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Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
1. The Effect of Religion on Meat Consumption and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
2. The Effect of a Government Planner’s Educational
Background on Environmental Outcomes in Autocratic
Regimes
3. Modeling the Economic Impact of Trade Regulation of
Invasive Species - The Case of the Apple Maggot
Quarantine Program in Washington State
List of Chapters
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
The Effect of Religion on Meat Consumption and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Yeon A Hong
Washington State University
August 11, 2017
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Motivation
Livestock sector accounts for 14.5 % of human-induced global green
house gas emissions (GHG) (FAO, 2013)
Direct factors causing an individual‘s dietary habit – income and
urbanization (Steinfeld, 2007; York an Gossard, 2004)
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Religion - Meat Consumption
Religion – a critical factor which influences an individual’s dietary
habits
Religion restricts an individual’s dietary choice – Hinduism and
Islam
India – Consumption of meat is not accompanied by income growth
as apposed to China and Brazil because of strong vegetarian
tradition and religious practices (Mohanty et al. 1998, Steinfeld,
2007)
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Research Question
Research Question
• How does religion affect meat consumption and subsequently GHG
emissions?
Objective
• Estimate religion elasticity of GHG emissions from meat
consumption
Contribution
• First study to theoretically link and empirically measure the
impact of religion on GHG emissions through meat consumption
• Unique cross-country panel data to measure the effect of religion
from multiple sources
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Incorporate an aspect of identity
• Each religion has its own prescriptions that indicate different ideal
behaviors for an individual in religious belief.
• An individual follows the prescriptions to keep identity shaped in
one’s religious belief (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
The extent of concern with identity is consistent across all
individuals within the same religious belief?
• Homogenous society in religion vs. Heterogeneous society
Theoretical Framework
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Theoretical Framework
ReligionIdentity
Concern Consumption
decision
Socially Accepted
Good
Socially Discouraged
Good
Production Level
– Endow. & Tech.
Religious
Homogeneity
Figure 1. Conceptual framework linking religion to the equilibrium level of socially accept
ed and discouraged goods under static general equilibrium model
Production Level
– Endow. & Tech.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
ReligionIdentity
Concern Consumption
decision
Socially Accepted
Good
Socially Discouraged
GoodReligious
Homogeneity
Household weighs a socially accepted good and a discouraged good
based on the degree of religious homogeneity within a society
• Homogenous society – magnitude of weight increases
• Heterogeneous society – magnitude of weight decreases
Theoretical Framework
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Equilibrium
Aggregate emissions
= Pollution emissions generated to produce one unit of the good
* Equilibrium quantity of the final good
Equilibrium of the
Final Good
Weight by
Household AWeight by
Household B
Production
Factors
Endowment,
Land & Labor
Socially Accepted Socially Discouraged
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Testable Implication
An increase in the religious homogeneity raises the equilibrium
level of a socially accepted good, but lowers the equilibrium level of
a socially discouraged good.
Because religions have their own distinctive prescriptions, the
influence of religious homogeneity on consumption of goods will
significantly vary from religion to religion.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Empirical Model
𝑀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑹𝒉′𝒊,𝒏,𝒕𝜷𝑹 + 𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑛 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡
𝑀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 indicates the equilibrium level of good 𝑗 for 𝑗 =
{𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑} in country 𝑛 for year 𝑡.
𝑹𝒉′𝒊,𝒏,𝒕 is a vector of measures of religious homogeneity for all
religions in category 𝑖 in country 𝑛 for year 𝑡.
𝐴𝑛,𝑡 is a measure of the factor productivity in country 𝑛 for year 𝑡
𝑆𝑛,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑛,𝑡 measure the endowed land and labor in country 𝑛 for
year 𝑡.
What are the expected signs of 𝜷𝑹 ?
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Data
We use country-level panel data including 44 developing countries
spanning from 2000 to 2011.
• In developing countries, the dietary transition actively occurs, and agricultural
emissions are seriously taking place due to limited access to modern technologies.
The measure of socially accepted and discouraged good
consumption is four types of meat consumption: cattle meat, pig
meat, chicken meat, and goat meat.
As the proxy of religious homogeneity, the religious prevalence
data are used, indicating the proportion of population believing in
four major religions, Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism
(ex. In Indonesia for the year 2005, 8.9% Christians, 88.6% Muslims, 0.6%
Buddhists, and 1.7% Hinduists of the total population)
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Cattle 47.61
Goat 50.93
Pig 8.56
Chicken 2.06
Variables Mean
Cattle meat (kg/capita) 6.76
Pig meat 2.25
Chicken meat 9.93
Goat meat 1.06
Christianity (%) 46.62
Buddhism 6.08
Islam 32.88
Hinduism 5.48
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Table 2. Emission Intensity (CO2-eq kg /kg product)
The measure of pollution emissions
per unit is GHG emissions intensity
of 1kg meat product.
Data
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Table 3. Effect of Religion on Meat Consumption, Two-Way Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logcattle logpig logchicken loggoat
Christianity 3.180*** 6.660*** -2.231** 2.458**
(0.998) (1.769) (1.117) (1.110)
Islam 1.561 -8.510*** -4.942*** 6.884
(1.615) (2.877) (1.895) (5.032)
Buddhism 8.683*** -1.481 -3.948 5.452*
(1.589) (3.996) (2.769) (2.897)
Hinduism -0.106* -0.023 -0.234 -0.101
(0.064) (0.096) (0.223) (0.068)
logmeadows&pastures -0.275** -0.189 -0.139 -0.216
(0.114) (0.449) (0.210) (0.181)
employment 0.004 0.017** -0.010 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
logagri-researchers -0.044 0.053 0.007 -0.096
(0.036) (0.138) (0.043) (0.149)
trade 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.003
(0.0009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
urb -0.026** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.005
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
N 352 265 372 130
adj. R-sq 0.984 0.987 0.978 0.997
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Religion Elasticity of GHG Emissions
Extra carbon emissions per capita from meat consumption for 1%
increase in the proportion of population believing in religion
evaluated at the sample mean
𝜕𝐺𝐻𝐺
𝜕𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐻𝐺=
𝜕𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝜕𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝜕𝐺𝐻𝐺
𝜕𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺
where 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑡, and 𝐺𝐻𝐺 are mean values reported in summary statistics.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Religion Elasticity of GHG Emissions
Cattle Pig Chicken Goat
0.58 -3.87*** -3.81*** 2.21
(0.98) (1.94) (1.66) (2.86)
Cattle Pig Chicken Goat
1.68*** 4.43*** -2.44*** 1.12*
(0.73) (1.42) (1.17) (0.75)
Cattle Pig Chicken Goat
0.60 -0.12 -0.56 0.32
(0.42) (1.16) (1.05) (0.71)
Cattle Pig Chicken Goat
-0.007 -0.002 -0.03 -0.005
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02)
Christianity
Islam
Buddhism
Hinduism
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.15 ** p<0.1 *** p<0.05
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Future works
We first plan to modify the theoretical model using a different
utility function proposed by Benjamin et al. (2010).
We then intend to create a new time-series index that indicates a
change in the degree of homogeneity within a country.
We plan to add an assessment of how changes in religious
landscape would affect GHG emissions from the livestock sector
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
The Effect of a Government Planner’s Educational
Background on Environmental Outcomes in
Autocratic Regimes
Yeon A Hong
Washington State University
August 11, 2017
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Motivation
A rise in the educational level of individuals along with economic
development provides an underlying mechanism for explaining
the environmental Kuznets curve (Panayotou, 1997, Stern, 2006).
The educated are more aware or environmental issues and are
likely to have a stronger preference for environmental amenities
(Farzin and Bond, 2006).
They organize advocacy groups to express their demands through
existing political channels along with votes (Fredrikssons et al.
2005)
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Motivation
Access to such political participation is restricted autocratic
countries.
Performance of autocratic countries on environmental issues
• Half of top 10 worst performers in autocracy
• China and Russia- the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions
Who makes the influence on the process of environmental policy
formation in autocratic regimes?
Education Planner’s
Attitude
Environmental
Policy
GOVERNMENT PLANNER
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Source: World Health Organization, 2016
Air Quality Levels
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Research Question
Research Question
• How does the educational background of a government planner
impact environmental outcomes in autocratic regimes?
Contribution
• Novel mechanism of environmental policy making process in
autocratic regimes
• Unique dataset to measure the effect of education of a planner
• Rigorous estimation using an instrument to fix potential
endogeneity of the main variable
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Definition
Regimes are considered autocratic when any one of the following
occurs:
• A political leader achieves power through undemocratic means.
• A leader achieves power through competitive elections but changes
a rule to limit competition afterwards.
• Despite existence of competitive elections, the military dictates
policy choice in critical policy areas.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Literature Review
Level of Education
• Individuals with higher levels of education express greater concern
about the environment and more likely to engage in
environmentally responsible behaviors (Mobly et al, 2010, Xiao and
McCright, 2007, etc.)
Field of Education
• University students’ attitudes towards environmental issues
significantly vary depending on their academic major.
• Economics and business students are less concerned with the
environment (Benton, 1994, Synodios, 1990, Tikka et al. 2000).
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Theoretical Framework
Industry
Sector 1 Sector 2Consumer
Dirty Good Numeraire Good
Government
Externalities
(-) Consumer welfare
Pollution Tax (-) output
(+) investment on pollution control
Optimal tax rate to maximize aggregate welfare
• Aggregate profits + Consumer surplus net of disutility from externality + Pollution
tax revenues
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
ProfitsConsumer
SurplusDisutility from
Pollution
Weight
The weight is dependent on the planner’s academic background.
• Academic discipline which influences an individual to be more aware – Magnitude
of weight increases
• Academic discipline which influences an individual to be less aware – Magnitude of
weight decreases
Theoretical Framework
Tax Revenues
Social welfare function capturing the extent of a planner’s
awareness about environmental damages
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Equilibrium
Aggregate pollutions
= Pollution emissions generated to produce one unit of dirty good
* Output level of dirty good
Equilibrium tax rateWeight by
the planner Price of dirty good
# of firms Consumer income
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Testable Implication
If a government planner was educated in an academic discipline
which shapes one to be less conscious of environmental damages, a
less-stringent regulation would be implemented and thus more
pollution would be generated.
On the contrary, if the planner was educated in an academic
discipline which affects them otherwise, a more-stringent
regulation would be implemented and thus less pollution would be
generated.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Empirical Model
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡
• 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑛,𝑡: measure of aggregate pollution in country 𝑛 at year 𝑡
• 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑛,𝑡: measure of the government planner’s academic background
• 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑛,𝑡: measure of the number of firms
• 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛,𝑡: measure of the consumer income
• 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛,𝑡: measure of the price of the dirty good
We separately run regressions for two distinct types of regimes,
autocracy, and democracy, for comparison.
We expect a negative sign for the estimate of the academic discipline
turning a planner to be brown.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Issues
Our main explanatory variable, the government planner’s
educational background, barely varies over time.
• OLS, a time fixed effects model, and control variables measuring
geography and inheritance
Omitted variable bias: country-level characteristics such as
measures of institutional quality, openness to trade, and socio-
demographic characteristics
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Issues
Endogeneity of the planner’s academic background (their
university major)
• We expect the direction of the bias to be positive since the planner’s interest could
be developed earlier, so that the effect of university education could be
overestimated.
● Instrumental variable reflecting educational condition during
planners’ age of adolescence when academic interests are
developed and planning for the future begins, the adolescent
fertility rate
• The higher adolescent fertility rate could indicate that the young are less likely to
participate in secondary education or more preferably attend military academies
which are tuition free and guarantee the future job.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Data
To measure the effects of the government planner’s educational
background, we collect unique data set on a university major for
heads of state from Barcelona Center for International Affairs.
• Academic disciplines into five categories: STEM & Health, Business & Economics,
Law & Social Sciences, Humanities, and Military Academy
● Business & Economics – measure of the academic disciplines
which influence the planner to be relatively less aware of
environmental issues
Country-level panel data on sulfur dioxide emissions from
Smith et al. (2011)
The dataset of autocratic regimes: 23 countries, 1981-2005 /
democratic regimes: 45 countries, 1994-2005
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Table 1. Effects of Business & Economics on Sulfur Dioxide Emissions –Autocracy vs.
Democracy, OLS and Time fixed effects
----------Autocracy---------- ----------Democracy----------
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business & Economics 0.015** 0.011** -0.00006 0.0005
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Birth year 0.0003*** 0.0005*** -0.0003** -0.0002
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Interest rate -0.00003 0.00002 -0.000004 -0.00006
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP growth -0.0002 -0.00003 0.0008** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Industry -0.0002*** -0.0002** 0.0002 0.0001
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Polity -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Year dummy No Yes No Yes
N 172 172 272 272
Adj. R-sq. 0.711 0.752 0.285 0.281
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Table 2. Effect of Business & Economics on Adolescent Fertility Fate - First Stage – Au
tocracy vs. Democracy, OLS and Time fixed effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
----------Autocracy---------- ----------Democracy----------
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adolescent fertility -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Birth year -0.006* -0.006* -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP growth 0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.0003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Interest rate 0.0009 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Industry -0.006* -0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Polity 0.003 0.002 0.033 0.043
(0.010) (0.011) (0.037) (0.038)
Year dummy No Yes No Yes
N 194 194 345 345
Adj. R-sq. 0.386 0.348 0.116 0.104
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Table 3. Effect of Business & Economics on Sulfur Dioxide Emissions – IV Instrumenti
ng Business & Economics– Autocracy vs. Democracy
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
The maximal IV sizes of 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% reported by the Stock and Yogo test are 16.38, 8.9
6, 6.66, and 5.53, respectively.
----------Autocracy---------- ----------Democracy----------
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business & Economics 0.021** 0.006 -0.009 -0.012
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Birth year 0.001*** 0.0008*** -0.001* -0.001**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006)
GDP growth -0.0001 0.0001 0.0009** 0.001**
(0.0001) (0.00007) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Interest rate 0.00003 -0.00005*** 0.0001 -0.000005
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Industry 0.0005*** -0.000007 0.0001 0.00007
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Polity -0.001 -0.001*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.002)
Year dummy No Yes No Yes
N 62 62 175 175
Adj. R-sq. 0.955 0.986 0.121 -0.012
KP Wald F statistic 15.946 25.525 13.71 14.619
Significant rejection rate 15% 10% 15% 15%
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Future works
We plan to build a model for democratic regimes.
We need to validate the assumption for our instrument use
referring reliable sources.
Lastly, we consider adding more control variables that capture the
planner’s individual characteristic such as a birth place and the
highest degree earned.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Modeling the Economic Impact of Trade Regulation
of Invasive Species - The Case of the Apple Maggot
Quarantine Program in Washington State
Yeon A Hong and R. Karina Gallardo
Washington State University
August 11, 2017
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
● Export dependency of the United States
(US) apple industry has risen over the
past decade along with rapid growth of
global agricultural markets.
• The State of Washington exported fresh apples by
more than 30% of its total production (WSTFA,
2016).
● The State of Washington has
implemented the quarantine program
to prevent infestation of an invasive
species, apple maggot (Rhagoletis pomonella).
Motivation
Source: WSDA, 2015
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Motivation
The apple maggot quarantine program is designed to facilitate the
movement of commercial fruits to domestic and international
markets by providing shippers with certification that their fruits
are apple maggot free (Sansford et al. 2016).
Apple growers having an orchard in the quarantined areas should
comply with regulations on the apple pest to ship fresh apples
(Kalus, 2015)
• For example, Canada requires all apples from the quarantined areas shipped to
British Columbia to be in storage at 1℃ for 40 days.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
● The apple maggot quarantine areas consist of the areas where
the pest is considered established but officially controlled.
2014 Apple Maggot Quarantine Status
Source: WSDA, 2016
In recent, industry concerns potential
apple maggot introduction to pest free
areas because of transporting yard (gr
een) waste from Seattle area to the Ea
st area.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Research Question
Objective of Study
• We investigate how the trade regulation of the invasive species
affects the optimal choice for an apple grower under the pest
quarantine program and assess its economic impact on the
grower’s economic profits.
Contribution
• Provide tailored information of economic profits at the individual
level in terms of the level of infestation of a grower’s orchard and
the existence of the trade regulation
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
The objective of a fruit grower is to maximize one’s economic profit
by choosing an optimal strategy of chemical use.
The model specifies the characteristics of two regions.
Theoretical Framework
Quarantine
Level of Pest Infestation
Production Costs
Pest-Free
Level of Pest Infestation
Production Costs
Differ
The control variable is the rate of insecticide application and
the state variable is the insect stock.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Theoretical Framework
High price for
intact fruitYield
Prob. of receiving
high price
YieldProb. of receiving
low price
Low price for
infested fruit
Storage costsOther production
related costs
Insecticide
application costs
+
-
Revenues
Objective Function
The insecticide applications detain the growth of the insect
population.
Insect population
Costs
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Maximum principle condition
• Marginal cost of insect control = Marginal benefits from decreasing
a unit of the insect population
Comparative statics of the storage cost and the insecticide
application in a steady – state
• The sign is indeterminate, conditioned on assumptions.
Theoretical Framework
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Data
We calibrate the model using data on yield, cost, and price of ‘Red
Delicious’ spanning from 2009 to 2015.
• Red Delicious contributes 50% of total export in the state.
• Processed juice prices are applied for infested portion of annual yield.
Cost
• Unit cost of insecticide application – Average cost of chemicals
commonly used to control apple maggots (Assail, Imidan, etc.)
• Unit storage cost – Two export markets, BC and China, $0.56 per
40lb box
• Other production related cost – Establishment, maintenance, etc.
Note: The initial investment years are counted : no yield in the first two years, six-
years to reach full production.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
• The WSDA traps apple
maggots from June to
September in thirteen
Washington State counties,
and reports the trap results.
• Number of detections /
orchard acreage, quarantine
vs. pest – free
Data
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Number of Apple Maggot Caught
Total detections Quarantine Pest free
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Scenario
Base
Pest-free
Quarantined
Non-Regulation
Trade Regulation
Export to BC & China
10% of Yield
Export to BC & China
20% of Yield
We separately estimate a grower’s economic profits considering
four different scenarios.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Results
Profits/acre Loss/acre Loss/380 acres
$ -26,740 $490 1.9% $186,200
Profits/acre
$ -26,250Baseline
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Profits/acre Loss/acre Loss/380 acres
$ -27,280 $1,030 3.9% $391,400
Profits/acre Loss/acre Loss/380 acres
$ -27,750 $1,500 5.7% $570,000
Estimated profits by Galinato S. et
al. (2014) : $ -25,040
Note: The values are calculated for 7 establishment years.
The average size of a fam in Washington State is approximately 380
acres.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Future Works
We plan to consider only a year of full production to have the
effects to be more clear rather than accounting for the initial
investment year.
We will see if the simulation result follow our story by changing
the marginal storage cost more continuously.
The same simulations will be conducted for other varieties.
Yeon A Hong Preliminary Exam
Thank you!