LESSONS FROM THE PASTSuccessful British Counterinsurgency Operations

in Malaya 1948-1960FIRST LIEUTENANT THOMAS E. WILLIS II

AI the conclusion of World War II. the world saw a newstruggle emerge between communism and thoseopposed to it. It spread across mueh of Asia and into

the British colonial territory of Malaya. The victory achieved bythe British over the communist insurgents in Malaya still standsloday as an exemplary model of effective counterinsurgencytechniques. From 1948 to I960, the British defeated communistinsurgents in Malaya in order to prevent the spread of communismand maintain control over the civilian population. The Britishaccomplished this through effective application of thefive fundamental conditions necessary for successfulcounterinsurgency operations.

BackgroundPrior to World War II, Great Britain had maintained colonial

control over the Malay Peninsula since the signing of treaties ofprotection with local Malay rulers in 1874. Several of the Malaystates were aggregated in 1896 to form the Federated Malay States,commonly referred to as Malaya. Strategically, the British wereinterested in Malaya because it was one of the world's largest rawmaterial producing territories, supplying one-third of the world'srubber and tin. Later. Malaya would become strategic as abattleground to keep communism from spreading west towards[he Indian Ocean. The British maintained dominion over Malayauntil World War II, during which time the Japanese seized andoccupied Malaya.

In 1948. Malaya's geography made it ideal for a guerrillainsurgency. Approximately the size of Alabama, some 80 percentof the country was covered in dense jungle, largely impenetrableexcept by animal tracks or through man-made paths. Mobilitywas further limited by a 6.000-footmountain range running north to southdown the center of the country.

assistance from the MCP. The MCP proceeded to toon the MalayanPeople's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which received trainingand logistical support from the British throughout the war. Althoughthe MPAJA showed few military successes against the Japanese,by the end of the war they possessed a cadre of experienced guerillafighters as well as stockpiles of hoarded supplies that the Britishhad supplied to them during the Japanese occupation. Perhapstheir greatest asset, however, were the strong ties the MCP hadestablished with the rural Chinese community, particularly thesquatters on the jungle fringes. The number of Chinese squattersresorting to subsistence fanning on the jungle fringes had risendramatically during World War II due to fear of the Japanese, foodshortages, and unemployment in the urban centers. By 1945. thetotal number of squatters was estimated at 400.000.

Having allied with the MCP during World War II. the Britishinitially granted the MCP legal status in 1945. The MCP usedthis status to prepare its efforts to subvert the Malayan government.From 1945 through 1948. the MCP organized mass strikes,attacked several local planters, infiltrated the Trade Unions, andintimidated officials and laborers. Furthermore, the MCPestablished cells in each Malayan village and wherever possibleconducted Communist indoctrination, cajoling participation byforce where necessary.

By 1947, many of the Malay ethnic Chinese felt disenfranchisedover perceived failure by the British to live up to promises toprovide an easier path to full Malayan citizenship. Subsequently,the MCP accused the British of attempting to exclude them frompower as the British organized the Federation of Malaya in 1947in a plan for the future independence of the Malay states. TheMCP used these perceived slights to call for immediate armed

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In 1945, the British regainedcontrol of Malaya from the Japanese:however, during the course of the war.a new threat to British colonial rulehad arisen. That new threat was theMalaya Communist Party (MCP),which had gained legitimacy fightinga guerilla war against the Japaneseoccupiers. Within 10 days of theJapanese attack, the British colonialgovernment accepted an offer of

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revolt, and ihc open insurgency began w iihllie killing of three British rubber plantei'-on June 18. 1*̂ 48. Within two days, theBritish had declared the "Emergency."

During this time, the armed wing oftheMCP was called the Anti-British Army:however, in 1949, the MCP changed ihcname to the Malay Races Liberation Army(MRLA) in an attempt to conjure feelingsof nationalistic sentiment amongst (hepopulation. The MCP and the MRLA wereled and dominated by ethnic Chinesecommunists. Support for the MRLA camemostly from approximately 500,000 ofthe3.12 million ethnic Chinese in Malay atthe time. At the outset ofthe Emergencyin 194S. ethnic Chinese eonstituted 39percent ofthe Malay population, while theremainder of the population consisted of49 percent Malays and 10 percent Indiansand Ceylonese. Apart from ihe ethnicChinese, the MCP found little enthusiasmtor its goal of replacing the e.\lstinggovernment with a eommunist regime.

MCP Organization and TacticsAt the operational level, the MCP

organization consisted of an elaboratestructure of eonimittecs and military units.The Central Cominittee was the head oftheorganization, and subsidiary units weredivided geographically into the RegionalBureaus, State Committees, DistrictCommittees, and Branch Committees. TheBranch Committees v\ere responsible lorcontrolling the Min Yuen, or "the Masses,"which had to be organized to supply thelogistical needs ofthe insurgency. The MinYuen consisted of loeal ethnic Chinese whovoluntarily or involuntarily supplied theMRLA with food, money, intelligenee,reeruits, and couriers.

As the military arm of the MCP, theMRLA had a strength of 6,000 to 8,000personnel. This force was divided intoregimental size units o f 200 to 400personnel, and in the early stages of theinsurgency, the MRLA generally operatedin detachments o\' 100 to 200 men. Thissize force was suft'ieiently large enough tostrike and overwhelm isolated policeoutposts and other outlying static defenses.Additional ly. the M R LA also almost alw^ayshad the element of surprise on its side.

On the tactical level, the MRLA hiitiallyhad great success against governmentforces and against the infrastructure ofthecountry. The MRLA engaged in a full-scale

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guerilia insurgency against the British andMalayan authorities, killing a total of 400civilians in the I'irst year, and torturingmany others. Using hideouts in theinaccessible jungle, the MRLA conductedambushes, sabotaged infrastructure,attacked rubber farms, extorted civilians formoney and supplies, and destroyedtransportation in a deliberate terrorcampaign designed to cause the populaeeto lose faith in the government. TheMRLA's terror activities did not extend intothe urban centers with their Malaymajorities, but the rubber plantations, tinmines, smaller vil lages, and railv\aystations quiekly became the focal point ofthe conflict.

1948-1950During the first two years of the

Emergency, there was no integratedcounterinsurgency strategy, although thepolice and armed forces were rapidlyenlarged. The British brought in aninfantry battalion trom Hong Kong and anadditional brigade from Great Britain.Additionally, a series of regulations cameinto effect that would prove effectivecounterinsurgency tools as the conflictprogressed. One such regulation was theright ofthe government to detain or deportwithout trial anyone suspected of aiding thecommunists. Other regulations made itpunishable by death to be found inpossession of weapons or supplies intended

for the MRLA guerrillas. Additionally, oneregulation required that the entirepopulation over the age of 12 register withthe local police, who issued identity eardsw ith photographs. Ne\'ertheless. the BritishofUcers from World War II facing this newenemy were unfamiliar with the type ofwarfare in which they were now involved.For instanee, they had not seen an enemythat would target "soft targets" or withdrawin the face of fire to jungle retreats.

Into 1949, neither side of the conflicthad made great strides against the other.The MCP was somewhat discouraged thatthe Malayan populace did not embrace itsmessage of revolution, and escalatedgovernment mi l i tary patrols wereincreasingly placing the MRLA on thedefensive. On the British side, althoughthe communists had been prevented fromseizing and retaining any populationcenters for any significant amount of time.British and Malayan forces were unable toelTeetively protect the local population frominfiltration, intimidation, and control by theMCP. There was no one person in chargeof handling the Emergency as a whole, andthus police, military, and ei\ i l efforts weredisjointed and uncoordinated instead ofbeing joined under a single efTective policy.Command and control overlapping policeand military geographic areas was severelylacking, with no clear division ofresponsibility. The British had also learnedthe frustrating lesson oi" the futil ity of

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running search and destroy operations in an effort lo overcome alack of actionabic intelligence from local sources.

Advent of the Briggs PlanWilh the introduction into the conllict of retired army offieer

Lieutenant General Harold Briggs in March 1949. the tide wasabout to turn in favor of the British. By .!une 1950, Briggs haddeveloped a coiinterinsLirgcncy plan that wt)Lild become known asthe Briggs Plan. The fundamental theme of the Briggs Plan wasto deny the MRLA access to their principal source of supplies andinformation, which vias the civilian population. To accomplishthis goal, Briggs placed new emphasis on the efforts ofthe policeand reinforced the enforcement and intelligence capabilities oithe police force particularly in the populated areas. Evenlually.the police force was augmented to 75,000 personnel, up iVom theapproximately 10.000 police in Malaya at the outset oftheKmergency. On the military side, the Briggs Plan called for troopsto establish secure bases in the villages. From these bases, themilitary was to conduct patrols within a radius of approximately(i\c hours travel. This caused the dispersion and deterrence ofthe MRLA. which was further exacerbated by the military'ssimullaiieous ellbrts to conduct deep-jungle patrols and air raidswhich further harassed the retreating insurgents, destroyed theircamps, and captured or destroyed their food caches.

A further prong ofthe Briggs Plan was a policy of "food denial."Although increasedpoliceeffortsin the villages denied the MRLAmany of its previous logistical support assets, it proved impossiblelo prevent the MRLA from obtaining supplies IVom the squattersat the jungle's edge. Often the squatters were forced or intimidatedby the MRLA into providing supplies, information, and recruits.Because of their geographic dispersion, it was logistically notfeasible for the British and Malay authorities to provide security(o those on the outer fringes. To address this problem, Briggsdeveloped a resettlement plan for the squatters.

Under the Briggs Plan resettlement initiative, approximately400.000 squatters on the jungle fringes were forcibly resettledinto approximately 500 villages. This measure not only providedsecurity for the squatters, but. because ofthe foresight and tact\v ith which the operation was conducted, it earned ihc governmentthe loyalty of many squatters who had up lo that point been unsureof which side would win the contlict. The government gave eachsquatter family actual ownership of its own parcel of productivefarmland in addition to five months worth of provisions to getstarted. On each parcel of land, the government built a hut frameand left the supplies to finish the walls for each squatter family toluiish constructing themselves, thereby giving the squatters animmediate sense of ownership. To provide seeurity along theperimeter of the villages, government forces installed wireobstacles, and each village saw the introduction of a policepresence. Additionally, the government established potable watersupplies, sehools, shops, medieal clinics, and eventually electricity.Through elTorts such as these, the British earned the support ofthe squatter population and managed to severely reduce theMRLA's ability to use the squatters as logistical assets. This furtherisolated the insurgents and provided the populace with a degreeof seeurity that was unavailable until then.

Another essential element to the Briggs Plan was the notionthat the civil and military authorities must proceed hand in hand.

Toward this end. Briggs instituted a system of committees, whichincluded the local civil authorities and the local military and policecommanders. These committees were set up at three levels. Inorder of descending geographic breadth, they were the State WarExecutive Committee (SWEC) at the state level, the CircleExeculive War Council (CWEC) at the circle level, and the DistrictWar Executive Council (DWEC) at the district level. The localbrigade commander would represent the army at the SWEC. andthe battalion commander and company commander wouldrepresent the army at the CWEC and DWEC levels, respeetively.Elected civilian authorities presided over these meetings, andrepresentatives from the planting community were also invited toattend. At these meetings, deeisions were made on how best towin the struggle with the communists both on a military level andin the hearts and minds ofthe populace. Routinely, these meetingsaddressed such items as food control, resettlement, curfewrestrictions, labor troubles, coordination of police and militaryactions, and other issues. The civilian leaders ofthe SWECs andDWECs also had the power lo prevent security forces from carr>'ingout a proposed mission if the cost in the goodwill ofthe localpopulace would outweigh the planned military victory.

The Briggs Plan showed early successes as insurgent activitydiminished into late 1950. However, the MCP regrouped andchanged their tactics, w hich led to a rise in insurgent activity to ahigh point of 606 incidents during June 1951. The insurgents, itwas determined, now were infiltrating the workforces on the estatesand among the remaining squatters and still were successfullyextorting food and supplies. To counter this development, Briggsfurther augmented his food denial program by conductingOperation Starvation. This plan was aimed at cutting off theinsurgents from all food and medieal supplies. All areas fromwhich food or supplies could be had were labeled "controlledareas," and the taking of food and supplies from these areas wasstrictly regulated and enforced. Shopkeepers were required tokeep detailed records of sales receipts, and riee rations weredelivered already cooked, so that it remained edible for only twoto three days after delivery. Additionally. Briggs developed theHome Guard as part of Operation Starvation, which enrolled thelocal populace to aid police patrolling in the effort to defeat theinsurgents logistics and free up the police force.

Despite the continuing cfTectiveness of the Briggs Plan, theMRLA scored a major psychological victory in October 1951, whenit managed to assassinate the acting British High Commissioner,Sir Henry Gurney. Kurlherniore, in November 1951, Briggs leftMalaya at the end of his appointment. These events proved apyrrhie victory for the MCP because they brought a new sense ofurgency to the British counterinsurgency cITorts. They also broughtto Malaya General Sir Gerald Templer in January of 1952. whowould energetically implement and improve upon the Briggs Plan.

The Time of TemplerTempter's effectiveness at implementing the Briggs Plan and

improving upon it would prove to mark the beginning ofthe endfor the MCP insurgency. As one of his fust moves, Templer madean official promise of Malayan independence upon elimination ofthe communist threat. This eliminated a platform of communistnationalist propaganda, and no longer could the MCP effectivelyrecruit based on an anti-colonial stance. Templer also emphasized

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thai the conduct of the counterinsurgencyand the conduct of normal civil govemnienlalTairs were completely interrelated andwould be handled as one problem under asingle, unified chain of command. Templerstreamlined and integrated the commandand control structure ofthe police, military.and civil aspects of the government.Additionally. Templer emphasized thai Iheentire Malayan population must play itspart in fighting the communists.

Templer took several steps to furtherincrease the security of the Malayanpopulation. He provided new impetus forthe until-then struggling Home Guardforces by providing one in three of themwith weapons and enlarging their ranks to200,000 by 1954. An all volunteer force.Home Guard citizens reported to the localpolice stations where they were issuedshotguns for the duration of their assignedpatrols. As individuals became thoroughlyscreened, they were trusted to haveshotguns in their homes for immediateaction against infiltrators and for defenseofthe village perimeter. Templer mandatedthat, as an entire Home Guard unit proveditself trustworthy., they would becomeresponsible for the security of the entirevillage, thereby relieving the police forcesfor further action. Although consideredrisky at the time, the gambit paid off whenthe Home Guard proved a critical linkbetween the populace and the securityforces, especially as attachments on militarypatrols. This link provided much usefulinformation that allowed security forces toetTectively focus their efforts based on theintelligence provided instead of spendinghours patrolling through the jungle insearch of insurgents. This derivation oflocal intelligence would prove a great forcemultiplier because it was estimated thatnon-intelligence based patrolling requiredU800 man-hours of jungle patrols for eachcontact to be had. The Home Guardisolated the MRLA insurgents bothphysically and psychologically in thevillages and rubber plantations and madea concerted effort to stamp out extortionand intimidation. By 1954, 150 newsquatter villages had become responsiblefor their own security.

In addition to the Home Guard., Templeralso began to build up a national Malayarmy with a vision toward eventual Malayaindependence. Templer also maintainedthe pressure on the food supply of the

The results of Templer'stenure were clearly

positive. There was adecrease in the number of

incidents from 6,100 in1951, to 4,700 in 1952, to

only 1,100 in 1953.

MRLA. the effectiveness of which wasattested to by captured MRLA soldiers.Police intelligence had also by this timeinfiltrated agents and informants into theMin Yuen, and many communist smugglerswere captured as a result. Additionally,British and Malayan security forces wereat the highest levels of strength yet seen.There were 40,000 British troops in thetheater, along with 40,000 police forces.Through the constant harassment andpursuit of insurgents with whom contacthad been made, the morale ofthe MCP wasquickly plummeting. Further, the lenienttreatment and offer of employment andfinancial reward to insurgents wishing toswitch sides proved a valuable source ofintelligence. Overall, the increased securityfor the populace and the emphasis on localefforts produced an improvement in thetlow of intelligence and information to thesecurity forces.

By March 1952, Templer, however, wasnot yet satisfied with the results and tookseveral additional measures at the locallevel to ensure cooperation with thegovernment as opposed to with thecommunists. For instance, Templer saw toit that security forces enforced strict 22-hour curfews on villages suspected of aidinginsurgents until the populace provided thedesired intelligence. To protect informers,security forces provided a system whereevery citizen was required to fill out ananonymous, confidential information card.Due to the security it provided theinformant, this technique proved veryeffective. Additionally, the security forcesunder Templer conducted extensivepsychological operations against theinsurgents, including the dropping ofleaflets encouraging surrender, thedistribution of some 93 million anti-communist pamphlets, and broadcastsrelating the relative comfort of captivity andworking for the government as opposed tohacking out an existence in the jungle.

Templer took several steps to encourageand facilitate participation in the localgovernment at the grass roots level as well.Although village committees were electedunder the Briggs Plan, they had no financialauthority and served only in an advisoryrole. Templer granted these villagecommittees statutory authority and madethem responsible for collecting rates andlicense fees. The village committees alsowere given the responsibility to oversee theuse of public funds for such localimprovements as schools, medical facilities,and community halls. To further facilitateinvolvement in local governance. Templerinstituted the Civics Course, which broughtcitizens together for one full week's worthof training on democratic governance. By1954. the government hosted 130 suchcourses. Additionally, in late 1953.Templer introduced the policy of labelingdistricts that had proven themselves to beactively opposed to the communistinsurgents "white areas." By achieving thissought after award, a district acquiredfreedom from most of the irksomerestrictions imposed by the Briggs Plan onthe remainder of the country, such ascurfews, limited shopping hours, foodcontrol, and prying patrols. To the firstdistrict vested with this honor. Templermade clear that it was now up to the localpopulation to "keep the Communists outand see that they never come back."'

The results of Templer's tenure wereclearly positive. There was a decrease inthe number of incidents from 6.100 in 1951.to 4,700 in 1952. to only 1,100 in 1953.Further, through constant police andmilitary patrolling, in addition to the othermeasures taken, the insurgents were nowon the defensive. The monthly total ofpolice losses fell from 100 per month in1951 to 20 per month by the middle of1952, never to rise above that figure again.Similarly, the number of civilian deaths atinsurgent hands fell from 90 per month in1951 to 15 per month in 1952, also neverto rise above that figure again.

After Templer left Malaya in 1954, hispolicies and those of Briggs werecontinually enforced with success againstthe insurgents. Although it took until 1960for the Malayan government to officiallydeclare the Emergency ended, victory overthe communist insurgents was clear whenMalaya gained its independence in 1957and saw a new government form without a

40 INFANTRY July-August 2005

single seat going to a eonimunist orcommunist supporter.

Analysis of ApplicatiDn ofCounterinsurgency Doctrine

Ihe British counterinsurgency againstthe MCP was effective because itsuccessfully established the five conditionsof an effective counterinsurgencycampaign. Under current United StatesArmy doctrine, the five fundamentalconditions necessary for successfulcounterinsurgency operations are asfollows:

1) A secure populace,2) Established local political institutions,3) Contributing local government,4) Noutrali/ing insurgent capahilitics,

and5) Information How from local

sources.Rach oi' these five conditions contains

some degree of nuance. Under the flrslcondition, a secure populaee means securityfrom the influence of insurgents initially,moving to a situation where the host nationpopulation is mobilized, armed, and trainedto protect itself Effective security allowslocal political and administrativeinstitutions to operate freely and localcommerce to flourish.

Under the second prong, establishingloeal political institutions includesestablishing conditions favorable for thedevelopment of host nation governmentalinstitutions, including law enforcement,publie information, health care, schools,and publie works.

Under the third condition, contributingloeal government is both tangible andpsychological, and local security forcesmust reinforce and be integrated into theplan. This local integration must beconstantly emphasized with the local andhost nation police, civil, and militaryleadership, as well as with the populaee atlarge. Psychologically, in order to mitigatethe impact of insurgent propaganda, thepopulaee must constantly be reassured thatconditions are improving.

Counterinsurgency operations mustestablish conditions that contribute to hostnation and loeal government effectiveness.

To neutralize insurgent capabilitiestinder the fourth prong, counterinsurgentefforts must work to exploit insurgentgrievances and work with local authoritiesand leaders to resolve issues of local

concern thereby legitimizing governmentalinstitutions.

Under the fifth prong, to fosterinformation flow from local sources,counterinsurgent efforts must facilitate anduse intelligence obtained from loeal sourcesto gain access to the insurgent's economicand social base of support, order of battle,tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The British effectively secured thepopulace during the Emergency. Theresettlement of the squatters under theBriggs plan proved to be an effectivesecurity measure. Though it displacedsome 400,000 persons from the life theythen knew, the resettlement eventuallyprovided security to the squatters by placingthem in defensible villages with a seeurityperimeter. Furthermore, the improvedliving conditions and new propertyownership the squatters enjoyed made it sothe former squatters now had somethingmore to defend. Briggs and Templer bothrightly emphasized the elTorts ofthe HomeGuard, which progressively formed into aviable, trained, and armed local securityforce. This not only bolstered local villagesecurity but security on an operational levelas well due to the faet that security forces,until then posted on static guard duties,were freed to eonduct other offensive

operations against the insurgents. Finally,Templer"s implementation ofthe "whiteareas" proved to be the tmal successful pushof security from a nationally led effort downto a locally led effort. The Briggs Plan andTempler's additions to it enabled Malayanlocales to achieve free operation ofcommerce and of loeal political andadministrative institutions.

During the Emergency, the Britisheffectively established local politicalinstitutions. One ofthe first prongs oftheBriggs Plan was to establish locally eieetedcouncils, and later, Templer furtherbolstered this loeal government tool byadding to each council's legal authorities.These actions gave the local populace astake in their own future, particularly whenTempler gave the local councils authorityto oversee the implementation of publicfunds for community improvements suehas schools, electricity, running v\ater, andhealth care facilities. Further, theintroduction of the "white areas" byTempler accelerated the country towardsvictory over the insurgents. In effect, theBritish had set up a clear reward system toencourage local governments to proactivelyassume the fight against the insurgents.The effectiveness of this plan was clearwhen those areas that won tbe "white area"

© Crown Copynght/MOD, image from www photos mod.ukReproduced wUh the permission of the Controller of Her Maiesty's Stationery Office

the Malayan F.merfiency in 1956. members of Britain \ 25th Regiment Royal Artilleryengage suspected bandit positions from their firehase.

July-August 2005 INFANTRY 41

© Crown Copyright/WOD, image from www.photos mod.uhReproduced with Ihe permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office

During the Malayan Emergency in 1956, gunners with Britain's 25th Regiment Royal Artillerytend to their 25 pounder gun/howitzer on their base camp in Malaya.

against their former comrades, which dealta further blow to the MRLA and MCP.Thus, the British effectively neutralizedinsurgent capabilities on all frontssimultaneously.

The British effectively fosteredinformation flow from local sources. As theBritish learned prior to implementation ofthe Briggs Plan, il took many hundreds,even thousands, of long hours of tediousjungle patrolling to produee the fruit of juslone reliable intelligence tip from informedlocal sourees. To their credit, the Britishthrough Briggs and Templer. realized thatin order to obtain intelligenee from the loealpopulace, the populaee had to feel securefrom retribution from the violent andundiseriminating insurgents. The Britishdid well then to substantially augment themilitary and police forces in order toconvince the populace that they intendedto win Ihe struggle with the communists.

label took pride not only in their newfound freedoms, but also intheir new "status." Thus, the British established conditionsfavorable for local host nation government institutions.

The British effectively fostered a contributing local goveniment.The SWECs and DWECs Briggs organized provided themechanism for integration ofthe elected civilian leadership, themilitary and police forces called for by United States Armydoctrine. The British also fostered loeal government contributionshy empowering the elected civilian leadership to oversee andapprove any military or police actions in their jurisdictions. Thisreal grant of power gave the local governing authorities thenecessary sense of ownership in their own destiny necessary toensure their energetic, proactive contributions to their own welfareand seeurity. Additionally. Briggs and Templer effectivelyemphasized the need for local government to work hard for thepopulace in the continuing effort to win hearts and minds. TheBritish did well to realize that the Malayan populace was lookingnot only at military successes, but also at whether the governmentthey currently lived under was better than what was being offeredby the communists. This emphasis on local government servicewas eOective in producing tangible results, in the form ofimprovedliving standards, and psychological results, in the form of loyaltieswon in the struggle for the hearts and minds ofthe populace.

The British effectively neutralized insurgent eapabilities. Theefforts by Briggs and Templer to eliminate the sources of food, recruits.and supplies for the insurgents proved effective. By forming the new-squatter villages, creating accountability for retailers of food andmedical supplies, and controlling the population's rice rationing, theBritish effectively began to starve tbe MRLA troops. Combined withincreased military, police, and Home (juard patrolling, made all themore effective through the use of intelligence from locals, the MRLAwas forced deeper and deeper into tbe jungle and away from thepopulace. This allowed British psychological operations to exploitinsurgent grievances through offers of food and comfortable livingconditions advertised in pamphlets and Hiers. Those insurgentswho surrendered were treated well and then employed to work

These forces also helped to provide the security necessary for thefree How of inlelligenee to the government. However, it was theHome Guard that provided the most effective conduit toinformation tlow from local sourees. The Home Guard broughtwith it the double-advantage of increasing security and fosteringintelligence flows, both trom the Home Guard citizens themselvesand from the local populace they secured. This movement gainedmomentum throughout applieation ofthe Briggs Plan, culminatingin the advent of Templer's "white areas." Thus, the insurgent'seconomic and social bases of support were effectively eviseeratedwhen information from loeal sources eliminated their ability toeoverlly operate amongst the pupulaee.

ConclusionThe British vietoi7 over the communists in Malaya has become

a textbook example of effective counterinsurgent techniques duelo the effective application by the British of the five fundamentalsof a counterinsurgency. Detractors from the British eflorts maypoint out that Malaya did not share a border with a hostilecommunist nation and that the insurgents thus were not as wellsupported as those in other world eontlicts. Additionally, eventhough the British defeated the eommunist insurgents in Malaya,the process took over a decade at an enormous cost in lives,manpower, and funds. However, ibe talent of men like Briggsand Templer cannot be overstated. They derived and applied noveltechniques and methods of battling an elusive and iidaptive enemy.As a testament to the efficacy ofthe British techniques, the methodsfor conducting a counterinsurgency developed by the British inMalaya still serve today as the basis for modern militarycounterinsurgent doctrine.

First Lieutenant Tom Willis currently serves with C Company. 2ndBattalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) al Camp Dawson. WestVirginia. He graduated with a bachelor's degree from the University of Virginia,a Juris Doctor from the University of Oregon School of Law, and a Master's ofLaw from Georgetown University School of Law. LT Willis received hiscommission via direct appiDintment by the Governor of the state of West Virginia

42 INFANTRY July-August 2005