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Liberal Citizenship and Civic FriendshipAuthor(s): Jason A. ScorzaSource: Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 85-108Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND
CIVIC FRIENDSHIP
JASONA. SCORZA
FairleighDickinsonUniversity
Aristotle amouslyarguesthatfriendship an serve as a normativemodelfor thepracticeof citi-
zenship,and this view has been widelyaccepted by neo-Aristotelians.Liberals,however,are
quick o rejectbothAristotle'sviewoffriendshipandhis viewof citizenship.Does this meanthat
theconceptoffriendship spolitically irrelevantfor iberalism?Thisessaysuggests,on the con-
trary, hattheconceptoffriendship sfarfromobsolete,evenfor liberals.Specifically,communi-
cative constraintsderivedfrom he normsoffriendship,as interpreted y RalphWaldoEmerson,
could serve topromotethe modest nstrumental urposes of liberalcitizenship-personalfree-
dom,socialjustice, and civilpeace-while simultaneouslyallowing thepractice of liberal citi-
zenshipto developin noninstrumental irections,enrichedrather hanstrainedbythemulticul-
tural realitiesof most modernsocieties.
Keywords: friendship; citizenship;Emerson; iberalism
When RalphWaldoEmersonsuggests,inhis 1844essay "Politics,"hat
citizensmight someday"exercise owardseach otherthe grandestand sim-
plestsentiments,as well asa knot of friends,or apairof lovers,"heappears o
be talkingpurenonsense.'If citizenship s conceivedin largely nstrumental
terms,as liberal ndividualists ommonlydo,there s no obvious ustificationforcitizensas such to model theirconducttowardone anotheron thenorms
of friendship.Fellow citizensmayreasonablydemand rom each otherbasic
respectandtoleration,as well as some assuranceof socialwelfare commen-
suratewith therequirements f humandignity.Butthey maynot demand hat
others love them,treat hem as friends,or abandonself-determinedprojectsfor their sake. In fact, such demandswould be completelyexternalto the
AUTHOR'SNOTE:I am deeply gratefulto JonathanAllen, KatharineLawrieBalfour Patrick
Deneen,AmyGutmann,GeorgeKateb,W.CareyMcWilliams,BethPosner,KathyPurnell,and
the editorandanonymousrefereesof PoliticalTheoryfor theirthoughtful ommentson earlier
versionsof this essay.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 32 No. 1, February 004 85-108
DOI:10.1 77/0090591703252378
? 2004 Sage Publications
85
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86 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
usual instrumentalpurposesof liberalcitizenship,which include the com-
mon defense of personalfreedom,the establishmentof basic conditionsof
socialjustice, and the maintenanceof civil peace.It is notsurprising,herefore, hat iberal ndividualists endtorelegate he
practiceof friendship and ts norms)to theprivatesphere,wherecitizens as
private persons are free to establish amicablerelationswith whomevertheychoose (regardlessof whether heir riendsarefellow citizens).2Theydonot,as a rule,proposethatfriendshipserve as a normativemodelfor thepracticeof citizenship,asAristotleand some of his contemporary dmirersdo and as
Emersonappears o do in thispassage.But Emerson s not anordinaryndi-
vidualist,andcertainlynot anordinaryiberal.Significantly,hisconceptionsof friendshipandcitizenshipare both informedby a commitment o "demo-
craticconnectedness," noninstrumentalalueenjoyedthroughresponsive-ness orreceptivity oothers,andexpressed hroughmembershipna commu-
nity of equals based on openness and empathy,ratherthan merely on
contractualobligations.As such, Emerson'sconceptionsof friendshipand
citizenshiparesympathetico,andmay verywell enrich,rights-basedorlib-
eral)conceptionsof citizenship,butshould not be mistakenforthem.
The term"democratic onnectedness"was first used by GeorgeKateb,who illuminatesandrefines Emerson'soriginalidea.3Accordingto Kateb,Emersondoes notembraceanextremeorunmodified ndividualism.Rather,he attempts o reconcile a strongcommitment o individualismwith a strongcommitment o a distinctivelydemocratic orm of association.Self-reliance,definedby Katebasthinkingone's ownthoughtsandthinking hemthrough,is the centralpracticeof Emersonian ndividualism,while democraticcon-
nectednessis the centralpracticeof the democratic-rather thanreligious,
racial,tribal,or national-form of associationtheorizedby Emerson.Self-relianceanddemocraticconnectednessdo notthemselvesconstitute
a positive vision of a good life. Rather,they are practicesthat, in theory,enableindividuals o choose for themselves a good way of life frommyriad
possible ways of life, or to engage in a succession of experimentsn living.Thepracticeof democraticconnectedness ntroducesndividuals o thevari-
ousness andpossibilityof human ife throughmmediaterelationswithother
persons,while the practiceof self-relianceenables individualsto navigate
deliberatelythroughthe gardens-and minefields-of humanvariousnessandpossibility.Herewebeginto see the intrinsicvalue of thepracticeof civic
friendship,whichcontributesbothto the developmentof the individualand
to the shareddemocraticculture.
Althoughdemocraticconnectednesscanmitigatesome of theworstego-istic, selfish,competitive,andacquisitive endenciesof unmodifiedndividu-
alism,this is not the mainreasonwhywe shouldvalueit. Almostanyform of
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 87
connectedness-including many ormsof religious,racial, ribal,andnational
unity-can tame individualismas well orbetter handemocraticconnected-
ness. However,these othertypes of connectedness end also to foster chau-
vinism and ntolerance, ather hanpromoting ivic friendshipwithinaheter-
ogeneouscommunity.Theyappealmoreto the authoritarianersonality hat
seeks to evade fears of freedom andresponsibilityby submitting he con-
science to some externalauthority. ndeed,these othertypes of connected-
nessoftenwork ostigmatize ndsuppress-rather hanenrich-individualism.
As such,religious,racial, tribal,andeven most kinds of nationalunity playnopart nEmerson'sconceptionof civic friendship,which standsas much n
oppositionto these forms of unityas it does to merelycontractual orms.
By theorizingaboutcitizenship n terms of friendship,Emersoncontrib-
utes to anunderstanding f civic life that s thicker hanconventional iberal
conceptions, but more individualistic than typical communitarianviews.
However,Emersondoes notaimatamiddlepositionbetween iberal ndivid-
ualism and more collectivist visions of citizenship,suchas those articulated
recentlyby the so-called civic liberals.4Rather,Emersoncalls us to a radical
democraticvision in which the nation-state ades into the background,and
primaryrelationshipsbetween citizens as suchemergeas the focus of civic
identityandactivity,andof personalstrivingand transcendence.
Thesignificanceof Emerson'svision shouldbeobvious.Politicsin liberal
democracieshasgraduallydegeneratedntothe worstconceivableversionof
Madisonianpluralism,with citizens dividedandconqueredby specialinter-
ests, andpublicopinionmanufactured y powerfulmedia forces. Tiesunit-
ingcitizens as such arepracticallynonexistent,exceptat the concrete evel of
the state,where individualsenjoythe statusof taxpayersandclients,and at
the abstract evel of thenation,where citizens often love theircountrybutnottheircountrymen.And so Emersonwonders,"Couldnot a nationof friends
even devise betterways?"In thisessay,I exploreEmerson'sconceptionof friendshipand consider
how its two crucial communicativenorms(whichhe calls "truth" nd "ten-
derness")couldhelpto enrich hecontemporary racticeof citizenship.6The
norm of truth,briefly, is a posture of candor and directness in political
speech,andawillingnesstolisten to suchspeechfromothers,while thenorm
of tenderness s anattitudeof gentle respecttowardothers andaresponsive-ness or opennessto others(particularly,hose who are differentfrom one-
self). Constrainedby thenormof tenderness,relationsof friendshiparepro-vided with an element of civility (a quality that is no less important or
citizenship han t is forfriendship).Constrained ythenormof truth, riend-
ship is providedwith a crucialelement of incivility.7Working n tandem,
these two normscanhelptopromote he limited nstrumental urposesof lib-
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88 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
eralcitizenship,while simultaneously ranscendinghis instrumentalism y
elevating hepracticeof citizenship oan encounterwith theradicalpossibili-
ties of democraticconnectedness.In addition oprovidingaconceptionof friendship hat s compelling nits
ownright,Emersonmakesat least threedistinctiveandworthwhilecontribu-
tions to ourunderstandingf therelationshipbetween thepracticeof citizen-
shipandthe normsof friendship.First,unlikemostcontemporaryheoristsof
civic friendship,he emphasizes communicativenorms, rather than more
demandingcivic obligationssuchasthe communalethicof care endorsedby
SibylA. Schwarzenbach,hegeneralresponsibility or the welfareof compa-
triotsproposedby AndrewMason,or theobligation o fellow citizenstopar-
ticipatefully in publiclife supportedby numerouscommunitarian nd civic
republican heorists.8Contrastedwith these theories,Emerson'smoremod-
est communicativenormscanenrichthepracticeof liberalcitizenshipwith-
outattemptingo erase,replace,ortransform t into a watered-downversion
of republican,communitarian, r Aristoteliancitizenship.These communicativenormsare also more relevant hanmanyothercon-
ceptionsof civic obligationto some of our mosturgentcontemporary oliti-
cal problems.Theresurgenceof chauvinisticnationalismaround heworld,thedumbingdownof democraticdiscourse,andthepoliticalinfantilization
of the democraticcitizenall seem to demandcommunicativenormscapableof defusingtensions andfosteringappreciative onnectionsbetweengroups,
elevatingpoliticalconversation,andactivating he deliberativecapabilitiesof citizens,whomust earn ogive fellow citizens(andexpectto receive from
them) reasonable accounts of theirpolitical preferences.The Emersonian
normsof truthandtendernesswould be transferable oanyof thedeliberative
settingsthatAmyGutmann ndDennisThompsoncall"middledemocracy,"including governmentalnstitutions,such as legislativesessions, courtpro-
ceedings,andadministrative earings,as well as nongovernmental ssocia-
tions, such as grassrootsgroups,laborunions,citizenscommittees,profes-sionalorganizations,and,of course, schools anduniversities.9t is here, in
middledemocracy,hatcitizenscanget a feel foroneanother,as actual-not
abstract-persons, and wherecommunicativenormsderived romaconceptof friendshipmightbe practiced, nitially,for purelyinstrumental easons
but,ultimately,perhaps, or normativeones.It should also be notedthatEmerson'scommunicativenormsrelyfarless
on formalcivic education or indoctrinationhando other theoriesof civic
friendship, ncluding hoseof both civic liberalsandthe criticsof liberalism.
Whereascitizens could notreasonablybe expectedto engage in communal
care, generalresponsibilityfor the welfare of compatriots,or fully active
politicalparticipationwithoutfirstbeing taughtthe intrinsicvalue of these
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Scorza / LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 89
practices,theycould begin to practicethe communicativenorms ntegral o
Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipnpublic ife forpurely nstrumental ea-
sons (i.e., becausethey help address he aforementionedpolitical problemsandbecausethey promote he basicpurposesof liberalcitizenship).Citizens
mightthendiscover the intrinsicvalueof citizenship-namely, the value of
democraticconnectedness-by actuallypracticingthese norms. Bonds of
civic friendshipwould emerge as individualsbegan to feel valued and
respectedby theircompatriots,by virtueof howtheyarespokenand istened
to in thepublic sphere,notmerelybecausetheyareurgedby teachers, ead-
ers,orimploredbypoliticaltheorists otreat heir ellow citizens like friends.
THEPOLITICALRELEVANCEOF FRIENDSHIP
Systematicattempts o establishthe politicalrelevanceof friendshipcan
be tracedbackto Aristotle,who identifiesthreedifferent ypesof friendship,
based,respectively,on utility,pleasure,and virtue.As he argues amously n
TheNicomacheanEthics,friendshipbased on virtue s the mostperfecttype,
insofar as it aims at the pursuitof goodness or moral excellence for its ownsake rather hanmerelythe interestsorpleasuresof individuals.1oHowever,each kind of friendship s, in a sense, altruistic, ince we are concernedwith
thewelfareof ourfriends ortheirsake,notmerelyforourown.'1Thegeneralbonds of civic friendship politikephilia), which are almostcertainlya vari-
ety of utility friendshiprather han of virtuefriendship,12help maintainus-tice and law in thestate,thuspreservingspacefor the cultivationof personal
friendshipsbased on virtue.Meanwhile, heproliferation f personal riend-
ships based on virtue serves as an independentcheck on the possible civiccorruptionof the state as a whole.'3Citizenswho view one anotheras civic
friendswould come together n a broadconsensus on mattersof public pol-
icy, a consensus made easierin Aristotle'sschemeby the exclusion fromthe
political communityof manymarginalized roupswithpotentiallydiffering
interests,such as women, slaves, andpersonsof foreigndescent.14
Therehave been numerousattemptsn recentyearsto restore heAristote-
lianconceptionof friendship o preeminent tatus.'"Theseefforts, however,
haveconsistentlygenerated artoo demandinga notionof civic friendship.'6Nevertheless, t may not be necessaryto abandon riendshipas a normative
modelforcitizenship ustbecauseAristotelianand neo-Aristotelian oncep-tions are unsuited o modemliberalsocieties.Likewise,it maynotbe neces-
saryto condemnliberalism ortheinstrumental oals of liberalcitizenship)
simply because they are incompatiblewith civic friendship,as it was con-
ceivedbyAristotle.Thereare, nparticular,wostrikingbutoften overlooked
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90 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
structural imilaritiesbetweenfriendshipandcitizenshipthat ustify further
inquiry ntothe usefulness of the normsof the former orimproving heprac-
tice of the latter.
First,relationshipsbetween citizens as such, like relationshipsbetween
friends,may-but, obviously,do notnecessarily--evolveanddevelop hroughthe investmentof time andeffort.Likefriendships, elationshipsbetweencit-
izens seldom begin at the highest level of intimacy,mutuality,and trust.
Hence,just as one maychafe when a new acquaintancepresumesa level of
intimacythat has not been earned,claims madeuponus by fellow citizens
who arepracticallyor completelystrangers o us can feel excessive. How-
ever,whenpeopleinvest ntheiracquaintanceships,heydo sometimesblos-som intodeeper,moretrusting,and moremutuallysatisfyingrelationships.
Likewise, if people invest in the practiceof citizenship,it could gradually
develop beyond its original,modest instrumentalpurposes,into a practicethatis, potentially,both noble andennobling.
Secondly,membersof modem liberalsocieties often disagreeandfightwith eachother,muchas friendsdo.Animportant ifference,however, s that
friendstry to governtheirdisagreements n such a way as to preserveand
develop,rather hanterminate, he bond between them.Theydo not exces-sively stifle or suppressdisagreements,creating deadly silences that could
cause the bonds of friendship ogradually rode. Nor do they engageinunre-
strained ree-for-alls,riskingthe eruptionof violence that could cause the
bonds of friendship o suddenlysnap.Instead, heyemploy relativelysimple(but subtle) communicative norms to achieve a balance, somewhere in
between. One might say that friendstryto disagree todayin a manner hat
will allowthem to disagreeagaintomorrow.Liberalcitizenscould,perhaps,
also learnto governtheirdisagreements n muchthe same mannerand forsome of the same reasons.
On the otherhand,ChristopherHeath Wellmanarguesthatrelationships
amongfellow citizens aredisanalogousto those amongfriends,for at least
threecogentreasons.First,friendshipsare based to somedegreeon consent,whereasconsent is missing fromcitizenship.Second, the strongemotional
bonds found ingenuinefriendshipareabsentfromrelationshipsbetween cit-
izens as such(especiallyinlargecommunitiesorstates).And, third,whereas
friendships commonly udgedto be intrinsically, ather haninstrumentally,valuable,the same cannotbe said for citizenship.'7
Theseobjectionswouldappear o damnthe ethics of friendship o irrele-
vance wherethe practiceof citizenshipis concerned. None of us, initially,consentstomembershipnour stateornation,although t is possibleforus-withconsiderabledifficulty-to withdraw rom suchmembershipswhen we
find themunpalatable.Wellman'spoint,though, s thatwe incurspecialobli-
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Scorza / LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 91
gationsto friendspreciselybecause theserelationshipsareconsensual.Inthe
absence of consent, there can be no such specialobligationsto fellow citi-
zens.WhileIaminclinedto agreewith thisanalysis,Iwould note one caveat.
Although herelationship f citizenshipmayormaynot entailspecial obliga-
tions, such as givingpreference o the welfareof fellow citizens over "simi-
larlysituatedforeigners,"'"t does conveya dutyto be mindful of how one
speaksto fellow citizens andhowonelistensto them.Ourfellow citizens are
our civic equals,as well as free and autonomouspersons.As such,we maynot conversewith them as if theyarechildren,subjects,or slaves.As long as
our account of obligationsto fellow citizens does not extendprimafacie
beyond certain obligations on democraticdiscourse, but are discoveredinstead throughdemocraticdiscourse, Wellman's first objection against
modeling citizenshipon friendshipcan be refuted.
Wellman's assertionthat the emotional ties between fellow citizens are
nothinglike those between friends, althoughunsubstantiated mpirically,
ringstrueenoughto be takenseriously.As he explains,
Not only does the enormoussize andbureaucratic atureof contemporary tates entail
that citizens will never meet (let alone becomeintimatelyattached o) more than a tinyfractionof theircompatriots,he multiculturalismf most statesoften results nxenopho-bic citizens'harboringantipathy ather hansympathy owardeach other.19
This seems somewhatmuddled,however.As we will see, the practiceof
friendship s dynamic.Individualsdo not as a generalrulebegintheir rela-
tionshipat the mostintense level of mutualregard. nstead, riendshipsgrowand evolve overtime,propelledby aninnermomentumof which we arenot
always fully aware.Friendshipshave a way of sneakingup on us. ConsiderThomas Jeffersonand JohnAdams who-once bitterpolitical enemies-
became friendsin the end.20
Wellmanalsoargues hat herelationship f friendshiphas intrinsicvalue,
and is properlyvaluedfor its own sake, whereascitizenshipcan only ever
haveinstrumentalalue.21Wellman'sposition s usefullycontrastedwiththat
of Mason who arguesthatspecialobligations o fellow citizensemergefrom
the intrinsicmoralvalue of therelationshipof citizenship.This,he suggests,
is basedon being "a memberof a collectivebodyin which
theyenjoy equalstatuswith its other membersand aretherebyprovidedwithrecognition."22
AlthoughI am inclinedto agreewithMason thatfreeandequaldemocratic
citizenshiphas an intrinsicmoralvalue,vestedinthetreatment f eachmem-
ber as worthyof equal recognitionandrespect,I am less confidentthat one
can, or should,attempt o derivemore thana verylimited set of obligationsfromthispremise.Suchobligations, t seemsto me, do not includea dutyof
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92 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
politicalparticipation r giving preference o the welfare of fellow citizens,as Masonargues,but,rather, nlya dutyto speakand isten to fellowcitizens
withrespectandregard ortheirequality.23 hat s, these dutiespertainonlyto the enactmentor realizationof the intrinsicvalueof citizenship, namely,thefeelingof mutualrespect,recognition,andresponsiveness hat following
Kateb)I have been calling democraticconnectedness.I would add that the
dynamiccharacter f friendship,whichWellmanneglectsin his analysisbut
whichEmersonemphasizes,againmakesfriendshipanexcellentanalogyfor
therelationshipof citizenship,whichmaybegin primarilyas aninstrumental
arrangement ut,with time andpractice, may evolve into somethingmore
meaningful.Turningfrom the theoreticalto the practical,there are some important
ways in which the dynamicsof actualpoliticallife in the late twentiethand
early twenty-first enturiesdefy anyattempt oestablishnormsof friendshipas norms of citizenship.In particular,nequalitiesof power;hierarchiesof
class, race,andgender;andthe relativepowerlessnessof ordinarypeople in
manycontemporary ocieties seem to makethe idea of genuine friendshipbetween all citizens laughable.Additionally,Wellman s rightto point out
thatusingfriendshipas a modeloranalogyforcitizenship s potentiallymis-guided because it "lendscredence to the dangerousidea that others have
standingonly if theystand n somerelation ous."24 hisidea,he thinks,sus-
tains(orat leastfails to deter)ethnicconflict,violation of humanrights,and
(presumably)ndifference o suchviolations.
However,it is not my contention,nor was it ever Emerson's,that true
friendship epresents,ngeneral,agoodbasis forpolitics.Rather,mypoint s
thatcertaincommunicativenormsbasedon thenormsof friendshipmayalso
serve,effectively,asconstraints ndisagreementsbetweenmembersof mod-ernsocieties who oftenhavedifferentvalues,competinginterests,and con-
flictingunderstandingsf thegood.Attheveryleast,theymay providea crit-
ical vantagepointwith broadcultural andintercultural) ppealfromwhich
to assail manipulativeand/orcoercive communicativestrategies,a benefit
not to be takenlightly.In some respects,the premiseI am presentingfollows the aims of dis-
courseethics.Thecommunicative onstraints ypicallysetby discourseeth-
ics, includingmutualrecognitionof the equalityof all participantsand anumberof constraints f rationality e.g., absence of forceorstructural res-sure,the admissibilityonly of rationalarguments, he privilegingof no un-sharedassumptions,etc.), workto promote usticeby constrainingdialogueand providecriticalleverage againstmanipulativeand coercive discourse.
Unfortunately,heseidealconditionsarrive romnowhere,relateto no com-mon practice,and are connected to no cultural(much less transcultural)
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 93
norms.Moreover, hey takeno account of religious,cultural,racial,territo-
rial,andsocioeconomicdividesamongparticipants.
Thenormsof friendship,onthe otherhand,derivefrom analmostuniver-sal practicethatcuts acrossreligious,cultural,racial,territorial, ndsocio-
economicdivides.25Wehave all experienced riendshipandknow its norms
intimately, ven if we practice hemimperfectly.Althoughmuch moremod-
est, perhaps,thanthe ideal conditionsof full-blown discourseethics, thenormsof friendshipare atleastavailableandfamiliar o anyonewho has,orhasbeen, a friend.This is not to say thatbeyondsome basicnormstherearenotalsosignificantdifferencesbetweentheattitudesoward riendshipndif-
ferenttraditions.26 owever, n spiteof these differences,thereareenoughunderlyingsimilaritiesbetweenconceptionsof friendship o providea basisfor interculturaldiscussion and cross-culturalunderstanding.Many tradi-
tions,forinstance,suggestthat riendshipmust nvolve asignificantmeasureof franknessor truth-telling,n addition o the expectedkindnessor gentle-ness.27 f common norms,such as these,can be transferredo thepracticeofliberalcitizenship,then its practicemay be enhanced,withoutresortingto
conceptionsof citizenship nconsistentwiththecontractualiberalapproach.
EMERSONAND THENORMSOF
DEMOCRATICRIENDSHIP
Likemostimportant onceptsin Emerson'sunsystematic heoretical ys-tem,friendship, o him,is closely related otheconceptof self-reliance.Per-sonspracticing elf-relianceheed theirownmoral udgmentas much aspos-
sible,anddependas little aspossibleon theopinionsof others,oron societalconventions.However,the relationshipbetween self-reliance-the core of
Emerson's ndividualistic reed-and thepracticeof friendships aparadox-icalone, forfriendships arelationshiphatpromotesself-relianceby threat-
ening always to undermine and destroy it. It is, for Emerson,a crucible
throughwhich self-reliancemustpass in orderto realizeitself fully.
Ideally, riendship erves as an aid to self-reliance.Throughacquaintancewith friends,one's acquaintancewith oneself can be renewed.So Emerson
writes,inhis poem"Astraea,""'Whatam I?companion,say.'/And he friendnothesitates/Toassignjust placeandmates;/Answersnot in word or letter;/Yetis understood hebetter;/Eacho each alooking-glass,/Reflectshisfigurethatdothpass."28 mersonmeansthatonlyanother elf, to whomone is openand responsive,can reveal one to oneself.29 n a gesture,pause, word, or
glance, individualscan, in a flash, see themselves throughthe eyes of a
friend. Friendscan also renew one another'sacquaintancewith the world in
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94 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
which theylive. Forinstance,a friend can introduceus to new perspectivesand viewpoints, share with us a new experienceor way of life, or even
increase our awareness of the variousness and possibility of human lifeitself by shakingus from ourdoldrums,depressions, anddogmas. And it
is through this process of developing or awakening friendship that the
value of democraticconnectedness-understood as receptivityor respon-siveness to others-is realized.
Inspiteof theseapparent enefits, however,Emersonrealizes thatfriend-
shipalso can undermine elf-reliancebecauseone's integrity s almostcon-
stantlyundersiege by the influenceof one's friends.Whilewe mightdeliber-
ately,orplayfully,choose to tryout a way of life that our friendhas already
exploredor embraced,we also may sometimes feel compelledto accept a
friend'sway of life as ourown,either for fear of losing thatfriend or due to
self-doubt. As Emersonexplainsin his essay "Friendship"1841), the ideal
friend is "a sort of beautifulenemy,untamable,devoutlyrevered."30To con-
ceive of a friend as an enemy, even as a beautifulone, is shocking. And,
clearly,Emersonwants to shock,as does Nietzsche when he transforms he
Aristotelianepitaph"friends, here are no friends" o "enemies,thereis no
enemy "3' Itis his wayof disrupting onceptionsof friendship hatpicture tas a perfectharmonyor unity,or which reduce it to casual companionship(e.g., friendsas golf partners rdrinkingbuddies).Of course,Emersondoes
notmeanthat riendsareenemies intheconventional ense.Theydonot,nor-
mally, tryto kill or ruinus, although hey may,periodically,misunderstand,
mislead,ordisappointus. Rather,by appealingmagnetically o oursensibili-
ties,bybeingattractive ous, friendstemptus to becomemore likethem and
less like ourown ideas of ourselves.
Although drawnby thoughts of ideal friendships,Emerson also fre-quentlyemphasizestheirfrustrating eality.Amonghis chief concerns s the
vulnerabilityof friendshipto degenerationand disintegration.Emerson
explains,"Our riendshipshurry o shortandpoorconclusions,because we
havemadethematextureof wineanddreams, nsteadof thetoughfibreof the
humanheart."32y his own analysis,friendshipcannotbeginin the clouds.
He writes,"Iwish thatfriendshipshouldhavefeet, as well as eyes andelo-
quence.It mustplant tself on theground,beforeit vaults overthe moon."33
Consequently,muchof Emerson's heorizing bout riendships concerned-quite properly-with the normsby which its bonds may, slowly and over
time,bedeveloped.Incontrast,whileAristotlealsodiscusses thefrustrationsof "inferior"ypesof friendship i.e., thosebased on utilityorpleasure),heoffers little insightinto how thesecoulddevelopintohighersorts of friend-
ship. This representsa significant differencebetween his conception of
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 95
friendshipandEmerson's,especiallyif thepracticeof friendships tobe seri-
ously consideredas a normativemodel for liberalcitizenship.
Importantly,orEmerson, riendshipdoes notentail aperfectharmonyor
unanimitybetweenpersons.Rather,he views friendshipas a turbulent nion,characterized lmost as muchby incivilityas by civility,and almost as much
by separatenessas by unityor harmony.Onceagain,therefore,his concep-tion of friendships uniquelysuitedas a model forthepracticeof citizenshipin modem liberalsocieties, sincetheyareoften characterized y deep asym-metries of power and resources,by enduringethnic, racial, and religious
antagonisms,and,most importantly,by moral and culturalpluralism.As a
model for liberal citizenship,Emerson'sconception of friendshipdistin-
guishes itself fromAristotle's,whichpresupposesa broadmoral consensus
as well as virtualunanimityconcerningquestionsof public importance.34
Truth
Foremostamongthe norms of friendship dentifiedby Emersonare two
communicativeconstraints,which he calls truthand tenderness.35 ruth, n
thecontext of friendship, s apracticeof franknessconjoinedwithopennessto the frankspeechof one's friends.Thedevelopmentof thebonds of friend-
ship requiresa kind of mutualunderstanding,rat least awillingnessto work
towardmutualunderstanding, othby speaking franklyandby listeningto
frankspeech. As Emerson writes in "Behavior" 1860), there "is a French
definitionof friendship,rienques'entendre,good understanding.Thehigh-estcompactwe can makewith ourfellow, is,-'Let therebe truthbetweenus
two forevermore.' 36Therefore,amongfriends, hereshouldbe nopredeter-
mined limits to whatmaybe said and heard.So Emersonwritesin "Friend-
ship,""A friend is a personwith whom I maybe sincere. Beforehim I maythinkaloud.""37
Accordingto Emerson,the bonds of friendship, ike the muscles of the
humanbody,must be exercisedregularly f theyare to grow stronger,over
time, ratherthandegenerate.Truth-sayingand truth-hearing re practicesthat test and develop the muscularityof a friendship.Of course, speaking
franklyis difficult. One may,reasonably,worrythatone will be misunder-
stood,or evenscorned.Openness o frank alk is also problematic,or in dis-
putes and disagreementswith friends the desire to win can be extremely
strong,andwinningcanrequireomission,as well as deception.However,as
Emersonexplains,
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96 POLITICALTHEORY February 004
Thegreatgainis, notto shine,not to conqueryour companion,-then you learnnothingbutconceit,-but to find acompanionwho knows whatyoudonot;to tilt with him andbe
overthrown,horse and
foot,with utterdestruction
of all yourlogic and learning.38
Appliedto politics,the norm of truthcannot nvolve thetellingof the lit-
eral truth n all instances because the practicalitiesof politics would never
permitsuch a thing. Deception, misinformation,and misdirectionare, for
betterorworse,partof theeverydayarsenalof thepolitician,andalwayswill
be.39 The normof truth, n the contextof politics, is much more concerned
withthe frankrepresentation f perspectives,purposes,andvalues,and with
the abilityof citizens to listen seriouslyto suchrepresentations,ven if theyappear o be threats o theirownwayof life. Through hepracticeof truth, o
conceived, membersof modernliberal societies may come to know and
better understandone another,although not necessarily agree with one
another,or even like one another,as personalfriendshopefullywould.
Examplesof how disarming rank alk can be areeasily observed.I expe-rienced his while sitting n an interfaith atheringof somesixtystudentsand
colleagues,in theaftermath f theSeptember11,2001 terrorist ttacks.Sev-
eralMuslims nthegroupwere atgreatpainstoexpresssympathy,anger,andregretregardingthe tragedy,overturesand acknowledgementsthat were
heartfeltand,obviously,welcomed by non-Muslimmembers of the group.Buttheyseemed to follow aformula,saying thingsthatneededtobe said and
thateveryoneexpectedtohear.Similarly,a numberof non-Muslimmembers
of the groupacknowledged hatAmericanforeignpolicy was not, perhaps,
alwaysbeneficial o theworldandthatmanyMuslims nthe MiddleEastmayhave legitimategrievanceswith the U.S. This, too, needed to be said, and
there was acertainexpectation hatit wouldbe.
Nonetheless, a great divide of understanding emained and the groupseemedhauntedbythingsunsaid.Apparently,herewere non-Muslimmem-
bers in the group(includingmyself) who expecteda lesson on the natureof
Islam. Itwas not untila numberof Muslimscandidlyexplained hattheyhad
no intentionof explainingor apologizingfor Islam,andthatthey were not
inclined tojustify theirreligionto anyone,thatthe airbeganto clear,even asthe tensionmomentarilyheightened.And it was not untilthe non-Muslims
beganto
grasp why the Muslims were so unwilling-they felt they werebeingaskedtoexplainwhytheyweren'tterrorists,oo-that thegroupbeganto pull togetheracross thedivide.The ritual ormulasof rapprochement is-solved andwhatensued was arealdiscussion of whatcould bedonetogether,as a group, n responseto the tragedy.
Tosaythatpoliticalconversation s constrainedby truth s sometimes ustanotherwayof sayingthat t is unconstrained y silence. A modelof "uncon-
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 97
strained"publicdiscourse,whichrequiresmembersof a societyto articulate
theirtruecommitments,desires,needs,projects,and so on, would,in theory,
promoteacommunity n whichthegenuineneedsandpurposesof individu-als are takeninto account.40Althougha mutualunderstanding f commit-
ments,desires,needs,and so forthalonecannot settlecontroversialpoliticalissues such as abortion,school prayer,affirmativeaction,orcapitalpunish-ment,when citizens find themselves in conflict with one anotherover such
issues, theyarewell-servedby an understanding f the values andcommit-
ments of their fellows. There is no guarantee hat any particularview or
vision of socialjustice wouldemergefrom a condition of improvedmutual
understanding etweencitizens.However,one would expectrival views orvisions ofjusticeto receiveproperhearings.And,anyconsensusconcerning
principlesof justice thatemergedfromsuchhearingswould be theresult of
the process andpracticeof politics, rather hanthe result of a prepolitical
attempt o squelchor silence genuinedisagreementswithina community.Even so, some theoristsdo not believe thatmembers of modem liberal
societies should be expectedto expose to one anothertheirmost intimate
beliefs, desires, fears,andcommitments.Accordingto J. DonaldMoon,for
instance,there s a coerciveaspectto thisexpectation,violatingthevalue of
privacy orindividualsandgroups.Moreover,Moonargues, hisexpectationrunsafoul of normalpsychologicaldefensesagainstvulnerability.41This is a
seriousobjectionto unconstrained iscourse,ortruth,conceivedof as a con-
straintonpublicdiscourse.Certainly,Moon'sassessmentof thepsychologi-cal barriers o such a practice s painfullyaccurate.If one's principlesand
commitmentsarebased on deeply personalreligiousbeliefs, as was thecase
forMuslimparticipantsn thecampusteach-in, t could be agonizingto talk
to nonbelieversaboutthem.Nonetheless,when fellow citizens seek to bindone anotherby law-as, forexample, prolifeandprochoiceadvocatesdo-
we canreasonably xpectthemtopresent hetruereasonswhy theyaredoingso. Itmaybe intrusive,but it is notunreasonable,o ask one's fellow citizens
to explain why they areattempting o use the coercivepowerof the state to
thwartone another'sgoals, hinder he satisfactionof one another'sneeds,or
block theenjoymentof one another'sconceptionof thegood life. However,the requirementof truthwould pertain only to political disagreements n
which citizens intend to subjectone another o a common law orpolicy.Noone should expect fellow citizens to bare their souls or expose theirmost
cherishedbeliefs to public scrutinyunderanyother circumstances.
Anotherobjectionto the idea of truthas a constrainton publicdiscourse
concernsthepotential mpactof truth-telling n mutualrespect.JohnRawls,forone,urgescitizens to invokeonly publicreasonsderived rom anoverlap-
ping consensus concerning constitutional essentials. Nonpublic reasons,
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98 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
derived from the many comprehensivemoral,philosophical,and religiousdoctrines that constitute the backgroundculture of a society, are to be
excluded frompublicdiscourse anddebate.42Accordingto Rawls,one doesnotdemonstrateespect orone's fellow citizensby offeringreasons hat heycannotreasonablybe expectedto comprehendor recognize as legitimate.
Therefore,citizens have a dutyof civility
to explainto one anotheron thosefundamental uestionshow theprinciplesandpolicies
theyadvocateandvote for can be supported y thepoliticalvalues of publicreason.This
dutyalso involves awillingnessto listen to othersanda fairmindednessndecidingwhen
accommodations o their views shouldreasonably
be made.43
This argument s quite compelling. It is, certainly,reasonable o expectfellow citizens to speakthe samepolitical language,in the name of mutual
respect,whenever hey tryto bind one anotherby law. It is also reasonable o
ask citizens to listen to one another,andtryto makecompromisesbetween
stronglyheld opinions.However,we do notdemonstratemutualrespectfor
ourfellow citizensby depriving hem of therightto expresstheirdeepestand
mostpassionate
commitmentsin thepolitical sphere. Indeed,
this denial
makes a mockeryof our duty to listen to them. The normsof citizenshipshould aimatbroadening, ather hanrestricting,dialoguebetweencitizens
withdifferent tronglyheld values andbeliefs.Hence,while arequiremento
offermutuallycoherentreasons n public disagreementss sound,aprohibi-tion on nonpublicreasons is not.
Tenderness
The basic meaningof tenderness s somethinglike "kindness" r "affec-
tion."However,a richermeaning s intendedbyEmerson. nhisdiscussionof
the norms of friendship,he understandsenderness o be both a postureof
giving and a postureof receiving,one of speakingandlistening.In "Man-
ners,"Emersondescribesa debatebetween BurkeandFoxintheEnglishPar-
liament,duringwhichFox "urgedon his old friend theclaims of old friend-
ship with such tenderness,that the house was moved to tears.""44n this
instance,Emerson seems to meanby tendernesssomethingthat is given orproffered. t is agentlebutrespectfulmannerof handlingotherswhoare,pre-
sumably,one'sequalsanddeserveto be treatedas such.However, n "Friend-
ship,"Emersonconfesses to "anextreme endernessof nature" ponmeetinga newpersonwho maybe apotential riend.Inthisinstance,Emersonseems
to mean by tenderness a kind of permeabilityor responsiveness.Through
responsiveness,we adoptapostureof opennessto ourinterlocutor, xposing
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 99
ourselves to his or herwords andthoughts,while throughgentle respectful-
ness, we tryto be sensitive to thatperson's potentialpermeabilityorrespon-
sivenessto our words andthoughts.Therefore,no unfairadvantages taken.
Instead,we attempt o care for our nterlocutorhroughour words(evenif we
feel no genuineaffection for thatperson).
Tenderness,whenproperlyunderstood s amannerof speaking,demands
recognitionandrespectfor thedignityandautonomyof others.Yet,tender-
ness alsoconnotessomethingof firmness.Neither riendsnorcitizens should
deal with one anotheras if theyweremade of glass or withgratuitous ough-ness orcruelty.Similarly,one maycareforotherswithouttreating hem as if
they are incapableof makingchoices for themselves.Hence, one sense oftenderness s "to tender."This is not a term of love oraffection,but one that
describesa relationshipnvolving somethingof closeness andsomethingof
distance.Importantly,enderness, n this first sense, means respectingthe
potentialof other individualsfor self-reliance.Throughouthis essays and
lectures,Emersonargues hateveryhuman ife is properlyviewed as anave-
nue throughwhich great thoughtsandgreatactionsnot only may flow but
also deserve to flow. He insists,therefore, hateverypersonhas a right(and,
perhaps,even a duty)to think and act self-reliantly,dependingas much as
possibleon one's own thoughtsand sense of justice forguidance,andlivingas much as possibleas one likes (provided hatone's way of life andexperi-mentsin livingdo nottransgressuponthedignityorrightsof others).Emer-
son writes,"Fornonconformity he worldwhipsyou withits displeasure."45
Tenderness,n thisfirstsense,means neverholdingthewhip, if one canpos-
sibly avoidit.
On the otherhand,tendernessunderstoodas a mannerof listeningcon-
notes a permeabilityorresponsiveness o impressionsreceivedfrom othersand aboutothers.Thisresponsivenesscanenrichour lives by introducingus
to differentways of life, as well as the variousnessof human life itself.
Describingthis responsiveness,Emersonwrites, "HighthanksI owe you,excellentlovers,whocarryout theworldforme to newandnobledepths,and
enlarge hemeaningof allmy thoughts. .. Iconfesstoanextreme enderness
of natureon this point."46Emersonhimself is understandably autiousabout the possibilities for
tendernessas a constrainton personalfriendship.Certainly,he is morecau-tious,say,thanWaltWhitman,whopictureshuman ife asajourneydownan
open road, a quest for individualityundertaken,perhapsparadoxically,
throughsomething ikeresponsiveness o others,andmanifested,variously,as camaraderie,riendship,eroticlove, anddemocraticcitizenship.47How-
ever,like Whitman,Emersonbelieves thatthe practiceof tendernesshelps
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100 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
introducendividuals o thevariousnessof human ife andhelpsthemachieve
a distinctlydemocraticconnectednesswith others.Emersonwrites,
Analogous to the laws of society are those of conversation,which is the firstoffice of
friendship. In able conversation we have glimpses of the universe, perceptions of
immensepowernative o thesoul,fardartingightsandshadowsof a mountainandscape,such as we cannot at all attainunto in oursolitarystudies.48
Ofcourse,thisresponsivenesswouldhave to be strictlybalancedbytheprac-tice of self-reliance, which enables individuals to navigate intelligently
throughhe
depths-andshoals-of humanvariousnessand
possibility.Transferrednto thepoliticalrealm,the normof tendernesss notwithout
certain limitations and liabilities. For instance, one might complain that
effective political talk could neverbe characterizedby tenderness(in the
sense of gentle respectfulness)but must be characterizedby eloquence.Indeed,mosteffectivepoliticalspeakersattemptobecomemastersof words,while takingcarethemselvesto avoidbeingvictims of words;to remainun-
moved,while moving others.However,practicing enderness-understoodas
gentlerespectfulness-doesnotnecessitateunilateraldisarmamentn the
politicalarena.Treatingone's fellow citizens with gentle respectcan be as
sound,strategically, s attemptingo trickthem. Thisis especiallytrue nthe
many smallersettingsof middledemocracy,where citizens encounteroneanother face to face, and where participantsn a discussion can responddirectlyto attacks.If we takethe possibility of social justice seriously,wemustacknowledgethe importanceof tenderness.Otherwise,unconstrained
by tenderness,or some comparablenorm,politicalconversation s likely to
be just anothermode of dominationorcynical manipulation,
deaf to theclaims of justice.
Anotherpossibleobjectionto tendernessas a communicative normfor
democraticdeliberation s that it goes farbeyondthepracticeof toleration
normally requiredby liberalism. While toleration merely requires citi-zens to put up with difference, tenderness in the sense of responsiveness)
attempts o entertain hepossibilitiesthatdifferencesuggests.This is one ofthe moreinvitingnoninstrumental ossibilitiesof citizenshipunderstoodn
conjunctionwiththecommunicativenorms offriendship.
However,tender-nessmaybe, inotherrespects,amoremodest,and ess taxing,constrainthantoleration.Whereastolerationappearsto requirecitizens to exercise self-
censorshipwhen they encounterways of life inconsistentwith theirvaluesandprinciples,therebyprojectingthe appearanceof at least tacitapproval,the normof tenderness equiresonlythatcitizenshave ago attrying ounder-stand one another.
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 101
Again, the gap in interculturalunderstanding evealedby the Septem-ber 11terrorist ttackson theUnitedStatescan illustrate hisproblem.Some
haveargued hatattempts o understand he motivationsof terrorists, rtheir
admirers, s somehowequivalent ojustifyingtheiractions,or thatattempt-
ingto imaginehow an AmericanMuslim feels in the aftermath f theattacks
somehow diminishes the memoryof those who perished.However,assum-
ing a postureof responsiveness owardone's fellow citizens (ortowardciti-
zens of othernations)does not necessarilyinvolve abandoningone's own
values andprinciples,orgivingupthefight(if onehappens o be in one).Itis
not moralbankruptcy rpoliticaltreason. nstead, t is anattemptatempathic
identificationwith others.If genuine sympathyor affection does notemergefrom thispractice,so be it. If membersof modemliberalsocieties musthave
enemies,theycan,at theveryleast,takethe timetogetto know these enemies
better.This practice s exemplifiedby the UnitedNations,where ambassa-
dors and staffersof rival nations maintaincordialrelations n spite of their
differences,and whererepresentativesf formerenemies(andpotentialene-
mies) may be observedchattingaffablyin the corridorsanddiningrooms.
The UN maybe anunexpectedplaceto discoverthepracticeof Emersonian
civic friendship.However, f it can bepracticed here tcan,perhaps,beprac-ticed elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
Theuse of Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model forliberalciti-
zenship is neither obvious nor unproblematic. ndeed,some scholars,like
Wilson Carey McWilliams,have found this conception unsatisfyingandemotionallycold.Indeed,McWilliamsobserves hatEmersondistrustedper-sonalfriendshipsbecausetheyare "basedonqualitiesof personality which]
hampermen in theirefforts to 'merge'with the all."49 notherwords,Emer-
son is too willingto sacrifice riends or thesakeof an idealizedtranscenden-
tal connectedness. McWilliams also notes that Emerson's conception of
friendship s premisedupon a radical ndividualism hat,in spite of Emer-
son'sownintentions,couldserveto "moralizedisloyaltyandself-seeking."50
RejectingEmerson,McWilliamswritesapprovinglyof ancientGreekcon-
ceptionsthatview fraternity s aneedestablishedby the natureof man,with-
out which society wouldbe sick, alienated, ndividualistic,andwithoutanytractiononthetrulyhumanexcellencesthat urnmere ife into thegoodlife.
Nonetheless,Emerson'sconceptionof friendship,with its twinpracticesof truthandtenderness,representsa compellingchallengeto the traditional
Aristotelianview that tendsto dominatediscussionsof friendshipand citi-
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102 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
zenship.One majoradvantageof Emerson'sconceptionoverAristotle'sis
that the formeraccepts as given the moraland culturalpluralismof most
modem societies, anddoes not insist that a strongor comprehensivemoralconsensusexist betweencitizenspriorto politics.51UnlikeAristotle,Emer-son had the opportunity o immerse himself in Islamic, Buddhist,Hindu,
Confucian,and othernon-Westernwritings,and can acknowledge signifi-cantintellectualdebtsoutside of theWestern radition.52orinstance, n his
essay "PersianPoetry,"Emersonassertsthat certainEasternpoets, amongthem IbnJemin, Hafiz, andJami,makecontributions o the philosophyof
friendshipequalto thatof Montaigne.He admiringlyquotesJami,who (like
Emersonhimself)portrays riendshipas growing stronger hroughconstanttesting,writing,"Afriendis he, who, huntedas a foe,/So muchthekindliershows him thanbefore;/Throwstones at him, or ruder avelins throw,/Hebuildswithstoneandsteela firmer loor."53Similarly,oneof Emerson'smorefamousobservations oncerning riendship,"He will havelearned helessonof life who is skilful in theethics of friendship,"s based on aquotation rom
Hafiz, "Thou earnestno secret until thou knowestfriendship,since to theunsoundno heavenlyknowledgeenters."54
The mainstrengthof Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model forliberalcitizenship,when comparedwith Aristotle's,is a dynamicelementthatcouldgive bothdefendersandcritics of liberalismreasonto believe thatthepracticeof citizenship n liberalsocieties can evolve in noninstrumentaldirectionswithoutjeopardizing iberalcitizenship'susualinstrumental ur-poses. Friendshipsdo not springforth,fully grown, like Athena from thehead of Zeus. Rather, f friendshipsare to grow and flourish,they requireinvestmentandgradualdevelopment."Letusbuyourentrance o thisguild,"
Emersonadvises,"byalongprobation."55henormsof friendshipdentifiedby Emersonworkto promoterelationships hatgrow,andgrowmoresolid,overtime,rather hanweakeninganddyingby degrees.By practicing ruthandtenderness, hetwocrucialnormsof friendship, elationsbetweenfellow
citizensalso canslowly develop,and cangraduallycometo be characterized
bya moreopenformof deliberation, morestableformof disagreement, nda moretrulydemocraticconnectedness.
The communicativenorms of friendship heorizedby Emersonpromote
solid relationshipswhere disagreementsare possible but not explosive.Friends,afterall, disagreeall thetimebutmakereservingandstrengtheningthe bondsof friendshipa priorityandwinninga particular rgumenta sec-
ondaryconsideration.Strategiessuch as pulling one's punches or leavingthingsunsaidmaybe employedto maintainfriendships,butsuch strategiescould also indirectlyserve to weaken hebonds of friendship n the longrun.
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Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 103
Friends who cannot be frankwith one another,or are afraidthatfrankness
will jeopardizetheirrelationship,cannot be friendsin the richestpossible
sense.They maybe close acquaintances nd know one anotherverywell, orthinkthey do. But such relationshipsare fragile and unsure. To endure,a
friendshipmustdevelop, and to developa friendshipoccasionallymustbe
testedby anelement of incivility.Therefore,Emersonwrites,"Ido notwish
to treatfriendshipdaintily,but with roughest courage.When they arereal,
they are not glass threadsor frostwork,but the solidestthingwe know.""56
Truthand tendernesscould,conceivably,be viewedas competingorcon-
tradictorynorms, since the former is primarilyconcerned with testing the
bonds of friendship,while the latter s primarilyconcernedwithpreservingthem.AlthoughEmersondoes not say so explicitly,it seems to me that the
normsof truthandtendernessarenotnecessarilyopposedtoone another at-
egorically,where the practicesof friendshipandcitizenshipareconcerned,
but, instead,maybe dialecticallyopposed.Thatis to say,the norms of truth
and tendernessmay turnoutto be dialectical correlatesin a processof per-sonaland socialdevelopmenthatoperates,at leastinpart, hrough he mech-
anismof disagreementand deliberation.
Workingtogether through the norms of friendship, truthand tender-
ness, as theorized by Emerson, can help produce a social union that is
characterizednot by fearor decorum,which may leave too much unsaid,or by street fighting, which leaves too much unheard.Instead, t would be
characterizedby a synthesisthatBernardCrickonce called "aroughcivil-
ity."57 he elementof incivility-namely, truth-pushes a society to recog-nize the divisions and tensions within it, while the element of civility-
namely, tenderness-helps thatsociety reachan endless series of delibera-
tive compromises. Working together against silence and violence, bothnormspromotea more durablesocial union and, ultimately,a greaterand
moremeaningfulharmony.If the norms cultivatedwithin friendshipsare transferable o political
communities, henpeoplewho understandwhat it meansto be a goodfriendalsowill knowsomething,althoughnoteverything,aboutwhat t meansto be
a good citizen.Peoplewill notnecessarilypracticegood citizenshipbecause
theyactuallyare united with their fellow citizensby reciprocalgoodwill, as
Aristotlehadhoped. Friendshipwill not become the concretebasis for thestate.Rather,peoplewill practicegood citizenship,at leastinitially,because
they recognizethat he samenormsthatworkforfriendshipalso will workto
preserveandstrengthenmodern iberalsocieties,even in theface of inevita-
ble disagreementbetween memberswithdifferentvalues and interests.The
practiceof citizenship hatemergeswill resemblecontractualiberalcitizen-
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104 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
shipin manyrespects,particularlyn its affirmation f expansive ndividual
rights.But it alsowill be enrichedby ademocratic onnectedness hat s both
radical n characterand,it mustbe said, indefinitein its possibilities.
NOTES
1. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Politics,"Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte(New
York:Libraryof America, 1983), 570-71.
2. ChristopherHeath Wellman is typical of this view. See ChristopherHeathWellman,
"Friends,Compatriots,and
SpecialPolitical
Obligations,"Political
Theory29
(April 2001):217-36.
3. Katebexplorestheideaof democratic onnectednesswith reference o WaltWhitman n
"WaltWhitmanand he Cultureof Democracy,"n TheInnerOcean(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniver-
sity Press, 1992),240-66. He investigates his conceptionfurtherwithreference o Emerson n
Emersonand Self-Reliance ThousandOaks,CA: Sage, 1995), esp. chap.4.
4. Articulationsof civic liberalism include William Galston,LiberalPurposes: Goods,
Virtues, ndDiversityin theLiberalState(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991);
Stephen Macedo, Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a MulticulturalDemocracy
(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,2000); StephenMacedo,Liberal Virtues:Citizen-
ship, Virtue, nd Communityn LiberalConstitutionalismNew York:OxfordUniversityPress,1990);PeterBerkowitz,Virtue ndtheMakingofModernLiberalism Princeton,NJ: Princeton
UniversityPress,1999);ThomasSpragensJr.,CivicLiberalism:Reflectionson OurDemocratic
Ideals (New York:Rowman & Littlefield, 1999);EamonnCallan,CreatingCitizens:Political
Educationand LiberalDemocracy(Oxford,UK: Clarendon,1997).5. Emerson,"Politics," 70.
6. JamesR. Martel also identifies these two centralfeaturesof Emerson'sconceptionof
friendship,but defines them rather lumsily as "repulsionandattraction." ee JamesR. Martel,
LoveIs a Sweet Chain:Desire,Autonomy ndFriendshipn LiberalPoliticalTheory NewYork:
Routledge,2001), 127.
7. The word"incivility"has come to enjoy an almostpurelynegativeconnotationdue, in
part,to the efforts of critics like StephenL. Carter.See StephenL. Carter,Civility:Manners,
Morals,and heEtiquetteofDemocracy New York:Basic Books, 1998), 134.Compare his with
MarkKingwellwho, in anexcellent studyof thepracticeof civility,acknowledges hatcivility
maynot be sufficient.Conceding hatcivilitycould "bea meansof oppressionoranexpressionof
power,not a restrainedandopen orientation o understanding," ingwell arguesthat we must
rebukeoneanother, rankly,when we suspectthat"civilityhides an instrumental nd"other han
maintaining ivil peaceandsocial order.See MarkKingwell,A CivilTongue: ustice,Dialogue,andthe PoliticsofPluralism(UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress, 1995),238-
39.
8. See SibylA. Schwarzenbach, OnCivicFriendship," thics 107(October1996):97-128;AndrewMason,"SpecialObligations o Compatriots," thics 107 (April 1997):427-47; David
Selbourne,ThePrincipleof Duty(London:Sinclair-Stevenson,1994), 156, 230-31.
9. AmyGutmann ndDennisThompson,DemocracyandDisagreement Cambridge,MA:
HarvardUniversityPress, 1996), 12.
10. Fordiscussion,see PaulSchollmeier,OtherSelves: Aristotle on PersonalandPolitical
Friendship Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1994).
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Scorza LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 105
11. See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1155al-1158a36.
12. JohnM. Cooperargues hatAristotle'sconceptionof civic friendship s properlyunder-
stood to be avarietyof utility friendship,andthatutility friendship, ike true riendship,nvolvesmutualanddisinterestedwell-wishing.See JohnM.Cooper,"Aristotle nFriendship,"nEssays
on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie OksenbergRorty(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress,
1980);andJohnM. Cooper,"PoliticalAnimalsandCivicFriendship,"nAristotle'sPolitik:Pro-
ceedings of the XIth Symposium Aristotelium, ed. Gunther Patzig (Friedrichshafen:
Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht,1990), 220-41. In contrast,AlasdairMacIntyreviews Aristotelian
civic friendshipas a kind of virtue riendship.See AlasdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue, ded. (Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1984), 156.
13. See PaulJ.Waddell,Friendship nd theMoralLife(NotreDame,IN:Universityof Notre
Dame Press, 1989), 49, 61-68.
14.Fordiscussion,see SuzanneStern-Gillet,Aristotle'sPhilosophyof Friendship Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1995).
15.Forinstance,Schwarzenbach ttempts o shedthe Aristotelian onceptionof some of its
infamousmasculinist,elitist,andxenophobicconnotations,arguing hatcitizens of modern oci-
eties can maintaina close approximation f Aristoteliancivic friendshipbased on a relatively
thin consensusregarding oleration,mutualrecognitionof rights,and a universalvalueof care.
See Schwarzenbach,"OnCivic Friendship," 05-14.
16.Indeed,according o MacIntyre,membersof modern iberalsocieties are unable o prac-tice civic friendshipas Aristotleunderstoodt. For iberal ndividualists,MacIntyre xplains,"a
communitys
simplyanarena nwhich ndividuals achpursue heirown self-chosenconception
of thegood life, andpoliticalinstitutions xist toprovide hatdegreeof orderwhichmakessuch
self-determinedactivitypossible."See Maclntyre,After Virtue,195.
17. Wellman,"Friends," 21-23.
18. Ibid.,220.
19. Ibid.,222.
20. See MerrillD. Peterson,AdamsandJefferson:A RevolutionaryDialogue (Oxford,UK:
OxfordUniversityPress, 1995);JeanM. Yarbrough, PoliticsandFriendshipn the Adams-Jef-
fersonCorrespondence,"n FriendsandCitizens:Essaysin Honorof WilsonCareyMcWilliams,
ed. PeterDennisBathoryandNancyL. Schwartz Lanham,MD:Rowman& Littlefield,2000);
Jean M. Yarbrough,The Adams-JeffersonLetters: The Complete CorrespondencebetweenThomasJeffersonandAbigailand JohnAdams,ed. LesterJ.Cappon ChapelHill:Universityof
North CarolinaPress, 1988).
21. Whilefriendships "aconstituentof well-being," hepowersandrightsof citizenshipare
no morethan a means to well-being. See Wellman,"Friends," 23.
22. See Mason,"SpecialObligations," 42. Masonbuildsuponthe workof JosephRaz,who
has argued hatthe obligationsof friendshipare constitutiveof the intrinsicgood of friendship,
rather hanmerelybeingburdens hatbenefitothers.See Raz,"LiberatingDuties,"Law and Phi-
losophy8 (1989): 3-21. Forrefinementsof Raz'sbasic argument, ee SamuelScheffler,"Rela-
tionships and Responsibilities,"Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (summer 1997): 189-209;
Michael O. Hardimon,"Role Obligations,"Journal of Philosophy 91 (July 1994): 333-63.Schefflerargues hatspecialobligationsadhere orelationships hatone happens o value,while
Hardimonsuggests that role identification provides the moral reasons to assume special
obligations.
23.According o Mason,thisobligationcannotbe derived romnational dentitybut,rather,
onlyfromcivic identity,although he reasonsforthis arenotentirelyclear.See Mason,"Special
Obligations,"442. Wellmanarguesthat no such distinctioncan be made between civic and
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106 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
national dentity,since both provide mainly instrumental oods thatpromotewell-being. See
Wellman,"Friends," 23.
24.Wellman,"Friends,"
30.
25. Some culturescautionagainstcross-cultural riendships.See for instanceQu'ran,3:26,
3:116, 4:137, and5:51.However, reatingothersaccording o some of the normsof friendship or
instrumental easonsis not the same as forming genuinefriendshipswiththem.
26. For an account of the historicaldevelopmentof the concept of friendship n Islamic
thought, see Lenn E. Goodman, "Friendship n Aristotle, Miskawayh, and al-Ghazali," n
FriendshipEast and West:Philosophical Perspectives,ed. Oliver Leaman(Richmond,UK:
Curzon,1996), 164-91; for discussion of Confucian hinkingon friendship, ee David L. Hall
andRogerT.Ames, "ConfucianFriendship:The Roadto Religiousness," n TheChangingFace
of Friendship,ed. LeroyS. Rouner NotreDame,IN: NotreDameUniversityPress, 1994), 77-
94; fordiscussionof traditional ndianviews of friendship, ee BhikhuParekh,"An ndianViewof Friendship,"n The ChangingFace of Friendship,ed. Leroy S. Rouner(Notre Dame, IN:
Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1994), 95-113.
27. We readin al-Ghazali, or instance,thatfriendship"entails ove as well as candor and
onlybenevolencecanguidethe choicebetweenspeakingoutandkeepingsilent."See Goodman,
"FriendshipnAristotle,"184.Similarly, t wasrecognized nthe Indianepics that riendship"is
one of thefew relationshipsnwhich honestandfearlesscriticism sbothpermitted ndrequired.Friendsmust'speak ruth' satyamvada) o eachother;otherwise heir riendship ests onuntruth
and is 'false.'" See Parekh,"AnIndianView,"102.
28. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Astrea,"n TheCompleteWorks fRalph WaldoEmerson,cen-
tenaryed., ed. EdwardW.Emerson,12 vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04), vol. 9, 80.
29. In an early lecture,"Society,"Emersonwrites of friendship,"This is anotherself. He
occupiesanotherpointof view,and sees thesameobjectonanother ide.His confirmation f our
report ejoices,his contradictionmakes us pause."RalphWaldoEmerson,"Society,"TheEarlyLecturesof RalphWaldoEmerson,3 vols. (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1972),vol. 2, 102. This notion of a friendas "another elf' recalls Aristotle'sunderstanding f a truefriend as a "second self."See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1166a30-35.However,Emersondoes notmean,as Aristotledoes, thatmy friend s anotherme, possessing the same moralper-spectiveandconcern orvirtue,so thatself-loveembracesbothpersonsequally.There s a crucial
separatenessinvolved in Emersonian
riendship,which does not
appearo exist in
Aristotle'sconceptionof virtuefriendship.Fordiscussion,see Stern-Gillet,Aristotle'sPhilosophy,37-40.
Also see Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance,106-7.
30. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Friendship,"n Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 351.
31. See FriedrichNietzsche,Human,All TooHuman,ed.MarionFaber Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress, 1984), section 376. Fordiscussion,see JacquesDerrida,Politics of Friend-
ship (London:Verso,1997), throughout.32. Emerson,"Friendship,"45.
33. Ibid.,348.
34. Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1167a22-1167b15.35. Kateb dentifiesandelaborates hese two aspectsof Emerson'sconceptionof friendship.
AlthoughEmerson laims,initially, ogive theseaspectsequalweightinconstituting riendship,Kateb s probably orrect n his view thattruth eceives a largerplacein Emerson'ssystem,per-hapsdue its moreintimateconnection to self-reliance,which is the centralconceptof this sys-tem. See Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance,esp. 102-9.
36. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Behavior,"n Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 1049.
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Scorza LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 107
37. Emerson,"Friendship,"47.
38. RalphWaldoEmerson,"SocialAims,"CompleteWorks f RalphWaldoEmerson,cente-
naryed.,ed. EdwardW.Emerson,12vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04),vol.8,95-96.39. Fordiscussion,see Sissela Bok,Lying(New York:Vintage,1989),esp. 90-106. Also see
GutmannandThompson,Democracyand Disagreement,esp. chap.3.
40. Fordiscussion,see Seyla Benhabib,"LiberalDialogue versus a CriticalTheoryof Dis-
cursive Legitimation,"n Liberalismand the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989),esp. 146-54.Comparewith Bruce Ackerman'sdefense of
conversational estraint n "WhyDialogue?"Journalof Philosophy86 (January1989):5-22.
41. See J. DonaldMoon, ConstructingCommunity:Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts
(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993), 92. For a contrastingview, see Stephen
Holmes,"GagRules or thePolitics of Omission," n Constitutionalism ndDemocracy,ed. Jon
Elster andRuneSlagstad (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988).42. JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),fn.220.
43. Ibid.,217.
44. RalphWaldoEmerson,in "Manners,"Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 525.
45. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Self-Reliance,"n Emerson:EssaysandLectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 264.
46. Emerson,"Friendship,"43.
47. Whitman's"Songof theOpenRoad"concludeswith,"Camerado, give you my hand /I
give you mylove moreprecious hanmoney,/Igive you myselfbeforepreaching rlaw;/Willyou
give me yourself?Will you come travel with me?/Shallwe stick by each other as long as we
live?" See WaltWhitman,Leaves of Grass (New York:New AmericanLibrary,1980), 144.
Derridaappears o echo this sentiment nPoliticsofFriendship,where he writes,"Whenwill we
be readyfor anexperienceof freedomandequalitythat s capableof respectfullyexperiencingthatfriendship,which would at last be just, just beyondthe law, and measuredup againstits
measurelessness?O my democratic riends" p. 306).48. RalphWaldoEmerson,"TheHeart,"n EarlyLecturesof RalphWaldoEmerson,3 vols.
(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1972), vol. 2, 292.
49. Wilson CareyMcWilliams,The Ideaof Fraternity n America(Berkeley:Universityof
CaliforniaPress, 1973), 285.50. Ibid.,285.
51. BernardCrickarguesagainst he need for such aconsensus,writing,"Themoralconsen-
sus of a free state is not somethingmysteriouslyprior o or abovepolitics: it is theactivity(the
civilizing activity)of politics itself." See BernardCrick,In Defense of Politics, rev. ed. (Balti-more:Penguin,1964), 24.
52. Among Emerson'ssourceswere theBhagavadGita,the Hindu VishnuSarma,the four
classic booksof Confucianism namely, heAnalects,the BookofMencius,theChungYung, nd
the TaHeo), various collections of sayings of Buddha,several volumes of Persian and Arabic
poetry includingFirdusi'sepicShahNameh),andseveralvolumesof Islamichistoryandphilos-
ophy (includingtheAkhlak-I-Jalaly,which introducedEmersonto Sufism).FordiscussionofEmerson'sexposureto non-Western hilosophies,see RobertD. RichardsonJr.,Emerson:The
MindonFire(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1995),218-23,376-80, 391-94,404-9.
53. RalphWaldoEmerson, n "PersianPoetry,"CompleteWorks f RalphWaldoEmerson,
centenaryd.,ed.EdwardW.Emerson, 2 vols.(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1903-04),vol.8,259.
54. CompareRalphWaldoEmerson,"DomesticLife," n CompleteWorks f RalphWaldo
Emerson,centenary d.,ed. EdwardW.Emerson,12 vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04),vol. 7, 129, with Emerson,"PersianPoetry," 58.
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108 POLITICALTHEORY February2004
55. Emerson,"Friendship" 51.
56. Ibid.,346.
57. Crick,In Defense of Politics, 161.
JasonA. Scorzais an assistantprofessor ofphilosophyandpolitical science at FairleighDickinsonUniversity n Teaneck,NewJersey.He is presently completinga book on the
theoryandpractice of liberalcitizenship.