Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Casefor an Unconditional Basic Income

STUART WHITE1

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real

Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the

objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI)

would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the e�orts of, and so exploit,

working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' `external assets argument' for UBI, and

®nds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI

with the reciprocity principle which underpins this `exploitation objection'. It

considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must

be grounded in a distributive principle which contradicts the egalitarian commitment

to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to

articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.

`. . . property is moral and healthy only when it is used as a condition, not ofidleness, but of activity, and when it involves the discharge of de®nite

personal obligations'. R. H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (London, Bell,(1921) 1933), p. 95.

In a number of advanced capitalist countries, there is currently a growinginterest in the idea of unconditional basic income: an income paid to eachcitizen (a) on an individual basis, (b) irrespective of income from other sources,and (c) without regard to past or present work performance or willingness toaccept a job if o�ered. Introduction of an unconditional basic income (UBIhereafter) is variously seen as an e�ective, incentives-friendly means ofpreventing poverty; as a way of redressing the inequalities, and reversing thesocial exclusion, produced by mass unemployment; and, by some, as a way offostering the development of a freer, less alienated society. Supporters disagreeas to the size of the UBI which should be aimed at, but many argue that thelong-term goal should be an UBI set at or close to a level su�cient to cover astandard set of basic needs, or what we may call a `substantial' UBI.The UBI proposal is apparently vulnerable, however, to at least one serious

ethical objection. Payment of a substantial UBI, it is objected, will lead to theexploitation of productive, tax-paying citizens by those who, while capable ofworking, instead choose to live o� their UBI. If a compelling case for theintroduction of a substantial UBI is to be made, supporters of the proposal

#Political Studies Association 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

1 I would especially like to thank Brian Barry, Amy Gutmann, David Miller, Debra Satz, PhilippeVan Parijs, Albert Weale, Andrew Williams, an anonymous referee, and members of the Nu�eldCollege Political Theory Workshop, for their comments on various earlier drafts of this paper.

Political Studies (1997), XLV, 312±326

must attempt to defuse this `exploitation objection'. Stating the challenge inmore general terms, they must show how the proposal can be plausiblygrounded in an attractive theory of distributive justice. In an importantrecent book, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?,2

Philippe Van Parijs has risen to this challenge, attempting to show how a liberalegalitarian conception of justice directly supports the introduction of asubstantial UBI. As a contribution to the emerging debate over the desirabilityof UBI I therefore propose in this paper to examine the key arguments of VanParijs' book and to consider whether these provide a successful response to theexploitation objection. While Van Parijs is far from being the only politicalphilosopher to have grappled with these issues, my exclusive focus on his workfor purposes of this paper is readily justi®ed by the fact that Real Freedom forAll presents what is easily the most meticulous and systematic argument for theUBI proposal published to date.I begin with a brief reconstruction of Van Parijs's central argument for a

substantial UBI, as set out in Real Freedom for All, which we may term the`external assets argument'. I then elaborate the exploitation objection to UBI,paying special attention to the reciprocity principle which underpins theobjection. This preliminary work complete, I consider whether Van Parijs'external assets argument is adequate to rebut the exploitation objection, andcontend that, taken by itself, it largely fails in this respect. However, Van Parijsalso argues against the exploitation objection (in ch. 5 of Real Freedom for All )by pointing to ethically unattractive properties of the distributive principleswhich he claims may be taken to underpin the objection. He points, inparticular, to the apparent incompatibility between these principles and theegalitarian commitment to minimize inequality attributable to di�erential bruteluck. I argue that this second `brute luck argument' also fails as a rebuttal of theexploitation objection because it is possible to ground the objection in otherdistributive principles, not considered by Van Parijs, which are not vulnerableto the criticism that they sanction brute luck inequalities in income (or `realfreedom'). I tentatively conclude, therefore, that Van Parijs has (thus far)failed to provide a convincing response to the exploitation objection to theintroduction of a substantial UBI.

The External Assets Argument Stated

I begin with a reconstruction of Van Parijs' central `external assets argument'for the introduction of a substantial UBI. The argument has essentially ®vesteps. The ®rst step introduces a foundational moral principle, implicit in muchrecent liberal egalitarian thinking about social justice, which we may refer to asthe equal opportunity principle:P1 Each person should have equal opportunity to pursue a conception of the

good life.`Opportunity' refers here to an individual's positive ability to pursue a con-

ception of the good, an ability conferred by command over resources (which,following Ronald Dworkin, includes not only commodities but also internal

2 P. Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1995).

Debate 313

#Political Studies Association, 1997

capacities); combined with `formal freedom', opportunity establishes what VanParijs terms the `real freedom' to pursue a conception of the good.3 In speakingof `equal' opportunity we mean, roughly, that individuals should not berelatively disadvantaged in terms of their positive ability to pursue a conceptionof the good, i.e., in the resource bundles available to them, as a result of factorsthat are beyond their control, matters of so-called `brute luck',4 such asdi�erences in natural ability which a�ect their prospects for earning income.For Van Parijs, as for most liberal egalitarians, commitment to the simpleprinciple stated in P1 is quali®ed in two ways. First, the application of theprinciple is subject to the constraint that we respect the basic liberties of theperson; in general, movements towards greater equality of opportunity may notbe made if these violate basic liberties. Secondly, movements away from strictequality are regarded as justi®able if the opportunity and real freedom of thegroup worst-o� under the ensuing inequality is higher than it would be under amore strictly egalitarian regime.5 For present purposes, however, I do not thinkanything of substance will be lost, and our exposition will be greatly simpli®ed,if we conveniently set these quali®cations aside.Now, individual opportunity and real freedom are centrally determined by

personal endowments of external wealth and individuals' respective internalcapacities (skills, handicaps, etc.). Exactly what counts as `external wealth' forpresent purposes will be clari®ed shortly. For the moment, let us simply notethat if we make the simplifying assumption that individuals have identicalinternal capacities,6 P1 appears to imply that:P2 Each person is entitled to an equal share of available external wealth.And one way of interpreting P2, which I will explain in a moment, is:P3 Each person is entitled to an unconditional income equal to the value of a

per capita share of available external wealth.To the proposition made in P3, Van Parijs then adds the following empirical

claim:P4 In the circumstances of at least some of the advanced capitalist countries

today, an income equal to the value of a per capita share of external wealth willbe a substantial income (i.e., one that is at, or close to, a level su�cient to covera standard set of basic needs).7

From P3 and P4, we then have:P5 In at least some advanced capitalist countries today, each citizen is entitled

to an unconditional basic income set at or close to a level su�cient to cover astandard set of basic needs.This is obviously a rather breathless summary of the argument, so let me try

to elaborate it a little, beginning with the right described in P2. P2 asserts thateach person has a right to an equal share of available external wealth. Imagine,then, an island populated by two individuals, May and June, upon which there

3 Here I follow Van Parijs, Real Freedom, pp. 21±4.4 On the notion of brute luck inequality, see especially G. A. Cohen, `On the currency of

egalitarian justice', Ethics 99 (1989), 906±44.5 Van Parijs' acceptance of these two quali®cations is expressed in his de®nition (Real Freedom,

p. 27) of a `free society' as `one in which people's opportunities are being leximinned subject to theprotection of their formal freedom . . . of a structure of rights that incorporates self-ownership'.

6 Internal capacities include talents and handicaps.7 Indeed, it could conceivably be even higher than this.

314 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997

is one type of homogeneous external asset, `land'.8 The right described in P2 canthen be straightforwardly interpreted to mean that May and June are eachentitled to equally sized shares of this land. However, the following questionnow arises: Should May and June be allowed to trade use-rights over theirrespective land shares? From the perspective of promoting each party's realfreedom to pursue a conception of the good, there is a very strong case forallowing them to do so. Both parties may be better able to pursue theirrespective conceptions of the good as a result. May, for example, has a verycorn-intensive conception of the good, and would value the extra corn she canget by farming June's share of land in addition to her own. June, on the otherhand, has a very leisure-intensive conception of the good, and would value theextra leisure she can get by leasing out her land share to May in return for ashare of the corn which May produces on it.The corn which June receives in return for her land share is an unconditional

`corn income' equal to the `corn price' of a per capita share of the available land,an income payment which is ®nanced entirely by May who appropriates theland for personal use. Granting each person an equal tradeable share ofavailable external wealth thus appears equivalent to granting each person anunconditional income equal to the value of a per capita share of this wealth,®nanced entirely by those who appropriate the relevant assets for personal use.Thus are we able to move from P2 to P3, which says that each person has a rightto an unconditional income equal to the value of a per capita share of availableexternal wealth. Those who appropriate this wealth, like May, are also entitledto this income, but they also have a tax liability equal to the value of the wealththey have appropriated.Now, returning from this desert island to our own world, what kinds of things

are thought to count as external wealth for purposes of ®nancing an uncondi-tional income of this sort? Van Parijs argues that in addition to naturalresources, transfers (i.e., gifts, bequests, and inheritances) of non-natural wealthshould also be included in the tax base for ®nancing an UBI.9 However, the UBIwhich could be ®nanced from these sources alone would not be substantial,probably well below the level necessary to cover a standard set of basic needs,and this prompts a search for other things that might plausibly be construed asexternal wealth, and so legitimately entered into the UBI tax base.Van Parijs makes the ingenious suggestion that jobs constitute a form of

external wealth in the required sense. Clearly, in societies like our own, jobs arevitally important determinants of life-chances, both because of the intrinsicbene®ts which employment can confer, e.g., opportunities to develop anddisplay various skills, or to socialize purposively with others, and because of theaccess which a wage provides to the social product. However, individuals arefrequently unable to obtain employment though they have the requisite skillsfor a given type of work, and are willing to work at, or slightly below, theprevailing real wage for work of that kind. Van Parijs argues that even undercompetitive conditions such involuntary unemployment is likely to arisebecause certain of the assumptions underpinning the in¯uential Walrasianmodel of the economy, in which there are no frustrated buyers and sellers inequilibrium, do not in fact hold in the real world. Firstly, in contrast to what is

8 This example and explication follows Van Parijs, Real Freedom, pp. 98±100.9 See Van Parijs, Real Freedom, p. 101.

Debate 315

#Political Studies Association, 1997

assumed in the standardWalrasian model, in the real world there may often be apositive relationship between worker productivity and the real wage; higherwages may have motivation e�ects that increase productivity and pro®tabilityso that ®rms have no incentive to allow currently unemployed workers to bidwages down to a market-clearing level. Secondly, in contrast to what isassumed in the standard Walrasian model, in the real world there are turnovercosts (costs associated with the ®ring of existing employees, and the hiringand training of new workers), the existence of which enables existing `insider'employees to claim a wage in excess of the wage at which unemployed`outsiders' are willing to work, without prompting their employer to hire theseoutsiders who are willing to work for less.10 In such a non-Walrasian world,where involuntary unemployment persists in competitive equilibrium, there willbe a signi®cant inequality in opportunity between those `insiders' fortunateenough to be in employment, and the involuntarily unemployed, the `outsiders',who are trapped, at least for some period of time, on the short-side of the labourmarket.Now an important corollary of this equilibrium involuntary unemployment is

the existence of substantial employment rents enjoyed by those fortunate enoughto be in employment, which are given by the di�erence between the wage theyreceive and the hypothetical market-clearing wage. Van Parijs' innovativeproposal is that we address the inequalities arising from job scarcity by includ-ing these employment rents in the tax base for ®nancing an UBI. The underlyingrationale for this proposal is essentially the same as the rationale for includingthe value of natural resources and transfers of other kinds of physical asset inthe UBI tax base. In the same way we thought of May and June as having rightsto equal tradeable shares of land on their desert island, or equivalently, to anunconditional income equal to the value of a per capita share of this land, VanParijs argues that we may regard the citizens of a non-Walrasian society ashaving rights to equal tradeable shares of available jobs, or equivalently, to an(additional) unconditional income equal to the value of a per capita share ofavailable jobs; and this amounts, Van Parijs tells us, to giving each person anequal share in the employment rents arising from job scarcity.11 These rents willbe particularly large when involuntary unemployment is high, but may still beconsiderable even if everybody has a job, because some of those with relativelypoor jobs may want and be able to do more attractive jobs at, or slightly below,the relevant prevailing wage. Van Parijs argues that once the UBI tax base isaccordingly expanded to include these employment rents, it becomes largeenough to ®nance a substantial UBI.12 Inclusion of `job assets' in the UBI taxbase thus enables Van Parijs to make the empirical claim contained in P4, whichtogether with P3, gives us the radical conclusion expressed in P5.This, then, is the external assets argument for a substantial UBI. In terms of

its underlying structure, the argument actually has a long historical pedigree. It

10 The focus on motivation e�ects is characteristic of recent `e�ciency wage' theories ofunemployment, and the focus on turnover costs, of recent `insider-outsider' theories. See A.Lindbeck, `The microfoundations of unemployment theory', Labour 5 (1991), 3±23.

11 See Van Parijs, Real Freedom, pp. 106±9.12 Once employment rents are included in the UBI tax base `it is then no longer ludicrous to

suggest that the non-discriminatory concern with people's access to the means for the pursuit oftheir conceptions of the good life, the leximinning of real freedom, should demand that people begiven an adequate basic income' (Real Freedom, p. 108).

316 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997

can be seen, in particular, as a modernized version of the old agrarian radicalargument for a universal endowment grounded in each individual's right to afair share of natural resources (or `land').13 The novelty in Van Parijs' version ofthe argument consists in attempting to expand the range of the traditionalagrarian radical argument from land to cover other assets, including, mostimportantly, so-called job assets.One potential di�culty with this argument arises when we relax the

provisional assumption of identical internal capacities. For if internal capacitiesdi�er, the equal opportunity principle requires that we make specially targetedpayments out of the external wealth fund to compensate those with relativelypoor capacities, using only the residual to ®nance an UBI. This will clearlyreduce the size of the UBI which can be ®nanced out of a given external wealthfund, and we may then be unable to ®nance a substantial UBI even afteremployment rents have been added to the fund. For present purposes, however,let us set this possible di�culty aside, and assume that a substantial UBI canindeed be ®nanced from the sources Van Parijs identi®es even after we havemade adequate compensatory transfers to those with poor internal capacities.14

This leaves us free to concentrate on the line of criticism alluded to in theintroduction. Consider again the `right to an equal share of external wealth'expressed in P2. The line of criticism I am about to describe does not involve asimple rejection of this right, but rather, a modi®cation of it that blocksderivation of an unconditional income. The argument runs as follows: In thecase of some types of external wealth, the right described in P2 carries with it, asa matter of reciprocity, a corresponding obligation to make a productive con-tribution to the community in which the relevant forms of wealth are produced.To claim a share of such wealth without being willing to make this contributionis unfairly to free-ride on those citizens who do make the required contribution.If this unfairness is to be avoided, receipt of an equal share of the relevant typesof external wealth must be made conditional on a demonstrated willingness tomake the required contribution. And it is therefore inappropriate to redistributesuch wealth in the form of an UBI precisely because doing so would disconnectenjoyment of this wealth from making the relevant contribution, and wouldthus permit free-riding. This is, of course, the exploitation objection to UBI,and it is to the further clari®cation of this objection that I therefore now turn.

The Exploitation Objection Stated

To understand the exploitation objection we must ®rst consider what principleof justice is allegedly violated by non-contributing, but productively able,recipients of an UBI. The relevant principle here is a reciprocity principle,according to which: those who willingly enjoy the economic bene®ts of socialcooperation have a corresponding obligation to make a productive contribu-tion, if they are so able, to the cooperative community which provides thesebene®ts. The essential intuition here is that where others bear some cost in order

13 This argument can be found, for example, in H. Spencer, Social Statics (Johnathan Chapman,(1st ed.) 1851), and H. George, Progress and Poverty (New York, The Robert SchlakenbachFoundation, 1962 [1879]).

14 Van Parijs' response to this potential di�culty takes up ch. 3 of Real Freedom, pp. 58±88. I willnot attempt to evaluate the adequacy of the response here.

Debate 317

#Political Studies Association, 1997

to contribute to a scheme of cooperation, then it is unfair for one willingly toenjoy the intended bene®ts of their cooperative e�orts (to a non-trivial degree)unless one is willing to bear the cost of making a relevantly proportionatecontribution to this scheme of cooperation in return.15 To willingly enjoy suchcooperative bene®ts without being willing to make such a reciprocal contribu-tion is to claim access to these bene®ts on what are necessarily advantagedterms, thereby treating one's fellow citizens (to put the point in Kantian terms)as if they were just instruments to one's own well-being.Theories of justice which make explicit appeal to the notion of reciprocity are

often thought, however, to have anti-egalitarian implications. This is becausereciprocity is usually conceived as requiring something like a strict proportion-ality between the value of the bene®ts an individual enjoys and the value of his/her productive contribution. Whether value is understood in market-based orMarxian terms, di�erences in the value of individuals' respective contributionswill, to some controversial extent, re¯ect brute luck di�erences in personalcharacteristics, e.g., in natural productive skill; a distribution of bene®ts inaccordance with this conception of reciprocity will re¯ect these brute luckdi�erences, and will therefore violate the equal opportunity principle. As Marxput it, a distributive rule of this kind `tacitly recognizes unequal individualendowment and thus the productive capacity of the worker as naturalprivileges'.16

However, the reciprocity principle need not be interpreted in this way; it canand (from a liberal egalitarian perspective) should be interpreted in a way thatrenders it consistent with the equal opportunity principle. Such a conception ofreciprocity must: (a) link income entitlement to productive contribution (for theproductively able), but without (b) supporting income inequalities that re¯ectbrute luck di�erences in productive ability, or (c) prohibiting the income di�er-entiation necessary to equalize opportunity amongst diverse individuals withbrute luck di�erences in degrees of `neediness' (e.g., in the amount of foodneeded to be well-nourished). In short, we need to formulate the reciprocityprinciple something as follows: Each person is entitled to a share of theeconomic bene®ts of social cooperation conferring equal opportunity (or realfreedom) in return for the performance of an equal handicap-weighted17

quantum of contributive activity (hours of socially useful work, let us say,weighted by labour intensity).According to this egalitarian conception of reciprocity, entitlement to a given

share of the economic bene®ts of social cooperation entails a correspondingobligation to make a productive contribution, but there is no presumption thatone's contribution must be equal or directly proportional in value to the value

15 Why add the quali®er `intended' to `cooperative bene®ts'? Because if A and B cooperate toproduce a good, X, which has as an unintended side-product, Y, it is not clear that (able-bodied) Cis free-riding on, and thus exploiting, A and B, if she willingly partakes of Y, while still refrainingfrom consumption of X. Intended economic bene®ts of social cooperation are, paradigmatically,the ¯ows of intentionally produced goods and services in an economy that provide, though notexhaustively, the material basis for the pursuit of individuals' respective conceptions of the good.

16 K. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (Peking, 1976), p. 16.17 Individuals may su�er `productive handicaps' which limit their ability to engage in production.

Contributive activity is then properly weighted by degree of productive handicap so that theseindividuals need not perform the same number of `raw' hours of socially useful labour to be entitledto a given level of income as those who su�er no such handicap.

318 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997

of the bene®ts one receives. Intuitively, reciprocity is now conceived not as amatter of `putting in as much as one takes out', but of `doing one's bit'.The old slogan, `from each according to his ability, to each according to his

needs', arguably embodies exactly this egalitarian conception of reciprocity,though the underlying idea has potentially much wider application. Suppose,for example, that one rejected the thorough-going equalization of opportunityimplied by this slogan (e.g., because one thought that any attempt to implementsuch a comprehensive egalitarianism would violate certain basic liberties), butthat one accepted a more modest principle according to which each citizen has aright to an income su�cient to maintain a basic level of opportunity or realfreedom. In this case, the egalitarian conception of reciprocity implies that inreturn for this decent minimum of income each citizen has a correspondingobligation to perform a decent minimum of contributive activity, the size of thisminimum varying with degree of productive handicap. We may refer to this asbaseline reciprocity.This notion of baseline reciprocity may then be ¯eshed out for policy

purposes by reference to the notion of a `reasonable work expectation', withattention being given to two sets of considerations in de®ning what counts as areasonable work expectation for any given citizen. Firstly, there are considera-tions relating to the duration of work activity. Given existing technology andgenerally prevailing assumptions concerning the minimally desirable level ofmaterial well-being we wish to make available to all, we may begin by positingsome standard work expectation for an independent adult citizen (at, say,35 hours a week). We may then modify this expectation (downwards) to allowfor other forms of contributive activity than paid labour (such as some kinds ofdomestic care work); thus, an individual who has to balance nurturing andbreadwinning roles, such as a single parent, will not necessarily be expected toperform as much work in the formal economy as an individual without suchcaring responsibilities.18 Secondly, there are considerations relating to di�er-ences in productive capacity and opportunity. Those who su�er signi®cantproductive handicaps, for example, should be altogether exempted from thework expectation; and in the case of those who are unemployed, the requirementwould be that the individual make a conscientious e�ort to ®nd a job. Moregenerally, the work expectation may be regarded as reasonable only if theproductively capable individual has some minimally adequate range of types ofwork realistically open to her (which in turn implies access to a high minimumof education and training).19 Baseline reciprocity would then require that all

18 The contributive status of various kinds of domestic labour is a complex issue and spaceprevents me from exploring it in the depth it warrants here. Also bracketed in this discussion is the noless important question of the contributive status of the capitalist, i.e., one who supplies capital forproductive purposes rather than working. For present purposes I make the provisional and simpli-fying assumption that personal contribution takes the form of work, and add to this the assumptionthat some forms of domestic care work do count, to some (here unelaborated) extent, as contributive.

19 Put another way, the condition is that the individual must have at least some minimumthreshold level of marketable talent in order to acquire obligations under the principle of baselinereciprocity. This condition is added so as to ensure that no productively capable individual isconstrained over the long-term to satisfy the work expectation by working at an objectively highlyunpleasant job (which would be a noxious form of brute luck disadvantage). My working assump-tion is that this goal can be achieved by ensuring that all citizens have access to a high minimum ofeducation and training. Those whose level of talent simply cannot be raised su�ciently througheducation to satisfy this condition may be regarded as su�ciently productively handicapped as to beexempt from the work expectation.

Debate 319

#Political Studies Association, 1997

those receiving a decent minimum of income ± an income that places themabove the poverty line ± satisfy their suitably adjusted reasonable work expecta-tion. By the same token, it would also require that all those who satisfy thisreasonable work expectation receive at least a decent minimum of income.The exploitation objection to a substantial UBI may then be stated more

exactly as follows: Those who willingly enjoy a decent minimum of theeconomic bene®ts of social cooperation without satisfying their suitablyadjusted reasonable work expectation violate the principle of baseline recipro-city, and thereby take unfair advantage of ± i.e., exploit ± those citizens whodo satisfy this expectation; payment of a substantial UBI is therefore unjustbecause, by completely detaching the receipt of a decent minimum of theeconomic bene®ts of social cooperation from the satisfaction of a suitablyde®ned reasonable work expectation, it makes possible exploitation of this kind.

The External Assets Argument Evaluated

Does Van Parijs' external assets argument o�er a rebuttal of the exploitationobjection? In approaching this question, it will help if we distinguish three typesof external wealth that, according to P2, each individual has an equal right to:(l) pure natural resources;20 (2) transfers of non-natural wealth; and (3) jobassets. The UBI which Van Parijs seeks to defend can be seen as being built upin three `layers' from each of these sources, and we may evaluate the vulner-ability of his argument to the exploitation objection by considering how ± if atall ± the objection applies to each respective layer.As regards the ®rst layer, derived from taxation of pure natural resource

values, I think the exploitation objection has limited force. Why? Recall that thereciprocity principle on which the objection is based applies to the economicbene®ts of social cooperation. Pure natural resources, however, do not originatefrom the e�orts of social cooperation; they are, so to speak, the pre-existingmaterial on which social cooperators (or non-cooperating hermits) go to work.The distribution of these resources, or their monetized equivalent, thus appearsto lie largely outside the scope of application of the reciprocity principle. Byvirtue of the `pre-social' status of these resources, we may say that each person isentitled to an equal share of them, or their value, simply qua person, and thatthis entitlement carries no (or only a very modest)21 corresponding obligation tocontribute productively to a given cooperative community.22 Thus, at least somesort of UBI, ®nanced from the taxation of pure natural resource values, is

20 By `pure natural resources' I mean natural resources in their natural, unimproved state, and the`value' of pure natural resources is simply the value of natural resources in this state, e.g., the value apiece of land has in virtue of its natural fertility, deducting any value added by human improve-ments to its fertility.

21 Presumably there has to be some sort of state apparatus to enforce the right in question, inwhich case it can be argued that individuals owe some portion of their natural resource UBI back tosociety in return for the services this apparatus provides; equivalently, we may say that a portion ofthe UBI is paid as income in kind, in the form of these services, with the general cash payment beingcorrespondingly reduced. I thank Amy Gutmann for raising this point.

22 A `cooperative community' is here conceived as an association of persons engaged in sustainedeconomic cooperation on the basis of ground-rules that re¯ect a shared, public conception ofjustice; in the case of a liberal egalitarian cooperative community, this conception of justice willincorporate the equal opportunity and reciprocity principles discussed above.

320 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997

arguably resistant to the exploitation objection. However, such an UBI wouldnot be su�cient to cover a standard set of basic needs (even before we take intoaccount the way the UBI fund may be reduced by morally prior transfers tothose with poor internal capacities).23 To get an UBI closer to this level, onemust add the value of the latter two types of external wealth ± transfers of non-natural physical wealth and job assets ± to the UBI tax base.It is at this point, however, that the exploitation objection does appear to have

force. Consider the nature of these assets. What I have termed `non-naturalwealth' consists of a diverse range of resources, but they have in commonthat they are largely products of labour in a cooperative community and maythus be considered `economic bene®ts of social cooperation'. Job assets arenot economic bene®ts of social cooperation in quite the same sense; never-theless, jobs can only constitute a type of asset in the context of a cooperativecommunity ± there are no jobs in the state of nature ± and, as I noted above, amajor reason for regarding jobs as assets is precisely that in societies like ourown they are the primary means of gaining access, via a wage, to what Milltermed `the bene®ts of combined labour'. In other words, it is sensible to seejobs as assets precisely because of the access they confer to the economic bene®tsof social cooperation. Consequently, when individuals claim a right to an equalshare of transfers of non-natural wealth and/or of job assets, these claims mayreasonably be interpreted as falling under the more general heading of a claim toa fair share of the economic bene®ts of social cooperation. But if this is so, thenit would seem to follow that these claims also fall within the scope of applicationof the reciprocity principle. And if that is so, then it would seem inappropriateto distribute these assets, or the income derived from the taxation of their value,in the form of (additional) UBI. Why? Because doing so would enable citizensto share in what are, in a direct or mediated sense, economic bene®ts of socialcooperation, without demonstrating a willingness to make a correspondingproductive contribution.I must admit, however, of at least one quali®cation to this argument, con-

cerning transfers of non-natural wealth. Imagine that ®ve people suddenly ®ndthemselves on a desert island and begin economic cooperation. Ten years laterthey all simultaneously die, to be replaced by ®ve new people. In addition to astock of natural resources, these people ®nd on the island a stock of machinesproduced by the previous generation. It seems reasonable to treat these assets injust the same way as pure natural resources, and thus, to enter them into theUBI tax base. Those who decline to engage in economic cooperation cannot besaid to be free-riding on the cooperative e�orts of co-existent individuals whodo choose to engage in such cooperation if they appropriate an equal share ofthese assets for these assets exist, like pure natural resources, prior to/independently of present-day cooperative e�orts. The implication is that wherenon-natural physical wealth is the product of members of past generations, whowere not co-existent with contemporary prospective recipients of this non-natural wealth, the assets in question are properly treated in the same manner aspure natural resources, and transfers of this portion of the existing stock of

23 Van Parijs states this quite explicitly in an earlier paper, `Competing Justi®cations of BasicIncome' in Van Parijs (ed.), Arguing for Basic Income (London, Verso, 1992), p. 13. It is alsoimplied by his claim in Real Freedom, p. 102, that the UBI ®nanced only from our ®rst two layers islikely to range from `the pathetically low to the frankly negligible'.

Debate 321

#Political Studies Association, 1997

non-natural wealth may therefore be taxed to ®nance an UBI. However, whilethis will boost the UBI justi®ed by the external assets argument to some extent,it is unlikely, as Van Parijs would admit, to boost the relevant tax basesu�ciently to support the introduction of a substantial UBI.24

Putting this quali®cation to one side, if the foregoing analysis is correct, thenin order to prevent free-rider exploitation it would seem appropriate to makeconditional the share out of employment rents and (some portion of) the valueof transfers of non-natural wealth on willingness to make the minimumproductive contribution required by the principle of baseline reciprocity. Theexternal wealth fund should be redistributed in some form other than an UBI, insome manner that links participation in the fund with contributive activity.There are a number of possibilities here. One noteworthy possibility would be

to use the relevant funds to ®nance the introduction of a universal `basic capital'grant. On maturity, each citizen would receive a capital grant which he/shecould then use to ®nance a range of approved projects broadly relating toproductive participation in the economy, such as education and training, theestablishment of a new business, and so on.25 Other possibilities include usingthe funds to ®nance employment subsidies to prevent long-term unemployment,and/or a modest `participation income' which shares many of the positivefeatures of an UBI without being vulnerable to the exploitation objection.26

Such policies would help to realize the equal opportunity principle, but unlike asubstantial UBI, they are also consistent with the reciprocity principle (indeed,they may be required by it).27

At this point, however, it might be objected that to restrict the share out ofemployment rents and the value of transfers of non-natural wealth in the way Ihave suggested is inconsistent with the liberal principle of neutrality ± that it isto discriminate against those whose conceptions of the good just happen to havelittle or no place for work.28 It is undeniable that those who have such concep-tions will indeed be disadvantaged as a result of conditionalizing the share outof these rents and transfers on the contribution required by the reciprocityprinciple. However, it is not at all clear that this constitutes discrimination or afailure of neutrality in any morally troublesome sense. If liberal principles ofjustice are `neutral', they are so in the sense that no speci®c conception of thegood need be invoked in order to justify them. These principles will obviouslynot be neutral, however, in the impact they have upon the pursuit of variousconceptions of the good. Laws protecting physical integrity, for example, will

24 See Real Freedom, p. 102.25 For recent proposals along these lines, see M. White, Against Unemployment (London,

Policy Studies Instititute, 1991), pp. 215±21, and R. Haveman, Starting Even: an Equal OpportunityProgram to Combat the Nation's New Poverty (New York NY, Simon and Schuster, 1988),pp. 168±71.

26 The participation income shares the ®rst two features of the UBI (i.e., is paid on an individualbasis and without a means-test), but is conditional, in the case of the able-bodied, on some form ofcontributive activity, though not necessarily paid work. See A. B. Atkinson, Beveridge, the NationalMinimum, and its Future in a European Context (London School of Economics, STICERD WelfareState Programme Discussion Paper 85, 1993).

27 Such policies are required by the reciprocity principle to the extent that they are necessary toensure that citizens have adequate opportunity to satisfy their reasonable work expectation, and toensure that those satisfying this expectation receive at least the decent minimum of income to whichthey are entitled.

28 See Van Parijs, Real Freedom, p. 109.

322 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997

put sadists at a clear disadvantage relative to others in pursuing their conceptionof the good. We do not worry about this, however, because we regard theprotection of physical integrity as a very basic element of social justice, andrespect for the physical integrity of others as part of the overarching `conceptionof the right' that a just society must ask its members to acknowledge as `prior'to, as bounding, their conceptions of the good. Exactly the same can be saidof the principle of reciprocity which justi®es the exclusion of those unwilling towork from the share out of the employment rents attached to job assets.Conditionalizing the receipt of these bene®ts in the manner suggested wouldonly be discriminatory in a worrisome sense if the claim to an equal share of jobassets did not fall under the heading of the broader claim to a fair share of theeconomic bene®ts of social cooperation, and thus fell outside the scope ofapplication of the reciprocity principle.29

The Brute Luck Argument

The external assets argument does not appear to provide a rebuttal of theexploitation objection to the introduction of a substantial UBI. Rather, thisobjection suggests that we should reinterpret the policy implications of the `rightto external assets' asserted in P2 in a way that is largely unfavourable toadvocates of UBI. In addition to the external assets argument, however, VanParijs also presents (in ch. 5 of Real Freedom for All) a `brute luck argument'against the exploitation objection.30 Does this brute luck argument serve torescue the external assets argument for a substantial UBI?According to Van Parijs, the exploitation objection must rest upon some

distributive principle which serves as a criterion for distinguishing when oneperson is deriving `unfair' advantage from the work of another,31 and he positsthree distributive principles which might be taken to underpin the exploitationobjection in this way. I will here refer to these principles, largely following VanParijs, as the `Lockean principle', the `Lutheran principle', and the `strong e�ortprinciple'. The Lockean principle asserts that each person has a right to the fullfruits of his/her labour; UBI is then seen as exploitative because the redistribu-tion it entails denies producers the full fruits of their individual labours. TheLutheran principle asserts that each person should receive a share of the socialproduct of equivalent or proportional value to the value of his/her individuallabour contribution (`value' being understood in Marxian terms); UBI is thenseen as exploitative because it upsets the required proportionality between thevalues of bene®ts received and contributions made by individuals. Finally, thestrong e�ort principle asserts that income should be distributed in strictproportion to individual productive e�ort; UBI is then seen as exploitativebecause it upsets the required proportionality between income and e�ort.32

Van Parijs proceeds to point out a number of di�culties with each principle,but the central ethical problem is the same for all three principles. To phrase the

29 For similar criticism of this aspect of Van Parijs' argument, see E. Torisky Jr., `Rawls, VanParijs, and unconditional basic income', Analysis 53 (1993), pp. 289±97, and R. Arneson, `Issocialism dead?', Ethics 102 (1992), 485±511, speci®cally pp. 507±8.

30 See Real Freedom, ch. 5, pp. 133±85.31 Real Freedom, p. 145.32 The three principles are respectively set out and discussed at pp. 145±53, 153±60, and 160±9 of

Real Freedom.

Debate 323

#Political Studies Association, 1997

point in the language of this paper, all three principles are unattractive becausetheir application, even if feasible, would generate brute luck inequalities inincome that are inconsistent with the underlying equal opportunity principle.The fact, for example, that the fruits of my labour are greater than yours maymerely re¯ect a brute luck inequality in the fertility of the soils we respectivelywork; similarly, di�erences in the values of our respective labour contributionsmay just re¯ect brute luck inequality in productive skills; and di�erences inproductive e�ort may also just re¯ect brute luck inequalities in capacitiesor opportunities for making such e�ort.33 Thus, if the exploitation objectionis necessarily grounded in one of these three principles, then the objection isarguably discredited, from an egalitarian point of view, because of theincompatibility of all three principles with the commitment to limit the extentof brute luck inequality in income and opportunity.Van Parijs does ask us to consider a fourth distributive principle which is not

so plainly unattractive from an egalitarian point of view. We may call this the`weak e�ort principle'. It says that there must at least be some positive associa-tion ± as opposed to a strict correspondence ± between income and productivee�ort. But while this principle may be less clearly at odds with the commitmentto limit brute luck inequality in income and opportunity, the link it assertsbetween entitlement to income and productive activity is not strong enough toground an exploitation objection to UBI. The principle is not violated by theintroduction of a substantial UBI, because those who work (and so make agreater e�ort) will still end up with a higher income under an UBI regime thanthose who just live o� their UBI.34

Thus, according to Van Parijs, we have three principles linking incomeentitlement to productive contribution in a manner that is strong enough toground an exploitation objection to UBI, but each of these principles is plainlyunattractive from an egalitarian point of view; and we have one principleasserting a link between income entitlement and productive contribution whichis not plainly unattractive from an egalitarian point of view, but in this case thelink asserted is too weak to ground an exploitation objection to UBI.This does not, however, amount to a rebuttal of the exploitation objec-

tion because the four principles considered by Van Parijs most certainly donot exhaust the distributive principles which might be taken to underpinthe exploitation objection. As I hope to have shown above, the objection can(and should) be taken to rest upon a principle of reciprocity, and one can (andshould) interpret the reciprocity principle in a way that does not leave theprinciple vulnerable to the claim that its implementation would generate brute

33 Thus, according to Van Parijs, the Lockean principle `would force us to endorse massiveinequalities between the rewards of workers . . . operating under di�erent conditions' (p. 153); andthe Lutheran principle has an `embarrassing implication' ± of rewarding workers who have thegood fortune of having more powerful tools more handsomely than other workers who `workequally long and hard' ± which is said to be `strictly parallel' to that just noted in relation to theLockean principle (p. 160). As regards the strong e�ort principle, Van Parijs expresses doubt thatthis principle would command widespread intuitive consent (p. 167), and backs this claim up withthe thought that `the principle of proportionality between income and e�ort loses all plausibility ina situation in which there are arbitrary inequalities in the opportunity to engage in productivee�ort' (p. 168). Van Parijs makes many other criticisms of each of these principles which I lack spaceto raise here, but this brute luck objection is the most persistent criticism, the only one which islevelled at all three principles.

34 See Van Parijs, Real Freedom, pp. 167±9.

324 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997

luck inequalities in income and opportunity. In particular, the principle ofbaseline reciprocity set out above, and in terms of which I have explicitlyformulated the exploitation objection in this paper, arguably satis®es thiscondition.35 At the same time, however, it also asserts a link between incomeentitlement and productive contribution which is su�ciently strong to groundan exploitation objection to UBI.In short, having rightly rejected the ®rst three Lockean, Lutheran, and strong

e�ort principles, Van Parijs retreats far too hastily to the weak e�ort principle,and fails to consider possible intermediate principles which do not con¯ict withthe commitment to prevent brute luck inequality, but which are at the same timestrong enough, in terms of the connection they assert between income entitle-ment and productive contribution, to ground an exploitation objection to UBI.For this reason, his brute luck argument against the exploitation objection fails,and the criticism advanced against the external assets argument in the foregoingsection of this paper remains una�ected.

Conclusions

Our results may be summarized as follows:(1) Van Parijs' external assets argument is, on the face of it, largely

unsuccessful in defusing the exploitation objection to the introduction of asubstantial UBI because it fails in the central challenge of reconciling paymentof a substantial UBI with the reciprocity principle (which is itself a crucialcomponent of the liberal egalitarian conception of justice). While Van Parijs isright to argue on equal opportunity grounds that certain forms of externalwealth should be redistributed, the speci®c mode of redistribution he envisagesis, in general, inappropriate because of its incompatibility with the reciprocityprinciple. The rejoinder that alternative, more conditional modes of redistribu-tion would violate the norm of liberal neutrality fails because it ignores the wayliberal neutrality is itself bounded by the claims of liberal justice, including theclaims of the reciprocity principle.(2) Van Parijs explicitly formulates the exploitation objection by reference

to three distributive principles (the Lockean, Lutheran, and strong e�ortprinciples), and attempts to discredit the objection by showing how the imple-mentation of each of these principles would generate brute luck inequalities incontravention of the underlying equal opportunity principle. This does notsu�ce as a rebuttal of the exploitation objection, however, if, as I have argued,there are other principles which do not support such inequalities, but which alsoa�rm a link between income entitlement and productive contribution which isstrong enough to ground an exploitation objection to the introduction of asubstantial UBI.(3) A relatively small UBI, representing each person's rightful share of pure

natural resources, is largely36 resistant to the exploitation objection. This isbecause the resources in question are not, strictly speaking, `economic bene®tsof social cooperation', and thus lie largely outside the scope of application ofthe reciprocity principle. This UBI may be legitimately supplemented by an UBI

35 At least, it does not tolerate individuals su�ering absolute disadvantage ± a de®ciency inopportunity relative to some minimally acceptable baseline ± as a matter of bad brute luck.

36 On the point and exact import of this quali®er, see footnote 21.

Debate 325

#Political Studies Association, 1997

®nanced from the taxation of the value of the transfers of a portion of non-natural wealth (the portion produced by members of past generations who werenot co-existent with present-day prospective recipients of this wealth), but, asVan Parijs acknowledges, the overall UBI this implies is still likely to berelatively small in size. (And this is before we consider how the size of therelevant income payment may be reduced by morally prior transfers from theprospective UBI tax fund to compensate those with poor internal capacities.)I conclude that Van Parijs has failed, thus far, to provide a convincing

rebuttal to the exploitation objection to the introduction of a substantial UBI,though a more modest UBI is not necessarily subject to this objection, andindeed, would appear to be a requirement of justice as the liberal egalitarianconceives it.

(Finally accepted: 17 November 1995)

326 Debate

#Political Studies Association, 1997