LETTER Farrakhan

8/6/2019 LETTER Farrakhan

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tort. . . . S. BELL TEL. & TEL. CO. v. HANFT, 436 So.2d 40, 42 (Fla.1983). ); CAPORICCI FOOTWEAR, LTD. v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.,894 F.Supp. 258 (E.D.Va. 1995) ( independent tort is one that isfactually bound to contractual breach but whose legal elements are distinct

from it. ); In re BOONE, 164 B.R. 167, 172 (S.D.Fla. 1994) ( To obtaintort recovery, there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of [the] breach of contract. AFM CORP. v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH CO., 515 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987) (citing LEWIS v.GUTHARTZ, 428 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1982). There exists such anindependent tort here. Under Florida law, the intentional and unjustifiable interference with contractual relations is actionable asa tort. See 32 Fla.Jur.2d, Interference, 2 (1981). Moreover, it isclear that the Banks interference with the Boon/Ulmer contract, atort, is distinguishable from and independent of its contract with theBoones. ( Emphasis mine ) ); and, where the Florida Attorney General hasallowed interference with the Petitioners ability to contract with Florida statecitizens collectively which was provided for in Article 1 of Floridas 1838Constitution Declaration of Rights and is a tort, this is distinguishable fromand independent of his breach of duty as a governmental trustee to thePetitioners.

Where the courts have found the federal government to be statutorytrustees of American Indians, they have ruled that the government is not

entitled to sovereign immunity. UNITED STATES v. WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE, 537 U.S. 465, 472-475, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d40 (2003). For state citizens pursuant to Article IV, 2, cl. 1 there is aconstitutional basis for stating government is our trustee and accountable tous as such at all times.

The consent of the Sovereign and the consent of the governed are relatedconcepts when examined in light of state citizenship. KAWANANAKOA v.POLYBLANK, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S.Ct. 526, 527 (1907) ( Some

doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereignpower from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been publicproperty since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. Asovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be nolegal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right


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consists of one person only and his successors, as a king or a bishop.Blackstone. ); state Sovereignty lies in its state citizens collectively, andthey bring into existence the body politic or political jurisdiction to exercisesovereignty in a representative capacity.

Where body politic is defined as a political corporation or body corporate,it stands to reason that it is synonymous with political jurisdiction; and,the political jurisdiction is where the actual administration of government isperformed; private citizens are not involved in the day-to-day activities of government whether they be administrative in nature or governmentalsovereign in nature; political jurisdiction within the meaning of all but one of the following cases is the administration of government by and through theexecutive branch of government in its representative capacity or even in itsproprietary capacity, FISHER v. MASTERS, 83 P.2d 212, 217, 59 Idaho

366 (1938) ( In KNIGHT v. TRIGG, 16 Idaho 256, 100 P. 1060, this courtsaid [page 1062]: The holding of elections is peculiarly and wholly amatter within the management and control of the political department of government. The word political, as used in this connection, has noreference to partisanship or political parties but rather to the control,management and operation of government. . . . ); WELLS v. HOUSING

AUTHORITY of CITY of WILMINGTON, 197 S.E. 693, 697, 213 N.C.744 (1938) ( The word municipal, as originally used in its strictness,applied to cities only, but the word now has a much more extended

meaning, and when applied to corporations the words political, municipal, and public are used interchangeably. ); LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. v. SUPERIOR COURT of L. A. COUNTY, 171 P.2d 21,24, 28 Cal.2d 481, 166 A.L.R. 701 (1946) ( [T]he interferenceproscribed by the statute is interference with political activities oraffiliations, and the test is not membership in or activities connected withany particular group or organization, but whether those activities are relatedto or connected with the orderly conduct of government and the peacefulorganization, regulation and administration of the government. ); AKIO

KUWAHARA v. ACHESON, 96 F.Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.Cal. 1951) ( InWebsters New International Dictionary (Unabridged), second edition, 1949,. . . the word political is defined as follows: Of or pertaining to polity, orpolitics, or the conduct of government, referring in the widest application tothe judicial, executive, and legislative branches; of or pertaining to, orincidental to, the exercise of the functions vested in those charged with theconduct of government; relating to the management of affairs of state....


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); DE-ANNEXATION of CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY, 102 P.3d 120,127-128, 2004 OK 60 (Okla. 2004), rehearing denied, ( In sum, forgovernmental action *128* to be political there must be (a) an issue of governing coupled with (b) a mandatory and final resolution by

nonjudicial means. ( Emphasis in original ) ), and even if political jurisdiction has a wider application than just to those who, in the conduct of government, execute the laws in contradistinction to those that make thelaws or those that judge what the law is, it should be clear that the termapplies to those who have been elected or appointed to conduct governmentas the peoples representatives and not to private citizens.

The constitutionsstate and federalare the peoples compacts ascovenants, but only as state citizens; these are our laws; and, statutesstate and federalare brought into existence by those of the political

jurisdiction for their own regulation, but only as public citizens; sometimesthe legislative body requires more specific regulation through theadministrative procedure act involving statutory authority and implementingregulations, UNITED STATES v. MERSKY, 361 U.S. 431, 437-438, 80S.Ct. 459, 463, 4 L.Ed.2d 423 (1960) ( Here the statute is not completeby itself, since it merely declares the range of its operation and leaves to itsprogeny the means to be utilized in the effectuation of its command. But itis the statute which creates the offense of the willful removal of the labels of origin and provides the punishment for violations. The regulations, on the

other hand, prescribe the identifying language of the label itself, and assignthe resulting tags to their respective geographical areas. Once promulgated,[361 U.S. 431, 438] these regulations, called for by the statute itself,have the force of law, and violations thereof incur criminal prosecutions, justas if all the details had been incorporated into the congressional language.The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are completewithout the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect,therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other. ); these are their laws; a constitutionstate or federalis the

supreme law of the land; its the will of the people in their original,sovereign, and unlimited capacity; statute law is the will of the legislature intheir derivative or subordinate capacity. RISON v. FARR, 24 Ark. 161, 87Am.Dec. 52, 55 (1865) ( Paterson, J., in VANHORNE v. DORRANCE, 2Dall. 308, in defining what a constitution is, says: It is the form of government delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certainfirst principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is


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certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land ; it is paramount to the legislature, . . . .

And in defining what legislatures are, the same learned judge says: Theyare creatures of the constitution; they owe their existence to theconstitution; they derive their powers from the constitution. It is theircommission, and therefore all their acts must be conformable to it, or elsethey will be void. The constitution is the work or will of the peoplethemselves in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity; law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative or

subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the creator, the other of the creature. ( Emphasis mine ) ).

This is what Justice Holmes is talking about in KAWANANAKOA v.

POLYBLANK, supra ; when those of the political jurisdiction violate theconstitutional rights (civil liberties) of private citizens of the common law jurisdiction, they have no sovereign immunity.

There is a lot of rhetoric in McDONALD v. CITY of CHICAGO, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010) to say that the Fourteenth Amendment wasnecessary to protect the black man with federal citizenship. This is all in thenature of a complete fabricationa lie.

All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every Stateand Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 42 U.S.C.A., 1982.-- Property Rights of Citizens.

(Codification of R.S. 1978 from Act April 9, 1866, c. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27.)

Congress has modified federal common law to give Negroes the sameproperty rights as white citizens which includes state citizenship. JONES v.

ALFRED H. MAYER CO., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 2189, 20L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968) ( We hold that 1982 bars all racialdiscrimination, private as well as public, in the [enjoyment of inheritableproperty rights], and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. (n. 5 omitted,and emphasis in original) ); CITY of MEMPHIS v. GREENE, 451 U.S. 100,


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120, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 1597, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981) ( To effectuate theremedial purposes of the statute, the Court has broadly construed thislanguage [the language of 1982 itself] to protect not merely theenforceability of property interests acquired by black citizens but also their

right to acquire and use property on an equal basis with white citizens. );UNITED STATES v. HARRIS, 106 U.S. 629, 640, 1 S.Ct. 601, 610, 27L.Ed. 290 (1883) ( 42 U.S.C.A., 1982 was enacted by virtue of the 13thAmendment. ); UNITED STATES v. MORRIS, 125 F. 322, 323 (D.C.Ark.1903) ( The power of Congress to enact such legislation must, therefore,be found in the thirteenth amendment, else it does not exist. That Congressassumed that its power was derived from that amendment, and not fromeither of the later amendments, is conclusively shown by the fact that at thetime this law was enacted, in 1866, neither the fourteenth nor fifteenthamendment had been ratified, or even submitted by Congress to theStates. . . . ); UNITED STATES v. BROWN, 49 F.3d 1162, 1167 (CA6,Tenn. 1995), rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, denial of habeas corpus affirmed, 62 F.3d 1418, certiorari denied, 516 U.S. 942, 116 S.Ct. 377, 133 L.Ed.2d 301 ( We agreewith GREER and OLZMAN that non-owners of property who neverthelesshave an interest in using or holding that property have a viable propertyinterest protected under Section 1982. ); and the fact that Congressenacted a statute for those of statutory jurisdiction makes it no less a causeof action that is unreliant on the Fourteenth Amendment for Michael L.Hodge claiming it has modified federal common law. MAHONE v.WADDLE, 564 F.2d 1018, 1033-1034 & n. 29 (CA3, Pa. 1977),certiorari denied, 438 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3122, 57 L.Ed.2d 1147( The genesis of [28 U.S.C.A.,] 1343(3) is not the 1871 Act but the 1866Act. . . . [T]he contention that 1981 (and 1982 which is also derivedfrom section 1 of the 1866 Act) create no cause of action is completelyforeclosed by the scores of adjudicated cases concerning 1981 (and 1982) causes of action. (Citations of n. 29 omitted). ); and 1982, as itmodifies federal common law, protects property rights as well as personalrights. KAO v. RED LION MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY, 381 F.Supp. 1163,1166 (M.D.Pa. 1974) ( While the due process clause of the fourteenthamendment and the Civil Rights Act protect property rights as well as

personal rights, LYNCH v. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP., 1972, 405 U.S.538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424; BOARD of REGENTS v. ROTH, 1972,408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; a trespass to property,


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negligent or intentional, is merely a common law tort and does not infringethe federal Constitution. (Citation omitted, and emphasis mine) );fourteenth amendment citizenship is a creature of the federal governmentand the courts cannot see citizenship as your personal property right in light

of it. The Fourteenth Amendment deserves to be struck down.Let me dare say that you might find Michael easier to talk to first because of past dealings he has had. He has been like a brother to me, and I wouldnever have gotten this far without him.

Over the years, there have been many books Ive enjoyed reading to learnwho the enemy ismy favorite being John Colemans COMMITTEE OF 300.Ive seen how the federal government and media vilify you. It tells me theenemy fears you. It is my heartfelt conviction that you have the inner

strength desperately needed in this controversy; it was my idea to make youa letter recipient.

Very Truly Yours,

J. Patrick Simpson

321-299-5773 (SU, MO, & TU are days off.)

Michael L. Hodges cell phone: 407-745-9449

LETTER Farrakhan

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