Licensing of CAREM prototype

WORKSHOP ON NEW CHALLENGES FACING

NUCLEAR REGULATORS

IFNEC-NEA

Paris, May 28th – 29th

Néstor Masriera

President of the Board, ARN

• CAREM is a small, advanced, integrated reactor (SMR)

• Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) is the licensee

• Licensing of CAREM began as a non-routine practice licensing procedure,

and a “Use of site and initiation of constructions authorization” was issued

against a “Design Report” (2013)

• From now on it is foreseen to catch up the “standard” NPP licensing

procedure, and a PSAR is due by 2019 . Its approval will lead to the

Commissioning License

Licensing of CAREM prototype

CAREM prototype

CAREM prototype

CAREM prototype Project

CNEA is the Responsible Entity / owner / principal Main contracts on:

Detailed engineering (INVAP + others) Civil works (Techint)

BoP (TECNA-Siemens) RPV (IMPSA)

Steam Generators (FAE) fuel (CONUAR)

…

Before Construction Permit

The integration concept qualified (experimentally + analytically)

Fuel / core performance tested

Verification that process systems feature proven design solutions

Today

Containment components are being assembled

Turbine is on site (FAT completed)

RPV is under construction

SG fabrication plan is complete

Detailed Engineering is quite complete

CRD qualification completion is foreseen

Approach to LICENSING CAREM prototype

Our licensing process is between ARN and CNEA

Suppliers support

The Safety Standards to comply are Argentinean ones plus some

“international” standards, being signatories of Conventions and a IAEA MS.

Industrial C&S have a role in the qualification of the components

compliance of engineering requirements. There is not a mandatory one.

Foreign C&S can be proposed by the Utility under proper justification.

We have a shared understanding of the approach with CNEA

Workshops

Interchange

History

CNEA was the “mother” institution of Argentine Utility, Vendor and Regulator

Today it is THE nuclear R&D institution

ARN has a defined identity as a regulator:

• Goal-setting approach (NON prescriptive)

• Adherence to international guidelines (IAEA Safety Standards)

• A clear view of the integrality of the safety assessment, connecting:

– the “safety demonstration” essentially by a deterministic-functional-analysis

– A safety classification by an essentially deterministic method (SSG-30)

Regulatory – safety – engineering requirements are defined for each Class

– Requirements on systems coming from Safety Standards

– Regulatory relevant requirements on components are focused on functional

capability / reliability / robustness and are dealt by specific C&S

• C&S are essentially a qualification means, and the adequacy of their use has

to be justified by the licensee

• Concept of Licensing Basis, to be kept during life cycle

ARN Regulatory Approach

Questions on LICENSING CAREM

Which is the role of Safety Standards on demonstrating Safety?

Setting Safety Requirements

Safety Standards define requirements at Plant level. E.g.

DID – independence of design provisions for each level (*)

Single failure criterion (resistance achieved within system)

specific safety goals - CDF, LERF, Criterion Curve

OLC treatment - SAR content – Plant Programmes

Operating License conditions (*)

Classification based on functional analysis of failures consequences

safety requirements at the Components level are on

• functional capability (effectiveness, safety margins)

• reliability (MTBF – failure rate on demand)

• robustness (mechanical loads, environmental, consequential

failure)

Industrial C&S are focused on qualifying the compliance with Safety

Requirements of components (SSCs in general)

Questions on LICENSING CAREM cont

Can industrial C&S from a country with a prescriptive approach be used in a

project abroad ?

As we discussed yesterday, given certain circumstances, exporting on a

turnkey scheme a plant of certified design WORKS

Applying industrial C&S of a foreign prescriptive approach to SSC of a Plant

whose design is not certified…

• may not link clearly the industrial C&S and Safety Standards

• the compliance of safety-engineering requirements may not be

“demonstrated” by the use of these C&S.

As example issues for discussion:

• In order to have CAREM RPV accomplishing requirements of reliability and

robustness, is it reasonable to apply the same ASME mechanical standards

as for the RPVs of certified PWR design?

• In order to have CAREM in-vessel CRD complying with requirements of

reliability and robustness, is it reasonable to apply ASME mechanical

standards used in some other component of a certified design?

Questions on C&S

Regulators need a view of the role of C&S in the demonstration of safety.

It is already quite clear, in case of a plant of certified design within the frame of

a prescriptive approach.

How clear / accountable are the links among safety goals / standards – safety

engineering requirements – and industrial C&S

When the C&S of countries A and B are analyzed for their use / compatibility in

a non-certified design,

• is it useful to compare the complete text of C&S?

• From a regulator viewpoint, they should only be compared on the elements

contributing to the compliance of Safety Standards (i.e. to functional

capability, reliability and robustness)

More Questions on C&S

Is there any chance of having an internationally complete set of Safety

Standards in the near future?

Not much, if sovereign regulators stick to customized Safety Standards

Would it still be useful to clarify the role of C&S in the demonstration of safety?

In the qualification of compliance of safety requirements?

In demonstrating safety, the role of C&S is focused on the compliance of

engineered requirements, Specifically on function and its failure:

• functional capability (effectiveness, safety margins)

• reliability (MTBF – failure rate on demand)

• robustness (environmental endurance, consequential failure, mech loads)

If this link was explicitly presented (accountable, quantifiable) , even if national

C&S were different, it would be possible to analyze their replacement /

interchange in the demonstration / qualification of safety requirements.

Perhaps this is a path towards a globalized nuclear market

Thanks a lot ! Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear