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NAT
O G
RA
PHIC
S ST
UD
IO 1
578-
97
LESSONSLEARNED
IN EACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS
LESSONSLEARNED
IN EACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS
Forewordto AHG Lessons Learned in
Peacekeeping operations
As witnessed by the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, peacekeeping has assumed a prominent place among NATO’s new missions after the end of the Cold War. Since 1992, peacekeeping has also been a subject for consultations with Partners in the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Group has become the principal forum for ex-changing views and sharing experiences among Allies and Partners in the field of peacekeeping.
In the course of its work, the Group has produced two detailed special reports on cooperation in peacekeeping, which are a unique example of a coherent and successful regional effort to develop common concepts of peacekeeping. The first report from 1993 - known as the «Athens Report - dealt with conceptual approaches to peacekeeping. A second report, the «Follow-On to the Athens Report» of 1995, revisited these issues in the light of experiences gained since 1993.
Drawing on the extensive peacekeeping experience of Group members, including in the
former Yugoslavia, the members of the Ad Hoc Group have completed the present compendium of «Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations». The paper reflects national experiences gained by Allied and Partner countries in areas such as the preparation, implementation and operations aspects of such operations. By exchanging national experiences, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) members aim to develop further common practical approaches to peacekeeping.
The common understanding and valuable lessons contained in the report bears witness to the utility of cooperation activities taking place within the framework of the EAPC. It also offers useful substance to our regular interchanges and cooperation with the UN, OSCE and other rele-vant organisations in the field of peacekeeping.
AmbassadorS.Balanzino DeputySecretaryGeneral ChairmanoftheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeeping
LESSONSLEARNED
INPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS
LESSONSLEARNED
INPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1 - 3
PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED
GroupI:Preparation
A. Planning 4 - 18
B. CoordinationAmongTroopContributingNations 19 - 21 andWithImplementingOrganisation
C. CoordinationAmongInstitutions 22 - 24 (includingHumanitarianAspectsandRefugees)
D. RoleofNeighbouringCountries 25 - 29
GroupII:Implementation
E. Civil-MilitaryRelations 30 - 35
F. PublicRelations 36 - 42
G. CommandandControl 43 - 46
GroupIII:Operations
H. CommunicationandInformationSystems 47 - 48
I. InformationandIntelligence 49 - 52
J. Logistics 53 - 61
K. MedicalSupport 62 - 71
L. Training 72 - 80
M. PersonnelandAdministration 81
N. FinancialAspects 82 - 87
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS �
INTRODUCTION
1TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekee-
pingwasestablishedwithintheframeworkofNACCin1993.TheaimoftheGroupistodevelopacommonunderstandingofthepoliticalprinciplesofandthetoolsforpeacekeeping,andtoshareexperienceandtherebydevelopcommonpracticalapproachesandcooperationinsup-portofpeacekeepingundertheresponsibilityoftheUNortheOSCE.Sinceitsinception,theGrouphasprovidedavaluableforumforcomparingnationalexperiencesandlearninglessonsarisingfromourparticipationinpeacekeepingoperations. TheGrouppresentedMinisterswithaninitialreportattheirAthensMeetingon11thJune1993,andsupplementedthiswithaFollow-Onreport,reflectinglessonslearnedinmorerecentoperations,inDecember1995.
2TheAthensReportanditsFollow-Oncollectively
provideagoodbasisforacommonunderstandingofthepoliticalprinciplesinvolvedinpea-cekeeping.TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeepinghasnowtakenitsworkonestepfurther,withtheaimofdevelopingcommonpracticalapproachestopeacekeeping,whichwasalsoidentifiedasanobjectiveinthe1993AthensReport.Thiscurrentpaperrepresentsacompendiumofpracticalnationalexperiencesinrecentpeacekeepingoperations,principally(butnotexclusively)intheformerYugoslavia.
3 Incarryingout thisexercise, theAdHocGroup
onCooperationinPeacekeepingnotedtheimportanceofcontinuingclosecooperationandregularinterchangeswiththerelevantelementsoftheUNandtheOSCE,toensurethatlessonslearnedaregiventhewidestpossibledistribution.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS �
PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED
GROUP I Preparation
A. Planning
GENERALEXPERIENCES
4Unityofeffortofallcomponentsofanoperation,
aswellascooperationamongallrelevantbodiesinthefield,mustbeestablishedfromthebeginningofamissionandmustbeforeseenintheplanningprocess.ThestrategiclevelHea-dquarters(HQ)shoulddevelopthedirectionandconceptofoperations,andcoordinatetheinitialgenerationofforces.Inparallel,acoordinatedmissionplanshouldbepreparedattheoperationallevel.ThisshouldideallybecoordinatedunderaMissionHeaddrawingtogetherallmissioncomponents,includingallocationoftasksandprioritiesandlogisticaspects.TimemustbeallowedfortheproperformationofthemissionHQbeforedeployment.
5Planningapeacekeepingoperationshouldnotbe
conductedinisolation,andplannersshouldinparticularbeawareofthepossibleimpactoftheiractivityonpublicopinion.Planningfora«worst-case»scenariohasproventobethebestprerequisiteforasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperation.Plannersmusttakeintoaccountandcoordinateallelementsofthemissionwithaviewtoachievingitsoverallobjective.Allrelevantactors,includingtheForceCommander,mustbeinvolvedinthejointandcombinedmilitaryandcivilianplanningprocessfromtheearlieststage.Reinforcedandimprovedmechanismsofcoordinationshouldbedevelopedbetweentheinternationalorganisationimplementingtheoperationandallpotentialcontributors.Forexample,allpotentialcontributorsshouldbeinformedoftheexpectedforcerequirementsatanearlystage.Moreover,theconceptofope-rationsshouldreflecttothemaximumpossibleextenttheviewsofpotentialcontributors.Tothisend,earlyconsultationswithcontributors,andwheneverpossible,theiractiveparticipationindevelopingtheconceptoftheoperation,isdesirable.Planningshouldalsocoverrotation(amaximumofsixmonthshasbeensuggested),reinforcement,redeploymentandwithdrawaloftheforces.Acomprehensiveexitstrategyisanimportantaspectofthisplanning.
� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
6Itisimportanttopursueeffortstoinitiatetheplan-
ningprocessinatimelyfashionandtodevelopitonthebasisofastep-by-stepapproach.Inthisregard,plannersalwayshavetokeepinmindthatthepoliticaldecisiontocontributemaycomelate;therefore,contingencyplanningmustbeinitiatedlongbeforethisdecisionistaken.Inviewofthis,itisalsoessentialtodevelopacapacitytoreactquickly.Accordingly,somefeelthatitmaybeusefulfornationstoworkonthebasisofstandbyforces,includingpreparedunitsformedwithpre-selectedpersonnel.
7SomenationsfeelthatUNstandbyarrangements
constituteakeytoenhancedefficiencyofpeacekeepingandamoreexpedientdeploymentofmultifunctionaloperations.InthiscontextsomenationsnotedthattheStandbyForcePlanningInitiativeisavaluablestrategicplanningtool,providingtheUNwithasoundknowledgeofmilitarycapabilitiesandasanindicatorofthepotentialavailabilityofforces.Anotherpro-posalistoplanandpreparedifferentpackagesofpossiblenationaltroopcontributionsandestablishandupdateadatabaseasapossiblesupportforfuturemissions,bypreparingsomekindofstandardcontributionplan.Thenextstepwouldbetodevelopanunderstandingofthepoliticalcriteriaappliedbypotentialcontributorsbeforecontributingpersonnel.
8Afrequentlyneglectedaspectof theoperational
conceptrelatestohumanitarianassistanceanditsimplications.Especiallyinrecentpeacekee-pingoperationsofamultifunctionalnature,themilitarycomponenthasoftenbeenrequestedtoprovideadditionalprotectionandcarryoutpeace-buildingactivitiesotherthanthoseexpli-citlydesignatedinthemandate.Themore«non-militaryservices»anticipatedbythemilitary,themoreadditionalresourcesarenecessarybeyondatraditionalTableofOrganisationandEquipment(TOE).SomefeelthatUNmultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperationsareparticularlywell-suitedtoensureaflexibleresponsetothechangingsituationwithinaconflictarea,toensureeven-handednessindealingwiththepartiestotheconflictand,aboveall,tominimise,ifnottoavert,thethreatofciviliancasualties,destructionofinfrastructureofacorrespondingstateandemergenceofaconsiderablenumberof«attendant»problems(includingrefugees,provisionofhumanitarianandtechnicalassistanceandde-mining).
9Theconceptoftheleadnation,wherebyonena-
tionestablishestheorganisationalcoreoftheoperationuntilotherforcesbecomeavailable,hasproventobefeasibleforcontributorsofsmallercontingentsandseemstobeapracticalarrangementforthefuture.Thecaseofthe«BELUGA»formationwithinIFOR,isoneexam-pleofthesuccessfulapplicationofthe«leadnation»concept.Onlythroughrapidreactionfromnationsthatarewillingtoprovidethenecessaryresources,cantheleadnationconceptbeefficient.Nationsprovidingforcesattheearlystagesofamission(socalled«vanguard»forces)maywishforearlywithdrawaloftheseforcesoncethemainbodyisinplace.OnepossibilitywouldbetosendthepreliminaryandpreformedHQtotheprospectivemissionareainadvanceoftheactualmandatingoftheoperation,inordertoensurespeedyandrealisticplanningandtofacilitateanefficientdeploymentoftheforcesintheareaofoperation.Ingeneral,unitsassignedtothemissionshouldbeequippedfromthebeginningsoastoensurethesafetyandeffectivenessofpersonnel.Whenappropriate,personnelandkeyequipmentshouldbedeployedbyair,ifpossibleusingstrategicairliftcapabilities.Tacticalairliftcapabilitymustalsobemaintainedin-theatre.
10Ifacompositenationalormultinationalunitisto
bedeployed,thedesignatedcommandershouldtakepartintheplanningforandformationoftheunit.Itwouldalsobeusefultoestablishacoordinatinggroup,comprisingrepresentativesfromthenationsinvolved,todeveloptheorganisationandoverseetheformationoftheunit,coordinateplanningandpolicyandsolveanyproblemsthatmayariseduringdeployment.Suchacoordinatinggroupshouldmeetatregularintervals.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS �
11Itisimportantthatunitsinthefieldbeatthere-
quired levelof interoperability;asan importantprecondition,nationalCrisisManagementCentres,andthatoftheimplementingorganisation,shoulddevelopacapabilityofoperatingtogether,onthebasisofcommonstandardstobedevelopedinthelightofexperienceinamission.OperationJointEndeavouroffersusefulmaterialonwhichtodrawtoimproveinte-roperabilityatthislevel.
12Planninghastocontinueinthemissionarea.The
ForceCommander should takeaccountof significantpolitical,humanitarian,militaryandenvironmentalconsiderationsinselectinglocationsforunits.Theresultsofeachphaseofanoperationshouldbeevaluatedinlightoftheoperation’soverallpolitical-militaryplan.Eachsuccessivephaseshouldonlybestartedwhenthesuccessfulimplementationoftheprecedingstageisachieved,asthiswillhaveanimportantimpactonthecontinuedsuccessofthemis-sion.AllplanningmustbedirectedtowardsachievingthefinalgoalofthemissionasdefinedintheMandate.
13Thesafetyandsecurityofpeacekeepingpersonnel
continuestobeofseriousconcern.Inrecentyearstheinternationalcommunityhaswitnesseddangerousactsofviolenceagainstpeacekeepersbeingtakenhostageandusedasa«humanshield».Thecontinuinguseoffirearms,inparticularsnipersbythepartiestoaconflictagainstthepersonnelofapeacekeepingforceremainsamatterofseriousconcern.Thewidespreaduseofmines,inparticularanti-personnelmines,inareasofpeacekeepingoperationsalsoposesimpedimentstothesafetyofpeacekeepingpersonnel.
14Therefore the security of personnel must be an
integralpartof theplanningofanypeacekeepingoperation. Allappropriatemeasures, inconformitywiththeUNCharterandwithintheagreedmandate,shouldbetakenbytherelevantinternationalorganisationsandtheirMemberStatestoensurethesecurityofpeacekeepers.SomedelegationsnotedthattheearlyentryintoforceoftheConventionontheSafetyofUNPeacekeepingandAssociatedPersonneladoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyResolution49/59of9thDecember1994wouldbeastepforwardinthisdirection.
15De-miningoperationsshouldbe,wheneverappro-
priate,animportantelementandanintegralpartofpeacekeepingoperations.
IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES
16IFOR experience has shown that the planners’
ability to influenceeventsduringearlypreparationof themission, throughdirectcontactswithnegotiatorsinvolvedinthePeacePlanprocess,helpedtoavoidproblemsencounteredbyUNPROFOR(mainlybecausethiswasnotbasedonapeaceagreement)andtoensureacleardefinitionofmilitarytasksunderaunifiedchainofcommand.Theintegrationof15PfPandfourothernon-NATOnationsunderaunifiedcommandandcontrolhasbeenamajorsuccess,buildingonexperiencefromthePfPprogrammeandbasedoninnovativecommandandcontrolarrangementsatalllevels.Moreover,mostnationsbelievethatIFOR’smilitarysuccessderivedtoalargeextentfrompreformed,provencommandstructuresandlogisticsystemsandfromlong-termcontingencyplanningcarriedoutatNATO.
10 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
17InthecaseofIFOR,militaryplanninghadtotake
placeaheadofcivilianplanning,sincethesamedegreeofadvanceplanningandorganisationdidnotexistonthecivilside.ItwasthereforedifficultforIFORtoplaninatimelyfashionitssecondarytasksofsupportingcivilimplementation.Thereisaneed,priortopeacekeepingoperations,toensureabetterunderstandingoftheroles,operationalconceptsandcapabilitiesofthecivilorganisationslikelytobeparticipating.Atthesametimecontactsandexercisesinvolvingboththemilitaryandcivilorganisationsshouldbeencouraged.
18TheIFORoperationhasshowedtheneedtoaddress
theissuesofimprovedmechanismsfortheearlyinvolvementofTroopContributingNations(TCNs)intheplanning,preparation,commandstructure,aswellastheirparticipationinthepoliticaloversightanddecision-makingproceduresinoperationstowhichtheycontribute.ThereisroomforimprovingtheamountofinformationprovidedbytheTCNsincertainareas.Forinstance,ithasbeenpointedoutthattherecouldhavebeenabettercoordinationwithinIFORconcerningevacuationplans.Thesameapplieswithregardtodecisionstakenbytheimplementingorganisation,whichcouldhaveanimpactonthesecurityofcontingentspro-videdbyTCNs.
B. Coordination Among Troop-Contributing Nations and With Mandating and Implementing Organisations
19Nationsconfirmtheimportancetheyattachtode-
velopingmechanismsforholdingconsultationsandexchanginginformationwithTCNs.TheUNSecurityCouncil,inparticular,hasconvenedmeetingsofitsmembers,TCNsandtheUNSecretariattofacilitateexchangeofinformationandviewsbeforedecidingtoextend,termi-nate,orsubstantiallymodifythemandateofspecificpeacekeepingoperations.MeetingswithTCNsareplannedandheldbothonaregularandanadhocbasiswhentheSecurityCouncilenvisagestheestablishmentofanewpeacekeepingoperation.SeveralcountriesargueformoreeffectivearrangementsandmechanismsforconsultationbetweentheUNSecurityCouncil,theSecretariatandTCNsinplanningaswellasincommandandcontrolofpeacekeepingoperations.Theypointoutthatconfusionandseriousproblemscouldoccurwhenforcesactonnationalcommand.Nationshavehighlightedtheneedforintensiveconsultations,beforetheadoptionofamandate,withallcountriescapableofandwillingtocontributetoparticularoperations.Asafirststep,itwouldbeimportanttodevelopamorestructuredinvolvementofTCNsintheprocessofformulationofmandatesbytheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC).Infact,thereisaneedtofurtherinstitutionalisetheconsultationsbetweentheUNSCandTCNsonpeacekeepingmandates.Inthecaseofapeacekeepingoperationwhereconsentofthehostcountryisrequired,itmayalsobebeneficialtoinvolvethehostcountryinthepreliminarystageofconsultations.Withinamultinationaloperation,contributorsshouldhavetheoppor-tunitytoparticipateintheprimarydecision-makingprocess,thuscontributingtothepoliticalguidanceforthemilitarycommandoftheoperation.
20Asasecondstep,MemorandaofUnderstanding
(MoUs)shouldideallybeconcludedamongTCNsinthepreparatoryphaseoftheoperation.Whereappropriate,TCN liaisonofficers shouldbe sent to the staffplanninganoperationand,asappropriate, toother troop-contributingnations. It isalsonecessarytoimplementa standardised planning process (phased and timed, including fact-finding and advancedpartymechanisms)involvingnationalstaffofficerstobeassignedtothefuturePeacekeepingHeadquarters.ThispreliminaryHQstaffcanserveasareferenceteamfortroop-contributingnationsinthenationalplanningprocess.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 11
21TCNsshouldbeconsultedpriortochangesinthe
mandatecausedbyasignificantevolutionofthesituationinthefield.Theyshouldbeofferedachoicebetweenreconsideringtheirparticipationandroleintheupdatedmissionandrea-djustingthecomposition,equipmentandleveloftrainingoftheirforces,forthemtobeabletocontinuetocarryouttheirmissioneffectively.Somebelievethatchangestothemandatesandtothesubsequentroleofthedeployedtroopsshouldnotbecarriedoutuntilthetroopsarereadytoadjusttheirroleonthegroundinthemissionarea.Insomecases,ashappenedwithBosnia-Herzegovina,itmaybenecessarytomodifythenatureandtheobjectivesofanoperation:ifthechangeissignificantenough,amodificationofthemandatewouldnotbesufficient,butanentirelynewoperationshouldbedeployed,onthebasisofacompletelynewmandate.
C. Coordination Among Institutions (Including Humanitarian Aspects and Refugees)
22Asanimportantpreconditionforeffectivecoope-
ration,thereis,inthefirstplace,aneedforaclearandefficientallocationoftasksamongthevariousorganisationsinvolvedintheimplementationofdifferentaspectsofapeaceplan.Mostoftoday’sconflictsareinternal,foughtnotonlybyregulararmiesbutalsobyirregularforces.Civiliansarethemainvictims,andhumanitarianemergenciesarecommonplace.Stateinstitutionshaveoftencollapsed.Thismeansthatinternationalinvolvementmustoftenextendbeyondtraditionalpeacekeeping.Therefore,cooperationbetweenthemandatingorganisation,regionalandcivilianorganisations,troop-contributingnationsandnon-governmentalagencies(NGOs)shouldbeinitiatedattheearliestpossiblemomentofthemissionplanningstageandmaintainedthroughoutthedurationofthemission.Thisdoesnotmeanthatapeacekeepingoperationcanreplacestateinstitutions.Incomplex,multi-dimensionalpeacekeepingopera-tions,theassistanceprovidedtothepopulationbyinternationalandnon-governmentalhuma-nitarianorganisationssuchastheRedCrossisakeyelementtothesettlementoftheconflict.Successofthemissionoftenhingesontheabilitytofulfilnon-militarytasks.Internationalandnon-governmentalorganisationsshouldcooperatewithinanagreedcoordinationarrangement.Ataminimum,closeliaisonbetweenthevariousorganisationsshouldbeassuredwiththemaintenanceofcoordination-liaisoncells.
23Particularlyinthecaseofpeacekeepingoperations
ofamultifunctionalnature,itisessentialtodefinefromtheoutsetthevariousagenciesandorganisations involved in the implementationofelementsof themandateand toestablishappropriateworkingrelationshipswiththem.RelationsbetweenthepeacekeepingforceandtheUN,inthecaseofoperationscarriedoutunderaUNSCResolution,areofspecialim-portance.RelationswiththeUNandotherorganisationsshouldideallycoverthefollowingareas:coordinationandcooperation,suchassupportandresourcesharingandassistance;proceduresforreimbursementandpropertytransfers;informationexchange,liaison,mediationandnegotiation;andcommonplanningandintegratedexecution.Intheviewofsomenations,experiencesinUNPROFORandinSomaliasuggestthatthehumanitariantaskswithinamulti-functionalpeacekeepingoperationshouldbeprimarilycarriedoutbyspecialisedhumanitarianorganisations (includingWHO, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP, ICRC), operationally autonomousfromthemilitary,undergeneralpoliticalguidanceand,whenevernecessary,coordinationbytheUN.Inthiscontext,thedevelopmentofaninternationalarrangementgoverningbasicprinciplesofcooperationandinteractionbetweentheUNandregionalorganisationsinvolvedinpeacekeepinghasbeensuggested.
12 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
24An important lesson learned from IFOR is that
permanent liaison arrangements should be established with other international bodies intheatre,includingrepresentativesofthemandatingbodyandotherorganisationschargedwithimplementingvariousaspectsofthemandate.
D. Role of Neighbouring Countries
25Acountryneighbouring a crisis areahas a vital
interestintheearliestpossibleeffectivesolutionofthecrisisandintherestorationofpeace.Therefore,neighbouringcountriesshouldfacilitatethesuccessfulconductofpeacekeepingoperationsandrefrainfromkindlinginter-ethnic,inter-confessionalandotherdifferencesinthecrisisareaaswellasfromencouragingseparatistandnationalistgroups,movementsandoppositionfactionsstrivingtoprovokeasplit insocietyandthebreakdownofthestate.Aparticularlydelicatesituationarisesforaneighbouringcountrywhichhasasignificantnationalminorityinthecrisisareaitself.Suchasituationmightservetolimititsfreedomofaction,inviewoftheimpactthatcertaindecisionsmighthaveonthenationalminorityinquestion.
26Countriesneighbouringareasofcrisisplayanim-
portantroleinpeacekeepingoperations,beyondservingaszonesoftransitforpersonnelandmaterial.Incomplexoperationssuchas«DenyFlight»,«SharpGuard»and«JointEndeavour»,andforactioninvolvingtheuseofpower,neighbouringcountriesfunctionasadvancedbasesofoperationalandlogisticstructures.Theyalsoprovideservices,withoutwhichtheoperationswouldbeexcessivelycostlyorevenimpossibletocarryout.Theycanalsoprovidetemporarysupportandaccommodationforrefugees.OnelessonfromtheformerYugoslaviaisthatabroa-derareacouldbeaffectedbyacrisis.Inparticular,theeconomiesofneighbouringcountriescanbenegativelyaffectedbytheimplementationofUN-mandatedsanctions.
27InthecaseoftheIFORoperationtheavailability
ofportsandairportsnearthecrisisareaprovedtobeofcrucialimportanceinmaintainingconstant,precisecontroloverairandmaritimespace,whetheritbeforbanningflightsorenfor-cinganarmsembargo,orforairoperationsinsupportoftheunitsonthegroundandensuringcompliancewithaheavyweapons-exclusionzone.Theuseofportsandairportsnecessitatesaseriesofstructuresandserviceswhichinturnrequirestheuseoflocalinfrastructure.Theuseofthesestructurescanhaveaconsiderableandlastingimpactonsocialandeconomicconditions,withresultingburdensofvarioustypesfortheneighbouringcountry.
28Inaddition,theneighbouringcountry’sresponsibi-
litiessometimesinvolvetheadoptionoftechnicalandlegalmeasuresrelatedtothetransitandstationingonitsterritoryofarmedpersonnel,aswellasadministrativemeasuresformanagingtheservicesrequiredforthepresenceofforeignforces,theprovisionofinformationactivityandtheavailabilityofliaisonpersonnel.Therecouldalsobevariousburdensderivingfromtheexposuretopossibleretaliatoryactionsbythewarringfactions.
29InthecaseofthecrisisintheformerYugoslavia,
neighbouringcountriessufferedconsiderableburdens.Duringtheperiodofarmedconflict,neighbouringcountrieshadtomakeeveryeffortpossibleinordertoisolateandcontainthewar,andhadtoreckonwitharmedgroupsandairstrikesspillingover.Thus,theyhadtoputtheirarmedforcesonacertainstateofalert.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 13
GROUP IIImplementation
E. Civil-Military Relations
GENERALEXPERIENCES
30Fullintegrationofallthoseinvolvedinanoperation
withmultifunctionalaspectsisoftendifficulttoachieveduetothemanyplayersinanytheatreofoperations,althoughaMissionHeadattunedtobothcivilandmilitarycultureswouldgreatlyassistincoordinationandintegration.Intheviewofsomenations,aCivil-MilitaryOperationsCentreisthebestwaytoensurecoordinationandintegration.Interdisciplinarycooperationandahierarchicalstructurearenotmutuallyexclusive.Forinstance,thereshouldbeveryclosecooperationbetweenthemilitaryandcivilianpolicecomponentsofapeacekeepingoperation.Moreover,themilitaryshouldnotbegivenpolicetasksforwhichtheyhavenotbeentrained.
31Also important is coordination at the level of
missionheadquarters.Thiscoordinationshouldideallyberegulatedintheframeworkofa«relationmanagementplan»,whichmaybecoordinatedbytheofficeoftheMissionHeadortheForceCommanderand/orfacilitatedbyanad-hocworkinggroupcomprisingthevariouscomponentsinthemissionarea.ItcouldbeadvantageoustodespatchanationalliaisonteamtotheUNHeadquartersinthemissionareaatanearlystageinordertopreparethedeploymentandfacilitatethearrivalofthetroops.
32Non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)canoffer
apositiveandimportantcontributiontopeacekeepingoperations;however,theirpresencecanalsomakeoperationsmorecomplex.Inprinciple,theconsentofthepartiestotheiractivitiesisdesirable.Non-governmentalorganisationsvaryfromthelargerinternationalagenciesandassociationsdowntosmallcharities,othergroupsorevenindividualswhomaylackexpe-rience,preparationandorganisation.Civiliansmaylackunderstandingofwhatthemilitaryisdoing,andvice-versa.BothmilitaryandcivilianorganisationsshouldconsiderhowbesttoavoidmisunderstandingsandhowtoestablishaworkablestructurecapableofcoordinatingtherequirementsbothofmilitaryandNGOstomutualadvantage.ACivil-MilitaryOperationsCentreshouldhandlein-theatrecoordinationandsupportissueswithnon-governmentalandprivatevoluntaryorganisations.
IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES
33ExperienceswithinUNPROFORand IFORhave
shownthateffectivecooperationintheatrebetweenthemandatingorganisationandimplemen-tingnations/authoritiesiscrucial,butthatitisdifficulttomakeitaspermanentandsystematicasitshouldbe.Infact,itisnotalwayseasytoestablisheffectivemechanismsofcooperationandcoordination,partlyinviewofthedifferentrolesandperceptionsoftheissuesandthetasks,partlybecauseofthedifferentproceduresadopted.
34SomeaspectsoftherelationshipbetweentheUN
andIFORworkedbetterthanothers.Relationsattheseniorlevelhavebeendescribedbythe
1� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
UNasverygoodandsupportprovidedtotheUNthroughcivil-militarycooperation(CIMIC)hasbeendeemedexcellent.AnexcellentrelationshiphasalsodevelopedbetweenIFORandtheOSCEmission,aswellaswiththeInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF).Butinthelattercase,ithasbeennotedthatthereisroomforimprovingcommunications(compatibleequip-mentislacking)andcollaboration,especiallyinhigh-riskareas.
35Onelessonlearnedfrompeacekeepingexperience
isthatcivilianpolicehavefrequentlyplayedanimportantrole.Thereis,therefore,aneedtoensureclosecoordinationbetweenmilitarypeacekeepingforcesandunarmedcivilpoliceadvisors. ThisreflectsthefactthatsomeofthemostdifficultproblemsfacedbyIFOR,forexample,relatednottoitsprimarytaskofensuringmilitarycompliance,buttodealingwithcivildisturbances.Thiswasparticularlytrueduringelections.TheexperienceofIFORindealingwithpublicdisturbancesishighlyrelevantandmeritsfurtherconsideration.
F. Public Relations
36Inaddressinglessonslearnedfrompeacekeeping
operations,oneshouldnotunderestimatetheimportanceofrelationswithlocalauthoritiesandthelocalpopulation,aswellaswiththemedia,whichallrequirecarefulyetdifferentia-tedhandling.Jointcommissions,whichincludepartiestotheconflict,governmentofficials,representativesfromthepeacekeepingforceand,asrequired,non-governmentalorganisationsoperatingintheareaofconflict,areusefulbodiesinthisrespect.
37Bearing inmind the large interest shownby the
media in recentpeacekeepingoperations, relationswithmedia representatives,aswellasasound,pro-activepublicinformationpolicy,areofcrucialimportance.Suchapolicyhastwokeyaudiences:thefirstiseitheratroop-contributingstateoranotherstateclosetothemissionareaorwithaspecificinterest,suchassharedethnicorculturalroots;thesecondisthecountryreceivingthemission.Themessagebeinggiventobothaudiencesmustbeclearandconsistentandlinkedtothemission’sobjectives.Aninformationpolicymaybereinforcedin-theatrebya«heartsandminds»campaign.InoperationJointEndeavour,thePsychologicalOperationsTaskForcewasassignedprimaryresponsibilityforcommunicatingwiththeBosnianpeople,whilethePublicInformationTeamcommunicatedwiththemassmedia-domesticandinternational.TheroleofpsychologicaloperationsintheIFORandSFORoperationsistodevelopandmaintaintheconsentofthelocalpopulationtothepresenceoftheForce,todiscourageinterferencewiththepeacekeepingoperation,andtoassess,reportandcounterpropagandadirectedtowardstheforce.
38In course of preparations for theoperation, it is
highlyadvisabletoworkout-onthebasisofthemandate-aplanofinformationalcoverage,atleastingeneralterms,aswellastoformulatemethodologyforitsimplementation,inclu-ding:
- personnelrequired;- informationmaterials;- independentchannelsfordistribution.
Theneedforflexibilitytoadjustplanstoeventsshouldberecognised.
39TheinformationsupportofPKOsshouldbebased
onaninformationpolicyofthehigheststandardsofconsistency,honestyandtransparency.The
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1�
specialnatureofactivitiesconductedwhenpreparingtheoperation,andtheneedtopreventtheleakageofsensitiveinformationthroughthemassmedia,shouldbetakenintoaccount.Even-handedandnon-provocativepresentationandinterpretationofeventswillbeimportant.
40ThelessonslearnedfromIFOR’sinformationpolicy
suggestthatearlydeploymentofresourcesinthisrespectwouldbeverybeneficial.Whenthepersonnelinchargeofrelationswiththepressactuallyarrivedin-theatre,theabilityofCommanderstoconveytothepressanaccurateappreciationoftheobjectivesandtasksofthemissionwasimproved.Mediaunderstandingofthechallengesofmissionimplementationroseaswell.Furthermore,theuseofmasscommunicationsmediabythepeacekeepingforcecansignificantlycontributetocounteringfactionalpropagandaandprovidingthepopulationwithasourceofunbiasednews.Theuseofradiocommunicationcanbeparticularlyimportantinsecuringthesuccessfuloutcomeofapeacekeepingoperation.Theadvantageoftheradioisthatitcanreachalargeraudiencethananyothermedia.Inaddition,itdoesnotdependonelectricitysupplies,itcannotbecensored,anditisimmediateandprecise.
41Electronic information exchange and handling,
both internal and external, directed towards the public and international media must beorganised,institutionalised,andprepared.Personnelmustbeproperlytrained.Computerequipment,networklinkageandhandlingskills,aswellasdatamanagement,willberequiredtomeetagrowingdemandforinformation.
42Relationswiththelocalpopulationareparticularly
importantforthesuccessofapeacekeepingmission.Theserelationsshouldbebasedontheimpartialityoftheforces,even-handednessindealingwiththelocalpopulation,onagoodknowledgeoftheculture,localcircumstancesandthepoliticalandeconomicsituationoftheregion,aswellasontheabilitytocommunicatedirectly.Beyondthenormalstabilisingeffectofestablishedpeacekeepingtasks,arethosesuchasthedistributionofhumanitarianaidandthecontributiontotherestorationofthecountry’sinfrastructure,whichmayinthemselvesbeapartofthemission.Theuseofmissionassets(suchasconstructionengineersormedicalresources)forappropriatelocalprojectswillalsocontributetobuildinggoodrelationswiththelocalpopulationandauthorities.
G. Command and Control
43An important prerequisite for successful peace-
keepingoperations, in theviewofsomenations, lies in theprovisionofstrategicpoliticalleadershipin,andcontrolover,operationsonthepartoftheSecurityCouncil.TheForceCommandershouldbecarefultoobservethegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofpeacekeeping,includingthoserelatingtocommandandcontrol.
44Command and control arrangements should be
clearlydefinedandagreedbeforethedeployment.Itisnecessarytoestablishresponsibilitiesatalllevelsinthecommandstructure;toclarifyproceduresandworkingrelationswithinthemission;andtoestablishcommunicationsproceduresandotherlogisticsupportcompatiblewiththeneedsofthemission.Commandandcontrolarrangementsshouldincludethemeansforcommunicatingwithliaisonteamstheorganisationofsuchteams,andtheselectionofheadquarterselementswithwhichliaisonisrequired.
1� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
45Duringthemission,theForceCommandershould
makethemosteffectiveuseoftheinternationalunitsathisdisposal,withinthelimitsofthemission’smandate.Boththecivilandmilitaryelementsoftheoperationmustbecoordinatedthroughoutthecommandstructure,andcommandandcontrolmustberesponsiveandflexible,withauthoritydelegatedtothemostappropriatecommandlevel.Provisionsshouldbemadetoallownon-governmentalandprivateorganisationsaccesstocommunications.
46Animportantlessonlearnedfrompeacekeepingis
that,forUN-ledoperations,theUNchainofcommandmustberespectedbyTCNs.Ifnatio-naldirectivesmakeitnecessaryforacontingentcommandertodeviatefromthisprinciple,hissuperiorintheUNchainofcommandshouldbeinformedimmediately.Foritspart,theUNshouldkeepTNCsthoroughlyandpromptlyinformedaboutthesituationinthemissionarea.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1�
GROUP IIIOperations
H. Communication and Information Systems
47Communication and Information Systems (CIS)
supportwithin theareaofoperationand from theMissionHeadquarters tohigher levelsofcommandsneeds tobecarefullyplannedprior todeploymentof forces. TheobjectiveshouldbetoachieveinteroperabilityofCISusedbytheorganisationleadingtheoperationandbetweenthoseusedbyTCNs.Thereisarequirementforstandardisationpertainingtotheleveloftechnicalinteroperabilityandtothelevelofcommonalityofoperatingandreportingproceduresused.
48CoordinationwithTCNs,interoperabilitytestingof
CISandtrainingofoperatingprocedurespriortodeploymentwillassistseamlessinformationflowduringtheoperation.Regardingspecificlessons,somenationsfeelthat:
- In-theatreCISshouldbecentrallymanagedbytheTheatreHQCISSupportCell;- CivilandmilitaryelementsoftheForceshouldnotusetheHostNations’telecom-
municationsinfrastructureasaprimarymeansofcommunication;- TheForcemustcontrolitsownCIS;- ThetacticalcommunicationsshouldbebasedonVHFCombatNetRadiosasprimary
meansofthegeographicareatobecoverediftheterraindoesnotdictatetheuseofothermeanssuchasTacticalSATCOM(TACSAT);
- HFCombatNetRadiosmaybeusedasback-upsystems.ThelinkstothehomecountriesofTCNsmaybebasedonINMARSAT;
- Encryptionequipmentwouldbeuseful;- Diplomaticmailshouldbeusedtotheextentpossible;- TheGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)isaveryusefultooltoestablishcommunica-
tionswithitinerantelements inareaswithinsufficientroadsandcommunicationfacilities.
I. Information and Intelligence
49Historical, political, and ethnographic factors
shouldbetakenintoaccountbeforethedeploymentofpeacekeepingforcesfromonenationintoanother.Inthiscontext,recentdevelopmentswithintheUNareinstructive.ASituationCentrewasestablishedunder theUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) in1993.WithintheSituationCentre,aninformationandresearchunitreceives,processesandanalysesinformationgatheredfromcurrentfieldoperations.Inaddition,theUnitmonitorsdevelopmentsinotherareaswithaviewtopossiblefuturedeployments.Oneusefulmeansofobtaininginformationaboutacrisisareapriortotheagreementonamandateforapea-cekeepingoperationisthedispatchoffact-findingmissionsandcommissionstoinvestigatedisputesandsituations,aswellasmissionsofaspecialenvoyoftheUNSecretaryGeneralforthesepurposes.Thesearesentattherequestorbyagreementoftheparties.TheoutcomeoftheiractivitiesistobereportedtotheUNSecurityCouncilandtakenintoaccountinthecourseofpreparationandplanningofmultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperations.Thus,theUNseekstoraiseitslevelofpreparednessforfuturepeacekeepingoperations.
1� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
50In the course of multifunctional peacekeeping
operationsitbecomesveryimportanttoobtaintimely,reliableandfullinformationonthesituationinaconflictregion,changesinthepositionsofthepartiesandanycircumstancesthatcannegativelyinfluenceorimpedetheimplemetationoftheoperation.Informationorintelligenceaboutlocalconditionsisthereforeessentialtoallpeacekeeping.OnesourceofinformationistheUnitedNationswhichgathersandanalysesinformationreceivedfromtheUNmemberstates,differentUN-familyagencies,thepartiestoaconflictthemselvesaswellasfrommediareportsandmembersofdiplomaticcorps.Bearinginmindtheneedtomaintainthehighstandingofthepeacekeepingmission,intelligencegatheringshouldbeclearlycontrolledandconductedsolelyforthepurposesofthepeacekeepingmissionandonlyatthedirectionoftheForceCommander.Covertintelligenceoperationsunrelatedtothesafetyofpeacekeepersandthesuccessofthemissionareinappropriatetopeacekeepingenvironments.
51Experience shows that identification of actual
factors of a dispute or conflict constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for initiating andconductingamultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperation.Reconnaissanceofaprospectivemis-sionareaisanessentialprerequisiteforaneffectiveconceptofoperations,asisthecaseforanymilitaryoperation.Reconnaissancepartiesshouldincluderepresentativesofallelementsofthemission.Intelligenceisalsoavitalelementintheanalysis,planningandconductofanyoperationanditisimportantthatindevelopinganassessmentofasituationallavailablesourcesareused.Thisincludesacademicexperts,in-theatrenon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)andotherbodies.
52It would be desirable to adopt uniform military
symbolsandabbreviations-forinstance,usingthoseemployedbytheimplementingorga-nisation-aswellasUniversalTransverseMercatorProjection(UTM)maps,thedevelopmentofIdentifyFriendorFoe(IFF)systemsandtheadoptionofcommonrescuestandards.InthecontextoftheIFORoperation,unitsfromdifferentnationshaveactivelycooperatedinthefieldoftopographicpreparation,successfullyadoptingunifiedmapsymbolsandmapformatsforuseatthevariouslevelsofcommandandbythedifferentnationalcontingents.
J. Logistics
53The logistic aspects of operations, and in parti-
cularthefinancialquestions,mustbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Thereisaneedtoclarifyatanearlystagethechannelsthroughwhichthesequestionsaretobeinitiallydiscussed.Infact,logisticandoperationalplanningareinextricablylinked.It isessentialthatbothlogisticsandoperationsstaffhaveaclearunderstandingofeachothers’aimsandrequirements.Itisimportanttoclearlyidentifywhatisexpectedofnationalcontingents,toconfirmthefeasibilityoftheseexpectationsortomakeandconfirmalternativearrangementsasrequiredinadvanceofdeployment.
54Thereisaneedforincreasedattentiontologistic
requirementsintheplanningphase,suchastheworkrequiredforthepreparationofdeploymentcamps(suchasde-mining,clearingthearea,settingupfences,organisingguardanddefencesystems,settingupthecamp,installingequipment,creatingaccessroads).Selectionofin-frastructureinregardtolocationandcapacitymustpermitadditionalroomforpeace-buildingworksuchashousingforrefugees,storageoffood,orcontributiontopublicinfrastructure.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1�
55ManyUNoperationshavebenefittedfromlogistic
supportbeingprovidedcentrallybytheUnitedNations.However,theIFORoperationde-monstratedthatanexcellentwayofproceedingistotaskonecontributorwiththeprovisionoflogisticsupport(e.g.,alogisticbattalion).Inanycase,detaileddeterminationofnationalandnon-nationalresponsibilitiesmustbedefinedintheconceptofoperationsandguidelinesfortroop-contributingnations.ATableofOrganisationandEquipment(TOE)ofcontributingunitsshouldbecollectedandmaintainedinaccessibledatabasesformodellingthecompatibilityandinterfacepossibilities.Hostnations’supportshouldbepoliticallyagreed,clearlystatedinaStatusofForceAgreement(SOFA)whereappropriate,andutilisedwhereverpossibleinordertokeeplogisticcostslow.
56In thefirst periodof a newmission, there is an
increasedrequirementforspecialistunitsandpersonnel.Asimilarrequirementexistsattheendofamission.Duringthestart-upphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementforconstructionengineers, legalexpertsandotherspecialists. Engineersandadditionalmedical resourcesforhelpingthelocalpopulationinthecaseofemergenciesarevaluabletoolsforconfidencebuildingatthelocallevel.Specialistsarealsoneededtoconductmineclearance,establishcamps,observationposts,shelters,instalutilities,conductroadrepairs,andestablishcom-munications.Legal,contractingandfinancialexpertsareneededtonegotiateanddrawupleaseagreements,hirelocalemployeesandsoon.Duringthedraw-downphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementforsupplyexpertstopackupandregistersuppliesandequipmentforshipmentandforlegalandfinancialexpertstoterminateagreementsandcontracts.
57Movementbybothairandsurfacecanbedifficult;
carefuldecision-makinginrespectofhighvaluetransportationassetsisrequiredtoavoidun-necessaryadditionalexpense.Accordingly,itisessentialthatmovementplansarelinkedtothemissionplanandfinalisedbeforethesubmissionofcosts,keepinginmindthatfreedomofmovementisimperative.Themethodoftransportationmustbedecidedatanearlystagetoallowfordetailedplanning.Cargocontainersshouldbestandardisedandreportedtotheshippingorganisation.Availabilityofunloadingcapacities,transportandstoragefortheportofdisembarkationinthemissionareaisalsoimportant.
58There canbe a significant shortfall between the
logisticsupportintendedin-theatreandwhatisactuallyprovided.Whenfirstdeployed,unitsshouldbeself-sufficient,withsuppliescommensuratetothetask.Stockmanagementbasedonconsumerstatisticsmustbeforeseen,withaminimumstocklevelof60days.Equipmentmustbeadaptedtoenvironmentalconditionsandshouldenabletroopstolivecomfortablyinapotentiallydifficultenvironmentforprolongedperiods.Asaprinciple,equipmentshouldnotbedeployedunlessthenecessarymaintenancecapacityandlogisticback-upisathandinthemissionarea.Equipmentrenderedunserviceableduetonon-availabilityofbasicmaintenanceorsparepartswillunderminetheeffectivenessofthemission.Inspectionbeforeshipping,andtransportsupervisionbytherecipient,shouldbeanormtoensurethatequipmentarrivesinuseablecondition.
59Insomemissionsitmaybeappropriateforacom-
mercialcontractortoprovidecorelogistics.Suchcontractorsshouldbeidentifiedbyopencompetitionandmeetanyrequiredperformancecriteriainadvance,andideallyshouldhavedemonstratedaprovenperformancestandard.Contractadministrationandmonitoringshouldbestrengthenedtoensurestandardsaremet,andcontractsbesecuredinsufficienttimeforthecontractortobeabletoprovideeffectivesupporttothemission.
20 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
60Fornavaloperations,aforwardlogisticssiteshould
beestablishedneartheareaofoperations,comprisingpersonnelfromallparticipatingnations.Asufficientnumberofhelicoptersshouldbeavailablefortransportbetweenshipsandthelogisticsite.Iffreespaceonboardtheshipsislimited,depots(e.g.,forspareparts)canbeestablishedatthelogisticssite.Intheareaofoperation,thereshouldbeanareafordegaussingships.
61The«Compendiumof LessonsObservedDuring
LogisticSupportofPeacekeepingOperations»producedbytheLogisticsDirectorateoftheNATO Infrastructure, Logistics andCivil EmergencyPlanningDivisionprovides additionalmaterialinrelationtologisticsupportofpeacekeepingoperations.
K. Medical Support
62Peacekeeping operations are complicated by a
numberofpeculiarcharacteristics,whichimpactfundamentallyupontheprovisionofmedicalsupport.Medicalsupportplansthereforemustbepurpose-builtforeachoperation.Plansmustbecapableofspeedyinitialreactionandflexibleenoughtomanagerapidlychangingdemands.MedicalsupportplanningandmanagementmustbeacceptabletoNATO/UnitedNationsHeadquartersandtoparticipatingnationsaswell.
63Theoverallobjectiveofmedicalsupportmustbe
physicalandmentalwell-beingofthedeployedpersonnel,theconservationofmanpower,preservationoflifeandthelimitationofresidualphysicalandmentaldisabilities.Operationalmedicalsupportthereforerequiresclearlydefinedanddistinctiveguidance.Thetaskofplan-ning,executingandcontrollingoperationalmedicalsupportmustlieproperlywithamedicallytrainedplanningstaffwhomusthaveanestablishedorganizationofsufficient,experiencedmanpower,communicationsandinformation.
64ThemedicalC3Iorganizationmustbecapableof
planning,executing,controlling,supportingandauditingthefullrangeofmedicalsupportfunctions.Itmustbecapableofprovidingaseamlesssystemofcontroloftreatment,evacuationandtransferofinformationfrominitialpointofinjuryorsicknessthroughouttheevacuationchaintodefinitivetreatment.EachlevelofoperationalcommandthereforehastohaveaSeniorMedicalOfficer,directlyaccountabletotheoperationalcommander.
- TheForceMedicalOfficer(FMEDO)ofaFieldMissionplans,directs,advisesandsupervisesallactivities related to themedicalsupportplan.He/she is theSeniorMedicalAdvisertotheForceCommander(FC)andtoallcontingentSeniorMedicalOfficers(SMEDOS)ofthemission.
- TheSeniorMedialOfficers(SMedOs)areFMedO’spointofcontactoncontingent(national) level.He/sheis theSeniorclinicianforhis/hernationalunit(s)andtheSeniorMedicalAdvisertothenationalContingentCommander.
65Preventivehealthmeasures involveevery indivi-
dualintheoperationaltheatre.Theorganizationtoundertakethem,itsstructureandsizewillbemission-dependant,andmustbebasedonbestavailablemedicalintelligenceevaluationof
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 21
theareaofoperations,butwillincludeatleastindividualadvisersateachlevelofoperationalcommand.Itisanationalresponsibilityatnationalexpensetoensurethatpersonnelispre-paredandappropriatelytrainedinfieldpreventivemedicinemeasurespriortodeploymenttoapeacekeepingoperation.Thismustincludethenecessaryvaccinationandimmunization.EducationforthepreventionofmedicaldiseasesmustincludethepreventionagainstAIDS/HIV.Eachparticipant,militaryleadersateachlevelinparticular,musthavebasictraininginthepreventionofsexuallytransmitteddiseasesandHIV/AIDS.
66All personnel being deployed on peacekeeping
operationsmustbemedicallyanddentallyfitfordutyandmustmeetatleastUN’medicalstandardsforpeace-keepingmissions.UNmedicalstandards,however,donotprecludena-tionalcontingents/militaryservicesfromestablishinghigherqualifyingmedicalstandards.Innocase,however,shouldanindividual,unacceptablefornationalmilitaryduties,beincludedinthepeacekeepingmilitarycontingentforce.
67Nationsretainultimateaccountabilityforthehealth
oftheirforcesbut,ontheassumptionofauthority,thePeacekeepingForceCommanderwillsharetheresponsibilityforthehealthofassignedforces.Tomeetthisrequirement,theForceCommanderneedsappropriatemedicalstaff.Theyshallplanandexecutethemedicalsupportplan.
68Medical information, particularly regarding pa-
tients,isavitalelementofcompetentmedicalsupportplanning.Theinformationmustbemanagedefficientlyanddistributedrapidlywithoutviolatingmedicalprofessionalsecrecy.Theabilitytotrackindividualpatientsthroughthetreatmentandevacuationchainisparamount.
69Policyandplanning for the resupplyofmedical
material is a medical matter and is inter-related directly with patient treatment. Medicalplanningstaffmustaimtoachieveasmuchstandardizationaspossibleandestablisheffectivemeansofauditingusageandresupply.Anefficient,well-regulatedandcost-effectivemedicallogisticssystemisfundamentaltomissionmedicalsupport.Medicallogisticsmustbeabletorespondrapidlytourgentclinicaldemands.
70From the outset of an operation, a theatre eva-
cuationpolicymustbeestablishedbytheoperationalandmedicalplanningstaffworkinginconcertwiththeForceCommander(FC)andFMedO(FMedO).DedicatedandfullyequippedMEDEVAChelicopterswithappropriatemedicalstaffshallbeallocatedwheneverpossibleandshallbemarkedwiththedistinctiveemblems.
71Therulesforentitlementtomedicalcaremustbe
establishedearlyintheplanningprocess.Plannersmustconsider,butnotbesidetrackedby,legalissuesofcompensationandclaims.Thedegreeofsupporttobegiventolocalorhuma-nitarianaidpersonnelmustbeclearlydelineatedintheoperationsorder.Ifcareistobegiventocivilians,considerationmustbegiventomodifyingthestaffingandequippingofmedicalunits.Veryfewpediatricorgynaecologicmedicationsarenormallystockedinfieldmedicalunits,andtheconditionofthelocalpopulacemaymandateadditionofmedicalspecialistswhodonotnormallyaccompanymilitarypeacekeepingforces.
22 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
L. Training
72Military or other specific skills, together with
appropriate training,are the fundamentalbasis for successfullymeeting thepeacekeepingchallenges. Specialpeacekeeping training isneededparticularly in relation tooperationsofamultifunctionalnature,sincebehavioursandtechniquesrequiredarenotnecessarilyinlinewith-andsometimesevencontradict-acquiredmilitaryskills,ormayneedanadequatecomplement,forinstanceinthediplomatic,civilorpolicefields.Acommontacticalleveldoctrineisrequiredfortroopcontributorstoanoperation,aswellasacommonunderstandingamongthemilitaryandotherelementsofapeacekeepingoperation-thepolice,civilians,NGOs,humanitarianorganisations.
73Relianceontheuseofhighlyandprofessionally
trainedunits,showsofforceanddetermination,andtherespectbythelocalpartieswhichisgainedbyactingfirmlycanimprovethecredibilityoftheforceandinfactreducetheneedtouseforce,thusretainingthemainaccentonconsentandcooperationwiththeparties.
74Eachnationshouldberesponsiblefortrainingits
owntroops;however,therearebenefitsinmultinationaldevelopmentofminimumtrainingstandards.TheUNplaysausefulsupportingrolebyestablishingguidelines,preparingcom-montrainingmodulesandpublishingaregisterofmemberstates’trainingfacilities.However,somenationssaytheyhaveexperienceddifficultiesinensuringtheirofficers’participationinUNtrainingcoursespriortoassignmentstoservewithinapeacekeepingoperation.
75Pre-deployment orientation training ensures that
troopsunderstandhowtheirroleaspeacekeepersdiffersfromthatascombatforces.Duringtheorientationperiod,specialattentionshouldbedrawnto recentpoliticaldevelopmentsandotherissuesrelatedtotheconflict,inordertocreatethenecessaryawarenessandun-derstandingbytheforcesinvolved.Personnelshouldunderstandtheorganisation,structureandobjectivesofthemissionandthenatureoftheconditionsinwhichtheywillbeworking.Thisincludesthenatureofthesocietyofthemissionarea,itsnational,factional,culturalandreligiouscharacteristics,aswellasphysicalsecurityandclimaticissues.Commontrainingactivitiesareanimportantprerequisiteformultinationaloperations.Theuseofmultinationalexercises,bringingtogetherdiplomatic,militaryandciviliancomponents,hasbeensuggestedinthisregard.Commontrainingstandardshelpdevelopthecohesivenessofmultinationalformations.
76Realistic simulation is equally important, and
shouldinvolvetrainerswithrecentexperience.RealisticstafftrainingalsorequiressimulationofthemultinationalcompositionofaHQ.Inter-linkagesbetweenthevariouscomponentsshouldbesimulatedbyamixtureofinternationalpersonnelalreadyinthetrainingphase.Whereappropriate,trainingshouldcontinueinthemissionareaasitwillnotalwaysbepossibletoreplicatethefieldconditionsinhometrainingareas.
77PfPprovidesausefulsourceoftrainingexperiences.
AveryeffectiveinstrumenttohelppreparationsofstaffandoperationalforcesareNATO/PfPexercisesfocusingonpeacekeepingand/orhumanitarianoperations.APfPcourseforplatooncommandersinpeacekeepingoperationsorganisedinthepastbytheCzechRepublicplayedausefulroleinthiscontext. CoursesorganisedinanumberoftrainingcentresinvariousNACC/PfPcountriesarealsoconsideredtobeextremelyvaluable.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 23
78However,somefeelthattheexperiencegathered
sofarsuggeststhatthenumberofinternationaltrainingexercisesshouldbeincreasedandthescopeoftopicscoveredinPfPtrainingandexercisesexpanded.Thechangingnatureofpea-cekeepingoperations,especiallyinthelightoflessonslearnedinBosnia-Herzegovina,clearlyshowstheneedtocarryouttrainingandexerciseactivitiesatanoperationallevel.Exercisesshouldbroadenthescopeofthoseactivitiestoincludestandardcombatactivitiesortrainingintheareasofsmallgroupindependentactionandminecounter-measures.
79Thereisaneedforacommonlanguagecapability
amongunitsdeployedonmissions.Thisisessentialtoboththeexecutionofthemissionandtheday-to-dayadministrationofdeployed forces. Foreign language training for the forcesshouldthereforebeintensified.Withregardtolocallanguagecapability,accesstocompetentinterpretersandtranslatorsisrequiredasanintegralpartofthemission,sinceitmaynotbepossible,ordesirable,torelyentirelyonlocally-recruitedstafffortheseroles.
80Thefollowingelementswereconsideredtobeof
particularimportanceintrainingforcesfordeploymentwithIFOR:abackgroundofexperien-cesgainedinpreviousmissionsandspecificpeacekeepingtrainingforforcestobeusedinthemission;andplanningandarrangementofadditionaltraining.Moreover,certainnationshavepointedtotheusefulnessofextendedtrainingofpersonnelexpectingtohavedualfunctions(e.g.,driver/mechanic)andofdirectselectionofpersonnelwithspecialskills,inparticularlogisticsexpertsorspecialistsinmaintenance.
M. Personnel and Administration
81Somenationsfeelthattrainingshouldbecomple-
mentedbyapersonnelselectionprocesswhichshouldtakeintoaccountpreviousexperiencesacquiredinthefieldandincludeapsychologicalscanning.Inthislight,itmaybeusefultoincludeasapartofthepreparatoryactivitiesstresspreventiontrainingandaregulardebriefingaftereachmissiontodiagnosethepossibledangerofpost-traumaticstressdisorder.
N. Financial Aspects
82Thesuccessofpeacekeepingoperations isoften
conditionedbytheavailabilityoffunds.TheconductofpeacekeepingoperationsundertheauspicesoftheUN,i.e.,cost-sharingamongUNmembers,improvesthesenseofresponsibilityandtheinvolvementoftheworldcommunity.
83Thebudgetaryprocedureapplyingtothemission
andthetroopcontributionsshouldbeclearlyspecifiedinallbasicandframeworkplanningdocuments:Ifapplicable,rulesforcost-sharingshouldbeclearlyspelledoutandtermsofdepreciationofequipmentshouldbespecified.Thefinancialquestionsraisedbythelogisticaspectsofoperationsshouldbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Finally,therewouldbeaneedtoidentifyproceduresforreimbursementofanylogisticsupportrenderedbyTCNs,andforpropertytransfers.
2� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
84Thereisacommoninterestthatthefinancialme-
chanismsforpeacekeepingoperationsworkasefficientlyaspossible.Thisproducesaneedtodrawupfinancialrulesandregulationstomakethemcompatiblewiththeoperationalneedsofcomplexandlarge-scalemissions.Toensuresufficientexpertiseisavailabletothem,troop-contributingnationsshouldconsiderappointingabudgetexperttoworkin-theatrewithChiefAdministrativeOfficers(CAO)andChiefLogisticsOfficers.
85Oneshouldalsoconsiderincreasingthedelegation
offinancialauthoritytoandwithinmissions,intheinterestsofbothmissionefficiencyandresponsivenesstotheneedsoftroopcontributorsandoftheForceCommander.Inanycase,alltroopcontributorsinvolvedintheoperationshouldapplythesamerulesvis-à-visthelocalauthorities.Inthisregard,asingle«claimspolicy»(aspractisedbyIFOR)hasproveduseful.
86ChiefAdministrativeOfficers shouldcontinue to
retainauthorityforexpenditurebutmissionbudgetsmustbedrawnupinconsultationwithcivilandmilitaryelementsandencompassall thedeclaredmissionaims,while reflectingbudgetaryrealities.CAOrecommendationsmustgoforwardaccompaniedbycertificationfromForceCommandersandMissionHeadsthattheproposalshavebeenfullydiscusseddowntotheloweroperationallevelandendorsedasrealisticandachievable.Areservecadreofadministrativeofficerscouldensuretheoptimaluseofresources.
87Aspecificaspectofrelationsamongorganisationsis
thereimbursementofcostsincurredbycontributingnations.Inthisregard,experienceshowsthatreimbursementsfromtheUNareseldomtimelyandthatforcecontributorsneedtobeabletobridgethedelayinreimbursementthroughnationalfunding.Onlyself-sustainingandsupportableforcesshouldbecommitted.