Lecture Guide of Assistant Secretary Augusto p

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LECTURE GUIDE of Assistant Secretary AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO Department of Agrarian Reform

Discuss the requisites for the existence of tenancy relations:

a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;

b) The subject is agricultural land;

c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either

orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;

e) The purpose is agricultural production;

f) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm household; and

g) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or produce. (Caballes vs.

DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974); Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235,

[1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991]

Agricultural leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease.

) Subject Matter - agricultural leasehold is limited to agricultural land; while a civil law lease may refer to

rural or urban property;

) Attention and Cultivation - leasehold tenant should personally attend to, andcultivate the agricultural

land; whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased;

) Purpose - In leasehold tenancy, the landholding is devoted to agriculture; whereas in civil law lease, the

purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits;

) Law governing the relationship - Civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,whereas leasehold

tenancy is governed by special law (RA 3844 as amended by RA 6389). (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA

590 (1974)

An overseer of a coconut plantation was not considered a tenant (Zamoras vs. Su, Jr., 184 SCRA 248

(1990); Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529 (1992). The owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant

within the contemplation of law. (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 197 (1990). Certification of

tenancy/non-tenancy issued by DAR are not conclusive evidence of tenancy relationship. (Oarde vs. CA

etal., 280 SCRA 235 [1997]). Successor-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the

consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land

(Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 [1992]). The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate

family to work on the land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons

to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).

We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is divested of his

landholding and somebody else is installed to became a new landlord.(Oarde, et al., vs. CA, et al., 780

SCRA 235 [1997]). Tenancy relation was severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm household

ceased from personally working the fishpond (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974). Since there is

no sharing arrangement between the parties, the Court held that Matienzo is merely an overseer and

not a tenant (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981). The Supreme Court has consistently ruled

that once a leasehold relation has been established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of


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tenure . The tenant has a right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom for

cause as provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 (1989). Security of tenure is a legal concession

to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount

to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 439 (1988)

Security of tenure afforded the tenant-lessee is constitutional (Primero vs. CIR, 101 Phil. 675 (1957);

Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967) Once a tenant, always a tenant. The Supreme Court heldthat only the tenant-lessee has a right to a homelot and that members of the immediate family of the

tenant are not entitled to a homelot (Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819

1997).

Causes for Termination of the Leasehold Relation

) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor (Teodoro vs.

Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969);

) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be

served three months in advance (Nisnisan, et al., vs. CA, 294 SCRA 173 (1998);

) or Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her death or permanent incapacity

(Section 8, RA 3844)

The lessor who ejects his tenant without the courts authorization shall be liablefor:

) Fine or imprisonment;

) Damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment for unauthorized

dispossession;

) Payment of attorneys fees incurred by the lessee; and

) The reinstatement of the lessee.

The Supreme Court in upholding its constitutionality held that there is no legal basis for declaring LOI

No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and taking of property without just

compensation grounds. (Zurbano vs. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333 (1989) In the case of Locsin vs. Valenzuela

which was promulgated on 19 February 1991, the Supreme Court explained the legal effect of land

being place under OLT as vesting ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent case dated 13

September 1991 Vinzons Magana vs. Estrella citing Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo which pre-dated the Locsin

case, the High Tribunal ruled that mere issuance of a certificate of land transfer does not vest ownership

in the farmer/grantee.

The consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not needed in the determination of just compensation pursuant

to Section 18 of RA No. 6657 (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Pascual (G.R. No. 128557,

December 29, 1999).

Just Compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property takenfrom its owner by

the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court, that the measure is not the takers gain

but the owners loss . The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to

convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,


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substantial, full and ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section II, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to

the courts to decide petition for determination of just compensation has already been transformed into

an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative law,

primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminarymanner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such

determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not

any less original and exclusive, because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial

proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For the matter, the law may

provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable.

Nevertheless, resort to courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the

legality of administrative action (Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132767, January 18,

2000).

The Supreme Court decided not to apply that 6% increment to the valuation because the Court of

Appeals affirmed the PARADs use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in the valuation of the private

respondents land (following theruling in the Court of Appeals case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No.

23168; Rollo, p. 36) (LBP vs.CA and Jose Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)

The DAR must first resolve the issues raised in a protest/application before the distribution of covered

lands to farmer-beneficiaries may be effected. (Roxas & Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17

December, 1999).

) The CREATION and JURISDICTION of the DARAB was discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of

Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995) . The Supreme Court held that: Section 17 of EO 229 vested the

DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive

original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those following

under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law. Executive Order 129-A, while in the

process of reorganizing and strengtheningthe DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of

agrarian reform cases. (Also Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609 (1991).

In Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996), complainant filed an administrative case against the

respondent Judge for taking cognizance of the ILLEGAL DETAINER case filed by their landowner against

them notwithstanding knowledge of previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer

case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the complainants

containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent judge took cognizance of the illegal

detainer case. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject,together with an ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the

case to the DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law. However,

DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the prosecution of all criminal

offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657

(1988), Sec. 57).


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Jurisdiction over said matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals

and Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided by DARAB. (Vda. de

Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA 885 (1990)

DARABs Jurisdiction over Agrarian Disputes was also resolved in Central Mindanao University vs.

DARAB, 215 SCRA 86.

Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,

tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning

farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or

seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy

relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of

ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether

the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,

or lessor and lessee (Isidro vs. CA, 228 SCRA 503 (1993).

In the case of Vda. de Areiola vs. Camarines Sur Reg. Agricultural School, et al., 110 SCRA 517 (1960),

the Supreme Court explained the phrase by a third party in Section 21 of RA 1199 (Ejectment;

Violation; Jurisdiction. ---all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third

party - - -) The Supreme Court held that when no tenancy relationship between the contending parties

exist, the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction, The law governing agricultural tenancy, RA

1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landholder and a

tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging to

the former, etc.Necessarily, the law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and tenant.

This does not exist where one is owner or possessor and the other a squatter or deforciant.

Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court (SACs) shall have original and exclusive

jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation and all criminal offenses. The

Supreme held that any effort totransfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR Adjudicators

and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary toSection 57 of RA 6657 and therefore would be void. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 758 SCRA 263 (1996).

It should be stressed that the motion in Fortich were denied on the ground that the win-win

resolution is void and has no legal effect because the decision approving the concession has already

become final and executory. This is the ratio decidendi or reason of the decision. The statement that

LGUs have authority to convert or reclassify agricultural lands without DAR approval is merely a dictum

or expression of the individual views of the ponente or writer of the Resolution of August 19, 1997. It

does not embody the Courtsdetermination and is not binding (Fortich, et al., vs. Corona, et al., G.R. No.

131457 (August 19, 1999).

Agricultural lands expropriated by LGUs pursuant to the power of eminent domain need not be subject

of DAR conversion clearance prior to change in use. (Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173(1993) 32. Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners landholding

does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners application for conversion

of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. (Roxas vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, (December 16,

1999) 33. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its

jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not

conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceedings

before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof. (Jaime Morta, Sr., et al., vs. Jaime


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Occidental, et al., G. R. No. 123417, (June 10, 1999) (Note the Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davide

Jr.,) 34. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program, covers tenanted

rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following:

(1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops : and

(2) there must be a system of share crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein.

If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not

apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed. On the

other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following:

(1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops ;

(2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein; and

(3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24)hectares or it could be more

than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered

lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of other agricultural lands.

In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27

are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded the August 27, 1985

deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT.

However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously

filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of

seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A.

No. 6657. (Eudosia Daez and/or Her Heirspresented by Edriano D. Daez, vs. The Hon. C.A. et. al., 325

SCRA 857).

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant toRule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not

within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still

within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was

filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes

with indirect contempt (LBP vs. Severino Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611. (August 5, 2003) There are only

two ways aperson can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) though a verified petition; and (2)

by order or formal charge initiated by the court MOTU PROPRIO.

We hold that our decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments

of Special Agrarian Courts is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given

retroactive application, it will prejudice LBPs right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of

Appeals will be dismissed outright in mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof.It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a

contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine. (Land Bank of

the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 143275 (March 20, 2003)(Note: Sec. 60in relation to

Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657). 37. The Supreme Court ruled that if landowners are called to sacrifice in the

interest of land reform, their acceptance of Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural lands,

government lending institutions should share in the sacrifice by accepting the same Land Bank bonds at

their face value (Ramirez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 81) 38. The Supreme Court granted the petition for


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mandamus seeking to compel respondent GSIS to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as

payment for a pre-existing obligation (Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281).

It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian

reform although such valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final determination of just

compensation is vested in the courts. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).

Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the

constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for Presidential Decree 27 lands through the

different modes stated in Sec. 18. R.A. 6657. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321

SCRA 629).

Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 granting the Department of

Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction (administrative proceeding) to determine and adjudicate "agrarian

reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of

agrarian reform" which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the

provisions of Sec. 57, R.A. 6657 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction

(judicial proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner, and

(2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under Republic Act No. 6657. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322

SCRA 139). It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction

given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been

transformed into an appellate jurisdiction . (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question

is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative

determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and

unappealable . Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the

guarantors of the legality of administrative action. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).

In Vda. De Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian

Reform is limited

to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of ag

rarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and landtenure related proble

ms; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjust

ment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other n

on-agricultural uses. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA 167).


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Lecture Guide ASEC AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO Page 7

45.

The findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantia

l evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal. ( De Chavez vs. Zo

bel, 55 SCRA 26).

46. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his p

owers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and

we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of Pre

sident Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same wa

s authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constituti

on, quoted above. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). 47. That fund, as earlier noted, is

itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requireme

nts of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however,

Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the c

reation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation la

w is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release o

f public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to

the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. (Ibid.) 48. T

he argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 shoul

d be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by

Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 665

7 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one

of its most controversial provisions. (Ibid.) 49. In other words, mandamus can

issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed

upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercis

e of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will int

ervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the du


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Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other dem

ocratic jurisdictions. (Ibid.) 53. CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than tho

se granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits. (Ibid.) 54. The rule is settle

d that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the

time of the commencement of an action . There can be no question that at the tim

e the complaints in CAR Cases Nos. 760-802-UP 78 and 806-810-UP 78 were filed, t

he RTC of Pangasinan had no jurisdiction over them pursuant to Section 12 (a) an

d (b) of P.D. No. 946 which is vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with

original exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted and obligati

ons imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian re

form program. However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judi

ciary Reorganization Act of 1980, took effect, the Courts of Agrarian Relations

were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the forme

r was vested in the latter courts. It can thus be seen that at the time Branch 4

6 of the RTC of Pangasinan dismissed the agrarian cases on 29 October 1985, Regi

onal Trial Courts already had jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. The issue tha

t logically crops up then is whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 automatically confe

rred upon the aforesaid Branch 46 jurisdiction over the subject agrarian cases c

onsidering that these cases were filed seven (7) years earlier at a time when on

ly the Courts of Agrarian Relations had exclusive original jurisdiction over the

m. We rule that it did not, for such a defect is fatal. Besides, the grant of ju

risdiction to the Regional Trial Courts over agrarian cases was not meant to hav

e any retroactive effect. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 does not provide for such retr

oactivity. The trial court did not then err in dismissing the cases. ( Tiongson

vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197). 55. On 22 July 1987, the President of the Republic of the

Philippines promulgated Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 providing for the mechan

isms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program institu


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ted by Proclamation No. 131 dated 22 July 1987. Section 17 thereof provides: "SE

C. 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.- The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-ju

dicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall hav

e exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of a

grarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DEN

R and the Department of Agriculture (DA). x x x The decisions of the DAR may, in

proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately

executory notwithstanding such appeal." This provision not only repealed Sectio

n 12 (a) and (b) of B.P. Blg. 129 . The abovequoted Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 w

as the governing law at the time the challenged decision was promulgated. Then,

too, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, substan

tially reiterates said Section 17 while Sections 56 and 57 provide for the desig

nation by this Court of at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court in e

ach province to act as a special agrarian court which shall have exclusive origi

nal jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation

and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. (Tiongson vs. CA, 214 S

CRA 197). The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions

No. 474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well

settled. More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutio

nality of Letter of Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrari

an Reform Conrado Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Progra

m of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/co

rn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own ot

her agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands u

sed for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which t

hey derive adequate income to support themselves and their families". (Vinzons-M

agana vs. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536). 57. It is settled that mandamus is not availa

ble to control discretion but not the discretion itself. The writ may issue to c


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ompel the exercise of discretion but not the

56.


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discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but not specific action wher

e the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion. (Sharp Int

ernational Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299). 58. Actions for forfeiture of certif

icates of land transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for more than two (2) y

ears fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agraria

n Relations. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567). 59. Referral of preliminary determina

tion of rights of tenant-farmer and the landowner to Ministry of Agrarian Reform

, not necessary, where tenancy relationship between the parties is admitted in t

he pleadings. ( Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567). 60. Presidential Decree No. 816 imp

oses the sanction of forfeiture where the "agricultural lessee x x x deliberatel

y refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments

when they fall due for a period of two (2) years ." Petitioners cannot be said

to have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They acted in accordance

with the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good faith. Forfeiture

of their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as decreed by t

he CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted. (Curso vs. CA, 1

28 SCRa 567). 61. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing pr

ohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiar

ies and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform.

Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates the above provisions of the

Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.

( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86). 62. The DARAB has no pow

er to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of

the CMU s titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordere

d segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school

to be necessary for its purposes. There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdict

ion to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP. An


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agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenu

rial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devot

ed to agriculture. ( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86). 63. Se

ction 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 deemed repealed by Section 1

7 Executive Order No. 229.- The above quoted provision should be deemed to have

repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested th

e then Courts of Agrarian Relations with the original exclusive jurisdiction ove

r cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presid

ential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program. In 1980

, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary

Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the Re

gional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter

courts. (Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609). 64. The Department of Agrarian Reform

is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform

matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving i

mplementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive origin

al jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environme

nt and Natural Resources. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorgan

izing and strengthening the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjud

ication Board (DARAB) to


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assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian ref

orm cases. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176). 65. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "

special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional trial Co

urts designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within each province-to ac

t as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts hav

e, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction ove

r: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, a

nd (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. (Machete vs. CA,

250 SCRA 176). 66. The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leas

ehold contract is an issue which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is c

learly beyond the legal competence of the Regional Trial Courts to resolve. (Ibi

d.) 67. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogat

e unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is

initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The resoluti

on by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties si

nce it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administr

ative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. (Ibid.

) 68. The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes , exce

pt on the aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over w

hich regular courts have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885). 69

. Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever b

etween the parties that could bring a controversy under the ambit of the agraria

n reform laws, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has no juris

diction. (Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293). 70. The CAR

ETAKER of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and, hence, a

tenant. (Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88).

71. The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation.


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(COCOMA vs. CA, 164 SCRA 568).

72. There are no squatters in Agricultural lands. Squatters are only found in UR

BAN

COMMUNITIES, not in RURAL AREAS. (On Presidential Decree No. 772- Illegal Squatt

ing) (People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663).

73. It bears noting that the Decision, which prescribed for Rule 42 as the corre

ct mode of

appeal from the decisions of the SAC, was promulgated by this Court only on 10 S

eptember 2002, while the Resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the sai

d case giving it a prospective application was promulgated on 20 March 2003. Res

pondent appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 July 1998 via ordinary appeal und

er Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Though appeal under said rule is not the prope

r mode of appeal, said erroneous course of action cannot be blamed on respondent

. It was of the belief that such recourse was the appropriate manner to question

ed the decisions of the SAC. In Land Bank v. De Leon, we held: On account of the

absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding t

he proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conf

licting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for avai

ling of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buen

aventura ruling, LBP acted on the


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mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question de

cisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Thus, while the rule is that the appropriate

mode of appeal from the decisions of the SAC is through petition for review und

er Rule 42, the same rule is inapplicable in the instant case. The Resolution ca

tegorically stated that said ruling shall apply only to those cases appealed aft

er 20 March 2003 (Fernando Gabatin, et al., vs. LBP, G.R. No. 148223, November 2

5 2004)

74. The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determinati

on of just

compensation absent respondent Land Banks participation. Logically, it follows th

at respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of ju

st compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program. Assuming arguendo

that respondent is not an indispensable party but only a necessary party as is

being imposed upon us by the petitioners, we find the argument of the petitioner

s that only indispensable can appeal to be incorrect. There is nothing in the Ru

les of Court that prohibit a party in an action before the lower court to make a

n appeal merely on the ground that he is not an indispensable party. The Rules o

f Court does not distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable party or

not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement is that the persons appealing

must have a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must be

aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved

or prejudiced when his interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the

lawsuit, is injuriously affected by the judgment, order or decree. The fact that

a person is made a party to a case before the lower court, and eventually be ma

de liable if the judgment be against him, necessarily entitles him to exercise h

is right to appeal. To prohibit such party to appeal is nothing less than an out

right violation of the rules on fair play.


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75. The Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or de

fendants. In BPI v. Court of Appeal, 402 SCRA 449 this Court explained: . . . .

. . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts a

ction in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can

be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief

sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal pre

sence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence ther

e cannot be resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is e

ffective, complete, or equitable. Conversely, a party is not indispensable to th

e suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divi

sible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudi

ced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not

indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him a

nd those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.

(Ibid)

76. In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, this Court even went o

n to say

that without the Land Bank, there would be no amount to be established by the go

vernment for the payment of just compensation, thus: As may be gleaned very clea

rly from EO 229, the LBP is an essential part of the government sector with rega

rd to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the instru

mentality that is charged with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of

agrarian reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the government m

achinery that fixes and determines the amount compensable to the


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landowner. Were LBP to be excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive, functi

on of establishing the compensable amount, there would be no amount to be establi

shed by the government as required in Section 6 of EO 229 (emphasis. supplied). (

Ibid)

77. We must stress, at the outset, that the taking of private lands under the ag

rarian

reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a numbe

r of cases, we have stated that in computing the just compensation for expropria

ting proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking not at t

he time of the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration.

This being do, then in determining the value of the land for the payment of just

compensation, the time of taking should be the basis. In the instant case, sinc

e the dispute over the valuation of the land depends on the rate of the GSP used

in the equation, it necessarily follows that the GSP should be pegged at the ti

me of the taking of the properties. In the instant case, the said taking of the

properties was deemed effected on 21 October 1972, when the petitioners were dep

rived of ownership over their lands in favor of qualified beneficiaries, pursuan

t to E.O. No. 228 and by the virtue of P.D. No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of pal

ay at that time was at P35. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the GSP s

hould be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP at the time of the taking of the

subject property . (Ibid)

78. Petitioners are not rendered disadvantage by the computation inasmuch as the

y are

entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded

annually pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply

explained by this Court: The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowner

s for unearned interests. Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for rice and c


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orn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposit

ed in a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus

, if the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35.00 or P31

.00) could be multiplied by (1.06) to determine the value of the land plus the a

ddition 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972.

79. Petitioners reliance on Land Bank v. Court of Appeals where we ordered Land B

ank

to pay the just compensation based on the GSP at the time the PARAD rendered the

decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not well taken. In that case, P

ARAD, in its decision, used the GSP at the time of payment, in determining the l

and value. When the decision became final and executory, Land Bank, however, ref

used to pay the landowner arguing that the PARADs valuation was null and void for

want of jurisdiction. We rules therein that the PARAD has the authority to dete

rmine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform. Thus, the decisi

on of the PARAD was binding on Land Bank. Land Bank was estopped from questionin

g the land valuation made by PARAD because it participated in the valuation proc

eedings and did not appeal the said decision. Hence, Land Bank was compelled to

pay the land value based on the GSP at the time of payment. (Ibid)

80. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief

from

judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excus

able negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence

and prudence could not have guarded against. Measured against this standard, th

e reason proferred by Land Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented

him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hear

ing, was by no means excusable.


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Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Recons

ideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 4

8, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of h

is arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable

negligence. (LBP vs. Hon. Elis G.C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005).

81. Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is no

thing but

a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it, m

uch less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The trial court th

erefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it

cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition

for relief from judgment. (Ibid)

82. At any rate, in the Philippines Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, We declar

e

that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to dete

rmine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction

over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which include

s jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination

of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the

second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of

administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a

preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian

reform program, but such determination is subject to challenged before the cour

ts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agra

rian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

83. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian

reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just comp


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ensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at

the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the Preside

nt, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landh

olding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take eff

ect on the payment of just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of this

case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation

to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of

Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just

compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.

Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only supple

tory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. (Ibid)

84. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation on the guid

eline

provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just c

ompensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be

determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially im

perative considering that just condensation should be the full and fair equivale

nt of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent bein

g real, substantial, full and ample.

85. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform

(DAR), even through they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional i

n nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has g

ranted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matter.

(DAR vs. Roberto J. Cuenca and Hon. Alfonso B. Combong, Jr., et al. G.R. N. 154

112, September 23, 2004).


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86. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points plead

ed by

respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that i

n case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolvi

ng a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of adminis

trative agencies, even if the question*s+ involved *are+ also judicial in charact

er, as in this case. (Ibid)

87. Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, i

t follows

that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the

assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken do

wn as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express p

rohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29

-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe S

ection 68 of RA 6657, which reads: Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies fr

om Undue Interference.No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus

shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (

DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natu

ral Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation

of the program.(Ibid)

88. It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be received by the

Supreme

Court in an appeal by certiorari. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are f

inal and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The o

nly time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals

(which are ordinary accorded great respect) is when these are based on speculati

on, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial evidence.


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(Samahan ng Magsasaka San Jose represented by Dominador Maglalang vs. Marietta

Valisno, et al., G.R. No. 158314 June 3, 2004).

89. The relevant laws governing the minors redemption in 1973 are the general Civ

il

Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1

327 of the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a

contract. Article 1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is inca

pable of giving consent is viodable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by

the minors in 1973 was merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab initio

, as petitions argue. Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered

into by the minors would require that: (1) the plaintiffs must have an interest

in the contract; and (2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the p

arty responsible for the defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides i

n part that *t+he action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all

who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are ca

pable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted. The action

to annul the minors redemption in 1973, therefore, was one that could only have

been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved parties

in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never init

iated by the minors . We thus quote with approval the ratiocination of the Court

of Appeals: Respondent contend that the redemption made by the petitioners was

simulated, calculated to avoid the effects of agrarian reform considering that a

t the time of redemption the latter were still minors and could not have recours

e, in their own right, to pay the price thereof. We are persuaded. While it is t

rue that a transaction entered into by a party who is incapable of consent is vi

odable, however such


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transaction is valid until annulled. The redemption made by the four petitioners

has never been annulled, thus, it is valid. (Ibid)

90. As owner in their own right of the questioned properties, RedemptionerGrandc

hildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. This right of

retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualificat

ion by the balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implement

ing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an justice agai

nst the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not su

pposed to leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the inc

onvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which w

ould be a pointless process.

91. On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctr

ine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible dependin

g on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings o

f a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are

circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the admin

istrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdicti

on. (DAR vs. APEX Investment and Financing Corporation; G.R. No. 149422, April 1

0, 2003).

92. In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrie

ved

landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protest

s (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial proc

ess. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have c

ontinued forever, the landowners has to act to assert and protect their interest

s. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not y


30/68

et resolved their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expec

ted to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial in

tervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondents lots dur

ing the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in conc

luding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not

exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari an

d prohibition. (Ibid)

93. In Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:

For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the

Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to preliminary conference sent to th

e landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other

interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the Not

ice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657. The i

mportance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of in

vitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They a

re steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.

The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the

power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limit

s to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of

private property in accordance with the Constitution (Association of Small Lando

wners in the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 373-374

[1989]. But where to carry out such regulations, the owners are deprived of lan

d they own in excess of the maximum area allowed there is also a taking under th

e power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of t

he use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physic

al possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner

in favor of the farm beneficiary (id.). The Bill of


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Rights provides that *n+o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property w

ithout de process of law (Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution). The C

ARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law (Developme

nt Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245, 253 [1996]). The

exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observe in

taking of private property. (Ibid)

94. In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not rec

eive the

Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latters old address. Pet

itioner explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those

notices upon respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investme

nt and Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, tha

t personal service could not be made, however, there is no showing that petition

er caused the service of the notices via registered mail as required by Section

16(a) of R.A. 6657, On this point, petitioner claimed that the notices were sent

not only by registered mail but also by personal delivery and that there was actu

al receipt by respondent as shown by the signature appearing at the bottom lefthand corner of

petitioners copies of the notices. But petitioner could not identi

fy the name of respondents representative who allegedly received the notices. In

fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible, It is thus sa

fe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition pr

oceedings, Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due proce

ss . It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he s

hould be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is

premised. (Ibid)

95. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform L

aw


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shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all publi

c and private agricultural lands. Section 3 defines agricultural land, as land devote

d to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,

forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. (Ibid)

96. In dismissing outright the petition for certiorari, the CA reasoned that sin

ce it

(petitioner LBP) was assailing the writ of execution issued by respondent Provin

cial Adjudicator, then its recourse was to file a petition for review under Rule

43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides: Sec. 1 Scope.Thi

s Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax

Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorize

d by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

Among there agencies are the . . . . Department of Agrarian Reform under Republi

c Act No. 6657. . . Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, howeve

r, Rule 43 does not apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because th

e same is not a final order within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Cou

rt fairly recently explained, a writ of execution is not a final order or resolut

ion , but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of

a final order or a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order o

r judgment against the losing party. As such an order or execution is generally n

ot appealable. (LBP vs. Hon. Pepito Planta and Faustino Tabla, G.R. No. 152324 A

pril 29, 2005.

97. On the other hand certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy

and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994

DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in par

t, that the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determi


34/68

nation and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but

shall be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts wit

hin fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice hereof. In relation to this prov

ision, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribed that any party who does not agr

ee with the


35/68


decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the

court for final determination of just compensation. (Ibid)

98. Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency betwee

n the

period to file certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days

from receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Se

ction 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judg

ment, order or resolution). The Courts holds that Section 54 of RA No. 6657 prev

ails since it is a substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or c

ases pertaining to the application, implementation enforcement of interpretation

of agrarian reform laws. However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is ex

tendible, but such extension shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section

4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

99. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discre

tion in

denying his motion for extension on the grounds that the petition which petitione

r intended to file is not the proper remedy. . . Petitioners contention is well-ta

ken. The Court of Appeals was rather hasty in concluding that the petitioner was

going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the basis of petitioners alleg

ation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have reserv

ed judgment on the mater until it had actually received the petition especially

considering that petitioners motion for extension was filed well within the regle

mentary period for filing a petition for review. (Ibid) Supreme Court citing De

Dios vs. CA, 274 SCRA 520)

100. Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given

full

opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalitie


36/68

s or procedural imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to exp

edite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A

strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to

frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rul

e 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the Rules shall be liberally co

nstrued in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and ine

xpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Paulina Diaz, et al., vs.

Carlos Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345, March 19, 2004)

101. The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of

the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents

may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations , Secti

on 12(g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian

Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipati

on patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was lat

er lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Proced

ure. Aside from ordering the cancellation of emancipation patents, the DARAB may

order reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to agrarian reform benefici

aries, forfeiture of amortization, ejectment of beneficiaries, reallocation of t

he land to qualified beneficiaries, perpetual disqualification to become agraria

n reform beneficiaries, reimbursement of amortization payment and value of impro

vement, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of emancipation

patents. (Liberty Ayo-Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato, G.R. No. 155181, April 15, 2

005).

102. Only questions of law, however, can be raised in a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact by the CA are f

inal and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more


37/68

so if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of the DAR

AB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and spe

cialized


38/68


jurisdiction. This Court is not thus duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over ag

ain the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, subject to certain

exceptions. (Ibid)

103. Petitioner furthermore argues that the amortization payments she made to th

e Land

Bank in the amount of P9,825.80 should not have been forfeited in favor of respo

ndent. On this score, the Court finds for petitioner. While the DARAB has jurisd

iction to Order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficia

ry, forfeiture should be made in favor of the government and not to the realloca

tee of the landholding. (Ibid)

104. In Monsanto v. Zerna, (G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001) it was held that f

or

DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship

between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a disput

e, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to it: (1)

the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject

matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent betwee

n the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is t

o bring about agricultural production (5) there is personal cultivation on the p

art of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between

the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In the case a bar, the elem

ent that the parties must be the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee o

n which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is absent. Tenanc

y relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both parties.

Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a Ce

rtificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert

ownership over Lots Nos. 5198-A, 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Em


39/68

ancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show

any juridical tie or tenurial relationship between the parties predecessors-in-i

nterest. The questioned lot it allegedly declared for taxation purposes in the n

ame of petitioners father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to have any connec

tion with the private respondents nor with their alleged predecessorin-interest,

Caridad Fuentebella. (Rodolfo Arzaga, et al., vs. Salvacion Copias, et al., G.R

. No. 152404, March 28, 2003).

105. In Chico v. Court of Appeals, (348 Phil. 37 1998) also an action for recove

ry of

possession, the Court was confronted with the same jurisdictional issue. The pet

itioner therein claimed ownership over the disputed property pursuant to a final

judgment, while the respondents asserted right to possession by virtue of an al

leged tenancy relationship with one who has no juridical connection with the pet

itioners. In holding that it is the trial court and not the DARAB which has juri

sdiction over the case, the Court ruled that the absence of a juridical tie betw

een the parties or their predecessor-in-interest negates the existence of the el

ement of tenancy relationship.

106. The basic rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined

by

the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or t

he theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss . Otherw

ise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the d

efendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is that th

e petitioners action does not involve an agrarian dispute, but one for recovery o

f possession, which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trail C

ourts. (Ibid)


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107. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural

activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residenti

al, commercial or industrial land. The terms agriculture or agricultural activity is

also defined by the same law as follows:


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Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultiva

tion of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestoc

k, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other fa

rm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farm

ing operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. (DAR vs. DECS, G.R.

No. 158223, April 27, 2004)

108. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempte

d

from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz: xxx x

xx xxx

c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for n

ational defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations

operated by public or private schools for educations purposes, shall be exempt

from the coverage of this Act. xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, a reading of the paragraphs shows that, in order to be exempt from the

coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly and exclusively used and found t

o be necessary; and 2) the purpose is :for school sites and campuses, including e

xperimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educations p

urposes. The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and

found to be necessary cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want

us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The

words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the Plain meaning rules or verb

a legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of

a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its litera

l meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. (Ibid) (Note: To be exem

pt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, t

hat must be actually and exclusively used for educational purposes.)


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109. In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential C

ARP

beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secr

etary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) iss

ued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the id

entification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly

the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the court to exercise

great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there

is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this cas

e, there was none. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the basti

on of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistr

ibute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberat

e them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means t

owards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the S

tate is no less certain: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highes

t consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound ru

ral development and industrialization. (Ibid)

110. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his the

ory of the

case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that courts of jus

tice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. A judgment

that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the c

ourt did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and


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invalid The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present ca

se, the Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of

Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the Spouses Velasco

from the land under RA 3844. (Henry Mon vs. CA, Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., et

al., G.R. No. 118292, April 2, 2004).

111. Administrative Law: The power of subordinate legislation allows administrat

ive

bodies to implements the broad policies laid down in a statute by filing in the de

tails, and all that us required it that the regulation should be germane to the

objects and purposes of law and that the regulations be not in contradiction to

but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. The power of subordi

nate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the board policies la

id down in a statute by filing in the details. All that is required is that the re

gulations be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescr

ibed by the law. One such administrative regulations is DAR Memorandum Circular

NO, 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27,

i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers

the ownership of the land theyre tilling. (Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Gonzal

es, 387 SCRA 15).

112.

Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to accomplish the noble p

urpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid and has the force of law. The rationale

for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court whe

n it stated that The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lea

se rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the

purchase price of the land. x x x The circular is meant to remedy the situation

where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favo


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r against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual

obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed circular essentially sought

to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being th

e case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. (Ibid)

113. The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816 and

DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the t

enant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner unti

l the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner

and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 19

78, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the

value of the land has been determine. (Ibid)

114. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in

implementation of P.D. 27these must not be read in isolation, but rather, in co

njunction with each other. (Private respondent, however splits hairs, so to speak,

and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circula

r implement P.D. 816, whereas it is expressed stated in the Circular that it was

issued in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but r

ather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be

made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/establish

ed, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provide

d in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly there is no inconsistency between them. Au cont

raire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets

the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property. (

Ibid)

115. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fac


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t that has

been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court.Further, that P.D. 27 does not

suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly

emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecit

ed case of De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and uph

eld as part and parcel of the land of the land, viz: There is no doubt then, as s

et forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the dec

ree


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is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitut

ion itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. Th

at would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has

spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so becaus

e of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundament

al law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at n

aught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order

at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive

petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree cons

idered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avo

wed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenan

cy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created.

There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on

a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implem

enting and not thwarting fundamental policy goals. (Ibid)

116. Eminent Domain; Just compensation; the determination of just compensation u

nder

P.D. No. 27, like in section 16(d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or

conclusiveunless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation

of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the par

ties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount

of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. The d

etermination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in section 16 (d) of R

.A. 6657 or the CARP Law is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the su

cceeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228: x x x In the event of dispute with t

he landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary

, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Productio


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n concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submissio

n pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series o

f 1973, and other pertinent issuances, In the event a party questions in court t

he resolution of the dispute the landowners compensation shall still be processed

for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of

the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the

resolution of the dispute before the court. Clearly therefrom, unless both the l

andowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barri

o Committee on Land production and the DAR the parties may bring the dispute to

court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmis

takably within the prerogative of the court. (LBP vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387

SCRA 15).

117. Republic Act No. 6657; The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 o

r the

CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27 R.A. 6657 covers all public and privat

e agricultural and including other lands of the public domain suitable for agric

ulture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; whil

e, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides f

or the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically stat

es: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with resp

ect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It cannot be gainsaid, ther

efore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D.27.And whatev

er provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A 6657 shall be supple

tory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 a

re retained even with the passage of R.A 6657.

118. We have repeatedly stressed that social justiceor any justice for that mat

ter

is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in


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his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the bala

nce in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy

and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply

because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for jus

tice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the


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121. The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absoluteit is premise

d on

the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained o

r will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.Clearly, the right to

retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the conditio

n that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actua

lly cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the

conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the sub

ject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is

Lecture Guide of Assistant Secretary Augusto p

Documents

Transcript of Lecture Guide of Assistant Secretary Augusto p