ResearchPaper

AmericaUnrestrained?:Engagement,Retrenchment,andLibertarianForeignPolicy

MatthewFayDirectorofDefenseandForeignPolicyStudiesTheNiskanenCenterNovember16,2017

ExecutiveSummaryWhilelibertariansoftendisagreewithoneanother,thereisbroadagreementamongthemabouttheneedtochangeAmericanforeignpolicy.TheybelievetheUnitedStatesshouldpursueapolitical-militaryretrenchmentbyforswearinginterventionintheaffairsofotherstatesandexitingthealliancesithasformedsince1945.Bydoingso,libertariansbelievetheUnitedStateswillbeatwarlessandafreesocietywillflourishasaresult.Thesizeofitsmilitarywouldshrink,theyargue,whichwouldinturnreducethefinancialburdenitplacesonAmericantaxpayersandthethreatthenationalsecuritystateposestoindividualliberty.However,usingretrenchmentasthebasisforalibertarianforeignpolicyisunlikelytoservelibertarianends.Retrenchmentignorestherelationshipbetweentheinternationalpoliticalenvironmentanddomesticpoliticalorder.Atthesametime,libertarianadvocatesforretrenchmenthaveoverestimatedthebenefitsitwillprovideforafreesociety,whileoverlookingtherisksitpresents.Instead,libertariansshouldembraceagrandstrategyofengagementthatmaintainsAmerica’scoremilitaryallianceswhilepursuingreformsthatwillconstrainAmericanleaders’tendencytousemilitaryforcerecklessly.

2

Acknowledgements

Thispaperrepresentspartofanevolutioninmythinkingonlibertarianforeignpolicythathastakenplaceoverthepastseveralyears.DuringthattimeIbenefittedgreatlyfromconversationswithanumberofscholars,analysts,andcurrentandformercolleagues,severalofwhomalsoprovidedfeedbackonearlierdraftsofthispaper.MysincerethanksgoesouttoElbridgeColby,BenjaminFriedman,JeffreyFriedman,RyanHagemann,JoshuaHampson,MichaelHunzeker,Hans-IngeLangø,PaulMusgrave,DanielNexon,ChristopherPreble,EdwardRhodes,HarveySapolsky,DavidSolimini,BrandonValierano,AlexVerschoor-Kirss,andWillWilkinson.MythanksaswelltoAvaPerez,StefanShover,andBenWermelingfortheirableresearchassistance.Allremainingerrorsaremyown.

3

IntroductionOneofthemanyremarkablefeaturesofthe2016presidentialcampaignwasthenumberoflibertarianswhofoundhopeinDonaldTrump’s“AmericaFirst”foreignpolicy.Tobesure,theoverwhelmingmajorityoflibertariansfoundTrump’scandidacy,andsubsequentelection,grotesque.However,anumberoflibertarianssawinAmericaFirst—withitssupposedrepudiationofnationbuildingandoverthostilitytoAmerica’sallies—aforeignpolicytheycouldrallybehind.Someoftheseindividualsoperateatthefringesofthelibertarianmovement,butevensomemainstreamlibertarianvoiceshadpositivethingstosayaboutTrumpashebelatedlycriticizedtheinvasionofIraqandhintedthathemightpulloutofNATO.1SeverallibertariansupportersofTrump’sforeignpolicyhaveexpressed“buyer’sremorse”ashelaunchedcruisemissilesagainstAssadregimeforcesinSyria,escalatedthebombingcampaignagainsttheIslamicState,rampedupcounterterrorismoperationsinYemenandelsewhere,promisedtorain“fireandfury”onNorthKorea,increasedthenumberofAmericantroopsinAfghanistan,andrefusedtocertifythatIranwasincompliancewiththedealtocurbitsnuclearprogram.2Butasacandidate,Trump

1WhilemanylibertariansrightlydenouncedDonaldTrump,anumberofprominentlibertarianshavehadsupportivethingstosayaboutTrump’scandidacybecauseofhisoppositiontotheAmericanforeignpolicystatusquo.JustinRaimondoofAntiwar.comlaudedTrump’schallengetothe“establishment,”andhis“AmericaFirst”foreignpolicy.SeeJustinRaimondo,“TrumpAgainsttheWarParty,”Antiwar.com,October7,2015,accessedOctober17,2016,availableat:http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2015/10/06/trump-against-the-war-party/.DougBandowoftheCatoInstituteusedTrumpasawaytocriticizeHillaryClinton’sforeignpolicy.SeeDougBandow,“HillaryClintonCriticizesDonaldTrump,RevealsHerselftobeQueenofWar,”HuffingtonPost,June9,2016,accessedOctober17,2016,availableat:http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/hillary-clinton-criticizes-donald-trump-reveals-herself-be-queen-war.ButBandowalsosuggestedTrumpwouldhavealessmilitaristicforeignpolicydespitethecandidate’sownstatementstothecontrary,seeDougBandow,“DonaldTrumpDismissesU.S.ForeignPolicyElite:WouldHeSaveAmericansFromUnnecessaryWar?”Forbes,May16,2016,accessedOctober17,2016,availableat:http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2016/05/16/donald-trump-dismisses-u-s-foreign-policy-elite-would-he-save-americans-from-unnecessary-war/#4491dd474b80.SeealsoIvanEland,“Trump’sForeignPolicyistheRealismAmericaNeeds,”NewYorkPost,April29,2016,accessedOctober17,2016,availableat:http://nypost.com/2016/04/29/trumps-foreign-policy-is-the-realism-america-needs/.InaninterviewwithNickGillespieofReason,libertarianhistorianThaddeusRussellexpressedapprovalforTrump’sforeignpolicy.SeeNickGillespieandJimEpstein,“DonaldTrump,PeacenikPresident?:HistorianThaddeusRussellonTrump’sLibertarianForeignPolicy,"Reason,Hit&Runblog,November10,2016,accessedOctober17,2016,availableat:http://reason.com/blog/2016/11/10/donald-trump-peacenik-president.KentuckyCongressmanThomasMassiestatedaftertheelectionthatTrumpwasoneofhistopchoicesfortheRepublicannominationin2016becausehebelievedthat,aspresident,TrumpwouldbereluctanttoinvolvetheUnitedStatesinnewwars.SeeMassie’scommentsat“OpeningRemarks,”at“ForeignPolicyinAmerica’sInterest:Realism,Nationalism,andtheNextPresident,”eventfromTheAmericanConservative,Washington,DC,November15,2016,availableat:http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/watch-foreign-policy-in-americas-interest/.SenatorRandPaul,theU.S.Senate’s“solelibertarian,”hasexpressedsympathyforTrump’sforeignpolicybecauseofhisoppositiontonationbuildingandalliances.SeeRandPaul,“DoNotLetElliotAbramsAnywhereNeartheStateDepartment,”Rare,February7,2017,accessedOctober1,2017,availableat:http://rare.us/rare-politics/rand-paul-do-not-let-elliott-abrams-anywhere-near-the-state-department/;and“MontenegroJoiningNATOisAgainstU.S.Interests,”March30,2017,accessedOctober1,2017,availableat:http://time.com/4718958/montenegro-nato-rand-paul/.AtleastoneleadinglibertarianthinkerwhootherwisestaunchlyopposedTrump’scandidacyalsobelievedTrump’s“fewgoodideas”cameintherealmofforeignpolicy.SeeDavidBoaz,“Trump’s(few)GoodIdeas,”PBSNewshour,November9,2016,accessedNovember10,2016,availableat:http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/column-trumps-good-ideas/#.WCTazrP4wm4.twitter.2JustinRaimondo,“IVotedforTrump.AfterSyria,IFeelBetrayed,”LosAngelesTimes,April21,2017,accessedOctober10,2017,availableat:http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-raimondo-trump-betrayal-antiwar-20170421-story.html;andDougBandow,“WhyisTrumpAbandoningtheForeignPolicythatBroughthimVictory?”TheNationalInterest,March10,2017,

4

neverreallyhidwhathewasselling.Onthecampaigntrail,Trumpnotonlyrejectedcorelibertarianprinciplessuchasthefreemovementofgoodsandpeople,butalsosaid,“Ireallylovewar,inacertainway,”promisedtotortureterrorismsuspectsandgoaftertheirfamilies,andrepeatedlystatedhisdesireto“take”Iraqioil.3Thatanysupporterofafreesocietywouldbackacandidateexpressingsuchsentimentsispuzzling.ApartialexplanationfortheinitialsympathyamongsomelibertariansforTrump’sforeignpolicycanbefoundwithhisopponent.HillaryClinton,throughouthercareer,hasbeenaconsistentlyhawkishinterventionist.4Thatexplanationisincomplete,though.WhilelibertariansupportforAmericaFirstwaslimited,itrepresentedabroaderprobleminlibertarianforeignpolicythinking.Libertarianismisperhapsmostfamousfortheinternaldisagreementsofitsadherents.However,onebroadareaofagreementamongAmericanlibertariansisthattheUnitedStatesneedstobelessinvolvedintheworld.Whilelibertarianswantdiplomaticandcommercialrelationswiththeworld,theybelievetheAmericangovernmentshouldhavelittlepoliticalormilitaryattachmenttoothercountriesandshouldavoidmeddlingintheirinternalaffairs.GeorgeWashington’swarningagainst“foreignentanglements,”ThomasJefferson’scallfor“peace,commerce,andhonestfriendshipwithallnations;entanglingallianceswithnone,”andJohnQuincyAdams’axiomthatAmerica“goesnotabroadinsearchofmonsterstodestroy”combinetoformthelodestaroflibertarianforeignpolicy.5

accessedOctober10,2017,availableat:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/why-trump-abandoning-the-foreign-policy-brought-him-victory-19738?page=show.Aftertheelection,TedGalenCarpenteroftheCatoInstitutereferredtoTrump’scampaignstatementsonforeignpolicyasa“brightspot”butworriedhewasgoingbackonpromisestoreassessAmericanalliances.SeeTedGalenCarpenter,"WashingtonShouldReassess,NotReassure,U.S.Allies,"CatoInstitute,Cato-@-Liberty,February13,2017,accessedFebruary13,2017,availableat:https://www.cato.org/blog/washington-should-reassess-not-reassure-us-allies?utm_content=buffer9a562&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer.3See,NickGass,“TrumpCampTriestoClarifyHis‘ILoveWar’Comment,”Politico,September,7,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/trump-i-love-war-comment-227818.Ontorturingterrorismsuspects,seeJennaJohnson,“Trumpsays‘tortureworks,’BacksWaterboardingand‘MuchWorse,’”TheWashingtonPost,February17,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-torture-works-backs-waterboarding-and-much-worse/2016/02/17/4c9277be-d59c-11e5-b195-2e29a4e13425_story.html;andNickVisser,“TrumpAmpsUpHisCallForTorture:‘We’reGoingToHaveToDoThingsThatAreUnthinkable,’”TheHuffingtonPost,June30,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-torture-waterboarding_us_5775d740e4b04164640f6597.On“takingout”thefamiliesofterrorists,seeTomLoBianco,“DonaldTrumponterrorists:'Takeouttheirfamilies',”CNNPolitics,December3,2015,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/.OntakingIraqioil,seeClairePhipps,“’Putin’sBeenaLeader’:KeyQuotesfromTrumpandClinton’sForeignPolicyForum,”TheGuardian,September8,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/08/trump-clinton-foreign-policy-forum-key-quotes;and“FullText:DonaldTrump’sSpeechonFightingTerrorism,”August15,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/08/trump-clinton-foreign-policy-forum-key-quotes.4SeeMarkLandler,“HowHillaryBecameaHawk,”NewYorkTimes,April21,2016,accessedOctober1,2017,availableat:https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/magazine/how-hillary-clinton-became-a-hawk.html?_r=0;andMicahZenko,“HillarytheHawk:AHistory,”ForeignPolicy,July26,2016,accessedOctober1,2017,availableat:http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/27/hillary-the-hawk-a-history-clinton-2016-military-intervention-libya-iraq-syria/.5GeorgeWashington,“FarewellAddress”(1796),accessedJanuary6,2017,availableat:http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp;ThomasJefferson,“FirstInauguralAddress,”March4,1801,accessedJanuary6,2017,availableathttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp;andJohnQuincyAdams,“AnAddressDeliveredattheRequestofaCommitteeoftheCitizensofWashington,”July4,1821,accessedJanuary6,2017,availableonlineat:http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-on-independence-day/.

5

Asamatterofpolicy,libertariansgenerallybelievetheUnitedStatesshouldundertakeapoliticalandmilitaryretrenchment.6Libertariansthinkthatbypullingbackfromoverseascommitmentsandforgoinginterventionintheinternalaffairsofothercountries,theUnitedStateswouldbecomeinvolvedinfewerwars.7Warisinherentlydestructivetohumanlifeandproperty,anddisruptivetopeacefulexchangeandcooperation.Itinfringesontherightsofindividualsabroad.Athome,warposesathreattoafreesociety.Thesizeofthestateincreasesduringwartime,asdoesitspropensitytoactoppressively.YetdespiteTrump’sprofessedmilitarism,somelibertarianssawthetypeofdisengagementtheyhadlongsoughtinhisAmericaFirstplatform.EvenifTrumphadbeenthetypeofnon-interventionistsomemistakenlybelievedhewas,retrenchmentmaynotproducethefreesocietyathomethatlibertariansdesire.Remainingalooffrominternationalpoliticsrisksthereturnofamorecompetitiveandwar-proneinternationalsystem.Oncloseexamination,thebenefitsofretrenchmentdonotoutweightherisksofamoreconflict-riddenworld.Ifpeaceisaprerequisiteofafreesociety,thenafreesocietyismorelikelyiftheUnitedStatesremainsengagedintheworld.Thispaperarguesthatagrandstrategyofengagementserveslibertarianforeignpolicyendsbetterthanretrenchment.8Atthesametime,libertariansshouldcontinuepursuingreformsthatinhibitAmericanleaders’tendencytousemilitaryforcerecklessly.Thepaperproceedsinfourparts.Thefirstpartdiscussestherelationshipbetweeninternationalorderandafreesocietybeforeexplaininghowagrandstrategyofengagementhelpsenableaninternationalenvironmentconducivetothelatter.Thesecondpartdiscussesthestrongestargumentlibertarianforeignpolicyanalystshavemadeforretrenchment:a

6ThediscussionbelowfocusesonworkbyscholarscenteredattheCatoInstitutebecausetheyhaveprovidedthemostintellectuallycoherentandrigorouscaseforretrenchment.However,whiledifferentterminologyandjustificationsareemployed,abroadswathoflibertariandiscourseonforeignpolicyfocusesonthetwoprimaryelementsofretrenchment:non-interventionismandnon-entanglement.Forexample,formerRepublicanCongressmanRonPaulhasregularlyclaimedtheUnitedStatesneedsto“giveupitsempire”andhasspecificallyarguedthatexitingitsalliancecommitmentsispartofthat.Forarecentexample,seeRonPaul,“AGreenLightforAmericanEmpire,”TheRonPaulInstituteforPeaceandProsperity,March14,2015,accessedNovember8,2017,availableat:http://www.ronpaulinstitute.org/archives/featured-articles/2015/march/14/a-green-light-for-the-american-empire/.ForPaul’sthoughtsonalliances,seeRonPaul,“StayOutofEntanglingAlliances:RonPaul’sFinalWord,”RonPaulLibertyReport,August26,2017,accessedNovember8,2017,availableat:http://www.ronpaullibertyreport.com/archives/stay-out-of-entangling-alliances-ron-pauls-final-word.ForcommentsspecifictoU.S.participationinNATO,seeRonPaul,“NATOisNotaFriendofPeace,”RonPaulLibertyReport,July5,2017,accessedNovember8,2017,availableat:http://www.ronpaullibertyreport.com/archives/ron-paul-nato-is-not-a-friend-of-peace;and“RonPaul’sLibertarianMessageAttractsSupporters,”NPR’sAllThingsConsidered,July25,2017,accessedNovember8,2017,availableat:https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12224561.7Foraconciseoverviewofwhylibertariansopposewar,seeJasonKuznicki,“ThreeArgumentsAgainstWar,”Libertarianism.org,December22,2014,accessedNovember7,2017,availableat:https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/three-arguments-against-war.8“Retrenchment”and“engagement”aregenericlabelsusedhereforthesakeofsimplicity.TheongoingdebateonAmericangrandstrategyfeaturesanincreasingnumberoflabelsforpotentialgrandstrategies.OnerecentworkcitedfourteendifferentnamesforproposalsforanewAmericangrandstrategy.Despitethebinarypresentedhere,theUnitedStatesactuallyhasarangeofgrandstrategicoptions.Retrenchmentandengagementarebothnearertothemiddleofthisrange,withpureisolationismandglobalhegemonyattheextremes.Fortheproliferationofproposedlabelsforanewgrandstrategy,seePaulD.Miller,AmericanPower&LiberalOrder:AConservativeInternationalistGrandStrategy(Washington,D.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2016),xi.ForthebestdiscussionoftherangeofAmerica’spost-ColdWargrandstrategicoptions,seeBarryR.PosenandAndrewL.Ross,"CompetingVisionsforU.S.GrandStrategy."InternationalSecurity21,no.3(Winter1996-1997):5-53.

6

grandstrategyderivedfromrealistinternationalrelationsknownas“restraint.”ThethirdpartexplainswhythebenefitsofretrenchmentaremarginalwhiletherisksarehighbyexploringalternativescenariosthatcouldoccuriftheUnitedStatesretrenches.Thefourthpartexploresthepolicyimplicationsofagrandstrategyofengagementforlibertarians.

EngagementandaFreeSocietyForeignpolicypresentsadilemmaforlibertarians.Inmodernhistory,thestatehasbeentheprimaryactorininternationalpolitics.Libertariansaresuspiciousofanoverweeningstatebecauseitposesathreattoafreesociety.Libertariansthereforeadoptanapriorinon-interventionistpositionaccordingtowhichtheuseofmilitaryforceshouldbeprohibitedexceptincasesofnationalself-defense.Thissectionexplainswhythisfocusonnarrowself-defenseismisguided.First,itexplorestherelationshipbetweentheinternationalorderandastate’spoliticalorder.Second,itdiscussestheconceptofgrandstrategyandhowagrandstrategyofengagementthroughasystemofalliancesfacilitatesaninternationalorderconducivetoafreesociety.

InternationalPoliticsandaFreeSocietyIftheUnitedStatesadoptedanarrowfocusonitsself-defense,itlikelywouldremainphysicallysecure.Givenitsgeographicisolation,Americaislargelyimmunetomajormilitarythreats.Therefore,iftheUnitedStatesfocusesnarrowlyonitsownsecurity,itwillhavefewreasonstogotowar.RetrenchmentmightthereforeallowtheUnitedStatestoremainalooffrominternationalpoliticsandforgoalliances,obviatingtheneedtomaintainalargemilitaryandtherebyavoidingthetaxation,bureaucracy,andstategrowththataccompanylargemilitaryestablishments.However,alibertarianforeignpolicynarrowlyfocusedonterritorialdefenseismisguidedforatleasttworeasons.First,“security”isanambiguous,andoftensubjective,basisfordeterminingAmerica’snationalinterest.Second,anarrowfocusonphysicalsecurityignoresthewayanincreasinglycompetitiveinternationalsystemmightaffecttheinternalcharacteroftheAmericanstate.Thephysicalsecurityofastateisobviouslynecessary,butitisaninsufficientbasisforidentifyingthenationalinterestbecausesecurityisaninherentlyambiguousconcept.Referencestonationalsecurity,aspoliticalscientistArnoldWolfersarguedin1952,arerhetoricallypowerfulbuthavelittleintrinsicmeaning.9Theinvocationofnationalsecurityisjustassymbolicwhenit’susedtosellretrenchmentasitiswheninflatingthreatsforthepurposeofhawkishpolicies.Astatedefinesitssecuritybasedonitsinterests,anditsinterestsareaproductofitsvalues.HistorianMelvynLeffler,inthecourseofdevelopinganexplanatoryframeworkforstudyingthehistoryof

9ArnoldWolfers,"'NationalSecurity'asanAmbiguousSymbol,"PoliticalScienceQuarterly67,no.4(1952):481-502.Onthispoint,seealsoBarryBuzanandLeneHansen,TheEvolutionofInternationalSecurityStudies(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),11.

7

Americanforeignrelations,hasarguedthatAmerica’snationalinterestmustbeviewedthroughits“corevalues.”Insteadoffocusingonnarrowself-defense,Lefflerargues,“Corevaluesusuallyfusematerialself-interestwithmorefundamentalgoalslikethedefenseofastate’sorganizingideology,suchasliberalcapitalism,theprotectionofitspoliticalinstitutions,andthesafeguardingofitsphysicalbaseorterritorialintegrity.”10LefflerlaterwarnedthatthroughoutAmericanhistory,imbalancesbetweenideologyandarationalunderstandingofAmerica’snationalinteresthaveledtoforeignpolicydisasters.Toomuchofthelatterleadstoheightenedthreatperceptions,whichhaveinturnresultedinthemisuseofAmericanpowerabroad.11However,herightlynotesthatnarrowphysicalsecurity,theinternalpoliticalcharacter,andideologicalconcernsareinextricablytiedtogetherwhenconsideringAmerica’sinterests.IfAmerica’svaluesinclude,forlibertarians,themaintenanceofafreesociety,thenitisimportanttoconsiderhowtheexternalenvironmentofastateaffectsitsinternalcharacter.Internationalpressureshelpshapetheinternalcharacterofstates.12Thetwoare,infact,intertwined.Internationalorderanddomesticpoliticalorderbothservethepurposeofprovidingsecurityagainstorganizedviolence.13Howthatorderisachievedonboththeinternationalanddomesticlevelshasimportantimplicationsforboththelikelihoodofwarandtheinternalcharacterofastate.Liberalpolitiesinparticularhavebeeninterestedintheconnectionbetweeninternationalorderanddomesticpoliticalorder.PoliticalscientistDanielDeudneyarguesthatliberalstatesattempttoshapetheirinternationalenvironmenttomitigateanarchyattheinternationallevel.Todoso,liberalstatespracticewhatDeudneyreferstoas“securityco-binding.”Securityco-bindingisanefforttolockstatesintomutuallyconstraininginstitutionstomitigatethethreattheyposetooneanotherinananarchicinternationalsystem.14Intheabsenceoftheseinstitutions,statesarelikelytobalanceagainstthepotentialthreatstheyposetooneanotherbybuildinguptheirmilitarycapabilities.Theresultofthesemilitarybuildupswouldberampantsecuritydilemmas.Securitydilemmasoccurwhendefensivemeasuresinonestatecreateasenseofinsecurityinanother,producingaresponsethatreducesthesecurityofthefirststate,leadingtofurtherdefensivemeasures,andsoon.15Securitydilemmastendtoproducearmsracesand

10MelvynP.Leffler,"NationalSecurity,"inExplainingtheHistoryofAmericanForeignRelations,editedbyMichaelJ.HoganandThomasG.Paterson(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),126.11MelvynP.Leffler,"9/11andAmericanForeignPolicy,"DiplomaticHistory29,no.3(2005):395-413.12Foraseminalwork,seePeterGourevitch,"TheSecondImageReversed:TheInternationalSourcesofDomesticPolitics,"InternationalOrganization32,no.4(1978):881-912.13Foranin-depthdiscussionoftherelationshipofdomesticandinternationalordersasameanstocombatorganizedviolence,seeR.HarrisonWagner,WarandtheState:TheTheoryofInternationalPolitics.(AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,2007).14DanielDeudneyandG.JohnIkenberry,"TheNatureandSourcesofLiberalInternationalOrder."ReviewofInternationalStudies25,no.2(1999):182.15JohnHerzfirstcoinedtheterm“securitydilemma.”SeeJohnH.Herz,"IdealistInternationalismandtheSecurityDilemma,"WorldPolitics2,no.2(1950):157-80.CitedinWilliamC.Wohlforth,"Realism,"inTheOxfordHandbookofInternationalRelations,editedbyChristianReus-SmitandDuncanSnidal,131-149(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2008)142.

8

occasionallyspiralintowar.16InmodernEurope,warsthatresultedfromthesesecuritydilemmasledtorecurringcyclesofstatebuilding.17WhilelibertariansarefondofquotingGeorgeWashington’sFarewellAddressforwarningagainstforeignentanglements,hisendorsementofasystemofco-bindingamongthenewlyindependentAmericanstatesislesswellrecognized.ArguinginfavoroftheunioncreatedbytheConstitution,Washingtonhighlightedhowithelpedavoidtheinter-statecompetitionthatwouldleadtocentralized,militarizedstatesinimicaltorepublicanfreedom:

While,then,everypartofourcountrythusfeelsanimmediateandparticularinterestinunion,allpartscombinedcannotfailtofindintheunitedmassofmeansandeffortsgreaterstrength,greaterresource,proportionablygreatersecurityfromexternaldanger,alessfrequentinterruptionoftheirpeacebyforeignnations;and,whatisofinestimablevalue,theymustderivefromunionanexemptionfromthosebroilsandwarbetweenthemselves,whichsofrequentlyafflictneighboringcountriesnottiedtogetherbythesamegovernments,whichtheirownrivalshipsalonewouldbesufficienttoproduce,butwhichoppositeforeignalliances,attachments,andintrigues,wouldstimulateandembitter.Hence,likewise,theywillavoidthenecessityofthoseovergrownmilitaryestablishmentswhich,underanyformofgovernment,areinauspicioustoliberty,andwhicharetoberegardedasparticularlyhostiletorepublicanliberty.Inthissenseitisthatyourunionoughttobeconsideredasamainpropofyourliberty,andthattheloveoftheoneoughttoendeartoyouthepreservationoftheother.18

IntheabsenceofunionundertheConstitution,politicalandeconomiccompetitionbetweenthestatesmighthaveledtomilitarycompetitiondestructivetoafreesociety.Justasnon-entanglementwasinstrumentaltoavoidinginvolvementinthebalanceofpowerpoliticsofEurope,politicalunionwasinstrumentaltoavoidingtheirrecreationinNorthAmerica.19Americanpoliticalandmilitaryengagementwiththeworld’smajorpowersthroughmultilateralinstitutionsfulfillsasimilarfunctiontoday.ExtendingsecurityguaranteestostatessuchasGermany,France,theUnitedKingdom,SouthKorea,andJapanco-bindstheirsecurity.20Intheprocessitmitigatestheanarchicnatureofinternationalpolitics,facilitatingpeacefulcooperationandreducingthechancestheywillgotowarwithoneanother.Byreducingthechancesofmajorwar,Americanallianceshelpmitigatehierarchyathomeandthethreatitposestoafreesociety.

16RobertJervis,"CooperationundertheSecurityDilemma,"WorldPolitics30,no.2(January1978):167-214.17SeeCharlesTilly,Coercion,Capital,andEuropeanStates,AD990-1992(Cambridge,MA:Blackwell,1992),67-95.18GeorgeWashington,“FarewellAddress”(1796),accessedJanuary6,2017,availableat:http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.19TheauthorthanksEdwardRhodesforthisinsight.20DeudneyandIkenberry,"TheNatureandSourcesoftheLiberalInternationalOrder,"182-184.

9

AmericanEngagementandLiberalInternationalOrderExaminingU.S.foreignpolicyasawholeistoocomplexforasinglepaper,sothefocushereisonanaspectofforeignpolicyknownasgrandstrategy.Foreignpolicyandgrandstrategyarerelatedconcepts,butthedistinctionbetweenthetwoisimportant.Thissectionbeginsbyattemptingtodefinegrandstrategyandexplainingwhyitmattersforlibertarianforeignpolicy.Itthenexplainshowagrandstrategyofengagementfacilitatesthetypeofinternationalorderconducivetoafreesociety.Grandstrategyisadifficultconcepttodefine.Scholarswhowriteaboutthesubjectoftendefineitinwaysthatareconvenienttotheirownpurposes.21Broadlyspeakingthough,astate’sforeignpolicyindicatesitsgoalsininternationalaffairs.However,itsgrandstrategyisbestunderstoodasaconceptualframeworkforlinkingvariousinstrumentsofnationalpowerinpursuitofthosegoals.22Astate’sgrandstrategycanhelpshapeitsexternalenvironmentandhasimportantimplicationsforitsdomesticcharacter.23Oftheinstrumentsofnationalpoweravailableforthepursuitofforeignpolicygoals,militarypowerisofparticularimportance.AspoliticalscientistBarryPosenhasexplained,ininternationalpolitics,militarythreatsarethemostdangerousandthemilitarymeanstoprotectagainstthemarethemostcostly.24Emphasizingmilitarypowerinthisanalysisisalsoimportantforreasonsspecifictolibertarians.Thefinancialburdenofastate’smilitaryisbornebyindividualcitizensfromwhomtaxesareextracted.Throughouthistory,militarieshavealsobeenusedastoolsofrepression.Whilehistorydemonstratesthatmilitarypowercanbeinstrumentaltoafreesocietybydeterringconflictsoremancipatingoppressedpopulations,itisabluntinstrument.25Itsmisuseleadstodestructionandinevitablytothelossofinnocentlives.Howmilitarypowerisusedandforwhatpurposethereforemattersimmenselyforthetypeofgrandstrategylibertariansshouldsupport.Inagrandstrategythatcanbedescribedbroadlyas“engagement,”theprimarypurposeofAmericanmilitarypoweristoco-bindthesecurityoffriendlypowersinkeyregionsoftheworldthroughasystemofmilitaryalliances.Theseallianceswithmanyoftheworld’s

21Foranintellectualhistoryofgrandstrategythathighlightsthispoint,seeLukasMilevski,TheEvolutionofModernGrandStrategicThought(Oxford,UnitedKingdom:OxfordUniversityPress,2016).22Forexample,HistorianHalBrandsdefinesgrandstrategyasthe“intellectualarchitecturethatlendsstructuretoforeignpolicy;itisthelogicthathelpsstatesnavigateacomplexanddangerousworld.”SeeHalBrands,WhatGoodIsGrandStrategy?:PowerandPurposeinAmericanStatecraftfromHarryS.TrumantoGeorgeW.Bush(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2014),1.Similarly,politicalscientistColinDueckstates,“Grandstrategyinvolvestheprioritizationofforeignpolicygoals,theidentificationofexistingandpotentialresources,andtheselectionofaplanorroadmapthatusesthoseresourcestomeetthosegoals.”SeeColinDueck,ReluctantCrusaders:Power,Culture,andChangeinAmericanGrandStrategy(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006),1.23SeeRobertJ.Art,AGrandStrategyforAmerica(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,2003),233;andRobertJ.Art,"TheUnitedStates,theBalanceofPower,andWorldWarII:WasSpykmanRight?"SecurityStudies14,no.3(July-September2005):365-406.24BarryPosen,Restraint:ANewFoundationforU.S.GrandStrategy(Ithaca,NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,2014),1.25ChristopherPreble,"LibertariansandForeignPolicy:TheIndividual,theState,andWar,"TheIndependentReview21,no.2(2016):173-174.

10

majorpowershavebeenacorefeatureofAmerica’sgrandstrategysincetheendofWorldWarII.26Byformingsuchalliances,theUnitedStateshashelpedunderpinaliberalinternationalorder.Thisorderconsistsofaweboflegal,political,economic,andsecurityinstitutionsthatfacilitatecooperationamongstates,developpatternsofexpectedoutcomes,andgenerallyspeaking,providetherulesthatgoverntheinternationalsystem.27Theseinstitutionshelpreducecompetitivepressuresininternationalpolitics,facilitatingamorepeacefulandstableinternationalorderintheprocess,andthusaninternationalenvironmentmoreconducivetoafreesociety.PoliticalscientistsStephenBrooksandWilliamWohlforthidentifythreeinterrelatedfunctionsthatU.S.militarypowerservesinunderpinningthisorderandprovidingbenefitsfromalibertarianperspective.28First,U.S.militarypowerhelpsdeterthreatsagainsttheUnitedStatesanditsallies.Second,itreassuresalliessotheydonotarmthemselves,eitherconventionallyorwithnuclearweapons.Third,itprovidesincentivesforcooperationbyreducingcompetitivepressuresamongmanyoftheworld’smajorpowers.ThefirstfunctionofU.S.militarypowerinagrandstrategyofengagementistodeteraggressionagainstitselfanditsallies.29Thekeytothisdeterrenteffectisthelocalbalanceofmilitaryforces.30Forward-deployedtroopsenhancedeterrencebecausetheyaredifficulttoremoveinacrisisandtheyraisetheexpectedcostsofinvasionbycrediblythreateningseriousphysicaldamagetoaggressors,evenwhenthey’reincapableofdefeatingtheinvadingforces.31ThelatentmilitarypoweroftheUnitedStates—thepotentialtoconvertitseconomicstrengthintomilitaryforce—isafarlesspotentdeterrent.Itcannotbeimmediatelybroughttobear,anditisextremelydifficultandcostly—militarily,economically,andpolitically—toreverseterritorialconquestbyanaggressivepower.Superioreconomicstrengththatmayormaynotbeconvertedintomilitaryforcethereforedoesnotposeacrediblethreattowould-beaggressors.32DeterrencefacilitatesasecondfunctionofU.S.militarypowerinagrandstrategyofengagement.AmericansecurityguaranteescreateasenseofassuredprotectionforU.S.alliesthatalleviatetheneed

26OnAmerica’spostwargrandstrategy,seeJohnLewisGaddis,StrategiesofContainment:ACriticalAppraisalofAmericanNationalSecurityPolicyDuringtheColdWar(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005);MelvynP.Leffler,APreponderanceofPower:NationalSecurity,theTrumanAdministration,andtheColdWar(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,1992);andG.JohnIkenberry,LiberalLeviathan:TheOrigins,Crisis,andTransformationoftheAmericanWorldOrder(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011).27Foranoverview,seeHansKundnani,"WhatIstheLiberalInternationalOrder?"PolicyBriefno.17(Washington,DC:GermanMarshallFundoftheUnitedStates,2017),availableathttp://www.gmfus.org/publications/what-liberal-international-order;andHalBrands,“AmericanGrandStrategyandtheLiberalOrder:Continuity,Change,andOptionsfortheFuture”(SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,2016):2-4,availableat:https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE209.html.28BrooksandWohlforthactuallyrefertothisstrategyas“deepengagement.”SeeStephenG.BrooksandWilliamC.Wohlforth,AmericaAbroad:TheUnitedStates'GlobalRoleinthe21stCentury(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),1.Criticsofdeepengagementoftenconflatewithstrategiesknownas“primacy”and“liberalhegemony.”However,thesestrategiesareactuallysynonymouswithaseparategrandstrategytheauthorsrefertoas“deepengagementplus.”SeeBrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,82.29BrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,104-10530Ibid.,104.31MichaelAllenHunzekerandAlexanderLanoszka,"LandpowerandAmericanCredibility,"Parameters45,no.4(Winter2015-2016):17-26.32BrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,105.

11

forthemtobalanceagainstoneanother.33Bymitigatingtheneedforregionalstatestoprovidefortheirownsecurity,theseallianceshelppreventsecuritydilemmas.Thesesecuritydilemmascanleadtodestabilizingconventionalarmsracesandprovideincentivesforthefurtherspreadofnuclearweapons.Theycanalsospiralintowars.34Statesoccupyingcontiguousterritoryareespeciallylikelytobesuspiciousofnearbystatesarmingthemselvesduetouncertaintyovertherealpurposeofadefensivemilitarybuildup.AsBrooksandWohlforthexplain,theUnitedStatesisthereforewellpositionedtoexportsecuritytoitsalliesinEurasiabecauseitsdistantgeographymakesitmoredifficulttoprojectpowerandthereforelesslikelytopursueterritorialconquestsofitsown.35ThedynamicsofdeterrenceandassurancealsoserveathirdpurposebycreatingincentivesforU.S.alliestoengageinmultilateralcooperation.BrooksandWohlforthpresentaprobabilisticargumentaboutthewayengagementbyapowerfulstateliketheUnitedStatesincreasesthelikelihoodthatstateswillcooperatewithoneanother.36DrawingonpoliticalscientistRobertGilpin’sinsightthatstatestendtoshifttonon-securityprioritieswhenprospectsforwararelow,theyarguethatcooperativeoutcomesaremorelikelywhenasecurityguarantorispresenttoreducethelikelihoodofsecuritydilemmas.37TheprovisionofsecurityguaranteesbytheUnitedStates,ineffect,createsavirtuouscircle.States,withtheirsecurityassured,aremorelikelytopursuemultilateralcooperationonarangeofmilitaryandnon-militaryissues.38WhileAmericanmilitarypoweraloneisinsufficienttoproducethesecooperativeoutcomes,theUnitedStatescanhelpincreasethechancesofcooperationthroughitsroleassecurityguarantor.39Twoimportantcaveatstothisargumentmustbeacknowledgedthough.First,notallalliesarecreatedequal.TheUnitedStateshaspartneredwithmorethanitsfairshareofunsavoryandauthoritarianregimesthroughoutthepastsevendecades.40Whilesometimescircumstances—suchastheColdWar—necessitatedthesearrangements,thesepartnershipsoftensullyAmerica’simageabroadandundermineitsleadershipofaliberalinternationalorder.Second,theincreasednumberofsecurityguaranteestheUnitedStateshasextendedsincetheendoftheColdWarcouldbecounterproductiveintwoways.Forone,extendingevendefensivemilitary33SeeCharlesL.GlaserandAndrewH.Kyddin"Correspondence:CanGreatPowersDiscernIntentions?"InternationalSecurity,vol.40no.3(2015):197-198.34Assuranceaddressesthe“securitymodel”ofnuclearproliferation.Therearealsodomesticpoliticalandnormativereasonswhystatesdoordonotpursuenuclearweapons.SeeScottD.Sagan,"WhyDoStatesBuildNuclearWeapons?:ThreeModelsinSearchofaBomb."InternationalSecurity21,no.3(1996-1997):54-86.35BrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,99.TheauthorsderivethisinsightfromJohnMearsheimer’sargumentaboutthe“stoppingpowerofwater.”SeeJohnJ.Mearsheimer,TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics,(NewYork:Norton,2001),44.36SeeBrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,156-161.Forarebuttaltothedeterministicversionofthisargument,seeChristopherJ.Fettweis,"Unipolarity,Hegemony,andtheNewPeace,”SecurityStudies26,no.3(2017):423-51.37FromRobertGilpin,WarandChangeinWorldPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983).CitedinWilliamC.Wohlforth,"GilpinianRealismandInternationalRelations,"InternationalRelations25,no.4(2011):503-504.38MarinaE.Henke,"ThePoliticsofDiplomacy:HowtheUnitedStatesBuildsMultilateralMilitaryCoalitions,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly61,no.2(2017):410-24.39DanielW.Drezner,"MilitaryPrimacyDoesn'tPay(NearlyasMuchasYouThink)."InternationalSecurity38,no.1(2013):70-74.DreznercitesalliancesandprotectionofshippinglanesasthekeypublicgoodstheU.S.providesassecurityguarantor.40SeeTedGalenCarpenterandMalouInnocent,PerilousPartners:TheBenefitsandPitfallsofAmerica'sAllianceswithAuthoritarianRegimes(Washington,D.C.:CatoInstitute,2015).

12

alliancescouldexacerbatesecuritydilemmaswiththosewhoarenotpartytothem.Forexample,anumberofanalystshavesuggestedthatthepost-ColdWarexpansionofNATOintoformerWarsawPactcountriesandSovietRepublicsexacerbatedRussianinsecurityandhelpsexplainitsaggressionagainstGeorgiain2008andUkrainemorerecently.41Andtwo,theUnitedStatescanundermineitsroleinunderpinningaliberalinternationalbyoverextendingitselfanddiminishingbothitsmilitaryandeconomicpower.42Inlightofthesecaveats,itisworthconsideringreformstoAmerica’scurrentalliancesystem.Partnershipswithauthoritarianregimescanandshouldbereconsidered.Moreover,theextensionoffurthersecurityguarantees—particularlyinRussia’speriphery—shouldbehalted.43WhileAmerica’salliancesprovedbeneficialinmanyways,theyshouldnotbeviewedasanunalloyedgood.Thelikelihoodthattherearediminishingreturnstoextendingsecurityguaranteesinperpetuityisworthexploringfurther.Takenasawholethough,agrandstrategyofAmericanengagementhashadapositiveeffectontheinternationalsystem.Thepost-WorldWarIIordertheUnitedStateshelpedbuild—andwhichitsprovisionofsecurityguaranteeshelpsunderpin—hasreducedsecuritycompetitionamongmanyoftheworld’sleadingpowers.Thereductioninsecuritycompetitionhasincreasedincentivesforpositive-sumeconomicandpoliticalcooperationamongformerrivals.Reducedcompetitionandincreasedcooperationhavehelpedfacilitateaninternationalorderthatislesspronetowarandthusmoreconducivetoafreesociety.

Realism,Retrenchment,andLibertarianForeignPolicyDespitethebenefitsdiscussedabove,libertarianassessmentsofU.S.foreignpolicyaregenerallynegative.EvenwidelydivergentgroupsoflibertariansagreethatAmericanengagementininternationalpoliticsistoocostly,leadstothelossofinnocentlifeabroad,andenablesanoppressivestateathome.Libertarians,forthemostpart,wanttheUnitedStatestoexititsalliancesandbringitsforwarddeployedmilitaryforceshome.Broadlyspeaking,theywanttheUnitedStatestoundertakeapolitical-militaryretrenchment.Thissectionexploresthestrongestargumentlibertarianforeignpolicyscholarshaveprovidedtojustifyretrenchment:agrandstrategyknownas“restraint.”

41SeeJohnMearsheimer,"WhytheUkraineCrisisIstheWest'sFault:TheLiberalDelusionsThatProvokedPutin,"ForeignAffairs93,no.5(2014):77-89;andJoshuaShifrinson,"DealorNoDeal?TheEndoftheColdWarandtheU.S.OffertoLimitNATOExpansion,"InternationalSecurity40,no.4(2016):7-44.42Drezner,"MilitaryPrimacyDoesn'tPay,”70-72.43ForabriefdiscussionoftheproblemofcontinuedexpansionintoRussia’speriphery,seeBenDenisonandMatthewFay,“MuchAdoAboutMontenegro,”WarontheRocks,April27,2017,accessedOctober19,2017,availableat:https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/much-ado-about-montenegro/.

13

RealismandAmericanGrandStrategyRestraintisagrandstrategyderivedfromrealistinternationalrelationstheory.TheforeignpolicygoalattheheartofthisstrategyisthephysicalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesanditspowerpositionintheinternationalsystem.BarryPosen,aleadingrealistscholarandtheforemostproponentofrestraint,haslaidoutinintricatedetailthestrategy’slogicandmeticulouslydescribesthetypeofmilitaryforcestructurenecessarytopursueit.44Inexplainingthepurposeofthisenterprise,Posenwrote,“TheexplicitpurposeofthisbookistodevelopagrandstrategybasedonastrictlyconstruedassessmentofU.S.securityinterests,orwhatoncemighthavebeentermed‘vitalinterests.’TheseinterestsaretheminimizationofthreatstoU.S.sovereignty,safety,territorialintegrity,andthepowerpositionnecessarytoensureagainstthosethreats.”45Realism,asaschoolofthoughtinthestudyofinternationalrelations,focusesonpowerpoliticsbetweenstates.46RealismassumestheinternationalsystemisaHobbesianstateofnature.47Itassumespeopleformthemselvesintopoliticalgroups.Statesarethemostimportantpoliticalgroupininternationalpolitics.48Nationalismservesasaformofin-groupcohesionwithinthestate,andstatesactintheirownself-interest.49Securityisastate’shighestprioritybecausenooneactorhasamonopolyonthelegitimateuseofforceininternationalpolitics.Thedistributionofmilitarycapabilitiesamongtheactorsintheanarchicsystemdeterminesitsstructureandtherelativesecurityofeachstate.50Toachievesecurity,stateswillattempttocounteractor“balance”againstthreatsbyeitherbuildinguptheirownmilitarycapabilities(“internalbalancing”)ormakingallianceswithotherstatestocombinetheirmilitarycapabilities(“externalbalancing”).51Sometheorieswithintherealistschoolofthoughtdotakeintoaccountdomesticfactors,butrealismisbyandlargeindifferenttotheinternalcharacteristicsstates.52Statesareundifferentiatedunitsforrealists,eachpursuingitsself-interest.Generallyspeaking,realismconsidersstates“securityseekers,”withthestate’snationalinterestdefinedbythepursuitofstatepowerforthepurposeofsecurity.53Posen’sdefinitionofgrandstrategy,whichiswidelycitedbyproponentsofgrandstrategicrestraint,is

44Posen,Restraint.Anumberofotherscholarshavemadethisargumentaswell,though.Forexamples,seeEugeneGholz,DarylG.Press,andHarveySapolsky,"ComeHome,America:TheStrategyofRestraintintheFaceofTemptation,"InternationalSecurity21,no.4(Spring1997):5-48;ChristopherA.Preble,ThePowerProblem:HowAmericanMilitaryDominanceMakesUsLessSafe,LessProsperous,andLessFree(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2009);andHarveyM.Sapolsky,BenjaminH.Friedman,EugeneGholz,andDarylG.Press,"RestrainingOrder:ForStrategicModesty,"WorldAffairs172,no.2(2009):84-94.45BarryR.Posen,“Author’sResponse”inH-DiploInternationalSecurityStudiesForumRoundtable8-16onRestraint:ANewFoundationforU.S.GrandStrategy,July11,2016,accessedOctober17,2016,availableathttps://issforum.org/roundtables/8-16-restraint#_Toc455908560.46Foranoverview,seeWohlforth,"Realism,"131-149.47SeeThomasHobbes,Leviathan,editedbyRichardTuck(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),xxx.48Wohlforth,"Realism,"133.49Ibid.50KennethN.Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics(Boston,Mass.:McGraw-Hill,1979),97-99.51Ibid.,168.52Thevariantofrealismthatbestincorporatesdomesticfactorsisknownas“neoclassicalrealism,”seeGideonRose,"NeoclassicalRealismandTheoriesofForeignPolicy,"WorldPolitics51,no.1(1998):144-72.53MarcTrachtenberg,"TheQuestionofRealism:AHistorian'sView,"SecurityStudies13,no.1(Fall2003):156-161.

14

emblematicofthisassumption.54“Agrandstrategy,”heargues,“isanation-state’stheoryabouthowtoproducesecurityforitself.”55GivenAmerica’srelativesecurity,realismsuggeststhatto“producesecurityforitself,”theUnitedStatesisbestservedbyactingasan“offshorebalancer.”RealistsdifferovertherelativeimportanceofvariousregionstoAmericansecurity,orwhethertheprotectionofcommercialshippingisvitaltothesecurityandeconomichealthoftheUnitedStates.56However,historically,theygenerallyagreethattheonlymajormilitarythreattotheUnitedStateswouldbeastatethatcouldgainhegemonyoverEurasiaoroneofitskeyregions.Shouldsuchathreatemerge,anoffshorebalancerwouldallowregionalstatestobalanceagainstthehegemonicthreat—supplyingthemwiththemeanstodosoifnecessary.57OnlywhenfrontlinestatescannotsuccessfullycontainordefeattheemergingthreatshouldtheUnitedStatesdrawonitslatentmilitarypowerandcommititsownforcestothefight.RealistinternationalrelationsscholarJohnMearsheimerarguesthatAmericanstrategyduringWorldWarIIwasanexampleofoffshorebalancing:TheUnitedStatessuppliedGreatBritainwiththemeanstobalanceagainstNaziGermany’sbidforhegemonyoverEuropebeforeultimatelyenteringtheconflictitselftodefeattheGermanthreatmilitarily.58Basedonrealisttheory,Posencritiqueswhathecalls“liberalhegemony”—whichishistermforAmerican’scurrentgrandstrategy.Liberalhegemonyisacombinationofseveralschoolsofinternationalrelationsthought.59AccordingtoPosen,itisthe“consensusgrandstrategy”AmericaadoptedafterWorldWarII.Itis“hegemonic,”hewrites,“becauseitbuildsonthegreatpoweradvantageoftheUnitedStatesrelativetoallothermajorpowersandintendstopreserveasmuchofthatpoweraspossible.”60TheUnitedStatesinvestsheavilyinitsmilitarytopreservethisgreatpoweradvantage.Indoingso,ithopestodissuadeothersfromcompetingagainst,letalone,fightingit.Americangrandstrategyisliberal,Posenargues,becauseit“aimstodefendandpromotearangeofvaluesassociated

54Forexamples,seeHarveyM.Sapolsky,EugeneGholz,andCaitlinTalmadge,U.S.DefensePolitics:TheOriginsofSecurityPolicy(Abingdon,Oxon:Routledge,2014),13;andBenjaminH.Friedman,andJustinLogan."WhyWashingtonDoesn'tDebateGrandStrategy,"StrategicStudiesQuarterly10,no.4(Winter2016):17.55Posen,Restraint),1.SeealsoBarryR.Posen,TheSourcesofMilitaryDoctrine:France,Britain,andGermanybetweentheWorldWars(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1984),25.56Forexample,manyrealistscholarssuggesttheUnitedStatesneedstotakeamoreactiverolebalancingagainsttheriseofChina.Libertariansborrowingfromrealistprinciples,however,arguethatAmerica'sregionalalliesshouldbearmostofthisburden.SeeJustinLogan,"China,America,andthePivottoAsia,"CatoInstitutePolicyAnalysisno.717(Washington,DC:CatoInstitute,January8,2013).SomerealistssaytheflowofMiddleEasternoilisimportantbecauseithelpsmaintaintheeconomicbasisofAmericanpowerandthereforearegionalhegemoncouldthreatenAmerica’svitalinterests.RealistscholarsEugeneGholzandDarylPressinsteadarguethatan“over-the-horizon”militarypresenceisallthat’snecessarytodefendagainstsignificantdisruptionstotheflowofoil.SeeEugeneGholzandDarylG.Press,"Protecting'thePrize':OilandtheU.S.NationalInterest,"SecurityStudies19,no.3(2010):453-85.57Mearsheimer,TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics,42.Seealso,ChristopherLayne,"FromPreponderancetoOffshoreBalance:America'sFutureGrandStrategy,"InternationalSecurity22,no.1(Summer1997):86-124.58Mearsheimer,TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics,42.59Liberalhegemonyisoftenusedinterchangeablywithastrategyknownas“primacy.”ItisalsooftenconflatedwithBrooksandWohlforth’sstrategyof“deepengagement.”SeeBenjaminH.FriedmanandJustinLogan,"WhyWashingtonDoesn'tDebateGrandStrategy,"StrategicStudiesQuarterly10,no.4(Winter2016):25.BrooksandWohlforth,however,arguethatinterventionstospreadliberaldemocracyarepartofadistinctgrandstrategytheycall“deepengagement-plus,”whichismoreorlesssynonymouswithliberalhegemony.SeeBrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,7-8&191.60Posen,Restraint,5-6.

15

withWesternsocietyingeneralandtheUnitedStatesinparticular”—namely,liberaldemocracyandfreemarkets—asameanstofurtheritssecurity.61LiberalhegemonyrecommendsthattheUnitedStatesusemilitaryforceunderavarietyofcircumstances.Underliberalhegemony,asPosendescribesit,U.S.militarypowermaybeusedtoenforceinternationalnorms,todeposedictatorialregimes,ortoinstallliberaldemocraticgovernments.Posen’sstrategy,ontheotherhand,recommendsafarmorelimitedrangeofscenariosunderwhichtheUnitedStatesshoulduseitsmilitarypower.Posensuggeststhat,intheabsenceofmajormilitarythreats,U.S.militarystrategyshouldfocusonmaintaining“commandofthecommons”—theabilitytodenyanotherstatecontroloftheglobalsea,air,space,orcyberdomainsifnecessary.62Indoingso,herecommendstheUnitedStatesdoawaywiththemajorityofitsalliancecommitments.63Byfocusingonmaintainingcommandofthecommons,ratherthandefendingalliesinEurope,Asia,andtheMiddleEast,theUnitedStatescanadoptasmaller,maritime-orientedmilitaryforcestructure.64OnlyiffrontlinestatesfailtobalanceagainstapotentialhegemonwouldtheUnitedStatesneedtoincreasethesizeofitsmilitarytoactasanoffshorebalancer.Givenitsinherentsecurity,theUnitedStateswouldnotneedtomaintainthesystemofmilitaryalliancesitdevelopedafterWorldWarIIunderrestraint.Forrealists,alliancesareadditive.Theyformsostatescanexternallybalance—thatis,combinetheirmilitarycapabilities—againstcommonthreats.AsrealistscholarStephenWaltargued,“statesjoinalliancestoprotectthemselvesfromstatesorcoalitionswhosesuperiorresourcescouldposeathreat.”65Theprimaryreasontodosoistoensurethestate’ssurvival.Intheabsenceofsuchathreat,alliancesareunnecessary.

Libertarians,Realists,andRetrenchmentWhilefewlibertariansarerealists,andfewerrealistsarelibertarians,theyshareacommoninterestinretrenchment.Therefore,libertarianforeignpolicyscholarshaveadoptedvariantsofrestraintastheirpreferredgrandstrategy.66TheyarguethattheUnitedStatesshouldfocusnarrowlyonitsownsecurity.Bydoingso,theyassumethattheUnitedStateswouldreducethechancesitgoestowar—allowingittodecreasethesizeofitsmilitaryandthestatethatsupportsit.Forlibertarians,thevirtueofrealism,andagrandstrategyderivedfromit,isthatitsetsahighbarofjustificationforgoingtowarandsuggeststheUnitedStatesdoesnotneedalliestobesecure.Accordingtorealism,onlymajormilitarythreatstothephysicalsecurityoftheAmericanstateoritsvitalinterestsrequiretheuseofAmericanmilitarypower.TheUnitedStates,secureasitisgivenitstwooceanic

61Ibid.62Ibid.,136-144.63Ibid.,87-120.64Ibid.,145-161.65StephenM.Walt,TheOriginsofAlliances(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1987),17-21.66SeeBenjaminH.FriedmanandChristopherA.Preble,"BudgetarySavingsfromMilitaryRestraint,"PolicyAnalysisno.667(Washington,DC:CatoInstitute,2010).

16

moats,weakfriendlyneighbors,andretaliatorynucleararsenal,shouldrarelyneedtogotowar.Realistsunderstandthatforceisnecessaryininternationalaffairs,buttheyareskepticalofitsefficacyinpromotingliberalvaluesinforeigncountries.Utopianschemestoremaketheworlddonotprovideacompellingreasontousemilitaryforceforrealists.Forlibertarians,becausethesizeandpowerofthestateconsistentlyincreasesaresultofwar,raisingahighbarfortheuseofmilitaryforcebytheUnitedStatesshouldslowthegrowthoftheAmericanstateandthusprovebeneficialforafreesociety.HavingfewerpeacetimealliancecommitmentswouldalsoallowtheUnitedStatestoreducethesizeofitsmilitary,andthestatethatsupportsit—thusreducingthefinancialburdenitplacesonAmericantaxpayers.ThereareimportantdifferencesbetweenacademicrealistsandlibertarianswhendiscussingwhytheUnitedStatesshouldadoptrestraintasitsgrandstrategy.WhereassomerealistsbelievetheUnitedStatesshouldtakeamorerestrainedroleininternationalpoliticsbecauseotherstateswillinevitablycounterbalanceagainstAmericanpower,orbecauseAmerica’scurrentmilitarycommitmentswillinevitablybecomefinanciallyunsustainable,libertarianstendtojustifyretrenchmentinnormativeterms.67Libertarian“retrenchers”generallyacceptthatengagementisfinanciallysustainable.68Theyinsteadarguethatextendingsecurityguaranteestoamelioratesecuritycompetitionisunnecessarybecausemodernwariscounterproductiveforstateseconomically,whileatthesametimenormshavedevelopedagainstmilitaryaggression.69Insteadofneedingtopullbackfromitspreeminentroleininternationalpolitics,assomerealistssuggest,libertariansarguethattheUnitedStatesshoulddosobecausethatroleisfinanciallycostly,threateningtoafreesociety,andunnecessaryforAmericansecurity,narrowlydefined.Itisunderstandablewhylibertarianswouldfindagrandstrategynarrowlyfocusedonthreatstoitsphysicalsecurityappealing.Timeandagain,Americanpolicymakershavejustifiedunnecessaryanddestructivewarswithtalkoffalling“dominoes”inSoutheastAsiaormushroom-cloud-shaped“smokingguns.”BecausetheUnitedStatesislargelyimmunetomajormilitarythreats,libertarianssuggestAmerica’sroleasasecurityguarantorisacostlyburdenratherthananecessity—possiblydrawingthe

67Whenagreatpower’sinternationalambitionsareunderminedbythefinancialburdensnecessarytoachievethem,itisreferredtoas“imperialoverstretch.”Fortheclassichistoricaltreatmentofthisargument,seePaulM.Kennedy,TheRiseandFalloftheGreatPowers:EconomicChangeandMilitaryConflictfrom1500to2000(NewYork:VintageBooks,1989).ForamorerecentargumentthatAmericangrandstrategyisunsustainableduetoitsfinancialburden,seeChristopherLayne,"ThisTimeIt’sReal:TheEndofUnipolarityandthePaxAmericana,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly56,no.1(2012):203-13.Foracritiqueofthesearguments,seeThomasH.Oatley,APoliticalEconomyofAmericanHegemony:Buildups,Booms,andBusts(NewYork,NY:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015),158-159.68JustinLoganandBenjaminH.Friedman,"WhytheU.S.MilitaryBudgetIs'FoolishandSustainable',"Orbis56,no.2(Spring2012):177-91.69Onthedeclineofinterstatewar,seeStevenPinker,TheBetterAngelsofOurNature:WhyViolenceHasDeclined(NewYork:Viking,2011);andBrunoTertrais,"TheDemiseofAres:TheEndofWarasWeKnowIt?"TheWashingtonQuarterly35,no.3(2012):7-22.Theempiricalbasisforthisargumenthasbeenchallengedinrecentyearsthough.SeeBearBraumoeller,“IsWarDisappearing?”(August27,2013),presentedattheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationChicago2013Meeting,availablethroughtheSocialScienceResearchNetwork:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317269(citedwiththeauthor’spermission);andTanishaM.Fazal,"DeadWrong?:BattleDeaths,MilitaryMedicine,andExaggeratedReportsofWar'sDemise,"InternationalSecurity39,no.1(Summer2014):95-125.OnthefinancialsustainabilityofAmerica’scurrentgrandstrategy,seeJustinLoganandBenjaminH.Friedman,"WhytheU.S.MilitaryBudgetIs'FoolishandSustainable',"Orbis56,no.2(Spring2012):177-91.

17

UnitedStatesintoconflictstheAmericanpeopleneitherwantnorneed.70Similarly,theysuggest,theforward-deployedmilitaryforcesneededtomakethosesecurityguaranteescredibleareunnecessaryandprovideAmericanpolicymakersthemeanstomilitarilyintervenetospreadliberaldemocracyorforreasonsotherwiseunrelatedtothephysicalsecurityoftheUnitedStates.71

ReasonsforRetrenchmentBasedontheassumptionthattheUnitedStatesshouldfocusnarrowlyonitsownsecurity,libertariansmakefourassumptionsabouttheconsequencesofretrenchmentforinternationalanddomesticpolitics.First,theyassumethatthepositivedevelopmentsininternationalpoliticssince1945wouldcontinueaftertheUnitedStatesrescindsitssecurityguarantees.Second,theyassumethatevenifinternationalpoliticsbecomesmorecompetitiveandconflict-prone,thatdevelopmentwouldhavelittleeffectontheUnitedStates.Third,theyassumethatretrenchmentwouldreducethechancestheUnitedStateswillgotowar.Fourth,theyassumethatretrenchmentwouldprovidesignificantpositivedevelopmentsforafreesociety.ThefirstassumptionunderpinningtheargumentforretrenchmentisthattheworldwouldremainpeacefulandcooperativeeveniftheUnitedStatesexitsitsalliances.LibertariansassumethatthepositivedevelopmentsininternationalpoliticsafterWorldWarII—decreasedinterstatewarandincreasedeconomicinterdependence—occurredindependentofAmerica’sroleasasecurityguarantor.Instead,normsdevelopedininternationalpoliticsagainstmilitaryaggression.Militaryvictoryisnolongerseenasamatterofnationalglory,norisaggressioneconomicallyprofitable.72Similarly,theyarguethatincreasedeconomicinterdependenceissufficientlyrobustthatstatesresponsiblefortheirownsecuritywouldcontinuetotradewithoneanotherandtheworldwouldcontinuetoenjoypacifyingeffectsofpositive-sumeconomicexchange.73Basedonthisassumption,retrencherspredictfewchangesininternationalpoliticsintheabsenceofAmericansecurityguarantees,whilethosechangesthatdooccurwouldbemostlypositive.Formerallies,whonowfreerideontheU.S.defensebudgetattheexpenseofAmericantaxpayers,wouldsimplyincreasetheirdefensebudgetsinlinewiththeirdefenseneeds.74Ifthreatstothosestates

70ManylibertariansarguethatAmerica'salliancecommitmentsaredangerousrelicsoftheColdWarbutacknowledgethattheyservedapurposewhiletheSovietUnionexisted.However,evenastheColdWarwasheatingbackupin1980,formerCatoInstitutescholarEarlRavenalreferredtoAmerica'salliancesas"transmissionbeltsforwar."SeeEarlC.Ravenal,"CanNon-InterventionSurviveAfghanistan,"CatoInstitutePolicyAnalysisno.3(Washington,DC:CatoInstitute,June1,1980),2-3.71Preble,ThePowerProblem,87-115.72JohnMueller,RetreatfromDoomsday:TheObsolescenceofMajorWar(NewYork:BasicBooks,1996),20-25and220-223.73JohnGlaser,“WithdrawingfromOverseasBases:WhyaForward-DeployedMilitaryPostureinUnnecessary,Outdated,andDangerous,”PolicyAnalysisno.816(Washington,DC:CatoInstitute,July18,2017),6.74Onthefree-riderprobleminAmerica’salliancesseeMancurOlson,Jr.andRichardZeckhauser,"AnEconomicTheoryofAlliances,"TheReviewofEconomicsandStatistics48,no.3(1966):266-79.Forexamplesofthelibertarianviewsonthisproblem,seeChristopherPreble,“OurFreeloadingAllies,”CatoInstitute,CatoatLibertyblog,May29,2014,accessedOctober17,2017,availableathttps://www.cato.org/blog/freeriders;and“U.S.TaxpayerSubsidiesforEuropeanWelfareStatesContinue,”CatoInstitute,CatoatLibertyblog,June16,2015,accessedOctober17,2017,availableat:https://www.cato.org/blog/us-taxpayer-subsidies-european-welfare-states-continue.However,Posenarguesthattheterm“cheap-riding”ismoreappropriatefordescribingAmerica’sallies’behavior.SeePosen,Restraint,35-44.

18

emerge,theywouldthereforebebetterpreparedtoconfrontthem.Someformeralliesmightalsopursuenuclearweaponstobalanceagainstthreats,butlibertarianretrencherssuggestthatnuclearproliferationisnotasproblematicasfrequentlyassumed.Inlinewithrealistthinkingonthesubject,theyarguethatthespreadofnuclearweaponsisnotnecessarilyaproblembecausestateswilladoptretaliatorynuclearposturesanddeteroneanotherfromgoingtowar.75Second,libertarianretrenchersassumethat,eveniftheworlddidbecomemorecompetitiveandconflict-prone,itneednotaffecttheUnitedStatesabsenttheemergenceofamajormilitarythreat.Threeargumentsaredeployedbasedonthisassumption.First,theyargue,theU.S.governmentisresponsiblesolelyforthesecurityandsafetyoftheAmericanpeople;therefore,warselsewhereshouldnotbeamatterofconcerntoU.S.foreignpolicyunlesstheydirectlythreatenthesecurityoftheUnitedStates.76Second,theUnitedStateswillnotsuffereconomicallyduetoforeignconflictsbecause,asaneutralthirdparty,itcancontinuetotradewiththecombatants.AccordingtopoliticalscientistsEugeneGholzandDarylPress,theUnitedStatescanevenprofitfromthesewarseconomicallybecausebelligerentswillneedtoacquiregoodsfromsomewhere.77Third,retrenchersarguethatitisnotinevitablethattheUnitedStateswillbedraggedintoawarinEurasia.PoliticalscientistChristopherLayne,forexample,citessevenmajorEuropeanwarsoutoftensincetheendoftheeighteenthcenturyinwhichtheUnitedStatesdidnotbecomeinvolved.Laynearguesthattherewasonlyone,WorldWarII,inwhichU.S.militaryinvolvementwasnecessary.78Athird,related,assumptionoflibertarianretrenchersisthattheUnitedStateswouldfightfewerwarsifitretrenches.TheypresentanumberofreasonswhytheUnitedStateswouldbelesslikelytousemilitaryforce.Forone,byreducingthesizeofthemilitaryandgarrisoningitathome,retrenchersimplythatAmericanpolicymakerswouldbelesstemptedtousemilitaryforce.Two,byjettisoningitsalliancecommitments,theUnitedStateswouldbelesslikelytogetdrawnintoawarbyitsallies.AccordingtoPosen,Americansecurityguaranteescreateamoralhazardproblemthatleadsto“recklessdriving”byU.S.allies.States,heargues,willactimprudentlywhentheirsecurityisguaranteed,underminingAmericaninterestsabroadandpossiblydraggingtheUnitedStatesintoawar.79Three,becausetheUnitedStateswouldnothavetoreassurealliesthatitwillcometotheirdefense,itwouldnothavetousemilitaryforcetodemonstratethatitspromisetoprotectthemiscredible.80Andfour,libertariansarguethatbyretrenching,theUnitedStateswouldnotriskprovokinghostilepowers.81

75Forarealisttakeonnuclearweapons,seeWaltz’scontributiontoScottD.SaganandKennethN.Waltz;TheSpreadofNuclearWeapons:ADebateRenewed;withNewSectionsonIndiaandPakistan,Terrorism,andMissileDefense2nded.(NewYork:Norton,2003).Foralibertarianargumentapplyingthislogic,seeGlaser,“WithdrawingfromOverseasBases,”4.76Preble,ThePowerProblem,129-131.SeealsoDougBandow,“Washington’sFirstObligationistoDefendAmerica,NottheWorld,”CatoInstitute,CatoatLibertyblog,August22,2016,accessedNovember7,2017,availableat:https://www.cato.org/blog/washingtons-first-obligation-defend-america-not-world.77EugeneGholz,andDarylG.Press;"TheEffectsofWarsonNeutralCountries:WhyItDoesn'tPaytoPreservethePeace,"SecurityStudies10,no.4(2001):1-57.78Layne,"FromPreponderancetoOffshoreBalance:America'sFutureGrandStrategy,"120.79Posen,Restraint,44-50.80Onthelimitsofcredibilityininternationalrelations,seeDarylG.Press,CalculatingCredibility:HowLeadersEvaluateMilitaryThreats(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,2005).81Forexample,libertariansarguethattheinsecuritycreatedbytheU.S.military’sforwarddeploymentisakeyreasonwhyhostilestatesactaggressivelyorpursuenuclearweapons.SeeGlaser,“WithdrawingfromOverseasBases,”9-10.

19

Finally,takingalltheseassumptionsintoaccount,libertarianretrenchersassumethatadoptingtheirstrategywouldproduceafreersocietybyreducingthefinancialburdentheU.S.militaryplacesonAmericantaxpayersandreducingthesizeofthestatenecessarytosupportit.Retrenchersarguethat,becauseAmericaissecurefrommajormilitarythreat,theUnitedStatescanreducethesizeofitsmilitary.TheU.S.militaryiscostlybecauseitisdesignedtoprojectpoweroftransoceanicdistances,nottodefendtheUnitedStates.Ina2010analysis,ChristopherPrebleandBenjaminFriedmanoftheCatoInstituteestimatedthattheU.S.military’sactive-dutyend-strengthwoulddecreasetoaround949,000.82Basedonthesereductions,PrebleandFriedmanhavearguedthattheUnitedStatescouldsavearound$1trillionoveraperiodoftenyearsifitretrenchedmilitarily.83Impliedinthisestimateisthatotheraspectsofthenationalsecuritystatecouldbereducedoreliminatedaswell.84Forexample,thenationalsecurityapparatusbuiltuptoprosecutethewaronterrorcouldbereducedbecauseterrorismdoesnotrepresentamajorthreat.Ifamajormilitarythreatweretoreemerge,retrenchersargue,theUnitedStateswouldquicklyregeneratethemilitarycapabilitiesdiscardedwhenitretrenchedanddefeatthethreat.85

CostsandBenefitsinLibertarianForeignPolicyAnumberoftheargumentslibertariansmakeinfavorofretrenchmenthavemerit,butthecost-benefitanalysisderivedfromthemisbasedonadeterministicviewofinternationalpolitics.LibertarianretrenchersassumethatinternationalpoliticswouldremainmoreorlessthesameabsentAmericanengagementandthatAmerica’sdomesticpoliticswouldremainthesameeveniftheinternationalsystembecomemoreconflict-prone.Giventheinherentuncertaintyofforecasting,thecostsandbenefitsofengagementandretrenchmentneedtobeconsideredinamoreprobabilisticfashion.86ThissectionbeginsbyexploringanumberofscenariosthatcouldoccurshouldtheUnitedStatesadoptagrandstrategyofretrenchment.Itthenreassessesthecostsandbenefitsofretrenchmentforafreesociety.82Thisfigureisderivedfroma2010recommendationtoreducetheend-strengthofeachU.S.militaryserviceby“roughlyonethird.”SeeBenjaminH.FriedmanandChristopherA.Preble,"BudgetarySavingsfromMilitaryRestraint,"PolicyAnalysisno.667(Washington,DC:CatoInstitute,2010),6.Atthetime,theU.S.military’stotalactive-dutyend-strengthwas1.4million.Active-dutyend-strengthtodayis1.3million.See“DoDPersonnel,WorkforceReports,andPublications:MilitaryPersonnel,”DepartmentofDefense,DefenseManpowerDataCenter,accessedNovember8,2017,availableat:https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.83SeeFriedmanandPreble,"BudgetarySavingsfromMilitaryRestraint."AnupdatetothisestimateisavailableinBenjaminH.Friedman,“Cato:AStrategyofRestraint,”inJacobCohn,RyanBoone,andThomasG.Mahnken,“HowMuchisEnough?:AlternativeDefenseStrategies”(Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,November28,2016),9-11.84Forexample,FriedmanandPrebleassumethesizeoftheAmericanintelligencecommunitywillbereducedbecauseretrenchmentwillrequireittofocusonfewerthreats.SeeFriedmanandPreble,"BudgetarySavingsfromMilitaryRestraint,"2&7.85WillRuger,"TheCaseforRealismandRestraint,"Reason46,no.8(January2015):30.86PhilipE.TetlockandDanGardner,Superforecasting:TheArtandScienceofPrediction,Firstedition(NewYork:CrownPublishers,2015),247-249.

20

TheCeterisParibusAssumptioninLibertarianForeignPolicyInasystemwithmoreindependentstatesbalancingagainstoneanother,iswarmoreorlesslikely?LibertariansareplacingabetthatallelsewouldremainequalininternationalpoliticsiftheUnitedStatesretrenches.Whiletheyassumeaworldwhereanincreasednumberofstatesarebalancingagainstoneanotherwouldremainpeaceful,therealityisnotentirelyclear.Usingbasicrealistpremisesaboutstatebehaviorunderinternationalanarchy,itiseasytoidentifyanumberofscenarioslessrosythantheonelibertariansassumewouldoccurshouldtheUnitedStatesretrench.Thesescenariosmightincludeaworldofincreasednationalism,erodingnormsagainstmilitaryaggression,increasedeconomicautarky,andthefurtherspreadofnuclearweaponsasstateslooktoproducesecurityforthemselves.SomestatesmayalsofailtobalanceagainstthreatsinthewakeofAmericanretrenchment,increasingthelikelihoodtheUnitedStateswillbedrawnintoamajorwar.LibertariansassumethatintheabsenceofanalliancewiththeUnitedStates,othercountrieswouldsimplyincreasetheirdefensespendingiftheyfeltthreatened.However,internalbalancingisnotamechanicalprocess.AccordingtoJohnMearsheimer,leadersofstatesfacingsecuritycompetitionarelikelytousenationalismtogarnersupportfromtheirpopulationsforthenecessaryregenerationofmilitarycapabilities.87WritingattheendoftheColdWar,MearsheimersuggestedthatEuropewouldreverttoapatternofrecurrentwarfare.TheabsenceoftheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwouldleaveEurope,onceagain,ananarchicmultipolarsystem.Thestructureofthesystemwouldforcethestatestocompetewithoneanother,astheyhadpriortotheColdWar.Mearsheimerarguedthatpre-1945“hyper-nationalism”wasaproductof“securitycompetitionamongtheEuropeanstates,whichcompelledelitestomobilizepublicsupportfornationaldefenseefforts.”88Americanretrenchmentcouldsimilarlyleadtoananarchic,multipolarEurope—thusincreasingthechancesofwaronthecontinent.SuchasystemcouldengendernationalistsentimentsamongthepopulationsofEurope,heighteninganimositiesbetweennationalgroups.Theseheightenedanimositiescouldhelperodenormsagainstmilitaryaggressionthathavefacilitatedthedeclineininterstatewar.Nationalistgroupswithinacountrycanseizeonthesesentimentstopursueconfrontationalandexpansionistpolicies.89Encouragingsupportforincreasedmilitarycapabilitiesthroughnationalismmightleadpopulationstoseewarasonceagainameanstonationalgloryormaintainingnational

87JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"BacktotheFuture:InstabilityinEuropeaftertheColdWar,"InternationalSecurity15,no.1(Summer1990):7-8,12-21,25,and29;seealsoBarryR.Posen,"Nationalism,theMassArmy,andMilitaryPower,"InternationalSecurity18,no.2(1993):80-124.88Mearsheimer,"BacktotheFuture,”12.89SeeJackL.Snyder,MythsofEmpire:DomesticPoliticsandInternationalAmbition(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1991);andJamieGruffydd-Jones,"DangerousDays:TheImpactofNationalismonInterstateConflict,"SecurityStudies26,no.4(2017):698-728.

21

honor.Mattersofnationalprestigeandhonorcanleadtotheinitiationofwarswhenboundupinterritorialclaims,whileatthesametimeincreasingtheintensityanddurationofaconflict.90Nationalismandsecuritycompetitionmightalsoerodethepacifyingeffectsofeconomicopenness.Realismsuggestsstatesareconcernedaboutrelativegains.91Statesinsecuritycompetitionmightbewaryoftradingwithoneanotherduetoconcernsabouthowapotentialrival’seconomicgainsmightprovideitwithanadvantageiftranslatedintomilitarypower.Theymayalsoadoptautarkicpoliciesforfearofunderminingtheireconomicandmilitaryself-sufficiency.92Territorialconquesthasbecomeincreasinganachronisticininternationalpolitics.However,theproliferationofprotectionistpoliciesmightonceagainmakeaggressionandpreventivewarseemlikestrategicallysensiblewaysforstatestosecuretheresourcesnecessarytoreducetheabilityofpotentialrivalstocutthemoffeconomically.Iftheriskofterritorialaggressionincreases,thepossessionofnuclearweaponswouldbecomeanattractiveoptionforsomestateswhosesecuritywaspreviouslyguaranteedbytheUnitedStates.Nuclearweaponsaremostusefulfordeterringmajorterritorialaggression,meaningtheirpotentialutilityincreasesasthepotentialforwardoes.93AnumberofU.S.allieshaveeitherpreviouslypursuednuclearweaponsorhavethecapabilitytodoso.Theymightchoosetoobtainanucleararsenalonceresponsiblefortheirownsecurity.Thereareatleasttworeasonswhyincreasingthenumberofnuclearweaponsstatesmaynothavethepacifyingeffectsomerealistssuggesttheydo.First,statesdonotalwaysadoptthesecond-strike—thatis,retaliatory—posturesrealistsassumetheywill.Recentresearchshowsthatevenintheparadigmaticcaseofmutualassureddestruction—theColdWarsuperpowerstandoff—neithertheUnitedStatesnortheSovietUnionabandonedthesearchforafirst-strikecapability.94Moreover,politicalscientistVipinNarang’sresearchonIndia-Pakistannuclearrelationshasdemonstratedthatstatessometimesadoptriskyposturesinpursuitofgoalsotherthandeterrence.95Second,anincreasednumberofnuclearweaponstateswillincreasethechancesnuclearweaponswillbeusedevenifstatesdoadoptsecond-strikepostures.Ontheonehand,simpleorganizationalpathologiesorpoliticalinstabilityinanewnuclearstatecouldleadtoanaccidentalorunauthorizednuclearlaunch.96Ontheotherhand,evenforretaliatorypostures,effectivedeterrencerequiresthat

90Ontherelationshipbetween“territoriality”andwar,seeDominicD.P.JohnsonandMonicaDuffyToft,"GroundsforWar:TheEvolutionofTerritorialConflict."InternationalSecurity38,no.3(Winter2013/14):7-38.Onhonorasafactorprolongingwars,seeAlexanderLanoszkaandMichaelA.Hunzeker,"RageofHonor:EntenteIndignationandtheLostChanceforPeaceintheFirstWorldWar,"SecurityStudies24,no.4(2015):662-95.91Onrelativegains,seeWaltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics,105.92JonathanD.Caverley,"UnitedStatesHegemonyandtheNewEconomicsofDefense."SecurityStudies16,no.4(2007):600-601;andDaleC.Copeland,EconomicInterdependenceandWar(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,2015),8-10.93BrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,109.94SeeAustinLongandBrendanRittenhouseGreen,"StalkingtheSecureSecondStrike:Intelligence,Counterforce,andNuclearStrategy,"JournalofStrategicStudies38,no.1-2(2015):38-73;andBrendanR.GreenandAustinLong,"TheMADWhoWasn'tThere:SovietReactionstotheLateColdWarNuclearBalance,"SecurityStudies26,no.4(2017):606-41.95VipinNarang,"PosturingforPeace?:Pakistan'sNuclearPosturesandSouthAsianStability,"InternationalSecurity34,no.3(Winter2009):38-78.96SeeScottSagan’scontributiontoSaganandWaltz,TheSpreadofNuclearWeapons.

22

statescrediblysignalthattheyarewillingtousenuclearweaponsinretaliationforanattack.Todosorequiresthatnuclearstatesincompetitionwithoneanothermustmaintainawillingnesstorisknuclearwar.Thegreaterthenumberofthese“competition[s]inrisktaking,”asThomasSchellingcalledthem,themorelikelyitisthatnuclearweaponswillbeusedatsomepoint.97ThesituationinNortheastAsiahelpsillustratehowincreasingthenumberofnuclearweaponsstatesincreasestheprobabilitythatnuclearweaponswillbeused.AbsentU.S.securityguarantees,thereisarealpossibilitythatJapan,Taiwan,andSouthKoreawouldbuildnucleararsenalsoftheirowngiventheirconcernsaboutChinaandNorthKorea.98Therearecurrentlytwonucleardyadsintheregion:theUnitedStatesandChina,andtheUnitedStatesandNorthKorea.IfJapan,Taiwan,andSouthKoreaallacquirednuclearweapons,therewouldbeatleastfiveadditionaldyads:ChinaandTaiwan,ChinaandJapan,ChinaandSouthKorea,NorthKoreaandSouthKorea,andNorthKoreaandJapan.Givenlingeringtensionsfromitspre-1945occupationoftheKoreanPeninsula,aSouthKorea-Japanesenucleardyadisentirelyplausibleaswell.99Eachnewdyadaddsacontestinrisk-taking,whichincreasesthechancesthatnuclearweaponswillbeusedintheregion.100ThoughAmerica’sgeographicisolationinsulatesitfrommanythethreatsofanincreasinglycompetitiveandunstableworld,itdoesnotprovideabsoluteimmunity.Asnotedabove,ChristopherLaynerightlyhighlightsthemajorwarsinEuropeinwhichtheUnitedStatesdidnotbecomeinvolved.However,thequestionshouldnotbeaboutfrequencyofAmericaninvolvementinmajorpowerwarsinEurasia.Instead,itshouldbeaboutthecostwhentheUnitedStatesdoesbecomeinvolvedinsuchaconflict.Thepurposeofinsuranceistoprotectagainstlowfrequency,high-costevents.TherewasarelativelylowprobabilitythattheSovietUnionwouldhaveinvadedWesternEuropeduringtheColdWar,buttheUnitedStatesinvestedindeterringaninvasionbecausethecostsofanactualwarwouldhavebeenhigher.101WhiletheUnitedStatesavoidedinvolvementinanumberofEuropeanwars,themajorconflictstheUnitedStatesdidbecomeinvolvedinwerehigh-costevents.AttheheightofWorldWarII,theUnitedStatesspent37percentofitsgrossdomesticproductonitsmilitary.102Morethan8percentoftheU.S.populationwasinuniformatthewar’speak.103ThesizeoftheAmericanstateexpanded

97BrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,108.Ondeterrenceasa"competitioninrisk-taking"seeThomasC.Schelling,ArmsandInfluence(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2008),94.98SeeMarkFitzpatrick,Asia’sLatentNuclearPowers:Japan,SouthKorea,andTaiwan(London:InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,2016).99OncontinuedtensionsovertheissueofJapan’suseofKorean“comfortwomen”duringWorldWarII,seeJamesGriffiths,“SouthKorea’sNewPresidentQuestionsJapan‘ComfortWomen’Deal,”CNN.com,June5,2017,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/asia/south-korea-japan-comfort-women/index.html.WhileJapanandSouthKoreasignedanagreementin2012toincreasemilitarycooperationinlightofNorthKoreanprovocationsandthegrowthofChinesemilitarypower,theSouthKoreanpublicmetthedecisionwithhostility.SeeChoeSang-Hun,“SouthKoreatoSignMilitaryPactwithJapan,”NewYorkTimes,June28,2012,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/south-korea-to-sign-historic-military-pact-with-japan.html.100SeethediscussioninBrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,108-109.101RichardK.Betts,"MaybeI'llStopDriving,"TerrorismandPoliticalViolence17,no.4(2005):509.102StephenDaggett,“CostsofMajorWars,”CRSReportno.RS22926(Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,June29,2016),2,availableat:https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf.103SeeTable1-6,“WorkForceLevels–1938throughPresent,”inDepartmentofDefense,“SelectedManpowerStatistics,FiscalYear1997,”accessedNovember7,2017,availableat:http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA347153.ThepercentageofthepopulationwascalculatedusingestimatefortotalU.S.populationin1945from“NationalIntercensalTables:1900-1990,”

23

massivelyduringthistime.104TheUnitedStatesdidnotneedaformalmilitaryalliancewithanyofthebelligerentspriortoeitheroftheworldwarstobecomeinvolvedintheconflicts.America’sinvolvementinWorldWarIIsuggeststhatonewaytheUnitedStatesmightbecomeinvolvedinanothermajorwarisifsomeformerU.S.alliesfailtobuildtheirmilitarycapabilitiesinthefaceofaggressivepowers.Neoclassicalrealistscholarsrefertothisproblemas“underbalancing.”105Accordingtothistheory,statesmayfailtointernallybalanceagainstathreatduetodomesticpoliticalfactors.106Ifstatesfailtocheckanaggressivepower,itcouldpavethewayforthetypeofhegemonicthreatrealistsbelievewouldrequireAmericanmilitaryaction.Ifsuchathreatmaterialized,andiffrontlinestatesfailedtocontainit,theoffshorebalancinglogicunderpinningretrenchmentrecommendstheUnitedStatesregenerateitsmilitarycapabilitiestodefeatit.Mearsheimerarguesthattheseperiodicmilitarybuildupsareafeatureofoffshorebalancingstrategies.Hewrites:

OffshorebalancersliketheUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStatestendtomaintainrelativelysmallmilitaryforceswhentheyarenotneededtocontainapotentialhegemoninastrategicallyimportantarea…[W]henitisnecessaryforanoffshorebalancertocheckapotentialhegemon,itislikelytosharplyexpandthesizeandstrengthofitsfightingforces,astheUnitedStatesdidin1917,whenitenteredWorldWarI,andin1940,theyearbeforeitenteredWorldWarII.107

Retrenchmentassumesthatthisprocesswouldbesomewhatmechanical.TheUnitedStates,awareofanewthreatandtheinadequacyoffrontlinestatestocounterit,wouldconvertitslatentmaterialstrengthintomilitarypowertoconfront,andifnecessary,militarilydefeatthethreateningstate.108However,theprocessisunlikelytobeasautomaticorfrictionlessasrealistssuggest.DrawingonAmerica’seconomicresourcestotapitslatentmilitarypowerwouldnotprovidethesameadvantageitdidbeforeWorldWarIIfortworeasons.First,changesinmilitarytechnologywouldmakeitdifficultfortheU.S.militarytoreturntoregionswhereitpreviouslypositionedforces.WhilemoderntechnologyenablestheUnitedStatestoprojectmilitarypoweraroundtheglobe,italsomakesiteasierforpotentialadversariestoincreasethecostofdoingso.AnumberofstateshostiletoAmericaninterests

UnitedStatesCensusBureau,accessedNovember7,2017,availableat:https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/pre-1980-national.html.104BruceD.Porter,WarandtheRiseoftheState:TheMilitaryFoundationsofModernPolitics(NewYork:FreePress,1994),280.105RandallL.Schweller,"UnansweredThreats:ANeoclassicalRealistTheoryofUnderbalancing,"InternationalSecurity29,no.2(Fall2004):159-201.106OndomesticbarrierstohigherlevelsofEuropeandefensespendingsee,AndreaGilli,“TheTrumpAdministrationWantsEuropetoPayMoretoDefendItself.It’sNotThatEasy,”WashingtonPost,MonkeyCageblog,February3,2017,accessedFebruary3,2017,availableat:https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm_term=.1b7d3b6c268e.107Mearsheimer,TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics,157.108JohnMearsheimerandStephenWalt,"TheCaseforOffshoreBalancing:ASuperiorU.S.GrandStrategy,"ForeignAffairs95,no.4(2016):70-83.

24

havealreadyprocuredanti-accessandareadenial(A2/AD)capabilitiesasacost-effectivemeanstopreventtheU.S.militaryfromoperatingneartheirrespectiveterritories.109Second,tappingAmericaneconomicpowertomobilizeforwarwouldnotbethesameasitwasbeforeWorldWarII.Theeconomicconditionsthatobtainedbeforetheworldwarsarenolongerwithus.ThereisnogreatsurplusoflaborandidlemanufacturingcapacityastheGreatDepressionhadprovidedtheUnitedStateswhenitconvertedtoawareconomypriortoWorldWarII.110Convertingtoawareconomytodaywouldthereforerequirefar-reachingpoliticalandsocialdisruptions.Inlightofthosedisruptions,anyefforttomobilizetheAmericanpublicforwarwouldrequireaunifyingmechanism.Realistsassumenationalismisthatmechanism.OrdinaryAmericansareunlikelytogetworkedupovertheabstractthreatofadistantregionalhegemoninEurasia.ConfrontedwithanewmilitarythreatinEurasia,AmericanleadersarelikelytorousewhathistorianWalterRussellMeadreferstoasthepopulist“Jacksonian”tendencyinAmericanforeignpolicy.Thistendency,Meadargues,leadstoAmericanwarsthatareparticularlyviolentanddestructive.111ItisentirelypossiblethatlibertarianretrenchersarecorrectandnoneofthescenariosdescribedabovewillcometopassiftheUnitedStateschoosestheirpreferredgrandstrategy.However,itwillrequireanaturalexperimentintherobustnessofnormsagainstmilitaryaggressionandincentivesfavoringeconomicinterdependencetodeterminetheoutcome.Iftheyarenotrobust,theworldcouldbecomemorecompetitiveandconflict-prone—increasingthechancestheUnitedStateswouldbecomeinvolvedinamajorwar.Libertariansneedtoaskthemselveswhetherthebenefitsofretrenchmentarehigherthantheserisks.

TheCostsandBenefitsofRetrenchmentLibertarianssuggesttherearethreeprimarybenefitsretrenchmentwouldproduce.First,theUnitedStateswouldmaintainasmallermilitaryifitretrenched—reducingthefinancialburdenmilitaryspendingimposesontheAmericanpeople.Second,thereducedsizeofthemilitarywouldleadtoasmallernationalsecuritystatethatwouldbelessthreateningtoafreesociety.Third,becausethemilitarywouldbesmaller,andbecausethreatstothenationalinterestwouldbedefinedmorenarrowly,Americanpolicymakerswouldbelesslikelytogotowar.However,oncloseexamination,thesebenefitsareeithernotassignificantaslibertarianretrencherssuggestorareunlikelytomaterializealtogether.109OntheincreasedvulnerabilityofAmericanpowerprojectioncapabilities,seeEvanBradenMontgomery,"ContestedPrimacyintheWesternPacific:China'sRiseandtheFutureofU.S.PowerProjection,"InternationalSecurity38,no.4(Spring2014):115-49;andJerryHendrix,“WhatCostaCarrier?”March11,2013,(Washington,DC:CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity).Advancesintechnologiessuchasadditivemanufacturing,artificialintelligence,andunmannedvehiclesmaydrivedownthecostofA2/ADcapabilitiesevenfurther.SeeT.X.Hammes,"TechnologiesConvergeandPowerDiffuses:TheEvolutionofSmall,Smart,andCheapWeapons,"PolicyAnalysis,no.786(Washington,DC:CatoInstitute,January27,2016).Forsomeoftheconstraintsonthespreadoftheseweapons,seeAndreaGilliandMauroGilli,"TheDiffusionofDroneWarfare?Industrial,Organizational,andInfrastructuralConstraints,"SecurityStudies25,no.1(2016):50-84.110StevenMetz,"HastheUnitedStatesLosttheAbilitytoFightaMajorWar?"Parameters45,no.2(Summer2015):11.111OntheJacksoniantraditioninAmericanforeignpolicyseeWalterRussellMead,SpecialProvidence:AmericanForeignPolicyandHowItChangedtheWorld,1sted(NewYork:Knopf,2001),218-263.

25

Fromapurelyfinancialperspective,retrenchmentdoescostlessthanengagementonayear-to-yearbasis,butthisassessmentfailstotakeintoaccountthecostsofevenamildmilitarybuildup.Adetailedforcestructureassessmentisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.112However,anumberofanalystshaveprovidedestimatesforthesizeofthedefensebudgetasapercentageofgrossdomesticproductundertheirpreferredgrandstrategies.Posenestimatesthatthemilitaryunderretrenchmentwouldcost2.5percentofGDPannually.113AnumberofhawkishanalystsandpoliticiansovertheyearshaveproposedadefensebudgetpeggedtofourpercentofGDP.114WhilecurrentdefensespendingasapercentageofGDPistrendinglower,forthepurposesofthisanalysis,wecanassumethatagrandstrategyofengagementwouldrequirethatthreepercentofGDPisspentonthemilitary.115Thesizeoftheeconomyisaflawedwaytomeasuredefensespendingonayear-to-yearbasis,butthesefigurescanprovideausefulheuristicforjudgingthefinancialcostsofretrenchmentandengagementversusarelativelymildmilitarybuildup.116BasedonCongressionalBudgetOfficeprojectionsofeconomicgrowth,amilitarybuilduprequiringfourpercentofGDPannuallywouldcostmorethan$4.5trillionoverafive-yearperiodbeginningin2023.Incomparison,agrandstrategyofengagementrequiringthreepercentofGDPwouldcostlessthan$3.4trillionoverthesameperiod,whileagrandstrategyofretrenchmentrequiring2.5percentofGDPannuallywouldcost$2.8trillion.117TheUnitedStateswouldthereforespend$600billionmoreforagrandstrategyofengagementthanitwouldifitretrenched,but$1.1trillionlessthanundermildhypotheticalmilitarybuildupatfourpercentofGDP.ThebuilduptofourpercentofGDPwouldrequireanadditional$1.7trillioniftheUnitedStatesretrenches.118Thesavingsthatretrenchmentissupposedtoproducearetheproductofmaintainingasmallermilitary,butthatsmallermilitarywouldnotnecessarilyreducethethreatthenationalsecuritystateposestoa

112Foradetailedcomparisonofthecostofthedifferentmilitaryforcestructuresnecessaryfordifferentstrategicoptions,seeCohn,Boone,andMahnken,“HowMuchisEnough?:AlternativeDefenseStrategies.”113Posen,Restraint,163.114See,JimTalent,"More:TheCryingNeedforaBiggerU.S.Military,"NationalReview,March5,2007,30-35.ForacompilationofHeritageessaysontheidea,seeMackenzieM.Eaglen,“FourPercentforFreedom:TheNeedtoInvestMoreinDefense–SelectedWritings,”(Washington,DC:HeritageFoundation,2007).115BrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,127.116Ontheflawsinherentincomparingdefensespendingovertimeusinggrossdomesticproduct,seeMatthewFay,“When‘More’isMeaningless:TheCaseAgainstaFourPercentofGDPDefenseSpendingMinimum”(Washington,DC:NationalTaxpayersUnion,October2015). 117ThesefiguresarebasedonprojectionsofgrossdomesticproductinCongressionalBudgetOffice,AnUpdatetotheBudgetandEconomicOutlook:2017to2027(June29,2017),accessedOctober1,2017,availableat:https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52801.Thefigureswereadjustedforinflationto2017dollarsusingtheBureauofLaborStatisticsCPIInflationCalculator,availableat:https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.118ThesefiguresdonotaccountforpotentiallostrevenuefromdecreasedbilateraltradethatmightoccuriftheUnitedStatesrescindsitssecurityguarantees.ArecentRANDCorporationstudysuggeststheUnitedStateswouldloseupto$490billioninGDPeachyearfromlossoftradeingoodsandservicesfromafiftypercentretrenchment,whilePosen’sestimateofa2.5percentofGDPdefensespendingfromaneightypercentretrenchmentwouldprovideonly$139billioninadditionalGDPannually.SeeDanielEgel,AdamGrissom,JohnP.Godges,JenniferKavanaghandHowardShatz,“EstimatingtheValueofOverseasSecurityCommitments”(SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,2016),availableat:https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR518.html.However,thereisdisagreementfromsomeanalystsaboutwhethersecuritycommitmentsactuallyproduceincreasedbilateraltrade.SeeDrezner,"MilitaryPrimacyDoesn'tPay,"59-67.

26

freesocietyfortworeasons.First,themilitarywouldremainquitelargeeveniftheUnitedStatesretrenched.Asnotedabove,BenjaminFriedmanandChristopherPrebleestimatethattheU.S.military’sactive-dutyend-strengthcouldbereducedto949,000iftheUnitedStatesretrenched.Moreover,thoseforceswouldbegarrisonedathomeinsteadofonbasesoverseas.119Astandingmilitaryforceofthatsizewouldstillremainathreattoafreesocietyifusedfordomesticrepression.Theuseofthemilitaryfordomesticrepressionisanextremescenario,butthesecondreasonretrenchmentisunlikelytoprovebeneficialforafreesocietyhastodowiththeaspectsofnationalsecuritystatededicatedtoprosecutingthewaronterror.Retrenchersdonotconsiderterrorismamajorthreatandimplythatthoseaspectsofthenationalsecuritystatetocombatit,suchastheintelligencecommunity,willbecutbackinlinewithreductionsinthesizeofthemilitary.120However,mostAmericansdonotsharethisviewoftheterroristthreat.Inthe2016election80percentofvotersrankedterrorismasa“veryimportant”issue,secondonlytotheeconomy.121PoliticaldemandforrobusteffortstocombatterrorismisthereforelikelytoremainhigheveniftheUnitedStatesexitsitsalliancesandreducesthesizeofitsmilitary.Thereducedsizeofthemilitaryunderretrenchmentwouldalsobeunlikelytosignificantlyaffectpolicymakers’willingnesstouseit.Libertarianadvocatesofretrenchmentarecorrectwhentheyarguethatthemilitaryforcestructureandforward-deployedforcesrequiredfortheUnitedStatestomaintainitssecurityguaranteestemptsAmericanpolicymakerstousemilitaryforcepromiscuously.122However,reducingthesizeofthemilitarytothelevelsrequiredforretrenchmentisunlikelytosolvethisproblembecauseretrenchmentcannotstarvepolicymakersoftheforcesnecessarytoundertakeinterventions.EvenadvocatesforretrenchmentregularlyacknowledgethattheUnitedStateswouldretainthemostpowerfulmilitaryintheworldaftertheirstrategyisimplemented.123Moreover,retrenchmentassumesthattheUnitedStateswouldstillhavetoprojectpowergloballyunderspecificcircumstances.ItalsoassumestheUnitedStateswouldmaintainthenecessaryindustrialcapacitytoproduceadditionalpowerprojectioncapabilitiesinacrisis.Therefore,theforcestructuretheUnitedStateswouldpossessifitretrenchedwouldstillbedeployabletovarioustroublespotsaroundtheglobewhereAmericanleadersmaywishtointervene.Libertarianscannotguaranteethatpresidentswhoembracetheirworldviewwillbeelectedonaconsistentbasis.RetrenchmentreliesonthereductionofAmerica’s

119Onendingoverseasbasing,seeGlaser,“WithdrawingfromOverseasBases.”120FriedmanandPreble,"BudgetarySavingsfromMilitaryRestraint,"2&7.Onterrorismasaminorthreat,seeJohnMuellerandMarkG.Stewart,"TheTerrorismDelusion:America'sOverwroughtResponsetoSeptember11th,"InternationalSecurity37,no.1(2012):81-110.121“2016Campaign:StrongInterest,WidespreadDissatisfaction,”PewResearchCenter,July7,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/2016-campaign-strong-interest-widespread-dissatisfaction/.Trumpsupportersdemonstratedparticularconcernsaboutterrorism,with59percentofthemagreeingthatanti-terrorismpoliciestodate“hadnotgonefarenough.”SeeSamanthaSmith,“6ChartsthatShowWhereClintonandTrumpSupportersDiffer,”PewResearchCenter,“FactTank,”October20,2016,availableat:http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/20/6-charts-that-show-where-clinton-and-trump-supporters-differ/.122Preble,ThePowerProblem,87-88.SeealsoSapolsky,Friedman,Gholz,andPress,"RestrainingOrder,"87.123SeeBenjaminH.Friedman,BrendanRittenhouseGreen,andJustinLogan,in"DebatingAmericanEngagement:TheFutureofU.S.GrandStrategy."InternationalSecurity38,no.2(2013):188.

27

armedforcestopreventtheirpromiscuoususe,butthelogicofthestrategydemandsthatthemilitaryremaindeployable.Therefore,thetemptationtousemilitaryforcewouldremaineveniftheUnitedStatesretrenched.IftheUnitedStatespursuesretrenchmentasitsgrandstrategy,thebenefitsforafreesocietywouldbemarginal.Therearerealfinancialsavingsavailablefromthetypeofretrenchmentlibertariansenvision;yettheycouldvanishifevenamildmilitarybuildupisnecessary.Theaspectsofthenationalsecuritystatewiththemostpotentialtothreatenafreesocietywillremain.AndtheU.S.militarywillretaintheabilitytoprojectpoweraroundtheglobe,thusprovidingAmericanleadersthecontinuedabilitytousemilitaryforcepromiscuouslyshouldtheysochoose.

RethinkingLibertarianForeignPolicyTheargumentspresentedabovesuggestthatlibertariansshouldabandontheirdesireforAmericanretrenchmentandinsteadembraceanAmericanforeignpolicythatremainspoliticallyandmilitarilyengagedintheworld.Byparticipatinginsecurityinstitutions,theUnitedStatescancontinuetohelpreducesecuritycompetitionintheinternationalsystemandprovideincentivesforcooperationamongitsleadingpowers.Indoingso,itcancontinuetocontributetoaliberalinternationalorderthatfacilitatesamorepeacefulandopeninternationalsystemabroadandbetterservesafreesocietyathome.However,thatdoesnotmeanlibertariansshouldbesatisfiedwiththeforeignpolicystatusquo.Thissectiondiscussesthepolicyimplicationsofthisargument.Fromapolicyperspective,libertarianswouldbewellservedbyreformingexistingsecuritycommitments,ratherthanabandoningthemwholesale.Andwhilenotdiscussedinthispaper,theproperroleofthemilitaryinafreesocietyisanissueindireneedoflibertarianattention.124However,asthissectionexplains,themainpriorityforlibertarianforeignpolicyadvocatesshouldbepreventingtherecklessuseofU.S.militarypower.AdvocatesofretrenchmentassumeifthatifAmericaisnotrestrained,astheydefineit,itisthereforeunrestrained.125Thatis,theUnitedStateswillcontinuetousemilitaryforcefrequentlyandcounterproductivelyunlessitnarrowlydefinesitsinterestintermsofitsownsecurity,givesupitsalliances,andbringsitsforward-deployedmilitaryforceshome.Historyprovidessomeevidencetobackupthisassumption.WiththeendoftheColdWar,America’smilitarymightandlackofrivalsenabledmilitaryinterventionsinplacesrangingfromtheCaribbeantotheHornofAfricatotheBalkanstothePersianGulfandtheHinduKush—forreasonsrangingfromaltruistictovenaltofoolish.DuringtheColdWar,theUnitedStatestoooftenwenttowarbecauseofmisperceptionsaboutthespreadof

124Fortheauthor’stakeontheneedtoaddressthisissue,seeMatthewFay,“ValuingtheMilitaryinaLiberalSociety,”NiskanenCenter,July13,2017,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:https://niskanencenter.org/blog/valuing-military-liberal-society/.125BrooksandWohlforthcitethisasthereasontheyuse“retrenchment”whenreferringtothestrategytheyargueagainst:“[R]estraintisaveryaproblematicterm.Mostnotably,thetermimpliesthatthepursuitofdeepengagementis,andmustbe,‘unrestrained’regardingtheuseofforce.SeeBrooksandWohlforth,AmericaAbroad,4,fnii.

28

CommunismandbecauseAmericanleaderswronglybelievedtheyneededtoprovetheircredibilitytoallies.126Theseinterventionshavebeencostlyintermsoflives—bothofAmericanmilitarypersonnelandinnocentciviliansinforeignwarzones—andtreasure.Atthesametime,theperceptionthattheUnitedStatesisanaggressivemilitarypowerunderminestheliberalinternationalorderithelpedconstruct.127FormerSecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbrightinadvertentlysummedupthisproblemwhenshereportedlysaidtoformerChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffColinPowell,“What’sthepointofthissuperbmilitarythatyou’realwaystalkingaboutifwecan’tuseit?”128Toactasasecurityguarantor,theUnitedStatesisrequiredtomaintainasuperbmilitary.Yetpossessingsuchasuperbmilitaryandforwarddeployingtoittodeteraggressionandassurealliesinevitablytemptspolicymakerstouseit.Asdiscussedabove,theassumptionthatretrenchmentwouldsolvethisproblemisflawed.ThesuppositionthatretrenchmentwouldhelpavoidthepromiscuoususeofmilitaryforceispremisedonstarvingpolicymakersoftheforcesnecessarytoundertakewhatBrooksandWohlforthrefertoas“optional”militaryinterventions.However,asdiscussedabove,theUnitedStateswouldstillmaintainamilitarycapableofprojectingpowergloballyevenifitretrenched.129Libertariansputtingtheirhopeinretrenchmentasameanstodoingawaywiththepromiscuoususeofmilitaryforceareinrealitypinningtheirhopesontheconsistentelectionofpresidentswhosharetheirworld-view.RegardlessofwhoiselectedaftertheUnitedStatesretrenches,theywillstillretaina“superbmilitary”thatcanbeusedfrequently.Assumingthebenefitsofremainingengagedintheworldoutweighthoseofretrenchment,therearetwowaystoapproachthisproblem.First,theproblemcouldbeignored.Justaswiththeobjectionsnotedabove,thequestionofoptionalinterventionscouldbeweighedagainstthepotentialdangerthatincreasedsecuritycompetitionposestotheinternationalsystemandafreesociety.Majorpowerwarsarefarmoredestructive,deadly,andcostlythanAmerica’soptionalinterventions.Ifthemaintenanceofaliberalinternationalorderpreventswarsofthattype,andthemilitarymeansnecessarytounderpinthatordernecessarilytemptAmericanpolicymakerstointervenefrequentlyaroundtheglobe,thenperhapsitisnecessarytolivewithsuchoptionalinterventions.Livingwithpromiscuousinterventions,however,isnotanoptionlibertariansshouldchoose.Militaryinterventionsinevitablyleadtothedeathsofinnocentcivilians,theyimposelong-termcostsonAmericantaxpayers,theycanengenderblowbackthatperpetuatesacycleofviolence,andequipment126ThereissomeevidencetosuggestthatthedecisiontoescalateU.S.militaryinvolvementinVietnamwasduetoaperceivedneedtodemonstratethecredibilityofAmericanmilitarypower.SeeFrancisJ.Gavin,NuclearStatecraft:HistoryandStrategyinAmerica'sAtomicAge(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2013),92-94.ForanoverviewofthedebateabouttheperceivedneedfortheUnitedStatestodemonstratecredibility,seeMaxFisher,“TheCredibilityTrap,”Vox,April29,2016,accessedOctober18,2017,availableat:https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war.127Forexample,RussiajustifiesitsactionsinUkrainebycitingU.S.militaryinterventions.SeeKundani,“WhatistheLiberalInternationalOrder?”6.128ColinL.Powell,MyAmericanJourney(NewYork:RandomHouse,1995),576.129Advocatesforretrenchmentthemselvesarguethatevenaftercuttingthesizeofthemilitaryitwillremaina“militarywithglobalreachfarexceedinganyrival.”SeeFriedman,Green,andLogan,in"DebatingAmericanEngagement,”188.

29

usedinAmericanmilitaryinterventionshasevenbeenturnedagainstAmericancitizensthroughprogramsthatprovidesurplusU.S.militaryequipmenttolocalpolicedepartments.130InterventionsalsodrainAmericanpowerandunderminethelegitimacynecessaryforleadershipoftheliberalinternationalorder.131Instead,asecondoptionisforlibertarianstofindpoliciesthatinhibittheuseofmilitaryforce.LibertarianshavefrequentlycalledforCongresstoreassertitsprerogativeswhenitcomestodeclaringwar,buttonoavail.TheyrightlyacknowledgethatCongresshasincentivestoconsistentlypuntonitsresponsibilitytooverseetheuseofmilitaryforce.Doingsoallowslegislatorstoclaimcreditwhenaconflictgoeswellortoblametheexecutivebranchwhenawargoespoorly.132However,evenifCongressweretotakebackitspowertoauthorizemilitaryaction,debatingandauthorizingtheuseofmilitaryforcewouldnotpreventpromiscuousorcounterproductivemilitaryactions.133TheUnitedStatescanintervenesofrequentlyabroadbecausethecostsofdoingsohavelittledirectimpactontheAmericanpeopleintermsofeitherbloodortreasure.OnlyasmallpercentageoftheAmericanpeopleserveinthemilitary.FewAmericanswilllosetheirlivesincombatorevenknowsomeonewhohas.134America’swarsinrecentyearshavebeendebt-financed.ThefinancialcostsofwararethereforeinvisibleanddonotaffectthevastmajorityoftheAmericanpeopleinanytangibleway.Whilethepubliclamentsincreasingdebt,theydonotrespondtoitinthesamewaytheydoincreasedtaxesbecausetheindividualfinancialimpactisdeferred.135ThattheAmericanpublicisinsulatedfromthecostsofwarmeanstheyhavelittleincentivetoholdaccountablethepoliticianswhoinitiateandoverseetheuseofmilitaryforce.InsteadoftryingtooverthrowseventyyearsofU.S.foreignpolicyinwaysthatareriskyandcounterproductivefromtheperspectiveofapeacefulworldandafreesociety,libertariansarebetterservedfindingwaystointernalizethecostsofAmerica’swars.Bringingbackthemilitarydraftisonewaytodoso.136However,conscriptionisantitheticaltobothlibertarianprinciplesandtheneedsofamodernmilitary.Recent

130OntheprogramtosellsurplusmilitaryequipmenttolocalpoliceforcesintheUnitedStates,seeRadleyBalko,RiseoftheWarriorCop:TheMilitarizationofAmerica'sPoliceForces(NewYork:PublicAffairs,2013),301-303.131Drezner,"MilitaryPrimacyDoesn'tPay,”73.TheCostofWarProjectatBrownUniversity’sWatsonCenterforInternationalandPublicAffairsestimatedthatasofNovember2017thewarssince2001havecost$5.6trillion.SeeNetaC.Crawford,“UnitedStatesBudgetaryCostsofPost-9/11WarsThrough2018:ASummaryofthe$5.6TrillioninCostsfortheU.S.WarsinIraq,Syria,Afghanistan,andPakistan,andPost-9/11VeteransCareandHomelandSecurity,”(Providence,RI:WatsonInstituteforInternationalandPublicAffairs,BrownUniversity,November2017),availableat:http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/news/Costs%20of%20U.S.%20Post-9_11%20NC%20Crawford%20FINAL%20.pdf.132Foragooddiscussionofthisproblem,seeGeneHealy,TheCultofthePresidency:America'sDangerousDevotiontoExecutivePower(Washington,D.C.:CatoInstitute,2008).133SeeMatthewFay,“AuthorizingMilitaryForceisNecessary,butInsufficient,”TheHill,October4,2017,accessedOctober4,2017,availableat:http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/353829-authorizing-military-force-is-necessary-but-insufficient.134ForagoodoverviewoftheboththebenefitsandpotentialnegativeconsequencesoftheshrinkingsizeoftheU.S.militaryanditsrecruitingpool,seeAmySchafer,“GenerationsofWar:TheRiseoftheWarriorCasteandtheAll-VolunteerForce”(Washington,DC:CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,May8,2017).135Forthereasonswhyreductionsinrevenuedonotleadtoreduceddemandsforgovernmentservices,seeWilliamA.Niskanen,"LimitingGovernment:TheFailureof"StarvetheBeast,”TheCatoJournal26,no.3(2006):553-558.136MichaelC.HorowitzandMatthewS.Levendusky,"DraftingSupportforWar:ConscriptionandMassSupportforWarfare,"TheJournalofPolitics73,no.2(2011):524-34.

30

experimentalresearchinsteadsuggeststhataspecial-purposetaxtopayfortheuseofforcemaybeamorerealisticoption.137

ConclusionAsmallnumberoflibertarianspinnedtheirhopesontheideathatDonaldTrump’s“AmericaFirst”foreignpolicymeanttheUnitedStateswoulddolessabroad.Doingless,manylibertariansassume,willmeantheUnitedStateswillbeatwarlessfrequently,itcanreducethesizeofitsmilitary,andafreesocietywillflourish.WhileTrump’smilitarismandhostilitytothefreemovementofgoodsandpeopleshouldhavemadehimunacceptablefromalibertarianperspective,theforeignpolicyretrenchmentthatsomelibertarianssawunderlyinghisAmericaFirstsloganisalsounlikelytofacilitatethetypeoffreesocietylibertariansseek.Libertarianendsarebetterservedbyagrandstrategyofengagementintheworld.Agrandstrategyofengagementpresentsrisksandtemptations.However,therisksofretrenchmentarehigher.Itrequiresrunninganaturalexperimentintheenduranceoftheliberalinternationalorder,whileprovidingfewbenefitsforafreesociety.InsteadofattemptingtooverthrowsevendecadesofAmericanforeignpolicyinwaysthatcouldleadtoamoreconflict-proneworld,libertariansshouldfindwaystointernalizethecostsofwartodiscouragethepromiscuoususeofmilitaryforce.

137GustavoA.Flores-MacíasandSarahE.Kreps,"BorrowingSupportforWar:TheEffectofWarFinanceonPublicAttitudestowardConflict,"JournalofConflictResolution61,no.5(2017):997-1020;andDouglasKriner,BreannaLechase,andRosellaCappellaZielinski,"Self-Interest,Partisanship,andtheConditionalInfluenceofTaxationonSupportforWarintheUSA,"ConflictManagementandPeaceScience(2015):1-22.