Linking Spokes Together: The Philippines' Gambit of Harnessing the United States' Alliances in its...

Linking Spokes Together: The Philippines’Gambit of Harnessing the United States’ Alliances

in its External Balancing Policy against anEmergent China

Renato Cruz De Castro

This article examines the Philippines’ strategy of external balancing againstan aggressive China as it intensifies its security ties with the United States,its only strategic and long-standing ally. This course of action aims tostrengthen the country’s defense relations with the United States, particularlyin developing the territorial defense capabilities of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines. In this process, the Philippines finds it similarly essential toestablish security ties with other bilateral defense partners of the UnitedStates, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In conclusion, the articleargues that fostering informal security arrangements with these countriesenables the Philippines to confront a pressing and persistent maritime issuein Southeast Asia: China’s expansion in the South China Sea.

Key words: alliances, external balancing, hub-and-spokes, Philippine–USrelations, Philippine defense policy, internal balancing.

In the last quarter of 2010, the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)noted increased Chinese naval presence and activities in the Spratlys and moni-tored around six or seven major intrusions by Chinese vessels into the watersclaimed by the Philippines. On 25 February 2011, Filipino fishermen alleged thatthey were fired upon by a Jianghu-B class missile frigate off Jackson Atoll, 140miles west of Palawan.1 On 2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats reportedlyharassed a survey vessel commissioned by the Philippines’ Department of Energyto conduct oil exploration in the Reed Bank, 150 km east of the Spratly Islands and250 km west of the Philippine island of Palawan. Then in early June 2011, the

1. See Carl A. Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,”International Journal of China Studies, 2-3 (December 2011), pp. 561–562.

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Philippine Navy (PN) discovered a number of alleged Chinese structures in thevicinity of Philippine-claimed Iroquois Reef–Amy Douglas Bank near Palawanand within the country’s 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

On 8 April 2012, the PN’s flagship, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, tried toapprehend several Chinese fishing boats in the Scarborough Shoal. However, twoChinese maritime surveillance vessels arrived and blocked the arrest of the Chinesefishermen who were hauling corals, clams, and live sharks into their boats. Toprevent the incident from escalating into an armed clash, the Philippines replacedits surface combatant with a smaller coast guard vessel. Instead of reciprocating,China deployed the Yuzheng 310 – its most advanced and largest patrol shipequipped with machine guns, light cannons and electronic sensors. The Scar-borough Shoal standoff lasted for 2 months. It was a tense situation in which fourChinese civilian vessels confronted a lone Philippine coast guard ship. On thepretext of the onset of the rainy season, both countries withdrew their respectivevessels from the shoal on 18 June 2012.

Soon after the Philippines ordered its lone coast guard vessel to leave the area,China began consolidating its control over the Scarborough Shoal. The ChinaMaritime Surveillance ships along with the China Fisheries Law EnforcementCommand constructed a chain barrier across the mouth of the shoal to blockPhilippine access to it. China has also deployed surveillance vessels to protect thefleet of Chinese fishing boats operating deep into the Philippines’ EEZ. Theseincidents reflect the historic pattern of Chinese protracted, low-intensity, andincremental moves to gain control of a large portion of the South China Sea. Chinahas specifically targeted the Philippines in its naval brinkmanship game forobvious reasons. The country has the weakest navy in the region, and its air forcecannot adequately patrol and monitor its vast maritime territory.

In confronting an assertive China, the Philippines adopts an external balancingpolicy. In mid-2011, it decided to pursue a substantial but much delayed moderni-zation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that is still preoccupied withinternal security operations against domestic insurgent groups. President BenignoSimeon Aquino ordered the PN to speed up the acquisition of second-hand cuttersfrom the US Coast Guard, and the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to scour theinternational market for affordable jet fighters to rebuild the country’s air defensesystem. The Aquino Administration also acknowledged the need for US diplomaticsupport and military assistance relative to its territorial row with China. Further-more, the country has established informal defense linkages with the UnitedStates’ three allies in the region – Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Without anycredible military capabilities, the Philippines finds it imperative “to leverage” onthe United States’ and its other bilateral alliance partners to enhance its securityand develop the AFP’s capabilities for territorial defense.2

2. Office of Plans and Program (J-5), Strategic Direction of AFP International Military Affairs(Camp Aguinaldo, Office of Plans and Program, May 2010), p. 2.

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© 2014 Center for International Studies, Inha University

This paper examines the Philippines’ external balancing policy on China as itconnects the separate US bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific region by estab-lishing security ties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It explores this mainquestion: how is the Philippines applying an external balancing policy on anaggressive China? It also attempts to answer these corollary questions: How doesthe Philippines forge defense arrangements with other US allies, such as Japan,South Korea, and Australia? What is the Philippines’ game plan in co-opting thesethree US allies? What is the implication of this move on the US allies in East Asia?And how can the Philippines and the United States maximize this move to link thespokes of the San Francisco system of bilateral alliances?

The Philippines’ External Balancing Policy against China

This article explores two theoretically related problems: Why do small powersbalance an emergent power despite the latter’s preponderant military capabilities?And how do small powers balance an emergent and potentially revisionist power?

Mainstream realist literature depicts an anarchic world in which states havetwo alternative responses to an emergent power. First, some states may balancethe emergent power to preserve their security, or second, they may jump on thebandwagon to secure economic gains or expand their influence.3 Considered as thebest form of defensive foreign policy, balancing involves a state’s efforts to preventan emerging power from upsetting the status quo – from increasing its share ofpower at the expense of the defending (or status quo) state’s expense.4 Amonggreat powers, balancing usually takes the form of internal balance, which entailsthe status quo state relying on its resources to build up its military capabilities fordeterrence, and if it fails, use them against the revisionist state in a systemic war.Or it may get on the bandwagon by aligning itself with the emergent power. Incontrast to balancing, bandwagoning is primarily a diplomatic strategy by whichthe political leadership willingly subordinates its country’s foreign policy to therevisionist state, and considers its national security interests in terms of collabo-rating and cooperating directly with the emergent power.5

Small or minor powers have limited economic and military capabilities. Many ofthem consider balancing an emergent regional power detrimental and risky. For abalancing policy to succeed, a state must have the essential military power, ademographic advantage, and a strong technological/industrial base. Generally,small powers have scarce natural resources, constrained geography, small popula-

3. Jack Levy, “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Designs,” in John A.Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power (New Jersey: Pearson Educa-tion, Inc. 2003), pp. 128–153.4. Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: Partisan and American Statecraft (Princeton, New Jersey:Princeton University, 2011), p. 12.5. Ibid., p. 13.

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tion, diverse ethnic composition, and, in many cases, weak state institutions.6 Thus,it is assumed that balancing cannot be effectively applied by small or minor powersas they have marginal capabilities to affect international outcomes. Given theirstrategic vulnerabilities and limited military capabilities, small/minor powers oftenresort to bandwagoning to appease the established, rising or emergent powers.Citing the attractiveness of bandwagoning for small powers when confronted by anemergent and revisionist state, Peter Trubowitz notes:

War, imperialism, and internal balancing are comparatively expensive. Building an army takestime and money, which can be hard to extract from a resistant populace or legislature. Militaryspending can also limit a state’s ability to satisfy important social welfare goals. Other strategies,such as appeasement or buck-passing (and bandwagoning), are cheaper. They require little in theway of taxation or conscription because they rely disproportionately on the use of diplomacy asa tool of foreign policy.7

Historically, however, power preponderance does not guarantee international peaceand stability since small powers, in certain cases, apply balancing strategies againstthe major powers despite the military and diplomatic disparities between them. Thebalance of power theory argues that power asymmetry in conflicting states’ capa-bilities will lead to a more peaceful world; while the hegemonic stability theorymaintains that peace is possible if a hegemonic power enforces order in the globalsociety.8 However, peace-through-power parity and peace-through-power prepon-derance had not effected a more peaceful world in recent history. For example,Finland militarily challenged the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1944. Another case inpoint is when North Vietnam fought a long and bloody asymmetric war against theUnited States from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. And more recently, Iraqresisted the United States from 1990 to 1991 and again in 2003. Indeed, inferencesbased on relative power relations cannot explain why small powers challenged bigpowers and in certain cases, even provoke or instigate an international crisis or anarmed conflict.9

The reasons why small powers ignore asymmetrical power relations and adopta balancing policy can be domestic politics, geography, and their ability to manipu-late local circumstances to achieve disproportionate power relations with the bigpowers. If global conditions for their balancing gambits are ripe, small powers caneither draw on their geostrategic location to exert leverage on the powerful state or

6. Small or minor powers are generally small or even medium-sized states whose territory, popula-tion and resource base make it difficult for them to defend themselves against external military attacksor other forms of big-power intervention. See Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: U.S. andComparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers,2003), pp. 108–159.7. Peter Trubowitz, op. cit., p. 14.8. Steve Chan, “Preventive War by the Weak: Loss Aversion, Strategic Anticipation and Third PowerIntervention,” Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, 14-3 (January 2011), p. 4.9. Ibid.



rely on other major powers for military assistance and security guarantee througha security alliance. This policy is referred to as “external balancing.”

In his 1987 classic work, The Origin of Alliances, Stephen Walt observed thatwhen confronted by a major external security challenge, a state may balance byallying itself with other states against the potential threat.10 As a form of inter-statecooperation, an alliance involves an explicit mutual declaration of states’ intent toassist each other by cooperating militarily against other states.11 Alliances areagainst, and only derivatively for, someone, or something – usually another state.Adversarial relations against this state provide the raison d’etre for alliances andalignments between the opposing states. The greater the threat posed by theadversarial state, the greater the cohesion of the alliance.

An alliance can also assume the form of a stronger ally providing economic andmilitary assistance to a weaker one to create a more effective ally and to commu-nicate favorable intention to it.12 This, in turn, enforces the alliance’s cohesion asit evokes a sense of gratitude from the (weaker) recipient ally, or it becomesdependent on the donor.13 This also makes balancing a cheaper and viable externalstrategy against a more powerful state as this enables a weaker state to pool itsresources either with another great power or other weaker states through allianceformation. Thus, external balancing as a defensive strategy against revisionistpower involves some combination of internal mobilization, and alliance forma-tions.14 A common alliance scenario brings together two or more status quo statesexpecting mutual support against an emergent and potentially revisionist state thatthreatens their common interests of stability and security.

The Philippines is an interesting case of a small power applying an externalbalancing policy on China despite the latter’s economic and military might. Since2011, President Aquino has challenged China’s expansive territorial claim in theSouth China Sea. After taking over the reins of government in 2010, he junked thepolicies of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, including her diplomaticstrategy of equi-balancing China and the United States. He redirected the AFP’sfocus from domestic security to territorial defense. He also promoted closerPhilippine–US security relations; acquired US military equipment; sought fromWashington an equivocal security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual DefenseTreaty (MDT), and gave the United States strategic access to Philippine territory.The Philippines is also fostering informal defense ties with the United States’ threeallies in the region – Japan, South Korea, and Australia. All these efforts are aimedat balancing an assertive China relative to the South China Sea imbroglio.

10. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 17.11. Glen H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization, 45-1 (Winter1991), p. 123.12. Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., p. 41.13. Ibid.14. Peter Trubowitz, op. cit., pp. 12–13.

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Harnessing and Linking the Spokes Together

The Philippines’ need for United States’ diplomatic and military support in theface of China’s expansionist actions in the South China Sea proves the continuingstrategic relevance of Philippine–US security partnership in particular, andof the United States’ bilateral alliance network in East Asia in general. TheUS–Philippine defense ties are part of a network of bilateral alliances – often calledthe “hub-and-spokes system” – that has sustained US strategic leadership in EastAsia since the Korean War in the early 1950s. During the Cold War, the UnitedStates developed a system of separate but related bilateral alliances with Japan,South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, and a trilateral security arrangementwith Australia and New Zealand. The Korean War in 1950 triggered the creation ofthis alliance system, which led the United States to sponsor a series of defensecommitments to these countries that could ensure US participation in Asian secu-rity affairs.15 These security arrangements were formalized after the signing of theJapanese Peace Treaty in September 1951, and the promotion of a number ofcollective defense treaties with these Asia–Pacific countries. During the Eisen-hower Administration, they were part of an overall US design to surround theEurasian landmass with US and Allied military power.16

The United States signed separate defense agreements with Japan, South Korea,Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia. These alliances, however,constituted a system in a number of ways. First, they extended the US strategicdeterrence from Western Europe to East Asia providing a Western military buttressto the imminent process of regional decolonization and against the Soviet Unionand China in the 1950s.17 Second, these treaties allowed the United States tomaintain a credible military presence through the basing structures for US forwarddeployment in East Asia. Third, they enabled the United States to act as Asia’sprimary security guarantor and common contact for the region’s non-communist

15. Sheldon Simon, The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration (Lexington, Massachusetts:DC Health and Company, 1988), p. 4.16. These alliances were considered part of the United States’ response to the June 1950 NorthKorean invasion of South Korea and, to a certain degree, were also spurred by the San FranciscoPeace Treaty between the United States and Japan. As a result of its peace treaty with its formerenemy, Washington signed a bilateral security pact with Tokyo that came into force on 28 April 1952.The treaty allowed US forces to remain in Japan to protect the country against both external andinternal threats. Then, on 27 August 1952, the United States signed another defense pact with thePhilippines in an effort to win this country’s support for Washington’s peace settlement with Tokyo.In addition to these two treaties, Washington also signed a defense treaty with Seoul as a USconcession to President Syngman Rhee’s promise to support the armistice to end the Korean War andto moderate his efforts to “go north.” The US–South Korea Security Alliance was signed in October1953 and provides for consultation to act in case of an external in accordance with [the signatories]constitutional process. Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw-HillBook Company, 1968), pp. 71–78.17. William T. Tow and William R. Feeney, “Introduction,” in William T. Tow and William R.Feeney, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 2.



armed forces. Fourth, these so-called “America’s alliances” allowed the UnitedStates to dominate their conditions and their dynamics. A significant feature ofthese alliances is that when they were formed, the United States bore the burdenof sustaining them, while the allies were initially “free-riders.” The partnershipreflected power asymmetry in which Washington became the hub of the East Asiansecurity wheel, with its spokes pointing to the individual allies in the region. TheUnited States was able to control the separate agendas of each relationship withouttoo much debate and sans the danger of being “ganged-up” on by its allies inNATO. Consequently, to some degree, the Asian allies resented US domination ofthese alliances. Finally, these alliances had an enduring effect on the United States’and its allies’ foreign policies. They created an inertia or stasis born out of theshared interests and bonds of anti-communism, which caused these security rela-tionships to outlive the Cold War.

After 9/11, the Bush Administration enlisted the Philippines and other East Asianallies (Japan and South Korea) to support the use of US military power againstnon-state security challenges in CentralAsia, the Middle East,Africa, and SoutheastAsia. In asserting its leadership role in East Asian security affairs, the United Statesuses these bilateral alliances to:18 (i) assure its security partners that they are apart of the US security umbrella in East Asia; (ii) deter any regional arms race,aggression, and coercion; (iii) justify and facilitate US military action in this part ofthe world; and (iv) exercise extensive political influence over this strategic regionwithout relying on multilateral security institutions like NATO or the UN. In effect,the United States maintains and fosters a Pax Americana over the Asia–Pacificregion outside of any internationally recognized multilateral organization.

The Philippines’ security ties with the United States were revitalized in the late20th century and became cohesive and relevant in the 21st century. History,however, shows a pattern of alliance disintegration as allies’ interests and purposeschange in the face of emerging threats or new global conditions. Interestingly, thistrend does not apply to the Philippine–US alliance, as well as to US securityrelations with Japan, and South Korea. These durable alliances have evolved frommere expedient and mechanical aggregations of national capabilities directed at aspecific threat to something qualitatively different. Since the end of the Cold Warin the early 1990s, the United States and its three Asian allies have institutionalizedtheir efforts to minimize their competitive and divergent interests. They havedeveloped a series of interactions to preserve their bilateral relations, and/or formnew patterns of security ties among them. Individually and collectively, they havedevised diplomatic/strategic processes and built structures that create islands ofstability amidst a sea of changes in the 21st century regional security environment.In other words, they have designed a new approach to security/political manage-ment to counter the centrifugal forces weakening their raison d’etre, to maximize

18. Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: U.S.-China Policies onRegional Order (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 170.

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their mutual benefits and to minimize alliance cost, and to promote their unityand cohesion. These innovations enable the alliances to adjust to a changingpoliticosecurity milieu.19 Currently, the Philippines actively establishes securitylinkages not only with the United States but also with its other bilateral defensepartners in the Asia–Pacific region.

Balancing an Emergent China

On 2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commis-sioned by the Philippines’ Department of Energy to conduct oil exploration in theReed Bank (now called Recto Bank), 150 km east of the Spratly Islands and250 km west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The Aquino administration wasstunned by the Chinese action as this maritime encounter happened east of theSpratlys and within the country’s adjacent waters. Two days after the incident, thePhilippine government filed a protest before the Chinese embassy in Manila. Inearly June 2011, the Philippines sought clarification on the sightings of ChinaMarine Surveillance and the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) ships nearthe Kalayaan group of islands. The Aquino Administration expressed seriousconcerns over Chinese encroachments into the country’s EEZ to stake China’sterritorial claim and to possibly construct an oilrig on the uninhabited IroquoisBank. According to the Philippine Foreign Affairs and Defense Departments, theseChinese actions “are clear violations of the China-ASEAN 2001 Declaration on theConduct of Parties on the South China Sea.”20 In response, the Chinese foreignministry sternly told the Philippines to stop “harming China’s sovereigntyand maritime rights and interests, which leads to unilateral actions that can expandand complicate the South China Sea dispute.”21 This was Beijing’s reaction to thePhilippines’ diplomatic protest against China’s plan to construct an oilrig deepwithin the Philippines’ EZZ. Consequently, President Aquino realized that thePhilippines is potentially on a direct collision course with China regarding theSouth China Sea issue.

The 2 March 2011 incident at the Reed Bank and China’s arrogant response tothe Philippines’ diplomatic queries prompted the Aquino Administration to hastenthe development of the AFP’s territorial defense capabilities. In June 2011, theexecutive branch of the Philippine government and the AFP agreed on a multi-year,multi-billion-peso defense upgrade spending and military build-up. The Depart-ment of Budget Management (DBM) released a Multi-Year Obligation Authorityto the Department of National Defense (DND), allowing the AFP to enter into

19. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 165–166.20. Carl Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Inter-national Journal of China Studies, 2-3 (December 2011), p. 563.21. BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “China Says Philippines Harming Sovereignty, Interests inSpratlys,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (9 June 2011), p 1, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=64&did=2369715781&Src...> (searched date: (3 April 2012).



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multi-year contracts with other governments or private arms and military hardwaremanufacturers. The DBM also committed Php 40bn (estimated $US800m) in thenext 5 years (2012–2016) to develop the AFP’s capabilities for greater domainawareness of the Philippine territorial waters and EZZ.

In the proposed “rolling” program, the executive branch would allocatethrough the Philippine Congress Php 8bn (an estimated $US160m) annuallyfor the procurement of air-surveillance radar, surface attack aircraft, close air-support aircraft, combat utility helicopters and long-range patrol aircraft.22 Alsocovered are current upgrade programs, such as the installation of a radar andcommunication network along the coast of Palawan and East Mindanao underthe Coast Watch South Project and the acquisition of three refurbished US CoastGuard Hamilton class cutters for the PN. These undertakings, according toformer AFP Chief-of-Staff General Eduardo Oban Jr, prioritize territorial defenseover domestic security.

In October 2011, DND Secretary Voltaire Gazmin released the Defense Plan-ning Guidance (2013–2018) restructuring the AFP to a “lean but fully capable”armed forces to confront the challenges to the country’s territorial integrity andmaritime security. It envisions the development of an effective force projectioncapability to monitor the Philippines’ territorial waters and EZZ. It contains thefollowing measures:23

1 Reduction of infantry and marine battalions and the redirection of limitedfinancial resources to key priorities, such as theater mobility, close air-support,air-surveillance, and air-defense.

2 Acquisition of naval assets for offshore patrol, strategic sealift, and accompa-nying base support system and platform to sustain the deployed maritime assets.

3 Development of the AFP’s long-range maritime air patrol and surveillancethrough the acquisition of necessary assets and accompanying base supportsystem.

4 Reactivation of the Philippine’ Air Defense System through the acquisition ofair surveillance radar and a squadron of air defense/surface attack aircraft toprovide air defense coverage over areas of high concern.

The Philippines’ territorial defense goal is to establish a modest but “comprehen-sive border protection program.” This program is anchored on the surveillance,deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the PN, and the PhilippineCoast Guard (PCG) that extend from the country’s territorial waters to its

22. William B. Depasupil, “Armed Forces to Spend P14b to Upgrade naval, aerial defense,”Tribune Business News (29 June 2011), at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=48&did=2386470651&Src...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).23. Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013–2018(Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 11 October 2011), pp. 11–16.

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contiguous zone and EEZ.24 This objective requires prioritizing the AFP’s materialand personnel requirements for territorial defense. The long-term goal, accordingto the 2011 AFP’s Strategic Intent, is to develop the force structure and capabilitiesenabling the Philippine military to maintain a “credible deterrent posture againstforeign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while allowingfree navigation to prosper.”25 Specifically, the AFP plans to develop the followingcapabilities. First, to enhance maritime domain awareness: The AFP’s capabilityfor maritime surveillance is extremely limited. The establishment of the CoastWatch South project in September 2011 to monitor the country’s vast maritimeenvironment requires air-assets, trained personnel, and radars. The PAF acquisitionof a long-range patrol aircraft, lead-in-fighter jets and surface-attack aircraftaddresses the need for maritime awareness and limited naval interdiction capabil-ity, particularly within Philippine territorial waters up to the 200-nautical mileEEZ.

Secondly, the AFP plans to establish joint operations between the PAF andNavy for limited naval interdiction capabilities: Given the Philippines’ inadequatedefense budget and defense capabilities, the PAF will support the PhilippineNavy’s limited naval interdiction operations. The PAF’s Air Defense System andthe PN’s Coast Watch South project will jointly cover and augment over-the-horizon reconnaissance and targeting capabilities.26 The PAF maritime patrol andsurveillance aircraft will serve as the primary platforms of patrols, surveillance,and interdiction, while the PN’s surface combatants would conduct helicopterpatrol and provide longer on-station time, and visible and enhanced navalpresence/deterrence.27 The PAF’s air-defense and coastal missile system will belinked with the Navy’s surface and underwater interdiction capabilities that willconstitute the first layer of maritime defense for the country.

The Aquino Administration is still hampered by limited financial resources evenwith its modest defense acquisition goals. The PN’s two former US Coast GuardCutters are no match for China’s naval prowess in the South China Sea. It could notimmediately purchase much-needed war materiel, such as blue-water missile-armed ships, search-and-rescue vessels, naval helicopters, strategic sealift shipsand top-of-the-line interceptors to protect the Philippines’ oil exploration projectsand maritime borders. The AFP waited a long time for a bill simply extending theoriginal AFP modernization law (Republic Act 7898) after it expired in February2010. In December 2012, the Philippine Congress passed the legislation and

24. National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011–2016: Securing the Gains of Democ-racy (Quezon City: National Security Council, April 2011), p. 39.25. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (QuezonCity: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011), p. 27.26. Commodore Jose Renan C. Suarez, “The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-Defense Partnership,” presentation at the Air Power Symposium, Pasay City, Philippines (21 June2012), p. 6.27. Ibid.



President Aquino signed Republic Act no. 10349, which extended the period forAFP modernization. The law, however, provides only Php 75bn ($US1.5bn) for thenext 5 years. This amount is not enough to cover the AFP’s projected purchaseof modern fighter planes, missile-armed frigates, sea- and land-based missilesystems, patrol vessels, and long-range reconnaissance planes along with supportfacilities, such as radar sites, forward operating bases, hangar, communication,maintenance, and command and control facilities.

Return to Relevance: The Philippine–US Security Alliance

A significant factor behind the Aquino Administration’s efforts to confrontChina in the South China Sea dispute, despite its military inadequacies, is thecountry’s alliance with the United States. The Aquino Administration is awarethat no amount of financial resources will enable the Philippines to confrontan assertive China in the South China Sea. The AFP’s maritime border patrolsystem is designed for limited deterrence and asymmetric combat but not fornaval warfare. Particularly, the PN and PAF’s’ capabilities for early warning,surveillance, and command, control and communication are directed towardsmaritime defense and interdiction operations. This build-up merely complementsthe deterrence provided by US forward deployment and bilateral alliances inEast Asia. In the final analysis, the Philippines’ territorial defense stance is predi-cated upon the United States’ assertion of its position as the dominant navalpower in the Pacific.

The US global war on terror in 2001 and US–China tension after 2008 auguredwell for the Philippines’ security agenda vis-à-vis an expansionist China. Therevitalized Philippine–US alliance achieved two strategic objectives. One, thePhilippine government received US support for its counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency campaigns. Two, the United States deepened its alliance with thePhilippines not only to neutralize terrorist groups, but also to counter Beijing’spolitical and economic influence in the country. Consequently, the United Statesregularly provides technical and military assistance to the AFP to firm up theirsecurity partnership against China’s naval might and assertiveness. Thus, animportant factor in the Aquino Administration’s balancing policy on China isstrengthened and reconfigured Philippine–US security relations. Currently, Was-hington’s medium-term goal is to assist the Philippine military in its counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism efforts, maritime security concerns, and transitionfrom internal security to territorial defense. In the long run, Washington hopes thatthe Philippines can help maintain the United States’ key strategic interest inSoutheast Asia – a regional balance of power that tilts in favor of the United States.At present, China can undermine that delicate balance of power.

The Philippines maintains strong security ties with the United States through the60-year-old MDT. The Philippines regards the US military presence in the Asia–Pacific as a stabilizing force, given the growing complexity of security challenges

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confronting the region.28 In 2010, China’s bullying behavior in the South ChinaSea caught the attention of the US–Philippine Mutual Defense Board (MDB), theliaison and consultative body that oversees the Philippine–US defense postureagainst external threats. The MDB annual meeting on 18 August 2010 discussedthe security challenges that the allies face, such as terrorism, domestic insurgency,and potential flashpoints, specifically the maritime dispute in the South ChinaSea.29 Both countries decided to complement each other’s military capabilities,enhance inter-operability between their armed services, and strengthen the AFP’sterritorial defense capabilities with tangible US security assistance.

Consequently, the Philippines and the United States agreed to conduct an annualbilateral strategic dialogue. The dialogue provides an opportunity for the foreignand defense departments of the two countries “to affirm the strength of thePhilippine–US alliance and the dynamic [security] partnership for peace, security,and stability.”30 In late January 2011, the first bilateral strategic dialogue discussedcurrent security challenges and identified new areas for cooperation. The allies alsoagreed to upgrade their mutual capabilities in maritime security through the fol-lowing:31 (i) US funding support to the AFP’s Capability Upgrade Program, espe-cially in the acquisition of equipment, and refurbishing and maintenance ofexisting AFP materiel; and (ii) the provision of additional funding of ($US40m) forthe Coast Watch South project to boost the Philippine military’s surveillance,communication, and interdiction capabilities in the South China Sea.

In November 2011, the allies signed a joint communiqué on the 60-year-oldMDT, declaring their mutual interest in maintaining the freedom of navigation,unimpeded lawful commerce, and the transit of people across the seas.32 Bothcountries expressed their adherence to a rules-based approach that can resolvecompeting maritime claims through peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and dip-lomatic processes within the framework of international law. The communiquéalso stated that the 60-year-old alliance has never been stronger and will continueto expand in the 21st century to enhance the Philippine military’s defense, inter-diction, and apprehension capabilities in the country’s maritime domain.

The two allies held the second bilateral strategic dialogue in Washington, D.C.in January 2012. The aim was to “shift the [security] partnership into a higher gear

28. National Security Council, op. cit., p. 16.29. Interview with mid-level AFP Officers, Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs,17 September 2010.30. Targeted News Service, “U.S. and Philippines to Hold Bilateral Strategic Dialogue,” TargetedNews Service (26 January 2011), pp. 1–2, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=63&did=2265055391&Src...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).31. Co-Chair’s Statement, “Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue,” United StatesEmbassy in Manila (27–28 January 2011), p. 10.32. Asia News Monitor, “Philippines-United States: Philippines, U.S. Affirm Mutual Defense Treatyas Foundation of Relationship; Signed Manila Declaration,” Asia News Monitor (18 November2011), p. 2, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=156&did=251358305&Sr...> (searched date:30 September 2012).





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at a time when the two countries’ ties have become broad-based, modern, matureand resilient.”33 During the talks, Philippine foreign affairs and defense officialsasked their counterparts for increased in US military presence in the country. Theyalso agreed to streamline the diplomatic clearance process for US personnel andships entering the country for combined training and interoperability.34 The 2012Scarborough Shoal standoff between Philippine and Chinese civilian vessels andlater, China’s occupation of the shoal made it urgent for Manila to negotiate withWashington the “Framework Agreement on Enhanced Rotational Presence andAgreement.” The agreement will facilitate the deployment of US troops and equip-ment on a rotational basis, thus avoiding the controversial issue of re-establishingUS bases in the country. Interestingly, the negotiation is being conducted againstthe backdrop of recurring tension between the Philippines and China over theSouth China Sea. With its small and obsolete naval force and an almost non-existent air force, the Philippines relies on the United States to assist in themodernization of its armed forces through military assistance and more signifi-cantly, short-term regular visits by US forces that will conduct joint training,humanitarian missions, and disaster response operations. More significantly, thePhilippines banks on the deterrent effect that is generated by the temporary deploy-ment of US forces and their equipment in its territory.

On 14 August 2013, the negotiation for a framework agreement started inManila. Earlier, the Pentagon clarified that it is strengthening its military presencein Southeast Asia not by establishing huge (permanent) bases reminiscent of theCold War but by maintaining a light (strategic) footprint in the region.35 Thisannouncement reassured Manila that “Washington has neither the desire northe interest to create US-only bases in Southeast Asia.”36 On its part, Philippinedefense and foreign policy officials informed the Philippine Senate that in theframework agreement negotiations, both parties are guided by the following prin-ciples:37 (i) The United States does not intend to establish a permanent militarypresence in the Philippines; (ii) US access and use of Philippine military facilitiesand areas will only happen at the invitation of the Philippine government; and (iii)the agreement should be mutually beneficial in developing the individual anddefense capabilities of both parties. Currently, the negotiations are focused ontechnicalities, such as implementation procedures, prepositioning of US supplies

33. Jerry E. Esplanada, “2nd Philippine-U.S. Strategic Dialogue set Next Year,” McClatchy-TribuneBusiness News (28 October 2011), pp. 1–2, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=2496704781&Srch...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).34. Floyd Whaley, “Philippines in Talk to Expand U.S. Military Ties,” The International HeraldTribune (27 January 2012), pp. 1,3.35. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Seeks to Expand Presence in the Philippines,” The Washington Post (26January 2012), pp. A1, A12.36. Ibid.37. Pio Lorenzo F. Betino, “Defense Undersecretary Pio Lorenzo F. Betino’s Letter to SenatorFranklin Drillon,” Camp Aguinaldo, Department of National Defense (29 August 2013), p. 1.

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and materiel, security, ownership of facilities, environmental protection, utilitiesand communication, resolution of disputes, and duration and termination of thepact.

Leveraging on the United States’ Other Alliances

A dynamic partnership with the United States enables the Philippines tostrategize its territorial/maritime defense through domain awareness. Therefore,the Philippines must develop military interoperability with the United States andexecute naval diplomacy, targeted engagement, and security assistance arrange-ments to enhance the country’s maritime security.38 Enhanced strategic engage-ments with the United States also require the Philippines to link with Washington’sother alliance partners in East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. ThePhilippines’ 2011 National Security Policy mentioned the need to maintain secu-rity ties and to reaffirm its alliance with the United States as the US militarypresence is a major stabilizing factor in the region.39 It also proposed that thePhilippines must pursue its cooperation arrangements with ASEAN, Japan, SouthKorea, India, and Australia, among others. Meanwhile, the AFP’s 2011 StrategicIntent stated that while the Philippines has only one formal defense treaty (the1951 MDT with the United States), it will be beneficial for it to engage andstrengthen its relationship with 17 countries that have signed security cooperationagreements with the AFP. Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea are amongthose countries.40

The Philippines’ efforts to forge security ties with Japan, South Korea, andAustralia are hedged on its strategic bets in the light of its limited militarycapabilities. It likewise complements the country’s alliance with the United Statesthat serves as a principal deterrence against external threats. The 2010 StrategicDirection of AFP International Military Affairs stated that the Philippine militaryshall maximize gains from the alliance with the United States, while seeking anddeveloping relationships with other potential allies, such as Australia, South Korea,and Japan, which are key players in the Asia–Pacific region.41 The document alsoconfirmed that the Philippines intends to develop relations with them to enhancethe country’s security and develop its military (specifically territorial defense)capabilities.42

The Philippines’ plan to link the spokes of the bilateral alliances together jibeswith Washington’s agenda of revitalizing the United States’ well-established alli-ances in Northeast Asia and deepening the United States’ security relationship in

38. Voltaire T. Gazmin, op. cit., p. 18.39. National Security Council, op. cit., p. 38.40. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, op. cit., p. 34.41. Office of Plans and Program (J-5), op. cit., p. 2.42. Ibid., p.2.



South and Southeast Asia.43 This is Washington’s strategic response to thegeostrategic significance of the littoral states of East and Southeast Asia (from theSea of Japan to the Bay of Bengal), which is rapidly emerging as the mostpolitically, economically and strategically important area. With the US strategicpivot to Asia, linking the bilateral alliances is one way of reassuring allies (espe-cially those that are confronted by increased Chinese assertiveness on maritimedisputes over the Senkaku Islands in East Asia and the Spratly Islands in the SouthChina Sea) that the United States has the ability and will to fulfill its securitycommitments in the Asia–Pacific region for decades to come.44

Engaging Japan in Fostering Maritime Security

China’s creeping irredentism or expansionism in the South China Sea haspreoccupied Japan since the Mischief Reef incident between China and the Phil-ippines in early 1995.45 Since then, it has closely monitored the PLAN’s growingcapability and flaunting of its overwhelming naval prowess.46 Tokyo’s worrisomeconcerns are predicated on these realities:47 (i) Japanese tankers carry 70% ofJapan’s energy requirements through the South China Sea; (ii) the United Statesexpects Japan to take a more active role vis-à-vis the South China Sea dispute; and(iii) Japanese interests are threatened by China’s aggressive behavior and expan-sionist tendency. China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea have strained itsrelations with several maritime Southeast Asian states.48 Then Japanese ForeignMinister Katsuay Okada publicly acknowledged in July 2010 that the unstablesituation in the South China Sea could hamper Japan’s trade and threaten regionalpeace.49

Japan and the United States made a joint declaration on 17 April 1996, callingfor closer security operations in areas surrounding Japan.50 More recently, the 2012National Institute for Defense Studies’ China Security Report admits: “Being indispute with China over the EEZ and the boundary of the continental shelf in the

43. Abraham M. Denmark and Brian M. Burton, “The Future of U.S. Alliances in Asia,” Global Asia,5-4 (Winter 2010), p. 58.44. Philip C. Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,”Strategic Forum, 281 (August 2013), p. 9.45. Michael Richardson, “Japan Asserts Rights in South China Sea Signs of Expansionism byBeijing Draw Veiled Warning from Tokyo,” International Herald Tribune (4 April 1995), p. 4.46. National Institute of Defense Studies, NIDS China Report (Tokyo: National Institute of DefenseStudies, 2011), p. 17.47. Joshua P. Rowan, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China SeaDispute,” Asian Survey, 5-3 (May/June 2005), p. 432.48. National Institute of Defense Studies, op. cit., p. 17.49. BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Japanese FM Airs Concern over Territorial Disputes in SouthChina Sea,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (27 July 2010), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/724504192/131A739EA)562...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).50. Sueo Sudo, The International Relations of Japan and Southeast Asia (London; and New York:Routledge, 2002), p. 87.

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East China Sea, Japan inevitably has to pay attention to China’s action in the SouthChina Sea.”51 There are two other reasons why the South China Sea dispute worriesJapan. First, if successful in intimidating the smaller Southeast Asian maritimepowers, China could pose the same gambit in the East China Sea where bothcountries have clashing claims over the Senkaku Islands.52 Second, China’s controlof the South China Sea and the East China Sea is part of its overall strategy ofanti-access/area denial to deprive the US Navy access to China’s surroundingwaters, and to give the People’s Liberation Army-Navy access to the WesternPacific outside of the so-called First Island Chain (an imaginary line that runs fromJapan’s mainland to Okinawa to Taiwan to the Philippines).53 It will be easier forthe PLAN to dominate the South China Sea if the US Navy is not present, as theSoutheast Asian claimant states cannot match overwhelming Chinese naval superi-ority.54 Therefore, Japan plays a balancing role by assisting some littoral SoutheastAsian states to confront China’s aggressive moves. Simply, Tokyo pre-emptsBeijing’s calculation that if Chinese belligerence can end the South China Seadispute, then it can similarly resolve the territorial row with Japan in the East ChinaSea.

Japan uses three instruments to balance China in the South China Sea dispute –conducting bilateral consultations with key ASEAN states, strengthening South-east Asian maritime security, and more effectively, forming trilateral securityrelations with US allies in the region. Japan also teams up with other US allies toconfront China’s belligerency. In July 2011, the Japanese destroyer Shimakaze, aUS Navy destroyer, and a Royal Australian Navy patrol boat conducted commu-nication training and other naval drills near the Spratly Islands. Immediately, aChinese analyst described this low-key US–Japan–Australia naval exercise as a“muscle flexing show.”55 He then accused the three countries of attempting tocreate an Asian version of NATO which, according to him, would exacerbate theSouth China Sea dispute.56

Historically, the Philippines and Japan have maintained vigorous economic andtransnational relations. More notable from being US allies, both countries havecommon security interests. Both countries adhere to democratic governance, civiland political liberties, free trade, freedom of navigation, and respect for human

51. National Institute of Defense Studies, op. cit., p. 26.52. Ian Storey, “Japan Steps Up to the South China Sea Plate: Tokyo is Confronting Beijing andIncreasing Defense Ties with ASEAN Members to Protect Maritime Trade,” Wall Street Journal(9 July 2012), at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303567704577516252626896574> (searched date: 26 February 2014).53. Yoichi Kato, “China’s Naval Expansion in the Western Pacific,” Global Asia, 5-4 (Winter 2010),p. 19.54. National Institute of Defense Studies, op. cit., p. 26.55. BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Planned Drill by U.S. in South China Sea ‘muscle flexing show’– analyst,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (9 July 2011), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/875596625/13A349E13622FC...> (searched date: 20 August 2012).56. Ibid.



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rights. Furthermore, they are US allies whose maritime security is threatened byChina’s renewed aggressiveness in its maritime domain. Since 2005, the twocountries have conducted the annual Political-Military Dialogue as part of Japan’soverall security relations with ASEAN to foster confidence-building measures andexplore areas of security cooperation. In these annual dialogues, the Philippinesand Japan have tackled several security issues of common interests, such as thesituation on the Korean Peninsula, China’s arms build-up, the South China Seadispute, nuclear proliferation in Asia, and maritime security. Japan extended emer-gency relief assistance when the Philippines was ravaged by earthquakes andtyphoons in the past. Japan has pledged to assist in the economic development ofMindanao once the peace process between the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is concluded.

However, Japan’s ability to forge closer security relations with the Philippines isrestrained by its pacifist 1947 constitutions. Despite this restriction, both countriesshare common security concerns, and thus cooperate bilaterally by: (i) enhancingmaritime security through joint activities by their respective Coast Guards; (ii)conducting joint counter-terrorism and UN peace-keeping trainings; (iii) counter-ing nuclear-arms proliferation; and (iv) facilitating the rotational deployment offorward deployed US forces in East Asia. Since 2011, Japan has found it necessaryto confront China’s assertiveness over a territorial dispute in the South China Seain which initially, it had no direct interest.

In July 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and President Aquino agreedto bolster security relations between Japan and the Philippines. After PresidentAquino’s third visit to Japan, Tokyo and Manila announced the holding of anelevated dialogue on maritime and oceanic affairs, exchanges between Filipinoand Japanese defense and maritime officials, as well as Japan’s capacity-buildingtraining of the 3,500-strong PCG.57 In September 2011, then Japanese PrimeMinister Naoto Kan and President Aquino issued a joint statement in Tokyo,affirming that the South China Sea is vital as it connects the world and theAsia–Pacific, and that peace and stability therein is of common interest “to theinternational community.”58 Prime Minister Kan also instructed the Japanese CoastGuard (JCG) to train the PCG, hold consultations with Filipino naval officers, andincrease joint coast guard exercises.59

57. “Japan and Philippines Strengthen Maritime Security Ties,” Jane’s Country Risk DailyReport, 18-195 (9 September 2011), p. 1, at <http://search.prospect.com/docview/894795349/13A384763AF488...> (searched date: 3 November 2013).58. Christian V. Esguerra, “Philippines Gets Japan Support on Spratly Dispute,” TribuneBusiness News (28 September 2011), at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/894306416/13A34DA4D4DFF70...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).59. James Hookway and Yoree Kih, “Japan, Philippines Seek Tighter Ties to CounterChina,” Wall Street Journal (27 September 2011), at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204422404576594521640016158> (searched date: 26 February 2014).

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In April 2012, at the start of the 2-month standoff between Philippine andChinese civilian ships at Scarborough Shoal, Japanese Ambassador to the Philip-pines Toshio Urabe mentioned the “close-knit triangular relationship among Japan,the Philippines, and their closest (mutual) ally – the U.S.”60 Then in May 2012,three Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) surface combatants arrived in Manilafor a 4-day port call.61 The visit came after Tokyo announced its plans to providethe Philippines with 10 new patrol vessels to bolster the latter’s maritime patrolcapability. The newspaper Yomuri Shimbun linked the ship visit to the ongoingScarborough Shoal standoff and editorialized that Japan could not just stand by andwait for China and the Philippines to clash openly.62 It also stressed that it is in“Japan’s national interest to ensure that its sea-lanes remain safe.”63 Interestingly,the MSDF’s ship visit to the Philippines happened just a few days after the USNavy’s Virginia class attack submarine, the USS North Carolina made a suppos-edly port-call in Subic Bay in Luzon. Actually, these ship visits were routineport-calls. However, they were made during the Scarborough standoff and wereextensively publicized. In a sense, Washington and Tokyo were conveying a tacitmessage to Beijing that the two allies would not hesitate to act collectively if thePhilippines were threatened by any form of Chinese armed aggression.64

In July 2012, then Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his Filipinocounterpart, Voltaire Gazmin, inked a bilateral agreement that emphasizesmaritime security.65 This agreement features high-level dialogues between defenseofficials and reciprocal visits by the MSDF chief-of-staff and the PN flag com-mander. A few days later, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosarioannounced that Tokyo was likely to provide the PCG with ten 40-m boats as partof Japan’s official development assistance to the Philippines by the end of theyear.66 Newspapers also reported that two additional bigger vessels are also beingconsidered for transfer to the Philippine government under a grant.

60. Asia News Monitor, “Japan/Philippines/United States: Japan Envoy Notes Close-Knit Relationsamong Philippines, Japan, and U.S.,” Asia News Monitor (11 April 2012), p. 1. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/993161337/13A384763AF88...> (searched date: 20 August 2012).61. BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Philippine Navy Says Japan Sending Three Warships for PortCall to Manila,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (26 May 2012), at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1023495212/13A384763AF48...> (searched date: 20 August 2012).62. Ibid.63. Ibid.64. Alec Almazan, “U.S. N-sub in Subic a Strong Signal to China: Routine Visit Comes amidReports China is Mobilizing Fleet for Philippines Ops,” The Business Times (18 May 2012), p.1, at<http://search.proquest.com/docview/1014157381/13914D940E373...> (searched date: 20 August2012).65. Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, “Japan and Philippines Sign Defense Pact,” Jane’s CountryRisk Daily Report, 19-134 (4 July 2012), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/102349/13A38763AF488...> (searched date: 3 November 2012).66. Jerry E. Esplanada, “Philippines, Japan to Enhance Maritime Security Ties,” Philippine DailyInquirer (9 July 2012), p. 1 <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/43508/philippines-japan-to-enhance...>(searched date: 20 November 2013).



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In January 2013, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida announced Japan’s technicalassistance to the PCG through the provision of essential communication systemequipment for maritime safety.67 More recently, on 27 June 2013, JapaneseDefense Minister Itsunori Onodera and his Philippine counterpart, VoltaireGazmin, confirmed the continuous “exchanges of information aimed at strength-ening Philippine–Japan defense relations and on working together to make USstrategic rebalancing a reality in Asia.”68 Secretary Gasmin also raised the possibil-ity of allowing the Japanese Self Defense Force access to the former US militarybases in the Philippines if Tokyo were interested in negotiating and signing anaccess agreement with Manila.69

Engaging South Korea as a Long-time Security Partner

Until recently, South Korean national security concerns were focused on theKorean peninsula, namely: (i) the maintenance of peace and stability on theKorean peninsula; and (ii) the improvement of inter-Korea relations. However,South Korea’s emergence as one of the most industrialized and wealthy states inthe world has forced it to pay attention to the security of the vital Sea Lines ofCommunication (SLOC) that link the Korean peninsula with the rest of the world.South Korean ships transport 97% of its imports and exports along vital sea routes.Consequently, Seoul expanded its security focus away from the North East Asianseas in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula to the Strait of Malacca, SoutheastAsia, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, Europe, and even Africa.70 The increasein maritime territorial disputes in East Asia, the competition for sources of energyin the high seas, the rise of transnational maritime threats, and the growing tensionbetween the United States and China over their respective maritime interests haveconvinced Seoul to adopt a policy of Combined Cooperation with Allies andFriendly Nations as a means of enhancing its maritime security interests.71

The Philippines and South Korea have a long history that was forged in blood.Philippine–South Korea diplomatic relations were established in 1949. Thestrength of this relationship was tested during the Korean War when the Philippinesdeployed the Philippine Expeditionary Forces as part of the US-led UN forces thatdefended the Republic of Korea against the aggression of the communist North

67. Asia News Monitor, “Philippine/Japan: Philippines, Japan Agree to Enhance Cooperation inMaritime Security,” Asia News Monitor (14 January 2013), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1269104724?accountid=28547> (searched date: 20 November 2013).68. BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Philippines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties,” BBCMonitoring Asia-Pacific (27 June 2013), p. 2, at http://search.proquest.com/docview/137173115?accountid=28547> (searched date: 20 November 2013).69. Ibid.70. Shim Kyong-wook, “SLOC Security: Challenges and Responses for the ROK,” in Geoffrey Tilland Yoon Sukjoon, eds., Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges (Seoul: Korean Instituteof Maritime Affairs, 2011), pp. 58–59.71. Ibid., pp. 71–82.

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Korea. The Philippines was the only Southeast Asian state that sent a sizeable forceto fight in the Korean War. Both countries are also US allies that share commoninterests in maintaining security and stability in Northeast Asia, and in ensuringthat North Korea behave responsibly in the interests of regional peace.

In May 1994, the Philippines and South Korea signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding on Logistics Cooperation and Defense Cooperation, which wasamended in July 2007. It specifically provides for both countries to identifyspecific firms in their respective defense industry that will participate in a coopera-tive defense project. In 2008, the DND acquired various types of ammunition forits light artillery units from two South Korean arms manufacturers – Poongsan andHanwa Corporations.

During his November 2011 State Visit to the Philippines, President Lee MyungBak and President Aquino discussed recent developments on the Korean Peninsulaand in the South China Sea. The two Asian heads of state expressed hope that theirsecurity cooperation could produce peaceful solutions to these two separate con-flicts according to international rule, norms, and standards. President Aquino alsorevealed that the Philippines needs to acquire specific defense materiel, such assurface combatants, and training aircraft.

In November 2011, President Aquino announced the PAF’s planned purchase oftwo squadrons of second-hand F-16C/D through the US Excess Defense Articles.72

This acquisition, however, might cause tremendous financial strain to the AFP,which is still actively engaged in internal security operations. In fact, relative to theAFP’s Oplan Bayanihan, the PAF continues to carry out these counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism functions: (i) intelligence–surveillance–reconnaissance; (ii)precision-attack to minimize collateral damages in its ground support operations;and (iii) education and information dissemination campaign to win the people’shearts and minds.

In May 2012, President Aquino hinted that the PAF might acquire brand-newlead-in jet trainers that could be converted into fighter planes by modifying theirairframe.73 In an interview, President Aquino admitted that the government foundit too expensive to buy, let alone maintain, second-hand fourth-generation jetfighters that only have 5 serviceable years. A sound alternative, he said, was to buycheaper new fighter aircraft from the UK, France, Italy, or South Korea.

The Philippines is currently in the process of negotiating a government-to-government procurement agreement with South Korea for the purchase of 12Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) F/A-50 Golden Eagles. The F/A-50’s designwas largely patterned after the US designed Lockheed Martin F-16 “FightingFalcons.” Both fighter planes have similar features: single engine, speed, size, cost,

72. Jon Grevatt, “Philippines to Hasten Recreation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF F-16Purchase,” Jane Defense Industry, 29-1 (1 January 2012), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/910358069/1367C416F31C55.> (searched date: 3 April 2012).73. Aurea Calica, “Aquino: Government Can Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets,” The PhilippineStar (17 May 2012), p. 2.



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and the range of weapons system. These 12 F/A 50 interceptors can secure thePhilippines’ air space and simultaneously serve as trainer planes to develop thePAF pilots’ “air command maneuvering” skills.74 Negotiations are ongoing onthe F/A-50’s price, weapons, and navigation systems, and technical and logisticsupport. During his 2-day state visit in South Korea on 17–18 October 2013,President Aquino announced that both governments were finalizing a deal worthPhp 18.9bn (estimated $US450m). While there is no definite delivery date yet forthe said procurement, President Aquino and President Park Geun-Hye vow toexpedite the process. Once delivered to the Philippines, these jet fighters will serveas the PAF’s interim interceptors until the defense budget can afford to purchaseand maintain fourth-generation fighter planes.

Jump-starting Philippine–Australia Security Relations

Since the end of World War II, Australia’s security has been based on thevariants of “forward defense” posture. This strategy involves Australia fostering abuffer or shield of friendly regional powers around the continent directed towardscapitalizing on its great distance from most industrial power centers, and East Asiathat could otherwise threaten the Australian homeland.75 Given that Australia’sarea of direct strategic interest is inherently too extensive, the alliance ties withregional security partners, particularly the United States, are essential to thecountry’s strategic interests.76 Currently, Australia warily watches China’s growingmilitary reach, despite the close economic ties between the two countries.77 Againstthe backdrop of China’s growing naval prowess in East Asia, and the growingtension in US–China relations, Canberra has enhanced its security ties with theUnited States, notably through a September 2011 agreement that allowed greaterUS use of military bases in Australia and the prepositioning of US militaryequipment in those facilities.78

In a 2006 bilateral review, the Australian government described its securityrelations with the Philippines as “very strong” and based on friendly ties, as wellas “common strategic interests in a secure, stable and prosperous region.”79 Thetwo countries are formal US treaty allies that are also engaged in bilateral security

74. Asia News Monitor, “Philippines: F/A-50s to Boost Country’s Capability to Defend Territory,”Asia News Monitor (21 October 2013) p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1443037151?accountid=28547> (searched date: 20 November 2013).75. William Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Singapore: GreenGiant Press, 2001), p. 148.76. Ibid.77. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assess-ment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 207.78. Ibid.79. Xinhua News Agency, “Australia, Philippines to Sign Defense Treaty: Envoy,” XinhuaNews Agency (25 August 2006), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/452462495/135CBA374052DE...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).

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relations. The two countries’ navies hold an annual joint naval exercise labeledPhilippine Navy-Royal Navy Exercise LUMBAS to enhance their interoperabilityand readiness. The Philippine Army and the Royal Australian Army conductedLand Activity Dawn Caracha, which focused on the training of Special Forces.The Philippines also received Australian military assistance, such as trainingcourses for senior AFP officers in Australian military schools, and the provisionof 28 flat-bottomed airboats used for both combat and disaster relief operations.Both countries also cooperate in counter-terrorism training under the Philippine–Australia Capacity Building Project, which began in July 2001 under then Aus-tralian Prime Minister John Howard. The project involves the provision of financialand technical assistance to the Philippines for law-enforcement, immigration, andport and transport security. Since 2005, Australia has provided financial and tech-nical support to the Coast Watch South project.

In 2007, the Philippines and Australia signed the Philippines–AustraliaStatus-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA). The agreement follows the format of theUS–Philippine Visiting Forces (VFA) signed in 1997. The SOFA provides legalguarantees to Australian forces conducting joint-counter-terrorism exercises in thePhilippines. It also extends technical assistance to the AFP’s logistics, and acqui-sition policy. The SOFA, however, does not oblige either party to assist the otherin case of an armed attack by a third party. Merely, it covers issues of jurisdictionover Australian troops training in the Philippines and vice versa as the two coun-tries undertake joint military exercises. In October 2011, then Australian ForeignMinister Kevin Rudd visited the Philippines to discuss with Foreign AffairsSecretary Del Rosario key regional and bilateral matters. The two sides tackledimproved cooperation on disaster response, consolidation of defense-counter-terrorism measures, and mutual concerns on maritime security, such as the SouthChina Sea dispute. Although Australia is not a claimant state in the South ChinaSea dispute, it shares with the Philippines the strategic interests of “unimpededaccess to the region’s maritime commons.”80

In July 2012, after 5 years of intense debates and deliberations, the PhilippineSenate finally ratified the agreement. The SOFA contains the detailed legal frame-work for Philippine–Australian military activities, such as the Coast Watch Southproject and the Joint Maritime Training Activity Lumbas. After the PhilippineSenate ratification of the SOFA, the DND announced that Australia looks forwardto joining the annual Philippine–US Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) joint mili-tary exercise.81 With improving Philippine–Australian security relations, PresidentAquino offered Australia a strategic partnership similar to what the country has

80. BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Australia Foreign Minister to Discuss Defense Ties DuringPhilippines Visit,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (20 October 2011), p. 1 <http://search.proquest.com.docview/899030868/135CB96541D630...> (searched date: 3 April 2012).81. Asia News Monitor, “Philippines/United States: Aussies Plan to Join Balikatan Exercise,” AsiaNews Monitor (13 November 2012), p.1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1151086998?accountid=28547> (searched date: 20 November 2013).



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forged with the United States and Japan.82 He commented that the Philippines andAustralia have usually been on the same side in issues that have confronted theirrespective nations during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.83 Healso added that both countries share the same values, and forms of government, aswell as face the same regional and global challenges.

Conclusion

Confronted by China’s assertive expansionism in the South China Sea, thePhilippines considers it crucial and urgent to engage the United States strategically.This partnership enables the Philippines to address its pressing security concern ofterritorial/maritime defense through domain awareness. Noteworthy, too, is itsdesire to develop the AFP’s interoperability with the US Armed Forces, and toenhance its territorial defense capability. Significantly, this revitalized securityrelation involves the Philippines’ efforts to link with Washington’s other alliancepartners in East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

The Philippines engages Japan in fostering maritime security as it taps the JCG inproviding technical and material assistance to the PCG. As part of security relationswith Japan, Tokyo will provide 12 patrol boats for the PCG. A well-developed PCGis extremely important in deterring Chinese intrusion into the country’s EEZ. ThePhilippines also plans to purchase 12 F/A Golden Eagles fighter planes from SouthKorea. These interceptors are the next best alternative to the more expensive F-16 jetfighters from the United States. Moreover, the government’s priorities and limiteddefense budget only allow for the purchase of these interim interceptors until thePAF can afford the fourth-generation fighter planes. The Philippines has also signedand ratified a SOFA with Australia to enhance security cooperation with theAustralian Defense Force that includes the Coast Watch South project and the jointMaritime Training Activity Lumbas. All these efforts are aimed to strengthen thePhilippines’ territorial defense posture. This, in turn, enables the Philippines toapply a viable external balancing policy against an aggressive China. Furthermore,by establishing informal security ties with these countries, the Philippines harnessesthe United States’ other bilateral alliances against a pressing strategic concern inmaritime Southeast Asia – China’s expansionist moves in the South China Sea.

The Philippines’ current efforts to link these spokes together are not a tentative,short-term and knee-jerk response to a crucial strategic concern. China’s emer-gence and design to control the South China Sea present the Philippines and theUnited States a persistent, complex, and enigmatic security challenge. Simplyreviving, strengthening, or transforming the Philippine–US security alliance may

82. Asia News Monitor, “Philippines/Australia: Aquino says Philippines is Offering Australia aStrategic Partnership,” Asia News Monitor (19 October 2012), p. 1, at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1112912020?accountid=28547> (searched date: 20 November 2013).83. Ibid., p. 2.

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not be sufficient in the long run. This long-standing alliance needs to be linked withother US bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific/East Asia (US–Japan, US–ROK,and US–Australia.). A coordinated four-way partnership will result in the conver-gence of views and well-thought-out alliance policies. These policies can redoundto fostering a loose association of US allies in the Asia–Pacific that can pursueshared interests and values with other East Asian states. Definitely, this looseassociation cannot solve all the security challenges in the region. Nevertheless, itcan goad the allies to participate actively and increase their responsibility inmanaging the regional security. More significantly, it can ensure that the UnitedStates remains Asia–Pacific’s guarantor of security, balancer of regional power,and champion of democratic principles in the 21st century.

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