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*William S. orser. .-

*' ' ' Wee PresidentNoo.c o mrations 10CFR50.73 c

|j . @. Ferml2

0400 North Dixie Highway Nur. learmen '-t

O ' Newport Michigan 48 tt36 Generatlort'

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November 22, 1989HRC-89-0249

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttention: Document Control Desk

r. Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Fermi 2'- NRC Docket No. 50-341

Facility Operating License No. NPF-43i'

Subject: Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-029-00

~Please find enclosed LER No. 89-029-00, dated November I'I22, 1989, for a reportable event that occurred on October

23, 1989. A copy of this LER is also being sent to theRegional Administrator. USNRC Region III.

If you have any quescions, please contact JosephPendergast at (313).586-1682.

Sincerely.

h NY!

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Enclosure: NRC'rorms 366 366A {_l

cc: A. B. Davic '|.

J. R. Eckert !!

R. W. Defayette/W. L. AxelsonU. G. RogercJ. F. Stang

Wayne County Emergency !

. Management Division

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NRC Form 306 U S. N9CLE AR t.E;ULS.is Y COMMISGIONI '

.PPROVED OMS M. 31660104'

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ' ma' 5 ''**

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F ACILITY NAME 0) DOCKET NUMSER (2) PAGE(3e

Fermi 2 o is I o i o I o | 3|Il 1 1 |or| 0:41

h. ' " ' ' ' ' ' Engineered Saf'ety Feature Actuations Due to Loss of Reactor ProtectionSystem Motor Generator Set "B" Power

EVENT DATE 154 LER NUMetR (4) AtPORT DAf f 176 OTHER F ACILITit$ INVOLVED (0)SIO ''' [* f, MONTH DAY VtAR F ACluT Y hAMES DOChii NUM5tRt36 *

fMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR n

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LICEN5f t CONTACT FOR THis LER (128

N1Mt TELEPHONE NUM8tm

ARE A COQt g,Joseph Pendergast, Licensing Engineerl6 i 8 28 6| -i3 | 13 5i i1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRittD IN THl$ REPORT H36

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1 I I I l I'l i I I I I I ISUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR

SUBMis$ ION

4tS lit ver, comosene EXPECTED SU9h*IS9 TON DA TE) NO | | |A98TLACT ILimit to I400 sonees. b e , eoorotomewy Muren v40 soece tverwerttee ronest nes

On October 23 1989 at 1020 hours a half scram signal was0 e

received-when power was lost on Reactor Protection System bus"B". Several Engineered Safety Features were actuated. All of

the expected actuations/isolations were received. ShutdownCooling was not expected to isolate at the time-of the event since 1

|- the affected Shutdown Cooling suction valve in the system wasde-energized open for surveille.nce testing. The valve did close

I when power was restored to it. |

|

The loss of RPS bus "B" was attributed to the location of a |

breaker operating switch in a high traffic area in the plant. 11

A Security investigation was conducted to determine if any |

personnel could have bumped the switch. This Licensee Event |,

E

Report will be given to operations personnel as required reading.A Fotential Design Change will be evaluated to determine ifbreaker covers should be installed at pancis when the b r e ak t: r l

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operating switches are located in hiEh traffic areas.,

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*AcILITV NAMA Hi DOCKET NUMSER GI LER NUMe6ER (6) P404 {3) - |

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JInitial Plant. Conditions: ,

Operational Condition: 5 -(Refueling) ;

N .ReactoriPowers! O -Percent,*, .gReactor Temperatures 98 degrees Fahrenheit >

-

Reactor / Pressure: 0. psig

m , Description-of the Event:p>

M On October-23.n1989.-at 1020 hours, a half scram signal wasreceived when power was lost.to. Reactor Protection System bus "B"

3

A (RPS) (J C) . - The-loss of power caused several Engineered Safetyf -

| Features uo actuate.. All of the expected actuations/isolations'

| were received. These^ included:

'1): The Control Center Heating Ventilation and Air ConditioningSystem -(VI) (CCHVAC)= shifted to the recirculation mode. ,

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-2) . Reactor' Building Hesting Ventilation and Air Conditioning*

(VA) (RBHVAC) isolated...

3)E .TheiStandby Gas Treatment System (BH) (SGTS) automaticallystarted.-

.

- 4 )' -Division'2 Non-Interruptible Air Supply control aircompressor-(COMP)'(NIAS) automatically started.

. Operations personnel quickly determined that the loss ofs power to j

trip of RPS motor generator "B".RPS bus "B".had been caused by a .

All expected isolations and actuations<were verified to haveoccurred.. Shutdown cooling had not isolated since the ResidualHeat. Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Valve E11-F008 was

. c de-energized in the open position at the time of the event for a ,

I L battery surveillance test..

Power was restored to RPS bus "B" from the alternate power supply-at 1103 hours. At 1210 hours, the above described system-actuations and isolations were returned to normal except for .

'E11-F008 which was still de-energized open for the surveillance.,

At 1214 hours.-power was restored to E11-F008 initiating a closure'

of the valve and isolating Shutdown Cooling. Operations personnel.immediately. recognized the valve closure as an expected isolationdue to the previous RPS bus "B" power loss. The valve was openedand Shutdown Cooling restored in approximately one minute.

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Cauce of'the Event:

A thorough investigation was conducted. The trip of the RPS MotorGenerator set "B" was attributed to the location of the breakeroperating.cwitch. The switch is located in an area that has seenhigh traffic during the refueling outage. The Motor Control

| -Center is 1ccated at the bottom of a stairwell leading to a path' that is traveled heavily during the refueling outage. A clearance

of. twenty-six inches exists between the path and the switch. ,,

|- Workers handling bulky objects may have had difficulty negotiating| the clearance, and not realized they bumped the switch. Securityp has investigated and found no evidente of deliberate tampering

with the switch.|'

The following is a detailed explanation of the E11-F008 operationduring this event.

L'At the time of the event an uncommon condition existed in thatE11-F006.was de-energized in the open position for a batterysurveillance. Operations personnel checked plant conditions and

!. alarms against expected actuations and isolations as described in'

L Enclosure "B" of NPP 23.316 "RPS 120 VAC and RPS MG Setc". Thedifference was noted that E11-F008 had not closed and Shutdown'

Cooling had not isolated as normally would have been expected.

The closure of valve E11-F008 upon re-enerization was due to ascal-in closure signal created by the isolation signal. This was

; through the open/ intermediate position of the valve operatingpushbutton. The signal actuated the "close" coil. With the' valve'

operator in the full open position and de-energized, no method ofremoving the "cloce" seal-in existed except for pushing the "open"pushbutton prior to re-snergizing the valve operator. Thus, whenthe valve operator was re-energized. the scal-in "clocure" signal;

: caused the valve to close.

' It should also be noted that there are differences between AC andDC valve operating circuits. For moct DC operators and nearly all -

AC operators. de-onergization of the valve Motor Control Centerde-energizes both the operator logic and the valve motor. Forsome DC operators. the power cupply to the valve motor is 260 VDCwhile the operator logic is 130 VDC supplied from an independentsource. Some of these selected DC operators have control relay

.

contacts / relays in the valve operator logic that serve to'

de-energize the logic when the valve motor power is lost.~ F11-F008 does not have these controls /relayc and it is necessary

,

| to either pull control power fuses in the valve operator's logic! or break the coal-in "close" by pressing the open pushbutton to

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. LICENSEE EVENT REPSRT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATISN - acaov6o ous No. no-oio4-[.,. EXPIRES: 8'31/MI

f ACIL4TY NAML H) DOcEEI NUMBER (2) L(R NUMSER (4) . PAGE (3t

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TEXT f# more asese de sovvest was esegnet NNC Form Jese)Un,

prevent valve closure before power restoration after a closuresignal is received. When E11-F008 closed, the condition wasrecognized immediately by operations personnel and actions takento restore Shutdown Cooling were complete in approximately oneminute.

Analysis of the Event:

All of the safety systems which actuated / isolated functioned asdesigned when the RPS "B" power supply was lost. C CilV A C . RBHVAC.SGTS. and NIAS responded by actuating or isolating per design.

The. loss of Shutdown Cooling was for only one minute. Promptoperator action was taken. In addition, the gate between theSpent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Cavity was open. The volume of '

water contained in the Reactor Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool, coupled !

with the heat removal capability of the Fuel Pool Cooling andCleanup System could have served as an additional source of heatremoval had there been a-need to remove excess heat. Underoperating conditions requiring Shutdown Cooling, a loss of this

.

capability for approximately one minute would have had anegligible effect on reactor coolant temperature. Therefore, thehealth and safety of plant employees and the public was protectedat all times.

Corrective Actions:|

| A security investigation was initiated to identify any personnel1: who could have bumped the switch or tampered with the switch. No

[ deliberate tampering is suspected.

Potential Design Change-10972 will be evaluated to determine ifbreaker covers should be installed at panels when the breakeroperating switches are located in high traffic areas. Thisevaluation is expected to be complete by March 15, 1990. 1

1

This Licensee Event Report will be given to Operations personnelas required reading. It will serve to alert operators to the

; particular conditions which were encountered during this event.This will be complete by December 30 1989.

1

' Previous Similar Events: ;

i<

Licensee Event Report 88-025 " Reactor Protection Trip System BDe-energized Due To Personnel Mishap" described a similar eventhowever the individual who caused the actuation was identified. !

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NCC DOOM 366A og,s. cro, ige 8-520 % H 00010

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