Levi on Nagel

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Logic without Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science by Ernest NagelReview by: Albert William LeviEthics, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Jan., 1958), pp. 142-144Published by: The University of Chicago Press

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142 ETHICS

dominant ontology, a set of basal beliefs aboutbeing and value that shape the culture in per-vasive, subtle, yet decisive ways. Likewise in-stitutions are embodied implicit philosophies,manifest in their myths and symbols; and in

fact the institution which dominates the cul-ture, whether by force or by persuasion, con-tributes the implicit dominant ontology.

Feibleman'smetaphysics is moderate realism.Propounded at length in the Ontology, where itis sometimes called axiological or value-realism,it means in social theory "the avoidance ofidealism on the one hand and of nominalismonthe other. The former would lead to the theoryof the superior reality of the society, the latterto the social atomism which holds to the theoryof the sole reality of the individual and the fic-tional nature of all social organization . . . ac-cording to its [realism's] tenets, all that is isreal,and, moreover,equally real, and so includesthe individual at one level of analysis and thesocial group, the institution and society, atothers" (p. 18). Thus when sketching the per-fect individual and the ideal institution withinthe natural society (chap. xxii), he avoids boththe paralysis of despair and utopian optimism,because, while acknowledging the values suchideals promise, he is nonetheless sensitive to

the limitations of actuality. In the last chapter(chap. xxiii), "On the Problem of Social Con-trol," he formulates what he calls "the funda-mental dilemma of society, that consistencyand completeness in social organization are in-compatible" (p. 389). In practical terms thisdivision is tantamount to the awful impasse be-tween totalitarianism and liberalism threaten-ing contemporary civilization. What Feible-man proposes for this crisis is "the search forthat philosophy whose application to society

will permit the most complete attainment ofwhat can be consistent" (p. 389).The Institutions of Society contains several

obvious defects. More careful editing couldhave compressed the book to half its size,though the style gains through expansiveness afacility that makes it a pleasure to read. Theexceptions to clarity are the discussions of quali-tative logic (chap. x, pp. 130 ff.) and of value(chap. xviii, pp. 265 ff.). When treating thesetruly technical and somewhat esoteric topicsFeibleman'sprose borders on what Tawney hasdubbed "mumbo jumbo." But, perhaps worstof all, the organizationof the book, while excel-lent in over-all plan, occasionally breaks down.The most glaringinstance is the strange case of

the "Law of Societal Difference." On page 362this law is cited as having been recognizedpre-viously, but not until page 366 is it defined,while the index registers no occurrence earlierthan page 362. Additional detective work un-

covers mention of the law on page 373, withFootnote 3 there referring to chapterxix for itselucidation; but unfortunately examination ofchapter xix discovers no mention of the furtivelaw.

Despite these shortcomings, however, The In-stitutions of Society has an important theme,the primacy of institutions for sociology; andthe treatment of this theme, especially in PartsIV and V where Feibleman analyzes and classi-fies institutions, is an original contribution tosocial philosophy. But above all else, the book'smain virtue is its imaginative power, or specu-lative character. "Let us now sit and speculate,"Feibleman recommendson page 297 when deal-ing with an isolated problem which lacked em-pirical evidence for its solution. Although Fei-bleman explicitly eschews armchairphilosophyif empirical inquiries are possible and indeedholds that the social studies investigate meta-physical systems as empirical facts, the intrinsicbrilliance of his work stems from his talent forspeculation, a talent which, so rare in an age of

analysis, has courageously displayed itself innineteen books and countless articles, includingnovels, poems, dramas, memoirs, and a massiveOntology. To this already impressive literatureThe Institutions of Society is a creditable ad-dition.

ANDREWJ. RECK

Yale University

LOGIC WITHOUT METAPHYSICS AND OTHER Es-SAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. ByErnest Nagel. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956.Pp. xviii + 432. $6.00.

It is perhaps one of the consequences of theanalytical tradition in modern philosophy thatbooks have ceased to be books and have becomecollections of articles and reviews. In any case,this is true of Logic without Metaphysics. Itsfirst two-thirds are made up of a series of arti-cles which originally appeared elsewhere. Theycover a range of twenty years from the "Veri-fiability, Truth, and Verification"of 1934, the"Notes toward a Naturalistic Conception ofLogic" of 1935, and the long, descriptive "Im-pressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy







BOOK REVIEWS 143

in Europe" of 1936 to the "Symbolismand Sci-ence" of 1953 and the "Naturalism Reconsid-ered" which was the Presidential Address atBaltimore in 1954.

The last third of the work is a series of book

reviews appearingduring the forties and fiftiesin periodicals like the New Republic,the Nation,Partisan Review, the New Leader,and the Jour-nal of Philosophy. The reviews are generally ofworks-within or on the periphery of the phi-losophy of science-by figures like Jeans, Op-penheimer, Haldane, Langer, Hayek, MacIver,Cornforth, and Mumford. Although this list isheterogeneous, there is a certain Gibraltar-likequality in the attitude from which ProfessorNagel criticizes them. It is solid, judicious, emi-nently reasonable,and critical in a fashion which

almost never violates the rules of fair play. Itis an attitude which can detect merit betweenthe lines of the most extreme conservatism andeven in philosophicpositions uncongenialto thecritic, but its chief concern is to defend the ob-jectivity of science and the experimentaltemperof mind against the social critics of the left orthe mystics and intuitionists of the right. Noneof the reviews is individually important, butas a collection they do admirably exhibit thecritical intelligence at work.

The articles, dealing with more professionalmatters, also have a certain central focus. Theyare concerned with naturalismas a point of viewand with the defense of a naturalistic concep-tion of logic. They are also concerned with theproblem of truth and verifiability and of issuesgrowing out of the logical activity of analysisand formalization. Therefore beneath the sur-face are points of difficulty not specifically re-solved (and, I think, never completely facedeither) which spring from the fact that Nagel'soutlook has in the

two decadesin

which theseessays fall been framed with one eye on Deweyand the other on Carnap. Now, there are thosewho say that it is just these lenses which pro-vide perfect binocular vision; but it also seemsthe case that there are areas of experiencewhereto focus with both lenses is apt to make a manslightly cross-eyed. This is particularly true ofthe area of values. To be sure, none of the essaysis a direct assault upon this area, but there aremoments when even more theoretical questionsof method and the interpretation of scientific

objects suggest a certain latent uneasiness.All of the essays presented here have been

available for some time, and they have calledout discussion, attack, and defense. So they do

not require technical consideration here again.But I believe that their chief interest for thoseconcerned with contemporary philosophy liesless in their substance than in the insight whichthey provide about an attitude which has be-

come more vocal than most others in the lastfew years-an attitude which tries to combinethe logic of positivism with the naturalisticmetaphysics of pragmatism.Here Nagel is bothcandid and helpful. He has provided a ten-pageIntroduction which is exactly to the purpose.

Like many who came to intellectual maturitybetween the two wars, he professes a lack ofenthusiasm for the grand philosophical system,a keen interest in the critical method of thosetrained in mathematics and the physical sci-ences, and a concern for the fresh viewpoints

emergingin psychology and the social sciences.This, he says, led to a general perspective "un-abashedly naturalistic in content and empiricalin temper." The teachers were Morris Cohen,Dewey, Woodbridge. The great influentialnames included Peirce, Russell, and Santayana.To these influences came to be added that ofthe European positivists Carnap, Frank, andothers. Two problems particularly interestedNagel: the role and status of logical and mathe-matical propositions and the scope of the logic

of the natural sciences and its relation to moraland social problems. In the first case he adopteda position similar to that of Peirce and Deweyand unlike that of Poincare and Russell. In thesecond he saw no alternative to the use of themethods of natural science for the solution ofsocial problems.

In general, it can be said that Nagel's concernwith the first problem has been more fruitfulthan his interest in the second, and perhaps thisis due to the fact that the theory of inquirywhich he

owesto

Deweyis more successful in

dealing with speculative matters relating to theontological status of logical principles than it isin dealingwith the practical issues of social sci-ence and social policy. Nagel has contrasted"the use of the logic of natural science in a re-sponsible study of human affairs"with its alter-native of "impressionistic conjecture" or "therecourse to the authority of dogmatic tradition,"but he has dealt neither with the adequacyof theknowledge which the social sciences purport togive nor with the role which such knowledge

might play in the area of policy concerns. Itwould not be fair to chide Logic without Meta-physics for those essays which it omits, but theduality of interest suggested by its Introduction







144 ETHICS

is not borne out by a perusal of its majorcontents.

There are three questions which such a workleaves with its reviewer. Most of the pieces arecritical. This is to say not merely that they are

closely reasoned, but that they tend to assertwhatever positive doctrine is to be found in thecourse of a criticism of opposing views. Thereare some minds in which this is an inherentquality. But would not a volume affirmativelyconceived, controlled by the discipline of asingle unified argument, be the next fitting useof Nagel's enormous philosophic talent?

Also the heritage to which Nagel appeals isnot (as I have suggested) quite consistent. Onewould like to see him deal directly with the kindof disagreementwhich existed between Deweyand Reichenbach on such matters as the possi-bility of scientific valuation and the metaphysi-cal status of scientific objects. Would not suchan examination make unambiguously clear thepoints at which logical empiricism and pragma-tism can join hands or must part company?

Finally, a word about Nagel's value assump-tions as disclosedby a hasty content analysis ofhis rhetoric. His two pervasive adjectives are"mature"and "responsible."So he speaks con-stantly of "mature" evaluation and "mature"

philosophizing, and even more widely of "re-sponsible" discourse, "responsible" criticism,and "responsible"analysis. But one cannot helpbut notice that the method for securing an ex-actitude of responsibility is through the limita-tion of liability of the philosopher's role. Re-sponsibility becomes a function of the minuteclosure of the area of examination. But there isa difficulty here. For the commitments of a"mature" naturalism may be far broader thanthe limitations of "responsible" analysis, and

when this is the case is there not civil war insti-tuted between the analytical and the meta-physical instinct?

Nagel's head seems to lead him towardPeirceand Carnap, but one is left with the sneakingsuspicion that his heart is still in Abraham'sbosom with Cohen, Dewey, and Woodbridge.

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

Washington University

THE NEW CLASS. By Milovan Djilas. NewYork: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Pp. 214.

$3.95.

Milovan Djilas is a Montenegrin who seemsunacquainted with fear.

He was a Communist-one of the most pow-erful Communistleaders in Yugoslavia. He alsohappens to be a humane and principledindivid-

ual, a man whose moral convictions are invio-lable laws of personal behavior. He is equippedwith a sharp, critical, ironical intelligence. Thiscombination of qualities drove him down apath which led, through conspiracy, revolution,and power, into a Communistprison. They alsocaused him to write a book.

In this book he exposes with deadly accuracythe despotic ruthlessness of his former com-rades. He does more than expose, however.Djilas tries to understand Communist despot-ism, to see why it has achieved success where ithas, to determine the organizational enginewhich enables it to persist in the form that ittakes today, to forecast its future.

Djilas is liberal to the core. His most funda-mental political conviction is that there aredefinite limits to the power which any com-munal agency is entitled to exercise over a hu-man being. These limits define a man's rights.But, like John Locke, Djilas writes in the idiomof his political milieu. He writes in the idiomof the Marxist.

Djilas' basic argument is schematically sim-ple. He argues that there is an immutable law"that each human society and all individualsparticipatingin it strive to increase and perfectproduction."This law has a corollary: "No so-ciety or nation allows production to lag to suchan extent that its existence is threatened."Theprimacy of these convictions reflects the per-sistence of Marxist orientation, at least socio-logically.

Applying these assumed laws to the develop-

ment of communism, Djilas maintains that,contrary to orthodox Marxist beliefs, commu-nism could triumph only in industrially under-developed societies. He argues for this convic-tion in the following way.

Revolutionary Communists wish to changesociety in fundamentalways. That is, they wishto transform existing social relationships-mostparticularly, property relationships.Because ofthis, communism can gain the support onlyof those who are so discontented that theyare willing to risk anything to improve their

lot. Even in underdeveloped countries, theseamount to a small minority. In industrially de-veloped countries, decisive support of commu-nism is an impossibility because the basic in-





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