ARI Research Note 89-05

Line of Sight-Forward (Heavy)Surrogate Assessment

Frank D. Brown and Jerry FrydendallIn Horizons Technology, Inc.

Rene J. dePontbriand DTICArmy Research Institute MCT

for

Contracting Officer's RepresentativeRene J. dePontbriand

ARI Field Unit at Fort Bliss, TexasMichael Strub, Chief

Systems Research LaboratoryRobin L. Keesee, Director

January 1989

United States ArmyResearch Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnei

EDGAR M. JOHNSON JON W. BLADESTechnical Director COL, IN

Commanding

Research accomplished under contractfor the Department of the Army

Horizons Technology, Inc. NTIceS- ' i

iNTJS C?&DTtO IAJ

Technical review by [ .......

David Moran i , K''

William Sanders , Cr~dsL -4

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ARI Research Note 89-05

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Line of Sight-Forward (Heavy) Surrogate Assessment

12 PERSON Al. ' (S)Brown, Frank D., dePontbriand, Rene J., and Frydendall, Jerry D.

13a TYPE O REPORT 3o TIE,;. COVERED ',. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Montnr, Cay) IS AGE COUN:-TFinal Report FF0'. _86/06 TO 86/09 1989, January 62

16. SJPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

Funding MIPR'd from ATSA-SEM-B, USAADASCH, through AINSMC-ASA-H, Contract #IDAAA0985-G-0035.

Rene J. dePontbriand, Contracting Officer's Representative.17. COSATI CODES 18 SUB JECT TERMS (Continue on reverse it necessary and ioenrfy by block nur,:er)

FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP MANPRINT Personnel System safety

05 09 Human factors Training Combat developmentManpower Health hazards (Continued)

19. ASSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necesary and iden~rm: by block number)

The U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH) briefed the Forward Area Air

Defense (FAAD) Line of Sight-Forward (Heavy) (LOS-F-H) concept at a mid-July 1986 ArmySystems Acquisition Review Council meeting. The briefing called for a manpower and per-

sonnel integration (MANPRINT) assessment of the operability and supportability of the

LOS-F(H)'s gun-missile or "hybrid" system. USAADASCH asked the Army Research Instituteto conduct the MANPRINT assessments, and the Human Engineering Laboratory to provide

support in its areas of specialty. Based on Manpower, Personnel, and Training assess-ments of one prototype or "surrogate" system from two manufacturers, it was found thatoperability and support requirements could be met by the anticipated transition MOS,

16R. Human factors engineering, system safety, and health hazard evaluations, whileidentifying specific arc-c of noncomplian- and risk, uncovered no features in the pro-

totype systems that invalidate th-e feasibility of the hybrid concept. Specific sugges-

tions were made to help guide the planned LOS-F(H) Candidate Evaluation.

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ARI Research Note 89-05

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ProcurementAcquisition non-developmental item

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FOREWORD

The Fort Bliss Field Unit of the Army Research Institute forthe Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) responds to research anddevelopment (R&D) needs of the U.S. Army Air Defense ArtillerySchool (USAADASCH) in areas such as the manpower and personnelintegration (MANPRINT) program. Of special interest to USAADASCHis the periodic quick-response requirement in which ARI may be oftechnical assistance. An Army Systems Acquisition Review Council(ASARC) study of the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Line ofSight-Forward (Heavy) (LOS-F-H) component presented one suchchallenge. A major concern of that review was whether represen-tative soldiers from the transition target audience could operatethe LOS-F-H's gun-missile or "hybrid" system.

This report describes the effort and findings of the conceptevaluation carried out by a task force from ARI, the USAADASCHDirectorate of Combat Developments, and the Army Human Engineer-ing Laboratory (HEL). Two manufacturers provided a prototype or"surrogate" system for use in this evaluation. The period fromproject initiation to ASARC was approximately 6 weeks.

The use of this report in the ASARC is evidence of thebenefits of close and timely cooperation within Army agenciesand with the contractor community. Further development of theMANPRINT concepts and research presented in this report will bepursued as the LOS-F-H and other FAAD systems progress throughthe procurement cycle, and will benefit the Army user communityand military managers and the military R&D community.

i)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to acknowledge the timely and thoughtfulassistance of MAJ Terry Tipton of the Army Research Institute(ARI), Fort Bliss Field Unit, for coordination and technicalcontributions; and Mr. Clarence Fry, Mr. Ernest Balarzs, and Ms.Diane Dotson of the U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory fortheir inputs to the human factors engineering, safety, and healthhazards reviews of the surrogate systems assessed in this proj-ect. Technical assistance was also provided by Dr. John Tock-hart, ARI; and Dr. John Hawley, Dr. Edward W. Frederickson, anjMr. Randall Neeb of Horizons Technology, Inc. A special thanksis due the director and his staff at the U.S. Army Air DefenseArtillery School (USAADASCH) Directorate of Combat Developments(DCD) for their support and extensive coordination efforts inthis quick-response project.

iv

LINE OF SIGHT-FORWARD (HEAVY) SURROGATE ASSESSMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirements:

The U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH)briefed the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Line of Sight-Forward(Heavy) (LOS-F-H) concept at a mid-July 1986 Army Systems Acqui-sition Review Council (ASARC) meeting. The briefing called for amanpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT) assessment of theoperability and supportability of the LOS-F-H's gun-missile or"hybrid" concept.

In early June 1986, USAADASCH asked the Army Research In-stitute's Fort Bliss Field Unit to conduct an operability andsupportability assessment. The Army Human Engineering Laboratory(HEL) was to provide human factors engineering, system safety,and health hazards evaluations. Four general questions were ofinterest: (1) What are the operator human factors concerns?(2) For the proposed operating environment, is the man-machinefunction allocation viable in such a hybrid system? (3) Areoperator performance requirements reasonable? (4) What are themanpower, personnel, and training requirements, and can these besupported with anticipated resources?

Procedure:

The concept feasibility assessment was conducted using twomanufacturers' prototype or "surrogate" weapon systems to providebaseline data for addressing MANPRINT issues. Operator workloadratings derived from several predecessor systems also provided acomparative baseline. A front-end analysis identified missionand performance requirements. The operability analysis then de-termined the performance role of the operator and associatedhealth and safety concerns. The supportability analysis lookedat manpower and personnel affordability from an organizational,staffing, and soldier quality perspective. The training require-ments analysis was guided by the TRADOC systems approach totraining.

Findings:

The analysis of the surrogate systems indicated that oper-ator task workload is no greater than that associated with base-line predecessor systems and that representcitie soioiers fromthe current personnel pool can operate a hybrid-concept system.

v

Analyses indicated that the Army can support such a system withrespect to quality of personnel and ability to train these per-sonnel. Identified design deficiencies affecting human factorsengineering, safety, and health hazards were generally judgedcorrectable and not a factor in the feasibility of the hybridsystem concept.

vi

LINE OF SIGHT-FORWARD (HEAVY) SURROGATE ASSESSMENT

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION............................

Background..........................1LOS-F-H Operational Requirement.................Acquisition Strategy.....................5

SCOPE OF ANALYSIS.........................6

Study Objective........................6Issues.....................................6Limitations and Constraints*...................7

TECHNICAL APPROACH........................8

Overall Approach.......................8Front End Analysis (FEA)...................8System Operability Assessment.................9MPT Affordability Assessment................10OperAlni' itv/.Affordabllity Intparation.............11

STUDY RESULTS.........................11

Results of Front End Analysis.................11Results of System Operability Analysis...........18Results of Human Factors Engi'eering, System Safety,

and Health Hazards Evaluations..............18Results of MPT Affordability Assessment ........... 25Operability and Affordability Integration .......... 33

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................35

Discussion.........................35Recommendations........................36

REFERENCES............................39

APPENDIX A. HUMAN4 FACTORS ENGINEERING/SAFETY EVALUATIONOF THE AIR DEFENSE LINE OF SIGHT-FORWARD(HEAVY) SURROGATE SYSTEM (BY HUMANENGINEERING LABORATORY)..............A-1

vii

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Line of sight-forward (heavy) functions ..... 12

2. Line of sight-forward (heavy) functionalrequirements ........ ................... 13

3. Line of sight-forward (heavy) generic equipmentlist .......... ....................... 14

4. Line of sight-forward (heavy) functionallocation ........ .................... 15

5. line of sight-forward (heavy) equipment designdifferences ........ ................... 17

6. Task list - LOS-F-H surrogate system ........ . 19

7. Rating scale values and descriptions for each

of four workload components ... ........... 21

8. LAV-AD workload rating ..... .............. 22

9. LOS-F-H task allocation analysis .. ......... 23

10. Currcnt MOS requirements .... ............. 28

11. LOS-F-H ADA crewmember personnel prerequisites 29

12. Range of "OF" scores - mOS 16R Mar 86 EnlistedMaster File ........ ................... 30

13. Task initial training location ..... .......... 31

14. Collective tasks for tactical operations ..... . 32

15. Preliminary training devices and materials . . .. 33

16. Course summary ....... .................. 34

17. Effect of combined "OF" and "EL" scores - 16RMar 86 Enlisted Master File ... ........... 37

A-1. Workspace dimension ..... ............... A-6

A-2. Reloading timelines ..... ............... A-9

A-3. System capabilities versus threat comparison . . . A-13

viii

CONTF'fS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3. Forward area air defense (FAAD) system ..... 3

2. Engagement sequence timeline for LOS-F-Hsurrogate system ...... ................ 20

3. Soldier-machine task allocation and effecton workload ratings ...... ............... 24

4. Tactical operation timeline ... ........... 26

ix

LINE OF SIGHT - FORWARD (HEAVY) SURROGATE ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Line of Sight-Forward (Heavy) (LOS-F-H) element of theForward Area Air Defense (FAAD) system was scheduled to undergoArmy Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) evaluation inmid-July 1906. As part of this review, manpower and personnelintegration (MANPRINT) concerns (human factors engineering,system safety, health hazards, manpower, personnel and training)for the LOS-F-H and the Army's ability to support manpower,personnel and training (MPT) requirements were anticipated toemerge as major issues. Accordingly, the U.S. Army Air DefenseArtillery School (USAADASCH) required that a preliminaryMANPRINT assessment of the LOS-F-H concept be carried out aspart of the preparations for the ASARC meeting.

The U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), and the U.S. ArmyHuman Engineering Laboratory (HEL) were requested by USAADASCHto conduct a MANPRINT assessment of two weapon systems whichwere (a) similar in concept to the proposed LOS-F-H and (b)currently available (in prototype form) from manufacturers.These two weapon systems were to be used as surrogates of theLOS-F-H concept and, as such, provide an exemplary baseline fromwhich MANPRINT issues could be addressed.

LOS-F-H Operational RecquAirement

Employment

The LOS-F-H serves as part of the combined arms team byproviding front-line air defense against attacks by highperformance fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as selfdefense fire against ground targets. Because of its hardness,the LOS-F-H is to be capable of operating side-by-side withmaneuver elements during all types of tactical operations.These maneuver forces operate in all types of terrain, weather,and climatic conditions to include reduced visibility whileexecuting day/night operations to accomplish their assignedmissions.

LOS-F-H will be integrated with U.S. Army High to MediumAltitude Air Defense (HIMAD) and U.S. Air Force fighter airdefense assets hrough the FAAD Command, Control, andIntelligence (C I) system, which will pass target informationand command and control messages within the integrated airdefenses.

Threat

The threat to the maneuver force and critical assetsagainst which LOS-F-H will defend in day/night operations, in a

1

countermeasures environment, and under all weather conditions iscomposed of the following elements:

" Rotary-Wing (RW): Attack/Observation/Troop andEquipment Carrying Helicopters

* Fixed-Wing (FW): Close Air Support, Fighters, FighterBombers, Bombers, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

* Ground Forces (GF): Wheeled Vehicles and DismountedTroops

Although this study is focused on the LOS-F-H component ofthe FAAD system, it is important to recognize theinterrelationship of this component with the rest of the FAADassemblage. Figure 1 is an illustration of the air threat andthe FAAD total system response to that threat. From near theForward Line of Own Troops (FLOT), the combined arms, LOS-F-H,and Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) components will counter fixed-wingand rotary-wing threats in their various tactical profile(standoff, pop up, and close air support). This will be dnewith the Pedestal Mounted Stinger (PMS) component. FAAD C Iwill collect intelligence and targeting information from organicsensors and other sources, and provide alerting and cuing toFAAD weapon components. Although the battlefield can be viewedas a collection of separate pieces, the overall employment ofthe FAAD force must be viewed as a system of subsystemsinterlocked and interwoven to provide total coverage and topermit the enemy no preferred attack option. MANPRINTassessments of each of the FAAD components must be sensitive tothis total system concept.

Mission

General Mission. The general mission of the LOS-F-H is toprovide air defense to the forward maneuver elements of Armoredand Mechanized divisions.

Specific Missions. The specific missions of the LOS-F-H,as stated in the Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan andthe government's LOS-F-H Request For Information (RFI) tocontractors, are:

e Defeat low altitude, high performance aircraft;

e Defeat advanced rotary-wing aircraft;

* Defeat ground targets;

* Surveillance;

" Maneuver; and

" Survive.

2

SENSORS - - - -

LINE -OF -SIGHT-REAR

NON-NE-OF-SIGHT COM D ARMS

COMMAND, CONTROLAND INTE2IGENCEL LINE-OF.SIGHT-FORWARD

Figure 1. Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) System

System Description

The LOS-F-H component is to be a self-propelled, armored,highly mobile, air transportable platform with a primaryarmament of launch-rcady missiles and a complementary weaponproviding full coverage of air defense within the dead zone ofthe missile. It will have an integrated ground defensecapability for self protection. The weapon will possess acapability for 360 degree target detection and engagement. Itwill be capable of engaging threat aircraft in all profiles(standoff, attack, run-in, etc.), and be effective in a heavythreat countermeasures environment (electronic countermeasures(ECM), infrared countermeasures (IRCM), etc.). The LOS-F-Hcomponent will possess a fully integrated passive detectionsensor capable of providing targeting data to the weapon in anautonomous mode of operation with no more than 40 percentdegradation in weapon ranging capability. It will incorporateactive target identification devices of the FAAD C2 I. Thesedevices will provide positive friend and hostile identification.Emplacement and set-up times from vehicle halt to engagement bythe missile subsystem will be minimized. Minimized displacementtime after engagement is also required. A shoot-on-the-movesuppressive fire capability for the gun subsystem is required.The weapon must use an Azimuth Reference Unit (ARU) to provide

3

an automatic capability to orient on true north to + 5 degreeaccuracy. Reload of the weapon must be accomplished by thecrewmembers within 15 minutes in day or night environments. TheLOS-F-H component will provide full performance in a climaticrange from -25 degree to 140 degree Fahrenheit (including solarradiation).

The major subsystems of the LOS-F-H are:

* Fire Control;

* Command, Control, and Intelligence;

* Armament;

* Turret;

* Power and Actuator; and

* Chassis.

Each of the major subsystems is briefly described in thefollowing sections.

Fire Control. The fire control subsystem consists of thepassive, day/night detection, tracking, integrated IFF(Identification Friend or Foe), automatic ranging and firecontrol computer. All subsystems are fully integrated with thefire control system and capable of providing detection,acquisition, tracking, ranging and firing from on-board.

Command, Control and Intelligence. The LOS-F-H weapon willinterface with the C I component of the FAAD system. Targetinginformation and command and control will be provided by theEnhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). Voicebackup and amplification of command and control information willbe provided by the Single Channel Ground to Air Radio System(SINCGARS).

Armament Subsystems. The primary weapon for the LOS-F-Hwill be at least six launch ready missiles capable of day/nightengagement. A secondary gun subsystem will provide coverage inthe missile dead zone and self defense against ground troops.The gun subsystem must carry a stowed load sufficient for atleast 20 engagements of aerial targets.

Turret Subsystem. The turret houses the turret/armamentdrive systems, all sensor C2 I/integrated data displays and majorequipment mounts. The weapon will possess a capability for 360degree target detection and engagement. The turret subsystemwill be hardened for operations and survival in a hostilebattlefield environment providing survival against dust, smoke,nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), ECM, small arms fire, andfragmentation.

4

Power and Actuator Subsystem. Turret and armamentpositioning is provided by a direct current electro-servosystem. Detection, C I, tracking, ranging and fire controlelectronics are powered by a rechargeable battery. Both therecharging auxiliary motor and the main engine use diesel fuel.

Chassis Subsystem. The LOS-F-H will be incorporated into aself-propelled carrier with mobility and armor protectionequivalent to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The LOS-F-H will becapable of operations and survival in the hostile battlefieldenvironment (i.e., dust, smoke, ECM). The weapon, minus themissile in flight, will be hardened against the effects ofelectromagnetic pulse (EMP). It must meet the standards of AR70-71 for NBC survivability. The weapon must be decontaminableutilizing materials that resist contaminant absorption anddesigned to allow easy access to exposed surfaces fordecontamination. The weapon must be hardened to preventmaterial damage to components by either agents ordecontamination procedures and materials.

Acquisition Strategy

The acquisition strategy for the LOS-F-H System is Non-Developmental Item (NDI). NDI is a generic term that defines asystem which uses demonstrated and emerging technologies from avariety of sources with little or no development effort by theArmy. The formal categories of NDI acquisition are listedbelow:

1. Category A - Off-the-shelf items that are to be used inthe same environment as commercial use.

2. Category B - Off-the-shelf items that are to be used ina military environment substantially different from a commercialenvironment.

3. Category Other - A new system assembled from componentsthat are in use in a variety of environments (commercial - U.S.or foreign; military - U.S. or NATO). The system requiresintegration by a manufacturer and may require some hardwareand/or software development.

The LOS-F-H is a Category Other NDI acquisition. Most of thecL'nponents exist but will require integration and somefaLurication by the manufacturer. The fact that LOS-F-H is anNDI acquisition has important implications with respect toMANPRINT. In NDI, the materiel system is not developed inresponse to a particular set of functional requirements nordesigned to specific performance objectives. Rather, a judgmentwill be made that the various available components will beeffective in addressing a set of mission deficiencies. Themateriel syste 3 may rely heavily on pre-planned productimprovement (P I) to obtain a desired capability, assuming thatthe basic configuration of the system is intrinsically sound.The manufacturer may be able to improve on system performance

5

through integration, hardware modification and software design.However, the object is not to design and develop the system, intraditional terms, in direct response to an identified threat.

SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

Study Objective

As stated by the proponent, the overall objective of thepresent study was to determine whether soldiers representativeof the current personnel pool can effectively operate a hybridsystem. While the overall objective appears straightforward, itis more encompassing when viewed from the perspective ofMANPRINT. A critical early step is to specify functionally whatthe total system must do to meet mission requirements and howwell it must perform these activities. Given system performancerequirements, it is necessary to demonstrate that the system'soperability concept (i.e., human-machine function allocationconcept) is viable. A related issue concerns systemsupportability: the Army's ability to provide the MPT resourcesrequired by a specific system concept. These concerns are morefully discussed in the next section.

Issues

Four closely related issues are subsumed under the overallissues of operability and supportability.

1. What operator human factors concerns exist in thesesurrogate systems? (Human factors engineering (HFE) "fit",systems safety (SS), and health hazards (HH).)

Human factors concerns consist of all of the elements inthe system's environment that influence operator capabilitiesand limitations. The specific concerns that were investigatedin the present analysis include:

* Anthropometry;* Man System interface (controls and displays);* Potential health hazards; ande Potential system safety hazards.

2. What performance is required of operators and are theserequirements supportable? (Operator in Action.)

For a system similar to LOS-F-H, the encompassing MANPRINTquestion is, "can this soldier, with this training, performthese tasks, to these standards under these conditions?" Thisissue was addressed through an examination of the surrogatesystems' human-machine interaction to insure that performancestandards could be met within the limits of training resources,aptitudes, skills, physical capabilities and physiologicaltolerances.

6

3. Is the human-machine function allocation scheme viable giventhe proposed operating environment? (Operator in TacticalAction.)

System performance is a combination of individual andequipment performances and is further impacted by operationaland environmental conditions. The functional allocation conceptfor the LOS-F-H was evaluated using time-line (contractor-provided) and operator workload (OWL) analyses.

4. What are the system's MPT requirements, and can the Armymeet these requirements? (Numbers, Quality, and Training.)

MPT affordability concerns the proponent's ability toprovide sufficient numbers of people with the right aptitudesand training for effective system performance. While MPTrequirements are often a single focus, this area is bestanalyzed in terms of (1) manpower and personnel requirements,and (2) training requirements. Manpower and personnel concernsdeal with defining organizational structure, manningrequirements, and personnel qualifications. Manpowerrequirements are typically addressed at three levels: weaponsystem, organization/unit, and total force.

Training requirements concern the subject content and timerequired to impart the requisite skills and knowledges toqualify a person to use, operate, maintain, or support a system.In its broadest context, training impacts on the Army personnelsystem, tactical employment concepts, the logistics system, andthe Army budgeting program.

Limitations and Constraints

Resource Documents

The primary document used for evaluating systemrequirements was the O&O Plan. At the time the analysis began,the Required Operational Capability (ROC) had not been written.The analysis is, therefore, based on the limited planningdocumentation available early in the acquisition process. Theimpact of this limitation is that the system description maylack detail that has since been developed.

Documentation on the system surrogates was provided by themanufacturers and consisted primarily of their responses to theArmy's RFI. Supplemental information was provided whenrequested and consisted of studies relating to human factors,system safety, operational time-lines, and task list data.

Hardware Systems

Fully developed systems were expected to be available forinspection at the manufacturers' facilities. However, only non-operational, partially configured systems were available.

7

Analysts were not able to perform a complete hands-on evaluationof the hybrid systems in order to gain an appreciation for thecomplexities of system operation. A "feel" for thesecomplexities had to be developed through interviews with themanufacturers' engineers.

Time

Approximately 30 days were available in which to gather andanalyze project data. During this time, four separate trips tomanufacturers' facilities were conducted. As a result of thetime limitations, not all of the inconsistencies identifiedduring the MANPRINT evaluation were completely resolved.Specific issues that will require study during future MANPRINTanalysis are described at the end of this report underDiscussion and Recommendations.

TECHNICAL APPROACH

Overall Approach

Given the short period of time available to conduct thesurrogate assessment, the analysis had to be conducted usingdata available from manufacturers or government sources, quicklyorganized briefings by manufacturers, and visual observationsand structured "walk throughs" on equipment located at themanufacturers' facilities. Sufficient time was not available tocarry out primary data collection.

The actual analysis was conducted in four phases, describedas follows:

1. Front End Analysis (FEA)2. System Operability Assessment3. MPT Affordability Assessment4. Operability/Affordability Integration

Each phase is described briefly in succeeding paragraphs.

Front End Analysis (FEA)

The purpose of the FEA was to gather background informationon the functional requirements and performance requirements forthe LOS-F-H surrogate systems. The first part of the FEA beganwith a review of the O&O Plan and the Army's doctrine for FAADemployment. This provided an overview of the system's missionrequirements and a description of the operational environment.Functions required in support of the mission were identified andanalyzed to the level necessary to determine performancerequirements for the system. The manufacturers' responses tothe government's RFI on each of the surrogate systems served asa basis for mapping functions to hardware, software, and humanoperators. The results of the FEA provided for a definition of

8

the system concept and an information store on which to base the

remaining analyses.

System Operability Assessment

Operator Performance Reauirements

Operator performance requirements were identified through atime-line analysis of the engagement sequence. This evaluationprovided a basis for assessing the ability (with the operator inaction) of each surrogate to perform effectively against theanticipated threat. The task analysis was based on thefunctional requirements that were identified during the FEA.Each surrogate's allocation of functions to equipment, softwareand operator was further examined to determine whether theallocation scheme placed an unreasonable burden on the operator.In this regard, a hypothetical manual system (50 caliber machinegun) and four systems with varying levels of automation (Vulcan,Air Defense Gun-Missile-l (ADGILE-I), Mobile Weapon System(MWS), and Light-Armored Vehicle-Air Defense (LAV-AD)) were usedas a basis for comparison. These systems were used in theanalysis because earlier tests had demonstrated that theserecent systems could be operated in a manual mode with littleobserved operator difficulty.

In each case, OWL was estimated using a technique developedby McCracken and Aldrich (1984). A composite OWL score wasderived for each system, based upon evaluations of existing testreports and system descriptions. Six "subject matter experts,"familiar with each system through analysis of availableinformation, rated the different critical engagement sequencetasks for operational difficulty. While time estimates were notavailable for all systems, for purposes of this analysis it wasassumed that such tasks as tracking or ranging would take equalamounts of time on each system, that is, would be largely afunction of target characteristics. Between-systemsdifferentiation was assumed to come from differing levels oftask automation. In view of the lack of availability of morespecific data, this approach afforded the most direct way toincorporate OWL concerns into the surrogate analysis.

Human Factors EnQineering/System Safety/Health HazardsEvaluations

A human factors engineering evaluation was completed usingthe guidance provided in MIL-H-46855B (Human EngineeringRequirements for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities) andMIL-STD-1472C (Human Engineering Design Criteria for MilitarySystems, Equipment and Facilities). The assessment wasconducted by HEL in response to the issue of the human's "fit"to the system. Various operational and environmental conditionsthat could be expected to occur in the system's operation anddesign deficiencies that did not meet MIL-STD-1472C guidelineswere examined for their potential impact on individualperformance. Health hazards and system safety assessments were

9

conducted to insure that the systems were intrinsically safe tooperate and maintain. These were generally conducted in alimited checklist fashion, since it was not possible to conductextended dynamic analyses on the prototype, unassembled systems.

MPT Affordability Assessment

Following the assessment of system operability, analyseswere conducted to determine whether sufficient numbers ofsoldiers were available with the right aptitudes and trainingfor effective system performance. The MPT affordabilityassessment was performed in two steps: (1) manpower andpersonnel analysis, and (2) training requirements analysis.

Manpower and Personnel Analysis

The objectives of the manpower and personnel analysis wereto: (1) identify the number of operators required to operate asingie surrogate system, and (2) determine whether the currentAir Defense military occupational specialty (MOS) structure canaccommodate these requirements. Manpower requirements for thecrew were determined based on tactical, scenario-drivenoperational requirements. Job requirements were identified bycomparing the current Air Defense MOS structure with thesurrogate systems' operator skill requirements. Manpowerrequirements were then compared with projected allocations forthe LOS-F-H.

Training Requirements Analysis

LOS-F-H training requirements were identified usingprinciples congruent with the Army's Systems Approach toTraining. The objective of the analysis was to identify the"what, where, and how" of training in sufficient detail todetermine if there are potentially unsupportable trainingburdens for the LOS-F-H. The procedures determined to beappropriate for this analysis are briefly described in theparagraphs that follow.

Task Analysis. A preliminary task analysis was conductedas part of the FEA. A review of each of these tasks was carriedout to insure that it qualified as a legitimate task statement(specific action, definite beginning and end, measurable,performed in a relative short period of time, and performed forits own sake). As all preliminary tasks met these requirements,all were selected for training. Each task was then evaluated todetermine those tasks that will initially be taught in theinstitution and those tasks that will be taught in units. Taskswere also evaluated with respect to initial, transition,sustainment, and/or collective training requirements. Inaddition, preliminary training device requirements weredetermined.

10

Training Program Development. In order to structure astrawman LOS-F-H training program, tasks were clustered intotraining modules. The course summary developed for the trainingprogram provided sufficient information to address trainingissues on a comparative basis to include: (1) the suitabilityof the training concept, (2) a preliminary assessment oftraining requirements, (3) potential training problems, (4)potential remedies for these problems, and (5) an analysis ofthe Army's ability to implement training remedies.

Operability/Affordability Integration

The integration of operability and affordability issues wasbased on the following questions.

" Can a sullier representative of the current personnel

pool operate a hybrid system effectively?

* Can the Army afford the MPT burden?

" Can improvements to system operability be made?

" What can be done to decrease the MPT burden?

STUDY RESULTS

Results of Front End &nalysis

Functional Requirements

The front end analysis provided the framework for theremainder of the analyses. As a starting point, the missionsoutlined in the O&O Plan were reviewed and used to identifysystem functional requirements. Functions required in supportof the system's mission are presented in Table 1.

Following the identification of functions and sub-functions, performance measures and performance standards weredeveloped. Table 2 presents a listing of functions with theapplicable performance measures and performance standards.Since the study dealt only with operators, only those measuresand standards that apply to operators have been identified. An"ns" notation in the performance standard column indicates that"no standard" has been identified.

Function Allocation

Before functions could be allocated to hardware, softwareand operators, an equipment structure had to be identified.Table 3 presents a listing of generic equipment by majorsubsystems defined for the LOS-F-H. Table 4 is a listing of thefunctions allocated to hardware/software and operator. Becausemost of the system functions are integrated through a computer,allocations to hardware and software were combined under asingle heading.

ii

Table 1. LINE OF SIGHT-FORWARD (HEAVY) FUNCTIONS

Functions Sub-funfunctions

Shoot AimAcquire TargetDetermine RangeTrack TargetLoadSelect WeaponCharge WeaponFire Weapon

Move TransitNavigate

Communicate TransmitReceive

Command, Controland Intelligence Search

DetectIdentify/ClassifyDisseminate

Sustain RearmAmmunitionMaintainInspectIsolateReplaceRepairAdjustServicePreventive Maintenance

Checks and Services(PMCS)

EvacuatePower

Survive Minimize SignatureVisualThermalAcousticElectronicRadar

NBCEnvironmentBallistic Penetration

12

Table 2. LINE OF SIGHT-FORWARD (HEAVY) FUNCTIONAL REQJIREMENTS

Performance

Function Measure Standard

Shoot Acquire target (per day) 11

Range target (per day) 11

Track target (per day) 11

Select weapon (per day) 11

Engage target (per day) 3

Rate of fire for 1 target

- Gun 3 bursts

10 rounds per burst

- Missile 1

Accuracy for 1 target

- Gun ns

- Missile ns

Move Kilometers per day 60

Hours of engine operation 3

DisplacemenL timeseconds (sec) Minimum: ns

Maximum: ns

Emplacement time (sec) Minimum: ns

Maximum: ns

Communicate Hours per day 17

Command, Control& Intelligence Surveillance hours 17

Sustain Reload Time (minutes) 15

Operating hours per day 6

Maintenance hours (PMCS) ns

Survive Mask/hide/engage 90%

Shoot on the Move 10%

13

II i%1i ilII I I II0Ill

Table 3. LINE OF SIGHT-FORWARD (HEAVY) GENERIC EQUIPMENT LIST

Fire Control SubsystemFire Control ComputerCommander's ConsoleGunner's Console

Command, Control and Intelligence SubsystemEnhanced Position Location Indicator

Communications SubsystemRadioIntercom

Armament SubsystemMissileGun

Turret SubsystemEnvironmental control unitArmament drive systems

Power and Actuator SubsystemFlectro-servo moduleTVFLIRBattery recharger

ChassisArmored track vehicleEngine

Design Differences

Design differences were identified in order to explain anydifferences in performance requirements between the baseline(generic) system identified from the descriptions in the O&OPlan and those performance capabilities of the surrogatesystems. Design similarities and differences are indicated inTable 5. Essentially, there were few basic design differencesidentified based on information available.

Preliminary Task Identification

The functions allocated to the operator, either alone or incombination with hardware and software, are the activities thatform the basis for task identification. The generic activitiesidentified through the allocation of functions (identified inTable 4) become tasks when they are analyzed as an integral partof the surrogate system. The preliminary tasks required of theoperator were assigned in a single step process through use of

14

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17

the functional allocation list, the RFI responses from themanufacturers, and interviews with manufacturer engineers.These tasks are listed by major subsystems in Table 6.

Results of System Operability Analysis

Operator Performance Requirements

Performance requirements for the operatcr were firstaddressed in a time-line assessment of the LOS-F-H engagementsequence, illustrated in Figure 2. The data for the operationaltime-line were obtained primarily through interviews withcontractor engineers. Procedures demonstrated on the systemconsoles were observed to determine if there were complexitiesin the sequence that would have an impact on operatorperformance. The time required to perform the engagementsequence by the commander and gunner was approximately 20seconds. This time permits the crew to engage a highperformance fixed-wing aircraft traveling at 600 knots anddetected at a distance beyond six kilometers.

A second analytical procedure directed at the issue ofoperability involved estimating OWL. OWL for the LOS-F-Hsurrogate, the hypothetical manual system, and four comparablesystems (Vulcan, ADGILE-l, MSW, and LAV-AD) was determined. OWLwas estimated using a technique developed by McCracken andAldrich (1984). Table 7 lists the workload components utilizedin their approach. For each of the systems in this comparison,the tasks in the engagement sequence were assigned an OWL ratingbased on known system characteristics. An illustration of theworkload rating procedure applied to one of the comparativesystems is shown in Table 8.

The results of this workload comparison are shown in Table9. Note that in the manual system, all of the tasks required inthe engagement sequence were assigned to the operator, and inthe LOS-F-H, only the essential manual tasks were assigned tothe operator. For this discussion, workload was seen as a zero-sum quantity; that is, a task had to be carried out by someentity, be it operator or equipment/software. The workloadratings signify what is required for a human operator to do thejob. The equipment/software or machine workload ratingindicates the "unburdening" of workload from the human operatorto equipment/software. The results indicate that if the LOS-F-H's automated functions work as intended, OWL should not beexcessive. Figure 3 is a simplified bar chart illustrating thetask allocation and distribution of workload between the humanoperator and machine for each of the evaluated systems.

Results of Human Factors Engineering, System Safety,and Health Hazards Evaluations

As noted earlier, HFE/SS/HH assessments of the twosurrogate systems were conducted by HEL. These analyses were inresponse to the issue of the human's fit to the system. The

18

Table 6. TASK LIST - LOS-F-H SURROGATE SYSTEM

Fire Control SubsystemOperate Radar/Commander's ConsoleOperate Radar in Alternate Mode (other than default)Operate Optical Sight

Power and Actuator SubsystemOperate the Electro-Servo ModuleBoresight the Electro-Servo ModuleOperate the TV SensorOperate the FLIR SensorOperate the Laser-Ranger Assembly

Turret SubsystemChange Gas BottleLock/Unlock Travel Locks

Armament SubsystemLoad/Reload MissilesLoad/Reload GunStow MissilesStow Gun AmmunitionBoresight GunAlign Gun

C21 and Communication SubsystemsOperate C4I System EquipmentOperate SINCGARS RadioOperate Intercom

Vehicle SubsystemDrive VehicleRefuel VehicleOperate Land Navigation SystemOperate M13 NBC FiltersOperate Smoke Grenade LauncherOperate Engine Grill CoversOperate Power Distribution SystemOperate Ventilation System

Operator MaintenancePerform PMCSPerform System Operation Verification Test with BITDetect/Isolate FailureReplace lowest replaceable unit (LRU)

observations thus obtained are related to the separate systemsbeing evaluated, and refer to the various anticipatedoperational and environmental conditions, and to designdeficiencies that failed to meet MIL-STD-1472C guidelines. It

19

Task Time (seconds)

1 5 10 15 20 25

Commander

Search * -----------------------DetectAcquireidentify .2 - -

Hand Off Target

GunnerAcquireRange raIdentifyTrack , -Select WeaponEngage zFire WeaponAssess Damage

Note 1. Search is a continuous action. Commander monitorsscreen and makes minor adjustments to lobe selection and change ofclutter mode.

Note 2. Current doctrine requires the Commander to positively identifyaircraft before handing off target to the gunner. If the doctrine is notchanged for this system, additional time to engage a target will be requiredand the Commander must be able to use the on-board passive detectiondevices.

Note 3. Where manual tracking is an option, the procedure will requireapproximately 1 1/2 seconds longer than automatic function.

Note 4. Beam guided missiles must be guided to the target and, thereforerequire approximately 18 seconds before Gunner can assess damage andacquire new target, or re-acquire previous target.

Figure 2. ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE TIME-LINE for the LOS-F-H SURROGATE SYSTEM

20

Table 7. Rating Scale Values and Descriptors for each of FourWorkload ComponentsSCALEVALUE DESCRIPTORS

VISUAL

1 MONITOR, SCAN, SURVEY2 DETECT MOVEMENT, CHANGE IN SIZE BRIGHTNESS3 TRACE, FOLLOW, TRACK4 ALIGN, AIM, ORIENT ON5 DISCRIMINATE SYMBOLS, NUMBERS, WORDS6 DISCRIMINATE BASED ON MULTIPLE ASPECTS7 READ, DECIPHER TEXT, DECODE

AUDITORY

1 DETECT OCCURRENCE OF SOUND, TONE ETC.2 DETECT CHANGE IN AMPLITUDE, PULSE RATE PITCH3 COMPREHEND SEMANTIC CONTENT OF MESSAGE4 DISCRIMINATE SOUNDS ON THE BASIS OF SIGNAL PATTERN

PITCH, PULSE RATE, AMPLITUDE

COGNITIVE

1 AUTOMATIC (SIMPLE ASSOCIATION)2 SIGN/SIGNAL RECOGNITION3 ALTERNATIVE SELECTION4 ENCODING /DECODING, RECALL5 FORMULATION OF PLANS (PROJECTING ACTION SEQUENCE,ETC.)6 EVALUATION (CONSIDER SEVERAL ASPECTS IN REACHING

JUDGMENT)7 ESTIMATION, CALCULATION, CONVERSION

PSYCHOMOTOR

1 DISCRETE ACTUATION (BUTTON, TOGGLE, TRIGGER)2 DISCRETE ADJUSTIVE (VARIABLE DIAL, ETC.)3 SPEECH USING PRESCRIBED FORMAT4 CONTINUOUS ADJUSTIVE (FLIGHT CONTROLS, SENSOR CONTROL,

ETC.)5 MANIPULATIVE (HANDLING OBJECTS, MAPS, ETC.)6 SYMBOLIC PRODUCTION (WRITING)7 SERIAL DISCRETE MANIPULATION (KEYBOARD ENTRIES)

is not the objective of this analysis to evaluate or rate thesesystems but rather to point out those concerns that coulddetract from the ability of a soldier representative of thecurrent personnel pool to operate a similar system. The resultsof the assessment of these prototype systems are summarized

21

Table 8. LAV-AD Workload Rating

SEARCH 4- P2 -V

DETECT 2 -VACQUIRE 4- P

HUMAN IDENTIFY 6- COPERATOR SELECT WPN 1- PWORKLOAD 1 - V

3 -CMONITOR TRACK AND RANGE AUTO 2 - VFIRE 1- A

1 -PDAMAGE EVAL 6 -C

SUBTOTAL 33

HARDWARE/ TRACK 11 - VSOFTWAREWORKLOAD RANGE 7 -V

SUBTOTAL 18

TOTAL WORKLOAD 51

V = VISUAL P = PYSCHOMOTOR C = COGNITIVE A = AUDITORY

here. A complete report of the human factors engineering andsystem safety evaluation conducted by HEL is included in theappendix.

Human Factors Engineering Evaluation

The human factors engineering evaluation indicated thefollowing representative types of probl3ms (See Appendix):

Workspace. Two problems were noted in the workspace:

1. Contractor-provided drawings indicate that the 95thpercentile male cannot be accommodated in a sitting position.The problem is compounded by the addition of individual andorganizational items of clothing and equipment.

2. Hatch width does not meet the requirements of MIL-STD-1472C.

Missile Loading. The missiles weigh approximately 150pounds each, requiring a two-man lift or the addition of anautomated lifting mechanism for reloading.

22

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F7 Soldier

18 Workload20 -

-20 11 11 11 18

-40 56

Manual Vulcan ADGILE-1 MWS LAV-AD LOS-F-H

Figure 3. Soldier-Machine Task Allocation and Effect onWorkload Ratings

Controls and Displays. Four problems were noted in theoperator console:

1. The commander and the gunner have different tasks buttheir workstations have identical controls. This conditioncould result in negative transfer when operators are required tomove from one console to the other in switching jobs.

2. A keypad is used to enter system function codes at bothworkstations but no on-screen menu is provided. This conditionrequires either memorizing the function codes, designing aneffective job performance aid, or redesigning of the software.Further evaluation of the method for executing keypad entries ofsystem function codes is recommended.

3. The PPU control panel is presently designed to belocated behind the commander and gunner seats. Accessing PPUcontrols and monitoring displays are therefore difficult tasks.

4. The gunner's engagement task requires a seven-stepoperational sequence divided: between two hand-operated controldevices and one foot switch. It is recommended that this methodbe studied to determine its trainability and impact on systemeffectiveness.

Speech Intelligibility. A determination of the interiorsteady-state noise levels created by the surrogate systems could

24

not be performed. It is recommended that candidate systemsundergo dynamic testing to determine speech intelligibilitylevels.

System Safety and Health Hazards Evaluation

The evaluation of system safety and health hazardsindicated that the prototype systems present hazardousconditions that must be further investigated by qualified safetypersonnel. The following hazards were identified for thisanalysis:

1. A thermal hazard is produced by the PPU.

2. An electrical hazard is produced by a 115 volt windowde-icing system.

3. Hazards are produced by the normal handling ofexplosive material.

4. Toxic hazards are produced during system operation andmissile launch.

5. Hazards are caused by high-velocity gun sabots(ejection of spent shells or packing material) during firingexercises.

Results of MPT Affordability Assessment

MPT affordability were obtained in two steps: (1) manpower

and personnel analysis, and (2) training requirements analysis.

Manpower and Personnel Analysis

The objectives of the manpower and personnel analysis wereto: (1) identify the number of operators required to operate asingle surrogate system; and (2) determine whether or not thecurrent Air Defense MOS structure can accommodate thesurrogates' manpower requirements.

Operator Reauirements. Using the preliminary task analysisresults obtained during the FEA, a tactical operation time-linewas developed for emplacement, engagement, and march ordertasks. Figure 4 presents the actions required in LOS-F-Htactical operation; the times required to perform driver,commander, and gunner actions; and the simultaneous events thatoccur for these operations personnel.

The results indicate that a three man crew is necessary tooperate the LOS-F-H surrogates. However, the analysis is basedprincipally on the manufacturers' outline for thp scheme ofoperation. The primary alternative t this scheme is theintegration of the LOS-F-H and FAAD C I components, which isexpected to replace the on-board radar. Since the commander's

25

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26

primary job in the operational scheme is to acquire targets withthe radar and hand them off to the gunner, elimination of theon-board radar would serve to free the commander to utilize non-cooperative target recognition and C21 information and settarget priorities. Potential ramifications J such task changeswere not assessed.

MOS Requirements. It was not expected that jobrequirements for the surrogate systems would match any existingShort Range Air Defense (SHORAD) MOS, since there are currentlyno fielded hybrid Air Defense systems. There are, however, anumber of systems fielded where the operators perform similartasks such as operate a console, search, detect, acquire,identify, track, engage, and fire weapons. Table 10 is alisting of current SHORAD MOS requirements. This tableindicates the prerequisites for entry level training for each ofthese MOS. Comparing LOS-F-H tasks common to those inpredecessor systems, a tentative prerequisite outline for a LOS-F-H Air Defense Crewman was constructed and is presented inTable 11.

Personnel classified in MOS 16R, Vulcan Crewman, have beenidentified as the most likely resource from which personnel;.;uld be drawn for transition training to LOS-F-H.Prerequisites for entry into MOS 16R are similar to therequirements identified for LOS-F-H (i.e., aptitude area OFscore of 100, very heavy physical demands, red/green colordiscrimination) (see Table 11). A critical prerequisite tosatisfy is the aptitude area score. OF scores for currentpersonnel in MOS 16R are shown in Table 12. Although just over26 percent of these personnel have OF scores below 100, thereare sufficient personnel remaining in the i.-fnto. t *eet theinitial manning requirements for the LOS-F-H (at the time ofthis project, the working figure was a crew of 3 for each of 160systems, for a total of 480 personnel). However, since manningstrength profiles are dynamic, the nature of the target audiencemust be monitored through to time of fielding.

Traininq Requirements Analysis

The objective of the training requirements analysis was toidentify the "what, where, and how" of the surrogates' trainingrequirements in sufficient detail to determine if there arepotentially unsupportable training burdens. The results of theanalysis were obtained in two steps: (1) Task Analysis, and (2)Training Program Development.

The preliminary task list developed during FEA wasvalidated for use in determining training requirements.Specifically, each task was reviewed based on the requirement toinsure that it qualified as a task statement (as described on p.10). Based on the current TRADOC policy requiring that 90percent or more of the tasks selected for training be initiallytaught in the institution with the remainder to be initiallytaught in the unit, a training location was obtained for each

27

Table 10. Current MOS Requirements

Source: AR 611-201, Apr 86

PHYSICAL ITEMSMOS aAA SCORE DEMANDS VISION bPROFILE SEC CL MAINT

16H cOF 100 dM eR/G 222221 fS 0

16J OF 100 M R/G 222221 S 3

16P OF 100 gv14 R/G 222221 hC 6

16R OF 100 VH R/G 222221 C 5

16S OF 90 VE N 111211 C 2

24M OF 100/ VH N 222221 C 14EL 110

24N OF 100/ VH N 222221 C 18EL 110

27F iEL 100 VH N 222221 C 24

27G EL 95 VH N 222221 C 34

27N EL 110 VH N 222221 C 10

AUD±TIONAL REQUIREMENTS: Minimum Height of 64 inchesVision correctable to 20/20 withoutmultifocal lenses

Notes:

a. AA: Aptitude Areab. Profile: PULHES (Physical capacity; upper

extremities; lower extremities; hearing andear; eyes; psychiatric. See AR 40-501)

c. OF: Operator/Food AAd. M: Mediume. R/G: Red/Green color vision is normalf. S: Secret Clearanceg. VH: Very Heavyh. C: Confidential Clearancei. EL: Electronics AA

16-Series: Operators24-, 27-Series: Maintainers

28

Table 11. LOS-F-H ADA CREWMEMBER PERSONNEL PREREQUISITE

Active Army, grade E-4 or below

Qualifying OF score of 100

Physical demand rating of very heavy

Color discrimination of red and green

Near and far visual acuity correctable to 20/20

Normal depth perception

Auditory acuity loss no greater than 15db in the100 to 8,000 hertz range

Motor coordination - finger and manual dexterity

Confidential clearance

task and is presented in Table 13. The unit must train 100percent of the individual and collective tasks for sustainmentof skills. A collective task hierarchy for tactical operationsis presented in Table 14. Preliminary training devices andproducts were also identified. Training device requirements arebased on a comparison with similar air defense systems and arelisted in Table 15. Proposed LOS-F-H training devices areeither currently in the Army inventory or the concept underwhich they may be obtained has been developed.

Training Program Development. A training program for LOS-F-H institutional training was developed and is summarized inTable 16. The preliminary task analysis identified those tasksto be taught in the institution. From this list, tasks wereclustered and tentative course modules were developed. Since aformal instruction program had not been developed on the hybridconcept prototypes, a Quasi Program of Instruction (QPOI) wasthen developed using as a model the POI that had been developedfor MOS 16L, Sgt York Gun System Crewmember. The QPOI coursesummary was then compared with other USAADASCH training programson the basis of:

1. Suitability of training concept. The strawman LOS-F-Htraining concept is consistent with other USAADASCH and TRADOCtraining concepts.

2. Preliminary assessment of training requirements. Thecourse summary is a reasonable assessment of LOS-F-H surrogatesystem institutional training requirements.

29

Table 12. Range of "OF" Scores, MOS 16R MAR 86 Enlisted Master File

SCORES NUMBER CUM. NO. PERCENT

01-69 21 21 .69

70-74 3 24 .78

75-79 8 32 1.04

80-84 12 44 1.44

85-89 99 143 4.68

90-94 262 405 13.27

99-99 394 799 26.18

100-104 413 1212 39.71

105-109 8 1560 51.11

110-114 314 1874 61.40

115-119 223 2097 67.71

120-124 171 2268 74.31

125-129 100 2368 77.59

130-134 46 2414 79.09

135-139 11 2425 79.45

140 and above 8 2433 79.72

No score recorded 619 (20.28)

3052

3. Potential training problems. There appear to be nosignificant problems in training the tasks required to operatethe LOS-F-H. Identifying operators capable of utilizingBIT/BITE technology could be a potential problem. At present,however, there appears to be no reason to set an electronicsaptitude prerequisite for entry into LOS-F-H training. Theactions required of the operator seem no more complex thanreplacing a fuse in an automobile or a home stereo unit.Personnel prerequisites and training requirements for BIT/BITEtechnology should be evaluated in more detail prior to fieldingof the system.

4. Potential remedies for problems outlined. Bettersystem definition will provide for a more complete task analysisand, subsequently, a better defined training program. APreliminary Training Effectiveness Analysis (PTEA) should beconducted as soon as possible to further explore systemtraina ility, potential problems associated with the system's

30

Table 13. TASK INITIAL TRAINING LOCATION

Training LocationTask Institution Unit

Fire Control SubsystemOperate Radar/Commander's Console XOperate Radar in Alternate Mode X

(other than default)Operate Optical Sight X

Power and Actuator SubsystemOperate the Electro-Servo Module XBoresight the Electro-Servo Module XOperate the TV Sensor XOperate the FLIR Sensor XOperate the Laser-Ranger Assembly X

Turret SubsystemChange Gas Bottle XLock/Unlock Travel Locks X

Armament SubsystemLoad/Reload Missiles XLoad/Reload Gun XStow Missiles XStow Gun Ammunition XBoresight Gun XAlign Gun X

Communication SubsystemOperate SINCGARS Radio XOperate I~tercom XOperate C I System Equipment X

Vehicle SubsystemDrive Vehicle XRefuel Vehicle XOperate Land Navigation System XOperate M13 NBC Filters XOperate Smoke Grenade Launcher XOperate Engine Grill Covers XOperate Power Distribution System XOperate Ventilation System X

Operator MaintenancePerform PMCS XPerform System Operation XVerification Test with BIT

Detect/Isolate Failure XReplace LRU X

31

Table 14. Collective Tasks for Tactical Operations

CrewmemberTask Cmmdr Gnnr Drvr

EMPLACEMENTStop Vehicle XStop Engine XClose Engine Grills XPower up Radar XPower up EO System XUnlock Travel Locks XCommand Turret Hydraulics toHigh Pressure X

ENGAGEMENT

Operate Radar X

Operate EO System X

MARCH ORDERDrive Vehicle XDirect Driver XOperate Radar (High Alert Only) XOperate EO System (High Alert Only) X

RELOADPosition Turret to Reload Position XLock Travel Locks XDepress Reload Button XLoosen Canister Clamps XRemove and Discard Spent Canisters X XPlace Missile Rounds in Yoke X XTighten Canister Clamps XTest Cables for no Voltage XCable Missiles XTighten Canister Clamps XLoad Gun Ammunition in Gun X XStow Missiles in Vehicle X XStow Gun Ammo in Vehicle X XDepress Reload Button X X

REFUELStop Engine XRemove Fuel Caps XInstall Fuel Hose in Tank XFuel Tanks XAssist Driver X

32

Table 15. PRELIMINARY TRAINING DEVICES AND MATERIALS

INSTITUTION

Conduct of Fire Trainer (COFT)2D/3D Integrated Video DiscDummy/Smart Missile SimulatorsLaunch Simulator

UNIT

Soldier's ManualsJob BooksSituational training exercise (STX)/DrillsArmy training and evaluation program(ARTEP)Common Troop Proficiency Trainer2D/3D Integrated Video DiscDummy/Smart Missile SimulatorsLaunch Simulator1/5 Scale TargetsCombat TablesMulti-purpose Range Complex

technological complexity, individual mental category andaptitude requirements associated with the training strategy, andavailability of personnel to field and sustain the system.

5. An analysis of the Army's ability to implement trainingremedies. There appear to be no significant complexities in theLOS-F-H that would require specific training remedies that arebeyond the Army's ability to resolve. Caution is suggested,however, because of the type of procurement (i.e., NDI).Training must not be permitted to become an automatic solutionto performance problems that cannot be readily resolved throughequipment or software modifications. Other avenues ofimprovement must also be taken into account, such as engineeringchange proposals (ECPs), a different mix of (MOS), as well asoptimizing of function allocation through effective automationof operator tasks or software redesign.

Operability and Affordability InteQration

Based on the operability and affordability assessments ofthe LOS-F-H surrogate systems, it can be stated that soldiersrepresentative of the proposed personnel pool can operate ahybrid system effectively. This conclusion is based in part onreductions in OWL brought about through automation. Operatorperformance requirements on the LOS-F-H surrogate systems appearreasonable since the majority of complex tasks are automated.

33

Table 16. Course Summary

16X10-OSUT, Line of Sight Forward (Heavy)Air Defense System Crew Member

ANNEX SUBJECT: PEACETIME MOBILIZATIONA Introduction to LOS-F(H) 11 Hours TBD

Air Defense SystemB Visual Aircraft Recognition 32 " TBDC Threat Vehicle Recognition 28 " TBDD Operate/Maintain Track Vehicle 57 " TBDE Subsystems of LOS-F(H) AD System 33 " TBDF Prepare System for Operations 32 " TBDG Gun Operations and PMCS 56 " TBDH Missile Operations and PMCS 44 " TBDI Engagement sequence 37 " TBDJ Combat Scenarios 16 " TBDK During system Operations 32 " TBDL Engagement with Degraded 36 " TBD

Equipment and Auxiliary DutiesM Range Firing 32 " TBDN Review & End of Course Test 12 " TBD

Vehicle/CommunicationsO Review & End of Course Test 20 " TBD

i.OS-F(H) PeculiarSUBTOTAL 478 HoursCOURSE LENGTH:

PEACETIME - 13.3 Weeks MOS Training

MOBILIZATION - TBD

ACADEMIC HOURS BY TYPE OF INSTRUCTION

ANNEX CONF PE 1 PE 3 El E2 E3A 5 4 2B 30 2C 24 4D 1 48 8E 11 19 2 1F 11 18 2 1G 12 38 4 2H 10 30 3 2I 16 18 2 1J 16K 8 21 2 1L 11 22 2 1M 32N 4 8O 2 8 8 2TOTAL HOURS 91 274 56 41 6 10 (478)

PERCENT OF INSTRUCTION: Active 69%: Passive 19%; Evaluation 12%.

34

There are deficiencies in the areas of human factorsengineering, system safety, and health hazards that if leftuncorrected could reduce the performance capabilities of theoperator. Manufacturers must follow the guidance provided inMIL-H-46855B and MIL-STD-1472C to insure that systems beingacquired by the Army create the least burden possible on theoperator. The HFE/SS/HH concerns identified in the surrogatesystems are not sufficient to preclude effective operation ofthe systems. These concerns do not appear to directly affectthe viability of the hybrid concept as demonstrated in thesurrogate systems.

Manpower requirements do not exceed the identifiedresources available to man the system. HARDMAN analyses ofmanpower requirements for the Sgt York System were based uponthe requirement for a three man crew, as is needed for the LOS-F-H. The total force requirements for LOS-F-H have, however,been reduced from what was planned for the Sgt York. Hence, onthe basis of previously planned manpower allocations, there areadequate operator manpower resources to field the LOS-F-H.

As stated above, the hybrid concept appears to be operableby soldiers in the transition MOS, and manning requirements canbe met. This means that qualified operator personnel resourcesare available to initially field the system. Based on currentlyavailable manpower pools and recruiting practices there does notappear to be a significant burden in recruiting operatorpersonnel necessary for sustainment of the personnel inventory.

Operator training requirements are consistent with currentrequirements for comparable air defense training programs and,in that regard, should not place an additional burden on theUSAADASCH or unit training programs.

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Discussion

Establishing the viability of a system concept requires theresolution of specific operability and supportability issues.These issues have been addressed throughout this analysis todetermine whether a soldier representative of the currentpersonnel pool can operate a LOS-F-H surrogate systemeffectively, and whether the Army can afford the MPT burden.The response to these two concerns are conditional.

" A soldier representative of the current personnel pool canoperate a hybrid system effectively if the equipmentactually works as intended; if changes in thehuman/machine allocation scheme do not require a greaterworkload burden on the operator; and if HFE/SS/HHguidelines are met.

" The Army can afford the LOS-F-H operator MPT burden if (1)the system does not require additional manpower by a

35

-- - - - I

change in OWL requirements; (2) the qualificationsrequirements of the personnel are not increased, thuslimiting personnel availability; and (3) changes to thesystem are not automatically reflected in a trainingsolut t.n requirment that increases the burden on theinstitution or the unit.

Once operability and supportability issues have beenresolved initially, they must be monitored so as to stay in"balance" throughout the life cycle of the system or theassumptions underlying initial estimates might be negated. Thisdoes not suggest that changes cannot be made to the system, onlythat the "ripple" effect of such changes must be assessed.

To illustrate the potential impact of such changes, assumethat a decision is made (e.g., to create an operator/maintainerMOS) requiring the LOS-F-H system operator to have anelectronics aptitude area (EL) score of 100. Table 17identifies the number of personnel available in MOS 16R withvarying OF and EL scores. The number of personnel in MOS 16Rthat become ineligible for transition to operator training onthe LOS-F-H is 53 percent of the current population versus 26percent when only a prerequisite OF score of 100 is required(see Table 12). More significant impacts could also result froma decision to field the system with an operator/maintainer:

e Additional workload might drive up manpower requirements;

* Aptitude area prerequisites might affect the number ofpersonnel eligible for training (noted above);

* Training might have to be lengthened; and

& Field training requirements might be raised (fieldcommanders are currently required to train 10 percent ofinitial tasks, and train to sustain 100 percent ofindividual and collective tasks).

The illustrations discussed here may seem insignificant.However, several small or seemingly insignificant changes in thesystem can set up a synergistic "creeping burden" that will havea serious impact on the operability/supportability balance.Allowed to occur to any significant degree, the results of suchan imbalance may result in the fielding of a system that can beneither operated nor supported effectively.

Recommendations

In conclusion, it is recommended that future MANPRINTevaluations of the LOS-F-H, as well as of the other FAADcomponents, include the assessment of the relationship betweenoperability and supportability issues within the context ofstudies to be conducted. The analyses considered relevant are:

36

Table 37. EFFECT OF COMBINED "OF" AND"EL" SCORESMOS 16R MAR 86 Enlisted Master File

SCORE INELIGIBLES PERCENT

OF 90, EL 90 554 22.77%

OF 91, EL 91 616 25.31%

OF 92, EL 92 689 28.31%

OF 93, EL 93 761 31.12%

OF 94, EL 94 820 33.70%

OF 95, EL 95 900 36.99%

OF 96, EL 96 989 40.64%

OF 97, EL 97 1,060 43.56%

OF 98, EL 98 1,147 47.14%

OF 99, EL 99 1,217 50.02%

OF 100, EL 100 1,302 53.51%

TOTAL = 2,433

NOTE: DOES NOT INCLUDE 619 INDIVIDUALS WITH NO "OF" SCORERECORDED.

" In-depth operational suitability analyses, toinclude empirical timeline and related operatorworkload assessments;

* HFE/SS/HH and MPT assessments in a dynamic,tactical operational evaluation setting;

" An updated modified HARDMAN-type analysis (tomore sufficiently address personnel and trainingissues);

" A Preliminary Training Effectiveness Analyses(PTEA).

37

REFERENCES

McCracken, H.H., & Aldrich, T.B. (1984). Analyses of selectedLHX mission functions (Army Research Institute TechnicalNote). Fort Rucker. AL: Army Research Institute FieldUnit.

U.S. Army. AR 70-71. Nuclear, bioloQical, and contaminationsurvivability of Army materiel.

U.S. Government. MIL-H-46855B, Human enQineering requirementsfor military systems, equipment and facilities.

U.S. Government. MIL-STD-1472C, Human engineerinQ designcriteria for military systems, ecuipment and facilities.

39

R

APPENDIX A

HUMAN FACTORS/SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE AIR DEFENSELJiNE-OF-SiGHI FORWARD (HLAVY) SURROGATE SYSTEMS

I INTRODUCTION.

The Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) conducted a limitedhuman factors/safety evaluation of ti.,o surrogate air defensesystems. A description of each system WdS previously presented.For the purpose of this report, the systems will be identified asSurrogate 1 and Surrogate 2.

A. Surrogate 1.

A two-day review of contractor material was conductedon 10-11 June 1986. This raterial included the Request ForInformation (RFI) contractor response, and information pertainingto safety, health hazards, and human factors engineering. Onlymizia] information on operator tasks was provided by thecontractor. Following this information review, an assessment ofa semi-operational system was conducted on 25 June. This system,which was provided for "hands-on" analyses, was housed on an M113chassis. Since the U.S. Army is interested in this systemintegrated with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), only alimited evaluation could be conducted.

B. Surrogate 2.

A two-day review of contractor material was conducted,on 18 June 1986. This materiel included the RFI response andinformation pertaining to safety, health hazards, and humanfactors engineering. No operational system was provided for"hands-on" analyses. The contractor instead provided a turretshell on a stand for the evaluation.

II. REPORT CONTENTS.

The following information is supplied in this report:

A. Safety and Health Hazards Evaluation

B. Human Factors Evaluation

C. System Capabilities versus Proposed Threat

III. SAFETY AND HEALTH HAZARDS EVALUATION.

This evaluation was conducted through reviews of contractordocumentation and a one-day observation of each surrogate.

A-1

The following topics will be presented:

o Thermal Hazardso Electrical Ha7ardso Toxic Hazardso Laser Hazardso Noiseo Radiation Hazardso Observations

The following safety and health hazards were found on thesurrogate systems:

A. Thermal Hazards.

Surrogate 1. Extreme temperatures are produced by thePrimary Power Unit (PPU). The contractor's system safety reportlists the highest measurement at 538 degrees (all meqsurementsare in Fahrenheit), taken at the PPU exhaust outlet.-Observations of the M113 vehicle showed this outlet on the sideof the vehi,:2 . It is not yet known where the outlet will belocated on the BFV. This is a very serious hazard for anyone whois walking around the vehicle. The contractor's remedy to thishazard has been to use heat dissipating baffles to lower theexhaust temperatures. Efforts should be made to !ower thesetemperatures further. Warning labels should also be placed nearthe outlet. The contractor's safety report also states that thePPU huts down when the exhaust temperature reaches 1400 degrees(F). Four missiles will be stowed in the two-missilecompartmnts. Missile autoignition occurs at around 300degrees. Multiple engagements could produce that type ofextreme temperature in the missile compartment, therefore ahazard may exist, depending upon the location of the PPU in theBFV.

Surrogate 2. No information on thermal hazards wasfound.

B. Electrical Hazards.

Surrogate 1. A 115 volt electrical hazard exists onthe exposed surface of the germanium coated windows on theelectro-optics (EO) module. This voltage may be disabled at theEO operator's workstation and a warning label is located on themodule. Other safety measures should be investigated toeliminate this hazard.

It is further recommended that the wiring above the EOoperator's head be shielded from possible damage due to thelimited head room inside the crew compartment.

Surrogate 2. No information on electrical hazards wasfound.

A-2

C. Toxic Hazards.

Surrogate 1. The contractor identified beryllium oxidearri b-erylliur ccnp-r *he primary toxic materials used in thesystem. Warning labels have been placed at the location,according to the safety report. The report also states thatcarbon monoxide, ammonia, lead and nitrous oxide levels areexpected to be well below the limits specified by theOccupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) due to thesupplemental ventilation system that circulates air at a rate of1200 cubic feet per minute.

b toxic gas and fire hazard was linked to the vehiclebatteries. The contractor reports that hydrogen gas produced bythe batteries is now vented to the outside.

It is recom'ended that toxic fume measurements be takenin the surrogate system integrated with the BFV to determine thelevels produced by the integration.

Surrogate 2. The contractor's RFI response indicatesthat an insignificant level of carbon monoxide was measured atthe gunner's position during testing;7 however contractorpersonnel indicated during the meetings that not only were highlevels of carbon monoxide present, but also high levels of argonand freon. Hydrogen chloride (acid) gas is produced duringitissile launches. Additionally, extremely poisonous mercurythallium liquid may be released if the seeker dome on the missileis broken.

D. Laser Hazards.

Surrogate 1. This system has two laser subsystems;the Guide Beam Assembly (GBA) and the Laser Ranger (LR). Thesafe eye exposure distance (SEED) has been determined by thecontractor. The SEED fvr the GBA is 70 meters and the SEED forthe LR is 7,836 meters. Eye protection must be worn by allpersonnel within these distances during lasing operations.

Surrogate 2. The contractor has reported that themissile guidance laser SEED is 148 meters and the laserrangefinder SEED is 1100 meters. Eye safety protection isrequired inside these distances. The radar and EO operators areprotected from this hazard by protective glass surrounding theirworkstations.

E. Noise.

Surrogate 1. Impulse Noise - Figures in thecontractor's RFI response show the missile peak impulse level tobe 170 dBA at the exteri y of the vehicle and 145 dBA at theinterior of the vehicle. It is likely that the dBA attached tothe values are a misprint, since impulse measurements are notmade using the A-weighted scale. The 170 dB is likely to be the

A-3

actual impulse measurement since missile noise is normally atthat range. Even so, the type of hearing protection required andthe exposure limits cannot be determined without the B-durationtha. s iould accompany the blast overpressure measurement.Measurements for the gun were not available.

Steady-State - An 80 dBA contour was taken around thevehicle. The farthest recorded distance was approximately 19meters at 270 degrees azimuth (primary noise source being thePPU). Normally an 85 dBA contour is taken to determine at whatdistances personnel must wear hearing protection. It istherefore determined that 19 meters is farther than required,protection contour can be determined.

It is recommended that impulse noise measurements (withthe B-duration) be taken on the missile and the gun in order todetermine the safe exposure limits for personnel. Steady-statemeasurements should be made with the system integrated with aBFV. Those measurements should include:

1. 85 dBA contour

2. Interior measurements (stationary and dynamic)

3. Aural detectability measurements

4. Drive-by measurements

Surrogate 2. The contractor has reported that thegunfire impulse noise did not exceed 152 dB at the 1unner'sposition when tested on the Light Armored Vehicle.I Thecontractor's safety assessment report states that double hearingprotection as been required in the past to protect the gunnerfrom noise. It is not known what these measurements will be onthe BFV. No measurements were taken during missile firings. Theccntractor has assumed that levels will be lower than thosecreated by shoulder launched missiles.

Recommendations are the same as for Surrogate 1.

F. Radiation Hazards.

Surrogate 1. Radiation effects are negligible whilethe radar is rotating, however, a safe exposure distance of 35feet is required when the systgm is radiating in the stationarymode for a period of 8 hours.1

Surrogate 2. The contractor claims the radiation fromoperations to be negligible. Personnel will be restricted frombeing on the vehicle during radar operation.

A-4

G. Observations.

Surrogate 1. A hazard may exist c tne driver'sposition while driving in the open-hatch mode. A missilepositioned directly above the driver's head was ubserved to havean unsecurod latch. Catastrophic results could occur if a 150-pound missile falls on the drivers head.

Since static eieutriuiLy uuuld uause a failure to occuiin the missi~e subsystem, contractor testing includes pin-to-pinand pin-to-case testing with a capacitive discharge of 25,000volts. Grounding of personnel and missiles is practiced duringall stages o the assembly, disassembly, storage and testingoperations. It is recommended that grounding also take placeduring reload and resupply operations if those precautions do notalready exist as standing operating procedures.

Fire suppression for the PPU and engine compartment isprovidpl by a halon-filled fire extinguisher. The knob for thisextinguisher is located in an awkward position behind the driver.No fire extinguisher was observed in the crew compartment. Fireextinguishers and controls for extinguishers should be locatedwithin reach of all personnel.

Surrogate 2. Personnel should be restricted fromstanding within 150 feet of the system during tactical firing.Launching creates an explosion of particles out the back end ofthe missiles. 1 8 Additionally, gun sabots fly from the system athigh speeds during tactical firing. The contractor's safetyreport states that these sabots have severed instrumentationtables during tpsting.

1 9

IV. HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION.

A. Workspace. Workspace measurements were taken fromdrawings of the surrogate systems that were supplied by thecontractors. The measurements provided were only for the tankcommander (TC) and gunner positions. The workspace dimensionsfor Surrogate 1 interface directly with the interior of the BF'.Surrogate 2, however has a self-contained turret that requiresalmost no direct interface directly with the interior of the BFV.Surrogate 2, however has a self contained turret that requiresalmost no direct interface with the Bradley. The workspacedimensions at the TC and gunner positions on both systems and howthey compare to the anthropometrics dimensions found in MIL-STD-1472C is presented in Table A-1.

Surrogate 1. These workspace measurements indicatelimited headroom at the TC and gunner positions. The sittingheight required for a 95th percentile male (minus his helmet is38.2 inches. This system provides a sitting height ofapproximately 34.0 inches, however, the contractor claims that ahatch will be located above the TC position that will supply 8additional inches of overhead space. The RFI reports that the

A-5

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system is transportable, survivable, and maintainable bypersonnel wearing arctic or nuclear/biological/chemical (NBCclothing. Seated workspace widths could not be determined fromthe drawings, however it is determined that problems may arisewhen two large soldiers are wearing arctic clothing.

The seating in this vehicle is sideways, with the twocrewmen facing the right rear wall. The ability of the crewmento travel cross-country sideways, without suffering any illeffects (motion sickness, unusual fatigue, etc.) should beaddressed.

The seats provided have armrests, however, commentsmade by the contractor representative has indicated a need for anextension to the right armrests that will provide adequate wristsupport when using the handgrips. Contractor testing apparentlyshowed that the operator's wrist/arm becomes fatigued due to theslant between the armrest and the grips. An extension could be aremedy for this problem, although the impact on emergencyevacuation should be determined before modifications are made.

Elevating the seat requires a two lever adjustment.Both levers are positioned on the same side and cannot beoperated while the crewman is seated. It is recommended that theseats be supplied with a spring-loaded mechanism that allows theoperator to adjust the seating height in a quick and efficientmanner.

Surrogate 2. The workspace measurements provide bycontractor drawings indicate that there may be limited workspacesurrounding each crew position. The required shoulder breadthfor a 95th percentile male is 19.6 inches. The amount of spaceprovided by the system is 18.8 inches. This workspace problemwill be compounded when wearing nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC)or arctic clothing. After observing the actual turretconfiguration at the contractor facility, however, it appearsthat there may be adequate shoulder room due to a cut-out that isbeing provided between the two crew members. On contractorrepresentative indicated that there was more workspace in theturret that originally expected.

A metal rim is located behind the head positions in theturret. This could cause head or neck injury if an operator isthrown against it during operations. It is recommended thatpadding be installed to protect the operator.

Ingress and egress are expected to be problems for bothsystems in addition to the workspace constraints at thecrewstations. It is recommended that complete workspacemeasurements be taken on each system to determine if they canmeet the needs of 5th through 95th percentile users.

A-7

B. Visibility. Although no objective visibilitymeasurements could be taken on the systems, the followingobservations were made:

Surrogate 1. Visibility is provided by the following:

1. Driver's vision blocks

2. TC's vision blocks

3. Electro-optics (EO)

It is expected that the EO will be needed to meet themajority of visibility needs. Since positive visualidentification must be made before target engagement, it isrecommended that a study be conducted to determine the ability ofth system to meet that need.

Surrogate 2. Visibility is provided by windows aswell as the EO. These windows provide 35 degrees of verticalvie 7 and 180 degrees of horizontal view. The 180 degrees isangled from about the 10-4 o'clock position if seated at theright side of the turret and from about the 8-2 'o'clock positionif seated at the left side of the turret. This view is partiallyobstructed by cornerposts.

C. Gun System. The gun is reloaded inside the turret bythe gunner and TC. 2 3 No detailed procedures were provided forthis task and no problems concerning loading from a resupplyvehicle could be determined from this evaluation.

D. Controls and Displays.

1. Radar Operator Control Panel.

Surrogate 1. The RFI response states that thissystem can interface with the Forward Area Air Defense Command,Control and Intelligence (FAAD C I) system currently indevelopment. The symbology o DOD-STD-1477 must beincorporated as well as other C I concepts. A detailedinvestigation must be made to determine the stowage of additionalrequired equipment as well as the full integration of the C Iconcepts.

Although having different displays and differentfunctions, the radar and EO workstations have the same type ofhandgrip. The handgrip at the radar operator's workstation isused for tracking and hooking a target for hand-off to thegunner. This is accomplished by using a thumb switch andtrigger. The handgrip at the EO operator's workstation is usedfor tracking the target and firing the missile or gun. Theswitches used for this task are identical to the type used by theradar operator to perform his tasks. Since all crewmembers mustbe cross-trained on this system and one man may be required to

A-8

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operate both the radar and EO consoles, this similarity ofoperation may prove to be a problem. An investigation should bemade into the effects of cross-training and how well one crewmancan perform both tasks of EO and radar operator while understressful battlefield conditions.

Although the radar display provides the airpicture to the TC, ground targets are not displayed unless theyare moving faster than 25 meters per second (55 mph). Thelimited visibility provided by this system will probably degradethe ability to detect slow moving stationary ground targets. TheEO operator will use his display to search and scan for groundtargets. During march order, the EO module will be locked downallowing only limited field of view. The radar operator is notprovided any ground target information form his display, so hemust make a visual scan through his vision blocks. The locationfor the TC's hatch has not yet been determined. If it ispositioned at his workstation, he will be able to raise hisseat(it should be sprirn-loaded as previously mentioned) and makea visual search and scan through his vision blocks. If, however,the hatch is positioned behind the driver, the TC will be able todirect the driver in his task, but he will have to change seatingpositions to do so. This position will also limit his ability tosee the area behind the vehicle. The tasks required by the TCmust be studied to determine how they will interface with thisair defense system.

Some of the control groups should have labelsidentifying them. These include the function keypad, and theradar status indicators. All controls/indicators that havecovers should be labeled on the exterior of the cover inaccordance with sc-tion 5.5 of MIL-STD-1472C.

Surrogate 2. The RFI responses states that thissystem hgs the capability of interfacing with the FAAD C Isystem. Contractor information further states that the systemis compatible with EPLRS data format. Due to the lack ofinformation provided by the contractor, any difficultiesexperienced by operators could not be determined during thisevaluation. Although the radar primarily displays the airpicture to the operator, it can also present moving groundtargets. The radar has two selectable filters that can detecttargets moving as slowly as 5 meters per second (12 mph).

2. EO Operator Control Panel

Surrogate 1. The function keypad is used to enternumerical codes into the software. A manual describing thesecodes is used during operations. It is assumed that operatorswill learn the codes during training and will then automaticallyknow which codes to use and when. This should be furtherinvestigated to determine if there may be a need for menuingthese functions instead of providing a manual. If a manual isused, it is recommended that storage space be supplied for it in

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a drawer under the operator's control panel. This manual must bereadily accessible to the operator at all times.

The labels above the FLIR controls are obstructedby the control and therefore should be relocated. Therequirement for the location of labels is found in section5.5.2.2 of MIL-STD-1472C. Labeling is needed for all groupedcontrols.

In addition to the EO control panel, the operatormust have access to the primary power unit (PPU) controls anddisplays. During the demonstration on the M113, the PPU waslocated next to the operator and facing the back of the vehicle.In this configuration, it was difficult to operator the maincircuit breaker and brake release switches that were located onthe right side of the PPU. Both switches required blindoperation. Contractor personnel, however, indicated that thepanel is likely to be located behind the EO operator in the BFV.This creates further human factors problems due to the inabilityof the operator to easily access the switches as well as thetotal lack of ability to monitor the indicator lights withoutmaking a conscious effort to turn to look at them. Requirementsfor location of displays is found in section 5.2.1.4 of MIL-STD-1472C.

The heater controls are accessible to th EOoperator only when he lowers the back of his seat. He can thenoperate the control in the reclined position. Additionally, theengine grill open/closed indicator light is located near theturret at the roofline. The indicator light should be locatedwithin the line-of-sight of the operator since failure to openthe grill before traveling could result in the engineoverheating. The grill is closed during missile firings toprevent toxic fumes from entering into the crew compartment.

Surrogate 2. The gunner's engagement taskrequires a seven-step operational sequence between two handgripsand one foot control. This sequence does not seem to follow alogical, easy to remember pattern. It is therefore recommendedthat this method be studied to determine its effectiveness andtrainability.

E. Speech Intelligibility.

Surrogates 1 and 2. A determination of the interiorsteady-state noise levels created by the candidate systemsintegrated with the BFV could not be determined by thisevaluation. Intelligibility scores of at least 75% forPhonetically Balanced or 91% for Modified Rhyme tests should beexpected from the system communications. This provides normallyacceptable intelligibility; about 98% of sentences correctlyheard. This requirement is found in Table 6 of MIL-STD-1472C.

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V. SYSTEM CAPABILITIES VERSUS PROPOSED THREAT

A simple, unclassified threat analysis was conducted on thetwo systems to determine each system's ability to meet the low-altitude air threat of the mid 1990's and beyond. This analysisdefines each system's ability to detect, engage, and destroy bothmoving and stationary rotary and fixed-wing targets. Allinformation presented was supplied by contractor material.

A. Missile Systems

The characteristics of each system are as follows:

1. Surrogate 1 uses a laser, beam-riding missile.

2. Surrogate 2 uses two diffeizint systems, an infraredheat-seeking, fire-and-forget missile and a laser beam-ridingmissile. For the purpose of this analysis, the missiles for theSurrogate 2 system will be identified as Missile I and MissileII.

B. Gu' Svstpms

Both contractors use a 25-mm hybrid gun system. Thesegun systems are to be used against ground targets and forcoverage of missile system dead zones (the dead zone is that areabetween the weapon system and that missile system's inner launchboundaries).

Each system's maximum range, launch-and interceptboundaries, intercept reaction times, and the probability of akill (PKa) are presented in Table A-3.

The contractor information gives the appearance thatthe Surrogate 1 system is better capable of meeting the low-altitude air threat of 1995 and beyond. The missile system hasgreater range and faster reaction time. Even though theSurrogate 2 system can shoot on-the-move, its reaction time fromtarget detection to missile intercept is much longer. Both 25-mmguns have comparable ranges and kill probabilities.

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Table A-3

System Capabilities Versus Threat Comparison

Surrogate 1 Surrogate 2

Missile I Missile II

Missile:

1. Maximum Range 10 + km 6 km 6 km

2. Boundaries for TargetsTraveling 1-250 m/sa

a. Launch 10 + km 6 km 6 kmB. Intercept 8 km 4 km 6 km

3. Launch/Intercept ReactionTimes for Incoming TargetTraveling 1-250 m/s at 6 km:

a. Launchb 8.0 sec 6.5 sec 6.5 secb. Interceptb 17.0 sec 40.0 sec 40.0 secc. Launch 13.0 sec 6.5 sec 6.5 secd. Intercept c 22.0 sec 40.0 sec 40.0 sec

4. Pka:

a. Launch at 6 km Target .9 .6 No datab. Launch at 8 km Target .9 No data No data

Gun:

1. Maximum Range 2 km 2 km2. Pka Against 2km Ground

Target No data .33. Pka Against 1.5 km

Air Target No data .2

asurrogate 1 is capable of engaging targets traveling faster than

250 m/s.

bMeasured w/system emplaced and in ready-to-fire mode. Times are

from target detection to missile launch/intercept.

CMeasured from target detection to missile launch/ intercept from

the move (Surrogate 1 cannot shoot on the move.)

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REFERENCES

1. Surrogate 1. (1982). Contractor Systems Safety AnalysisDocument ANA00500000-001). Orlando, FL. p. 136.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

3. Surrogate 1. (1985). Contractor Safety Hazard Matrix(Document ANA00500000-002). Orlando, FL. p. 10.

4. Ibid., p. 137.

5. Surrogate 1. (1985). Contractor Safety Hazard Matrix(Document ANA00500000-002). Orlando, FL. p. 4.

6. Surrogate 1. (1982). Contractor System Safety AnalysisDocument ANA00500000-001). Orlando, FL. p. 140.

7. Surrogate 2. (1986). Contractor Response to Request forInformation (RFI) (unclassified). Burlington, VT. p. GS-3.

8. Ibid., p. I-10.

9. Ibid., p. GS-3.

10. Surrogate 2. 19V;. Contractor RFI Appendix A - SystemAssessment Report (unclassified). Burlington, VT. p. 2.

11. Surrogate 1. (1986). Contractor RFI (unclassified).Orlando, FL. p. 1-14.

12 Ibid., p. 1-16.

13. Surrogate 2. (1986). Contractor RFI (unclassified).Burlington, VT. p. GS-3.

14. Surrogate 2. (1986). Contractor RFI, Appendix A - SystemAssessment Report (unclassified). Burlington, VT. P. 2.

15. Surrogate 1. (1982). Contractor System Safety Analysis(Document ANA00500000-001). Orlando, FL. p. 135.

16. Surrogate 2. (1986). Contractor RFI Appendix A - SystemAssessment Report (unclassified). Burlington, VT. p. 3.

17. Surrogate 1. (1985). Contractor Safety Hazard Matrix(Document ANA00500000-002). Orlando, FL. p. 9.

18. Surrogate 2. (1986). Contractor RFI, Appendix A - SystemAssessment Report (unclassified). Burlington, VT. p. 1.

19. Ibid., p. 1-8.

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I

20. Surrogate i. (1986). Contractor RFI (unclassified).Orlando, FL. p. 1-7.

21. Ibid., p. I-8.

22. Surrogate 2. (1986). Contractor RFI (unclassified).Burlington, VT. p. GS-2.

23. Ibid., p. GS-2.

24. Surrogate i. (1986). Contractor RFI (unclassified).Orlando, FL. p. 1-83.

25. Surrogate 2. (1986). Cohtractor RFI (unclassified).Burlington, VT. p. GS-29.

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