderto resolve a specific dispute with an employerand then stop paying dues thereafter (Roberts2000; Shipper 2002: 22).

Some local-government social integrationprograms (such as counseling services) alsooffer crisis assistance to foreign residents whogenerally do not participate in the civiccommunity. Participation in these localprograms tends to be less episodic. Theseprograms (language classes, cultural exchangeactivities, and foreigners’ advisory councils)require some ongoing commitment. Forexample, local education for immigrantchildren usually involves a long-terminstitutional commitment by settled immigrantfamilies. A number of immigrant parents(especially the Latin American nikkeijin) havebecome actively involved in their children’seducation and school activities, and evenparticipate in local parent-teacher groups.Sustained participation in such programs,however, is limited to a small portion of theimmigrant community.

Conclusion: Toward Local-NationalCollaboration in Immigrant CitizenshipPolicy

The importance of local citizenship in countriesof recent immigration such as Japan is of greatimportance. With national governmentsfrequently hostile toward immigration, oremphasizing immigration control overprotection of immigrant rights, localgovernments and NGOs have been the onlyofficial organizations providing essential rightsand social services to foreign residents who

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have settled in local communities. In theprocess, they have demonstrated thatimmigrants can enjoy substantive rights evenwithout the formal citizenship conferred by thenation-state. A number of localities havecrafted innovative programs and services thatare sensitive to local needs and sufficientlyspecialized to address basic needs of Japan’sincreasingly diverse foreign worker population.

Nonetheless, the emerging local citizenshipdoes suffer from some serious limitations. Theimmigrant integration programs of municipalgovernments and NGOs are each restricted to asingle geographical locality, and they varywidely in quality and coverage from city to city.Although some Japanese cities have providedextensive rights and services, most have beenless welcoming to their foreign residents(Komai 2001: 120; Machimura 2000: 191).Even the more support ive municipalgovernments are hampered by a lack ofresources--they have limited local tax revenues,and the national government has generallybeen unwilling to offer financial support.Likewise, some NGO services are alsounderfunded and understaffed. Theseorganizations have also tended to becomehighly specialized, sometimes focusing on aspecific group of immigrants or a narrow set ofissues. In sum, local citizenship remains at bestan uneven and uncoordinated conferral ofrights without firm governmental guarantees.In the final analysis, only the nationalgovernment can implement policies thatprovide a uniform set of services and rights forimmigrants across localities.

There have been a number of significant stepstoward extending formal citizenship rights toimmigrants and offering social and welfareprograms to assist them. For instance, in 1996Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare finallybegan compensating hospitals for some of theunpaid medical bills of foreign workers whohad no health insurance, thus relieving localgovernments of this costly responsibility. There

have also been initial steps toward a nationaleducation policy for immigrant children. In theearly 1990s the Ministry of Education began aprogram to increase the number of Japanese-language teachers for foreign students, setaside hours for special Japanese languageclasses, and issued a language textbook andteaching guide. In recent years , thegovernment has decided to provide specializedJapanese language instructors in schools withlarge numbers of nikkeijin children, andimprove social insurance coverage andworking/housing conditions in communitieswith high nikkeijin concentrations. Atminimum, the Japanese government, like thoseof Italy and Spain, needs to provide funding tolocalities for their immigrant service andwelfare programs and provide some nationalcoordination and guidance by issuing a proforma immigrant integration policy or a set ofguidelines.

National governments can implement extensiveprograms that provide uniform services andrights nationwide that are characteristic offormal citizenship. However, such general (one-size-fits-all) programs may not be sufficientlysensitive to the needs of specific immigrantgroups or localities when compared to theparticularity of local citizenship. In addition,federal programs and services may be evenmore underutilized than those offered bylocalities, especially among the large number ofillegal immigrants who are afraid of federalauthorities. For instance, although theJapanese government has shelters for abusedmigrant women, the shelters are not fullyutilized because most of the women areundocumented and hence reluctant to come tothe attention of federal authorities (Shipper2002: 32). Although the Ministry of Justice’sHuman Rights Bureau has consultation servicesfor foreign residents, it is doubtful that manyillegal immigrants use this service, since theyfear being reported to the Immigration Bureau(also part of the Ministry of Justice).

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In the end, any coherent, effective immigrantcitizenship and social integration policy muststrike a balance between national and localpolicy making and service delivery, and the roleof NGOs in supporting immigrant rights.

Takeyuki Tsuda is associate professor ofanthropology, Arizona State University. He isthe author of Strangers in the ethnic homeland:Japanese Brazilian return migration intransnational perspective and coeditor withWayne Cornelius of Japan: Government policy,immigrant reality. In Controlling immigration:A global perspective.

He wrote this article for Japan Focus. Posted onMay 26, 2008.

Notes

[1] This does not mean, of course, that theyhave never experienced significant immigrationin the past or that immigration has never beenimportant for their past nation-building (seeTsuda and Cornelius 2004 for the Japanesecase). From 1910-1945, when significantnumbers of Japanese left the country tocolonize Asia and then fight in World War II,2.1 million Koreans immigrated to Japan --some as forced laborers -- to work in Japanesefactories (see Weiner 1994). Although a goodnumber of them repatriated after the war,many remained in Japan, creating a Korean-Japanese minority of well over 1.5 million thatcontinues to suffer from ethnic discriminationand economic marginalization. Thus, thepost-1985 influx of foreign workers is just thelatest chapter in Japan’s immigration history.

[2] This does not include the Korean Japanesewho are born and raised in Japan but have notnaturalized and are still registered as“foreigners.”

[3] The nat ional government ’s localinternationalization programs also includedfunding for localities and the authority to raise

funds locally (see Tegtmeyer Pak 2001: 15–16).

[4] Most of Japan’s workers are organized incompany-specific enterprise unions, not byindustry. However, since most foreign workersare not formal employees of these companies(virtually all are on temporary contracts), theycan only join community unions (Shipper 2002:20).

[5] The notable exceptions are local schools,which require even the children of illegalimmigrants to attend as long as they have localaddresses and emergency medical coverage,which some local governments have offered toillegal foreign workers (Sellek 2001: 149–52,201).

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