1. Macias v Comelec

G.R. No. L-18684

FACTS:

Petitioners request that respondent officials be presented from implementing

Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts. They alleged that said RA

unconstitutional and void because: (a) it was passed by the House of Representatives

without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the Members at least three

calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved more than three years after the

return of the last census of our population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard

to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. The respondents aver they were

merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to

be constitutional. Respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners have no

personality to bring this action; that a duly certified copy of the law creates

the presumption of its having been passed in accordance with the requirements of the

Constitution (distribution of printed bills included); that the Director of the Census

submitted an official report on the population of the Philippines in November 1960, which

report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the principle of

proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 3040 violates the principle of proportional representative

stipulated in the Constitution.

DISCUSSION:

The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House

of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may

be according to the number of their respective inhabitants. "After hearing the parties and

considering their memoranda, The Court issued a resolution, stating that RA 3040

violates the Constitution in several ways namely:(a) it gave Cebu seven members, while

Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members,

while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; .

 

"The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates for

the house of delegates is a judicial question for the courts, although the statute is

an exercise of political power."

HELD:

Republic Act No. 3040 that gave provinces with less number of inhabitants more

representative districts than those with bigger population is declared invalid because it

violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution.

2. Mariano Jr. v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577

FACTS:

Two (2) petitions assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 entitled “”An Act

Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the

City of Makati” as unconstitutional. They contend that section 51 collides with section 8,

Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution where elective local officials,

including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and

are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that

by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A.

No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and

disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that

section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has

already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor

Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still

run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since

his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted.

Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the

political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners’ arguments are tenable for litigation

DISCUSSION:

The court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51.

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well

delineated. They are: there must be an actual case or controversy; the question of

constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; the constitutional question must be

raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and the decision on the constitutional question

must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from

complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many

contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty

elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-

election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these

contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue

which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of

Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this

Court has no jurisdiction.

HELD:

Petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.

3. Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC

G.R. No. 13687

FACTS:

There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-list election under RA

7941:

1. 20% allocation 3. 3-seat limit

2. 2% threshold 4. Proportional representation

The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states that the State shall

“promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral

parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging

to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack

well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and

enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become

members of the House of Representatives. The State shall also develop the simplest

scheme possible to guarantee a full, free and open party system by enhancing their

chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature.”

ISSUES:

Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up

completely all the time?

Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?

How should the additional seats be determined?

DISCUSSION:

NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. The

Congress has prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage

requirement, and the mechanics by which it is to be filled up.

YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent with the very essence of

“representation.” The 3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations

into the legislative. Thus, no single group would dominate.

To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be followed:

rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the “first” party.

determine the seats the “first” party will have. For the “first” party, it will have a

6% benchmark. Every succeeding additional 2% of votes from the first 2% requirement

will constitute 1 additional seat. If the “first” party gets 2 additional seats, then the next in

rank will get less.

HELD:

The Petitions are partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec

are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list

representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified

parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

4. BANAT v COMELEC

G.R. No. 179271

FACTS:

The May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for party-list representatives.

The Comelec counted 15, 950, 900 votes cast for Ninety Three parties under the Party-

list system. Banat filed a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives

provided by the Constitution. Banat filed its petition because the chairman and the

members of Comelec have recently been quoted in national papers that they are duty

bound to and shall implement the Veterans Ruling, that is, application of the Panganiban

formula in allocating part-list seats. There were no intervenors in Banat’s petition before

the NBC.

Comelec, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed thirteen

parties as winners in the party-list elections based on the presumptive two percent

threshold of votes were thus given to one guaranteed party-list seat each.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives in Sec 5 (2), Art

VI of the Constitution mandatory merely a ceiling.

DISCUSSION:

All parties on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to a party-list

candidate garnering at least 2% of the total party-list votes. However, there are

numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of

additional seats under the Party-list System.

Sec 11 and Sec 12 of R.A. No. 7941 provides:

Rank from the highest to the lowest.

At least 2% of the total votes cast, guaranteed one seat.

Garnering more than 2%, means additional seat is unconstitutional.

Not more than three seats.

The additional seats allocated to parties with sufficient number of votes for one seat, in

no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party. Congress in enacting R.A. No.

7941 put the three seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from

particularly in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution

clearly intended the major political parties to participate in the party-list elections through

their sectoral wings. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling

in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,

directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from

the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On

the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in oncurring with this

ponencia.

HELD:

Petition is partially granted. Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in

NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60, is

set aside. The two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats is

declared unconstitutional. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System

shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of the Decision of his case.

Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. The

Decision immediately executory.

5. Sema v Comelec

G.R. No. 177597

FACTS:

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the

province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted

against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative

districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power

to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the

ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act

201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the

exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is

now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating

that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the

first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while

awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative

district (or part of any).

Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with

Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a

separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting

(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he

won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S.

Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.

Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a

representative in the HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.

Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its

representation.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create

validly LGUs.

DISCUSSION:

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria

established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or

barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government

unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation

must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite

in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to

create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress

can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,

subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the

Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and

municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to

compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the

plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot

validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k,

and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR.

Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k

(population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so

Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the

province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be

legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.

At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

 

HELD:

Republic Act No. 9054 is unconstitutional.

6. MARCOS v COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976

FACTS: 

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a

candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with

the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for

residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-

year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art.

VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution 

DISCUSSION:

For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court

upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of

candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following:

(a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of

origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of

origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide

intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts

which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the

concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the

wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in

Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married

President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new

home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile

after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband

died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose

Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

HELD:

Having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of

Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May

25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is directed to order the

Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative

of the First District of Leyte. 

7. Aquino v Comelec

G.R. No. 120265,

FACTS:

Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati,

a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of

Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the

latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under

Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year

immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for

congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.

DISCUSSION:

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second

District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but

domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he

was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the

same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate

indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate

places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently

clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his

most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a

condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of

petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of

permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare

assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a

bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new

one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and

positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Held:

The instant petition is DISMISSED. THE Order restraining respondent COMELEC from

proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the

congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.

8. Social Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs Board

G.R. No. 157870

FACTS:

In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was

implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public

office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and

private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and

regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection

with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator

and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition under Rule 65.  In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in

that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already

provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing

Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a

maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a

member of the Senate.  He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring,

via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to

undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for

senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the

Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification

requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the

qualifications of Senators.

DISCUSSION: 

Pimentel’s contention is valid.  Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is

unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the

Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the

basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the

Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of

government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. 

Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.     The provision “[n]o person elected to

any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone

mandatory drug test.” Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications.  COMELEC cannot,

in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and

regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator

in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate

for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also

without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should

not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in

the Constitution.

HELD:

The Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.

36(g)of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to

PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.

36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined

from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.

9. Avelino v Cuenco

G.R. No. 2821

FACTS:

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the

court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano

Cuenco. On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor

to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on

the next session (21 Feb 1949).On the next session, Tanada’s request to deliver a

speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was

approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they

deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The Senate

President with his supporters employed delaying tactics, tried to adjourn the session,

and then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate,

who remained, continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting

President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the

Philippines. Thus this petition at hand.

ISSUES:

Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

DISCUSSION:

The court has no jurisdiction of the case. It is because of the principle of

separation of powers. The judiciary has no power over the decisions made by the

senate, especially in electing its president. Also, the Chief Executive already approved

the said election. (MAIN) 2. If the court has jurisdiction over the case, was there a

quorum in the second session of the Senate? According to the 4 Justices, (Justice

Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon) It is because 12 constitute a quorumin the said case.

Normally, 13 would be the number of majority in the Senate, but since Senator Confesor

was out of the country, there was a change to the number of majority. The Justices

said,“ When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a

quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the

members constitute “the House”.There is a difference between a majority of “all the

members of the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number

than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less

one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the

arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would

be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same

inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.” In fine,

the four justices that the practical situation here is to agree with the newly appointed

Senate President. It is because even though the other 11 members would be present,

they still would be at 12-11 in favor of Cuenco. Also, the election of the Senate President

greatly rest upon the will of the majority. Therefore, if they wanted to, they could just

change the Senate President again.

HELD:

The court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.

10. Arroyo v De Venecia

G.R. No. 127255

FACTS:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends

certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members

of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House

which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount

to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with

certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the

disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The

bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep.

Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll

call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.

After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader

Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The

Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being

none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking,

“What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.

Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the

approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the

Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of

Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective

secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by

President Ramos.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the

rules of the House.

DISCUSSION:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject

to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they

are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They

may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to

conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite

number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to

qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than

members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in

character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are

involved.

HELD:

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a

member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to

the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no

quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the

presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had

already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The

question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is

obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 

11. Osmena v Pendatun

G.R. No. L- 17144

FACTS:

Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House

of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia.

Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of

the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to

produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For

having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,

Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of

15 months for serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUE:

  Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary privilege

of speech

 

DISCUSSION:

Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or

debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not

be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity

which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the

democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without

fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other

forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility

before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the

latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of

speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may

be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what

constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred

jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual

circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black

and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if  the Court

assumed the power to determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly

behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never

intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed.

12.  Santiago v SandiganbayanG.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

FACTS:

A case for the review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in

ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-

Santiago, in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation

of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act.

Employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed the case

against the petitioner who was then CID commissioner. The ff are details of the case

filed:

On Oct. 17, 1988, Petitioner approved the application for legalization of the stay

of certain aliens who arrived in the Philippines in Jan. 1, 1984, knowing that they are

disqualified from the legalization. This violates EO No. 324 which prohibits the

legalization of said disqualified aliens. In view of the said case, the Sandiganbayan

issued an order of suspension for 90 days.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis

E.Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen

Thousand(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner bailed. On May 24, 1991 petitioner filed,

concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before

the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from

proceeding with case. Court granted, issuing a temporary restraining order. On Jan. 13,

1992, the Court lifted the temporary restraining order. And on December 1992 to August

1995new information and testimonies were admitted by the court. August 22, 1995,

Petitioner filed opposition to the motion of prosecution to suspend her. January 25, 1996.

Sandiganbayan resolved to suspend petitioner as senator and from any other

governmental position she may be holding. Her suspension was for 90 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend a senator.

DISCUSSION:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an

incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.

3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.-Sec. 13 of RA 3019 provides for the

suspension and loss of benefits. In Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that treating

of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer may no longer be put

at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.

HELD:

Instant Petition for Certiorari is Dismissed.

13. Paredes v Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco,

Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the

governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and

Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy

of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio

claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a

criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the

judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the

arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part

maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his

testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of

political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended

that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes

appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by

order of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD

 Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman

Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by

the court on the prerogatives of congress.  The SC ruled:

“x x x.  Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution – which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to

‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a

vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of

suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it

appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,

which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the

fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of

the House of Representatives.”

14. MABANAG v VITO

G.R. No. L-1123

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional

resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the

Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto. "The petitioners contend that their vote

were not taken into consideration in requiring that in amending the constitution, the law requires 3/4 of

the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question of constitutionality of

the said resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction and whether or not the journals can be

investigated against the conclusiveness of the enrolled bills.

DISCUSSION:

Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the enrolled bills which were

already authenticated and to investigate the journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the

coequal and independent department of the state, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct

of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must

lead to confusion in the administration of the law. Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof

of the provisions of Acts and the due enactment thereof.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed.

15. Casco v Gimenez

GR No. L- 17931

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim

for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. Pursuant to the provisions of

Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the

Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95 fixing a

uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The Bank later

promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption

from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.The petitioner

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea

and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of synthetic resin

glues. Petitioner sought refund relying upon Resolution No.1529 of the Monetary Board

which declares that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from

said fee. Central Bank issued margin fee vouchers for the refund. However, the Auditor

of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve the said vouchers on the ground that

the exemption of the separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord

with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. No. 2609. The petitioner also

contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"

between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress

intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the

manufacture of the syntheticesin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a

finished product.

ISSUE:

Whether or not “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment

of the aforesaid margin fee.

 

DISCUSSION:

National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its

Commissioner, the view that: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the

synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and

formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of

reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive

fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and

different from urea" and" formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of

the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". It is well settled that the enrolled bill

which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" --- is

conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress

and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill

before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on

which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers

and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system, the remedy is

by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

HELD:

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

16. Astorga v Villegas

G.R. No. L- 23475

FACTS:

House bill No. 9266,definingthe powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became

a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed it. However, it was later on

found out hat the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it was going

thru its revision. With this finding, the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement

saying they are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No. 9266, therefore, it should not be

considered as a law.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory

and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of

RA4065.

DISCUSSION:

The journal of The proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The

Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of

misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire

whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by

both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this

and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy

amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the

printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such

amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill

was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of

the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the

manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief

Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding

that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous

consequences not intended by the law-making body

HELD:

The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents'

signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not become a law. The temporary

restraining order was also made permanent. The intent of the law making body based on its journals

prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill.

17. Morales v Subido

G.R. No. L- 29658

FACTS:

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years

but does not possess a bachelor’s degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police.

Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the

rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose

to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales  was

designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional

appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the

designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the

minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.”

Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked

Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

“Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be

appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a

recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the

Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with

exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain

or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has

served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain

and/or higher.”

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police

department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that

when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the

following:

‘No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s

degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National

Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain

or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has

served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces

for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.’

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by

Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change

made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police

with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of

certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an

employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the

then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring

upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

DISCUSSION:  

The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the

Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in

slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to

discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the

Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the

said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the

SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine

what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of

the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as

holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are

certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal

of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure

to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon

but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now

decide.  All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be

entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy

HELD:

Motions for reconsideration denied.

18. Tanada v Cuenco

G.R. L-10520

FACTS:

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly

occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada

who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a

senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral

Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is

provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3

justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from

the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET

members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed

this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if

the SET would be  dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista

Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al

(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the

issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the

members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and

Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before

the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the issue is a political question.

DISCUSSION: 

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable

question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,

namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution,

are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the

government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a

particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being

asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised

by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid –

which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from

the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the

minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of

the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats

(even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the

majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the

Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such

rules comply with the Constitution.

HELD:

Respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have

not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not

entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from

exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting

in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the

qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo

Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special

pronouncement as to costs.

 

19. Bondoc v Pineda

FACTS

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio

Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth

District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,

3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of

Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).

Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.

Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman

Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly

helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting

LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the

promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the

Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives

decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura

to the HRET.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political

party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the

promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending

therein.

RULING

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to

provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to

legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their

functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence

from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of

party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In

expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in

favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the

ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives

committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its

resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives

is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the

HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure

just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution.

Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,

such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death,

permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,

formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member

may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof

that he has formally affiliated with another.

20. Abbas v Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 83767

Facts:

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an

election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN

coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987

congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. On November 17, 1987, the

petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce

Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the

latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's

representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for

Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and

resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties

to said case, as respondents therein. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had

voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and deliberations of the

respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter

being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T.

Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two

cases. The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the

norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought

and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the

questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally

unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of

procedures as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal. The

proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence of

five (5)members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is aproviso that where

more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a

quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)Justice, and may adopt resolutions by

majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the

petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the

resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this

Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE:

Whether the proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) is neither

unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution.

DISCUSSION:

Fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and

intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate

Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. It

seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices

of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both

those "judicial' and' legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of

deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The

respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said

provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved

by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are

represented.The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly

mandates the participation in the same process of decision of are presentative or

representatives of the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the

decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather,

just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels

that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial

judgment.

21. Co v Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 92191-92

 

FACTS:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a

decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET

declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of

Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11,1987, the congressional

election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who

vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar

are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose

Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second

district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private

respondent premised on the following grounds:

 1.Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

 2.Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

 

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This

was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence,

these petitions for certiorari.

ISSUE:

  Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

DISCUSSION:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather),

arrived in the Philippines fromChina. Ong Te established his residence in the

municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he boughtfrom the fruits of hard work.

 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the

then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong

Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year

1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absor

bed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years

passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love

and, thereafter, got married in 1932according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple

bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong

Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and

shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered.

Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,Manila. In the

meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation

of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an

application for naturalization on February 15,

1954.On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipin

o citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order

declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan

may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a

certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private

respondent) was 9years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of

Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as

the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better

education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college

education. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the

CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the

respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines

as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in

Manila.

 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional

Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the

Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to

derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly

declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The

Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship

since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

HELD:

Petitions were dismissed.

22. Codilla v De Venecia

G.R. No. 150605

FACTS:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th

district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit

was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By

virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec

later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently

disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner,

the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s

proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to

subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he

won.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.

Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.

Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

DISCUSSION:

The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner

had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the

disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and

for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could

not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.

Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before

the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order

disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise

jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A

petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with

jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its

(Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial.

Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of personal

judgment or opinion.

HELD:

Petition for Mandamus is granted.

23. Guingona v Gonzales

G.R. No. 106971

FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators,

5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice

the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the Commission on

Appointments, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a

political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No.of Senators elected. The results of such a formula

would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-

NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,

nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded

off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP

-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the Commission on Appointments.

This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen.Tolentino who proposed that

the elected members of the Commission on Appointments should consist of eight LDP,

one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-

NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against

proportional representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in

the Commission on Appointments.

DISCUSSION:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional

membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the

political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads

to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2

to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a

fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half

or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect

Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly

reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less

than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section

18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the

Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The

election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the

representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.

A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the

Commission on Appointments. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party

which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to

resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with

proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the

other party.

HELD:

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and

jurisprudence on the matter before the declared the election of Senator Alberto Romulo

and Senator Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments as null

and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under Section 18

of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition

is issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist

from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of the Commission

on Appointments; and ordering the respondents Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in

his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from

recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and

permitting them from sitting and participating as members of said Commission.

22. Daza v Singson

G.R. No. 86344

FACTS:

Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and was listed as

representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the

Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of this, the House of Representatives revised

its representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-

formedLDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional

representation.

ISSUES:.

Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable political party

Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to been titled to proportional

representation in the CA Held and ratio both petitioner and respondent invoke the case

of Cunanan v. Tan.

DISCUSSION:

In the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and

formed the Allied Majority. Three Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen, were

deprived of their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s

ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place.

Cunanan contended the validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority

was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the Nacionalista

Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on proportional

representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the organization

of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives. The

petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability.

However, the LDP has already been inexistence for a year. They command the biggest

following. They not only survived but prevailed. Regarding being a duly registered party,

the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus,

shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required.

RULING:

The petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989,

is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of

the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body

pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

24. People v Jalosjos

G.R. Nos. 132875-76

FACTS:

The accused-appellant, a full-fledged member of Congress, confined at the

national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is

pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully

discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and

committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of anon-

bailable offense. Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states

that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as

their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the

duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his

constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be

defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which

states that –The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his

present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to

elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that

they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or

forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by

reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. Jalosjos

avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices

to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of

Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his

mandate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as

member of House of Representatives.

DISCUSSION:

No. The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense. True,

election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its

importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may been larged

or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a

position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather

than exemption. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the

House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has

always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a

special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may

not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-

appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of

Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent

members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The

confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of

more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To

allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5

days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges

appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-

appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes

of the correction system. ranted in a restrictive sense.

HELD:

Motion denied.

25. Aguinaldo v Santos

G.R. No. 94115

FACTS:

Rodolfo Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan.

Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local

Government sent a telegram and a letter, to Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why

he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within

forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. A sworn complaint for disloyalty to the

Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel

Mamba and Orlino Agatep, the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and

Lasam, all in Cagayan, against Aguinaldo for acts the latter committed during the coup.

In his letter, Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively

participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of

the rebel soldiers. The Secretary suspended Aguinaldo from office for 60 days from

notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. During the hearing, Aguinaldo

did not present any evidence and instead moved that the Secretary inhibit himself, which

motion was denied. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as

charged and ordering his removal from office. The Vice Governor, Melvin Vargas was

installed as Governor. In this appeal, the power of the Secretary to suspend officials was

repealed by the 1987 Constitution and that the act of disloyalty committed by Aguinaldo

was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. While the case was pending before the SC,

Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan.

Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been

removed from office. The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the

ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending

review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the

resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local

government officials as alter ego of the President

DISCUSSION:

Yes. Aguinaldo's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the

canvassing of votes, Aguinaldo garnered the most number of votes among the

candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v.

Comelec et al:

‘

the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the

extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a

public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be

to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a

man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and

character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been

guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically

overrule the will of the people. Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be

removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-

election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the

extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds

no application to criminal cases pending against Aguinaldo for acts he may have

committed during the failed coup. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local

government of officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from

the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4)

of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all

executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over

local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are

presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory

grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the

then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2. A

similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Inasmuch as

the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code, which

provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973

Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that BP337 was

repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution. Moreover,

in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr.,

BP 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the Constitution, until such time as

the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of he Secretary

of the DILG to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of

BP 337. As to Aguinaldo's argument of the want of authority of the Secretary to appoint

Melvin Vargas as Governor, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to

show the fallacy of the same. Equally without merit is Aguinaldo's claim that before he

could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required

inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is

defined and penalized under Article 137 of the RPC. Aguinaldo is not being prosecuted

criminally under the provisions of the RPC, but administratively with the end in view of

removing Aguinaldo as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of

disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial

evidence.

HELD:

Petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent Secretary

of

Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing

petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is REVERSED.

26. Jimenez v Cabangbang

G.R. No. L-15905

FACTS:

Defendant Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of

Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open

letter to the President dated November 14, 1958 which caused said to letter to be

published in several newspapers of general circulation in Philippines. This exposed the

allegedly operational plans of AFP officers of a massive political build-up of then

Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him in becoming a Presidential

candidate in 1961.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication

DISCUSSION:

The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls

within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate in Congress” as used in Art. VI, Sec.

15(now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the

performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or

votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills

introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed

by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the

official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional

Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the

performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not

belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress

presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in

several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so

published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or

as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely

privileged.

HELD:

Order appealed from is affirmed.

27. Pelaez v Auditor General

FACTS:

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities

– this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which

provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of

any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any

subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as  a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to

prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said

municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68

of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that

barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except

by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even

create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,

since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were

barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and

that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that

through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create

municipalities to the President.

ISSUE

Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the

President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD

No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another

branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or

administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation

of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to

be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate   — and (b) fix a standard —

the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate

must conform in the performance of his functions.  In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such

standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,

make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the

aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable

certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may

require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public

welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a

proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may

require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation

is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such

place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be

changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of

municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially

and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

 

28. Santiago v COMELEC

FACTS

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement

for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to

Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of

the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and

directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between

petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file

their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18,

1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin

filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,

among others: 

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an

enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the

Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. 

ISSUES

1. WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s

initiative.

2. WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution,

and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

3. WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to

the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the

conduct of such initiative?

4. WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the

draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution. 

5. WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

6. WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there

is a pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD: 

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the

Constitution. 

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.

The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in

whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so

with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws

sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A.

No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for

Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.

This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and

local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the

initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle

therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of

values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far

more important than the initiative on national and local laws. 

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and

referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to

forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made

permanent. 

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. 

29. ABAKADA Guro v Purisima

FACTS

Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and

collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It

provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and

Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR

and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all

officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,

regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the

constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the

scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR

and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid

basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials

and employees of all other government agencies.

Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries

is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with

the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC

because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government

agencies and instrumentalities.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:

Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who

are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be

accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be

treated in law differently.

The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated

in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid

discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which

is limited either in the object to which it is directed. 

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that

has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA

9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability

and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-

generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or

sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the

law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary

function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of

taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the

special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of

its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is

germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and

treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of

equal protection.