Limitations of Rational Choice TheoryAuthor(s): Raymond BoudonSource: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 3 (November 1998), pp. 817-828Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/210087 .Accessed: 26/02/2011 11:48

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Limitations of Rational Choice Theory1

Raymond BoudonCNRS

THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

The appeal of rational choice theory (RCT) has been well explained byJames Coleman (1986): rational choice theory has “a unique attrac-tiveness” as a basis for theory because it is such a complete conception ofaction “that we need ask no more questions about it.” Hollis (1977) hasexpressed the same idea in other words: “rational action is its own explana-tion” (quoted by Goldthorpe 1996). It is true that, once we have explainedthat subject X has done Y rather than Y′ because Y was more advanta-geous, we need to know nothing more. Even if biology was able to describeadequately the chemical or electrical processes going on in the brain whena subject makes a decision, this would add nothing to the explanation asto why the subject did Y. It would merely describe the same process ina different language. But the biological explanation would be unable toconfirm or disconfirm the rational explanation. This “final” aspect of ratio-nal explanations, the fact that these explanations are without “black box”frustrations, is probably, as suggested by Coleman, the main source ofRCT’s attractiveness.

IS RCT GENERAL?

Two questions should be raised before we give RCT the status of a generaltheory. Being attractive does not necessarily imply that a theory is accept-able, valid, or true in all circumstances. That “rational action is its ownexplanation” is one thing. Whether action can always be considered ratio-nal in the very special sense RCT gives to the notion of rationality isanother. If all actions and, further, all social phenomena could be validlyexplained by RCT, this would be fine. But can they? In the same way, itwould be just fine if I had lost my key bundle under the streetlight whereI may search more effectively than in the surrounding darkness. But apreference for looking in an illuminated area does not mean that I will

1 Address correspondence to Raymond Boudon, CNRS, 54 Boulevard Raspail, 75270Paris, Cedex 06, France.

1998 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.0002-9602/99/10403-0006$02.50

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drop my keys under the streetlight instead of in a less accessible place.So, an important question to ask is whether RCT is effectively, as con-tended by its followers, general. If the answer is yes, the discussion canstop at this point. If no, the next question is whether RCT can be revisedto make it more general.

Can we legitimately apply RCT to all research situations and to allproblems? The answer to this latter question is no for a simple reason:RCT assumes that individual action is instrumental, namely that it hasto be explained by the actors’ will to reach certain goals. Now, action canbe noninstrumental, as most sociologists have recognized. Schutz, throughhis distinction between Weil and Wozu motive, and Weber, through hisdistinction between instrumental and axiological rationality, have stressedthat action is not always instrumental. If the instrumentality of action isindeed limited, then RCT cannot claim to be a general theory of action.Thus, one cannot apply RCT notably in the cases where an actor does Xbecause he believes in Z and that Z implies his doing X independentlyof the consequences of X. And even when action is instrumental, it canmobilize beliefs that need to be explained and that normally will not beexplained by RCT. Thus, the French authorities were, for many years,more reluctant than the Dutch to use methadone to curb drug addiction.Why? Because the Dutch thought methadone was an adequate meanswhile the French thought it was not. But why had the French and theDutch different beliefs on this point?2 RCT is of little help here.

Of course, these objections are not new and there are two traditionalways to overcome them. First, one may promote the generality of RCTby supposing that actions that appear to be noninstrumental are actuallyinstrumental at a deeper level. This conversion from noninstrumental toinstrumental is obtained by introducing the postulate that, contrary toappearances, beliefs are the product of self-interest. This assumption con-stitutes the core of some classical theories besides RCT. It was introducednotably by Nietzsche, by Pareto, and by Marx: I believe X, because be-lieving X serves my psychological interests or my class interests.

A second way of salvaging the generality of RCT is to appeal to MiltonFriedman’s epistemology and to treat the causes of behavior, by principle,as unknowable. In this view, one set of assumptions about the causes ofbehavior is as good as any other, and it can legitimately be assumed thatself-interest explains any behavior. By virtue of this “positivistic” episte-mology, this assumption cannot be discussed: the only thing that matters

2 The answer is given by Bergeron (1999) who, rather than RCT, uses the theory ofrationality I advocate here.

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is whether or not theories incorporating this postulate reproduce correctlythe observed data.

Assumptions of type 1 can be acceptable in some cases. Thus, I canbelieve that social inequalities are unfair because such a belief makes mypoverty undeserved and thus more acceptable to me; alternatively, I be-lieve that social inequalities are fair because I would then perceive myopulence as well deserved. It is hard, though, to accept the view that allbeliefs are generated by their psychological or social function. This objec-tion was explicitly raised by Weber ([1920] 1986, p. 241) against Nietzscheand Marx: “ressentiment” theory applies exclusively to particular cases.In the general case, psychological or social interests may draw my atten-tion to a theory and eventually create in my mind a positive or negativedisposition toward the theory in question. But interests alone are generallyunable to explain conviction.

Assumption of type 2 rests upon a very debatable epistemology. Whysuch a view as Friedman’s “positivism” was developed can be understood:it derives from the reluctance of the positivistic tradition toward takinginto account subjective factors. But such an epistemology is ungrounded:I can check whether this man whom I see cutting wood in his yard wantshis room to get warmer. If he puts the piece of wood in his chimney, myinterpretation of his behavior will be confirmed. If the weather is hot orif he starts carving the piece of wood, my interpretation will be falsified.Even if I cannot perceive directly his reasons, I can reconstruct them.This reconstruction has the status of a theory that can be confronted withdata. That the reasons motivating people are not directly observable doesnot imply that their reconstruction is doomed to be arbitrary. Now, Kiserand Hecter reject both Friedmanian positivism and also the view thatdetermining the reasons explaining actions would be an empirical ques-tion. Instead, they see self-interest as the ultimate real cause of any action.But this raises a difficult question. The rational choice theorist who en-counters a voter who tells him that he votes because he considers votingto be a civic duty will reject the interpretation of the subject himself and,by application of his own RCT, assume that voting maximizes for thevoter some costs-benefits balance. At this point, the rational choice theo-rist should explain the “false consciousness” he attributes to the actor: Whydoes the subject think he votes for one reason while he really votes foranother? But how does the rational choice theorist know that the con-sciousness of his voter is “false”? I am not saying here that what the actorhimself thinks and says of his own motivation is the ultimate truth. It israther one piece of information among others. What I am saying is (1)that actor’s statements about his motivation are facts that, as any fact,should be taken into consideration and explained, (2) that the Nietzschean,

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the Marxian, or the rational choice theorist who attributes to the behaviorof the observed subject causes that the latter does not endorse shouldexplain his “false consciousness,” notably if he rejects the Friedmanianepistemology.

On the whole, none of the strategies currently used to make noninstru-mental actions instrumental appears very convincing. Each raises morequestions than it answers. In other words, noninstrumental actions cannoteasily be converted into instrumental actions. Consequently, RCT cannotbe held as general.

Beside this basic objection, “empirical” objections can be raised againstRCT, namely that it has never succeeded in explaining satisfactorily im-portant classes of phenomena. Voting is the best known of these classes.People vote, though any individual vote has a practically zero probabilityof having an effect on the outcome of an election. In this case, the antici-pated consequences of individual action cannot easily be taken for thecause of the action. An enormous literature has been devoted to this prob-lem; it tries to reconcile RCT with the hard facts of voting (see, e.g., Over-bye 1995). Many other puzzles in the same style could be evoked: Whydo people appear so easily upset by political corruption and so sensitiveto it? This familiar observation cannot be easily explained by RCT, sincepolitical corruption has, in the case of Western democracies at least, anegligible and invisible effect on the well-being of citizens. In other words,the rejection here is implausibly the effect of the consideration by socialactors of the consequences of corruption on themselves. Allais (1953) anda number of authors after him have revealed another Achilles’ heel ofRCT (if I may make Achilles’ heels plural) and shown that people do notbehave effectively according to RCT predictions: when they have tochoose between lotteries, in given experimental circumstances, they donot behave as maximizers.

Rational choice theorists have tried to meet these objections by auxil-iary assumptions. For instance, nonvoting would include a high social costbecause it would be disapproved of socially; cognitive biases make peopleoverestimate the weight of a single vote; biases would have the effect thatpeople see in an erroneous fashion the mathematical expectation of lotter-ies; cognitive “frames” predict that people do not see the world as it is. Icannot discuss these theories in detail here (I have done so elsewhere; seeBoudon 1996, 1997a). In fact, none of the rational choice theories proposedto explain why people vote is satisfactory. As to the theories that proposeto reconcile RCT with observed data by introducing the notions of“frames,” “biases,” and so on, they appear as empty (“frame,” “bias” aremere words); moreover, they purchase the reconciliation with observationat a high price, since they lose the “unique attractiveness” of RCT. Onceone has introduced the assumption that people see the world in such and

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such fashion because a bias or a frame affects their perception, the nextquestion is, namely, Where do these biases come from? As RCT has noanswer to this question, the explanation is no more final; it generates, onthe contrary, large black boxes.

The two categories of objections merge into a general objection. Someactions are purely instrumental. Among the purely instrumental actions,some are egoistic. Some actions are not purely instrumental in the sensethat they include a cognitive dimension: the actor wants to reach a goal,G; he has the impression that M is a good way of reaching G, but therelation between M and G is not trivial. In that case, the noninstrumentalcognitive dimension of action is the focus of the analysis. Some actionsare not instrumental at all, as when an actor does X not because he wantsto generate some outcome, but because X is a consequence of the princi-ples he endorses. In that case, the main point in the analysis is to explainwhy the actor endorses the principles. Endorsing principles, endorsing atheory or a viewpoint is also an action, but of the noninstrumental type.This diversity cannot be forgotten or reduced except by two controversialstrategies: considering the noninstrumental aspects of actions as uninter-esting and being content with saying that the actors are subject to biases,frames, and so forth; or assuming that all actions would be at a deeperlevel of a unique type: not only instrumental, but egoistic. I agree withSomers that such an assumption has a metaphysical flavor.

ALTERNATIVE WAY

Instead of trying to salvage RCT against these objections, a more fruitfulmove is to question the basic postulates of RCT. Somers says rightly thatthe weak side of RCT is not its individualistic approach but its definitionof “rationality”: intentionality, self-interest, maximization. Do we need toendorse this very special view about rationality? Do we really need toaccept the idea that all actions are not only consequential but egoistic?Is this version of rationality the only one representing the uniqueness ofproviding explanations without black boxes? The greatest of classical his-torical sociologists, Tocqueville and Weber, have implicitly answered thisquestion. Yes, they said, action should be considered as meaningful; yes,the meaning of his action to the actor should be perceived as its cause;yes, in most cases, the meaning to the actor of his action resides in thereasons he perceives as strong to adopt it: in other words, they introducedthe general postulate that the causes of an action reside in the reasons theactor has of adopting this action. And they added that, depending on thesituation the actor is involved in, these reasons can take the form of cost-benefit considerations but also other forms. Thus, endorsing a theory is inmost cases an action caused by the fact that one sees strong reasons of

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endorsing it. Priestley endorsed the phlogiston theory, not only becausehe had a strong interest defending it, but because he was convinced itexplained many facts better than did alternative theories.

These classical writers should be heard: they have solved implicitly byanticipation some of the crucial questions raised by the present discussionand indicated a path worth following today. They start from the viewthat (what we call) RCT can be useful notably in the situations where theactor is invited to apply a cost-benefit analysis by the very nature of thesituation. But, in other circumstances, the notion of “rationality” must begiven another content. In modern words, RCT is not a general theorybecause it uses a much too rigid and narrow conception of rationality. Toillustrate, I will evoke briefly two examples from Tocqueville.

TWO EXAMPLES FROM TOCQUEVILLE

Example 1

Using implicitly “methodological individualism” and RCT.—At one pointin his Old Regime Tocqueville ([1856] 1955) wonders why, at the end ofthe 18th century, French agriculture remains stagnant at a time whenagriculture is flourishing in England. This is particularly puzzling sincethe physiocrats, who develop the view that modernizing agriculture is themain path to growth, are politically very influential in France at the time.Tocqueville’s explanation: administrative centralization is the cause ofthe fact that positions of “civil servants” are more numerous and hencemore easily available in France than in England. Also, the French central-ization makes serving the king in France a unique source of prestige, in-fluence, and power; consequently, other things equal, landlords are moreeasily incited in France than in England to leave their lands and buy aroyal position. In England by contrast, being an innovative landownernot only produces local respect and prestige, it may also open the way toWestminster. This macroscopic difference between England and France,summarized by Tocqueville by his notion of “administrative centraliza-tion,” explains why landlord absenteeism is much larger in France thanin England. Further, landlord absenteeism is the cause of a low rate ofinnovation: since their interests are at the court, the landlords themselveshave little motivation to innovate; as to the farmers who run the landown-erships, they would have a motivation to innovate, but hardly the capacityof doing so. Finally, the low rate of innovation is responsible for the stag-nation of agricultural development in France.

In this discussion, Tocqueville uses “methodological individualism”(MI). The macroscopic difference between France and England is ex-plained as the effect of individual decisions taken by the landlords. Theindividual decisions are analyzed as taken, not by “angels,” but by men

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belonging to social contexts. The parameters characterizing the Frenchand British contexts are themselves the products of a long history. Thispoint gives me the opportunity of stressing that MI does not imply solip-sism as soon as individual decisions are analyzed, as here by Tocqueville,as affected by the parameters characterizing the context.3 Finally, Tocque-ville uses here what we call RCT: by leaving their land and serving theking, the landlords gain in influence, prestige, and so on. In England bycontrast, it is a better strategy to appear locally as a modern and efficientlandlord. The macroscopic statement “centralization is a cause of agricul-tural underdevelopment” appears as entirely acceptable, because it is sup-ported by this individualistic analysis. Though “centralization” is a com-plex factor, it is identified with precise “parameters” that affect thesituation of decision making of the actors, here the landlords. “Centraliza-tion” is a construct. But it is not a mere word. In summary, Tocquevilleuses MI and, moreover, he uses the basic behavioral axiomatics of RCT;the individuals are analyzed as selfish, goal-oriented, and maximizers. Itcan be noted incidentally that Tocqueville’s path has been literally fol-lowed by Root (1994) in his illuminating book on the comparative devel-opment of the modern state in Britain and France.

Example 2

Using implicitly MI, but rejecting RCT.—In other circumstances,Tocqueville uses MI but not RCT. Thus, he wonders, again in his OldRegime, why the cult of Reason became immensely popular in France atthe end of the 18th century, but not in England. His answer is that tradi-tional institutions, and hence “Tradition” with a capital T, were totallydisqualified in France but not in England. Thus, the British aristocracyfulfilled important social and economic roles. Consequently, its higher sta-tus was considered by people as grounded and legitimate. In France, bycontrast, the gentry had no visible social and economic function exceptsitting in Versailles. Those members of the gentry who were not able tobuy a royal position remained on their land. Poor and bitter, they stuckritualistically to their privileges. Their officially higher rank was perceivedby the peasants as illegitimate. As it was the product of tradition, thepeasants came to the idea that institutions deriving their strength fromtradition were bad. So, when the philosophes proposed to substitute forinstitutions grounded on Tradition, a society grounded on what they pre-sented as the opposite term, namely Reason with a capital R, they had

3 Bunge (1996) stresses rightly that MI (especially as I have applied it; see Boudon1974) has nothing to do with atomism or solipsism and is perfectly compatible withhis systemism.

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immediate success. After all, the notion translated widespread feelings.Tocqueville makes clear that this success cannot be analyzed as the prod-uct of interpersonal influence, since it was immediate. So, the macroscopicphenomenon under examination, namely the fulgurant success of the ideaof Reason, is analyzed by Tocqueville as the effect of the fact that individ-ual French peasants, lawyers, and so on, accepted easily the theory thatgood institutions should be the effect of social engineering (in our lan-guage), be the product of Reason (in 18th-century parlance). This analysisfollows MI, but not RCT. Here again, a social fact, in this case a differencebetween France and England, is analyzed as the product of reasons, butnot of the RCT type. Individual peasants tend to endorse the politicaltheory proposed by the philosophes because this theory appears to themas valid. Evidently, they expected returns for themselves from the applica-tion of this theory. Most of them were probably convinced that their condi-tion would become better if the ideas of the philosophes were applied.But this does not explain why they saw “social engineering” as a goodpolitical philosophy. Tocqueville uses here implicitly a view of rationalitythat I have proposed as “cognitive rationality.” The peasants endorse thepolitical theory of the philosophes because they have strong cognitive rea-sons for seeing it as valid. This type of rationality is typically at work inthe case of the scientist who chooses theory T against a theory T′. Cogni-tive rationality in my language overlaps with “rationality” in the sensethat historians and philosophers of science use this word. Tocqueville’sanalysis provides a powerful hint here: that the type of rationality at workin the endorsement by scientists of an idea or theory is also at work in“ordinary knowledge.”

COGNITIVE RATIONALITY

Cognitive rationality should be distinguished from instrumental rational-ity. First, because endorsing a theory is a noninstrumental action. Second,because the question the actor is confronted with here is not to maximizeany cost-benefit balance, but to check whether, to the best of his knowl-edge, an idea is acceptable. Radnitzki (1987) has tried to reduce this cogni-tive rationality to RCT. When more and more facts appeared easily ex-plainable by the theory that the earth was spherical, it became more andmore difficult to develop alternative arguments supporting the theory thatthe earth was flat. Radnitzki proposes to substitute “costly” for “difficult”and makes then the point that the choice between alternative scientifictheories can also be analyzed in RCT terms. But the main point is thatthe arguments supporting the theory that the earth is spherical appeared,after a while, much stronger than the arguments supporting the alterna-tive theories. Therefore, little is gained by substituting “costly” for “diffi-

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cult.” “Cost” is namely a consequence of “difficulty.” So, what needs to beexplained is why a set of arguments appears as defensible or not.

AXIOLOGICAL RATIONALITY

Although I cannot go very far in a short note on this, another importantpoint, as suggested by Weber, is “axiological rationality,” which should bedistinguished from “instrumental rationality.” This notion has been muchdiscussed, and what Weber meant by it is not clear. My own interpretation(see Boudon 1997a) is that he wanted to introduce the idea that in somecircumstances actors do X not because they expect any desirable conse-quence, but because they are convinced that X is good, since it is groundedon strong reasons. Thus, Weber would probably never have consideredvoting as a paradox. It is a paradox as long as one assumes that rationalaction is always consequentialist, as RCT assumes. In that case, votingis well a paradox, since my vote has with quasi certainty no consequenceon the outcome of the election. People vote, though. Why? Because theyhave strong reasons to believe that democracy is better than alternativeregimes, they see that elections constitute a major institution of democ-racy, they understand the principle “one man, one vote,” they see that thisprinciple is an expression of a basic value, and so forth. In other words,they vote because one should vote if one believes in the value of democ-racy. This explanation mobilizes what, following my interpretation, We-ber called “axiological rationality.” I vote because I think I should vote.I think I should vote because I have strong reasons to believe in democ-racy. Of course, I will have strong reasons to refrain from voting if noneof the candidates convinces me, if I do not know how I should vote, forexample.

As I said earlier, many efforts have been made to explain voting by RCTtheories. But these theories are all unconvincing and moreover assumeimplicitly without explaining it the existence of a “false consciousness” ofthe voter: this is, then, a huge black box.

CONCLUSION

Finally, we come to the idea that Tocqueville and Weber among othershave sketched a model, which I have proposed to call the “cognitivistmodel” (CM), resting on the following postulates (see Boudon 1994, 1996a,1997b, 1998).

1. Until the proof to the contrary is given, social actors should be consid-ered as rational in the sense that they have strong reasons of believingwhat they believe, of doing what they do, and so forth.

2. In particular cases, these reasons can be realistically treated as deal-

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ing with the difference between costs and benefits of alternative lines ofaction. In other cases, they cannot: in particular when a decision or anaction rests upon normative or cognitive beliefs, the reasons will generallynot belong exclusively to this type. This results from the fact that beliefsare unintentional, and that normative beliefs are not always consequen-tially grounded. Also, in many circumstances, a social actor can be person-ally distant from an issue, yet have strong feelings about it (a good exampleof this is the use of the death penalty in the United States). This point iscrucial: it suggests that RCT is of limited use in the analysis of publicopinion.

3. In some circumstances, the core of some action is constituted by “cog-nitive” reasons: he did X because he believed Z is likely or is true, andbecause he had strong reasons of believing so.

4. In some circumstances, the core of some action is constituted by axio-logical reasons: he did X because he believed that Z is fair, good, unfair,and so on, and had strong “nonconsequential” reasons of believing so.

It follows from these postulates that RCT is a particular case of CM.When the reasons in CM are restricted to belong to the benefits-minus-costs type, we get RCT. Reciprocally, when the restriction that reasonsshould belong to the benefits-minus-costs type is lifted in RCT, we getCM. Again, RCT is a powerful model; it cannot be held as a generaltheory.4

CM supposes that actions, decisions, and beliefs are meaningful to theactor in the sense that they are perceived by him as grounded on reasons.Even though he cannot be able to identify these reasons clearly, he hasthe intuitive impression that they are grounded on reasons.

Two important remarks can be introduced here. Although it is tautolog-ical to define “rationality” by the notion of “strong reasons,” it is the onlyway of getting rid of the discussions as to “what rationality really means,”where the discussants expose generally what they mean. As to the postu-late that beliefs and actions are grounded on reasons, it is not tautological.Many traditions start, on the contrary, from the assumption that actionsand beliefs are not the effect of reasons. As to finding out those reasons,reconstructing them, this can be a hard job: Why were the French land-lords less innovative than their British counterparts? Why did Priestlybelieve in the phlogiston? Why did Englishmen of the 18th century believethat miners should be paid more than soldiers? (On this, see Smith 1976.)Why did the people of London not try to exert pressure on political powerby street gatherings as frequently as did the Parisians? (See Root 1994.)

4 I defended the two points already (Boudon [1977] 1982, chap. 7) but explored else-where the non-RCT dimensions of rationality (see Boudon [1994] and later publica-tions).

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Why are magical beliefs more likely to found in some societies than inothers? (See Boudon 1994.) Why was methadone used much earlier inHolland than in France? (See Bergeron 1999.) All of these questions havebeen convincingly answered in works that use MI and an open theory ofrationality rather than the special figure of rationality used by RCT. Inparticular it can be noted that, in his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith,RCT’s spiritual father, solves the above question about miners and sol-diers using what I call the CM rather than RCT (Boudon 1996a, 1998).

The second remark, which I cannot develop, is that CM excluded radi-cally solipsism: I cannot perceive as strong the reasons leading me to en-dorse a statement “X is good, legitimate, right, true, and so forth” withoutconceiving these reasons as grounded and hence as intersubjectively valid(Boudon 1995).

Finally, a crucial question is raised by Somers: What is a good theory?Sometimes, good scientific theories use mathematical language, are de-rived from a general theory, and so on. But such attributes are not compo-nents of a good theory generally. Otherwise, physical theories would begood, but biological theories bad, since the latter make little use of mathe-matics and are hardly deducted from a general theory. Celestial mechanicsis not the model to be followed by all disciplines. A good scientific explana-tion of a phenomenon P is rather a set {S} of statements meeting threerequirements: (1) that all s ∈ {S} are acceptable, (2) that {S} ⇒ P, (3) thatrelevant facts are not arbitrarily ignored. They are satisfied, for instance,in Tocqueville’s above examples: all statements are acceptable (simplepsychological statements, empirical statements congruent with observa-tion, no “black box” concepts in the components of the statements, etc.);moreover, {S} ⇒ P (P 5 stagnation of French agriculture, enthusiasm ofthe peasants for the idea of Reason); finally the theory explains not onlythe observed behavior but the verbal statements of actors as they havereached us.

REFERENCES

Allais, M. 1953. “Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: Critiquedes postulats de l’ecole americaine.” Econometrica 21 (4): 503–46.

Bergeron, H. 1999. Soigner ou prendre soin des toxicomanes: Anatomie d’une croyancecollective. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Boudon, R. 1974. Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality. New York: Wiley.———. (1977) 1982. The Unintended Consequences of Social Action. London: Mac-

millan.———. 1994. The Art of Self-Persuasion. London: Polity Press.———. 1995. Le juste et le vrai. Paris: Fayard.———. 1996. “The ‘Rational Choice Model’: A Particular Case of the ‘Cognitive

Model.’ ” Rationality and Society 8 (2): 123–50.———. 1997a. “Le ‘paradoxe du vote’ et la theorie de la rationalite.” Revue Francaise

de Sociologie 38 (2): 217–27.

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———. 1997b. “The Present Relevance of Max Weber’s Wertrationalitat (value ratio-nality).” In Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics, and Economics in the NewerHistorical School: From Max Weber and Rickert to Sombart and Rothacker, editedby P. Koslowski. New York: Springer.

———. 1998. “Social Mechanisms without Black Boxes.” In Social Mechanisms: AnAnalytical Approach to Social Theory, edited by R. Swedberg and Peter Hedstrom.New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bunge, M. 1996. Finding Philosophy in Social Science. New Haven, Conn.: YaleUniversity Press.

Coleman, J. 1986. Individual Interests and Collective Action: Selected Essays. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldthorpe, J. 1996. “Class Analysis and the Reorientation of Class Theory: The Caseof the Persisting Differentials in Educational Attainment.” Manuscript. NuffieldCollege, Oxford University.

Hollis, M. 1977. Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Overbye, E. 1995. “Making a Case for the Rational, Self-Regarding ‘Ethical’ Voter. . . and Solving the ‘Paradox of Not Voting’ in the Process.” European Journal ofPolitical Research 27:369–96.

Radnitzky, G. 1987. “La perspective economique sur le progres scientifique: Applica-tion en philosophie de la science de l’analyse cout-benefice.” Archives de Philoso-phie 50 (avril–juin): 177–98.

Root, H. L. 1994. The Fountain of Privilege: Political Foundations of Economic Mar-kets in Old Regime France and England. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press.

Smith, A. (1776) 1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tocqueville, A., De. (1856) 1955. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. NewYork: Doubleday.

Weber, M. (1920) 1986. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1. Munich:Mohr.

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