Liga de Los Comunistas

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The Communist Party in Yugoslavia

Author(s): Fred Warner NealReviewed work(s):Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1957), pp. 88-111Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951773.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA*FRED WARNER NEALUniversityof Californiaat Los Angeles

Of all the changes that have occurred n Yugoslavia since 1948, one ofthemost nterestings thedevelopment fa newtheory nd rolefor heCommunistParty. Now officiallyalled the League ofCommunists,'the Yugoslav Partyillustratesboth thewell-known ominantrole ofCommunistparties n stateswheretheyhave come to powerand at the same timethe peculiar nature ofYugoslav Communism hathas set it apartfrom heSovietvariety.Organized on the Soviet patternand headed by men steeped in the Soviettradition, heYugoslav Communists ven in 1945 occupied a position ikethatoftheircomrades n theUSSR, where, s Stalin said, "not a single mportantpolitical or organizationalquestion is decided withoutdirections fromtheParty...."2 Even after heCominform isputehad produced new deologicalpattern, moreliberal approach to Communism,political and economic de-centralization nd profuseprofessions f democracy,3 ew could doubt that,as Stalin said about the situation n the Soviet Union, "the Party governs hecountry."'Yet at the same time,both the ideologicaland operationalpositionof theParty also underwent onsiderable hangesafter1948. If the changesdid notportend fundamentalweakening ftheParty'sdictatorship, tillthey createdseriousdifficultiesor hemaintenance fthatdictatorshipnd raised mportantquestions as to its future ourse.

I. IMPACT OF THE RESOLUTIONThere can be littledoubt that the CominformResolution expellingTito'sPartyhad an enormousmpactontheYugoslav Communists. he crisiswasnotonly political but psychological.VariousCommunist eadershave described othewriter odily ilments hatresulted rom heirperturbation t thetime, nd

Tito's gall bladdertroublewas attributed o a case of"nerves" inducedby theCominform ction.' Stunned themselves nd doubtfulof the reaction of the* This article is based on a chapter of a forthcomingbook. Much of the material wasgathered while the writerwas doing work in Yugoslavia during 1954 as a member of theAmerican Universities Field Staff,which has permitted him to quote fromAUFS reportsprepared at that time. The writer s also indebted to the American Philosophical Society,whose grant assisted him in his researches.1 The name, changed in 1952, is Savez Komunista Jugoslavije in Serbo-Croat. The or-ganization is still often referredto as "party," however, and herein the terms Party andLeague are used interchangeably.2 J. V. Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma (Questions of Leninism), Gosizdat (Moscow, 1934),p. 34.8 For a discussion of these, see Fred Warner Neal, "The Reforms in Yugoslavia," TheAmerican and Slavic and East European Review,Vol. 13, pp. 227-244 (April, 1954).4 Stalin, op. cit.,p. 38.6 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York, 1952), p. 365.

88


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 89rankand file, heYugoslav Partyheads at first rotested heir oyaltyfortheUSSR. When a new line cautiouslybegan to be formulated year later-byPijade, Djilas, Kardelj and others-it was largelynegative,emphasizingcrit-icism of Soviet theoriesand methods. To the extent that dogmatismwaslessened n theYugoslav Communist ttitude, t was replacedby uncertainty.Whenpositive deas did appear, theycentered round theidea ofdecentraliza-tion as a meanstowarda moredemocratic ypeofsocialism.6That is to say, ftheconceptof the nfallibilityfMarxism-Leninism id notat firstuffer,oubtswere at least created as to whatMarxism-Leninismwas.The basic Soviet-typedoctrine, n whichmembersof the CommunistPartywere upposedtohave unswerving aith nd in thenameofwhich heydevotedtheirdisciplined ffortso help the Party control ll phases ofYugoslav life,was eliminated.What was put in its place was less a theorythan a methodofactioncallingfor lmosta reverse mphasison thepart of the Communists.It is not unnaturalthat thereresulted, n Tito's words, "a certainspiritualdemoralization."7One thingwas certain:the Party needed supportfor ts new position,notonlyto strengthents hand in the quarrelwiththe Soviet Union but also be-cause decentralization nevitably meant relianceon a broader sector of thepopulationthanformerly.n thenature ofthings, hismeantgreaterrelianceon the People's Front, a mass organizationwhichin 1948 already numberedabout 7,000,000.Whiletherewas no doubtabout theParty'sdomination f thePeople's Front,theprivileged ositionoftheCommunistswas an irritant,ndthe tendencyofmanyofthemwas, Balkan style,to flaunt heirprivileges nthe faceof thepopulace.The upshot was a decisionby the CentralCommittee n the fall of 1950 toeliminatecertain material privileges,particularly s regards special rationsand housingrights, orParty members.8 he correspondent f the New YorkTimes,often ritical f the Tito regime,was moved to comment: For thefirsttime, Communist tate has abolished the line ofdemarcation eparating herulers rom hepeople and has adopted as a fundamental rinciple modicumofequalitarianism.9The adoption of "a modicumof equalitarianism" as a principlewas notspecifically onnectedwith thereformsn thegovernmentnd the economyorwith heemphasisondemocracy hatwas appearingmore nd more nYugoslavideologicaltracts. Therewas, in fact,a noticeableofficialilencepertaining otherole oftheParty nYugoslavia's newCommunist ystem.But the contrastbetweenthenew theoriesofsocietyand the monopolistic owerposition of ahighly entralizedCommunistPartywas alreadyapparent.As a part of their

6 See Pijade's statement on this in Neal, "Certain Aspects of the New Reforms inYugoslavia," University f Colorado Studies, Series in Political Science, No. 1, p. 53 (June,1952).7 Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, Borba, November 4, 1952.8 Yugoslav Newsletter,October 23, 1950.9 M. S. Handler in the New York Times, October 16, 1950, p. 1.


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90 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWnew campaignagainstbureaucracy, heYugoslav ideologues ncluded n theircriticisms ftheSoviet system heroleofthe CommunistPartyas well as thegovernment.n addition,theprogram fdecentralizationwas beingbuckedbyvariousCommunists, itherbecause theymisunderstoodhe new line orwerereluctant to share authority. In the spring of 1952, the Fourth PlenumoftheCentralCommittee t last came to gripswith theproblem.The CentralCommittee'sdirectives fJune,1952,not only began to apply theprinciple fdecentralization o Party organizationbut also decreed a limitationon theParty'srole n local government.'

II. THE JUNE DIRECTIVESAccording to the Junedirectives, ecretariesof local Party organizations

were to give up theirpositions s heads of ocal government rganizations,.e.,People's Committees. t was declaredthatfor the same persons to hold bothjobs was incompatiblewiththe new autonomybeingextendedto local govern-ments, nterfered iththe developmentof the Party's ideologicalwork,andacted to preventcriticism flocal governmentctivity.Since almost all localgovernment eads were also heads of local Party committees, he People'sCommitteeswere ittlemore than extensions fthe Party organization.Sincethis situation in the Soviet Union typified he "bureaucraticcaste system"whichthenewYugoslavia nowwas opposedto, thad to be changed. From thesame pointofview,theJunedirectivesnstructedocal partyofficials o limittheir nterferenceneconomicoperations.Althoughworkers' ouncilshad beenfreedfrommuchgovernment ureaucracy,Party interference as sometimeshaving thesamedeleterious ffectsnd had to stop.The Junedirectivesalso extendedconsiderableautonomyto local partyunits,with n aim ofexpanding ntra-Party emocracy in forms f deologicaland educationalwork"and eliminating ureaucracy ntheParty."Up to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CommunistParty ofYugoslavia," admittedTito, "the entire deological-educationalworkwas runpredominantlyrom hecenter.The subjectmatter nd eventheformsofworkweredetermined nd initiatedby the Agitation-PropagandaDepart-mentoftheCentralCommittee.""Under thenewdirectives, lthoughpropagandaactivitieswere,ofcourse, ofollow hegeneralprogram ftheparty, ntheabsence of pecialdirectivesocalPartyunitswereto decide themselveswhat to do and how to do it. The re-sponsibilitynd theprivileges f owerpartyorganizationswereemphasized.These were significant hanges.Their effectwas mixed,and, as far as therankand fileofthe Partywas concerned, he result was considerableconfus-sion. As Tito said at the SixthParty Congressa fewmonths ater: "Many ofthePartyorganizationshave been leftto themselves,withoutbeingextended

10 The directives are given in Komunist, June, 1952, and are furtherdiscussed in thereports of Tito and Rankovid to the Sixth Party Congress. See Borba, November 4, 1952,and Politika, November 9, 1952.11Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 91anyhelp in the transitions nd preparations or heirnew responsibilities,ndas a resultof this theworkof raising the ideologicaland educational level ofthemembership as been neglectedor is lagging.... Various conceptions ..alien to thePartybegan to penetrate n theranks ofthe Partymembership . .variouselements . . began, tappears,to conceiveour expansionofdemocracywronglynd to raisetheirheads. Varioustheoriesbegan appearingon the free-dom of this or that."''2And Rankovic added that some Communistswent too far in interpretingpartydemocracywhileothersdid notgo farenough. n certain nstances,Partymembers ven thought t was not necessaryto attend Partymeetingsor paydues. A contributingactor o the difficulties,ankovic thoughtwas the "lowideological evel of a considerable artof the Partymembership.'3

At the same time,bothTito and Rankovic insisted hat, n the wordsofthelatter, henew measures"increasedthe politicalactivitiesof theParty organ-izationamongthemasses . .. [and] ntroduced newspirit nd styleofworkingintothe Partyorganization."'4III. A NEW THEORY OF THE PARTY

In manyways, 1952was thehighpoint of enthusiasm ordemocracy mongtheYugoslav Communist eaders.Theirrelationswith theWestwere flourish-ing, and oppositionto the Soviet Union was at a peak. Americaneconomicassistance had brought a halt to the deteriorationn living standards. Thereformsn the economy and governmenthad produced an unquestionablyfavorableresponsefrom he populace, and plans for a new constitutionwerelaunched.Despite thenegativeresultsof theJune iberalizationsn the Party,it was almost as ifa momentumwere propelling he leaders along paths theyfearedto travel.The SixthParty Congress n Zagreb,November3-7, crystal-lized the trend n theform f a new theoryof the Party and new roles for tsconstituent artsand theirmembers.The main purpose of the Sixth Congress,accordingto Rankovic, was "toharmonize the Party's work withchanges that have occurred n connectionwith the new reforms"'5 nd to "suppress dangers of bureaucracy in theParty."'6 It soughtto achieve this not only by extendingmuch further e-centralizationn Party organizationbut by proclaiming hat henceforth hePartywould confinets activitiesmainly to politicaland ideological ducationand no longerseek to impose its will on government nd otheractivitiesbydirect order.Members of the Partywereto exert nfluence ot by theweightof theirParty positionbut by functionings individuals n the society.

12 Ibid.13Rankovic'sReportto SixthParty Congress, p. cit.14 Ibid.15 "Preview of the Sixth Congress," Yugoslav Review, Vol. 1, No. 8, p. 3 (October,1952).la"Reportonthe Vth Congress fthePeople'sFront," YugoslavReview, ol. 2,No. 3-4, p. 17 (March-April, 953).


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92 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWEven thenameof heParty was changedbecause "inviewofthefactthattherole ofthe Party at thisstage of our social development hangedto a certainextent . . thewordParty is no longer dequate." The Party henceforthwasto be known s the League ofCommunists fYugoslavia. The change nnamewas not to "affectthe organizational tructureof the Party, its democraticcentralism,"norwould thenew League "reduce its role and responsibilityorthe successful evelopment fsocialism,"but, still, t would be "more correctand would correspond o the present tage and perspective ffuturedevelop-ment" iftheParty wereto be knownas a League."7Under the new Statute adopted by the Sixth Congress,the Party was nolongerto play the "leading role" in the developmentofSocialism but onlya''consciousrole,'' sincetheParty nowhas to win a leadingrole "on the basis ofgoodwork nd extensiveknowledgeof the laws ofsociety nd notby a decreedeterminingor tself hat it is the leadingpolitical force."Further, he partyno longer aw itself s the "initiator, rganizer nd leader of thestruggle f theYugoslav people," but, moremodestly, it mobilizesand moves the broadestmassesof thepeople to actionbypoliticaland organizationalmeans, so thatitsstruggle nd achievementsmake it a leader."18The resolutionof the Sixth Congress,proclaiming hat the reformsn theeconomy nd governmentmakepolitical nd ideologicalworkon theeducationofthe massesthefundamental utyof the Communists,"declared:

The League ofCommunists cannot be and is not the direct operational leader and directorof economic, government or social life. It is rather, by its political and ideological activi-ties, primarily by discussion, to work in all organizations, agencies and institutions fortheadoption of its line and standpoint, of the standpoint ofindividual members.19IV. THE NEW PARTY STATUTE

The PartyStatuteadoptedby theFifthCongress n 1948,despitetheComin-formResolutionwhichpreceded it, "was by and large a copy of the Statuteof the Soviet CommunistParty . .. weigheddown by Soviet practices andrequirements."To "find release fromsuch bureaucratic obstructions,"theSixth Congressadopted a new Statute which "lays down clearlythe funda-mentalprinciplesforthe buildingof the Party at the presentstate ofsocialdevelopment and socialist democracy."20The changes in the new Statute,embracing hedirectives ftheFourthPlenum, ncludethefollowing oints:21. All theParty'sactivities houldbe public."This isnopropagandaslogan,"said Rankovic, "but a principle hat mustgovernthe Party organizations ntheireveryday work."2. Non-Party membersshould be urged to attend meetings of the basic

17 Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.18 Rankovit's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.19"Resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the Roleand Tasks of the Communist League of Yugoslavia," Sixth Congress of the CommunistParty of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953), p. 128.20 Rankovi6's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.21 See items on the Sixth Congress in Borba, November 7, 1952, and reportsof Tito andRankovi6 to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 93(lowest) Party units,whose "activities should develop as much as possibleunder the control nd theparticipation fthemasses."3. Special Partyunitswill no longer xist nsidegovernmentdministrativebranchesand "social organizations," uch as trade unions and youthgroups.In these organizations,ndividualParty members hould workfor the PartyProgram, utactual Partyorganizationsmustbe based only onproduction ndterritorialivisions.That is to say,Communistswillnowbelongonlytofactoryunits or organizationsbased on residence-bloc, ward, village, etc.-exceptwhere pecial ad hocgroupsmightbe formed o deal withspecific roblems.4. Republic Party Congresses,which underthe 1948 Statute had only theright o determine hetactical line,now have theright o determine hepolit-ical line of the Party in their reas "based on the generalpolitical ine of theCPY."5. HigherPartyorganswillno longerhave authority oassignspecific pera-tionaltasks to basic Partyunits but only to lay downbroad linesofpolicy andmake general uggestions or mplementation.6. The Central Committee s no longerempoweredto appoint party or-ganizerswith uthority nspecial areas. The articleof the1948statutegrantingthisauthority o theCentralCommittee, which was literally opiedfrom heSoviet CommunistParty'sstatute,was again simply n undemocraticmeasureto justify heexistenceofcommissarswherever heywerethoughtnecessary."7. CentralCommittee andidates-"with no rights xceptan advisoryvote"-are eliminated, nd vacancies on the centralcommittee-if themembershipis reducedby a third-are to be filledby a special congress onvenedforthatpurpose.8. The permanentbureaus ofParty officialsn lowerParty committees reabolished.Partytasks are now to be assigned to various Partymembers ndi-vidually, lthough ach town,district,ward and commune ommittee etainssecretariat f no morethanfivemembers, eaded by a secretary, to take careofcurrent ffairs."9. Basic Partyunits can now expel any oftheirmemberswithoutreferencetohigher artyauthority.Under the1948Statute, decisions o expela membernot onlyhad to be approvedby district ommittees, ut basic units were for-bidden to expelcommitteemembers.The change givesgreater ndependence obasic units, and, since all Party membersbelongto a basic unit,providesthebasicunitswitha check on the eadership, t least theoretically.10. Basic Partyunitscan make theirowndecisionsregarding ewmemberswithout reference o higherParty authority.The requirementfor an 18-monthperiodofcandidaturepriorto fullmemberships abolished.In addition, henameofthePolitburowas changedto ExecutiveCommittee.Doubtless because no changewas foreseen n theunquestioned eadingrole ofthisbody,this was notdiscussed at theCongress.

V. ONE-PARTY SYSTEM RETAINEDNone ofthis mplied hat thePartywas goingto lose itsidentity r cohesive-ness. Rankovic especiallycriticizedPartyworkerswho frequently alk about


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94 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWthe need to make the Party a "mass organization"with emphasis on largenumbers.22This viewpoint,"he declared, is an erroneous ne,and it certainlymusthave an injurious ffect.... The strengthndmass character f hePartycannotbe measuredsimplyby the number of membersbut also, apart fromotherthings,by internalunity, politicalactivity and purity.The mass char-acter ofthePartydoes not lie in thenumbersof membersbut in the extenttowhichthesemembers, y their ctivity nd political work, ucceedin bringingthe broad masses of the people under the influence f the Party." In ordertohave this success, Rankovicwarned, he Communistsmustbe "responsible ortheirwork nd theirbehaviornotonlyto theirParty organizations nd leader-shipbutto thepeople,to thewholeofsociety nthe first lace."The new role of the Partywas said to meanthe end of tsmonopoly npolit-ical affairs.No longer, roclaimedEdvard Kardelj, did theparty "considerthedetermination f thepolitical ine of struggle orconstruction fsocialistrela-tionship s itsmonopoly lone."23If it was not clearwhat this meant n fact,Tito made clearwhat it did notmean. It did not mean any change in the one-party ystem.A multi-partysystemwouldonly "permit heorganizeddestruction f revolutionarychieve-ments for whichblood has already been shed," Tito emphasized.Yet at thesame time,he said, therewere now new "conditions n whichthe revolution sin the mainconsummated nd the transformationf society s already nearinga higher evel." Under such conditions new forms f organizedmass politicalforces"must be set up having "an indispensableuniform rogram." Accord-ingly,Tito called on the People's Front to be reorganized ntoa "Socialist Alli-ance ofWorkingPeople ofYugoslavia," whichwould include "the broad sec-tionsofthepopulation, ll our social organizations, roups nd individuals, ndCommunists oo.... 24

VI. THE SOCIALIST ALLIANCEResponding o Tito's call,thePeople's Frontat its Vth Congress n BelgradeinFebruary,1953, reorganizedtself.The changeof the People's Front ntotheSocialistAlliance,declaredKardelj, in his capacity as secretarygeneral oftheneworganization,s, alongwith the changeof the Party to the League of Com-munists, an inseparable, componentpart of all the social changes that havebeencarried utinourcountry uring he ast fewyears."25 ardelj deniedthatthechangewas onlyoneofname but insisted herewere "substantialchanges nthe characterand role of the People's Front in new social conditions."TheSocialist Alliance, he declared, "is not a political organizationof socialistsbut a political alliance of the working class and the whole of the workingpeople . . . who, through hisAlliance, willpolitically mplement heirgovern-ment and determine he socialistpolicy of that governments well as all other

22 Rankovi's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.23 Edvard Kardelj's address to IVth Congress of People's Front, Yugoslav Review,Vol.2, No. 3-4, p. 17 (March-April, 1953).24 Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.25 Kardelj's address to IVth Congress of People's Front, op. cit.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 95social organs.... It should be sufficientlyroad in its politicalplatform o astoenabletheparticipation n tofevery itizen whocomports imself onorablytoward the social community nd accepts the general aims of socialism-regardless f deological nd otherdifferencesn opinion."Kardelj saw the role of the League of Communiststo be one of "generalideological eadership . . politicaland educational workamong the masses,"while the Socialist Alliance was to deal with "concrete political and othersocial questions."In short, heCommunists, itting s a League, wereto makebroad, general policy and then, as individuals, ead the Socialist Alliance inapplying t to specific ituations.However, Kardelj exhorted the Socialist Alliance to independence,andwarnedthe Communists to put an end to the so-calledduplication ofwork,that s an end to thepracticewhereby hePartyorganizations t theirmeetingsdecidedall politicaland otherquestions and thensimplyforwarded hese de-cisionsto thePeople's Frontorganizations or pproval."

VII. THE "WITHERING AWAY OF THE PARTY"These changesannouncedfor the Party, althoughthey might ignificantlyalter the method of operations, mplied no essential change in the Party'sdominant osition nthesociety.There nowcame,however, conceptofa morestartling haracter:the "witheringway oftheParty."Communist heoryhas always embracedas a goal-however distant-"thewitheringway of thestate," but since theearlydays oftheSoviet Unionwhatwould happen to the CommunistParty had not been discussed.26Now inYugoslavia, theCommunists ontended hatthe "witheringway of thestate"was in actual process.This being the case, Tito admitted, "the CommunistParty cannot continueto function n the same old way.... If the state doesnotwither way, then thePartybecomes, n a certain ense, an instrument fthestate,a force utside ofsociety. f thestate reallywithers way, thePartynecessarilywithers way withit. Many of our own people do not realize this

factyet. We have to explain to themgradually ofwhat thiswithering wayconsists, nd we have begun to do so."27Tito firstpubliclymentioned the concept of the "withering way of theParty" evenbefore heSixthCongress,but it was onlywith thepublication ofhis biographyby Vladimer Dedijer rightafterthe Congress that the ideaentereddiscussion mong therankand file.Tito again referred o the conceptafterthe Congress in replyingto questions of some young Communists re-garding he future oleof the Party.2826A 1920resolution f theComintern eld that"the necessity or politicalpartyoftheproletariat"wouldcease "with the complete bolition ofclasses,"at whichtimetheCommunist Party would become dissolved completely in the working class ... " Kom-munistichestkiinternatsional DokumentakhCommunistnternationaln Documents), .100 (Moscow,1933).27Dedijer,op. cit.,pp. 428-431.28 Fred WarnerNeal, "Yugoslav CommunistTheory,"American Universities ieldStaffReports,WN-5- (Yugoslavia,1954),p. 5.


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96 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWEven at the time of the Sixth Party Congress, confusionwas apparentthroughout he ranks of the Yugoslav Communists.The Politburo did nothave a formalProgramto proposeto theParty, Milovan Djilas explained,be-

cause "it was decided that our own socialist development . . was not suffi-ciently lear noutline."29t was obviousfrom emarks ftheleadership t theCongress,cited above, that already the liberalizingdirectivesof the FourthPlenumhad produceduncertaintymongtherankand file.The actionsof theCongress,plus the new concept of the "withering way of the Party," com-poundedtheconfusionnd produceda crisis n thepartythat ed somemonthslater to the Djilas Affair.VIII. PARTY DECENTRALIZATION

Meanwhilethemainorganizational hanges n theCommunistPartyfollow-ing theSixthCongressconcerneddecentralization f functions nd a reductionofthe Party apparatus at various levels. This had, in fact,beguneven beforethe Congress.Rankovic, in his address to that body,testified hat "860 com-radeswhoheld posts of eadership n the Partyand state apparatus" had nowgoneto otherwork. Some ofthese functionarieseftthe employoftheParty,whileotherswere assignedto local units. In November,1952, therewere901paid partyworkers ssignedto district nd citycommittees, r one forevery865 Partymembers, ut,Rankovicdeclared, more mustbedoneonthegradualreduction fthe numberof professional artyworkers."30The reductionproceededon all levels, n largepartby curtailing artyfunc-tions. For example,all formal gitation-propagandaworkand supervisionofsuch organizationsas women's and youth groups,was turned over to theSocialistAlliance.Workon Party cadres and so-called ideological-educationalworkamongPartymemberswas turnedoverto local Partyunits.Fromthe secretariat fthe CentralCommittee n Belgradewereeliminatedtheagitation-propaganda,ultural nd military epartments. he Secretariat'sapparatus as reorganized onsistsof a personnelor cadre department, n or-ganizationdepartment, financialdepartment nd a recorddepartment on-cernedwith, mongother hings, hehistory f theParty.To theSecretariat salso attacheda control ommission,withthetask of enforcing ecisions oftheExecutive Committee nd CentralCommittee, heckingon lowerPartyunitsand ferretingut serious deologicalaberrations.3'Also attached to the Secretariatwere the High Party School in Belgrade,where budding Communist eaders received training n Marxism,Yugoslavbrand, and so-called lowerParty schoolswhere lesser functionaries eceivedideologicaltraining nd indoctrination. he Secretariatalso has instructors

29 Address of Milovan Djilas, "On the Programme of the League of Communists ofYugoslavia," Sixth Congressof the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953), p. 88.30Rankovi's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.31 This informationwas given to the writer by officials f the Secretariat in Belgrade onAugust 27, 1954.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 97conducting arious coursesand seminars t the local level. Between 1948 and1952, 560 persons ttended the High Party School, 17,196attended the lowerParty schoolsand 3,282 members,mostly ocal leaders, participated n otherformalParty instruction.32The secretariatsof the republic central committeeswere practicallydeci-mated by this decentralization.For example, the secretariatof the CentralCommittee fMontenegro, he smallest n Yugoslavia, had onlytwo full-timeemployees n the fall of 1954.33However,since almost all high Party officialsarealso governmentfficials, uchpartywork sinfact carried n from overn-ment offices. or instance,Mito Hadzi Vassilev, a memberof the CentralCommittee fMacedonia and also a memberof theMacedonian Republic Ex-ecutive Committee, old the writer n 1954 that he spentmost of his time onworkfor he Party and the Macedonian SocialistAlliance,of whichhe is secre-tary.Except for xpenses,he was paid entirely ythe Macedonian Republic.On the lower evels especially,many Partyfunctionaries,oath to lose goodjobs, fought he decentralization.Resolutelypushingthe newprogram,Borbadenounced uch Communists nd declared that "they played nto the hands ofreaction. ..34While the formaldecentralization f Party activitieswas real enough,themeaningof the extensionof autonomyto lowerParty bodies was less clear.Operationally, o be sure, ocal Party Committeesweremore on theirown,andtheright o recruit nd expelmemberswas, theoretically t least,an importantone. However,the Yugoslavs claimed that the rightofRepublic Party Con-gressesto determine heir own "political line" had "profoundmeaning" andthat it showed "more sharply" than anything lse the contrastbetween theSoviet and Yugoslav Parties." The limitednatureof thisrightcan be seen inthe following hypothetical xample of this change n practice,"citedto illus-trate "the tremendous ignificancef the newprinciple n thefuturedevelop-mentofthe Yugoslav Communist arty and to the entireprogramofbuildinga Socialistdemocracy s well:"

Underthe formerystem fPartyorganization,f the nationalCongressfixed spe-cificgoal for henumericalgrowthofagricultural ooperatives,n, let us say, Croatia,thetaskof theCroatianParty was limited o working ut the waysand meansof reach-ingthat figure. nderthe newprovision,t wouldbe up to theCroatianCommunist artyto determine nderthe specific onditions nderstoodby those ivingand studying hesituation n the spothow strong cooperativedriveshould be launchedat any specificperiod,what short-term alance betweenprivateand socialistholdings hould be en-couraged,whattypeof cooperativeorganizationwouldbe mosteffective nd practicalwithin ivenconditions,nd so forth.'632 Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.33Statement of Blaio Jovanovi6, chairman of the Montenegro Central Committee, towriteron September 24, 1954.u Borba,August 23, 1954.35 "Toward Greater Democracy in Party Organization," Yugoslav Review,Vol. 1, No.8, p. 3 (October, 1952).to Ibid., p. 3, p. 15.


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98 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWIX. THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The high point in Party membershipwas reached in 1952, just beforetheSixth Congress,when 779,382 persons belonged.The tightening fdisciplinethe followingyear resulted n a sharp increase in the numberof expulsions,reducing he membershipo 700,030 at thebeginning f1954.Table I shows thetrend of Party membership:

TABLE I. PARTY MEMBERSHIPPeriod Number of Members

June,1945 140,000June,1948 448,175December,1949 530,000December, 1950 607,443December,1951 704,617June,1952 779,382January, 954 700,030

Source: Figuresfor1945-1952are taken fromReportsof Tito and Rankovi6,SixthCongressof the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1953. Figure for 1954 was givento thewriter y officialsftheSecretariat f he CentralCommitteenBelgrade.In 1952, the Party accounted for 8.43 per cent of the adult population ofYugoslavia, or 4.72 per cent of the total population. In 1948, peasants com-prisedapproximately 0 per cent of the Party membership, nd workers essthan 30 per cent. By 1952, the number of workershad increasedby only2.5per cent, while the number of peasants decreased by 7 per cent. The Partyleadership then ordereda drive to increase the number of workers n theParty.37 y the beginning f 1954, this had succeeded to the extent hat for hefirst imetherewereslightlymore workers han peasants in the Party.38Table II, presentedbyRankovic to theFourth Plenum of theCentral Com-

mittee n 1954, shows the social pattern of Party membership s well as itsgeographic istribution t the beginning fthat year. Womenmade up 20 percentofthemembershipn 1948 but only 13 percent of themembershipn 1952.By 1954, according o figures rovided by the secretariat f the Central Com-mittee, he number fwomen n the Party had increased o 121,159,or approxi-mately 18 per cent. Party officials onstantly xhort heircomrades "to elimi-nate sectarian,conservative nd undemocratic ttitudes towardwomen."39Not onlythe low ideological evel of the Communistsbut their ow literacylevelas well s a source ofconcern o the eadership.Blazo Jovanovic, member f the nationalExecutive Committee Politburo)3Rankovk's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.38 Apparently the trend toward an increase of workers in the Party continued during1954. The Sarajevo newspaper, Oslobodjenje, on December 21, 1954, put the percentage ofworkers at 32.9."9 See, forexample, Rankovic's remarks, Politika, November 9, 1952.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 99and head ofthe MontenegroLeague ofCommunists,complainedto a PartyCongress nTitograd:

There is a considerable number of those [Communists] who are not up to the eventsand are unable to settle the problems by which they are confronted n the course ofsocial-ist development. In the countryside, there is a considerable number of Communists whoare either semi-literate or illiterate, who can hardly read the newspapers, not to mentionanything else. And if they read the papers, they can hardly understand what they writeabout. As for those Communists, it is their prime task and obligation to learn how toread... 40

TABLE II. COMPOSITION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Area Workers Peasants White Collar Other TotalEmployeesSerbia 70,120 98,504 71,398 30,624 270,646Croatia 47,816 30,122 42,573 17,737 138,248Bosnia-Herzegovina 25,615 17,828 28,009 7,717 79,169Slovenia 18,846 4,053 21,096 8,368 52,363Macedonia 9,564 17,377 13,314 4,911 45,166Montenegro 4,697 10,105 5,556 1,812 22,170Army 14,997 11,403 7,285 58,583 92,268Total 191,655 189,392 189,231 129,752 700,030a

a Includes 25,096 persons who joined the Party during 1953. See Table III.Source: Komunist, No. 4, p. 267, April, 1954.In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ess than 22 per cent of the Party membershadgone beyondelementary chool in 1948,while n 1954 63.2 per cent had gonebeyondelementary chool. Ofthese,46.8 per cent had onlya partialsecondaryschooltraining, 0.3 per centhad finished econdary chool and 6.1 percenthadcompleteor incompleteuniversity raining. While some of these increasedpercentages eflected ddition ofnewermembers etween 1948and 1954,much

of tresulted rom dulteducation.4'The levelof educationof Partymembers shigher nSerbia, Croatia and Slovenia.X. PARTY DOMINANCE

Allmembers f theParty belongto theSocialistAllianceofWorking eople,whichhad in 1954 a totalmembership f about 8,000,000.42 nder the Statuteadopted by the IVth Congressofthe People's Front,the SocialistAlliance iscomposed fbothorganizationsnd individuals.Although rganizations s suchmay belong, theirmembers,n orderalso to be membersof the SocialistAlli-ance,mustthemselves enrollpersonally" n one ofthe basic organizations ftheAlliance. Like theParty,the Alliance s organized t thefederal, epublic,local and "bloc" levels.

40 Pobjeda, Titograd, October 24, 1954, p. 2.41 Oslobodjenje, December 21, 1954, p. 1.42 Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.


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100 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWThe Socialist Alliance s completely ominatedby the League ofCommunists.Officially,tshighestbodyis a Federal Board,which n turn lectsa presidium.Ofthe 27-manpresidiumnamed at the FourthCongress,21 weremembersof

theCentral Committee ftheLeague ofCommunists.The presidium mbracedall but two members fthe Party's executive ommittee. ito, secretary-generalof theParty, s president f theSocialistAlliance,and Kardelj is its secretary-general. The Secretaries of each republic organizationof the Alliance aremembers f the republicParty centralcommittees.The Alliance serves the Party not only as a front rganization ut also as acoordinatorof most organized group activities aside from the Party itself.WhThereasrior o 1952,the chief ctivityofthePeople's Front was to rally argegroupsfor "voluntarywork" on construction rojects,43 he Socialist Alliancenow goes in formore political work. While the numberof paid functionaries fthePartyhas declined, hose ofthe Alliance ncreased s it took overactivitiesfrom he Party. Chiefofthesenew functionss politicalpropaganda,practicallyall of which s now handled by the Socialist Alliance. This includes not onlyelectionpropaganda and hortatorymaterial-such as wall signs saying "LongLive theBalkan Pact "-but also organization f mass meetings, peeches bygovernment ignitaries, tc. Socialist Alliance committees ay especial atten-tion to elections, nstructing heir members on procedure to be followed atvoter's meetings nd the like. Borba, which had been the official rganof theParty, s now the organof the Socialist Alliance.As a part of ts work n "educating the masses" forthe Party, the SocialistAlliance relies on its large memberorganizationsas "transmissionbelts."Chiefamong these are the People's Youth Organization, he Association ofAnti-FascistWomen, The Federation of Veterans and the Federation ofDisabled WarVeterans, ssociationsof ournalists,writers, rtists nd teachers,and various children's rganizations. ince, in additionto meetings nd otheractivities,most of these groupshave special publications,theircoordinationby the SocialistAlliance has enormouspropaganda possibilities.

It is likely that the Party finances ome activities of the Socialist Alliance,althoughthere s no evidence on thispoint.The Socialist Alliance nets about40,000,000dinarsa monthfrom ues. In 1954,theCentralCommitteedecreeda reduction n Partydues that was estimatedto cut Partyrevenuesfromduesnearly45 per cent.44 ven withthese reductions, owever,dues would bring heParty some 75,000,000dinars a month.*While monthlydues in the Socialist Alliance are fivedinars per member,inthe Party dues are graduated according o the income of the member, xceptforpeasantswhopay a flatrate of30 dinars month; tudentsnoton a scholar-shipand Communistswithoutmonthly ncome,who pay 20 dinars; and armyconscripts,who pay two dinars a month.All Communistsreceivingmonthlycash wages pay accordingto the following cale: up to 10,000 dinars,one half

43 For a discussion of this, see Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress. Ibid.44See discussion n Party dues nKomunist,No. 9-10 (October-November, 954).45 The writer's stimate, ased on the breakdown f membershipn Table II.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 101per cent of income; 10,000 to 20,000 dinars, one per cent; 20,000 to 35,000dinars,2 per cent; above 35,000 dinars,3 per cent.Three per cent ofmonthlyearnings lso is paid by artists,authors, awyers,craftsmennd otherCom-munistsnot formallymployed.46

XI. TRADE UNIONS AND THE ARMYTwo other ransmissioneltswhoseactivities regenerally utsidethe Social-ist Alliance are of especial importance.These are the trade union Sindikatand theArmy.The generalunionorganizationhas a membership f1,700,000out of some 2,000,000workersnYugoslavia. All Sindikatofficialsremembersof the League ofCommunists.Partymembers mployed nfactoriesnvariablybelongto the Sindikat,47 hich s the Partyinstrumentalityorcontrollinghe

Workers'Councils,which run the factories n Yugoslavia. In addition, theunionplays an important dvisoryrole in governmentnd carriesout an ex-tensive ducationprogram.48"It is obvious," said Tito, "that in our country he CommunistParty andthetrade unions re closelybound nonesinglepurpose-the building fSocial-ism."49Although heSindikat s affiliatedwiththe SocialistAlliance, ts top leader-ship also holds importantParty posts,and it has direct relationshipwiththeSecretariat f the Central Committee s wellas withtheParty organization nlowerlevels. In fact,with the extensivedecentralization f government ndeconomy hathas takenplace,without hetradeunion acting s the voiceofthePartyin the factory, herewouldbe littlemeans of enforcinghe Party's willupon many ndividualproducingunits.The army s in a special category.As in any highly uthoritariangovern-ment, t is an important ourceof strength or hose n power;at thesame timeit always represents potentialthreat. n Yugoslavia this s particularly rue.The existenceof a large and testedarmywas a factor n Tito's independentpositionvis-h-vis he USSR. Tito referred o the Armyas "the chiefpillar ofsupportof our peoples forpreservingndependence."50 t the same time,theArmywas a focusofSovieteffortst subversion.Therewas,therefore,ntensivePartywork n the armyto buildup loyaltyto the Tito regime.Between 1948and 1952, 90,948newmemberswere admitted nto the Partyfrom he Army,bringingArmymembership t the time of the Sixth Congressto 140,193.51In thehaste to recruitnew members rom he Army,however, herewas "in-adequate attention .. paid to necessaryqualitiesforbecoming Partymem-ber."52 he resultwas a reductionnarmymembershipn 1953.However, s can

46 See discussion on Party dues in Komunist, No. 9-10 (October-November, 1954).47 Information given to writerby Ivan Boiedevi6, secretary-generalof the Sindikat onAugust 24, 1954.48 See Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.49 Ibid.60 Ibid.61 Ibid.52 Ibid.


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102 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWbe seen fromTable II, Party membership n the Armyis still more thanmembershipnywhere xceptSerbia and Croatia, and almosttheentireofficercorpsbelongsto theParty.5"

Indicativeof theattention hePartypays to theArmy s thefact that about650 Partycourses are organized nnuallyformilitary ersonnel, nadditiontoabout a millionpolitical ectures nd 700,000politicaldiscussiongroups.54XII. THE NEW PARTY SYSTEM IN OPERATION

Under thenewconceptofthePartyin Yugoslavia, Partydecisions re sup-posed to be carriedout not by the Party organizations ollectively ut by in-dividualmembersworkingnvariousnon-Party rganizations, articularlyheSocialistAlliance.The task ofcoordinating hevarious "social organizations"ofthe country s supposedto restwiththe SocialistAlliance,with theLeagueofCommunists reeingtself fadministrativematters.In fact,thedivisionofresponsibilityetweentheLeague and theAlliance soften ifficultosee.A not nfrequentomplaint fPartyunits s thattheycan'tkeep trackofwhat theirmembers re doing in various otherorganizations.55Local Party organizations till spend considerabletimedealingwithdetailedadministration feconomic nterprises. orba,findingvidenceofmalfeasancein a brickyard ear Travnik,demanded: "What were the Communistsdoingin the brickyard .. ?"56Criticizing ctivitiesofthe large Zenica ironworks,Borba denounced the local Communist organizationsfor failingto devote"fullattention o thesequestions."57In carrying ut "ideological-politicalwork,"the League ofCommunists ndtheSocialistAllianceappear to overlapto thepointof ointactivity, o that itis oftendifficulto ascertainwhether certainproject s sponsoredby one ortheotherorbyboth.58It is perhaps n its operationsregardingocal governmenthat the Socialistalliancecan be seenmostclearly s an individualorganization. n Kragjuevac,for xample, twas reported hat during1954thePeople's Committeedid "notdeal with a single mportant uestionwithout tshavingbeendiscussed n theSocialist Alliance." Once action was taken by the People's Committee,theSocialistAlliancethen"paid particular ttentionto the carrying ut ofthesedecisions nd at itsmeetings riticized eoplewhobroketheserules."59Although heSocialistAllianceoperatesonthebasis ofdemocratic entralismas faras itsorganizations re concerned,more eeway s supposed to be allowed

3Relatively high officermembership is indicated in the "other" column in Table II.64 Tito's Report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit.65 See, forexample, discussion of Party problems in Sarajevo, Oslobodjenje, December24, 1954.66 Borba, July 12, 1954.67 Borba, November 2, 1954.68 For examples ofthis confusion, see report of oint activity in Politika, December 15,1954, and Oslobodjenje, December 27, 1954.69 Politika, January 12, 1954.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 103individualmembers n expressionoftheirprivatebeliefs.For example,whilethe Party takes a dimview ofreligious ctivities on the part of its members,according oKardelj: "For theSocialistAllianceand itsmembers, eligious eel-ingsare theprivateconcern fthe ndividual.Within heranksoftheSocialistAlliance can be both atheistsand peoplewho believe in and belongto variousreligions."60In fact, t is a question how farthis leewayextends.There arefrequent e-ports of expulsionsfrom he Socialist Alliance of membersunduly criticalofthePartyorregime rengaging nproselytyzingeligious ctivity.For examplethe SocialistAllianceorganization fKasindol, in Bosnia, expelledfourmem-bers nAugust,1954. One,Lazar Bojovic, "openly .. criticized ur eadershipand some measures . . making use of [Communists']personal mistakes."Another,Despot Stefanovic, began to curseand scold people's deputies ..and evenbeganto assaulthonestpeople." A third,Cvija Stefanovic, began toattack those women who refusedto observe churchholidays......" Theseexplosions, s mostSocialistAllianceactions,werevoted unanimously.The whole relationof the League of Communiststo the Socialist Alliancestrongly ndicates that the Alliance does not functionsignificantlyxceptthroughts Communistmembers.Blazo Jovanovicput it thisway:

The activity ofpolitical work in the Socialist Alliance mostly depends upon the activ-ity of the Communists themselves, and this is the best criterionof work and political in-fluenceofthe League ofCommunists. In those quarters where the Communists are active,the Socialist Alliance is also active. In those quarters where the Communists are inactive... the other working men do not assign any importance to the work.... The influenceand attitude of the League of Communists should predominate....62

XIII. CONFUSION AND REACTIONWhatwas apparentby thespring f1953was notthat theCommunistPartyinYugoslavia didnothave a newrolebut thatmanyCommunistshad no clearunderstanding fwhatthenewrolewas supposed to be."It isknown,"wroteStalin,"that theory,f t is really heory, ivespracticalpeople strength nd orientation, clarity ofperspective, onfidence t work,faith... ."6 If someYugoslav Communistswondered, s faras the Partywasconcerned,ftherereally was a theory,what perplexedotherswas that thereseemed to be several theorieswhich, f not mutuallycontradictory,were atbest vague.64The Communistshad been told to workas individualsratherthan relyontheirParty status. They had been told to workwithbut not dominate theSocialistAlliance.They had been toldnot to order hegovernmentbout but60 Kardelj's address to IVth Congress ofPeople's Front, op. cit., p. 18.61 Oslobodjenje, August 7, 1954.62 Pobjeda, Titograd, October 24, 1954.63 Stalin, op. cit., pp. 299-300.64 See, forexample, discussion on demands of rank and file to clarifyfrontiersbetweenthe Communist Party and the Socialist Alliance and between the Party and the govern-ment in New York Times, June 14, 1953, p. 12.


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104 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWto criticize ts activities.They had been told theymustemphasizedemocracyand toleratedissenting pinions.They had been told that the Partyno longerhad a monopoly nsetting hepolitical ine.Theyhad beentoldthattheParty,to whichtheywereexpected to devote their ives,was to "wither way." Butat thesame time, nd often lmost nthe same breath, heyhad beentoldthatthePartymustmaintain nd evenaugment tsleadingposition hroughouthesociety;that theymustfight ll bourgeoistendencies nd anti-stateactivity;thatthey mustnot believe n freedom o express nti-Socialist deas; and thatthey must struggleto safeguardthe purityand monolithicposition of theParty.Given theadmitted ow deological evelof heParty, t washardly urprisingthat theresulting onfusion eacheda pointwhere,nJune,1953,the eadershipdecidedsomething ad to be done about it. FromBrioni,hissummer esidencein the Adriatic,Tito summoneda Plenum ofthe Central Committeeto dealwith hematter.The BrioniPlenum,as it isknown,promptly ecreed generaltightening fParty discipline nd a reemphasison democratic entralism.65The Plenumfound hatrelaxeddisciplinehad allowed"ideologicaland polit-ical confusion o grow"to thepointwherebroadareas ofthePartywere"ceas-ingto be revolutionary."And itfurtherharged:

All kinds ofuncertainty and anti-Marxist theories are starting to appear. The strugglefor deological and political unity is veryweak. It is not a rare occurrence that members ofthe Communist League believe they have a right to protest against decrees and othermeasures that have been adopted in our Socialist State in a democratic manner.

Two fundamental rrors mongCommunistswereheldresponsible orthese"negativetendencies." On the one hand, some Communists onsideredthat"the processofdemocracymeant theycould contributenothing o the Partybut lectures." They had become passive, ignoredParty discipline,adopted"petty-bourgeois-anarchistdeas of freedomand democracy" and failed tocombat "foreign nd anti-Socialistmanifestations."On the otherhand, someCommunists tillbelieved "the Party inehad notchangedat all" and thoughtthenewemphasis on democracywas only an "agitation-propaganda actic."Althoughboth ofthese errorswereto be corrected, hePlenumconcentrateditsfire n theformer roup,whichclearlywas considered hemoreharmful. othat therewouldbe no misunderstandingbout the concept ofthe "witheringaway of theParty," the CentralCommittee aid that thisconcernedonlythedistantfuture,whenCommunismwas achievedand theproblemof deologicalleadershipwas no longerpresent.For theforeseeablefuture, t was explained,leadership by the CommunistParty as a disciplinedand monolithicforce-modified s it mightbe-was an indispensablefactor to the developmentofSocialismand Communism n Yugoslavia.It would be too muchto say that a formal purge" resultedfrom he BrioniPlenum,but thetotal of72,467memberswereexpelledfrom heLeague during85 Proceedings and decisions of the Brioni Plenum are contained in Komunist, No. 4(July, 1953).


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 1051953, most of themin the latter half of the year. Table III, givingfigurespresentedby Rankovic to the Central Committee n 1954,showsthe distribu-tionof members xpelledas well as newmembers ecruited uring1953.

TABLE III. PARTY MEMBERSHIP CHANGES, 1953Area Expelled New Members Decrease

Serbia 25,259 10,603 15,056Croatia 13,949 6,113 7,836Bosnia-Herzegovina 19,737 4,577 15,160Slovenia 4,368 915 3,453Macedonia 5,142 1,120 4,022Montenegro 1,075 261 814Army 2,537 1,507 1,030Total 72,467 25,096 47,351

Source:Kornunist,No. 4 (April),1954, pp. 267-268.Althoughnone of the formaldecisionsof eitherthe Fourth Plenum or theSixthCongresswereabrogated,the leadershipmade it clear that Communistswerenot authorized o differ ithgovernment olicieswhere hese reflectedhewill of the Party.66 ince almost all government oliciesreflect he will ofthe

Party, criticism f governmentwas seriouslydelimited.The elections,whichhad beenscheduledfor hespring f1953,werepostponeduntilfall, o that theParty could apply the Plenum's admonitions n the campaign.87XIV. THE DJILAS AFFAIR

The BrioniPlenum indicatedthat if the Party leaders did not want to re-versethetrend owarddecentralizationnd democracy n connectionwiththeParty, theyat least wanted to put brakes on it. Yet even among the highcommand heconfusion ad not been cleared up. One member f the hierarchyinparticular,Milovan Djilas, felt hat thedecisionsof theBrioni Plenumwere"one-sided, hattheyhad forgotten he struggle gainst bureaucratism."68 otonlydid Djilas notagree,but he "feltthat the BrioniPlenum had somehow obe corrected."69his he set about to do bywriting seriesof articles nthefallof 1953 in Borba and finally dministering hat he considered coup de gracein the theoreticalmagazine,Nova Misao (New Thought)n January,1954.AlthoughDjilas had been given virtuallya green ightby Tito himself,70

66See, for example, various articles in Borba, July 4, and September 29, 1953, exhortingCommunists to prevent workers' councils from making decisions contrary to governmentand Party policy.67 New York Times, March 14, 1953, p. 2. See also admonition to Party members re-garding election in Borba, September 8, 1953.

68 See Djilas's second statement at Third Plenum, Komunist, No. 1, p. 157 (January-February, 1954).69 Ibid.70 See Tito's first peech to Third Plenum, ibid., p. 4.


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106 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIMWhis articleswentfarbeyond deas expressedby anybodyelse in the YugoslavParty. In fact,Djilas called foran end to the Party as an organizedpoliticalforcenthesociety,declaring hatit should"wither way by mergingwiththeSocialistAlliancewhile ndividualCommunists houldmergewiththeordinarycitizen.... The Leninist type ofboth Partyand state dictatorship y meansof thePartyhas becomeobsolete,"Djilas asserted,7"nd he added:"The goal of completeCommunisms too distantto be meaningful.... Thegoal today is quick progress f socialismand democracy hrough oncrete ndfeasibleforms-not Communism."72Not onlywas Djilas carryinghe conceptofthe Party nYugoslavia towhathesaw as its ogicalconclusion, ut alsohe was going otheheart ofthe theoret-ical principlenvolved. Underlyinghis reasoning, s he laterexplained it,wasthebelief hat the Yugoslav Communistshad abandoned the Leninistconceptof the Party. As Djilas saw Leninism,"objective truth"was arrivedvia theMarxian dialectic.Underthis concept,he agreed,therehad to be strictdemo-cratic entralism;herehad to be, nfact, dictatorship f thePartyleadershipbecause that leadershipwas responsible or carrying ut the exact line deter-mined by the dialectic.But now,as Djilas saw it,Yugoslav Communismhadgone beyondthis stage and had abandoned the Leninist conceptfor a moreor less pragmatic pproach. It had no definiteine, and it did not need one,because therewas no longerany dangerfrom nti-Socialistforces.But therewas a dangerfromPartybureaucracy.Truth,no longer eenvia thedialectic,nowhad to be arrived t by freediscussion.Thismeantabandonmentofdemo-cratic centralism o permitformation f "ad hoc blocs" of Party memberswhich could differ mong themselveson various questions. This being thecase, theParty,as a Party,was no longerneeded.The alternativemeantdeci-sion simplyon the basis of the personal deas ofthe Party leaders,and sincetheywerefallible, his nevitably reatedthe dangeroferroneous ecisions.73Djilas's last effort as themost extreme. n a bitter, atiricalattack on theverytop "innercircleof Party bureaucrats,"he chargedthattheymaintainedtheir xistence n "a world closedfrom henatureofpowerand themanner nwhich t was attained."74The generally ague, philosophicalmanner n whichthe Djilas articleswerewrittenwerehere spiced by indirectbut obvious refer-encesto Colonel GeneralPeko Dapeevic, chiefofstaff f theYugoslav Army,and his21-year-old ctressbride.75

71Borba, January , 1954.72 Borba, December 6, 1953.73 "Yugoslav Communist heory."ov. cit.. r. 6.74 "Anatomija ednogMorala" ("An Anatomy fMorals"),NovaMisao, p. 7 (January,1954).76 This articlecriticized ot ColonelDapeevi6 or hiswifebut the top Partyechelon,includingts distaffide,for nubbingn earnestyoungwoman imply ecauseshedidnothave an ideologically-approvedast. According o Belgraderumors urrent t thetime,Djilas himselfwas enamoredwithMrs. Dapdevi6."Yugoslav CommunistTheory,"op.cit., p. 7.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 107XV. DJILAS DISCIPLINED

It was an indicationofthe extentof the ideologicalconfusionn Yugoslaviathat t was not immediately bviousto all that Djilas had placed himselfn aposition of irrevocableopposition to the top Party leadership. There waswidespreaddiscussion mongthe Communists nd in the press about Djilas'sarticles.Generally peaking,theywerepopular among the rankand file, ndeven somemembers f theCentralCommitteehailed them.76 ven whenTito,Kardelj and Rankovic finally ealizedwhat was happeningand sent word oftheirdisapproval,Djilas continued o publishhisviews.A showdownwas thenclearly t hand, and it was apparentthat Djilas had intended t so.7The showdownwas not long in coming.On January10, 1954, Borba an-nouncedthatDjilas's articleswere "contrary o the opinionsofall othermem-bers of the Executive Committee"and that thematterwould be takenup atthe forthcominghirdPlenumof theCentralCommittee.The Third Plenum, convenedJanuary16, in effect ut Djilas on trial. Inkeepingwiththe SixthCongress dmonition hatPartyproceedingswere to bepublic,thePlenumwas not onlyopenbut its proceedings roadcast.The Partyleadership rose one by one to denouncetheirfriend nd colleaguefor devia-tionism.Tito seemed to do it more in sorrowthan in anger. "In ComradeDjilas," he said, "I see a comrade."Kardelj accused Djilas offollowing duardBernstein,who was expelledby theGermanSocial Democrats in 1899becauseofhisdenial ofCommunism s an ultimategoal and his insistence hatdemoc-racy was theprincipal onsideration.Moge Pijade, heapingbitter nvectiveonDjilas, referredohis writing s "politicalpornography."OnlyVladimirDedijerrecalledthat "a week ago Milovan Djilas's postulates n Borbaweremoreorless adopted by the majorityof us who are sittinghere.... All at once theverysame people who approved these articlesare attackingMilovan Djilasfiercely.... "And Dedijer asked: "How can we thinkone thing oday and allofa sudden changeour opinionovernight?"The answerto Dedijer's questionappeared to be that "all ofa sudden" thetophierarchyfthe Partyrealizedthattheir ictatorship ftheproletariatwasbeing challenged.That they did not intendto preside over its dissolution,despiteall talk about democracy, esponsibilityo themasses and "witheringaway," wasmade clear byTito himself. he Djilas affair, ito toldthe CentralCommittee, asdone a lot to open our eyes and thoroughly wake us up.... For we never imagined thatthere were any (least of all Comrade Djilas) who thought that in Yugoslavia the classenemy was already liquidated.... The class enemy exists, and it is very clear afterDjilas's articles that he exists in the League of Communists. He is manifest in variousforms.

76 See Thomas Taylor Hammond, "The Djilas Affair nd Yugoslav Communism," For-eign Affairs,Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 308 (January, 1955).77 See Kardelj's remarks at Third Plenum. The speeches and decisions of the ThirdPlenum are contained in Komunist, No. 1-2 (January-February, 1954).


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108 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWAs for he"witheringway" oftheparty:I was first o speak of the witheringaway of the Party ... but I never said this wasto take place in six months or a year or two, but rather that it was a lengthy process.

There can be no witheringaway or windingup ofthe League ofCommunists until the lastclass enemy has been immobilized, until the broadest body of our citizens are socialist inoutlook.... The League of Communists ... must exist, and not merely exist, but also beideologically stronger....Tito added that Djilas's ideas would lead "to anarchy,to a terribleuncer-tainty"and added: "If we permitted his, n a year's time oursocialistrealitywould not exist. t would not exist, tellyou,without bloodybattle."In twostatements, otable for heir ambling mbiguity, jilas was contrite,but he did not recant.He said he realizedhe had been in error, ut he added:

"It wouldnotbe honest f said thatnow,suddenly, ll the ideas I have heldwerewrong.This I cannotdo."Djilas was expelledfrom ll Party posts and given a "finalwarning."Al-thoughnot expelledfrom he Party,he soon resigned.No attemptwas madeagainsthis person,but he was ostracizedby his former omrades. The wholeaffair, fcourse,was instriking ontrast o Sovietpractices.A fewyears earlierDjilas mightwellhave been summarily ispatchedby a firingquad. He him-selfdeclaredthathe survived as a monument o theCominformesolution."78And Tito referredo "the step we wouldhave had to take in the days ofthesharprevolutionarytruggle."79

XVI. IMPACT OF THE DJILAS AFFAIRIt isnoteasyto assess the mpactoftheDjilas Affair. jilas was undoubtedlycorrectwhenhe said later"there areno Djilasites, inanyformal, ctivesense,"but he was also rightwhenhe added "there is lots of Djilasism, though."80True, itsmanifestations ere argelynegative.For one thing, s a Communistleader admittedalmost a year later,throughout ugoslavia "intellectuals reavoiding writing bout the theoryof Marx-Lenin...."''8 A Croatian Com-munistdeclared: "We willnot go against the Party leadership,but we havestoredup new ideas whichthe futurewill permitus to utilize." A SlovenianParty functionarymade the surprising dmissionthat "ideology is unimpor-tant."2Party officialshemselves estifiedo theexistence f"Djilasism" at thesametimetheydenied t. A member ftheMontenegroCentralCommittee,declar-ing "there does not exist an intensive life in the League of Communists,admitted:"We have allowedthisstate ofaffairs o comeabout to someextent... because ofthe influence fDjilas's writings... ."83 AnotherMontenegrin

78 "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 7-8.79 Komunist, No. 1-2, p. 163 (January-February, 1954).80 "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 9.81 Pobjeda, October 24, 1954.82 These statements were made to the writer n the summer of 1954.83 Pobjeda, October 24, 1954.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 109Party officialwarnedof"anarchisticmanifestationswhich Djilas fannedhereby his personal nfluence nd his conceptionsand writings."Lest any thinkthat thiswas trueonly n Djilas's Montenegro,he added that the situationofwhichhe complained"is acute . .. not only in Montenegrobut in general."84Yet the controlofthe Partyhierarchywas never seen to betteradvantagethanin themanner n whichthematterwas hushedup immediately.Once theThirdPlenumhad ended,therewas almostno further ublicdiscussionorevenmention f theaffair, ordid any ofthePartyorganizations o into t.8A

XVII. DJILAS S SECOND HERESYThe last had not been heard of l'affaireDjilas, however. Among thoseexamined by the Control Commission were General Dapcevic, who hadfiguredo prominentlyn theNova Misao articleand whose brotherhad beencaught tryingto escape eastward after the CominformResolution; MitraMitrovic',Djilas's firstwife,who had indicated some sympathy-althoughnot support-for Djilas at the Plenum; and VladimirDedijer, who alone hadspoken nfavorofhis friend.Allthreeweremembers ftheCentralCommittee.The Commissionapparentlydecided therewas no question about GeneralDapvevic', nd Miss Mitrovkiclso satisfactorily assed herproverka.88edijernot only did not pass-he reiteratedhis support of Djilas's ideas-but hechallenged he right f theCommission o examinehim.Dedijer went even further.n mid-December,1954, he walked out on ameeting f the ControlCommission,eaked the episodeto Westernnewspapermen n Belgradeand thengave an interniew o the Belgrade correspondent fThe Timesof London.87During this contretemps, jilas had remained n his "splendid isolation."Now,however, hecorrespondentftheNew YorkTimeswent ohimand askedhisopinion.Djilas respondedwith viewevenmore tartlingndheretical hanthoseexpressednhis articles yearpreviously.f therewas to be noreallyfreediscussion nsidetheParty,he said, thenYugoslavia shouldhave a two-partysystem.He thought "new democraticSocialist party" shouldbe formed ocompetewiththeLeague ofCommunists.He denouncedtheControlCommis-sion's examinations s "an attemptto frightenhedemocratic lements n the

Party."88Tito was in India at the time this interviewwas published,but Kardelj, asactingpresident, id not hesitate.He assailed Djilas and Dedijer for"black-84 Ibid.85Conversation of the writer with Blalo JovanoviL.8 Proverka s a Russian word generally used in Eastern Europe for such examinations.For informationregarding the Control Commission's examinations, see New York Times,December 22, 23, 26, 29, and 31, 1954.87 The Times, London, December 22, 1934, p. 8.88 New York Times, December 25, 1954, p. 1. Djilas's views were not "cooked up" onthe spur of the moment, however. He had confided them to the writer n a conversationalmost two months earlier. See "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 9.


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110 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWmail" and demanded theirprosecution n chargesofhostile propaganda. TheFederal Assemblyvoted to strip Dedijer of his parliamentarymmunity. heCentral Committee, cting on a recommendation rom he ControlCommis-sion, suspendedhim.89Three days afterhis statementappeared in the NewYork Times, Djilas was expelled fromthe Socialist Alliance, and the basicorganization f he Allianceto whichhe had belonged demanded thatcriminalproceedings hould be takenagainst" him.90A few days later Djilas was expelledeven from uch an organization s thesport fishing ociety Dunav "because of his harmfuland treacherousworkagainstourpeoples.... )91The trialbegan on January24, 1955,and, contrary t least to the spirit ofthe statute, was not open to the public.92Great emphasiswas placed on thefact that Djilas and Dedijer found a platform or theirviews in the foreignpress. Tanjug, the officialYugoslav news service, termedthe pair "foreigninterventionistools,"93 nd a veritableorgy of criticism gainst theWesternpress ensued.94Djilas and Dedijer were convicted,one receiving sentence of 18 months,the othera sentence of six months.But the sentences n both cases weresus-pended-that is, the pairwas placed on probation,Djilas for hreeyears,Dedi-jerfor wo-and theywerefreed.95n manyways, consideringhe gravitywithwhich theiroffenseswereviewed, the sentenceswere tantamount o acquittal.

Once again, the new and anomalous character f Yugoslav Communismhadbeen manifested.While theresultsof thetrial doubtlessfrightenedomeway-ward Party members nto conformity,t did little to solve the fundamentalquestion stillfacing he Yugoslav Communists:Conformityo what?XVIII. CONCLUSIONSThe Yugoslav CommunistParty can take credit orhavingsteeredYugoslavCommunism oward omewhat ess totalitarianpaths and forhaving pioneered

89 New York Times, December 28, 1954, p. 1. See also Kardelj's remarks to the Sec-ond Congress of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Borba, December 28,1954.90Borba,January 6, 1955.91Borba,January 6, 1955, p. 1.

92 Associated Press dispatch in Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 1955, p. 1.93 New York Times, January 7, 1955, p. 1.94 See, forexample, Borba and Politika, January 4, 1955.'6 New York Times, January 24, 1955, p. 1. Although unable to findemployment, Djilascontinued to heckle the government fromhis Belgrade apartment. On May 31, 1956, hecomplained in a letter to the New York Times that Yugoslav publishers refused his manu-scripts for political reasons. While Tito was in Moscow in June, 1956, he wrote a series of

articles forthe Hearst and other foreign newspapers attacking the new Soviet leadershipwith which Tito was then making furtherrapprochement. Cf. New York Journal Ameri-can, June 11, 12 and 13, 1956. For these likely violations of his probation, he received onlyabusive criticism n the Yugoslav press. But when, at the time of the Hungarian uprising,he wrote an article for the New Leader attacking the ambiguity of Tito's stand (Novem-ber 19, 1956, pp. 3-6), this was too much. He was sentenced to prison for three years.This time there was no probation. See New York Times, December 13, 1956, p. 1.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 1llin newforms nd theories fMarxism.This development esultedfromYugo-slavia's explosionfrom heCominform,nd it was doubtless ccelerated bytheclose relationsbetweenTito and the West duringthe period 1950-1954. ButhowevermuchtheYugoslav leaderswere forcedby events nto this new posi-tion, heyhave appearedtohold it sincerely. herehas been little fanyindica-tionso farthat theyhave been swayed in this regardby theups and downsoftheirrelationshipswith the Soviet Union duringthe past two years. The im-portanceoftheYugoslav experiences seen n theundoubted mpact t has hadon Communism lsewhere n Eastern Europe.The over-allpicturepresentedby the Yugoslav Party, however, s one ofconfusion nd uncertainty roducedby the effort o maintaina Communistdictatorship t the same timethat democracy s emphasizedand the govern-ment and economydecentralized.Tito and otherParty leaders apparentlywantto developtheir wn brandofSocialismby popularsupport nd participa-tionrather hanbyParty control, uttheyfear hat there s not enoughpopularsupport o accomplish t.Whether hePartycan continuendefinitelynthisambiguouspositionwith-out returning o the traditionalpostion of a dominantCommunistParty orwithout osing ts hold on Yugoslav society s unclear.The Djilas affairwas anindication hat the leadership aw theneed to tightenParty discipline s wellas an indication fthe imits ffreedomn Yugoslavia. But, despitetheelimina-tionof Soviet hostility,whichoriginally rompted henewdirections,herehasso far beenno concrete videnceofa shiftback to the StalinistconceptofthePartyas a "gendarmefor hegovernment."

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