Literature Review - port.ac.uk · 3.2.2 Employee Engagement and Motivation ... For the purpose of...
Transcript of Literature Review - port.ac.uk · 3.2.2 Employee Engagement and Motivation ... For the purpose of...
Pay Modernisation Project December 2015
Literature Review Andrew Wright & Sanam Ammari
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Key Findings
Improving performance of underperformers through pay is unproven but
rewarding those who do perform has symbolic value, aiding line of sight
between employee and strategy, communicating new strategic intent and
improving accountability in the public sector.
Transparency, fairness, communication and staff involvement are key.
As outputs are hard to define, there is much criticism of sole reliance on
quantitative performance measures, especially for academic work.
Measures should be used within a rich and open conversation about the
‘whole’ job and not dictate the conversation.
Due to the potential for unintended consequences, evaluation of the effects of
the system should be undertaken.
A reward café, with a broad range of non-financial rewards, with the individual
free to choose, rewarding work in general, should address concerns of
harming intrinsic motivation but will need monitoring. Money should only be a
small part of the reward strategy.
Selected Articles the Universities and Colleges Employers Association found that successful
performance-related pay schemes need:
o to be situated within wider reward strategy (with range of financial &
non-financial rewards)
o clear rationale for introduction
o a robust, transparent Performance and Development Review system to
underpin pay decision
o to have limitations recognised (the need for good management,
development and job design more significant for motivation and
productivity)
o a clear line of sight with individual objectives and the organisations
o employee consultation
o transparency and communication
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o a balance of quantitative measures of performance with qualitative
assessment of behaviour (although they fail to proffer advice how)
o enough budget to differentiate performance levels
o detailed understanding of workforce profile, their reward needs and
expectations (UCEA, 2014)
Podgursky and Springer’s (2007) overarching lesson was that trial and error
was required to formulate right set of performance incentives as the literature
is not robust enough to say which design works.
Maslach et al. (2001) suggested that while a lack of rewards and recognition
can lead to burnout, appropriate recognition and reward is important for
engagement.
Chawla & Sondhi (2011) suggest a strong correlation between reward
fairness and employee commitment in both the industrial and academic
sector.
Heinrich’s (2007) study of US public sector targets-based incentives schemes
provides reason for caution, finding them more likely to encourage
misrepresentation of performance and other strategic behaviours than to
recognize and motivate exceptional performance or performance
improvements (emphasis added).
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Contents 1 Performance ............................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 4 1.2 Managing Performance ..................................................................................... 4 1.3 Performance Management in Higher Education Institutions ............................. 4 1.4 Measuring Performance .................................................................................... 5
1.4.1 Measuring Performance in Higher Education Institutions ........................... 5 1.5 Performance Pay .............................................................................................. 7
1.5.1 Performance Pay in the Public Sector ........................................................ 7 1.5.2 Performance Pay in Education ................................................................... 8 1.5.3 Performance Pay in Higher Education Institutions ...................................... 9
2. Theoretical Background ....................................................................................... 10 2.1 Objective Setting ............................................................................................. 10 2.2 Motivation ........................................................................................................ 10
2.2.1 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation ............................................................... 10 2.2.2 Public Service Motivation .......................................................................... 12
2.3 Theories of Organisational Performance......................................................... 13 2.3.1 Agency Theory .......................................................................................... 13 2.3.2 Stewardship Theory .................................................................................. 13 2.3.3 A Hybrid Approach? .................................................................................. 14
3. Behavioural Aspects ............................................................................................. 14 3.1 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................... 15 3.2 Engagement .................................................................................................... 15
3.2.1 Engagement in Higher Education Institutions ............................................ 16 3.2.2 Employee Engagement and Motivation ..................................................... 17
3.3 Job Satisfaction ............................................................................................... 17 3.4 Commitment .................................................................................................... 18
4. Equality ................................................................................................................ 19 4.1 Gender ............................................................................................................ 20
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1 Performance 1.1 Introduction Performance is an ambiguous concept which can be applied to individuals and
organisations: individuals performing well when meeting objectives set by
management (Harvard Business Essentials, 2006), organisations when they meet
the requirements of their stakeholders (Neely et al., 2002). In addition to being
framed by entity: individual, group or organisation, performance is usually defined in
terms of the tasks to be completed or goals needed to be achieved (Franco-Santos
et al., 2014).
1.2 Managing Performance Indicative of the different levels performance can refer to, Franco-Santos et al.
(2014, p 9) define performance management as ‘the evolving formal and informal
mechanisms used to ensure the institution attains its aims and objectives satisfying
its stakeholders and being sustainable’. Armstrong (2009, p 9) defines as ‘a
systematic process for improving organizational performance by developing the
performance of individuals and teams’. Fletcher asserts (2010, p 38) successful
performance management ‘should affect all aspects of the organisation's functioning;
it is a holistic phenomenon’.
1.3 Performance Management in Higher Education InstitutionsThe use of performance management in Higher Education Institutions stems from
New Public Management (Broadbent, 2007). New Public Management utilises
practices generally found in the private sector, including performance targets with
quantitative measures, individual appraisal and external audits (Hood, 2001). This is
directly opposed to old public management, which had professionalism, self-
management, implicit standards and qualitative performance measures as its tenets.
New Public Management espouses the view that managers are essential for
administering public sector organisations (Deem et al., 2007). In the 1980s,
influenced by New Public Management, the Jarett Committee, a committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals, proposed that Higher Education Institutions adopt
performance management practices including quantitative performance indicators
and individual performance appraisals (Jarratt Committee, 1985). The Research
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Excellence Framework (following on from Research Assessment Exercise) and
National Student Survey were introduced into the sector subsequently, being used
by the media since to compile performance league tables. The Research Excellence
Framework used, in part, to determine the size and allocation of funding.
1.4 Measuring Performance The measuring of performance is a contentious issue, as it assumes performance is
measurable. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that, as performance can not be
perfectly known in advance, perfect measures are unlikely to be found, Stewart and
Walsh (1994, p 45) concurring:
“the dilemma of performance management in the public domain is to
secure effective performance when the meaning to be given to it can
never be completely defined, and the criteria by which it is judged can
never be finally established”.
In addition to the difficulty in finding perfect measures, Goodhart’s Law states as
soon as economic indicators are used as performance targets, they lose their ability
to be reliable and appropriate indicators (in Martin, 2011): Martin concluding
‘accuracy is a diminishing return’. In the absence of perfect measures, proxy
indicators are used, which Franco-Santos et al. define as ‘quantitative measures that
approximate or serve as surrogates of performance’ (2014, p 12).
1.4.1 Measuring Performance in Higher Education Institutions In Higher Education Institutions, research quality is measured by proxy through the
Research Excellence Framework, where publication in top-rated journals is used.
The National Student Survey is used as proxy for quality of teaching. There have
been various criticisms of performance measures in Higher Education Institutions,
including: reactivity of staff including gaming, goal displacement and counterstrategy
(Osterloh & Frey, 2014; Martin, 2011, Frost & Brockman, 2014); increased research
productivity at the cost of creativity and innovation (Osterloh & Frey, 2014; Vakkuri &
Meklin, 2003; Ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012; Heinze et al., 2009; Frey, 2003; Alvesson
& Sandberg, 2013); increasing the total cost of research by creating transfer markets
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(Power, 1997) and inadequacy of measures (Martin, 2011) leading to hostility (Leigh,
2013, focused on teachers but transferable). Accounting Education ran a special
edition dedicated to the negative side-effects in 2015 (including Sangster finding
administrative coding reducing cross-disciplinary collaboration in Australia; Moya et
al. finding a negative impact on knowledge transfer to society from higher weighting
for academic journals in Spain). Finding adequate measures of teaching is a key
challenge: the National Student Survey being influenced by teaching style, not
validity of content, and peer review requiring many reviewers from the same
background and consistently applied over time to be effective (Terpstra & Honoree,
2008).
An issue with proxy measurements, highlighted by Franco-Santos et al., is eventually
means can become ends: ‘proxy indicators are perceived to represent true
performance’ (2014, p 12). Broadbent (2007) stating they make the measurable
visible, the unmeasurable invisible: Power (1997) observing a decline in editing
books, organising conferences and facilitating others research as consequence.
Bates and Holton (1995) state the importance of determining whether the objective is
for performance outcomes or behaviour to be measured. Despite the potential for
inaccuracy in performance measurement, ‘by virtue of their necessary reductionism’
(Power, 2004, p 778), measures are needed to define performance at each level.
Power (1997) suggests, if there is a solution to unintended side effects of auditing
performance, it lies in making the effects of auditing visible, through assessment of
influence on outcomes. Oakes and Berry (2009) identify that this accounting
‘colonisation’ can be interpreted in three main ways (with 7 additional
considerations), each having different potential behavioural responses. Due to this
complexity, open discussion is called for: measures should be used to support
conversation between appraiser and appraisee. Heinrich (2007) advising that
measures with high informational value should be an improvement on inputs, outputs
or cost measures for public sector employees. This view is also developing in the
private sector, Deloitte asking of their performance system, ‘what’s the most detailed
view of you we can gather and share?’ (Harvard Business Review, 2015).
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1.5 Performance Pay Performance-related pay can relate to a broad range of reward practices which
distribute variable amounts of money to employees, based on individual, team and
organisational performance (UCEA, 2013). For the purpose of this report, and taking
into consideration the parameters of the project it is written for, performance-related
pay will be confined to progression within grade (also termed ‘merit pay’ and
‘contribution pay’). Performance-related pay is the most popular pay approach in the
private sector in the UK (WERS 2011), and long established.
Performance-related pay has many reported benefits such as:
Motivating staff to increase performance (although only evidenced in roles
with easily measurable output) (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003)
Providing a line of sight between employee and business strategy
(Armstrong, 2012)
Delivering improved accountability and performance management,
particularly in the public sector (Marsden & Belfield, 2005)
Aiding or facilitating organisational change (Kessler & Purcell, 1992)
Enabling on-going renegotiation of the effort bargain (Marsden, 2009)
Whilst there is criticism of performance-related pays ability to improve performance
(UCEA, 2013), it has been found to have symbolic value, communicating new
strategic intent (Thompson, 2009) and that the principle is what is important
(Armstrong & Brown, 1999; Makinson, 2000). Prendergast’s (1999) meta-analysis
found performance-related pay scheme designs were very rarely structured in line
with theory, meaning it remains largely untested. Due to the afore-mentioned
prevalence of performance-related pay in the private sector, and the public sector
adopting Performance-related pay relatively late, following the advent of New Public
Management, there is a scarcity of robust research in the public sector, particularly
outside the US (Prentice et al., 2007). Research focussed in Higher Education is
scarcer still. This review will locate what there is within the Public Sector as a whole
and include Education where relevant.
1.5.1 Performance Pay in the Public Sector Studies have found limited evidence that performance-related pay has a positive
effect on the motivation of public sector workers but that it has the beneficial indirect
effect of pressuring line managers into setting more specific and effective targets
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(Ray et al., 2014; Marsden, 2009). Burgess et al. (2010) found team incentives
raised individual productivity but that reallocation of efficient workers had the most
significant impact on outcomes, reinforcing the importance of line management. In
addition, they found that non-financially motivated managers were most successful
although they cautioned these managers were also younger so long-term career
aspirations may be the root cause. Kontopantelis et al. (2014) found only modest
(albeit sustained) improvements in performance from substantial incentives from
British GPs. Taylor and Beh (2013) found that performance-related pay had no effect
on organisational citizenship behaviour among government employees. Frey et al.
(2013) caution performance-related pay and output measures can produce negative
outcomes in the public sector, suggesting variance of measures is required for more
ambiguous tasks.
1.5.2 Performance Pay in Education Belfield and Heywood (2008) found performance-related pay was not associated
with higher levels of job satisfaction. Guis (2013) conversely (but using a different
definition of ‘merit pay’) found merit pay affected job satisfaction but also noted lower
enthusiasm, lower importance given to teaching and effective teachers more likely to
pursue better pay elsewhere. Other negative effects include working fewer hours and
reduced participation in unpaid cooperative activities (Jones, 2013). There was no
overall impact on student achievement (Goodman and Turner, 2009). Gender seems
to be significant: in Belfield & Heywood’s (2008) study women received lower pay but
had higher levels of job satisfaction whilst Jones (2013) found males responded
more favourably than females. Leigh’s meta-analysis found new teachers more open
to performance pay than experienced teachers, with their hostility highest when
measured against test scores (Leigh, 2013). This concurred with Yuan et al.’s (2013)
findings where lack of acceptance of measures combined with low expectancy that
their efforts could impact results (with external factors deemed more influential).
Podgursky and Springer’s (2007) overarching lesson was that trial and error was
required to formulate right set of performance incentives as the literature is not
robust enough to say which design works. Leigh (2013) stated support of
autonomous staff is essential.
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1.5.3 Performance Pay in Higher Education Institutions The gender differences seen in Education are also seen in Higher Education
Institutions, with Terpstra and Honoree finding (again, in the US) that female faculty
staff were significantly more likely to feel that appraisal decisions were biased and
that performance standards were not communicated well. Age and tenure
observations in Higher Education Institutions were reversed, however, with young
and less senior faculty staff significantly more likely to have negative views:
perceiving that standards were not communicated well enough and also that
performance level pay distinctions were not wide enough (Terpstra & Honoree,
2008). Studying Higher Education Institutions in the UK and Netherlands, Sousa et
al. (2010) found research managers were ambivalent in two key ways: seeing
performance management targets as simultaneously part of the problem and
solution and seeing themselves as a buffer between ‘pure management’ and their
researchers. They advise a negotiation-based application with collaborative
leadership style. This recommendation concurs with Broadent’s call for the use of
relational Performance Management Systems: the difficulty in defining outputs in
Higher Education Institutions means that culture, ethics and trust are important
elements. Autonomy with active engagement with key stakeholders is advised to set
output means (Broadbent, 2007). In a report from 2014, the Universities and
Colleges Employers Association found that successful performance-related pay
schemes need:
to be situated within wider reward strategy (with range of financial & non-
financial rewards)
clear rationale for introduction
robust, transparent Performance and Development Review system to
underpin pay decision
to have limitations recognised (the need for good management,
development and job design more significant for motivation and
productivity)
a clear line of sight with individual objectives and the organisations
employee consultation
transparency and communication
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a balance of quantitative measures of performance with qualitative
assessment of behaviour (although they fail to proffer advice how)
enough budget to differentiate performance levels
detailed understanding of workforce profile, their reward needs and
expectations (UCEA, 2014)
2. Theoretical Background There are many economic theories relating to Performance (see UCEA Report,
2013, for further detail). Three main psychological theories have been identified
which underpin Performance Management: goal theory, motivation theory and
control theory. The latter in essence stating that, when given feedback on behaviour,
people recognise where they are failing to meet expectation and take action to
overcome it.
2.1 Objective Setting The underpinning theory which informs objective setting is goal theory. Goals are
used to: direct attention to priorities; stimulate effort and, encourage people to utilise
their skills and knowledge to increase likelihood of success (Latham & Locke, 1979).
Difficult goals being just as effective when set by a manager than self-set, provided
the manager provides their reasoning, and the goal is specific (Latham & Locke,
2006). Otley (2005) suggests the additional benefit of increasing managers’ sense of
ownership and commitment by involving them in the target-setting process. In their
meta-analysis, Ordonez et al. (2009) caution that negative effects have been largely
overlooked, citing narrow focus neglecting non-goal areas, a rise in unethical
behaviour, distorted risk preferences and reduced intrinsic motivation, as seen also
with measures. They advise careful application, consideration of the noted side
effects and close supervision.
2.2 Motivation 2.2.1 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation The importance of perception in the Motivational Crowding Effect (if staff perceive
the system as incentivising, the effects will apply) coupled with the finding that
professions with internalised standards of excellence have in general higher work
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motivation based on feelings of competence and self-determination, indicates
motivation needs to be considered.
Extrinsic motivation is the motivation to perform a behaviour for external factors such
as pay, whereas intrinsic motivation is the propensity to engage in a particular
behaviour due to a personal reward factor.
Monetary reward can crowd out intrinsic work motivation, under identifiable
conditions, but external interventions can raise intrinsic motivation, known as the
crowding-in effect (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Intrinsic motivation can be raised through
recognition, trust and loyalty, through personal relationships between principal and
agent and, increasing opportunities to participate (Frey, 1997). Interventions crowd
out when perceived as controlling (James, 2005; Frey, 1997). When perceived as
informative (eg positive feedback), or supporting the innate need for self-
determination and competence, intrinsic motivation is not affected, or can rise (Frey,
1997). James (2005) finds interventions are perceived as controlling when:
The object of an agent’s intrinsic motivation is also the source of their
extrinsic compensation. When an agent is intrinsically motivated to act
in the interest of the principal, it can be perceived as manipulating
when the principal introduces incentives.
The incentives are too large, as they are negatively related with
intrinsic motivation.
However, when motivated by generalised norms, such as work ethic and
professional standards, external to the narrow definitions of the principal’s interests,
it can be perceived as an affirmation of competence (James, 2005).
Rewards contingent of performance crowd out intrinsic motivation but if rewards
indicate competence they raise it. Rewarding work in general is found to be best for
this, contrary to the current Recognition Award scheme. Non-monetary gifts are
hypothesised as most suitable, as they acknowledge self-esteem (Frey & Jegen,
2001). However many studies suggest intrinsic rewards are more salient than
extrinsic rewards (Fresko, Kfir & Nasser, 1997). For example, a study of 100
teachers found that intrinsic rewards boosted teacher commitment more effectively
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than financial reward (Martinez-Pons, 1990). Bogler (2001) supported this idea and
concluded that leadership styles based on intrinsic rewards contribute positively to
teacher satisfaction and commitment.
2.2.2 Public Service Motivation Research has shown public sector employees differ to private sector in terms of
motivation (Bhagwat et al., 2004; Heath, 1999; Perry, 1996; DeHart-Davis et al.,
2006; Anderfuhren-Biget et al., 2010), with prosocial motivation having a more
significant role in public sector employees (Festre & Garrouste, 2008; Houston,
2006).
The implications of the Public Service Motivation literature are: to ensure the
performance-related pay system isn’t used in place of job design, as ‘meaningful
work’ was found by Houston (in the US) to be the most important factor for public
service employees; promotion opportunity the second (Houston, 2006). For public
service employees particularly, age decreases importance of income (Houston,
2000). Taylor and Taylor (2011), covering the UK and 14 other countries, found
Public Service Motivation had a link with higher performance but that there was still a
positive relationship between wages and effort, wages therefore still being important.
Heinrich’s study of US public sector targets-based incentives schemes provides
reason for caution, finding them more likely to encourage misrepresentation of
performance and other strategic behaviours than to recognize and motivate
exceptional performance or performance improvements. The theory and empirical
evidence does, however, suggest low-powered incentives may be desirable in
systems where performance is measured with less precision. They also found
systems need openness and fairness if they are to be consistent with stewardship or
public service motives for cooperative behaviour (Heinrich, 2007).
From the review, whether a reward café is perceived as non-monetary will depend
on the rewards on offer. The autonomy it affords staff should protect intrinsic
motivation.
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2.3 Theories of Organisational Performance In the context of public institutions, there are two main theories focused on
organisational performance and how the individual effects it: agency and
stewardship. Due to the different performance management mechanisms they call
for, it is important to identify the motivators of employees (Franco-Santos et al.,
2014).
2.3.1 Agency Theory Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) defines employees as self-interested,
opportunistic and extrinsically motivated, in need of close managerial control, which
can take the form of performance measurement and evaluation systems (Franco-
Santos et al., 2014). Agency theory places more emphasis on extrinsic motivation.
This approach has been criticised (Frey et al., 2013; Larkin et al., 2012;
Vandenabeel and Hondeghem, 2005, cited in Frey et al., 2013) for ‘failing to address
intrinsic motivation and other psychological factors at work which are of high
importance in the public sector’ (Frey et al., 2012, p 950). Academics reside in this
group (if we are to reduce them to a homogenous group). Research undertaken by
Doolin (2002) found that employees were likely to resist control practices that
challenged their professional autonomy.
2.3.2 Stewardship Theory Stewardship theory addresses this by modelling employees as stewards, where
behaviours which are pro-organisational and collectivistic are of more use than
individualistic ones and whose interests can be in line with organisational goals
(Davis et al., 1997). This theory assumes a focus on intrinsic rewards. Hernandez
defining stewardship as ‘the extent to which an individual willingly subjugates his or
her personal interests to act in protection of others’ long-term welfare’, asserting
stewardship behaviours can be enacted across all organisational levels; not just by
those in positions of power (Hernandez, 2012, pp 174-5). This is clearly linked with
Public Service Motivation and assessing areas and levels of presence will be a
significant challenge of the primary research.
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2.3.3 A Hybrid Approach? Generally viewed as opposing theories (Segal & Lehrer, 2012; Hernandez, 2012),
Franco-Santos et al. (2014) propose that, when Higher Education Institutions are
simultaneously pursuing goals of varying complexities and time scales, a hybrid
approach of agency and stewardship mechanisms can and should be used. This
concurs with Weick’s (1976) assertion, which can be interpreted as advising strong
steward mechanisms with lighter use of agency mechanisms, to deliver long-term
objectives.
Davis et al. (1997) present a model where managers can chose to behave as
stewards or agents, their choice dependent on their perception of the situation and
their motivation. They found that if either the manager or principal perceives the
other will act opportunistically, they will be best to act in an agency fashion (which
has the lowest risk), the organisation receiving a suboptimal return (Davis et al.,
1997). For the organisation, fostering a work environment where employees feel they
can adopt steward behaviours seems beneficial for pursuing long-term or ill-defined
goals (Franco-Santos et al., 2014b) and where mutual stewardship choices can be
made, potential performance is optimised (Davis et al., 1997), positively influencing
longevity and the organisations locale (Hernandez, 2012). This has been found to be
the case in Higher Education Institutions in the work of Broadbent and Laughlin
(2009) and Bolden et al. (2012).
3. Behavioural Aspects In both the private and public sector, rewards (above base salary) have the main role
to keep employees motivated, engaged and attracted to their work (Bullock, Stritch &
Rainey, 2015). ‘Employee attitude’ describes the actions of employees towards their
objectives and goals (Saari & Judge, 2004). There are many studies which suggest
that perceived organizational support is positively related to various employee
behaviours towards the organization (Knippenberg, 2015). Multiple studies suggest
rewards in both extrinsic and intrinsic form have positive effects on employee
behaviours. Imran et al. (2014) suggest a positive relationship between organisational
support and employee’s attitude and work commitment in academic sectors.
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3.1 Theoretical Framework There are a number of theories that potentially explain the relation between HR reward
practices and employee attitude: ‘organization support theory’, ‘social exchange
relationship’ and ‘norm of reciprocity’. The exchange of supports between employees
and employer refers as the main base of organization support theory: employees’
general perception about the extent to which the employer values their contributions
and cares about their well-being. This perception affects employee satisfaction levels
and encourages staff to engage more in their job (Eisenberger & Stinglhamber, 2011;
Kurtessis et al., 2015).
Social Exchange Theory is among the most influential conceptual paradigms for
understanding workplace behaviour (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). One of the basic
tenets of Social Exchange Theory is that relationships progress over time, becoming
trusting, loyal, and committed. Social exchange processes in the relationship between
employees and the organization have extensively shown their importance in explaining
the occurrence of important employee attitudes and behaviours (van Knippenberg et
al., 2015). Perceived reward practices plays an important role in the social exchange
relationship between the employee and the organization. This relationship is based on
norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), in this theory employees respond to benefits
received from the organization by showing loyalty, effort, and positive attitude in the
work place (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).
3.2 Engagement Work engagement represents a state in which employees bring their individual
experiences to play during role performances, signifying an emotional connection
between the employee and their work (Kahn, 1992; Rich et al., 2010). As such, work
engagement is fundamentally a behavioural concept that defines the active
allocation of personal resources toward the tasks associated with a work role
(Kanfer, 1990; Rich et al., 2010). Work engagement is also perceived as a personal
resource and the cognitive energy that employees bring to work (Rich et al., 2010).
In contrast with work engagement, Burnout refers to exhaustion which is illustrated by
relatively low correlations with professional efficacy (Green, Walkey & Taylor, 1991).
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Burnout and work engagement are independent states that are negatively related
(Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004; Schaufeli et al., 2002). However, this subject is more
specifically important in the Higher Education sector because, in comparison with
other professions, employees in Higher Education show higher levels of exhaustion
(the core dimension of burnout) (Maslach, Jackson, & Leiter, 1996). Academics who
experience greater demands on their time, attention and energy, while receiving fewer
rewards and less recognition, run a higher risk of becoming exhausted and alienated
from their work lives (Blix et al., 1994; Lackritz, 2004).
One of the most effective variables that affects employee engagement is reward
(Heneman et al., 2007; Halbesleben, 2010). To explain the relationship between
reward and employee engagement, Kahn (1990) reported that people vary in their
engagement as a function of their perceptions of the benefits they receive from a role.
Furthermore, a sense of return on investments can come from external rewards and
recognition in addition to meaningful work therefore, it follows, that employees’ will be
more likely to engage at work when they perceive a greater amount of rewards and
recognition for their role performances (Saks, 2006). Maslach et al. (2001) have also
suggested that while a lack of rewards and recognition can lead to burnout,
appropriate recognition and reward is important for engagement.
3.2.1 Engagement in Higher Education Institutions
An organisational supportive climate is positively correlated with the level of employee
work engagement (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007). Research also reveals that
motivational practices in the workplace can control negative effects of job stress on
work engagement. Studies reveal that in Higher Education both exhaustion and
cynicism were negatively correlated to the size of reward and recognition practices in
Higher Education (Barkhuizen, Rothmann & Vijver, 2014). Hakanen et al. (2006), on a
sample of over 2000 Finnish teachers, suggest that job control, information,
management support and reward climate were all positively related to work
engagement. Chikoko, Buitendach and Kanengoni (2014) indicate that reward and
recognition have positive effects on employee work engagement and psychological
meaningfulness: reward and recognition in Higher Education can increase job
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enrichment and meaningfulness amongst employees, leading to increased
productivity.
3.2.2 Employee Engagement and Motivation A study by Lardner (2015), on the public sector indicated a strong reward culture in
an organisation positively affects employee engagement and suggests that staff
familiarity and awareness to the reward system will lead to higher levels of employee
engagement and performance.
3.3 Job Satisfaction Job satisfaction is conceptualized as the positive or negative evaluative judgments
that people make about their jobs (Weiss, 2002). Traditionally, rewards are
considered a major determinant of job satisfaction. Danish and Usman (2010), in a
study on diverse types of organizations, addressed the importance of rewards as a
crucial contributor to the job satisfaction of employees, they reveal different
dimensions of work motivation and satisfaction are significantly correlated and
reward and recognition have great impact on employee motivation. In addition,
Amabile et al. (1994), Milne (2007) and Islam and Ismail (2008) indicate that reward
in intrinsic format (e.g. full appreciation of work done, good work conditions and job
security) is positively related to job satisfaction in public organisations and service
sectors.
In the discrepancy model of Porter and Lawler (1968) people's job satisfaction is
determined by a comparison of their current job conditions (including the rewards
they receive) to their ideal job. According to the equity model of Adams (1965)
people compare their input with output ratio – which reflects the rewards they receive
in return for their work performance – and this comparison determines whether they
feel satisfied in their job. However, other theories on job satisfaction suggests that
job rewards do not always affect job satisfaction. In particular, Herzberg's (1959) two-
factor theory conceptualizes pay as a hygiene factor rather than a satisfier. Hence, it
is predicted that satisfaction with pay does not affect job satisfaction. Hofmans,
Gieter & Pepermans (2013) explain that there are individual differences in the link
between job rewards and job satisfaction, they explain that for some people extrinsic
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rewards are related to satisfaction, whereas for other people intrinsic reward could
result to improving job satisfaction (Hofmans, Gieter & Pepermans, 2013). Grandey
et al. (2013) suggest that financial rewards for service performance were more likely
to enhance job satisfaction. Fang and Gerhart (2012) revealed job satisfaction and
retention in an organisation were highly related to the degree of matching reward
with effort towards work. Peters and Hopkins (2014), in a study in Higher Education,
suggest employees whose workload was characterized as high effort/low reward had
significantly greater rates of dissatisfaction (Peters & Hopkins, 2014). In contrast,
Deci et al. (1999) revealed that monetary reward could have negative impact on
employee attitude and job satisfaction. Gagné & Forest (2008) concur that
performance-contingent rewards reduce job satisfaction.
3.4 Commitment Organisational commitment is defined as the relative strength of an individual’s
identification with and involvement in an organisation (Kim & Kao, 2014). Committed
employees believe in and accept organisational goals and values, and are willing to
remain within their organisations and exert more effort in their work (Mowday et al.,
1979). Employees who show high organisational commitment tend to be more
enthusiastic and are more likely to contribute to the organisation mission and goals
(Freund, 2005; Kim & Kao, 2014).
Many studies reveal the significant effect reward and recognition has on attaining
high level work commitment amongst employees in organisations (Cropanzano et
al., 1997; Wayne et al., 1997). According to social exchange theory, when
employees believe that the organisation is concerned about them, they feel obligated
to commit to their organisation (Eisenberger et al., 2004). Employees who perceive
high levels of organisational support in terms of how their organisation values their
contribution or cares about their welfare will demonstrate increased commitment to
their work responsibilities.
Nagar (2012), in a study on 255 university lecturers, indicated that favourable work
setting is a key reward with employees responding by making a psychological
contract which may be demonstrated through more effort, greater participation in
work and organisational commitment. Furham (2009) stated that reward mechanism
19
plays an important role in motivating employees to exert considerable effort to meet
organisational goals, and to maintain membership in both private and public sectors.
Lee, Chen & Lee (2015) found that, when an organisation provides education and
training, a reward system and good communication channels, employees effectively
improve organisational commitment and performance. Chawla & Sondhi (2011)
suggest a strong correlation between reward fairness and employee commitment in
both the industrial and academic sector. They reveal that organisational commitment
in both sectors was heavily dependent on employee perception about the fairness of
rewards.
4. Equality Issues of particular concern regarding equal pay in performance and contribution-
related pay systems are:
female staff receiving, on average, significantly lower contribution-related pay
than male staff (or vice versa) where they are undertaking equal work
black and minority ethnic staff receiving lower performance assessments than
white colleagues, and in consequence lower payments
groups of staff being excluded from such payments where they are
undertaking equal work
applying different contribution-related pay systems to different groups of staff
undertaking equal work
contribution-related criteria that are potentially indirectly discriminatory by, for
example, being more characteristic of ‘male’ than ‘female’ behaviour or
emphasising features that individuals with caring responsibilities may have
greater difficulty in complying with, for example, willingness to work outside
normal hours
a reliance on staff putting themselves forward for bonuses, as some groups of
staff may, in general, be more likely than others to put themselves forward
20
The use of unique rewards systems (such as a cafeteria or flexible reward system) are
recommended to meet the needs of workers from different cultural backgrounds
(Stone et al., 2015).
Based on equity theory (Adams, 1965), employees must be able to see a clear
connection between their job performance and the reward system. Further, if
employees perceive a lack of equity in rewards, they may lower their level of job
performance or leave the organization. Cloninger, Ramamoorthy & Flood (2011)
suggest that equality based reward systems have positive effects on citizenship
behaviours.
4.1 GenderThe most commonly cited explanations of gender pay gaps are sexual discrimination
and ‘glass ceilings’, in essence, the differential treatment of individuals based on their
sex (UCEA, 2013b).
To explain the root of the gender inequality in reward systems, Blau & Kahn (2007)
state differences in performance evaluation is a drive for gender differences in
outcomes such as pay, promotions, or other organizational rewards. See sections
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education, the key finding being that female staff are more likely to feel appraisal
decisions are biased and performance standards are not communicated well.
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