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GGEEOOTTIINNAA VV.. GGOONNZZAALLEESS Case No. 64 41 SCRA 66 (1971) Chapter XIII, Page 497 & 504, Footnotes No. 87-88, 91-92 & 126

G, defendant, filed a motion to disqualify Judge X from hearing a criminal case on the ground that Judge X and the complainant C were related within the 6

th civil degree by affinity, a ground for disqualification under Section 1 of

Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. Judge X denied the motion on the ground that since it was a criminal case, he is neither related to the People of the Philippines nor to the defendant G, who were the party-litigants. He contended C was merely a complaining witness in such criminal action but made no denial whatsoever of his relationship within the 6

th degree of affinity

to C. Thereafter Judge X continued to hear. G, then filed a special civil action for prohibition with preliminary injunction so that Judge X may cease and desist from trying the case. (1) Does Judge X’s action of continuing the case despite his relationship with the complaining witness divest the court of jurisdiction? (2) Is G’s course of action correct under Section 2 of Rule 137? (3) Is Judge X’s contention correct? No. Judge X is deprived of his authority to continue to hear and decide the case. It does not, however, divest the court of jurisdiction. The disqualification of a judge does not necessarily render his judgment null and void. Neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 137 so states. The disqualification of the person called upon to preside over a specific case does not divest his court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of or the persons of the parties to the said case. At most, the disqualification strikes only at the authority of the challenged judge to preside over the trial of the specific case and therein to exercise the jurisdiction of the court. Important is the distinction between the jurisdiction of the court and the authority of the judge called upon to exercise such jurisdiction. A judge may be disqualified to try, to sit in or act in a specific case, but his disqualification does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court which he resides. Thus, if subsequently the judgment of a disqualified judge should be set aside as null and void, by a higher court, the nullity stems not from the court’s lack of jurisdiction but from the absence of authority on the part of the disqualified judge to try the given case. Yes. Section 2 of Rule 137 requires the judge to make a determination of his competency and to proceed with the trial of the case or to withdraw therefrom, in accordance with determination such that the aggrieved party, in his appeal to the appellate court from the final judgment rendered in the main case may raise the question of the correctness of the determination of the judge of his competency to sit in the case. However, such prohibitory

provision against an appeal from or a stay of the proceedings (motion to disqualify) does not operate to bar an accused in proper cases, from availing of the special civil action of prohibition before superior courts for determination, ahead of the judgment on the merits, of whether the challenged judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to disqualify himself. No. Even if the case is criminal, the crime also constitutes an offense against the offended party under Section 15 of Rule 110. DDEELL CCAASSTTIILLLLOO VV.. JJAAVVEELLOONNAA Case No. 51 6 SCRA 146 (1962) Chapter XIII, Page 499 Footnote No. 100

A filed a complaint for breach of contract against B Sugar Central Co. before the Justice of the Peace Court of Y. Before B Sugar Central could reply, Justice of the Peace Y filed a petition with his superior, requesting that he be authorized to inhibit himself on the ground that the counsel for B Sugar Central was his first degree cousin. This was granted and the case was reassigned to Justice of the Peace Z. However, a motion for reconsideration was filed by counsel for A, alleging that relationship between Judge and counsel was not legal basis for inhibition under the law, and so the case should remain under Justice of the Peace Y’s court. May Justice of the Peace Y, in the absence of any challenge directed against him, voluntarily request that he be allowed to inhibit himself from a case, where the lawyer for one of the parties is his “first degree cousin” or on grounds of similar nature? Yes. In 1962, the Supreme Court relaxed the rule and allowed a judge to voluntarily inhibit himself to sit in a case because he was closely related to the lawyer of one of the litigants and stated that the law on compulsory disqualification does not preclude cases of voluntary inhibition based on good, sound or ethical grounds. GGAARRCCIIAA VV.. DDEELLAA PPEENNAA Case No. 62 229 SCRA 766 (1994) Chapter 13, Page 500, Footnote No. 109

Judge A’s brother filed a criminal case for grave oral defamation against person B with the MTC of Leyte where Judge A was the acting judge. Judge A took cognizance of the case despite the fact that private complainant is his brother, a relative within the second degree of consanguinity.

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Did Judge A violate the rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge? A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful examination. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself, so as to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

VVIILLAALLUUZZ VV.. MMIIJJAARREESS Case No. 169 288 SCRA 594 (1998) Chapter 13, Page 500, Footnote No. 109

Judge A took cognizance of and decided a petition for correction of entry in the birth record of her grandson, notwithstanding such close relationship. Was judge a disqualified from taking cognizance of the case?

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful examination. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself, so as to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

UURRBBAANNEESS,, JJRR VV.. CCOOUURRTT OOFF AAPPPPEEAALLSS Case No. 160 236 SCRA 72 (1994) Chapter XIII, Page 500, Footnote No. 107

Mr. A had contracts of security services for B’s various installations. His two contracts expired by 1985, but according to Mr. A, he was asked by B to stay on until he would have been properly relieved. According to him, such act was considered to be a renewal of contracts. B disagreed and even decided to ban Mr. A from future contract bids. Thus, Mr. A filed for an injunction against B for which he got a favorable decision. However, in the Court of Appeals, one of the Justices, Justice C was the former Solicitor General of B. He only inhibited from the case when Mr. A refreshed his memory about his previous employment. The decision was therefore made by the two remaining justices. They ruled in favor of Company B. According to Mr. A, Justice C should have not participated in the case at all. Is the contention of Mr. A correct? Explain. What is the rationale behind Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?

The rationale of the rule is that no judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. PPAALLAANNGG VV.. ZZOOSSAA Case No. 116 58 SCRA 776 (1974) Chapter XIII, Page 482, Footnote No. 26

A case has been filed for estafa and was assigned to the sala of Judge Y. Judge Y acquitted the defendant A from said case in his decision stating that the charge was nothing but a concocted story. After which, A filed a case claiming damages from B, the person who instituted the case of estafa against A. Due to the wordings of the previous decision, B petitioned for the disqualification of Judge Y in the civil case for damages. Consequently, Judge Y voluntarily inhibited himself from conducting the trial. If Judge Y opted to proceed with the case would he be violating any provision in Rule 137?

The grounds provided for in Rule 137 for compulsory disqualification does not include the situation provided. Nevertheless, Judge Y’s inhibition is commendable as in relation to the grounds provided for in voluntary inhibition. It is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism, nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover, inspire that belief. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. Thus, if Judge Y opted to proceed, it would render nugatory the purpose of voluntary inhibition as provided in Rule 137. GGUUTTIIEERRRREEZZ VV.. SSAANNTTOOSS Case No. 66 112 Phil 184 (1961) Chapter XIII, Page 482, footnote No. 27

A case was filed against C for having illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds. The Judge to whose sala the case was assigned, Judge Z, was formerly a counsel of some fishpond owners in a similar situation who opined that said case could not prosper because the subject streams and rivers referred to in that separate case were private in nature. Consequently, Judge Z issued an order inhibiting himself and endorsing the case to another branch of the Court, in consideration of the due process prescribed by law as the impartial character of a tribunal.

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Is Judge Z compulsory required to inhibit himself from said case because of his previous involvement with a separate case of the same nature? Judge Z is not compulsory required to inhibit himself for he does not fall under the situations and instances enumerated in Rule 137. His previous employment as a counsel in another case of the similar circumstances does not preclude him from hearing the present case because the case assigned to his sala is not the identical case he handled before. Nevertheless, Judge Z must be commended for voluntarily inhibiting himself, which is like wise provided for in Rule 137. For due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal and every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Since Judge Z perceives the possibility of his partial judgment, it is rightful for him to voluntarily disqualify himself from hearing the case. MMAARRTTIINNEEZZ VV.. GGIIRROONNEELLLLAA Case No. 97 65 SCRA 245 (1975) Chapter XIII, Page 482, Footnote No. 24

In a criminal case, M, as principal, and D and B, as accessories after the fact, were charged with the murder of AB. As the first two were not apprehended, trial proceeded with respect to the third, B. Judge G in his decision acquitted B to the effect that the “crime was committed by M.” Thereafter, M surrendered and later arraigned before the same court. Counsel of the accused moved for the trial judge, G, to inhibit himself from hearing the case on its merits on the ground that G is no longer impartial. Judge G denied the oral motion. M did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the motion so the trial proceeded. When the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the government, the present Petition for Prohibition was filed commanding Judge G to desist from hearing and deciding the case. Is there a ground for the disqualification of Judge G from hearing and rendering the decision in the case against M? A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge’s integrity. While the Supreme Court does grant respondent’s capacity to render a just and impartial decision acquitting B to the effect that the “crime was committed by M” renders it impossible for respondent to be free from suspicion that in deciding petitioner’s case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced. The Supreme Court therefore held that under these circumstances petitioner has the right to have his case decided by another Judge.

JJAAVVIIEERR VV.. CCOOMMMMIISSSSIIOONN OONN EELLEECCTTIIOONNSS Case No. 80 144 SCRA 194 (1986) Chapter XIII, Page 482, Footnote No. 28

J and P were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because it was made only by a division and not by the Commission on elections en banc.

In addition, Commissioner O was asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent. The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. Should Commissioner O inhibit himself from participating in the case? An indispensable requisite of due process is that the judge who presides and decides over a proceeding must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at that time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner O and P, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner O’s refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. Due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void.

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CCAASSTTIILLLLOO VV.. JJUUAANN Case No. 60 62 SCRA 124 (1975) Chapter XIII, Page 483, Footnote No. 30

On two separate occasions, in the secrecy of his chambers, Judge J informed petitioners C and V of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of the verdict of acquittal of the accused, and impressed upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most that he could do on their behalf was to have such accused indemnify them. This move, according to him, would assure their being spared from the embarrassment occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to their future. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet. Judge J argued that he was prompted to act thus from the best of motives, “as an act of charity” and as a “clear attempt to humanize justice.” Is there a ground for the disqualification of Judge J from hearing this case?

It was the submission of respondent Judge that his final decision would be independent on the evidence that could be presented by petitioners. What cannot be denied, however, is that after such conferences, they could no longer be expected to have faith in his impartiality. Even before they had been fully heard, they were told that their cases were weak. They could very well conclude that there was prejudgment. The administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of the plea for disqualification. He should in the performance of his functions, avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose statements or gratuitous utterances that could form the basis for erroneous impressions in the mind of those who hear them and who may conclude that he is prejudging the case or the issues that come before him in the exercise of his jurisdiction.

PPEEOOPPLLEE VV.. MMOORREENNOO Case No. 123 83 Phil. 283 (1949) Chapter XIII, Page 498, Footnote No. 94

M was convicted of treason. On appeal, M claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motion for voluntary inhibition of Judge X to sit as one of the judges in the treason case because Judge X previously convicted M for the crime of murder, based on the same facts alleged in the information for treason but was later on eliminated, and therefore is biased. Is Judge X legally disqualified to sit in the treason case? No. If a judge is not legally disqualified, it is a matter of official duty from him to proceed with trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called to account for his dereliction. JJOOAAQQUUIINN VV.. BBAARRRREETTTTOO Case No. 82 25 Phil. 281 (1913) Chapter XII, Page 498, Footnote No. 95

J filed a complaint against the municipal president, the provincial governor, and the provincial board to compel said defendants to issue a license to operate a cockpit in his favor. The defendants sought the disqualification of Judge B. During the disqualification proceedings, the defendants admitted that there was no legal basis for B's disqualification. They therefore appealed to the extreme delicacy of B. In his order, B stated that he was fully convinced that there existed no legal reason for his disqualification but he was voluntarily retiring from the case solely for reason of extreme delicacy. Thereafter, J sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel B to proceed with the trial of the case. Is extreme delicacy a sufficient ground for B's voluntary inhibition? Prior to January 1, 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on the ground of extremada delicadeza.

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DDAAIISS VV.. TTOORRRREESS Case No. 45 57 Phil. 897 (1933) Chapter XII, Page 498, Footnote No. 96

D filed a compliant wherein he alleged that T, taking advantage of the fact that he was D's attorney, induced him to sign a Contract of Sale with right to repurchase over his land in favor of T's mother-in-law. He sought the nullification of the said contract and payment for damages. During the pendency of the case, T filed a complaint against Judge G by reason of which the SC ordered G to remove from his courtroom the iron cage where he was accustomed to keep persons accused of the crimes of violence during the trial of their cases. T also charged G for partiality, bias and hostility towards him in various cases. According to T, G even held him up to public ridicule and repeated said action in his courtroom. Because of the said incidents, T challenged the competency of G to decide the present case. However, G continued with the case and rendered judgment against T and his mother-in-law. G stated in his decision that T fraudulently prepared the Contract of Sale for the purpose of collecting legal fees by way of extortion and of taking control over the land by simulating a sale. G also mentioned that there were 4 charges of malpractice against T, none of which appeared to be relevant, and that certain charges culminated in T's suspension from exercising the legal profession. The administrator of the estate of T's mother-in-law appealed the said order. According to him, G's order was more of a charge against T than a decision. Should G inhibit himself? Prior to January 1, 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on the grounds of prejudice, bias, and hostility.

TTAALLIISSAAYY--SSIILLAAYY MMIILLLLIINNGG CCOO..,, IINNCC.. VV.. TTEEOODDOORROO,, SSRR.. Case No. 154 91 Phil. 101 (1952) Chapter XII, Page 498, Footnote No. 97

The stockholders of T corporation filed a complaint wherein they sought the distribution of another corporation's shares of stock owned by T corporation among themselves. T corporation filed a petition for certiorari against Judge X praying that X be disqualified from the case. T corporation argued that X is being paid as a professor of law in a school owned and controlled by the plaintiffs-stockholders. Can X be disqualified?

Prior to January 1, 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on the ground of conflict of interests.

UU..SS.. VV.. LLUUMMAAMMPPAAOO Case No. 161 20 Phil. 169 (1911) Chapter XIII, Page 498, Footnote No. 98

A, while testifying in a case, came under suspicion by Judge X that the witness A was falsely swearing upon a material matter. Judge X believed that Witness A was committing perjury and therefore, ordered the fiscal to present an information against the witness. A was subsequently tried in Judge X’s court and was convicted of the crime of perjury, despite an application to disqualify said Judge from hearing the case, as he was the one who had ordered the investigation. Counsel for A alleges that Judge X erred in denying the application of the accused A that he be tried before another court by reason of the alleged prejudice of Judge X against A and that as a such, Judge X should be voluntarily disqualify himself from hearing the case. Is Counsel for A correct? No. Counsel for A is incorrect. Judge X is not disqualified. Neither was a judge disqualified from trying a prosecution for perjury of an accused who was ordered investigated and prosecuted as a perjured witness by said. TTAAYYKKOO VV.. CCAAPPIISSTTRRAANNOO Case No. 157 53 Phil. 866 (1928) Chapter XIII, Page 498-99, Footnote No. 99

Judge X was the judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros. Judge Y was the auxiliary judge for the CFI of Oriental Negros. It was alleged in a case filed by petitioners A, B, C, D and E, who had pending election and criminal cases in the CFI of Oriental Negros, and that there was an agreement between Judge X and Y. That agreement pertained to an understanding between the judges that Auxiliary Judge Y was to take cognizance of all election and criminal cases in the court while Judge X would take cognizance of other ordinary cases. This agreement was supposedly disregarded by Judge X who proceeded to try and take cognizance of the election and criminal actions in the Court, and thereby appointed a fiscal to prosecute the case when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file the information.

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Counsel for A, B, C, D and E claimed that Judge X, as a result of his actions, should voluntarily disqualify himself from taking cognizance of the case. Is counsel correct?

No. Judge X was not disqualified. Not even if the judge himself took great interest and an active part in the filing of the criminal charges to the extent of appointing the fiscal when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file the proper information.

PPEEOOPPLLEE VV.. GGOOMMEEZZ Case No.121 20 SCRA 293 (1967) Chapter XIII, Page 499, Footnote No. 101

A, a Special Prosecutor, was assigned to prosecute a case for copra overshipment. Notice of the trial was served to Y, the assistant fiscal, but no notice was separately served to A. As a result, A was not present during the trial as he was in Tacloban attending to another case. He then asked for a postponement. Despite the fact that it was the first time for the prosecution to ask for a postponement while the defense even before the trial had requested and was granted the same in several instances, Judge G dismissed the case. A petition for certiorari was then filed against Judge G to assail the nullity of the dismissal of the case. Judge G as a defense averred that he dismissed the case due to an alleged dinner invitation from a stranger that was extended through Y, which he regarded as suspicious and unusual. He then concluded that “the indication were to the effect that some ‘pillos’ and opportunists were making his court the unwitting forum for extortion and exploitation of person charged with crime.” In his answer he also prayed that if the dismissal be nullified, that he be disqualified from taking further cognizance of the case as he “in all frankness, had lost all respect in the manner A has been prosecuting the case.” Was the dismissal capricious? Should Judge G be disqualified? This ruling paved the way for the promulgation of the provision on voluntary disqualification, which in effect overruled past decisions on the subject, for under said provision a judge may validly disqualify himself from hearing a case on any just and valid ground, such as bias or prejudice.

UUMMAALLEE VV.. VVIILLLLAALLUUZZ Case No.159 51 SCRA 84 (1973) Chapter XIII, Page 499, Footnote No. 103

A case for robbery was filed by the assistant prosecutor, who conducted the preliminary investigation directly with the Circuit Court presided by Judge V. Judge V, without any party moving for his inhibition, voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case on the ground that before the case was filed in court, he already had personal knowledge of the same. Was Judge V’s reason for voluntarily inhibiting himself valid? This ruling paved the way for the promulgation of the provision on voluntary disqualification, which in effect overruled past decisions on the subject, for under said provision a judge may validly disqualify himself from hearing a case on any just and valid ground, such as personal knowledge of the case.

BBAAUUTTIISSTTAA VV.. RREEBBUUEENNOO Case No. 23 81 SCRA 535 (1978) Chapter XIII, Page 499, Footnote No. 104

Judge R voluntarily inhibited himself from trying a civil case assigned to his sala because according to him, the court had found out from reliable sources that the defendant doubts the actuations of his court because the plaintiff therein is his townmate and distant relative. Similarly, the plaintiff also doubts Judge R’s actuations because of the defendant’s alleged utterances that he will surely win the case. Such circumstances according to Judge R, has placed the court in a very unpleasant and untenable position because all of his acts would always be tainted and beset with doubts and misgivings which is highly detrimental to the good name and integrity of the court. Was the reason for Judge R’s voluntary inhibition valid? This ruling paved the way for the promulgation of the provision on voluntary disqualification, which in effect overruled past decisions on the subject, for under said provision a judge may validly disqualify himself from hearing a case on any just and valid ground, such as affinity or former association with one of the parties or the latter’s counsel.

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MMAASSAADDAAOO AANNDD EELLIIZZAAGGAA RREE:: CCRRIIMMIINNAALL CCAASSEE NNOO.. 44995544--MM Case No. 98 155 SCRA 72 (1987) Chapter XIII, Page 499 & 501, Footnote Nos. 43, 104, 110

Judge A rendered a decision finding Tadao, who is an activist leader of peasant and farmer group, guilty of Estafa. B through his counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. Before a decision was made for the motion for reconsideration, retired Justice Reyes entered his appearance for B. Due to these developments, Judge A issued an order inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case on the ground that retired Justice Reyes had been one of those who had recommended him to the bench. Hence, he ordered that the case be transmitted to the Executive Judge for re-raffling among the other branches of the court for further proceeding. The case was assigned to Judge C of the RTC of Bulacan. Judge C returned the case with an accompanying letter stating his refusal to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and assailing the re-raffling of the case as impractical and uncalled for. What is the principle behind the axiom that a judge in his dispensation of justice must guard and measure his language (both written and spoken)?

His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this light, is affinity or former association of a judge with one of the parties or the latter’s counsel enough reason for him to inhibit himself? Explain. Yes. A judge may validly disqualify himself from hearing a case on any just and valid ground, such as affinity or former association with one of the parties or the latter’s counsel. Is a judge’s decision to disqualify himself conclusive? If no, how can it be determined? No. His decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive, and his competency may be determined on application for mandamus to compel him to act.

PPIIMMIIEENNTTEELL VV.. SSAALLOONNGGAA Case. No. 125 21 SCRA 160 (1969) Chapter XIII, Page 496, Footnotes Nos. 86, 88,105

Atty. A is the counsel of one civil case, two criminal cases and one election case all under the sala of Judge Salanga. He prays that Judge B be suspended from office and after due notice and removed therefrom on the ground that his career and potential as practitioner of law is put at risk. Judge B counters that the cases are now in the final stages of termination and transferring it to another sala would only delay their final disposition and make the parties suffer from further efforts and expenses and would be violative of territorial jurisdiction. The question facing the court is whether or not a judge is disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him. What is rule on the disqualification of judges? Explain the difference between the two sections. Is the reason put forth by Atty. A covered by the second paragraph of the said rule? The first paragraph of the above rule enumerated the grounds for compulsory disqualification of a judge from sitting in a case. The express enumeration of the grounds excludes all other grounds not specified herein. The second paragraph refers to voluntary disqualification of a judge. What does the law presumes in cases of compulsory disqualification? In case of compulsory disqualification, the law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent on all parties concerned. What guideline must a judge, to whom a suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, follow? How can he give meaning to the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 137? If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 37. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

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AAPPAARRIICCIIOO VV.. AANNDDAALL Case No. 169 175 SCRA 569 (1989) Chapter 13, Page 501, Footnote No. 114

Petitioner A, filed a motion for inhibition against Judge B without explicitly stating on its face the valid grounds relied upon to support his motion. Petitioner A maintains that there is between him and Judge B, an existing state of hostility sparked of by the filing by him of petitions for certiorari and administrative cases against the latter. Judge B denied the aforesaid motion for inhibition because no valid grounds were cited. Did judge b commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

The mere filing of an administrative charge against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case. The court has to be shown that, other than the filing of an administrative complaint, acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.

MMAANNTTAARRIINNGG VV.. RROOMMAANN,, JJRR.. Case No. 96 254 SCRA 158 (1996) Chapter XIII, Page 501, Footnote No. 114

On 7 January, 1993, B filed an administrative complaint against MTC Judge X, charging him of conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. On 21 February 1994, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Meanwhile, Judge X issued a search warrant against C, and on 25 August 1993, a complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against C, B, and B Jr.; B and B Jr. having been included in the complaint as the firearms and ammunition were found in the house owned by B and B Jr. B is now contending that Judge X should have inhibited himself from the preliminary investigation as an administrative complaint was filed by B against Judge X before the preliminary investigation. Is the mere filing of an administrative case against Judge X a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case? Other than the filing of the administrative complaint, what must B show to the Supreme Court so that Judge X can be branded the stigma as being biased or partial? The mere filing of an administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case. The Court has to be shown, other than the filing of the administrative complaint, acts or conduct of the judge

clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.

CCHHOOAA VV.. CCHHIIOONNGGSSOONN Case no. 6 (Supplemental) 253 SCRA 371 (1996) Chapter XI, Page 412, Footnote no. 90

L filed a complaint for perjury against her husband, A for allegedly asserting falsehood in his petition for naturalization that they were living together when in fact, he was living with another woman. Judge C found A guilty of perjury. A then filed a complaint against the judge seeking to remove him from office for rendering an unjust judgment, for convicting him although the information did not constitute an offense, and for not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The investigating judge found that the allegations against judge C were baseless and recommended that it be dismissed. He also recommended that the lawyer Q be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious offense. Did Q violate his oath and duty as a lawyer? Yes. A lawyer has been made to account administratively for assisting a complainant in filing clearly unmeritorious complaint against a judge, as his act violates his oath and duty of counseling or maintaining only such action only as appears to him as just and of upholding the Code of Professional responsibility.

PPAARREEDDEESS JJRR..,, VV.. SSAANNDDIIGGAANNBBAAYYAANN Case No. 117 252 SCRA 641 (1996) Chapter XIII, Page 502, Footnote No. 117

A accused Provincial Governor B, Clerk of Court C, and Atty. D of conspiring in making it show that an arraignment of B has been made, purportedly to be able to acquire a dismissal for the case against B due to Double Jeopardy. Prosecutor X conducted a preliminary investigation, but as X’s resolution was about to be acted upon, D retracted his earlier statements. D stated in an affidavit that no arraignment had been held after all. Because of D’s retraction and confession, the case had to be reopened for investigation. This reinvestigation was conducted by Graft Investigation Officer Y. After such reinvestigation, Y recommended the prosecution of B, C, and D. B now contends that Y was biased for considering D’s retraction in her resolution of the case. Is the divergence of opinion between B and Y regarding the use of D’s retraction in Y’s resolution a ground for disqualifying Y from investigating the

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case? Is the divergence of opinion between a judge and a party’s counsel a ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and partiality? Mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a party’s counsel as to the applicable law and jurisprudence is not a sufficient reason to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and partiality.

VVDDAA.. DDEE BBOONNIIFFAACCIIOO VV.. BB..LL..TT.. BBUUSS CCOO..,, IINNCC. Case No. 171 34 SCRA 618 (1970) Chapter XIII, Page 502, Footnote No. 118

Due to the reckless imprudence of a bus driver, it collided with a car. The accident resulted in the death of one and physical injuries on the 3 other passengers of the car. The said driver was convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In the civil case, the driver and the bus company were held jointly and severally liable for damages. In that civil case, A, is the counsel for the plaintiff and B, for the defendant. Judge M is A’s former classmate. Judge M questioned the defense witnesses more closely than those of plaintiff's. Is this a legal ground for disqualification of Judge M? This is not a legal ground for disqualification. Rule 137 enumerates the grounds for disqualification and being a classmate is not among the grounds enumerated. On the second issue, the court held that there was NO BIAS here. That he should question the defense witnesses more closely than those of plaintiffs is but natural since the defendant's evidence varies from proof already on record.

VVIILLLLAAPPAANNDDOO VV.. QQUUIITTAAIINN Case No. 168 75 SCRA 24 (1977) Chapter XIII, Page 502, Footnote No. 121

An altercation took place in a restaurant in San Antonio, Quezon on Good Friday between A, B, C on the one hand and V, on the other hand. A, B, C were all men of consequence in the local government and political firmament of San Antonio. V is a man of modest means. The next day, (a holiday) A,B,C sent for Judge Q to conduct the preliminary examination on the charge of theft of 2 packs of cigarettes against V and a criminal case was immediately filed against the latter. V, on the other hand, had difficulty in

filing the case against A, B, C for maltreatment and less serious physical injuries arising on the same occasion. He sought the help of an agency just to file his case. When it was filed, Judge Q even accompanied the 3 accused to inform the investigator that the complaint of V was only in the nature of counter charge. All these cases were triable by Judge Q. Can Judge Q be disqualified in handling the case by these actuations? The judge's actuations clearly leave the impression that he was not immune to disparity in the economic, social and political standing of the litigants. Favoritism is much more odious if directed against one coming from the poor and dispossessed. The judiciary should try to redress the imbalance, not magnify it. Thus, the judge was disqualified and restrained from taking any further action in the 2 cases.

MMAATTEEOO,, JJRR.. VV.. VVIILLLLAALLUUZZ Case No. 99 50 SCRA 18 (1973) Chapter XIII, Page 503, Footnote No. 124

A, B, C, D were charged with robbery in a band with homicide. R, another accused later arrested, subscribed before Judge V an extrajudicial statement admitting the crime and implicating A, B, C, D. The information fell in the sala of Judge V. During the trial, the extrajudicial statement was repudiated by R, saying it was a product of intimidation by a government agent. Does this event suffice to negate the degree of objectivity required of judges, hence be a ground for disqualifying the judge? Judge Villaluz could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. By signing the jurat, he in effect was satisfied that the facts alleged therein were true. Meaning, he was convinced of the statements stated therein. It was unlikely that he was not a bit offended by the affiant's turnabout. He was just admonished. SC said judges are well advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing declarations so as to avoid events which might lend itself to the interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised.

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LLUUQQUUEE VV.. KKAAYYAANNAANN Case No. 90 29 SCRA 165 (1969) Chapter XIII, Page 476, Footnote No. 1, 29, 123

L, a member of the bar, sought to have Judge K disqualified, alleging that: “Judge K doctored the records of the case, that he suppressed the true and genuine proceedings… orders were issued but based on untrue and ungenuine records…” L’s case was raffled to Branch I presided by Judge V. On the scheduled date of hearing, it was found that their case was not included in the calendar of cases scheduled. He later found that his case was transferred to the sala of Judge V. Apparently, Judge V took cognizance of the case, though without reasonable explanation. Judge V then continuously issued questionable orders, altered scheduled hearing dates of L’s case, and even sought to have L cited for contempt in one instance. Decide the conflict between the lawyer and Judge. The administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects the lawyer to properly perform his role in the same manner that the lawyer expects a judge to do his part. The people expect of them a sense of shared responsibility, which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice.

TTAABBUUEENNAA VV.. SSAANNDDIIGGAANNBBAAYYAANN Case No. 153 268 SCRA 332 (1997) Chapter XIII, Pages 494 & 496, Footnote Nos. 77 & 85

T and P, as general manager and acting finance services manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) respectively, were charged with malversation in the Sandiganbayan. The two encashed three PNB manager’s checks that were charged to MIAA’s account and brought the money to the office of R, who was then the private secretary of Marcos. The act was done because of a Presidential Memorandum that required the payment of the amount MIAA purportedly owed to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). T and P were convicted. However, during the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, the Justices actively took part in the questioning of M, a witness, as well as in questioning of T and P. Their questions amounted to 67 for T, 41 for P, and 37 for M. Their questions were confrontational and probing. Was the conviction of T and P valid?

No. The judge should limit himself to asking classificatory questions and the right should be sparingly and judiciously used, for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process is denied an accused when the judge, with his overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.

TTUURRQQUUEEZZAA VV.. HHEERRNNAANNDDOO Case No. 158 97 SCRA 483 (1980) Chapter XIII, Page 510, Footnote No. 163

A was crippled in a vehicular accident involving a passenger jeep owned and operated by B. A subsequently filed an action for recovery of damages against B. During the pre-trial, due to the non-appearance of B and her counsel despite due notice, B was declared in default by Judge X. The decision awarded damages to A. No appeal was taken. However, sometime later, Judge X, through a “Special Order” granted B’s “Motion to Reopen the Case” Judge X claims that judgment by default are frowned upon and it is but fair to give justice to the defendant her day in Court a full blown litigation. Is Judge X correct? The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not waste his time by taking an active part in the proceeding which relates to official actuations in a case, but should apply himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court.

CCAARRIIAAGGAA VV.. JJUUSSTTOO--GGUUEERRRREERROO Case No. 35 23 SCRA 1061 (1968) Chapter XIII, page number 481, Footnote No. 18

A was accused of Grave Slander for shouting the words: “What kind of standard do you have here Mr. Guiang? Is this the character training that the teachers and employees of this school give to the students? Bullshit! Shit! I better walk out of this room. Vulva of your mother all of you teachers as if you are always in the right track.” The incident happened during a meeting of graduating students. Some thirty teachers filed a complaint on April 27, 2004. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. It was also discovered that, attached to the complaint was an information dated April 15, 2004. In the information however, the allegedly offensive utterances were as follows:

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“What kind of standard do you have here Mr. Guiang? Is this the character training that the teachers and employees of this school give to the students?” It appears that on April 15, 2004 the complaining teachers subscribed and swore to the truth of the information and gave the same to the judge who received it. But the complaining teachers returned to the judge and took back all the original copies of the information. On April 27, 2004, the complainants filed the complaint, attaching thereto as supporting papers the information. The information was not docketed as a separate case but merely attached to the complaint as supporting paper. The judge was found to have informally received the information and just as informally allowed its withdrawal. Can the accused file for the voluntary inhibition of the judge? Judges must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. Nevertheless, said actions of the judge do not constitute a ground for him to inhibit from trying the case which was filed after the parties failed to settle it amicably.

TTAANN JJRR.. VV.. GGAALLLLAARRDDOO Case No. 155 73 SCRA 306 (1976) Chapter XIII, Page 482, Footnote No. 25

Judge X was handling a case of frustrated murder and double murder against A, B, C, D, E and F. While the case was in progress, Judge X was alleged to have met up with an uncle of the deceased victims, Mayor G, on several occasions. During one meeting, Judge X received a bottle of wine wrapped in newspaper from Mayor G, which was suspiciously bulky and thick, indicating that something else was wrapped with the bottle inside. In another meeting, Judge X suspiciously amended his prepared decision for the two criminal cases increasing the penalties and was a mere exact copy of the memorandum of the prosecution. Lastly, Judge X also received two bottles of whisky from Mayor G during the progress of the trial on another occasion. Thereafter, a judgment that the said accused persons are guilty of the aforementioned crimes was promulgated. Was the decision rendered by Judge X questionable? Yes. In fact, Judge X committed a serious charge as prescribed in Rule 140, which may fall under the category of bribery or a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. In the case at bar,

Judge X clearly failed to do so. Nevertheless, since Judge X has already retired from service, the issue has been rendered moot.

AAUUSSTTRRIIAA VV.. MMAASSAAQQUUEELL Case No.19 20 SCRA 1247 (1967) Chapter XIII, Page 487, Footnote No. 42

In a case for recovery of lands, Judge M declared plaintiff A as the owner and ordered defendant B to vacate the premises. A motion for immediate execution was granted. Atty. S, a former associate of Judge M, entered his appearance as the new counsel for the defendant. He filed a bond to stay the execution and this was granted. Judge M then ordered the sheriff to restore the possession to defendant. Plaintiff A asked for the appointment of a receiver and this was granted, but upon the filing of the bond by the defendant for the non-appointment, the order of receivership was set aside. Atty. S then filed a motion for new trial, and over the vigorous objection of A, Judge M granted the motion. Plaintiff requested his counsel D to see the judge in his chamber and verbally transmit the request to inhibit himself from further hearing the case because the new counsel of the defendant was the judge’s former associate and there was a rampant rumor that defendant is boasting that he will surely win the case because of his new lawyer. Judge M rejected the request because according to him such fact alone does not constitute a legal ground to disqualify a judge. Judge M then called on A and verified whether he really requested the inhibition. With A’s affirmative answer, Judge M declared him guilty of contempt of court and imposed upon him a fine of Php50.00 for the court considered his actuation as insulting to the integrity of the presiding judge and shows his lack of respect to the court. Was Judge M correct in declaring A guilty of contempt of court? Is inhibition limited to grounds specified by law? Did Counsel D violate Rule 13.01 on the rule that lawyers should not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to a judge in order to be given special consideration of favor?

The judge should voluntary disqualify himself for having an affinity or former association with one of the parties or the latter’s counsel.

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AABBAADD VV.. BBLLEEZZAA Case No.1 145 SCRA 1 (1986) Chapter XIII, Page 488, Footnote No. 46

After a cockfight, A and P had a heated verbal argument, which led to A being shot in the chest by P’s bodyguard. Judge B acquitted P but found his bodyguard guilty of Attempted Homicide with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to kill. Is Judge B liable for gross ignorance of the law? Service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end.

RROOYYEECCAA VV.. AANNIIMMAASS Case no. 137 71 SCRA 1 (1976) Chapter XIII, Page. 491, Footnote number 65

Dr. A filed a motion to disqualify Judge X from hearing the case filed before him and to transfer the said case to another branch. The said motion was prompted when the judge uttered the following words to the complainant: “You are stupid", "There are octopuses and crocodiles here and you are one" and that the complainant was a "self-anointed local tyrant." Should the judge resort to such intemperate language? What penalty should the courts impose against the judge if any? In case the complaining party loses interest in the said case, will the case still prosper? He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting manner.

LLIIBBAARRIIOOSS VV.. DDAABBAALLOOSS Case No. 87 199 SCRA 48 (1991) Chapter XIV, Page 583, Footnote No. 198

Judge D was charged with an administrative complaint by Atty. L when he granted bail without the mandatory requirement of hearing as prescribed in the Rules of Criminal Procedure to the accused after the issuance of warrants of arrest to which previous recommendations of no bail has been given by the Investigating Fiscals, in relation to a criminal case of murder filed before his sala. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside

the order of Judge D citing that such order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and is a manifestation of gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Is Judge D liable of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law or procedure? Yes. Fixing a bail bond for an accused and allowing him to post the same for his provisional liberty in a criminal case involving a capital offense, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong is a clear dereliction from the duty of the judge as mandated by the Rules of Court. Judge D was caused to pay a fine of Php 20,000 and was given a warning constituting a punishment for a serious charge. PPAAGGUUIIRRAANN VV.. CCLLAAVVAANNOO Case No.115 61 SCRA 411 (1974) Chapter XIII, Page 483, Footnote No. 32

Judge C was requested by the city mayor to advise and lecture pedicab drivers of their respective duties and responsibilities in order to protect the life and limb of the riding public. Judge C upon seeing P, a motor cab driver overloading and over speeding, told him to stop and warned said driver of the latter’s violation. Judge C shouted at the driver to surrender his license and pointed a revolver at him. Judge C confiscated said license, without issuing any traffic violation report. Judge C failed to return to P his license because he later lost it. Is the judge guilty of abuse of authority? While respondent judge might have been motivated by a spirit of civicism in cooperating with the city officials in the enforcement of traffic laws, it is obvious that the investigation, arrest and confiscation of licenses are essentially police functions which are vested upon law enforcement agencies of the government. Respondent as city judge will necessarily hear and decide cases filed in his court regarding such violations and infraction of the Motor Vehicle Law. It is patent, therefore, that the judge should not have taken upon himself the responsibility of confiscating the license of the motor cab driver but he should have referred the matter to the police. He must refrain from doing essentially police work that may involve prosecution of crimes which he may have to hear and decide for his involvement, though actuated by civic mindedness, may blur his sense of duty to administer justice or subject him to a suspicion of partiality in the discharge thereof. The official conduct of a judge should be free from impropriety or any appearance thereof. His personal behavior in the performance of his official duties and in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. Respondent Judge acted in a manner unbefitting his high judicial office.

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Judge Clavano is ordered to be reprimanded.

SSAANNTTIIAAGGOO VV.. CCOOUURRTT OOFF AAPPPPEEAALLSS Case No.139 184 SCRA 690 (1990) Chapter XIII, Page 483, Footnote No.33

Judge S was the judge in a petition for expropriation. The issue as to the amount of compensation to be paid was amicably settled by the litigant parties during the pendency of the proceedings. Judge S rejected the amicable settlement, declaring it to be invalid. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of Judge S declaring the settlement invalid. Judge S filed a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Is the act of Judge S in filing the petition proper? In special proceedings, the judge whose order is under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his official capacity, should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court. The judge should not, as a petitioner, file a petition for review seeking reinstatement of his challenged order, he being not an active combatant but one imbued with the duty of detachment.

VVEELLEEZZ VV.. CCOOUURRTT OOFF AAPPPPEEAALLSS Case No. 166 34 SCRA 109 (1970) Chapter XIII, Page 496, Footnote No. 86

Spouses V petitioned that a Deed Of Absolute Sale of a house and lot with assumption of mortgage executed in favor of B be rescinded. The petition was granted by the CFI of Cebu ordering B to make money payments to the spouses V and to restore them to the possession of the property. B appealed the decision but the appeal was disapproved on the ground that the appeal bond was filed out of time. B then moved to reconsider but was turned down. B then filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA against the Spouses V, the trial court judge and the sheriff of the City of Cebu praying that the Spouses V be enjoined from disturbing petitioner’s possession of the property in question. The CA then issued an order directing the provincial sheriff to maintain B’s possession of the premises, ousting the Spouses V therefrom. The Spouses V filed a motion requesting that Justice P, one of the members of the division in the CA which acted on the petition for certiorari and prohibition, disqualify himself from taking part in the consideration of the case on the ground that he allegedly granted

interviews with B’s wife before the order directing the provincial sheriff to maintain B’s possession of the premises was issued. Is there a ground for Justice P to disqualify himself from the consideration of the case? The express enumeration of the grounds (in Section 1 of Rule 137) excludes all other grounds not specified therein.

RROOMMEERROO VV.. VVAALLLLEE Case No. 136 147 SCRA 197 (1987) Chapter XIII, Page 476, Footnote No. 1

R, the complainant, is a practicing lawyer. V, the respondent is a judge, in whose court R was litigating a case. During the trial of said case, R requested that an inventory book of his client be marked “exhibit F.” V interrupted R with a remark that the said inventory book should be marked “exhibit G” since there was already an “exhibit F” which was marked during the last hearing when R was absent. Still, R insisted in a loud voice that it be marked “exhibit F.” This remark irritated the judge who retorted that R had not come to trial fully prepared, thus, resulting in confusion in the marking of the exhibits. R, however, in a loud voice, continued to insist on marking it as “exhibit F.” Judge V admonished R, saying that R should not bring his “passion” to the court and if complainant does not respect the Judge, he must respect the court. Judge V then banged his gravel and went to his chamber. According to R, but not conclusively established, Judge V asked R to step out with him and finish the matter outside. Witnesses, however, did see Judge V outside the court, carrying a gun in his hand while looking into the courtroom. Decide the conflict between the lawyer and Judge. The administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects the lawyer to properly perform his role in the same manner that the lawyer expects a judge to do his part. The people expect of them a sense of shared responsibility, which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice.

JJUUGGUUEETTAA VV.. BBOONNCCAARROOSS Case No. 83 60 SCRA 27 (1974) Chapter XIII, Page 483, Footnote No. 31

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In one hearing for a case of rape, M, the alleged victim, and R, the alleged rapist, were called in to the chambers of Judge B. M's parents were not called in to the chamber to go with the 17 year old girl. All was well up this point. Things became interesting when R suddenly asked M to marry him. M was frightened. She stood up and went to the door to leave. While she was slowly turning the door knob, R rushed to her and gave her a kiss on the cheek. Judge B then remarked, "Bakit sa pisngi, hindi sa labi?" M reported all these things to her mother, who was patiently waiting outside. M and her mother are thinking of filing appropriate charges against Judge B, as they believe he is favoring the accused in the case. Judge B later asserts that he made those remarks out of anger. Is Judge B guilty of any impropriety in his conduct in the aforementioned scenario?

The judge should avoid any action as would subject him to suspicion of interest in a case in his court.

EEVVAANNGGEELLIISSTTAA VV.. BBAAEESS Case No. 56 61 SCRA 475 (1974) Chapter XIII, Page 498, Footnote No. 93; Chapter XIV, Page 574, Footnote No. 132; Page 585, Footnote No. 214

Judge X admitted having sat and partly acted in a case wherein his nephew-in-law was the counsel for the defendant. Should Judge X be reprimanded under Section 1 of Rule 137 even though he subsequently inhibited himself from sitting in the case without even hearing a single witness?

Yes. A judge who continues to hear a case in which he is legally disqualified under any of the enumerated grounds in Section 1 of Rule 137 may be held administratively liable thereof, except where all parties concerned have given their written consent thereto. Judge X is therefore guilty of serious misconduct by sitting in a case which he is legally disqualified from trying or deciding. Judge X authorized K, landholder, to eject his tenant M. M’s counsel moved to reconsider and Judge Y, the presiding judge, ordered the clerk of court to furnish a copy of the motion to K. Since K interposed no opposition to M’s motion, Judge Y then reconsidered Judge X’s decision and denied K’s petition for ejectment of M. Three and a half years later, K moved for reconsideration of Judge Y’s decision which was granted by Judge Z, with

the justification that Judge X’s decision had become final and executory because Judge Y’s grant of M’s motion for reconsideration was fatally defective for lack of proof of service upon K despite the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in Masa v. Baes, belied the alleged non-service upon K of a copy of the motion. Is Judge Z liable for knowingly or by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance rendering unjust orders? Does it follow that he acted in bad faith or does his abuse of discretion signify ignorance of the law? No. The fact that a judge abused his discretion in issuing the order complained of does not necessarily follow that he acted in bad faith nor does it necessarily mean a willful disregard of a litigant’s right.

RRAAQQUUIIZZAA VV.. CCAASSTTAANNEEDDAA JJRR.. Case No. 129 81 SCRA 235 (1978) Chapter XIV, Page 573, Footnote No. 126

The government expropriated the property of the Castellvi estate which was valued at 2.6M. N's right as instituted heir of 2/3 of the estate was recognized by final judgment although by compromise agreement, 1/2 was transferred by her to her children. The special proceedings for the Castellvi estate was presided by Judge C. When the 2nd release of 1M pesos for the estate was made by the government, C gave N a portion of the money as her share and issued an order allowing N to obtain a loan using the awarded portion as collateral. R, the father and the attorney-in-fact of the children, charged C for violation of the Anti-Graft Law for giving unwarranted benefits to N and for violation of RPC for knowingly rendering an unjust order. R contended that the 1M pesos was intended solely for the children and that C knew that N had no more interest in the estate since N already transferred the subject property to her children. R also charges C with bribery. R testified that N told him that she gave C a portion of the loan which she had obtained from the 1st release of 1M pesos. However, N was not presented to testify on the matter. Was there 'misconduct' or 'wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment' on the part of the judge? Is the testimony of R which was purely hearsay regarding the charge of bribery a sufficient proof? When the charges for the removal of a judge are also penal in nature, as in this case, what quantum of proof is required? The word "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment. (Chapter XIV, Page 573, Footnote no. 126)

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In some cases, it has been held that impeachment proceedings against judges are penal in nature and are governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt in cases which will require dismissal from the service. Chapter XIV, Page 605, Footnote no. 300) The ground for removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials applies. (Chapter XIV, Page 607, Footnote no. 311)

BBAARRJJAA VV.. BBEERRCCAACCIIOO Case no. 22 74 SCRA 355 (1976) Chapter XIII, Page 519, Footnote no. 189

N was an accused in a criminal case pending in Judge B’s court. Judge B allegedly converted the check worth P8,000 given by N as bail bond for his own use. When N requested that the cash bond be substituted with a surety bond and the motion was granted, only the amount of P5,000 was returned leaving an unaccounted balance of P3,000. Judge B claimed that the amount of P3,000 was loaned to him by L, the President of the company who lent N the check for his temporary liberty. Was the judge’s act proper?

No. He should maintain high ethical principles and a sense of propriety without which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society. GUTTIEREZ V. BELAN 119 – 65 “Judge v. Phantom instigator”

Judge B concealed the pendency of a case against him for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries in his application to the Judicial and Bar Council.

Judge B is administratively liable for gross misrepresentation and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

He committed dishonesty that renders him totally unfit for appointment to the judiciary.

The fact that he had been subsequently been acquitted is not important.

o He is not being chastened for having a pending criminal case at that time but for his act of dishonesty and misrepresentation.

SSAARRMMIIEENNTTOO VV.. CCRRUUZZ

Case No. 143 65 SCRA 289 (1975) Chapter XIII, Page 481, Footnote No. 18

Atty. X prepared and ratified a deed of donation whereby A donated to his children a parcel of land. X volunteered to sell the land. X also suggested to A that part of the proceeds of the sale be invested for the joint account of A and his daughter B. X induced A to sign blank withdrawal slips which allowed him (X) to withdraw from the joint account of A and B. The withdrawals were soon discovered by B. X was subsequently appointed as judge. B filed a case for estafa which was later withdrawn when X executed a real estate mortgage in favor of B. It was only after 5 years that X returned the money together with interest to B.

Is X still liable despite the fact that he already returned the sum of money in question? If yes, what is his offense and how would you classify it under Rule 140?

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities, including their private life, as well. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.

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IINN RREE HHOORRIILLLLEENNOO

Case No. 76 43 Phil. 212 (1922) Chapter XIV, Page 605, Footnote No. 300

Judge X was charged with (1) negligently and carelessly delaying a case and (2) Judge X was a political judge (this is misconduct, but the specification of such charge was not pressed).

Since Section 173 of the Administrative Code provides that a judge may be removed from office on the ground of (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency, should Judge X be exonerated from the impeachment proceedings due to the fact that since impeachment proceedings involving judges have been said to be in their nature highly penal in character and are governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases, and considering that the misconduct charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt because there was absolutely no proof that Judge X acted partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively?

Yes. It has been held that impeachment proceedings against judges are penal in nature and are governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The charges must therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt in cases which will require dismissal from the service. In the case at bar, serious misconduct on the part of Judge X has not been proved by a preponderance of evidence, much less beyond reasonable doubt due to the testimony different witnesses. AARRBBAANN VV.. BBOORRJJAA

Case No. 14 143 SCRA 634 (1986) Chapter XIV, Page 603, Footnote no. 292

A filed an administrative case for grave misconduct against Judge B, Presiding Judge of Branch XX, Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region of Naga City. A contended that B, without any justification whatsoever, hit with the pistol he was carrying A on the left side of his head, sending A sprawling to the floor and rendering him momentarily unconscious. Moreover, B threatened with his gun the companions of the petitioner. A then filed the case against B and the story received much coverage by the print and broadcast media. A then filed a motion to withdraw petition on the ground that he was already satisfied with the public apology made by B. However, the court still continued to hear the case against Judge B despite the motion to withdraw petition of A.

May the court continue to hear the case even after A filed a motion to withdraw petition? The withdrawal of the complaint by the complainant does not divest the Supreme Court of the authority to order the investigation of the charges, nor does it preclude such investigation nor result in its dismissal.

AARRCCEENNIIOO EETT..AALL.. VV.. PPAAGGOORROOGGOONN

Case No. 15 224 SCRA 246 (1993) Chapter XIV, Page 573 and 574, Footnote No. 128 and 133

Judge X conducted a preliminary examination of a robbery case. Part of the evidence in the case was a black and white renegade type jeepney. Thereafter, the robbery case was endorsed to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Malolos, Bulacan for filing of the information; however, the jeep was not turned over to the Provincial Fiscal. Judge X took possession of the jeep and had an auto mechanic tow it to the auto mechanic's shop, repair and repaint the same from black and white to red. Judge X even provided new batteries for the jeep and initially spent Php1,500.00 to put the jeep in good running condition. Judge X’s brother volunteered "to take care of the jeep" as Judge X "could not afford to hire a driver." In addition, Judge X’s brother shouldered additional expenses for the further repair and maintenance of the jeep. It is for these expenses that Judge X is seeking reimbursement from the anonymous owner with the threat that unless Judge X is reimbursed "the jeep is to be returned to its original condition." Consequently, a letter-complaint was filed by A with the Office of the Ombudsman accusing Judge X of abuse of authority and irregularity in connection with the motor vehicle in custodia legis alleged to have been used in connection with a robbery case filed with Judge X’s court.

What is gross misconduct? Is Judge X guilty of gross misconduct? If yes, what specific act constitutes such?

Judge is guilty of gross misconduct.

Gross misconduct of a judge refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence. The act of having the jeep in custodia legis repainted, which was evidence in a robbery case in her sala and changed its color and made use of it for her personal benefit constitutes grave misconduct BUENAVENTURA V. BENEDICTO 196 – 29

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“Benedicto’s Leniency, Nakalusot sa Penalty”

Judge is charged with serious misconduct, immorality, and gross inefficiency

o allowed his clerk-messenger to promulgate decisions in criminal cases

o formed a committee to solicit contributions for office equipment

o imprudently received complainant in his chambers prior to the promulgation of his decision.

He was found not guilty of the charges.

He was admonished to exercise close and unremitting supervision over his subordinates and to adhere at all times to the full intendment of each and all of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

CCAAPPUUNNOO VV.. JJAARRAAMMIILLLLOO,, JJRR..

Case no. 34 234 SCRA 212 (1994) Chapter XIII, Page 526, Footnote no. 209

R borrowed money from P and so R mortgaged her property as a security thereof. The mortgaged property was foreclosed and a certificate of sale was issued by Judge X. It was P who purchased the foreclosed property, and a consolidation of property and a Deed of Sale were made by P and registered in the Register of Deeds (RD). P filed for a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which was assigned to the Branch of Judge X. Judge X granted the Petition and ordered its implementation to Sheriff K. Sheriff K went to the house of R and her daughter T, and advised them that Judge X wanted to see them “to know how much more they are to pay” P. R and T, accompanied by a certain G, went to the judge’s sala, where Judge X told them that if they can pay Php200,000.00 in cash, in 100 bills, and Php150,000.00, postdated, he shall take care of everything, and that R, T and G should not talk to anybody about such undertaking. R, T and G came back on a second occasion to inform Judge X that they could not afford such amount, thus Judge X reduced the amount to Php150,000.00, postdated. But because of R and T’s failure to comply with such agreement, they were evicted and their house was demolished.

In another case, Judge X required J to give him a board resolution authorizing him to use the corporation’s car. This was while the company had a pending litigation before Judge X. J complied with such. Judge X then used the car for free for his family and had its battery recharged for free in the litigant’s shop. In fact, a receipt from X’s wife’s favorite salon was left

in the car, thus evidencing Judge X’s use of said car. The litigants filed an administrative complaint against Judge X.

Will the action prosper? If so, what are the violations committed by Judge X?

A judge violates the above provision [against soliciting of gifts] when he accepts the free use, for a year, of a car, and his availment for free of batter recharging of the shop of a litigant who has a pending case before him. CCAASSTTIILLLLOO VV.. BBAARRSSAANNAA

Case No.38 63 SCRA 388 (1975) Chapter XIII, Page 489, Footnote No.50

Judge Y, while visiting the house of Ms. G, kicked police officer B in the chest without any motive or provocation on the part of the part of the victim. B sustained injuries that required medical attendance for 5 days. A trial court found the judge guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries. Judge Y contended that he should not be held liable administratively because the incident occurred when both the offended party and the accused were not in the performance of their official duties, and the same occurred in a private house.

Was Judge Y’s contention correct?

People see the judge as an intermediary of justice between conflicting interests. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. PPIILLIIPPIINNAASS BBAANNKK VV.. TTIIRROONNAA--LLIIWWAAGG

Case No. 58 190 SCRA 834 (1990) Chapter XIV, Page 585, Footnote No. 218

Spouses D filed a complaint against the Bank to stop the extrajudicial foreclosure of a parcel of land. The complaint also prayed for the payment of php 2M as damages. Inspite of the injunction, the disputed property was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold. When the Bank failed to file its answer within the reglementary period, Judge Z declared the Bank in default and allowed Spouses D to present evidence ex-parte. Spouses D presented evidence to establish that the total damages sustained by them amounted to 14M pesos. Later Judge Z set aside the default order and admitted the

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Bank's answer but ordered that the evidence already presented shall remain as part of the record of the case. The Bank was also given the right to cross-examine the wife whose testimony had already been received. After the termination of the cross-examination, the court, now presided by Judge T directed the Bank's counsel to furnish the Spouses D's counsel a copy of the answer. Since the Bank's counsel failed to furnish the other counsel with the copy of the answer and failed to appear during the scheduled hearings, Judge T ordered that the answer be stricken off the record and declared the bank in default. Then Judge T rendered a decision in favor of Spouses D and awarded damages to them amounting to php 14M. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the said decision. The CA annulled the decision and remanded the case to the lower court for trial on the merits. The Bank then filed an administrative complaint against Judge T for partiality, serious misconduct, and rendition of unjust orders. Its charges centered on the second default order and the award of damages greater than what was prayed for in the complaint. The Bank asked for the application of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine arguing that there was on the face of the assailed decisions an inexplicable grave error.

Was Judge T in error when she issued the said orders? Do the facts of the case show malice on the part of Judge T to warrant the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine?

A judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment, unless there is proof that the error was attributable to a conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. For as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. The res ipsa loquitor doctrine does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts from which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary. (Chapter XIV, Page 608, Footnote no. 315) LLAACCHHIICCAA VV.. FFLLOORRDDEELLIIZZAA

Case No.85 254 SCRA 278 (1996) Chapter XIII, Page 483-484, Footnote No.35

Dr. L, a municipal health officer, knowing the importance of a death certificate, refused to sign one on the ground that she has no personal knowledge of the cause of death of the deceased. Later in the evening, Judge F invited Dr. L to sit next to him. Judge F, who was drunk told her in an angry manner: “Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan ang death certificate?” Judge Flordeliza threatened Dr. L that he will file an administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the death certificate.

Is Judge F guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position and intimidation amounting to a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct? If yes, what specifically are the violations of Judge F under the code of Judicial Conduct?

A judge’s personal behavior in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. His inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during festivities is reprehensible. A judge who yields to the strength of the “spirits” and acts like an uninhabited drunkard in a public place demeans his judicial office, strips himself of his dignity as a man and disrobes the court of the respect of the people it serves.

Judge F violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial ethics which is the avoidance of appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge F is sentenced to pay P10, 000 as fine with warning.

MMAACCAABBAASSAA VV.. BBAANNAAAAGG

Case No. 92 57 SCRA 465 (1974) Chapter XIII, Page 505, Footnote No. 137

An administrative proceeding was filed by A against the Judge B for negligence and dereliction of duty. A was an offended party in a case for grave oral defamation. A alleged that at the schedule continuation at 8:30 in the morning, B failed to appear until 1:00 noon, all the while planting mango seedlings in his garden, thus keeping waiting the parties, their witnesses, an assistant provincial fiscal and the defense counsel, who were all in court at the appointed time. The hearing having been reset, at the same time in the morning, B again failed to appear until noon time, his absence caused by his being at his farm. B’s sole defense was on both occasions his absence was due to a severe, excruciating headache.

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Was the act of the Judge justifiable and consistent with his duty in administering justice?

Justice delayed is often justice denied, and delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary. In addition, it lowers its standard and brings it into disrepute.

OOFFFFIICCEE OOFF TTHHEE CCOOUURRTT AADDMMIINNIISSTTRRAATTOORR VV.. BBAARRRROONN

Case No.107 297 SCRA 376 (1998) Chapter XIV, Page 574, Footnote No. 135

Judge X was designated as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court where a civil case was pending. A retired court employee who introduced himself as Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court looked for A, who is one of the parties in the civil case pending before the sala of Judge X. The Sheriff told A that Judge X directed the former to deliver the message that the Judge wanted to “talk to A about the case.” When Judge X and A met, Judge X told A that the former would write a decision for A’s case that would be favorable to A’s situation if A would give Judge X Php4,000. Subsequently, when A delivered to Judge X the marked money, Judge X was apprehended for having been found in possession of the marked money which was utilized by the NBI during the entrapment operation conducted against Judge X.

Does the act of Judge X constitute gross misconduct? If yes, what specific act constitutes such?

The judge’s act of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant with a pending case in his sala constituted grave misconduct.

RRAAMMIIRREEZZ VV.. CCOORRPPUUZZ--MMAACCAANNDDOOGG

Case No.128 144 SCRA 462 (1989) Chapter XIII, Page 488, Footnote No.47

Deputy Sheriff A was directed by Regional Trial Court Judge X in an order to demolish the improvements of the defendants in a No. of civil cases. Regional Trial Court Judge Y then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Deputy Sheriff A from demolishing the improvements of the said defendants, who are intervenors in another case handled by Judge Y. When A enforced the order of Judge X, Judge Y ordered the arrest of A for direct contempt of court consisting of the alleged disobedience to the order made

by Judge Y. Judge Y even effected a handwritten note given for the immediate execution of her order. A was arrested and then filed a petition for habeas corpus and an administrative case against Judge Y for having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing his arrest.

Will the administrative case prosper?

Mr. A filed a complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge X for the latter’s alleged failure to decide the civil case where the former is the respondent despite the case being submitted for decision for more than 18 months. In her answer, Judge X claimed that there is nothing in the records that the case has been submitted for decision. She also alleged that only after she received a phone call pressuring her to decide the case in favor of Mrs. B or else she will be removed from office. She said that by reason of the said phone call and considering that the existing government at that time is a revolutionary one, she has no choice but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. B, which she did.

Is Judge X justified in deciding the case in favor of Mrs. B by reason of the threat against the former?

A judge should continuously study and research on the law from beginning to end. Only then will the litigants have greater faith in the administration of justice. VVEEDDAANNAA VV.. VVAALLEENNCCIIAA

Case No.54 295 SCRA 1 (1998) Chapter XIII, Page 490, Footnote No.54

S in her capacity as court interpreter entered the chamber of Judge V to inform him that the scheduled cases were ready. Judge V held her hand and being a distant relative she thought that it was without malice. Only when the Judge held her hand for quite some time did she suspect an ulterior motive. Judge V then pulled her hand, hugged her and tried to kiss her on the lips but she was able to avoid it and it landed on her cheek.

Can Judge V as a public official be judged by his personal morals?

A judge who is guilty of sexual harassment or unjust vexation by holding the hand of his interpreter, who is his distant relative, kissing by her lips,

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although missing it as the complainant wiggled out, has violated Canon 2 and 3, for a public official is also adjudged by his private morals.

YYUUSSOONN VV.. NNOOEELL

Case No. 174 227 SCRA 1 (1993) Chapter XIII, Page 477, Footnote No. 7

Judge X received a sum intended for payment of a judgment debt and misappropriated it to his personal use. A case was filed against Judge X. Judge X admitted that he received payment but denied that he was still in possession of the money for what he allegedly received was a check which he claims to have returned to the counsel of the judgment debtor for it to be replaced.

Was the judge guilty of any misconduct? How should a judge conduct himself?

He is a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will receive no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. DDEE LLAA CCRRUUZZ VV.. CCOONNCCEEPPCCIIOONN

Case No. 48 235 SCRA 597 (1994) Chapter XIV, Page 575, Footnote No. 140

A, B, C and D filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness before the court against their coach. Judge X took cognizance of the case and rendered a decision acquitting the accused even if the accused stroked and touched the private parts of the complainants. Judge X reasoned that the complained acts may no longer be considered lascivious in view of the directives and implementing rules and guidelines of the then Ministry (now Department) of Education, Culture and Sports which imposed on the coaches of boys' and girls' volleyball teams the responsibility of excluding over-aged players from their teams using as one of the criteria the presence of pubic hair; therefore, lewdness could no longer be merely presumed. Subsequently, Judge X was administratively indicted for gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for acquitting the accused.

What is the nature of the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment? As a crime what are its elements? Is Judge X guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment?

The judge is NOT guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal act and administrative misconduct. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 205 of the Revised Penal Code and requires the following elements: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. HHEEIIRRSS OOFF YYAASSIINN VV.. FFEELLIIXX

Case No. 67 250 SCRA 545 (1995) Footnote No. 140, Chapter XIV, Page 574-575

N was fatally shot in the back with a .38 caliber revolver. S was arrested without a warrant for the death based on the sworn statement by two persons who testified that they saw S, who was at that time, a security guard, running after somebody. However, they failed to see who the person was or whether said person was hit or not. The Provincial prosecutor filed an information for murder against S and no bail was recommended. On the same day, Judge F issued an order for the arrest of the accused even though the accused was already arrested six days before. S then filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was illegally arrested and was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. Judge F issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. He failed to inform the provincial prosecutor. The provincial prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the order which was denied by Judge F.

The heirs of N represented by Atty. Y charged Judge F with gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for granting the petition.

W/N the judge was grossly ignorant of the law

W/N the judge has been impartial.

(1) A judge is not assumed to be entirely immune to error. As basis for disciplinary action, the error or mistake of a judge must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. A judge cannot be held to account or answer criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. In the absence of fraud, dishonestly or corruption, the acts of a judge in his capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.

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(2) There is no evidence of impartiality. However, the judge, in not informing the prosecutor seems to be lax in the management of his office. As head of court of record, he should have seen to it that the office of the Provincial Prosecutor be furnished with a copy of the petition and notice of hearing. Judge F is only guilty of negligence and was ordered to pay a fine for mismanagement of his office

IINN RREE:: CCLLIIMMAACCOO

Case no. 204 55 SCRA 107 (1974) Chapter XIV, Page 575, Footnote no. 141

Fiscal Z of Negros Occidental filed a charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against 13 persons as principals, 7 persons as accomplices, and 2 persons as accessories. The case was assigned to a Branch presided over by X. Upon the acquittal of one of the accused, Z bewails as malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law the behavior of X, alleging that X made a secret ocular inspection of the place where the crime has been committed, without anybody to guide him, much less in the presence of the prosecution. Z further concluded that the secret ocular inspection was the sole basis of X’s judgment.

In short, the charges impute upon X, (a) dereliction or misconduct in office, which contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment knowingly and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

Under the circumstances, may X be rendered liable? If the answer is in the affirmative, what should the prosecution prove the court?

Yes, but in order to discipline a judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond cavil that the judgment or order is unjust for being contrary to law, or as was not supported by evidence and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

RREE:: IINNQQUUIIRRYY OONN TTHHEE AAPPPPOOIINNTTMMEENNTT OOFF JJUUDDGGEE CCUUBBEE

Case No. 72 227 SCRA 193 (1993) Chapter XIV, Page 572, Footnote No. 120

Judge A was appointed as a presiding judge of MTC. Subsequently, information was received by the Judicial and Bar Council that Judge A had been previously dismissed as an Assistant Fiscal for gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties. It was later found out that Judge A did not disclose his dismissal in the Personal Data Sheet that he submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council as a requirement for application to his present position.

Did the concealment of his previous dismissal constitute an act of dishonesty that would render him unfit to remain in the judiciary?

A judge who concealed in his bio-data form the fact required by the Judicial and Bar Council that he had been dismissed as assistant city fiscal for gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to remain in the judiciary. LLEEYYNNEESS VV.. VVEELLOOSSOO

Case No.86 82 SCRA 325 (1978) Footnote No. 158 Chapter XIV Page 576

Judge PV, who was 68 at the time of the complaint, was married to one L. Even before the judge married L, he already has children out of wedlock. When he met an accident sometime in 1974, L allegedly hired G to take care of her husband and to act as the judge’s real wife. L even issued an affidavit that she will not prosecute G and the judge’s offspring. One Attorney V charged Judge PV for having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances in his own house. It was the contention of Judge V that he was already condoned by his wife through a letter stating that she hired his husband’s concubine in order to take care of him. Attorney V withdrew his complaint but the court refused to dismiss the same stating that Judge PV did admit committing concubinage and such admission is a confession. FL then adopted the complaint against Judge V.

W/N Judge V should be dismissed

A lawyer should have a good moral character. He may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage. MORONO V. LOMEDA

118 – 103 “Not the Best Witness”

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Judge L was the subscribing officer in the custody confession of M who was charged for murder.

Judge L did not follow the procedure in taking the confessions of M, hence violated several constitutional rights of the latter.

During the trial of M, Judge L falsely testified in court that the extrajudicial confessions of M were lawfully executed.

The Court held that the actions of Judge L amounted to serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.

Judge L was dismissed, with prejudice to reinstatement.

AAPPIIAAGG VV.. CCAANNTTEERROO

268 SCRA 47(1997) Case No.10 Chapter XIV, Page 598, Footnote No. 271

MA and EC got married in 11 August 1947. After having lived together as husband and wife, they begot a daughter T and son G. Thereafter, EC left the conjugal home and left MA to raise the two children. For several years, EC was never heard of and his whereabouts unknown. In 1993, complainants MA and children T and G, through their lawyer, wrote a letter to respondent judge EC as a formal demand for maintenance and support and a request that they be properly instituted and named as EC’s compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries. However, the letter elicited no action.

MA later learned that EC had another family. MA charges EC of bigamy and falsification of public documents, that he contracted his second marriage with NY in Leyte and that EC misrepresented himself in all of public documents as being married to NY.

EC explained that when they were still in their early age, MA and EC engaged in a lovel affair which resulted in the pregnancy of MA, and then and there gave birth to T. In order to save name and avoid shame, their parents came to an agreement to allow MA and EC to get married in name, but not to live together as husband and wife, thereby forcing EC to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were already prepared and duly signed; that after the said affair both MA and EC immediately separated each other without living together as husband and wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal home. From that time on, they have never met each other nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years. EC continued to study in Cebu, and eventually became

a member of the Philippine Bar in 1960 and was eventually appointed as MCTC Judge of Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, Cebu. EC further claims that he didn’t file any annulment or judicial declaration of nullity because the said marriage was in jest and was void from the beginning. That MA and EC already signed a compromise agreement and without knowledge of EC, MA proceeded with the complaint.

Is EC guilty of the crime of grave misconduct (bigamy and falsification of public document)?

The misconduct imputed by MA, T and G against Judge EC comprises the following: abandonment of the first wife, failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of public document.

Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action has a specific meaning in law. It refers to a misconduct such as would affect the judge’s performance of his duties and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. Misconduct, misfeasance or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an office must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties.

The acts imputed against EC clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. Therefore, the said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of the acts of Judge EC “xxx to warrant disciplinary action, the act must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer.”

Finally, the Court was inclined to treat EC with leniency considering his records that the Court found no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing of the administrative case. Dismissal from service as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh. A penalty of suspension should have been warranted but in view of EC’s death, the case is dismissed.