Liability of Intermediaries Carthy Thesis
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Transcript of Liability of Intermediaries Carthy Thesis
i
Copyright Enforcement in
the Digital Era and the
Role of Internet
Intermediaries
LL.M.
2011
Laura Carthy
ii
SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGIES USED AND MAJOR
FINDINGS
I was motivated to complete this thesis having a deep interest in the Intellectual
Property and Technology Law areas. This is due to my undergraduate qualification
in Information and Communication Technology which I obtained here in Trinity
College in the School of Computer Science and Statistics. Researching this thesis
has allowed me to synergise both my technology and legal knowledge and to gain
a broad and in-depth understanding of digital piracy, both from a technical and
from a legal perspective. Particularly as I have grown up in the Internet age and
am an avid consumer of digital culture, I find digital copyright and the plethora of
issues that it throws up, enthralling. I watched with interest as the EMI v UPC case
unfolded in the autumn of 2010 and felt that the ramifications of this case
warranted an in depth analysis.
In March 2011, in furtherance of my research, I commenced a legal internship
with the Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland. This is the
representative industry association for Internet intermediaries in Ireland. As part of
my role here I have followed the issue of digital copyright very closely both at a
national and European level. It has given me indispensible industry insight into the
on-going reviews and recent developments in this area, and has enabled a much
broader understanding of the issues than one could possibly grasp in a purely
academic position.
I attended the Annual Conference on European Copyright Law in Brussels in May,
where I met such copyright experts as Mihály Ficsor, Alain Strowel, Jonathan
Griffiths and Frank Macrez to name a few. I met and have since liaised with the
lead counsel for the litigation team of Scarlet in the highly anticipated case of
Scarlet v SABAM which is currently before the CJEU, Thomas de Meese. I
observed with interest as each of these esteemed academics and practitioners
presented on the most contemporary developments in Europe in the realm of
copyright.
iii
In June I attended the ALAI (Association littéraire et artistique international)
annual conference entitled Expansion and Contraction of Copyright: Subject
Matter, Scope and Remedies where I volunteered with the Irish Copyright
Licensing Agency and the Copyright Association of Ireland. This highly
informative conference included speakers such as Mr Justice John Cooke, Mr
Justice Peter Charleton, solicitor Helen Sheehy, Professor Robert Clark and
representatives from Google, WIPO, HADOPI and the European Commission.
Specific presentations were delivered in relation to the enforcement of rights in the
digital era honing in on the graduated response regime and the alternative solution
of private agreements with Internet intermediaries. With my industry experience I
could constructively analyse and critique the information which was imparted to
me, in order to draw my own conclusions, which are evident in this paper.
The Department of Enterprise, Jobs and Innovation announced on 9th of May that
it was to begin a public consultation for the review of the Copyright and Related
Rights Act, 2000. The Copyright Review Committee held a public meeting here in
Trinity College Dublin on the 4th
of July which I attended and observed the
contributions of all of the stakeholders present. I also attended an event run by the
IIEA where senior copyright counsel for Google, Fred von Lohmann, delivered a
powerful presentation entitled Protecting Innovation While Protecting Copyright.
This detailed how copyright policy should be adapted for the digital age stressing
the necessity to embrace the technological advances which we are currently
experiencing all around us, with new business models and flexible laws which can
be adapted to the online environment.
As I had anticipated when I chose this topic for my thesis, legislative reform
resulting from the fallout of the UPC decision is now on the agenda in this
jurisdiction. The Government presented draft wording for a Statutory Instrument
in May in order to bring Ireland into line with its European counterparts in
complying with the E-Commerce Directive. I have followed this suggested
amendment very closely and liaised with industry representatives and copyright
lawyers in relation to same. I have conducted extensive research on this entire area
iv
of jurisprudence in order to present my analysis and my major findings have been
as follows:
The current legislative conditions are unsatisfactory in this jurisdiction in
relation to digital piracy. The attempts of rightsholders to enforce their
copyright against individual infringers through means currently available
has proven burdensome and insufficient and they have thus turned their
focus toward Internet intermediaries seeking a more active role on their
part.
Internet intermediaries have a defence of „mere conduit‟ under the E-
Commerce Directive. However European law provides that rightsholders
should be in a position to obtain injunctions against intermediaries whose
facilities are used by third parties to infringe copyright.
Under the principles of EU law, any such injunction must be subject to
certain safeguards. It must be proportionate and effective and have regard
for the fundamental rights of third parties. A body of case law is
developing in this area in Europe providing much-needed further
guidance, particularly the opinion of the Advocate General in Scarlet v
SABAM. The full judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union
in this case should be available in the autumn.
European case law differentiates between hosting providers, access
providers and index and search providers and the courts have treated each
category very differently. Those intermediaries who play a neutral role
will generally enjoy the protection of the „mere conduit‟ safe harbour,
while the more active intermediary will not.
A number of national measures have been enacted in some Member States,
and indeed worldwide, to combat copyright infringement by means of a
graduated response. It has been established, through a body of European
jurisprudence, that such a scheme must be made on a statutory basis, with
judicial oversight and procedural safeguards, and a private agreement
between the parties will not suffice.
v
The current proposals from the Department of Enterprise, Jobs and
Innovation of an amendment to the Copyright and Related Rights Act
2000 by way of Statutory Instrument is unsatisfactory. It is broadly
worded and provides little guidance to the judiciary. It will not serve to
alleviate the situation in Ireland and the manner in which the consultation
has been carried out, separately to the broader review of the 2000 Act, is
disappointing. Reform which may bring about a real solution to the
problem is required and this would necessitate input from the Oireachtas
and collaboration of all stakeholders involved.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend many thanks to my supervisor, Mr Paul Coughlan, for his
insightful comments and much appreciated guidance throughout the year. I would
also like to thank my colleagues at ISPAI for offering their thoughts and
observations, and most importantly for their banter, which has provided many a
diversion, keeping me sane while completing this thesis. I am indebted to all of my
friends and family members who have supported me in many and varied ways
over the course of the past year.
vii
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION
“I hereby declare that this project is completely representative of my efforts alone.
Where use has been made of other people‟s work, it has been fully acknowledged
and referenced accordingly. This thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a
degree at this or any other University. I agree that the Library may lend or copy
this thesis upon request.”
Signature_________________________
Date_________________________
viii
CONTENTS
Summary of methodologies used and major findings ii
Acknowledgements vi
Author’s declaration vii
Contents viii
Table of Cases x
Table of Legislation xii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 European Framework
2.1 Background 4
2.2 Directive 2000/31/EC 4
2.3 Directive 2001/29/EC 8
2.4 Directive 2004/48/EC 10
Chapter 3 European Copyright Jurisprudence – A Pattern
Developing
3.1 Introduction 13
3.2 Indexing and Searching 13
3.2.1 Newzbin (UK) 13
3.2.2 The Pirate Bay (Sweden) 16
3.2.3 The Pirate Bay and Mininova
(Netherlands) 18
3.2.4 RapidShare (Germany) 19
3.3 Hosting Providers 21
3.3.1 Google Adwords 21
3.3.2 Google Video 22
3.3.3 L‟Oréal and Ebay 23
3.4 Internet Access Providers 24
3.4.1 Telenor (Denmark) 25
3.4.2 Ziggo (Netherlands) 25
3.4.3 Belgacom and Scarlet (Belgium) 26
3.4.4 UPC (Austria) 27
3.4.5 UPC (Ireland) 27
Chapter 4 Options Available for Intermediary Action and
Striking a Balance
4.1 What in theory can an ISP do and can it work? 29
4.1.1 DNS Blocking 29
ix
4.1.2 IP Blocking 30
4.1.3 Filtering 31
4.1.4 Graduated Response 31
4.2 Striking a Balance – Proportionality and
Effectiveness 32
Chapter 5 Ireland – A Chronology of Case Law
5.1 Introduction 35
5.2 Norwich Pharmacal 35
5.3 Graduated Response 36
5.4 The Pirate Bay 37
5.5 Data Protection Implications 38
5.6 UPC 43
5.6.1 Background 43
5.6.2 Attitude of UPC 43
5.6.3 Possible Solutions 44
5.6.4 Fundamental Right to Privacy 45
5.6.5 Authority of the Court 45
5.6.6 European Obligations 49
Chapter 6 National Measures against Piracy on the Internet
6.1 Introduction 52
6.2 UK – Digital Economy Act 2010 52
6.3 France – HADOPI 60
Chapter 7 Ireland
7.1 Consultation on Amendment to Copyright
and Related Rights Act 2000 64
7.2 A Closer Look 66
Chapter 8 Conclusion 73
Bibliography 75
x
TABLE OF CASES
AUSTRALIA
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (No3) [2010] FCA 24
AUSTRIA
Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft
mbH v UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH Unreported 17 May 2011 (HW(Vienna)).
BELGIUM
Belgian Anti-Piracy Federation v Belgacom Unreported 8 July 2010 (RvK
(Antwerp))
SABAM v SA Tiscali [2007] ECDR 19
SABAM v Tiscali Unreported January 28, 2010 (App (B))
DENMARK
Telenor (tidligere DMT2 A/S og Sonofon A/S) v IFPI Danmark 27 May 2010
(Højesterets)
FRANCE
Decision no 2009-580 of June 10th 2009 of the French Constitutional Council
Google Inc. v Compagnie des phares et balises 21 March 2011 (Cour d‟Appel de
Paris)
Google Inc. v Bac Films, the Factory 21 March 2011 (Cour d‟Appel de Paris)
Google Inc. v Bac Films, the Factory, Canal + 21 March 2011 (Cour d‟Appel de
Paris)
Google Inc. v Les Films de la Croisade, Goatworks Films 21 March 2011 (Cour
d‟Appel de Paris)
GERMANY
GEMA v Rapidshare AG Unreported 12 June 2009 (LG (Hamburg))
Rapidshare AG v Capelight Pictures Unreported 22 March 2010 (OLG
(Düsseldorf))
IRELAND
EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & Ors v Eircom Ltd & Anor [2005] IEHC 233
EMI Records (Ireland) Limited v Eircom Plc [2009] IEHC 411
EMI Records & Ors v Eircom Ltd [2010] IEHC 108
EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & Ors v UPC Communications Ireland Ltd [2010]
IEHC 377
xi
NETHERLANDS
Brein v Mininova B.V. Unreported August 26, 2009 (DC (Utrecht))
Brein v Ziggo Unreported July 19, 2010 (RB (Den Haag))
SWEDEN
Public Prosecutor v Neij Unreported April 17, 2009 (TR (Stockholm))
Neij v Public Prosecutor Unreported November 26, 2010 (HR (Stockholm))
UNITED KINGDOM
British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021
Norwich Pharmacal Company and Ors v Commissioners of Customs and Excise
[1973] UKHL 6
Twentieth Century Fox and others v NewzBin Limited [2010] EWHC 608
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORTS
Joined Cases C236/08 – Google France SARL, Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, C237/08 Google France SARL v Viaticum SA, Luteciel SARL, and
C238/08 Google France SARL v Centre National de recherche en relations
humaines (CNRRH) SARL, Pierre-Alexis Thonne, Bruno Raboin, Tiger SARL
[2011] ECR (page number unavailable at time of writing)
Case C-324/09 L'Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire
Garnier & Cie, L'Oréal (UK) Limited v eBay International AG, eBay Europe
SARL, eBay (UK) Limited, Stephan Potts, Tracy Ratchford, Marie Ormsby, James
Clarke, Joanna Clarke, Glen Fox, Rukhsana Bi [2011] ECR (page number
unavailable at time of writing)
Case C-324/09 L'Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire
Garnier & Cie, L'Oréal (UK) Limited v eBay International AG, eBay Europe
SARL, eBay (UK) Limited, Stephan Potts, Tracy Ratchford, Marie Ormsby, James
Clarke, Joanna Clarke, Glen Fox, Rukhsana Bi, [2011] ECR (page number
unavailable at time of writing), Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen
Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et
éditeurs (SABAM)
Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et
éditeurs (SABAM), Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón.
xii
TABLE OF LEGISLATION
EU LEGISLATION
Directives
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data.
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society
Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights
Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and
associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic
communications networks and service
xiii
NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Ireland
Primary Legislation
Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000
Data Protection Act 1988
Data Protection Amendment Act 2003
Secondary Legislation
SI 68/2003 European Communities (Directive 2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003
SI 16/2004 European Communities (Copyright and Related Rights) Regulations
2004
United Kingdom
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1998
Digital Economy Act 2010
Sweden
Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 as amended
Germany
Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Law) 1965 as amended
France
Act No. 92-597 of 1 July 1992 on the Code of Intellectual Property
Law No. 2006-961 of 1 August 2006 on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society
1
Chapter 1 Digital Copyright Infringement
1.1 Introduction
Internet service providers (ISPs) could probably not exist if the law did not protect
them from liability for abuse committed by their users to some extent. How much
protection should they be afforded though is one question that the judiciary and
stakeholders alike are struggling to answer. In the world of digital piracy, it is
difficult to strike a balance between the competing rights of the intellectual
property rights holders, consumers and intermediaries alike. I use the term
intermediaries because the wider dispute encompasses not only ISPs, in the sense
that they provide access to the Internet, but includes companies providing other
internet services, such as YouTube and Google. The core of the debate is how to
reconcile the fundamental rights of Internet users such as freedom of expression
and privacy, and exclusive rights such as copyright.
Ideally, the wrongdoer alone would be at the receiving end of any hypothetical
lawsuit, but this is difficult in reality because of the very nature of the Internet and
how it operates. The cost of access to the courts to obtain the kinds of injunctions
necessary for this has proven to be an obstacle to the rightsholders. When one
compares the costs of obtaining these injunctions with the recompense obtained,
this method of enforcement would appear futile. Frustrated, rightsholders have
turned their attentions toward access providers. They seek injunctions against the
service provider to block websites, filter traffic on their networks, or implement
what is commonly referred to as a “three strikes” system resulting in the eventual
disconnection of the Internet account of a repeat infringer. Feeling that their
industry is under threat, rightsholders will seek to do everything possible to
conquer the battle that is digital piracy.
Traditionally ISPs have been cooperative in a passive-reactive fashion, but recent
trends in some jurisdictions illustrate a shift in this approach to a more active
methodology. This shift in trend however brings with it a risk of transforming
intermediaries into a private extra-judicial copyright police. These more active
methods may be the subject of private agreements between the rightsholders and
2
the ISPs. Nonetheless they ought to be subject to certain safeguards. Some
schemes are created by well thought out legislation as is the case in the UK. In
legislating for copyright infringement, the legislature must be aware of the risks of
undermining the limited liability regime provided for in European law and must
not be so heavy handed in its laws as to be disproportionately burdensome on the
intermediaries. It is vital that costs of implementation and other factors are given
serious consideration in order to maintain an environment where ISPs operating in
Ireland can remain competitive, particularly as the economy struggles to regain
stability. Even more importantly, a real regard must be had for the privacy of the
individual Internet user. The drafters must simultaneously however have regard for
the rights of the creators of original artistic and creative works.
In what is one of the most eagerly anticipated cases in this area of interest
currently before the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Advocate General
published his long awaited opinion in April last. This undoubtedly came as a great
relief to ISPs since it was concluded that a measure ordering an ISP to filter or
block electronic communications in order to protect intellectual property rights in
principle infringes fundamental rights. The industry awaits the final judgment with
baited breath as the CJEU finally begins to fill in the gaps that have existed in
providing guidance to national courts on such matters until now. The opinion of
Advocate General Cruz Villalón places the legal concept of proportionality centre
stage in the debate. Any kind of injunction sought by rightsholders against ISPs
must satisfy a proportionality test before they will be granted.
In this jurisdiction such a lack of guidance has been particularly evident.
Furthermore, it has been highlighted that there exists a gap in our national
copyright laws leaving us in a position where we are out of line with our European
counterparts. Where European law requires a Member State to ensure that a
rightsholder is in a position to seek an injunction against a third party who
provides facilities which are used to infringe copyright, the Copyright and Related
Rights Act, 2000 fails to do so according to Charleton J in his controversial
judgment of EMI v UPC in October 2010. Subsequent persistent lobbying from
rightsholders and particular political motivations have resulted in a proposed
3
legislative amendment by way of Statutory Instrument to the aforementioned Act.
Regrettably the wording of this proposed amendment is extremely broad and
provides little or no direction to the judges presiding over what will inevitably
result in a watershed of litigation. Even more unfortunate is the fact that this
consultation has been carried out concurrent to and separate from a broader
consultation in relation to potential amendments to the current legislation to
promote innovation in Ireland. Public policy however is beyond the scope of this
thesis and one must focus on the law, as it stands now, and how it may stand upon
the adoption of such a Statutory Instrument.
This thesis examines the existing European and national framework in relation to
copyright and copyright enforcement, with emphasis on the ways in which these
have been adapted, albeit inadequately in some instances, to cope with the rapid
digitisation of society. Amendments made or proposed to such legislation,
particularly in regard to the Internet are also scrutinised. The motivation behind
this thesis is primarily the recent events arising as a result of the on-going discord
between record companies and the internet service providers in this jurisdiction.
The relevant cases are analysed in detail, along with the various hurdles posed to
the judiciary. Specific national measures which have been or are in the process of
being implemented in France and the UK are examined and their respective
advantages and shortcomings are identified. Importantly I will address the
essential issue of the on-going consultation regarding the proposed Statutory
Instrument and its implications for all of the stakeholders involved.
4
Chapter 2 European Framework
2.1 Background
The existing European framework which sets the scene for copyright enforcement
and intermediary responsibility imparts two primary themes which resonate time
and again in any debate or case involving illegal file sharing and copyright theft on
the Internet. These are the premise of “mere conduit” or the safe harbour regime as
it is sometimes referred, and the injunctions system which enunciates the
possibility for rightsholders to obtain an order against an ISP for the prevention of
any infringement which is occurring on their network. There are three Directives
detailed in this chapter which build the structure within which an ISP operates
today.
2.1 Directive 2000/31/EC
Directive 2000/31/EC is titled „on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market‟ hereinafter
referred to as the E-Commerce Directive or ECD.1 This provides for the limited
liability regime of ISPs and bestows the necessary protections upon intermediaries
enabling them to operate without the fear of potential liability for the actions of
their customers. The framers of the ECD have struck a very tenuous balance in its
provisions and any interference with these provisions could potentially increase
the burdens for legitimate commerce, creating a negative impact on innovation,
distorting competition and undermining consumers‟ fundamental rights to privacy
and free flow of information.
The ECD makes a number of defences available to intermediaries who either
provide the “mere conduit” through which copyrighted material is transmitted,
host content or cache information. The first of these defences specifies the
conditions which must be satisfied in order to preclude the imposition of liability
on a “mere conduit” intermediary and is set out in article 12 as follows:
1 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market.
5
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a
recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a communication
network, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable
for the information transmitted, on condition that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in
paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of
the information transmitted in so far as this takes place for the sole
purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network,
and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than
is reasonably necessary for the transmission.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative
authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring
the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.
Article 13 sets out the caching defence as follows:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a
recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service
provider is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary
storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose of making more
efficient the information's onward transmission to other recipients of the
service upon their request, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not modify the information;
6
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the
information;
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the
information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by
industry;
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of
technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data
on the use of the information; and
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of
the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission
has been removed from the network, or access to it has been
disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered
such removal or disablement.
2. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative
authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring
the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.
Article 14 provides for the defence of hosting:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on
condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or
information is apparent; or
7
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting
under the authority or the control of the provider.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal
systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an
infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of
establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to
information.
Article 15 expressly requires that an intermediary should not be required to
implement any general monitoring measures:
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when
providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively
to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
2. Member States may establish obligations for information society service
providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged
illegal activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their
service or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their
request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their
service with whom they have storage agreements.
The prohibition in article 15 of the ECD to impose general monitoring obligations
on ISPs as well as the conditional liability regime in articles 12 to 14, are rooted in
the Council of Europe‟s Convention for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
8
2.2 Directive 2001/29/EC
Directive 2009/29/EC is titled „on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society‟ hereinafter referred to as
the Copyright Directive.2 The motivations behind this Directive were to respond to
the challenges provided by the Internet and to adapt the copyright framework to
the digital environment.
The Directive affords a mandatory exemption of transient or temporary copying
for technological purposes which was inserted as a result of lobbying by large ISPs
and telecommunications companies who were concerned by the prospect of
liability and felt that the safe harbour provisions in the E-Commerce Directive
were not sufficient. According to some commentators these provisions may not
have been necessary to begin with, and ironically have come to place even more of
a burden on service providers which would otherwise have been the case due to
the implementation of a standalone injunctive right for rightsholders to secure
injunctions against service providers. 3
Article 5(1) allows for temporary acts of reproduction which are fundamental to
the functioning of the Internet and states as follows:
1. Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2, which are
transient or incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a
technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable:
(a) a transmission in a network between third parties by an
intermediary, or
(b) a lawful use
2 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 3 Trevor Cook and Lorna Brazell, The Copyright Directive: UK Implementation (Jordans, 2004), at 95.
9
of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no
independent economic significance, shall be exempted from the
reproduction right provided for in Article 2.
Recital 33 further explains this
The exclusive right of reproduction should be subject to an exception to
allow certain acts of temporary reproduction, which are transient or
incidental reproductions, forming an integral and essential part of a
technological process and carried out for the sole purpose of enabling
either efficient transmission in a network between third parties by an
intermediary, or a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made.
The acts of reproduction concerned should have no separate economic
value on their own. To the extent that they meet these conditions, this
exception should include acts which enable browsing as well as acts of
caching to take place, including those which enable transmission systems
to function efficiently, provided that the intermediary does not modify the
information and does not interfere with the lawful use of technology,
widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the
information. A use should be considered lawful where it is authorised by
the rightholder or not restricted by law.
The Copyright Directive contains a number of provisions in relation to the
possibility of injunctions against ISPs. This Directive was issued one year after the
Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 came into force in this jurisdiction. It was
believed that the Directive had been correctly transposed and that the wording of
article 40(4) provided a possibility for the granting of injunctions, for example to
block a website such as the Pirate Bay. This would prove not to be the case, as will
be seen in the ensuing chapters.
Recital 59 of the Copyright Directive states the following:
In the digital environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may
increasingly be used by third parties for infringing activities. In many
10
cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing
activities to an end. Therefore, without prejudice to any other sanctions
and remedies available, rightholders should have the possibility of
applying for an injunction against an intermediary who carries a third
party's infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in a
network. This possibility should be available even where the acts carried
out by the intermediary are exempted under Article 5. The conditions and
modalities relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law of
the Member States.
2.3 Directive 2004/48/EC
Directive 2004/48/EC is titled „on the enforcement of intellectual property rights‟
hereinafter referred to as IPRED.4 The European Commission recently published
its report5 on the application this Directive, in preparation for its eventual
amendment, in order to adapt it to “the new challenges inherent in a modern
Digital Society.”6 The report states that the Directive was not drafted with the
challenges posed by the increase in opportunity for infringement offered by the
Internet in mind.
IPRED created a framework for harmonised enforcement of intellectual property
rights throughout Europe. The report sets out specific areas in relation to the
digital environment which may be in need of clarification, particularly regarding
the liability of intermediaries and the workability of injunctions. This is
particularly concerning to ISPs due to the possibility of injunctions “aimed at
prohibiting the continuation of the infringement” against intermediaries whose
services are being used by a third party to commit such infringements, as provided
for in articles 9 and 11 of the directive.
4 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 5 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0779:FIN:EN:PDF (visited 8 April 2011). 6 Ibid.
11
Article 9(1) provides for interlocutory injunctions against those whose services are
being used by a third party to infringe copyright:
Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may, at the request
of the applicant:
(a) issue against the alleged infringer an interlocutory injunction
intended to prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual
property right, or to forbid, on a provisional basis and subject,
where appropriate, to a recurring penalty payment where provided
for by national law, the continuation of the alleged infringements of
that right, or to make such continuation subject to the lodging of
guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of the rightholder;
an interlocutory injunction may also be issued, under the same
conditions, against an intermediary whose services are being used
by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right;
injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used by a
third party to infringe a copyright or a related right are covered by
Directive 2001/29/EC;
(b) order the seizure or delivery up of the goods suspected of
infringing an intellectual property right so as to prevent their entry
into or movement within the channels of commerce.
Article 11 sets out the framework for injunctions:
Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding
an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities
may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the
continuation of the infringement. Where provided for by national law, non-
compliance with an injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a
recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring compliance. Member
States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party
12
to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3)
of Directive 2001/29/EC.
The Commission is proposing to conduct an impact assessment pursuant to article
187 and a questionnaire
8 was circulated to Member States earlier in the year
focussing on some issues which they feel are in particular need of addressing. This
consultation period ended on the 31st of March and we are now awaiting the
resulting analysis. Whilst article 18 does require an assessment of the impact of the
Directive at this time, a critical economic analysis of the impact has not been
possible due to late transposition in some Member States, and without sufficient
evidence of the necessity of this revision there is no justification for amendment at
this time. Such premature amendments could potentially have considerable impact
on ISPs.
7 Article 18 states that “Three years after the date laid down in Article 20(1), each Member State
shall submit to the Commission a report on the implementation of this Directive.” 8Council of the European Union, Working Document 6141/11 Brussels 4 February 2011, available
at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st06/st06141.en11.pdf (visited 26 July 2011).
The questions posed by the Council pertaining specifically to intermediaries were as follows:
Is there a need to introduce a common definition of intermediaries in the Enforcement
Directive?
Does your law contain specific provisions on injunctions against intermediaries, or do such injunctions have to be requested under the general rules? If there are specific
provisions, what are these and are they used often?
Is there a need to clarify in the Enforcement Directive that not only permanent injunctions
are available against intermediaries but also interlocutory injunctions? Should other
provisional or precautionary measures be available against intermediaries?
Taking into account that certain measures are available against intermediaries even when
they cannot be held liable for the infringing acts, is there a need to clarify the standing of
an intermediary in IP infringement proceedings? Can an intermediary be deemed an
“unsuccessful party” when an injunction is issued against it without establishing its
liability for the infringement (e.g. relating to cost issues)?
Should intermediaries (transport service providers, Internet platforms, ISPs) be involved to a greater extent in the prevention or termination of IP infringements? If yes, what ways
would you deem appropriate?
13
Chapter 3 European Copyright Jurisprudence --- A Pattern Developing
3.1 Introduction
The term ISPs encompasses not only Internet Access Providers who provide the
“mere conduit” over which information flows on the network but also includes
indexing and search services which are actively facilitating illegal file sharing, and
hosting providers which lease server space to their users. The courts treat these
very differently. The approach of the courts has been consistent in Member States
in relation to its treatment of index and search providers.
3.2 Indexing and Searching
3.2.1 Newzbin (UK)
Newzbin is an indexing and searching site which was held to be liable for primary
and secondary copyright infringement by the High Court for England and Wales in
March 2010.9 Newzbin provides indexing services for the Usenet system which is
a global system of online bulletin boards that users may read or contribute to. Its
website describes it as the “Google of Usenet”10
. The content posted to Usenet can
be either in text or binary form. Binary files, which could include copyrighted
movies for example, being substantially larger than a text file, must be split into
more easily manageable parts in order to be processed. These parts will then be
posted in separate messages in the newsgroup and a user wishing to download a
particular movie must be sure to download all of the relevant parts. Newzbin
processes and stores the header information of these separate messages in three
main indices. A member of the site can then search these various indices for
material by categories. One of these indices is a file format known as NZB which
aids users in downloading these files in a quicker way than would usually be
possible. It eliminates the need for a user to search for each individual relevant
part manually.
9 Twentieth Century Fox and others v NewzBin Limited [2010] EWHC 608 10 http://www.newzbin.com/ (visited 7 June 2011).
14
The claimants contended that the defendant infringed their copyrights by: i)
authorising acts of infringement by its members; ii) procuring, encouraging and
entering into a common design with its members to infringe; iii) communicating
the claimants‟ copyright works to the public, namely the defendant‟s members.
They also claimed Newzbin was a service provider with actual knowledge of other
persons using its service to infringe copyright and sought an injunction under
section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Kitchin J identified what was meant by “authorisation” in this context as “the grant
or purported grant of the right to do the act complained of. It does not extend to
mere enablement, assistance or even encouragement” and went on to state that this
grant or purported grant may be implied from the relevant circumstances, for
example the level of control retained by the service provider. He analysed the
application of these principles in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd.11
Roadshow was primarily concerned with the question of whether iiNet, one of the
largest ISPs in Australia, authorised infringing acts of some of its subscribers who
were downloading copyrighted films. Proceedings were brought with the aim of
preventing copyright infringement by means of a peer-to-peer system known as
BitTorrent which was being used by these subscribers. The claim was dismissed
for three reasons: first, because the copyright infringements occurred directly as a
result of the use of the BitTorrent system and iiNet did not control and was not
responsible for the operation of that system; second, because iiNet did not have a
relevant power to prevent those infringements occurring; and third, because iiNet
did not sanction, approve or countenance copyright infringement; it had done no
more than supply an internet service to its users.
In applying principles extrapolated from Roadshow and other caselaw, Kitchin J
considered that Newzbin had authorised its users‟ infringements. Relevant to this
finding was the fact that by their very nature, the NZB files facilitate infringement,
are created by the defendant and are entirely within their control.
11 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (No3) [2010] FCA 24
15
In relation to the second part of the claim – participation in a common design –
Kitchin J remarked that “it is well established that a person who procures an
infringement of copyright is liable joint and severally with the infringer”. Mere (or
even knowing) assistance or facilitation of the primary infringement is not enough
to sustain a claim but the tortfeasor “must have so involved himself in the tort as to
make it his own”. The factors considered above in relation to NZB files were also
considered to be relevant to this part of the claim and the test was satisfied on the
facts.
Concerning the third part of the claim, the defendants were held primarily liable
for infringement by communication to the public contrary to section 20 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 which implemented Article 3 of
Directive 2001/29/EC. Kitchin J considered whether the copyrighted material had
been made available to the infringing users by the defendants. Material in his
decision here was the fact that its behaviour was not in any way passive, but on the
contrary they have “intervened in a highly material way”.
Importantly, with respect to injunctions against service providers pursuant to
section 97A, the claimants failed in seeking an injunction to prevent Newzbin
from indexing all copyrighted materials, even those of which they do not own the
rights. Kitchin J declined to impose an injunction of this breadth and was satisfied
that the injunction already granted extending only to the claimant‟s repertoire was
adequate.
Commentators12
have stated that this case is significant because it was the first of
its kind in the UK to hold an online service provider both primarily and
secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by its users. The activities
of Newzbin are of a very different nature however to search engines or indeed
access providers. Murray has noted that because of the refusal to grant the final
12 Darren Meal and Mark Shillito, “Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd - copyright - online service provider held liable for copyright infringements of its users” E.I.P.R. 2010, 32(8),
N67-72.
16
injunction sought, this is “more of a limited victory for the claimants not the
complete victory painted by some media outlets”.13
3.2.2 The Pirate Bay (Sweden)
On April 17, 2009, the District Court of Stockholm handed down its judgment
against the infamous Pirate Bay website‟s founders.14
They were fined a sum
equalling €2.7 million and each sentenced to one year imprisonment for copyright
infringement.
The Pirate Bay is a BitTorrent tracking, indexing and searching website. The
BitTorrent protocol is a peer-to-peer system which allows for the wide distribution
of large amounts of data without incurring large server costs and bandwidth
consumption. The BitTorrent client or application is then used in the creation, up
and downloading of torrent files. A tracker, such as the Pirate Bay, helps users to
locate one another so that the initial file sharing can occur. A tracker is clearly
instrumental in the entire process and has been identified as “the first port of call
in the assignment of indirect copyright infringement blame”.15
If a tracker is
configured to do nothing more than merely track the torrent, then liability can be
hard to establish. Most trackers however, in reality, act as both trackers and
indexes and provide all of the features necessary to initiate downloads.16
Swedish law differs from UK law in that “authorising infringement”, as discussed
above, is not an existing ground upon which to base a claim of secondary
liability.17
Copyright infringement in Sweden is a criminal activity and is
punishable as such. In the case at hand it was first necessary to establish that a
crime had occurred. It was held that a communication to the public of copyright
infringing material contrary to the Swedish Copyright Act (the Act on Copyright
13 Andrew Murray, “UPDATE: Twentieth Century Fox v Newzbin” The IT Lawyer’s Blog,
available at http://theitlawyer.blogspot.com/2010/03/update-twentieth-century-fox-v-newzbin.html
(visited 03/06/2011). 14
Public Prosecutor v Neij Unreported April 17, 2009 (TR (Stockholm)). 15 Okechukwu Benjamin Vincents, “Secondary liability for copyright infringement in the
BitTorrent platform: placing the blame where it belongs” E.I.P.R. 2008, 30(1), 4-10. 16 Ibid. 17 Jerker Edstrom and Henrik Nillson, “Case Comment: The Pirate Bay verdict – predictable and
yet…” E.I.P.R. 2009, 31(9), 483-487.
17
in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 as subsequently amended) had indeed
occurred.
The District Court then went on to consider whether the defendants had
participated in furthering the copyright infringement. It was held that because the
interface made infringement incredibly easy for the user, and because it facilitated
contact between the users, they were liable.18
In relation to the part played by each
of the defendants, they were deemed to have collectively furthered the
infringement as they worked together as a team. In relation to the question of
intent, it was contended that they did not have specific knowledge of the files that
were being shared but the judge held that they had sufficient knowledge that
infringements were occurring and specific knowledge was not necessary. There
was also evidence presented displaying the commercial motives behind the
website which held sway with the judge.
One interesting point to note is that in the BitTorrent technology, users which
collectively share a work, such as a movie, are referred to as a “swarm”. These
users can be either “seeders” or “leeches”. A “seeder” is a computer which
contains an entire torrent and offers it for upload. This can be compared with a
“leech”, who does not initially have the complete torrent, but once they commence
downloading, they simultaneously make the same files available for downloading
by others via the BitTorrent client which they are using. This creates a more
efficient environment. In the case at hand, the court held that both the “seeder” and
“leech” were making works available which constituted communication to the
public. Given that a “seeder” or “leech” generally only makes available
fragmented pieces of the work, each piece will not usually be a standalone
copyright-protected work. Edstrom and Nillson have suggested that “it is possible,
and perfectly reasonable … that the Court has applied general criminal law
principles and considered all participants in a “swarm” to be accomplices of the
same crime of communication to the public.”19
18 Henrik Wistam & Therese Andersson, “Case Comment: The Pirate Bay Trial” C.T.L.R. 2009, 15(6), 129-130. 19 Ibid.
18
The defendants had demonstrated a blatant disregard for copyright owners‟ rights
and given the circumstances and background, the outcome was hardly surprising in
this instance. The case was seen by the entertainment industry as a huge win for
rightsholders in Sweden, which would arguably now be seen as a favourable
jurisdiction for copyright infringement claims. In reality however, it has been
referred to as more of a “minor milestone”20
. The trial became a spectacle more
due to the political implications that surrounded it and the huge anti-copyright
movement which ensued, which lies outside of the scope of this thesis. The Court
of Appeal upheld this decision in November 2010, decreasing the sentences of
each of the parties upon assessing their liability individually, but increasing the
damages payable by each.21
3.2.3 Pirate Bay and Mininova (Netherlands)
On 30 July 2009, BREIN, the Dutch association representing both the recording
and movie industries, won a case against the Pirate Bay demanding that the site
block access to all users in the Netherlands within ten days or face a penalty of
€30,000 per day up to a maximum of €3 million. The judge ordered The Pirate
Bay to desist and refrain from infringement in the Netherlands of the copyrights
and neighbouring rights of the rightsholders represented by BREIN, including
from the offering of services in the capacity of an intermediary within the meaning
of article 26d of the Dutch Copyright Act. It subsequently transpired that the 3
owners of the site which were sued no longer had the power to block access and
the site continued to be accessible.
BREIN then turned their attention to a similar website. In August, in an unreported
judgement22
, the Utrecht District Court ordered Mininova to remove links to all
copyright infringing material within three months or face a fine of €1000 per
offending torrent up to a maximum of €5 million. Mininova is a search engine for
BitTorrent files, similar to that of Pirate Bay. They were held liable for enabling,
inducing and profiting from its users‟ copyright infringements but it was not,
20 Ibid. 21 Neij v Public Prosecutor Unreported November 26, 2010 (HR (Stockholm)). 22 Brein v Mininova B.V. Unreported August 26, 2009 (DC (Utrecht)).
19
however, liable for communicating or making available infringing works.23
The
site differs from the Pirate Bay in that it merely allows its users to store torrent
files but does not itself index and categorise the stored information.
Mininova were operating a Notice & Takedown procedure on their site but the
court held that this was not enough and it should be assumed that all commercial
works were copyrighted. The court said that it is “generally known that
commercially made films, games, music and TV series are copyrighted and that
these works are only copyright-free in exceptional cases”.24
3.2.4 RapidShare (Germany)
In Germany in 2009 the District Court of Hamburg delivered their judgment in a
case taken against RapidShare AG by the German rightsholders association
GEMA.25
RapidShare is a Swiss file hosting website, also known as a cyber-locker
or web-locker, where users can upload large amounts of data and are provided
with a download link for each file that they upload. This link may be used to by
anybody who possesses it to download the files any number of times. RapidShare
differs from the technologies discussed in the previous cases in that it does not
provide any search functions for its users, nor does it categorise or index the
content. There does however exist third party search engines which search
RapidShare and similar sites, facilitating effortless copyright infringement. Cyber-
lockers have become increasingly popular in recent years, surpassing the
BitTorrent technology as the method of choice for illegal file sharing.26
GEMA claimed that the defendant had not done enough to prevent the illegal
uploading and downloading of non-licensed musical works, thus violating its
23 Simon Baggs and Rachel Barber, “Case Comment: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin
Ltd – a changing tide in the fight against online piracy: how significant is the Newzbin judgment?”
Ent. L.R. 2010, 21(6), 234-237. 24 Intellectual Property Magazine, “Dutch court rules against file sharing site Mininova” available
at
http://www.ipworld.com/ipwo/doc/view.htm?id=229019&searchCode=S&searchPage=basic_searc
h&queryString=mininova (visited 7 June 2011). 25 GEMA v Rapidshare AG Unreported 12 June 2009 (LG (Hamburg)). 26 TorrentFreak “Cyberlockers Take Over File-Sharing Lead From BitTorrent Sites”
http://torrentfreak.com/cyberlockers-take-over-file-sharing-lead-from-bittorrent-sites-110111/ (visited 12 June 2011). RapidShare and four other cyberlocker sites were listed in the top 100
visited websites ahead of the Pirate Bay in 2011 according to popular internet blog.
20
members‟ copyrights by making the content publicly available within the meaning
of section 19a of the German Copyright Act27
. The defendants claimed that the use
of these files was excepted since it amounted to private use as provided for in
section 53. Moreover, they claimed to have cooperated with rightsholders by
removing infringing material once they were on notice of such files, and it was
contended that they were using all appropriate and reasonable measures to prevent
illegal copying.
The court granted an injunction against RapidShare and held that they had wilfully
contributed to the infringements. They had made the content publicly available
within the meaning of section 19a and it thus fell outside the scope of the section
53 exception. It was held that the reactive approach of the defendant in
cooperating with the rightsholders was not satisfactory and the removal of
infringing links was insufficient since it did not prevent users from uploading the
infringing file again. The court ruled that RapidShare, going forward, would have
to monitor for potentially illegal uploads. In coming to this conclusion, the court
considered a number of other matters, including the fact that the filtering system
employed by the abuse department within RapidShare was insufficient because it
could be easily circumvented. They also frowned upon the fact that the defendants
systematically refrained from ascertaining the identity of its users, including those
who signed up for paid membership.
A similar case taken against RapidShare by Capelight Pictures has since been
overturned by the Dusseldorf Court of Appeals which held that RapidShare is not
liable for the infringements carried out by its users.28
The court rejected the
imposition of impractical filtering measures and held that RapidShare should not
be under any obligation to prevent the dissemination of download links. This was
seen as a huge victory for intermediaries who do not actively participate in the
sharing of infringing files in the same way that a BitTorrent index and search
provider for example does.
27 Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Law) 1965 as amended. 28 Rapidshare AG v Capelight Pictures Unreported 22 March 2010 (OLG (Düsseldorf)).
21
3.3 Hosting Providers
The intermediaries which provide space on their servers to their subscribers, to
allow them to connect a website to the Internet for instance, are known as host
providers.29
A host provider does not make available its own content but instead
merely provides a third party with connectivity by technically enabling them to
publish their own content.30
It can be confusing because sometimes access
providers offer hosting services also. When you add social media sites such as
Facebook and YouTube, where the site user generates the content, or bulletin
boards such as boards.ie, to the mix it is hardly surprising that the water muddies.
Host providers are subject to a notice and takedown procedure and usually once
this is adhered to they cannot be held liable for infringement. As can be seen in
Chapter 2, a defence of Hosting is provided in the E-Commerce Directive.31
3.3.1 Google Adwords
The CJEU handed down its ruling in Google France32
commonly known as the
Google Adwords case, in March 2010. This was a case involving Google‟s paid
referencing service called „Adwords‟. This is an advertising system which sells
keywords to economic operators so that their business endeavour is placed in the
search results in the sponsored links section of the Google search results page
when a user conducts a searches using one or more of the keywords which have
been purchased. This case related to trademark infringement but the court was also
asked to rule on the liability of the referencing service provider, Google.
The questions of whether a referencing provider such as Google was an
“information society service” for the purpose of the E-Commerce Directive, and if
so may they avail of limited liability as provided for in article 14 of said Directive,
29 Broder Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for Unlawful Third Party
Content (2010) International Journal of Law and Information Technology Vol. 18 No. 4, 332. 30 Ibid. 31
This was transposed into national law by SI 68/2003 European Communities (Directive
2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003. 32 Joined Cases C-236/08 – Google France SARL, Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, C-
237/08 Google France SARL v Viaticum SA, Luteciel SARL, and C-238/08 Google France SARL v Centre National de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL, Pierre-Alexis Thonne, Bruno
Raboin, Tiger SARL [2011] ECR (page number unavailable at time of writing).
22
were referred to the CJEU. It was held that such an advertising service does fall
within the scope of information society service and as such they may be said to be
providing “hosting” services for the purposes of the Directive. Whether they may
be exempt from liability based on the article 14 defence depends on whether they
play a neutral role. In other words, their conduct must be “merely technical,
automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data
which it stores”.33
If the service provider has not played an active role then it
“cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of an
advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature of those data
or of that advertiser‟s activities, it failed to act expeditiously to remove or to
disable access to the data concerned”.34
This is reassuring for service providers.
Provided that they do not have knowledge of the infringing activity they will be
allowed to avail of the article 14 hosting exemption.
3.3.2 Google Video
In March 2011, the Paris Court of Appeal heard four similar cases35
in relation to
Google Video and imposed a monitoring obligation on Google to prevent future
infringements of the litigious work. Illegal copies of protected works were placed
on Google Video. The rightsholders notified Google Video pursuant to the notice
and takedown regime which it implemented. These videos were removed by
Google from their platform, but subsequently were made available again. On
appeal it was held that Google were not entitled to avail of the hosting exemption.
It was held that Google not only had an obligation to remove the videos which
they had been notified of, but they also had a duty to monitor and prevent future
access to these videos The court also considered that Google Video was going
beyond the merely neutral and passive functions of a hosting provider. Some
commentators have said that the court is recognising a “new duty of
33 Joined Cases C-236/08 – C-238/08, note 32, at 114. 34 Joined Cases C-236/08 – C-238/08, note 32, at 120. 35 Google Inc. v Compagnie des phares et balises; Google Inc. v Bac Films, the Factory; Google Inc. v Bac Films, the Factory, Canal +; and Google Inc. v Les Films de la Croisade, Goatworks
Films 21 March 2011 (Paris Cour d‟Appel de Paris)
23
surveillance”.36
This is remarkable as it seems to transform the system of notice
and takedown into a burdensome system of notice, takedown and keep down. This
may be compared with the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in the case of
L’Oréal v eBay.37
3.3.3 L’Oreal and Ebay
In his opinion, the Advocate General communicates his reservations in relation to
a neutrality-based assessment of a hosting provider as advocated in the Google
France. According to the Advocate General, the court referenced Recital 42 when
endorsing the neutrality-test but this recital, he feels, relates to 'mere conduit' and
'caching' providers, but not to a hosting provider. He makes the distinction
between a referencing service provider and an electronic marketplace such as eBay
and notes that if the conditions that were applied in Google France were applied to
an electronic marketplace it would seriously endanger the objectives of the E-
Commerce Directive.38
He stated that it would be “surreal that if eBay intervenes
and guides the contents of listings in its system with various technical means, it
would by that fact be deprived of the protection of article 14 regarding storage of
information uploaded by the users”.39
The Advocate General goes on to address the issue of future infringements where
he reiterates the principle of notice and takedown. He recalls that an ISP is
required to act expeditiously to remove infringing material of which he has actual
knowledge. This actual knowledge may only relate to the past or the present and
not to the future.40
36 Catherine Jasserand, “Recent Decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal: toward an extra duty of
surveillance for hosting providers?” Available at
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2011/03/29/recent-decisions-of-the-paris-court-of-appeal-towards-
an-extra-duty-of-surveillance-for-hosting-providers/ (visited 14 June 2011). 37 Case C-324/09 L'Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie,
L'Oréal (UK) Limited v eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL, eBay (UK) Limited, Stephan
Potts, Tracy Ratchford, Marie Ormsby, James Clarke, Joanna Clarke, Glen Fox, Rukhsana Bi,
[2011] ECR (page number unavailable at time of writing), Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen. 38 Case C-324/09, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, note 37, at 142. 39 Case C-324/09, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, note 37, at 146. 40 Case C-324/09, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, note 37, at 162.
24
The CJEU handed down its judgment in this case on the 12th
July41
and in fact
advocated a neutrality based test. It was recognised that liability is not automatic
but that if the operator of an electronic marketplace provides a service that is not
“merely technical and automatic”42
and has played an active role having
knowledge of, or control over, the data in relation to the goods offered for sale,
they cannot rely on the article 14 exemption.43
It is now for the referring court in
the UK to assess whether eBay have played such a role.
It was further held that even if the service provider plays a passive and neutral
role, it may not rely on the exemption from liability if it was aware of facts or
circumstances, having regard to which, a diligent economic operator ought to have
known that such offers were unlawful and failed to act expeditiously.44
With
regard to injunctions preventing future infringements it was held that injunctions
may be granted against the operator of an online marketplace “to take measures
which contribute, not only to bringing to an end infringements of those rights by
users of that marketplace, but also to prevent further infringements of that kind.
Those injunctions must be effective, proportionate, dissuasive, and must not create
barriers to legitimate trade.”45
This judgment could prove to be burdensome for intermediaries who are likely to
have to bear the costs of implementing the technical measures necessary to prevent
incurring liability.
3.4 Internet Access Providers
Litigation efforts have traditionally been directed toward those hosting or
operating infringing websites such as the Pirate Bay but recently these efforts have
begun to focus elsewhere. Over the course of the last year or so a number of
judgments have been rendered in various Member States concerning Internet
41 Case C-324/09 L'Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie,
L'Oréal (UK) Limited v eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL, eBay (UK) Limited, Stephan
Potts, Tracy Ratchford, Marie Ormsby, James Clarke, Joanna Clarke, Glen Fox, Rukhsana Bi
[2011] ECR (page number unavailable at time of writing). 42 Case C-324/09, note 41, at 113. 43 Case C-324/09, note 41, at 116. 44 Case C-324/09, note 41, at 124. 45 Case C-324/09, note 41, at 144.
25
access providers and requests to implement blocking measures. These judgments
illustrate the diverging approaches and views adopted across the EU. This is due to
differences in national legislation or type of proceeding since these will be
criminal proceedings in some jurisdictions and civil in others. Universally it would
appear that whether an access provider will be ordered to block a particular
website or not will depend upon satisfaction of the legal principle of
proportionality, which I will discuss in more detail in a subsequent chapter.
3.4.1 Telenor (Denmark)
In 2010 the Supreme Court of Denmark held that the blocking measures which
Telenor were ordered to implement were in fact proportionate in the
circumstances.46
This is a surprising outcome but on closer inspection, it becomes
clear that this is due to a particular provision in Danish law in relation to copying
the original protected work. As already discussed above, in order for efficient
communications to occur via the Internet, temporary copies must be made of every
packet of data that is transmitted. In doing so the intermediary is exempt from
liability unless the work which is being transmitted is in itself illegal. In this case
the temporary copies are held also to be illegal copies. This ruling places a huge
burden on intermediaries to implement a technical measure which, as discussed in
the subsequent chapter, has little effectiveness.
3.4.2 Ziggo (Netherlands)
In the Dutch case mentioned in the previous subsection, BREIN were successful in
their endeavours against the Pirate Bay, but nevertheless the site remained
successful and active in the Netherlands. BREIN then turned their attention toward
access provider Ziggo seeking a preliminary injunction ordering them to block
46 Telenor (tidligere DMT2 A/S og Sonofon A/S) v IFPI Danmark 27 May 2010 (Højesterets)
This case is available in Danish at http://www.domstol.dk/hojesteret/Documents/Domme/153-
09.pdf (visited 15 June 2011). Unofficial translation available at http://hssph.net/Sonofon_IFPI__DK_SupremeCourt_27May2010_PirateBay.pdf (visited 21 July
2011).
26
access for its subscribers to all of the sites of the Pirate Bay. On 19 July 2010 the
court of The Hague rejected the claim.47
BREIN based their claim on the IPRED provision which states that injunctions
may be sought against “innocent” third parties whose facilities are used in the
course of infringement. Ziggo stressed that it was a “mere conduit” and the Court
held that while injunctions may be taken against third party intermediaries as a
separate action notwithstanding the liability regime set down for ISPs in the
national rules transposing the relevant provisions of the E-Commerce Directive,
this would only apply in specific and identifiable cases of infringement. The
granting of an injunction would otherwise be disproportionate.
The judge also considered the principle of subsidiarity in delivering his judgement.
While BREIN claimed that this was the last resort, it was held that they could in
fact have pursued individual infringers in what would have been a less far-
reaching option than imposing a general blockade.
3.4.3 Belgacom and Scarlet (Belgium)
On the 9th
of July 2010, the Antwerp Commercial Court refused to impose an
injunction to block access to The Pirate Bay on service providers Belgacom and
Telenor.48
This had been sought by the Belgian Anti-Piracy Foundation. The
implementation of such a measure was held to be disproportionate. The ISPs
argued that they were merely technical operators and did not have the competence
to judge whether a site that a subscriber wishes to access is unlawful or not.49
This
case has been appealed and the oral hearings took place before the Antwerp Court
of Appeal in May. There is no publicly available information in relation to this
case and at the time of writing the Court is yet to present its judgment.
Interestingly in the same jurisdiction the Belgian Court of Appeal is awaiting the
ruling of the CJEU in the case of Scarlet Extended.50
A case was taken by Belgian
collecting society Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM)
47 BREIN v Ziggo Unreported July 19, 2010 (RB (Den Haag)). 48 Belgian Anti-Piracy Federation v Belgacom Unreported 8 July 2010 (RvK (Antwerp)). 49 http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number8.14/belgium-isps-pirate-bay (visited 15 July 2011). 50 SABAM v Tiscali Unreported January 28, 2010 (App (B)).
27
against Scarlet (then Tiscali), an ISP, seeking an injunction requiring them to make
it impossible for their subscribers to engage in the illegal file sharing of any
musical work in SABAM‟s repertoire. This was granted by the Court of First
Instance, essentially requiring Scarlet to implement a preventive filtering and
blocking system.51
The Court of Appeal referred the case to the CJEU for a
preliminary ruling. The Advocate General delivered his opinion in April 2011 and
this is discussed in the ensuing chapter.
3.4.4 UPC (Austria)
In an extremely recent case taken by the Austrian Association for Anti-Piracy
(VAP), Internet access provider UPC was ordered by the Commercial Court of
Vienna to block access to streaming website kino.to which was hosted from the
island of Tonga.52
It was held in the circumstances that such measures are
proportionate once enforced with DNS or IP blocking but monitoring measures
such as deep packet inspection were considered to be disproportionate. In this
particular case the site‟s administrators could not be identified. The judgement
which was rendered on the 17th
of May 2011 was highly controversial and UPC is
expected to appeal. The case was extremely similar to the above mentioned Dutch
case of BREIN v Ziggo, the outcome of which was to the contrary.
3.4.5 UPC (Ireland)
In this landmark case judgment was given in favour of service provider UPC and
the injunction sought by the plaintiffs was refused.53
UPC had claimed that it had
no liability under the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 and argued that it
was a mere conduit for illegal downloading. Charleton J said that while injunctive
relief was merited on the facts of the case, respect for the doctrine of the separation
of powers prevented the granting of the orders sought. Interestingly, Charleton J
said that he had erred in his previous judgment in the Eircom54
case as there was
no legislative basis in Irish law that enabled him to reach the conclusions he did
51 SABAM v SA Tiscali [2007] ECDR 19. 52 Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH v UPC Telekabel
Wien GmbH Unreported 17 May 2011 (HW(Vienna)). 53 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & Ors v UPC Communications Ireland Ltd [2010] IEHC 377. 54 EMI Records (Ireland) Limited v Eircom Plc [2009] IEHC 411.
28
and he invited the parties involved in that case to reapply to the Courts. These
cases are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
29
Chapter 4 Options Available for IAP Action & Striking a Balance
4.1 What in theory can an IAP actually do and can it work?
There are a number of mechanisms that an Internet access provider could
hypothetically implement on their infrastructure to combat illegal file sharing of
copyrighted content including blocking and filtering measures or the
implementation of a graduated response regime. Each of these will be considered
in turn below. These methods however are either ineffective or they do not satisfy
the requisite principle of proportionality as discussed in the opinion of the
Advocate General in Scarlet Extended which is currently before the Court of
Justice of the European Union.55
Technical experts insist that the term „Internet Blocking‟ is somewhat of a
misnomer because it gives the impression that it can be implemented with little or
no difficulty and “it is simply a choice to switch on or switch off”.56
This is
certainly not the case. It involves complex and costly technologies which can be
easily circumvented. The Internet is inherently designed to ensure the free flow of
data so that any barriers which materialise will be sidestepped.
Regrettably Internet blocking is a tool that is sought on the foot of political or
emotional motivations rather than implemented as a result of evidence of any
genuine effectiveness.
4.1.1 DNS Blocking
The Internet is essentially a network of smaller interconnected networks. Each
device on the network is associated with a unique sequence of numbers known as
an IP address. When information is transmitted from one device to another, it is
broken into what are known as packets, containing origin and destination IP
addresses among other information, sent across multiple networks, and
55
Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs
(SABAM). 56 Cormac Callanan et al. Study: Internet blocking: balancing cybercrime responses in democratic
societies, (Aconite Internet Solutions, 2009) available at http://www.aconite.com/sites/default/files/Internet_blocking_and_Democracy.pdf (visited 21 July
2011).
30
reassembled at the destination device. A host or server will generally have a
Domain Name System address or DNS address as well as an IP address. The DNS
is a system that was designed to make the Internet easier to use by associating
words rather than number sequences with the host or server. As an example, take
the infamous Pirate Bay website whose DNS address is thepiratebay.org. When
this address is entered into a browser a DNS server resolves this to its IP address
which is 194.71.107.15 and subsequently the user is connected to the requested
website.
If a service provider blacklists the domain of a particular website in their DNS
server then the DNS address when entered by the user cannot be resolved to the
corresponding IP address rendering the site inaccessible. 57
This type of blocking
can be easily eluded if the user has knowledge of the actual IP address itself since
they may type this directly into the browser gaining access to the rogue site. This
can potentially be obtained by something as simple as performing a web search.
4.1.2 IP Blocking
This is a more effective method of blocking but it has more wide reaching side
effects. With IP blocking or packet dropping, a blacklist is made containing IP
addresses so that packets containing the blacklisted IP sequence are dropped
preventing any attempted communication with the aberrant server.58
The problem
with this method is that an IP address can be associated with a server which hosts
many sites, which may all be legitimate except for one. This carries with it a huge
risk of over-blocking. If such a regime were sought to be imposed on ISPs they
would most likely want some kind of indemnification from the music companies
to protect them in the likelihood that they will be sued for blocking a legitimate
site.
This type of blocking may be easily skirted by the person operating the blocked
site. All that is required is merely to adopt a new IP address and the blocking
measure is rendered useless. Likewise the user need not be an expert in order to
57 Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin G. Edelmann, “Internet Filtering in China” (2003) Cyberlaw Vol. I, 585. 58 Ibid.
31
evade this type of blocking mechanism. 59
This can be done by using a proxy that
connects to the website on behalf of the user.60
Websites exist such as
http://zend2.com which uses a “mirrored server with the help of which your IP and
other details are always concealed”61
or http://tools.rosinstrument.com/proxy/
which provides vast libraries of publicly available proxies.62
4.1.3 Filtering
Content filtering is a more complex mechanism which involves real-time
intervention by the ISP. A list of forbidden URLs is compiled and the service
provider can implement a proxy or a firewall that checks every URL request of a
subscriber against this list.63
If a subscriber requests a blacklisted URL they will
receive an error message or may be redirected to a legitimate site where legal
copies of the material they seek are available. 64
This is a very precise method
which does not pose the same threats of over-blocking as the previous options. It
does however involve the implementation of extremely complex and costly
equipment which hampers the efficiency of data transmission to the detriment of
the subscribers, the ISP and the Internet community. 65
4.1.4 Graduated Response
Graduated response is a system in which a service provider sends a number of
infringement notices to a subscriber who is using their Internet account to illegally
download protected musical works. These notices increase in gravity with each
instance ultimately resulting in suspension or disconnection of the subscriber‟s
account if they continue to infringe. This procedure, or variations of it, including
the Hadopi system in France and the private agreement which has been
59 Joe McNamee, Internet Blocking: Crimes should be punished and not hidden
http://www.edri.org/files/blocking_booklet.pdf (visited 21 July 2011). 60 Kleinschmidt, note 22. 61
www.zend2.com (visited 21 July 2011). 62 Richard Clayton, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace Ph.D. (University of Cambridge,
2005). 63 Kleinschmidt, note 22, at 336. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.
32
implemented in this jurisdiction by Eircom, is discussed in more detail in the
ensuing chapters.
4.2 Striking a Balance – Proportionality and Effectiveness
Whilst Member States, pursuant to their European obligations under the Directives
discussed in chapter 2, provide in their national laws for injunctions regimes which
may potentially encompass such blocking or filtering obligations as set out above,
it is crucial that such measures satisfy the principle of proportionality.
Article 8(1) of the Copyright Directive provides that sanctions must be “effective,
proportionate and dissuasive”. This is reiterated in article 3 of the IPRED which
also stipulates that these sanctions must be “fair and equitable”.
In what will be the most important decision in relation to the imposition of
monitoring obligations on ISPs, the Court of Justice is expected to deliver its
decision at the end of this year.66
This will provide much needed guidance to
judges presiding in cases where rightsholders are seeking injunctions of the kind
discussed above. Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered his opinion in Scarlet
Extended on 14th April, stating that a general obligation to monitor, in abstracto,
and as a preventative measure could not be imposed.67
Although the Advocate
General opinion is a non-binding guideline, the CJEU usually tends to follow the
same reasoning and ISPs are hopeful that the CJEU ruling will finally provide
some sensible guidance on the matter.
SABAM sought an injunction against Scarlet, an ISP, requiring it to impose
technical measures to make it impossible for its subscribers to engage in the illegal
file sharing of any musical work in the repertoire of the collecting agency. The
injunction was granted by the Court of First Instance, requiring Scarlet to
implement a preventive filtering and blocking system. The Court of Appeal
referred two questions to the CJEU as follows: does EU law permit a national
court to order an ISP, in abstracto and for all of its customers, bearing all of the
66 Case C-70/10, note 55. 67 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs
(SABAM), Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón.
33
costs, to introduce a filtering and blocking system, for works in which the
applicant claims to hold rights; and if so must the national court apply the
principle of proportionality when deciding on the effectiveness and dissuasive
effect of the measure sought.68
The Advocate General pointed out that this constitutes a general obligation to
monitor as a preventive measure, such that a finding that there had been an actual
infringement would not have first been made. Furthermore it would make the ISP
fully responsible for the costs of implementing such a measure. He went on to note
that such a system would impose a restriction on rights of privacy and protection
of personal data which are protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
While it is accepted that the exercise of such rights may be restricted, this may
only be done „in accordance with the law‟ and must meet requirements concerning
„the quality of the law‟ at issue. As such, a restriction of this kind would only be
permissible if it were pursuant to national laws that are accessible, clear and
predictable.69
Advocate General Jääskinen in L’Oréal v Ebay stated that in granting an
injunction against an intermediary, given the requirement of proportionality, “what
is crucial, is that the intermediary can know with certainty what is required from
him, and that the injunction does not impose impossible, disproportionate or illegal
duties like a general monitoring obligation.”70
Advocate General Cruz Villalón noted in his opinion that the Belgian statutory
provision at issue did not provide expressly in clear, precise and predictable terms,
for an obligation on ISPs to install such a general monitoring obligation.71
Since
the provisions of national law in most Member States implementing article 8(3) of
the Copyright Directive are very similarly worded to the Belgian provision it
follows that none of the national law provisions are sufficiently clear to justify
68
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d‟appel de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 5
February 2010 - Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et
éditeurs (SABAM). 69 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 37/11 Luxembourg 14 April 2011. 70 Case C-324/09, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, note 37, at 181. 71 Court of Justice of the European Union, note 69.
34
filtering or graduated response obligations. As such, the introduction of any
graduated response measure for example, would require statutory footing.
In relation to “effectiveness”, in order for a blocking or filtering measure to satisfy
the proportionality test, it is conceded that no measure is 100% effective, so what
is important here is that the obligation is clearly identified. In other words if the
court says to an ISP, you must implement measures x, y, and z and after you have
done this you cannot be held liable, this will be sufficiently clear and specific.
What is not acceptable however is for a court to say you must ensure that your
subscribers cannot access a certain site but it is up to you how you implement this.
This opens up the possibility of liability for the access provider as of the moment
that one subscriber can access the prohibited site.
Cost allocation issues may be taken into consideration at this point also. Huge
costs burdened on Scarlet were acknowledged as unfair by AG Cruz Villalón in
his opinion. The importance of cost allocation was also highlighted in the judicial
review of the Digital Economy Act in the UK.72
This was the only ground upon
which BT and TalkTalk were partially successful in - all other grounds were
dismissed. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
72 British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021.
35
Chapter 5 Ireland - A chronology of case law
5.1 Introduction
The current legislative conditions in Ireland in the area of copyright have given
rise to contradictory judgments and lengthy debates. The Government launched a
national copyright review in May and it is presently an incredibly controversial
topic. This chapter presents the case law in chronological order which illustrates
the attitudes of the courts, music industry and intermediaries concerning the
enforcement of copyright against illegal file sharing in this jurisdiction.
5.2 Norwich Pharmacal
In a 2005 dispute73
, the High Court granted what is known as a Norwich
Pharmacal order to the music industry instructing Ireland‟s largest ISP Eircom to
release the names and contact information corresponding to the IP addresses of
seventeen subscribers who had allegedly infringed the copyright of a number of
sound recordings which were vested in the plaintiffs. This rule was enunciated in a
House of Lords decision74
where Lord Reid stated that “if through no fault of his
own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their
wrong-doing he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist
the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing
the identity of the wrongdoers”.75
A Norwich Pharmacal order differs from other orders in that generally only parties
named in existing litigation are obliged to disclose documents and other
information relevant to the proceedings. It must only be used as a last resort. If
other methods are available to discover this information then these avenues must
be exhausted firstly. These orders have been adapted for use against ISPs where
copyright infringement is concerned. An ISP is not committing any infringement
yet they are the only means of permitting identification of the transgressor. An
Internet user is assigned, by their ISP, a unique number known as an Internet
73 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & Ors v Eircom Ltd & Anor [2005] IEHC 233. 74 Norwich Pharmacal Company and Ors v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1973] UKHL 6. 75 Ibid.
36
Protocol or IP Address. These can be static or dynamic and are a means of
identifying the subscriber. If it can be established in the High Court that there is
sufficient evidence of a wrongdoing the order may be granted. Usually an
undertaking of damages will be required also.
Kelly J emphasised that there was no suggestion of wrongdoing on the part of the
Defendants but that there was no other method available to the plaintiffs to
ascertain the identities of the individuals in this case.
5.3 Graduated Response
The process of obtaining a Norwich Pharmacal order is an expensive one and as
such rightsholders began to seek other means to prevent infringement and turned
their focus to ISPs. In 2009 proceedings were again taken against Eircom by EMI
and the other big players in the music and film industry.
The basis of this claim lay in section 40(4) of the Copyright and Related Rights
Act 2000 which reads as follows:
(3) Subject to subsection (4), the provision of facilities for enabling the
making available to the public of copies of a work shall not of itself
constitute an act of making available to the public of copies of the work.
(4) Without prejudice to subsection (3), where a person who provides
facilities referred to in that subsection is notified by the owner of the
copyright in the work concerned that those facilities are being used to
infringe the copyright in that work and that person fails to remove that
infringing material as soon as practicable thereafter that person shall also
be liable for the infringement
After eight days of evidence an agreement was effected between the parties and no
court order was thus required. On the 29th of January the terms of the settlement
were filed with the court. It essentially constituted a private agreement between the
parties and thus did not create any precedent for other ISPs in the jurisdiction. The
exact details of the protocol remain confidential.
37
This introduced the first graduated response system in Ireland. The Irish Recorded
Music Association (IRMA) use software to detect the occurrence of illegal file
sharing and on foot of this provide Eircom with notifications containing among
other things the IP addresses of the individuals uploading or downloading such
content. Eircom can then identify the account which matched the particular IP
address at the time when the alleged infringing incident occurred.
Rather than divulge this information to IRMA, Eircom sends the customer a
notification informing them that their IP address has been identified by IRMA as
infringing copyright. The notification advises the customer that these acts are
illegal and provides information on how the customer can avoid repeating the
infringement. If the customer continues to engage in infringement, after a fourteen
day period has passed, Eircom will issue a second warning to the customer in the
form of a letter indicating that if the infringement continues the customer‟s
Internet service will be disconnected.
If Eircom is notified that a third infringement has occurred they will write to the
customer to advise them that their service will be withdrawn for a seven day
period as they have continued to engage in copyright infringement. If the customer
infringes a fourth time then their Internet connection will be disconnected for a 12
month period.
Under the terms of the settlement it was agreed that the plaintiffs would take
proceedings against the other access providers in the State, since it would be unfair
to expect Eircom to carry the entire burden alone. It was also agreed that Eircom
would not oppose an injunction ordering them to block the Pirate Bay website.
5.4 The Pirate Bay
On the 24th
July 2009, Charleton J delivered an ex tempore judgment76
granting an
order against Eircom to block access to the Pirate Bay. Since in the main
proceedings as discussed above it was agreed that such an application would not
be objected to by Eircom, an argument from only one of the parties was heard.
76 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Eircom PLC [2009] IEHC 411.
38
Charleton J quoted section 40(4) of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 as
the basis for his conclusion and goes on to explain that this section “gives an
entitlement in the right circumstances to the plaintiffs to seek an order against a
party who is essentially innocent in relation to copyright infringement, in
distinction to those actively stealing copyright material through the act of copying
without authorisation and facilitating it”.77
Charleton J places Eircom in this
bracket of innocent transmitter. The so called innocent transmitter once notified of
the infringement that is occurring must act as soon as practicable to remove the
infringing material before they in themselves become liable. The Judge in this case
interpreted this section as encompassing what he refers to as the “pipe or
channel….down which the copyright infringing material is going”.78
An order was granted “requiring the defendant to block or otherwise disable access
by its internet subscribers to the website - thePirateBay.org and related domain
names, as set out in the schedule, to IP addresses and URLs, as set out in the
schedule, together with such other domain names, IP addresses and URLs as may
reasonably be notified as related domain names by the plaintiffs to the defendant
from time to time.”79
As of the 1st of September 2009 if an Eircom subscriber attempts to access the
forbidden URL they will be redirected to a page explaining why the site is not
available. The music industry seemed to have found a sympathetic ear with
Charleton J but their increasing confidence would be dealt a blow in the following
months when he would change his mind as to the legislative basis in Irish law for
the granting of such an injunction.
5.5 Data Protection Implications
In April 2010 the graduated response protocol again came before Charleton J as its
implementation raised a number of issues concerning the Data Protection Acts
1988-2003.80
The Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) did not appear before the
77 [2009] IEHC 411, note 76. 78 [2009] IEHC 411, note 76. 79 [2009] IEHC 411, note 76. 80 EMI Records & Ors v Eircom Ltd [2010] IEHC 108.
39
courts due to an issue relating to indemnity for his costs and as such judgment was
delivered upon only receiving the advice of the parties to the main case. The
questions raised are paraphrased as follows:
1. Do IP adresses in the hands of EMI, taking into account the purpose for
which they are collected, constitute personal data for the purposes of the
Data Protection Acts 1988-2003?
2. Having regard to section 2A(1) of the 1988 Act, and assuming that the
processing by Eircom of “personal data” in the context of the termination
of a user‟s Internet subscription is necessary for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by Eircom, does much processing represent
unwarranted processing by reasons of prejudice to the fundamental rights
and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject?
3. Having regard to section 2A(1) and 2B(1) of the 1988 Act, may the parties
to the settlement implement the graduated response process where: (a) in
doing so they are engaged in the processing of personal data; and (b) the
termination of Internet access is predicated on the commission of an
offence without such offence having been investigated by an authorised
body or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction?
Section 1 of the 1988 Act, as amended, defines personal data as “data relating to a
living individual who can be identified either from the data or from the data in
conjunction with other information in the possession of the data controller.”81
According to Charleton J in order to be personal data under the Act “the
information has to identify a living individual from the data or from data in
conjunction with other information in the possession of the data controller, or from
other information that is likely to come into the possession of the data
controller.”82
He goes on to state that the only possible means for the data
controller to ascertain the identity of a person relating to a particular IP address is
81 Data Protection Act 1988, s.1. 82 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 23.
40
to obtain a Norwich Pharmacal in an expensive process though the courts. He
therefore answered the first question in the negative.83
Charleton J, in answering the second question, felt that he must first ascertain if it
was necessary for Eircom to enter into the agreement. He also addressed whether
the protocol interfered with any fundamental right and if so whether such
interference was proportional and justified. Section 2A(1) of the Act states as
follows:
2A (1)Personal data shall not be processed by a data controller unless
section 2 of this Act (as amended by the Act of 2003) is complied with by
the data controller and at least one of the following conditions is met:
(a) the data subject has given his or her consent to the processing or, if
the data subject, by reason of his or her physical or mental
incapacity or age, is or is likely to be unable to
appreciate the nature and effect of such consent, it is given by
a parent or guardian or a grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother or
sister of the data subject and the giving of such consent is not
prohibited by law,
(b) the processing is necessary
(i)for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is
a party,
(ii) in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior
to entering into a contract,
(iii) for compliance with a legal obligation to which
the data controller is subject other than an obligation imposed by
contract, or
(iv) to prevent
83 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 25.
41
(I) injury or other damage to the health of the data subject,
or
(II) serious loss or damage to property of the data subject
,or otherwise to protect his or her vital interests
where the seeking of the consent of the data subject or
another person referred to in paragraph (a) of this
subsection is likely to result in those interests
being damaged,
(c) the processing is necessary
(i) for the administration of justice,
(ii) for the performance of a function conferred on a person by or
under an enactment,
(iii) for the performance of a function of the Government or a
Minister of the Government,
(iv) for the performance of any other function of
a public nature performed in the public interest by a person,
(d) the processing is necessary for the purposes of
the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by
a third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except
where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by
reason of prejudice to the fundamental rights and freedoms or
legitimate interests of the data subject.
Charleton J. considered that more than one of the conditions set out in the above
provisions are met regarding Eircom‟s legitimate interests, particularly their
interest in upholding the law. He stated that it is “completely within the legitimate
standing of Eircom to act, and be seen to act, as a body which upholds the law”.84
84 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 29.
42
He mentions that the subscriber contract specifies that access may be terminated if
the subscriber uses the facility to infringe the copyright of others. He therefore
found that the processing, warning, and ultimately disconnecting was necessary
both in complying with the law and in performance of the contract.85
Furthermore,
it was held that there was nothing disproportionate in the ultimate sanction of
disconnection for three infringements of copyright and that there were adequate
procedural safeguards in place.86
Therefore the second question was also answered
in the negative.
In relation to the third question, Charleton J. acknowledged that while there are
instances when both criminal and civil offences overlap by reason of statute, he
was satisfied that none of the parties were interested in detection and prosecution
of any criminal offence here and that there was nothing in the protocol which
would involve the disposal of proceedings or the sentence of any court.87
On the
contrary the protocol was based upon civil principles which do not require an
examination of knowledge, intention, recklessness or negligence. He therefore
considered that it was not necessary to require an investigation by an authorised
body or determination by a court of competent jurisdiction.88
Consequently the
third question was answered in the affirmative and it was declared lawful for the
parties to implement the graduated response protocol.89
The judgment of Charleton J. has been criticised as deeply flawed90
and the Data
Protection Commissioner may also be criticised for allowing this case to be heard
without sending any representation to give information that was necessary in order
for the judge to gain a broader view of the issues at hand. It was predicted upon
implementation that it would be likely that Eircom would end up wrongly accusing
innocent Internet users of copyright infringement. 91
This has in fact transpired and
85 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 29. 86 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 30. 87 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 40. 88 [2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 41. 89
[2010] IEHC 108, note 80, at 42. 90 TJ McIntyre “Data Protection Commissioner investigating Eircom‟s „three strikes‟ system” IT
Law in Ireland available at http://www.tjmcintyre.com/2011/06/300-false-accusations-data-
protection.html (visited 23 June 2011). 91 TJ McIntyre “Eircom, three strikes and false positives” IT Law in Ireland available at
http://www.tjmcintyre.com/2009/08/eircom-three-strikes-and-false.html (visited 23 June 2011).
43
the graduated response protocol is now being investigated by the DPC, which
according to TJ McIntyre has the “potential to derail the entire system”.92
An
internal error which occurred when the clocks went forward last October caused
approximately 300 subscribers to receive warning notifications erroneously. This
has called the entire protocol into disrepute and has triggered a wider investigation
into its proportionality. At the time of writing this investigation was on-going.
5.6 UPC
5.6.1 Background
Upholding their side of the graduated response settlement, EMI and the other
music companies went on to pursue additional ISPs in Ireland seeking to impose
the implementation of a similar regime. Vodafone agreed that it would follow
suit93
but UPC refused and the issue again came before Charleton J in the High
Court in October 2010 and a surprising turn of events saw UPC secure a victory,
albeit on a technicality.94
The plaintiffs sought an injunction pursuant to sections 37 and 40(4) of the
Copyright Act 2000 restraining UPC from infringing the copyright in music works
owned by or licensed to the plaintiff companies by making these available through
the provision of internet facilities, along with an order to block the Pirate Bay
website. UPC claimed that there was no liability in law for acting as a mere
conduit and the sections of the 2000 Act permitting injunctions do not apply.
Moreover, such an injunction would not be just or convenient as it would infringe
fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality.
5.6.2 Attitude of UPC
In a lengthy judgment Charleton J. condemned the attitude of UPC towards the use
of its services for copyright infringement. He remarks that the customer use policy
92 Ibid. 93 Ronan McGreevy, “Vodafone in line to join file-sharing clampdown” The Irish Times, 6 June
2010, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0616/1224272615990.html (visited 25 July 2011). 94 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53.
44
provides for the possibility of termination of the contract if the services of UPC are
used to infringe copyright, as does the policy of Eircom. He comments that UPC
does not abide by their policy however, unless they can profit from it. Charleton
J‟s tone throughout the judgment displays a similar air of disdain toward UPC and
his viewpoint relating to the role of intermediaries and their “economic and moral
obligation to address the problem” is evident.95
5.6.3 Possible Solutions
Charleton J. considered a number of possible solutions. He did confirm that he was
against the idea of any solution based on the blocking or severe constriction of all
peer to peer traffic “unless the harm is demonstrated to be so grave as to illegal file
sharing of copyright material as to render that both necessary and just”.96
This
would otherwise be unreasonable since peer to peer technology did have its
legitimate uses, even if these were in the minority.
The solutions which he identified as satisfying the principle of proportionality and
inexpensive to implement include Detection, Global File Registry, and CopySense.
Detection involves the use of software such as DtecNet which searches the
network to trace copyrighted files being shared. It then records the IP address of
the person sharing these files along with information about the files themselves.
Although this method can be evaded by use of a proxy IP address or by using
encryption, Charleton J. nevertheless came to the conclusion that this solution is
both viable and proportionate.97
The Global File Registry option consists of a
database containing a collation of unique identifiers such as a filehash for
copyright protected files and the software issues take-down information in relation
to these files. When a user searches for these files, the search results do not display
the files which have a take-down status. The user is redirected to a site where the
particular music work can be accessed legally. Charleton J. stated that privacy is
not infringed through use of this option since it simply reads numbers identifying
the illegality of the transmission and the record companies can never identify who
95 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 20. 96 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 33. 97 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 37.
45
is infringing their copyright through use of this option alone.98
The CopySense
option involves identification of copyrighted content through use of “digital
fingerprint” technology. It is implemented in universities and colleges as part of a
graduated response system to prevent users of the college network from illegally
file sharing. Charleton J was satisfied that this type of system did not invade
privacy since it did not monitor content. He was also of the opinion that this type
of option was clearly effective and believed that the implementation of such a
solution by UPC could prove successful.99
5.6.4 Fundamental Right of Privacy
It has long been accepted that a right to privacy exists in this jurisdiction and it has
been invoked numerous times over the years. In the digital sphere it can be
difficult to define its scope but Charleton J. remarked that “Privacy in the modern
panoptic society must be flexible enough to address new technologies and
developments and their privacy implications while at the same time certain enough
as to offer guidance and clarity as a matter of law.”100
He was of the view that the
„right to be left alone‟ encapsulated here can never extend to any communication
designed to further a criminal operation however. Moreover, he was of the view
that in relation to the Internet, “there are no privacy or data protection implications
to detecting unauthorised downloads of copyright material using peer-to-peer
technology”.101
5.6.5 Authority of the Court
Charleton J then considered whether he was entitled to grant such injunctions as
were requested of him in this case. He noted that he was bound to apply the law
“within the four corners of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000”.102
Furthermore he stated:
98 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 38. 99 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 49. 100 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 66. 101 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 68. 102 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 86.
46
The courts are not entitled, on the other hand, to take an area which has
been properly legislated for as to the extent and balance of rights by the
Oireachtas and to take a different view. For the Court to pursue the course
of granting an injunction on the basis not of law but of economic abuse or
moral turpitude would lead the Court beyond the threshold of the judicial
arm of government and into legislation.”103
He therefore went on to consider the exact scope of the Copyright and Related
Rights Act 2000 and any relevant European legislation.
In this instance the injunctions were sought pursuant to sections 37 and 40(4) of
the Act. Section 37 concerns the exclusive right of the owner to make copies of the
work available to the public and is worded as follows:
37.—(1) Subject to the exceptions specified in Chapter 6 and to any
provisions relating to licensing in this Part, the owner of the copyright in a
work has the exclusive right to undertake or authorise others to undertake
all or any of the following acts, namely:
(a) to copy the work;
(b) to make available to the public the work;
(c) to make an adaptation of the work or to undertake either of the
acts referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) in relation to an adaptation,
and those acts shall be known and in this Act referred to as ‘‘acts
restricted by copyright’’.
(2) The copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the
licence of the copyright owner undertakes, or authorises another to
undertake, any of the acts restricted by copyright.
103 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 86.
47
(3) References to the undertaking of an act restricted by the copyright in a
work shall relate to the work as a whole or to any substantial part of the
work and to whether the act is undertaken directly or indirectly.
It is acknowledged that in peer-to-peer file sharing, the parties making copies of
protected works available to the public include the downloader and uploader. UPC
however are not making the works available since they do not store, host, or cache
the files but are merely a conduit. The crucial issue, he notes, is “whether the Act
allows the Court to interfere with the transit through the UPC network of copyright
music to those intent stealing it and offering it for theft on their home
computers.”104
Section 40(1)-40(3) declares:
40.—(1) References in this Part to the making available to the public of a
work shall be construed as including all or any of the following, namely:
(a) making available to the public of copies of the work, by wire or
wireless means, in such a way that members of the public may
access the work from a place and at a time chosen by them
(including the making available of copies of works through the
Internet);
(b) performing, showing or playing a copy of the work in public;
(c) broadcasting a copy of the work;
(d) including a copy of the work in a cable programme service;
(e) issuing copies of the work to the public;
(f) renting copies of the work;
(g) lending copies of the work without the payment of remuneration
to the owner of the copyright in the work, and references to
104 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 92.
48
‘‘lawfully making available to the public’’ shall mean the
undertaking of any of the acts referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g)
by or with the licence of the copyright owner.
(2) References in this Part to the making available to the public of copies
of a work shall include the making available to the public of the original of
the work.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), the provision of facilities for enabling the
making available to the public of copies of a work shall not of itself
constitute an act of making available to the public of copies of the work.
(4) Without prejudice to subsection (3), where a person who provides
facilities referred to in that subsection is notified by the owner of the
copyright in the work concerned that those facilities are being used to
infringe the copyright in that work and that person fails to remove that
infringing material as soon as practicable thereafter that person shall also
be liable for the infringement.
Providing the facilities which are used in the activity of making available copies of
the protected works, does not in itself breach copyright. Liability can only be
established if the person or company providing the facilities has been notified and
subsequently fails to remove the infringing material.
The meaning of removal is given some consideration in the judgement. Charleton
J. discusses how the legislation must be interpreted to give effect to the wishes of
the legislature, but that he may not interpret the wording in a way which would
effectively result in “rewriting the text”.105
To block access to pirated material is
not removing the material in the ordinary sense of the word. To use the suggested
solutions of CopySense or Global File Registry would neither constitute removal
from the network. He came to the conclusion that the plain wording of the section
required that “action should be taken…not by digital blocking or diverting
strategems, but by removal. That is simply not possible in the context of a transient
105 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 96.
49
communication.”106
He turned his focus to European law to determine whether this
could shed some light on the situation.
5.6.6 European Obligations
A national measure should be construed in accordance with its legislative purpose,
in accordance with its obligations under European law. Charleton J examined the
defences provided to ISPs in the E-Commerce directive, as discussed in Chapter 2
above. These defences arise when an ISP establishes that they are providing the
mere conduit, or are caching or hosting. Although he accepts that UPC is a mere
conduit, he opines that article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive does not preclude a
court from requiring an ISP to “terminate” or “prevent” an infringement.107
This
language, he notes, is in marked contrast to the “removal of infringing material”
referred to in the 2000 Act.108
The Copyright Directive does not provide any further assistance either. It is
pointed out in paragraph 104 of the judgment that although the explanatory note
attaching to the 2004 SI109
on copyright states that it has made a number of
amendments to ensure full compliance with the relevant directives, this is in fact
not the case. Recital 59 states that:
(59) In the digital environment, in particular, the services of
intermediaries may increasingly be used by third parties for
infringing activities. In many cases such intermediaries are best
placed to bring such infringing activities to an end. Therefore,
without prejudice to any other sanctions and remedies available,
rightholders should have the possibility of applying for an
injunction against an intermediary who carried a third party’s
infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in a
network. This possibility should be available even where the acts
carried out by the intermediary are exempted under Article 5. The
106 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 100. 107 Recital 45 of the E-Commerce Directive 108 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 109. 109 SI 16/2004 European Communities (Copyright and Related Rights) Regulations 2004.
50
conditions and modalities relating to such injunctions should be left
to the national law of the Member States.”
Furthermore, article 8 which deals with sanctions and remedies declares the
following:
1. Member States shall provide appropriate sanctions and remedies in
respect of infringements of the rights and obligations set out in this
Directive and shall take all the measures necessary to ensure that
those sanctions and remedies are applied. The sanctions thus
provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure
that rightholders whose interests are affected by an infringing
activity carried out on its territory can bring an action for damages
and/or apply for an injunction and, where appropriate, for the
seizure of infringing material as well as of devices, products or
components referred to in Article 6(2).
3. Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are
used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.
Charleton J puts particular emphasis on the fact that the Copyright Directive places
an obligation on the Member State to ensure that a rightsholder is in a position to
apply for an injunction against an ISP, however the particular wording of the 2000
Act does not provide for this. Nor does an interpretation of the 2000 Act in light of
the Framework Directive as amended or the E-Commerce Directive provide for
such a construction. This led the judge to the conclusion that the 2000 Act has
“made no proper provision for the blocking, diverting or interrupting of internet
communications intent on breaching copyright. In failing to provide legislative
provisions for blocking, diverting, and interrupting copyright theft, Ireland is not
yet fully in compliance with its obligations under European law.”110
Injunctive
110 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 138.
51
relief was refused to the plaintiffs even though Charleton J. was of the opinion that
such relief was indeed merited on the facts. This legislative gap has recently been
the subject of much debate which is detailed in the following chapter.
52
Chapter 6 National Measures against piracy on the Internet
6.1 Introduction
National legislation has been introduced in a number of countries worldwide
including the UK, France, Korea, Taiwan and New Zealand. National regimes are
also currently envisaged in Finland, Italy and Denmark. Draft legislation was
passed in Finland in October 2010 providing for notification and warning but not
extending to disconnection.111
It is unclear how this will work without provision
for any ultimate sanction. At the time of writing this has not yet come into force.
Spain also has adopted its Sustainable Economy Act which contains provisions
aimed at speeding up the process of blocking and shutting down websites which
are used to infringe copyright.112
Since the focus of this paper is within the EU, the
national measures which have been adopted in the UK and France are analysed in
detail.
6.2 UK – Digital Economy Act 2010
In 2009 a White Paper entitled “Digital Britain” was produced by the Government
with the ambition to “secure the UK‟s position as one of the world‟s leading
digital knowledge economies”.113
It acknowledged that embracing the digital
revolution to fully appreciate and thus maximise exploitation of this reality was a
necessary step, potentially leading to huge commercial and industrial
opportunities. The recommendations contained in the report and the lengthy
consultation process which ensued, culminated in the drafting of the Digital
Economy Bill. Its most contentious feature was the imposition of an obligation on
ISPs to suspend the internet access of serious infringers of peer-to-peer illegal file
sharing. This caused outrage amongst internet-based communities and activists
111 Torrent Freak, “File-Sharers to Receive Warning Letters, But No 3 Strikes”
http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharers-to-receive-warning-letters-but-no-3-strikes-101102/ (visited 17
July 2011). 112
Francisco Javier Cabrera Blázquez, “The „Sinde Act‟”
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2011/03/04/the-sinde-act/ (visited 17 July 2011). 113 Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Department of Business, Innovation and Skills,
Digital Britain: Final Report (Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Department of Business, Innovation and Skills ,2010) available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7650/7650.pdf (visited 25 July 2011).
53
such as the Open Rights Group.114
The bill was heard during the so called wash-up
period, which essentially follows the announcement of an impending general
election, and as such was not properly debated. This has since been a cause for
concern. Benjamin Farrand noted that other suspicions arose in relation to the
motives of the Business Secretary, Lord Mandelson, in announcing that such
measures to control piracy would be introduced.115
Apparently this occurred just
days after he had dined with Dave Geffen, the founder of Asylum Records, whilst
holidaying in Corfu. Opponents of the Bill viewed this as evidencing the sway of
industry lobbyists over the legislative process. After receiving very little debate,
the Bill was given the Royal Assent on April 12, 2010, and entered into force on
June 12, 2010.
The Government‟s explanatory note on the Act gives a good illustration of how
the provisions might work in practice:116
Copyright owners identify cases of infringement and send details
including IP addresses to ISPs;
The ISPs verify that the evidence received meets the required
standard, and link the infringement to subscriber accounts;
The ISPs send letters to subscribers identified as apparently
infringing copyright. They keep track of how often each subscriber
is identified;
If asked to do so by a relevant copyright owner, ISPs supply a
copyright infringement list showing, for each relevant subscriber,
which of the copyright owner‟s reports relate to that subscriber. The
list does not reveal any subscriber‟s identity;
114Jim Killock, “Digital Economy Bill: Dangerous and Draconian Just Got Dictatorial” Open
Rights Group http://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2009/digital-economy-bill (visited 2 March
2011). 115 Benjamin Farrand, “The Digital Economy Act 2010 - a cause for celebration, or a cause for
concern?” E.I.P.R. 2010, 32(10), 536-541. 116 Digital Economy Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/24/notes/division/5/2 (visited 10 March 2011).
54
Copyright owners use the list as the basis for a “Norwich
Pharmacal” court order to obtain the names and addresses of some
or all of those on the list. At no point are individuals‟ names or
addresses passed from the ISP to a copyright owner without a court
order;
Copyright owners send “final warning” letters direct to infringers
asking them to stop online copyright infringement and giving them
a clear warning of likely court action if the warning is ignored; and
Copyright owners take court action against those who ignore the
final warning.
A good overview of the elements of the Bill, relating to copyright infringement,
which survived the legislative process, is given in the aforementioned article by
Farrand.117
Sections 3 – 18 are those sections with which we are concerned. These
are difficult to read since they refer to and amend the Communications Act 2003.
Sections 3 – 7 provide the framework for an Initial Obligations Code which must
be drafted or approved by Ofcom. These sections provide guidance as to what
should be included in this code. A draft code118
was published by Ofcom on the
28th of May 2010 for consultation.
Section 3 of the DEA places the ISPs under an obligation to inform subscribers of
infringements reported by rights owners. The notice given to the subscriber must
contain a description of the infringing content, evidence displaying the IP address
at the time of the infringement, and the name of the content owner making the
report. It also extends to impose liability on an internet subscriber who allows
another to utilise the service and commit an infraction on the service. This far-
reaching clause can cause problems for businesses whose employees use their
service on a daily basis, parents whose children use the home accounts and many
other private and public organisations.
117 Farrand, note 115. 118 Ofcom, Online Infringement of Copyright and the Digital Economy Act 2010: Draft Initial Obligations Code available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/copyright-
infringement/summary/ condoc.pdf (visited 13 March 2011).
55
There are ramifications for unsecured wireless access also. A subscriber presently
has the choice of whether to leave their network unsecured, but this will essentially
be allowing access, as caught by the Act. This effectively amounts to “constructive
prohibition of unsecured Wi-Fi by the back door, for consumers, corporations and
the public sector”.119
Farrand notes the irony in the situation; in light of the stated
aim of the Digital Britain Report - to ensure maximum accessibility – section
3(6)(h) may in fact “have the effect of reducing accessibility as libraries, airports
and even corporations such as Starbucks end their open-access Wi-Fi services in
order to avoid liability”.120
Section 4 obliges the ISP to provide infringement lists to content owners, upon
their request. Confusion may arise here without further clarification as noted by
Farrand.121
Content holders are notifying ISPs of infringing IP addresses per
section 3 and then under section 4 ISPs are providing content holders with a list of
these IP addresses. Without further explanation this seems to be somewhat
purposeless. However, since IP addresses are often specified on an ad hoc basis, it
is possible for the same user to have infringed multiple times on different IP
addresses.
Section 9 provides for the imposition of an obligation on the ISP to take “technical
measures” against certain subscribers as a preventative step. These measures
include suspension of a relevant subscriber‟s122
internet connection, restrictions on
download speed or quantities, restrictions on the types of material that they can
access, or other types of limits on access to the internet. The following section
however states that these technical measures cannot be put in place by the ISPs
until at least 12 months following an initial obligations code entering into force.
These technical measures must be regulated by an Ofcom drafted code to be
approved by Parliament, namely the Technical Obligations Code. These measures
could include such actions as download caps, bandwidth throttling, protocol
119 Lilian Edwards, “Mandy and Me: Some Thoughts on the Digital Economy Bill” (2009) 6:3
SCRIPTed 534. 120 Farrand, note 115, at 540. 121 Ibid. 122 A relevant subscriber is one whom the amount of copyright infringement reports against them, has exceeded a threshold as set out in the initial obligations code. In other words they will appear in
a copyright infringement list.
56
blocking and port blocking. Something of important note is the very general clause
that a measure can be anything that “limits the service provided to the subscriber
in another way”.123
This effectively gives the government the power to limit the
internet access of anybody in any way if it can be seen to potentially reduce or
prevent online copyright infringement. In this regard, the redeeming feature of the
Technical Obligations Code is that its provisions must be objectively justifiable,
must not unduly discriminate against any person or class of persons and must be
proportionate and transparent.
Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of the Bill was the initial clause 17
which has attracted much criticism from stakeholders. This clause provided the
Secretary of State with a power to amend the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988 for the purpose of preventing or reducing online copyright infringement, if it
is appropriate to do so because of technological developments. This caused
consternation because it would allow for primary copyright legislation to be
amended without examination by Parliament. Large technology companies such as
Google and Facebook wrote an open letter lobbying against this clause.124
It was
then revised to ensure that any amendment by the Secretary of State pursuant to
this clause would be proportionate. It must also now receive the approval of
Parliament.
At the beginning of February, Ofcom were ordered to review the powers given by
the DEA, relating to blocking websites which could be used for copyright
infringement.125
Before Government will begin to enforce the website blocking
measures, they want to be sure that these can in fact work in practice. This led to
the creation of a working group on the matter to facilitate discourse on how to
make the proposed system more agreeable.126
ISPs are inevitably concerned about
123 Digital Economy Act 2010, s9. 124 Charles Arthur, “Tech chiefs attack digital economy bill” The Guardian 10 March 2010,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/mar/10/digital-economy-bill (visited 25
July 2011). 125
Kate Holten, “Ofcom to review Digital Economy Act” Reuters 1 February 2011, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/uk-britain-digital-idUKTRE71041O20110201 (visited 2
March 2011). 126 Mark Sweeney, “Government hunts for „plan B‟ on internet piracy proposals” The Guardian 25 February 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ technology/2011/feb/25/digital-economy-
act-website-blocking (visited 2 March 2011).
57
potential litigation which could arise as a result of blocking a website. One
possible solution to this that has been suggested is the indemnification of ISPs by
the rights holders and the placing of the onus on the rights holders to prove
undoubtedly that the website was in fact being used for illegal purposes before
blocking it.127
Two of the UK‟s largest ISPs, BT and Talk Talk, applied for judicial review of the
Act, to assess whether it was incompatible with certain provisions of EU law. Five
grounds were advanced for challenge. These included the contention that the DEA
is incompatible with certain provisions of the E-Commerce Directive and the
Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive; that they are disproportionate
in their impact on ISPs, businesses and consumers; and that the suggested costs to
be footed by ISPs are inappropriate.128
The first ground of challenge was an alleged breach of the Technical Services
Directive. Article 8(1) TSD requires Member States to inform the Commission of
any draft technical regulation and a statement as to why it is necessary, for the
purposes of legal certainty and transparency. It has been established that a draft
technical regulation which has not been duly notified is unenforceable at national
level.129
It was held that the initial obligations enacted by the DEA are not yet
legally enforceable against any individual, including ISPs; and, therefore, they do
not have the requisite “legal effect”. They could not be said to be technical
regulations and as such this ground was dismissed.130
The second ground of challenge was a purported breach of the E-Commerce
Directive, particularly articles 12, 15 and 3(2) which relate to the prohibition of all
forms of restrictions by Member States which would hamper the free provision of
Information Society Services, the limited liability regime of mere conduit ISPs,
and a no general monitoring obligation. The judge noted that a careful balancing of
competing interests was completed in drafting articles 12 and 15 and if one were to
127 Ibid. 128 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72. 129 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 63. 130 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 93.
58
depart from the plain meaning, an unfair tipping of the balance in favour of one
industry to the detriment of the other could occur.131
The judge noted that it is conceivable that an IPR holder may draw the attention of
an ISP to an infringement or likelihood of repeat infringement and invite them to
terminate or prevent such an infringement. In these circumstances, the “careful
balance” struck by the legislator allows Member States to authorise the courts or
competent administrative authority to order the ISP to terminate or prevent the
infringement, so long as the ISP is not made liable (by way of fine or
compensation) in respect of the infringement itself. The potential exposure of ISPs
to financial penalties etc. was raised as an argument to bolster this ground of
challenge but this was dismissed because such liabilities would arise as a result of
failure to comply with the core obligations of ISPs under the DEA as opposed to
liability for the underlying infringement. The judge reiterated that he could not
give such an extended meaning to article 12 and on a natural reading of this clause,
there was no breach.132
It was contended by the claimants that the database of information linking
infringements with subscribers, which must be maintained by ISPs pursuant to the
DEA, is contrary to article 15‟s no general monitoring obligation. The judge stated
that “nothing in the DEA requires ISPs to inspect or examine the information
transmitted for any purpose” and the role of the ISP under the DEA is a passive
one.133
It is the copyright owners themselves that must show that an infringement
has occurred and the ISP has itself no general obligation to inspect or examine the
transmitted information for potential or actual copyright infringements.
The third ground of challenge was a breach of the Data Protection Directive134
(DPD) and the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive135
(PECD). It
131 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 100 – 108. 132 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 107 - 108. 133 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 115. 134
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.
135 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.
59
was submitted that the processing of “personal data” within the meaning on the
DPD is likely to be required by ISPs under the initial obligations of the DEA. It
was conceded that copyright owners would be processing personal data but it was
held that this processing was permissible in the context of copyright
infringement.136
There is uncertainty as to whether an IP address constitutes
“personal data” but it seems that the judge here is of the opinion that they do. This
issue has been the subject of much debate across Europe with different
jurisdictions reaching contradicting conclusions. In Ireland it would appear that
they do not constitute “personal data”.
The only ground which was successfully challenged was in relation to costs.
Section 15 of the DEA empowered the Secretary of State to implement a Costs
Order addressing cost sharing between ISPSs, rights holders and Ofcom in relation
to costs incurred in implementing and complying with their obligations under the
DEA. It refers to three kinds of costs: qualifying costs which are administrative
costs incurred by Ofcom or the appeals body; relevant costs which are
administrative costs borne by the ISPs in carrying out its obligations; and case fees
set by the appeals body in respect of each subscriber appeal which it receives.
Under the Costs Order, each of these costs were to be split between the ISP and
the copyright owner with the ISP incurring 25%. This was held to conflict with the
Authorisation Directive137
. While it was held that relevant costs and case fees
could be borne by the ISP, to require them to pay qualifying costs is unlawful.138
BT and TalkTalk were originally refused leave to appeal this decision however it
has very recently come to light that an appeal hearing was in fact granted and is
scheduled for 7th October 2012.
139 This is yet another hurdle that the DEA must
overcome before we will see its implementation.
136
[2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 161. 137 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services. 138 [2011] EWHC 1021, note 72, at 200. 139 Malcolm Hutty, “BT, TalkTalk to get an appeal hearing” Linx 25 July 2011, available at
https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=4757 (visited 26 July 2011).
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6.3 France – HADOPI
In January 2010 the French law amending the existing French Intellectual Property
Code (IPC)140
, known as “Hadopi 2”, was finally adopted in modified form after a
review by the French Constitutional Council. This sets out the French approach to
the graduated response regime. It has as its aims141
the “encouragement of the
development of the legal offer on the Internet” and the “protection of works to
which a copyright or related right is attached against any infringement”. This
intentionally strikes a balance between the educational and the repressive. Hadopi
stands for Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des droits
sur Internet which translates as the High Authority for the Diffusion of Creative
Works and Copyright Protection on the Internet. It is an independent
administrative body, hereinafter referred to as the Authority, with a board of nine
members – three appointed by the government, two by the legislative bodies, three
by judicial bodies and one by the Superior Council of Artistic and Literary
Property.
The Authority, upon referral by sworn agents142
, acts to inform an ISP that an
infringement has occurred. The ISP then sends an email notification to the
subscriber that corresponds with the infringing IP address, warning them of this
first occurrence. If infringement reoccurs within six months, a second warning will
be sent by registered mail. Since the sworn agents are processing IP addresses, the
issue of processing personal data has arisen. The Constitutional Council
considered that the IP addresses make it indirectly possible to identify a person
and to process data of a personal nature. As such, processing must be subject to the
requirements of the national data protection laws and the data may be transmitted
only to the Authority or to the judicial authorities. The processing of such data
must be “strictly proportional to the purpose it is sought to achieve.”143
140 Act No. 92-597 of 1 July 1992 on the Code of Intellectual Property (Code de la Propriété
Intellectuelle) hereinafter referred to as IPC. 141 IPC Article L331-13. 142 IPC Article L331-24. 143 Decision no 2009-580 of June 10th 2009 of the French Constitutional Council, English version available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (visited 22 July 2011).
61
If the subscriber continues to infringe, a formal judicial complaint will be made.144
The judge has the power to impose sanctions including disconnection of the
subscriber account. While suspension will be reserved for the most serious
infringers, it is the cornerstone of the system, and without this sanction, it would
serve a “mere letterbox role” and would be “nothing more than a scarecrow whose
warning messages would soon be ignored”.145
The sanction of suspension is set down in Chapter V of the IPC entitled “Criminal
Provisions”. Article L.335-7 states that any infringement under Article L. 335-2146
,
L.335-3147
or L. 335-4148
of the IPC carries a punishment of “suspension of access
to a public communication line for a maximum of one year, plus the prohibition to
take over the same period another contract on a similar service from any operator”.
Originally, under what is known as “Hadopi 1”, the administrative body had the
power to order disconnection of the infringing subscriber‟s account. This was held
to be unconstitutional by the French Constitutional Court149
as it was reasoned that
only a judge would be empowered to do so. It was held that “the powers to impose
penalties created by the challenged provisions vest the Committee for the
protection of copyright, which is not a court of law, with the power to restrict or
deny access to the internet by access holders and those persons whom the latter
allow to access the internet. The powers vested in this administrative authority are
not limited to a specific category of persons but extend to the entire population.
The powers of this Committee may thus lead to restricting the right of any person
to exercise his right to express himself and communicate freely, in particular from
his own home. In these conditions, in view of the freedom guaranteed by article 11
of the Declaration of 1789, Parliament was not at liberty, irrespective of the
guarantees accompanying the imposition of penalties, to vest an administrative
144 IPC Article L331-25. 145 Jean-Sébastien Mariez, “HADOPI… 3 small suspension points…” Juriscom.net available at
http://www.juriscom.net/documents/ pla20110315.pdf (visited 17 July 2011). 146 Any edition of writings, musical composition, drawing, painting or any other production,
printed or engraved in whole or in part, in defiance of the laws and regulations relating to
property of the authors shall constitue infringement. 147 Any reproduction, performance or dissemination of an intellectual creation or of software, by
any means whatsoever shall constitute infringement. 148 Any fixation, reproduction, communication or making available to the public, or any broadcasting of a performance, phonogram, videogram or a program shall constitute infringement. 149 Decision no. 2009-580, note 143.
62
authority with such powers for the purpose of protecting holders of copyright and
related rights”.150
Article L.335-7-1 introduces a misdemeanour of “characterised negligence” which
is punishable by the imposition of suspension for a maximum of one month. This
obligates a subscriber to implement a means of security on their own network. If a
subscriber‟s network is hacked then they will be liable. In 2006 the DADVSI Act
was passed in France to implement the Copyright Directive.151
This act contained
provisions imposing an obligation on subscribers to secure their connection so as
to ensure that it is not being used by another for copyright infringement, but it did
not provide for any sanctions to deal with a failure to comply with this condition.
Hadopi however introduced liability for this. According to the article L. 336-3 a
subscriber “has the obligation to ensure that this access is not the subject to a use
for the purpose of reproducing, representing, making available or communicating
to the public works or other materials protected by a copyright or a neighbouring
right without the authorisation of the right holders”.152
The decision of the French Constitutional Court also considered the
proportionality of the penalty of suspension, particularly in relation to the
presumption of innocence and the fundamental rights of the defendant. The regime
imposed a strict liability on the Internet subscriber unless they could adduce
evidence to prove that the infringement had been committed by a third party.153
This reversal of the burden of proof was held to be unconstitutional. It was stated
that “under article 9 of the Declaration of 1789, every man is presumed innocent
until proved guilty. Parliament cannot therefore introduce a principle of
presumption of guilt in criminal matters. However, as an exceptional measure,
such a presumption may be introduced, particularly in the case of minor offences,
once such presumptions are not irrebuttable, the rights of the defence are respected
and the available facts tend to confirm the likelihood of the commission of the
150 Decision no. 2009-580, note 136, at 16. 151
Law No. 2006-961 of 1 August 2006 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society. 152 IPC Article L. 336-3. 153 Nicola Lucchi, “Regulation and Control of Communication: The French Online Copyright Infringement Law (HADOPI)” (2011) 19 JICL (page number unavailable at time of writing due to
availability of electronic copy only).
63
incriminated act.”154
With regard to freedom of expression and communication,
the Court recognises that freedom of communication is a fundamental right, and
that this extends to include freedom to access online communication services
given the importance of this in the participation of democracy and the expression
of ideas and opinions.155
Any restriction placed on the exercise of this right must
be “adapted and proportionate to the purpose it is sought to achieve.”156
The Hadopi regime is not merely a three strikes policy, but adopts a broader
approach to entice people to lawful downloading. It does this in two ways:
educational measures and the introduction of the “Carte Musique Jeune”. As part
of an education code school pupils receive information about illegal downloading
of protected works and the potential sanctions that may be imposed on copyright
infringers. They also receive information in relation to valid legal offers available
on the Internet. The “Carte Musique” is a card subsidised by the government
offered to people between the ages of 12 and 25 which will allow them to purchase
€50 worth of music online for a payment of just €25.
One of the problems with Hadopi is that it monitors only peer-to-peer
technologies. Studies have shown that the use of peer-to-peer in accessing illegal
copies of protected works however has declined and that the consumers of these
illegal materials are now using alternative channels such as cyber-lockers.157
Perhaps this has been too expensive and protracted a system to implement with
waning efficacy, if these trends are anything to go by. Nonetheless it aims to have
reached a target of sending 10,000 first warning notices per day by. Its
effectiveness thus far remains to be seen as there is yet to be an independent study
with reliable figures.
154 Decision no. 2009-580, note 143, at 17. 155
Decision no. 2009-580, note 143, at 12. 156 Decision no. 2009-580, note 143, at 15. 157 PWC, The speed of life: Discovering behaviors and attitudes related to pirating content (PWC,
2011) available at http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_discovering_behaviors_attitudes_related_to_pirating_conte
nt.pdf (visited 22 July 2011).
64
Chapter 7 Ireland
7.1 Consultation on Amendment to Copyright and Related Rights Act
2000
In the week leading up to the 2011 election, rumours were rife that a Statutory
Instrument was being rushed through the legislative process without political
debate and was due to be signed by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and
Innovation Mary Hanafin TD. This caused much consternation among
stakeholders, particularly since the very closely related Scarlet v SABAM is
currently before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Minister Hanafin was
quick to respond to this speculation, confirming that legislation would not be
hurried through parliament. It was also confirmed that the advice of the Attorney
General had been sought, along with consultation with the Department of
Communications, Energy and Natural Resources. Minister Hanafin concluded that
it would be normal practice to “consult all the relevant stakeholders in advance of
legislation such as this being enacted.”158
The Digital Economy Act was swept
through in a similar fashion in the United Kingdom to much dissatisfaction, and as
such is already undergoing a review.
Richard Bruton T.D., the Minister for what has recently been renamed Jobs,
Enterprise and Innovation, announced on the 9th
May, a review of the Copyright
and Related Rights Act 2000.159
The terms of reference of the review are
summarised into the following short points: to identify any areas which are seen to
create barriers to innovation; identify solutions and recommendations for the
implementation of such solutions; assess whether the introduction of a „fair use‟
doctrine may be appropriate in Ireland; and make recommendations for changes to
the EU law if necessary. The deadline for submissions to this review was 14th
July
2011 and at the time of writing these were being compiled and reviewed by the
158
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, Minister Hanafin clarifies speculation on
possible changes to copyright law http://www.deti.ie/press/2011/20110224.htm (visited 22 July
2011). 159 Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, Consultation on the Review of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 http://www.djei.ie/science/ipr/copyright_review_2011.htm (visited 22
July 2011).
65
Copyright Review Committee. A consultation paper will be prepared as the next
stage of the review process and is due for publication in the autumn.
Notwithstanding this review, on the 9th
June, a question was raised in the Dáil in
relation to the supposed gap that has existed in Irish law as identified in the
October judgment of Charleton J and it was sought to have this resolved as a
matter of urgency.160
Proposed wording for a Statutory Instrument was published
on the 20th June by the Department, with an astonishingly brief consultation period
of just ten days.161
This was extended at the request of stakeholders to the 30th
July
2011. The proposed SI will purportedly bring Ireland into line with its European
obligations under the Copyright Directive and the E-Commerce Directive. The
Department stated that it had believed that the types of injunctions which ought to
be available were already available in this jurisdiction under section 40(4) of the
2000 Act. They also stated that Charleton J had not considered removal of access
rather than „mere‟ removal of the infringing material in his judgment. Furthermore
it is emphasised that the proposal is not intended to introduce a Hadopi-style
graduated response system. The SI proposes to insert the following wording after
section 40(5) and 205(9) of the 2000 Act respectively:
(5A) (a) without prejudice to subsections (3) and (4), the owner of the
copyright in the work concerned may apply to the High Court for
an injunction against a person who provides facilities referred to in
subsection (3) where those facilities are being used by one or more
third parties to infringe the copyright in that work.
(b) In considering an application for an injunction under this
subsection, the court shall have due regard to the rights of any
third party likely to be affected and the court shall make such
directions (including, where appropriate, a direction requiring a
160
Willie O‟Dea Dáil Debates Vol. 735 No. 1, 14987/11 9 June 2011
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2011/06/09/00014.asp (visited 22 July 2011). 161 Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation Consultation on Amendment to Copyright and
Related Rights Act, 2000 http://www.djei.ie/science/ipr/copyrightconsultation.htm (visited 22 July 2011).
66
third party to be put on notice of the application) as the court may
deem necessary or appropriate in all the circumstances.
(9A) (a) without prejudice to subsections (7) and (8), the rightsowner
may apply to the High Court for an injunction against a person who
provides facilities referred to in subsection (7) where those
facilities are used by one or more third parties to infringe any of
the rights referred to in Parts III and IV.
(b) In considering an application for an injunction under this
subsection, the court shall have due regard to the rights of any
third party likely to be affected and the court shall make such
directions (including, where appropriate, a direction requiring a
third party to be put on notice of the application) as the court may
deem necessary or appropriate in all the circumstances.
7.2 A Closer Look
The Department have stated that Charleton J in his judgment failed to consider the
concept of removal of infringing material from access as opposed to „mere
removal‟ by UPC.162
It is not clear what exactly is meant by this. In paragraphs 99
and 100 of the judgment there is a discussion and analysis of the system of deep
packet inspection and packet dropping in order to prevent a piece of data transiting
the network. The distinction is made between removal from access and whether
the entire communication is removed. The expert witness explained that when you
stop a communication the files still exist on the machines that it existed on before
the communication.163
Charleton J was of the opinion that “[c]utting off access to
the computers holding pirated copyright songs is not to remove infringing
material; it is to stop the transit of that material.”164
He further notes that the
solutions of CopySense and Global File Registry, which he had explored, also
cannot be said to remove the infringing material from the Internet. “This is not, in
the ordinary use of language, the removal of infringing material from the network”
162 Ibid. 163 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 99. 164 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 100.
67
he remarked.165
Furthermore “the plain wording of the section in its use of the
present tense and its reference to removing infringing material, requires that action
should be taken in respect of a then existing situation, not by digital blocking or
diverting stratagems, but by removal. That is simply not possible in the context of
a transient communication.”166
It would thus appear that Charleton J did in fact
give consideration to the concept of removal from access, and that in doing so he
came to the conclusion that it was not possible. It is unclear what the Department
is attempting to achieve with this statement, but in any event it is unlikely to have
any impact on the outcome of the consultation.
Another noteworthy point is that the Department has emphasised that the proposed
amendment is not about the introduction of a statutory regulatory regime such as
the French “Hadopi” system or the regime set out in the Digital Economy Act in
the United Kingdom.167
This emphasis would appear to be just a fallacy however.
Once this amendment has been implemented, there is nothing to prevent
rightsholders from seeking injunctions requiring ISPs to implement a graduated
response system. It will be for the judge to decide, based on certain legal principles
whether such an injunction is mandated in the circumstances. The injunctions
regime provided for in the broad wording of the proposal could potentially
encompass not only blocking but mass filtering obligations and the eventual
introduction of a graduated response system is not inconceivable in these
conditions.
Academic commentators have noted that the injunctions provided for under this
broad wording could potentially be aimed at a number of different groups.168
The
wording of the proposal covers anybody providing facilities which may be used by
an infringing third party. This is broad enough not only to include the imposition
of an injunction on access providers like Eircom and UPC, but also cyber-lockers
such as Rapid Share and Megaupload, and those who upload on a peer-to-peer
165 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 100. 166
[2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 100. 167 Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, note 154. 168 Rónán Kennedy, “Consultation on amendments to Copyright Act 2000” Commons.ie available
at http://coimin.ie/?cat=6 (visited 15 July 2011). This blog post documents a twitter discussion which occurred between TJ McIntyre and Rónán Kennedy in which the proposed amendments
were discussed.
68
network. The concept of a leech in the context of peer-to-peer is described earlier.
If a leech is using a client which allows download only, then these users will not, it
seems, fall under the remit of this injunctions scheme. Neither will a download
only user on a cyber-locker. This is because a download only user does not
provide facilities which may be used for infringement. As Rónán Kennedy notes,
if the pursuit of individual downloaders through Norwich Pharmacal orders proved
futile, the option to seek injunctions against individual infringers one by one will
hardly be much more of an effective alternative.169
It is not inconceivable to think that there may be some who will argue that Ireland
is in fact already complying with its European obligations and that an amendment
is entirely unnecessary. The Department admits that even they were under the
impression that injunctions of the kind mandated under EU law were already
available in Irish law under Section 40 (4) of the 2000 Act and by reason of the
inherent power of the courts to grant injunctions, which are equitable and
discretionary remedies granted according to settled principles, developed by the
courts.170
The representative body for the telecommunications sector in Ireland
have drafted a response to the consultation to that effect which may be viewed by
the public by request to the Department. They argue that while a Member State
must ensure that a rightsholder is in a position to apply for an injunction against an
intermediary, it is not specified what type of injunction must be available.
Furthermore, Recital 59 of the Copyright Directive asserts that “the conditions and
modalities relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law of
Member States”. The very fact that Ireland expressly limited this injunctive relief
to a notice and takedown procedure, exercising the discretion set out in Recital 59,
it may be argued, satisfies the obligation as set out in article 8(3) of the E-
Commerce Directive. This argument is unlikely to hold much weight and it is
likely that the Statutory Instrument will become law soon regardless of the
countless objections that it receives.
169 Ibid. 170 Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, note 154.
69
Charleton and O‟Keeffe further explain the legislative gap.171
Although article 12
of the E-Commerce Directive provides for the defence of „mere conduit‟, it also
states that this should not prevent a court, in accordance with national law, from
requiring a service provider “to terminate or prevent an infringement” or from
“establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to
information.” Charleton and O‟Keeffe note that in the European legislation the
words used are: remove, disable, terminate, prevent.172
The wording in the 2000
Act refers to the removal of infringing material. When different words are used in
legislation, it is noted, they have intentionally different meanings.173
The disabling
of access is not the removal of material. A graduated response system ultimately
resulting in the disconnection of the users Internet connection pursuant to a court
order is not removal of material but is would operate to prevent the occurrence of
an infringement. They note that in this sense the Irish legislation does not go as
far as it should under the European directives.174
They observe that Britain
complies with its obligations with the Digital Economy Act 2010 but even before
this became law, the transposing laws in the UK used all four of the words listed
above which appear in the European directives.175
Only one of these appears in the
Irish legislation.
The wording of the amendment as it stands provides little or no guidance to a
judge in a court of law. Charleton and O‟Keeffe have expressed their opinion on
judicial discretion and judicial activism in the context of such injunctive relief.
They note that merely because an injunction is available pursuant to national law it
does not mean that it is an automatic remedy, and must still be subject to the
discretionary jurisdiction of the courts. While it may appear simple, they remark, it
poses a dilemma to every judge that is requested to grant interlocutory relief
because no finding of fact has yet been made and there is a grave concern of the
consequences if the decision turns out to have been a wrong one. They state that a
judge must not only be sure that the making of an order injuncting an activity is
171 Peter Charleton and Conor O‟Keeffe, “Copyright Piracy and the Internet” (2011) 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid.
70
right but that the individuals whom the injunction is aimed at must know that
which is permitted and that which is forbidden, and it must be possible for them to
comply with it. A number of guiding principles which a court may take into
account when establishing whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy, may be
found in Kirwan.176
Even more considerations are involved in injunctions relating
to digital piracy. One of the principles in EU law, Charleton and O‟Keeffe add, is
“prevue par la loi”177
In other words they are “entitled to know what the law is;
what it demands; how judges are empowered; and what he is likely to be facing in
the event of a breach.”178
This is difficult when the injunction dictates the
implementation of a technical measure which may be of a new untested kind given
the rapid pace at which technology advances and becomes obsolete.179
Judges
must also consider third party rights which may be affected by any such injunction
along with the burden of costs and resources and where this should lie. All of these
considerations can prove to be quite a headache for the judiciary and the broad
wording of the proposed amendment is not likely to alleviate this in any way.
The proposed wording expressly places an obligation on the judge to have due
regard to the rights of any third party likely to be affected. These rights include the
right to respect for privacy of personal communications, the right to protection of
personal data and the right of freedom of information. All of these rights are
protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These rights are not absolute
however and may be restricted in certain circumstances. Advocate General Cruz
Villalón stated that they may be abridged but only in accordance with the law. He
considered that the legal basis for such a restriction must be adopted nationally and
must be “accessible, clear and predictable”.180
Once the final ruling has been
handed down, it is hoped that it will provide some detailed guidance to national
judges seeking to impose a technical measure on an intermediary. Charleton J was
of the opinion that there were no privacy or data protection implications to
detecting unlawful downloads of protected works using peer-to-peer technology,
176 Brendan Kirwan, Injunctions, Law and Practice (Thomson Roundhall, 2008). 177 Charleton and O‟Keeffe, note 164. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Court of Justice of the European Union, note 69.
71
nor to blocking, nor to a graduated response.181
Digital rights advocates would beg
to differ.
If the Advocate General‟s opinion is adopted by the CJEU, then it will not be
likely that a graduated response scheme could be imposed on foot of an injunction
at the behest of the righstholder pursuant to the proposed amendment. This type of
scheme would require statutory status similar to the DEA or Hadopi. From the
Advocate General‟s opinion it would appear that such national legislation must be
accessible, clear and predictable. As part of the EU Commission‟s Telecoms
Package182
which aimed to reform the regulatory framework for electronic
communications and services within the EU, a directive was introduced in 2009
amending the Framework Directive.183
This was transposed in Ireland on the 1st of
July 2011 and requires judicial oversight for any such scheme. The relevant clause
reads as follows:
Measures taken by Member States regarding end users’ access to, or use
of, services and applications through electronic communications networks
shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and general principles of Community
law.
Any of these measures regarding end-users’ access to, or use of, services
and applications through electronic communications networks liable to
restrict those fundamental rights or freedoms may only be imposed if they
are appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic society,
and their implementation shall be subject to adequate procedural
safeguards in conformity with the European Convention for the Protection
181 [2010] IEHC 377, note 53, at 68. 182 European Commission Memo/09/491, Agreement on EU Telecoms Reform paves way for
stronger consumer rights, an open internet, a single European telecoms market and high-speed
internet connections for all citizens Brussels, 5 November 2009. 183 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation
of electronic communications networks and service.
72
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with general
principles of Community law, including effective judicial protection and
due process. Accordingly, these measures may only be taken with due
respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to
privacy. A prior, fair and impartial procedure shall be guaranteed,
including the right to be heard of the person or persons concerned, subject
to the need for appropriate conditions and procedural arrangements in
duly substantiated cases of urgency in conformity with the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. The right to effective and timely judicial review shall be
guaranteed.184
Charleton and O‟Keeffe note that because of the advocates of Internet freedom,
issues which once were simple have now become “entangled with issues of
privacy, issues of data protection, issues of personal freedom, entitlements to
communicate and ultimately...a requirement…that no one is to be cut-off from
Internet service unless there is judicial determination.”185
The requirement of
judicial determination to which they refer is that which is described above. The
tone of the article suggests that this is a bad thing but it is difficult to understand
how consideration of such issues should ever be bemoaned. They observe that
until now an Internet contract was a private contract between two parties and if
breached could be sued upon. Under the amendments to the Framework Directive
termination of an Internet contract is now subject to “prior judicial supervision”
and “a special and protected status” is given to these contracts.186
184 Ibid, article 1(b). 185 Charleton and O‟Keeffe, note 164, at 8. 186 Ibid.
73
Chapter 8 Conclusion
It is clear that if the proposed Statutory Instrument is adopted in the coming
months, the conundrum of digital piracy will remain far from solved. Whether
rightsholders will bombard the courts with a deluge of injunction applications or
whether they will be deterred from doing so by the impending Scarlet decision
remains to be seen. A lot of questions remain unanswered. One thing is for certain
however, the judge assessing these injunction applications will not have an easy
task. It will be a struggle for the courts to assess what exactly is proportionate
when it comes to ever-evolving technical measures.
Pursuant to the proposed amendment to Irish law, an injunction ordering the
implementation of general filtering obligations would fall foul of the Scarlet
principles. Any injunction seeking to impose a “three-strikes” regime would
similarly conflict with the guiding principles of European jurisprudence, unless it
were the subject of accessible, clear and precise national legislation. Furthermore,
the ultimate disconnection of such a system must be subject to prior judicial
determination. Such a system is not likely to be introduced in this jurisdiction in
the near future. Although the Norwich Pharmacal route of directly pursuing the
infringer would be the method of enforcement preferred by ISPs, this has proven
futile, as noted by Charleton J, because of huge costs and labour intensity. Perhaps
a less costly and less burdensome option which would allow a rightsholder to
obtain the information that they require to pursue the individual, through a lower
court, would be preferable. This however, would need to be the subject of well
thought out primary legislation, with the input of the Oireachtas, which addresses
data protection issues and all of the other concerns of the parties involved.
There is no one universal remedy for the problem of piracy in the Internet age. It
may be alleviated only upon cooperation of all concerned parties. Increasing
enforcement alone is not the appropriate way to tackle this. A balance between the
pedagogical and the oppressive needs to be reached, along with an increase in the
availability of affordable legitimate digital products. This may only be achieved
through a broad all-encompassing review of the copyright regime. The
implementation of secondary legislation addressing enforcement alone, in spite of
74
the wider review which is now occurring is imprudent and will benefit none. In the
words of Professor Ian Hargreaves in his definitive report on the issue “[a]ction is
needed on all fronts.”187
187 Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (2011) at
8.45.
75
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Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law (Oxford University Press, 2010)
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century-fox-v-newzbin.html (visited 03/06/2011)
Barry Sookman, “Copyright reform for Canada: what should we do? A submission
to the copyright consultation” C.T.L.R. 2010, 16(1), 15-26
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