Lessons learned from the battle for Mosul 2016-7 - RUSI Williams Mosul.pdf · Lessons learned from...

Lessons learned from the battle for Mosul 2016-7

Professor Clive Williams MGCentre for Military and Security Law, The Australian National University

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• Mosul statistics (and some comparisons with Aleppo).

• “Allied” interests and military forces involved.

• The lead-up to the Mosul battle and current situation.

• What will happen after Mosul falls?

• Lessons learned from the battle.

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Scope of presentation

• About 780 ADF personnel have deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation OKRA. These personnel make up the Air Task Group (ATG), the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) and Task Group Taji (TG Taji).

Operation Okra..

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• Comprising approximately:– 400 personnel assigned to the ATG at Al

Minhad Air Base in the UAE– 300 personnel assigned to TG Taji in Iraq– 80 personnel assigned to the SOTG in Iraq

• The SOTG soldiers have been deployed to assist the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) at Mosul.

Operation Okra

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5

Mosul statistics

Mosul’s population prior to IS occupation in 2014 was 2.4 million.

It had - and still has - a Sunni Arab population majority (85-90%), concentrated particularly in Mosul west of the Tigris.

Across the Tigris and further north in the suburbs, Mosul's population comprises mainly Assyrians, Kurds, Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis, Armenians and Mandeans.

Stats – Mosul..

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• Mosul is rich in ancient cultural sites and its museum was the second largest in Iraq after Baghdad.

• IS destruction of cultural treasures seems to have been widespread.

Mosul cultural sites

7https://vid.alarabiya.net/images/2014/07/24/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea-aca3d8554b25/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea-aca3d8554b25_16x9_600x338.JPG

• IS has a unit Kata'ibTaswiyya tasked with selecting cultural targets for demolition.

• Some easily transportable artefacts have been looted and sold to finance IS activities.

Mosul cultural sites

8https://vid.alarabiya.net/images/2014/07/24/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea-aca3d8554b25/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea-aca3d8554b25_16x9_600x338.JPG

Important commercial products of the Mosul area include marble, sulphur and oil/petroleum.

One of IS’ obstructive defensive measures was to set fire to a major sulphur factory south of Mosul.

Stats - Mosul

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Local marble

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Comparisons with Aleppo

Aleppo’s population is 1.8 million, with 1.5 million in government controlled areas.

Comparing built-up areas, Aleppo is much the same size as Mosul with an area of 190 sq km –compared to Mosul’s 170 sq km, but Aleppo has more multi-storey buildings.

In Aleppo, the attacking Syrian government and Russian forces were seen in the West as the “bad guys” and the US-supported opposition fighters (other than those aligned with al-Qaeda (AQ)) as the “good guys”.

Stats – Aleppo..

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The reality was that the Aleppo opposition groups were an unsavoury loose coalition who used civilians as human shields and lacked much popular support.

Stats - Aleppo

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https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=mosul+street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&tbm=isch&q=Aleppo+human+shields&imgrc=qJqWfW0uSNoaEM%3A

The Syrian government and Russian forces were ruthless in going after the opposition groups and were prepared to cause civilian casualties in the process.

Stats - Aleppo

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http://pravda-team.ru/eng/image/article/3/0/4/57304.jpeg

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Mosul - allied interests and military forces involved

Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the US, the Arab Gulf States, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shia groups, Sunni tribal groups and Iraq’s ethnic minority groups - all have overlapping or competing strategic interests in Mosul.

To take one example, Turkey’s interest dates from the period of the Ottoman empire. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and later the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne removed territory that included Mosul from Turkey.

Competing interests

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Turkish nationalists still believe that Mosul should be part of Turkey.

The Turkish government wants to maintain a military presence near Mosul to keep the lid on Kurdish separatism and protect Turkmen interests.

Competing interests..

16http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/images/dc5hur-6n0r9r4chrdiyuzre2a_original.jpg

The US focus is on defeating IS in both Mosul and Raqqa as soon as possible, but it does not want US casualties. It has encouraged the Kurdish Peshmerga to take on IS, but is now limiting US air support to them in favour of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and CTS.

At the same time. the US does not want to alienate Turkey by making the Peshmerga capable enough to take over Mosul, or seeming to support Kurdish separatism.

Competing interests

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Iraq says it does not want foreign forces on its soil - but does not have the capability to remove the US-led 60 nation coalition or Turkish troops.

Competing interests

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https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=turksih+forces+in+iraq&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#gws_rd=ssl&imgrc=E_ZbyjaFN1RI7M%3Ahttp://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/01/26/concerns-

about-fatigue-mount-iraqi-troops-prepare-retake-mosul.html

US intelligence sources believe that IS committed 3-5,000 fighters to protect Mosul, of whom more than 1,000 are foreign fighters.

Participating forces..

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While a number of IS commanders have remained in Mosul, more senior IS figures have reportedly sold their properties and moved their families to Syria.

IS leader al-Baghdadi is probably in Raqqa.


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Iraqi forces involved in the “liberation” of Mosul, total about 80,000 from six major groups:


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https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=iraqi+forces+advancing+on+Mosul&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#gws_rd=ssl&imgrc=9S-sTkTU29bHYM%3A

First, the ISF, (20-25,000) - the regular Iraqi Armed Forces and Interior Ministry forces -including the Iraqi Police, and the General Security Directorate’s Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). They have three divisions around Mosul.

Iraqi military forces include the CTS (1,800) separate from Defense and the Interior Ministry, under command of the PM. The CTS has two Task Forces at Mosul. They wear black uniforms.


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Second, the Hashd al-Ashari, a 15,000 strong Sunni militia force under the nominal control of Falah al-Fayad, head of the National Security Agency.

Third, the Haras Nineveh, which consists of local Sunni Arab tribes.


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https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=mosul+street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&tbm=isch&q=Hashd+al-Ashairi

https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=mosul+street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&tbm=isch&q=Haras+Nineveh&imgrc=DUUdLjbjsDaXvM%3A

Fourth, the Hashdal-Shaabi or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a Shia coalition of 40+ militias supported by Iran and nominally under Iraqi government control.


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https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=mosul+street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&tbm=isch&q=pmf+iraq&imgrc=FTMjC-lKXkqAOM%3A

Fifth, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, estimated at 40,000 to 50,000, that have surrounded Mosul in a crescent formation from NW to SE.

They include 1,500 members of the Turkish-backed Nineveh Guard Force.


25

http://rudaw.net/ContentFilesArchive/232115Image1.jpg

Sixth, smaller armed groups including Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Kakais, and Turkmen who are affiliated with, and supported by, either the Iraqi government, the PMF, or Kurdish groups. One such group is the 600-strong Christian Nineveh Plains Protection Unit (NPU).

Participating forces

26http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnnnext/dam/assets/141120092346-qassim-shesho-with-a-group-horizontal-large-gallery.jpg

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The Fallujah blueprint

• Despite US protestations that Mosul should be recovered first because of its importance to IS (and Washington), the Iraqi Haider Al-Abadi government made the recovery of Fallujah its first priority.

• Fallujah, being only 66 km from Baghdad, was a much more pressing concern for the Iraqi government than distant Mosul because it was a base for attacks on Baghdad.

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Fallujah the blueprint..

• Fallujah fell after three months’ fighting but much of the city was destroyed.

• Resettlement of the displaced Sunni population back into Fallujah has been hampered by excesses of the Shia militia, government’s failure to restore destroyed infrastructure and property, and IS’s placement of booby traps and mines throughout the city.

• IS has now shifted to rural guerrilla warfare around Fallujah.

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Fallujah the blueprint

• The Iraqi advance towards Mosul began on 17 October 2016.

• The offensive began with Iraqi troops and Peshmerga fighters engaging IS on three fronts outside Mosul, going from occupied village to village in the surrounding area.

• More than 120 towns and villages were freed from IS control in the first two weeks of fighting. By 3 December that number had increased to 369.

Conduct of the battle..

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• IS was always expected to put up strong resistance in Mosul, as they had done elsewhere, and particularly because of Mosul being the “capital” of the IS caliphate in Iraq.

• IS also had two and a half years to prepare for an allied attack.

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IS preparation..

• As anticipated, IS has made extensive use of:– Snipers and mobile combat teams.– Tunnels to target Iraqi HQ areas and re-

access “cleared” areas.– Suicide belts to avoid capture alive.– VBIEDs and PBIEDs to attack forward

units.– Command detonated IEDs placed in likely

Iraqi forward locations.– Improvised mines and booby traps. 33

IS preparation..

• IS also planned to make extensive use of:– Civilians - to provide “human shield”

protection and provide information on CTS movements and locations.

– Earth berms and obstacle barriers containing IEDs.

– Drones to collect intelligence and to deliver explosive ordnance. (IS has an institutionalized drone manufacturing and management program.)

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IS preparation..

– Mosul airport sabotage to hamper Iraqi logistic support.

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IS preparation..

• The advance on Mosul from the north by the 16th Iraqi Division and from the south by the 9th

and 15th Iraqi Divisions and Iraqi Police soon got “pinned down” by IS strongpoints, leaving the CTS in the east to do the heavy lifting.


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• At dawn on 1 November 2016, the CTS entered eastern Mosul and, by 24 January 2017, the CTS had taken control of most of eastern Mosul at a reported cost of 50% casualties.

• The US estimates 2,000+ IS fighters killed in Mosul so far.


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• There have been ongoing coalition airstrikes, including by RAAF aircraft (131 by 3 March), on IS targets in Mosul.

• How many civilians have been killed by airstrikes and artillery is hard to judge because, unlike Aleppo, aid agencies do not have access on the ground - in early December 2016 it was estimated at 1,000+ deaths.


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• Ground fire support is being provided by US and French artillery from established firebases, and by Iraqi MLRS.

Fire support

39https://www.google.com.au/search?q=attacking+forces+mosul+wiki&biw=1042&bih=704&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi5tsTy_6TQAhWCl5QKHasKC8YQ_AUICCgD#tbm=isch&q=mosul+fire+support&imgrc=g-EEaoyQnvCU6M%3A

https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-c0tcPK5d50A/V1Jx9fiNIKI/AAAAAAAAEGQ/J2SXBUG97kY59Tg8bbWQfyBucLq5B8TvwCK4B/s320/isis-iraq-mosul-obama-islamic-state.jpg

• The next phase of the ground battle which began on 19 February 2017 was the advance into western Mosul, made more complicated by the dense urbanisation, narrow streets, high CTS casualties, IS sabotage of the bridges, and IS re-infiltration into eastern Mosul behind CTS lines.


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• So far the Iraqis have captured the southernmost two bridges, government buildings and the museum, and are probing into the southern part of western Mosul towards the old city.


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• An escape route was to have been left for IS fighters (2,000?) and civilians (750,000?) on the western side of the city to reduce civilian casualties, but that route towards Syria has been cut by the Shia PMF, Iraqi 16th Division and Peshmerga.


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• Meanwhile, IS’s ongoing attacks against Shia elsewhere in Iraq are intended to cause a PMFand Shia backlash against Sunnis to aid IS recruitment of young Sunnis.

• The Shia PMF are not supposed to enter Mosul but they will stay out once the city is closer to falling seems doubtful.

• It seems inevitable that there will be clashes between the Peshmerga (who are also not supposed to enter Mosul) and the PMF.


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• During the battle and afterwards there will inevitably be war crimes by both sides. Iraqi and Kurdish news outlets have reported that Kurdish Peshmerga fighters are torturing civilians in eastern Mosul.

War crimes

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What will happen in Mosul after Mosul falls?

• Surprisingly, neither the US nor the Iraqi government has planned that far ahead.

• Much of the city's infrastructure will be damaged or destroyed and there will be an urgent need for EOD clearance and rebuilding.

• But the Iraqi government does not have the means to rebuild all of the villages, towns and cities destroyed in the southern heartland during the recovery battles against IS, let alone deal with the new damage in remote Mosul.

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What will happen after Mosul falls?..

• Mosul will most likely remain a very damaged city for several years unless the US and international community step in to run a regeneration program.

• Most of Mosul’s residents do not want the Baghdad government back in control and there will probably be violence between rival groups for control of the city, or parts of it.

• Many of the residents will see little point in returning to the damaged city and will seek their future elsewhere. 47


• In the interim, humanitarian prospects are poor. The Iraqi government and international organizations are not resourced to care for and re-house up to a million displaced persons and few countries want to take them.

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http://cdn.iraqinews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/A-refugee-camp-in-Mosul-650x365.jpg

• IS will recruit young Sunni men from Mosul and Nineveh Province as it pivots back to rural guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks - in the expectation of exploiting local differences and making a comeback.

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http://twt-thumbs.washtimes.com/media/image/2015/01/10/midest-iraq-france-attack-militant-recruitmentjpeg-0e9bf_s878x580.jpg?62de0e3fb284456efaf71b70e2103996bfb6f7bd

• Ultimately, security can only be restored in Mosul and other parts of Iraq through religious tolerance, devolution of power to locals, and the establishment of domestic and regional compromises between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey -with the latter two agreeing to end their interference in Iraq once IS has been defeated in Mosul.

• This would probably require ongoing peace-keeping supervision and peace enforcement by the UN and the US-led coalition. 50


• It seems likely that the Trump Administration will lose interest in Iraq once Mosul falls, and its attention will shift to destroying IS in Raqqa.

• The loss of Mosul will be a propaganda blow for IS, but will not be fatal as it can regenerate elsewhere in Iraq and Syria.

• Iraq could in the longer term become destabilized and again descend into chaos, re-creating the conditions that set the stage for the rise of IS in the first place.

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What will happen after Mosul falls?

• IS is capable of increasing terrorist attacks in Western Europe and elsewhere, focusing on members of the US-led coalition - including Australia, to encourage its supporters and underline its continuing relevance.

• IS is also capable of promoting increased attacks against Western visitors in Muslim countries, including Indonesia. 52

IS reaction

• A key question for Australia post-Mosul is whether our continuing presence in Iraq is in ourstrategic interest, and whether we should draw down our commitment.

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Operation Okra

https://images.defence.gov.au/assets/archives/5003-All%20Defence%20Imagery/?q=atg

In any future IS-influenced urban insurgency, challenges for conventional forces could include:• Enemy innovative uses of IEDs to target

command and forward elements - to cause disruption and maximise casualties.

• Use of drones for intelligence collection, ordnance delivery, fire control and to collect propaganda footage.

• Use of well-concealed tunnel systems to facilitate movement, PBIED attacks and sniping.

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Lessons learned..

• Insurgents embedding themselves within a potentially sympathetic or hostage civilian population to protect themselves.

• Clearly, winning the battle is only the first phase in working towards a lasting solution.

• There is little point in suffering heavy casualties and destroying a city to win a battle if there is no agreed blueprint for the future.

• Australia should now place more emphasis on engineer urban restoration than we do on providing regular infantry training. 55

Lessons learned

Professor Clive Williams MGCentre for Military and Security Law The Australian National University

+61 421 374 277

[email protected]

© Clive Williams 201756

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