Lecture 11 Rebecca B. Morton - University of Exeter · Lecture 11 Rebecca B. Morton NYU EPS...
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Deception Lecture 11 Rebecca B. Morton NYU EPS Lectures R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 1 / 19
Transcript of Lecture 11 Rebecca B. Morton - University of Exeter · Lecture 11 Rebecca B. Morton NYU EPS...
DeceptionLecture 11
Rebecca B. Morton
NYU
EPS Lectures
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 1 / 19
Deception in ExperimentsWhat is Deception?
De�nition (Deception)Deception in an experiment occurs when the experimenter uses intentionaland explicit misrepresentation of the purpose of the investigation and theidentity of the researcher and confederate.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 2 / 19
Deception in ExperimentsWhat is Deception?
De�nition (Deception)Deception in an experiment occurs when the experimenter uses intentionaland explicit misrepresentation of the purpose of the investigation and theidentity of the researcher and confederate.
De�nition (Deceptive Purpose)When the subjects are not told the purpose of the experiment.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 3 / 19
Deception in ExperimentsWhat is Deception?
De�nition (Deception)Deception in an experiment occurs when the experimenter uses intentionaland explicit misrepresentation of the purpose of the investigation and theidentity of the researcher and confederate.
De�nition (Deceptive Purpose)When the subjects are not told the purpose of the experiment.
De�nition (Deceptive Identities)When the subjects are not told the identity of the experimenter orexperimenters.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 4 / 19
Deception in ExperimentsWhat is Deception?
De�nition (Deception)Deception in an experiment occurs when the experimenter uses intentionaland explicit misrepresentation of the purpose of the investigation and theidentity of the researcher and confederate.
De�nition (Deceptive Purpose)When the subjects are not told the purpose of the experiment.
De�nition (Deceptive Identities)When the subjects are not told the identity of the experimenter orexperimenters.
De�nition (Deceptive Materials)When the materials used in the experiment are deceptive.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 5 / 19
Arguments for Deception
In some cases deception is needed to achieve �natural� responsesfrom subjects & avoid Experimental E¤ects
Investigate rare situations
To reduce the costs of the experiment by telling subjects that othersare participaticing and there is a larger group (but see Eckel &Wilson).
Better educational experience � learn from debrie�ng.
Allows for research that otherwise could not be conducted & thusgreater knowledge about the world.
Deception is part of everyday life.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 6 / 19
Arguments for Deception
In some cases deception is needed to achieve �natural� responsesfrom subjects & avoid Experimental E¤ects
Investigate rare situations
To reduce the costs of the experiment by telling subjects that othersare participaticing and there is a larger group (but see Eckel &Wilson).
Better educational experience � learn from debrie�ng.
Allows for research that otherwise could not be conducted & thusgreater knowledge about the world.
Deception is part of everyday life.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 6 / 19
Arguments for Deception
In some cases deception is needed to achieve �natural� responsesfrom subjects & avoid Experimental E¤ects
Investigate rare situations
To reduce the costs of the experiment by telling subjects that othersare participaticing and there is a larger group (but see Eckel &Wilson).
Better educational experience � learn from debrie�ng.
Allows for research that otherwise could not be conducted & thusgreater knowledge about the world.
Deception is part of everyday life.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 6 / 19
Arguments for Deception
In some cases deception is needed to achieve �natural� responsesfrom subjects & avoid Experimental E¤ects
Investigate rare situations
To reduce the costs of the experiment by telling subjects that othersare participaticing and there is a larger group (but see Eckel &Wilson).
Better educational experience � learn from debrie�ng.
Allows for research that otherwise could not be conducted & thusgreater knowledge about the world.
Deception is part of everyday life.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 6 / 19
Arguments for Deception
In some cases deception is needed to achieve �natural� responsesfrom subjects & avoid Experimental E¤ects
Investigate rare situations
To reduce the costs of the experiment by telling subjects that othersare participaticing and there is a larger group (but see Eckel &Wilson).
Better educational experience � learn from debrie�ng.
Allows for research that otherwise could not be conducted & thusgreater knowledge about the world.
Deception is part of everyday life.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 6 / 19
Arguments for Deception
In some cases deception is needed to achieve �natural� responsesfrom subjects & avoid Experimental E¤ects
Investigate rare situations
To reduce the costs of the experiment by telling subjects that othersare participaticing and there is a larger group (but see Eckel &Wilson).
Better educational experience � learn from debrie�ng.
Allows for research that otherwise could not be conducted & thusgreater knowledge about the world.
Deception is part of everyday life.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 6 / 19
Objections to DeceptionEthical Concerns
First, it has been argued that in general lying or misrepresenting thetruth to subjects is morally wrong and can cause psychological harmto them.
Bok (1978 p. 194) remarked in relation to experimental subjects�Among the risks taken seriously must be psychological ones: thedamage which some may experience from having revealed themselvesunknowingly, from having their privacy invaded, or from discoveringsomething about themselves that will be painful to live with.�
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 7 / 19
Objections to DeceptionEthical Concerns
First, it has been argued that in general lying or misrepresenting thetruth to subjects is morally wrong and can cause psychological harmto them.
Bok (1978 p. 194) remarked in relation to experimental subjects�Among the risks taken seriously must be psychological ones: thedamage which some may experience from having revealed themselvesunknowingly, from having their privacy invaded, or from discoveringsomething about themselves that will be painful to live with.�
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 7 / 19
Objections to DeceptionMethodological Concerns
Major methodological concern �will negatively ability to runexperiments in future. Consider quote from Ledyard:
�It is believed by many undergraduates that psychologists areintentionally deceptive in most experiments. If undergraduatesbelieve the same about economists, we have lost control. It is forthis reason that modern experimental economists have beencarefully nurturing a reputation for absolute honesty in all theirexperiments... (I)f the data are to be valid. Honesty inprocedures is absolutely crucial. Any deception can be discoveredand contaminate a subject pool not only for the experimenterbut for others. Honesty is a methodological public good anddeception is not contributing.�
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 8 / 19
Objections to DeceptionMethodological Concerns
Does using deception materials from hypothetical candidates a¤ectchoices?
Know from monetary experiments di¤erence, but do we know withhypothetical ones?
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 9 / 19
Objections to DeceptionMethodological Concerns
Does using deception materials from hypothetical candidates a¤ectchoices?
Know from monetary experiments di¤erence, but do we know withhypothetical ones?
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 9 / 19
E¤ects of DeceptionAre Harms from Deception Minimal?
Can subliminal priming have a longer e¤ect on subjects?
Is trust diminished?
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 10 / 19
E¤ects of DeceptionAre Harms from Deception Minimal?
Can subliminal priming have a longer e¤ect on subjects?
Is trust diminished?
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 10 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examined whether resentful andsuspicious (after deception) subjects behaved di¤erently from naivesubjects.
The �rst question is whether subjects who have been deceived in pastexperiments will be resentful and take this sentiment into theexperiment, thus changing their �natural�behavior.
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examine various studies on this issueand found mixed results.
On the one hand some studies found that deceived subjects did notbecome more resentful (Kimmel, 1998; Christensen, 1988), whileother studies have found that resentfulness in subjects a¤ected theirbehavior (Allen, 1983, Straits, Wuebben and Majka, 1972, Cook,Bean, Calder, Frey, Krovetz, and Reisman, 1970).
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 11 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examined whether resentful andsuspicious (after deception) subjects behaved di¤erently from naivesubjects.
The �rst question is whether subjects who have been deceived in pastexperiments will be resentful and take this sentiment into theexperiment, thus changing their �natural�behavior.
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examine various studies on this issueand found mixed results.
On the one hand some studies found that deceived subjects did notbecome more resentful (Kimmel, 1998; Christensen, 1988), whileother studies have found that resentfulness in subjects a¤ected theirbehavior (Allen, 1983, Straits, Wuebben and Majka, 1972, Cook,Bean, Calder, Frey, Krovetz, and Reisman, 1970).
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 11 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examined whether resentful andsuspicious (after deception) subjects behaved di¤erently from naivesubjects.
The �rst question is whether subjects who have been deceived in pastexperiments will be resentful and take this sentiment into theexperiment, thus changing their �natural�behavior.
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examine various studies on this issueand found mixed results.
On the one hand some studies found that deceived subjects did notbecome more resentful (Kimmel, 1998; Christensen, 1988), whileother studies have found that resentfulness in subjects a¤ected theirbehavior (Allen, 1983, Straits, Wuebben and Majka, 1972, Cook,Bean, Calder, Frey, Krovetz, and Reisman, 1970).
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 11 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examined whether resentful andsuspicious (after deception) subjects behaved di¤erently from naivesubjects.
The �rst question is whether subjects who have been deceived in pastexperiments will be resentful and take this sentiment into theexperiment, thus changing their �natural�behavior.
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) examine various studies on this issueand found mixed results.
On the one hand some studies found that deceived subjects did notbecome more resentful (Kimmel, 1998; Christensen, 1988), whileother studies have found that resentfulness in subjects a¤ected theirbehavior (Allen, 1983, Straits, Wuebben and Majka, 1972, Cook,Bean, Calder, Frey, Krovetz, and Reisman, 1970).
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 11 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The second question is whether subjects who have been deceived inpast experiments will be suspicious in future experiments, and willthis suspicion alter their behavior?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) found that the suspicion did impactbehavior in the experiment.
However, there is some evidence that the e¤ects of deception dependon the type of experiment.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 12 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The second question is whether subjects who have been deceived inpast experiments will be suspicious in future experiments, and willthis suspicion alter their behavior?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) found that the suspicion did impactbehavior in the experiment.
However, there is some evidence that the e¤ects of deception dependon the type of experiment.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 12 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The second question is whether subjects who have been deceived inpast experiments will be suspicious in future experiments, and willthis suspicion alter their behavior?
Hertwig and Ortmann (200x) found that the suspicion did impactbehavior in the experiment.
However, there is some evidence that the e¤ects of deception dependon the type of experiment.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 12 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
One experiment by political economists on deception.
Jamison, Karlan, and Schechter (2008) examine the e¤ects ofdeceptive identities on future performance in other experiments
In the experiment some subjects are deceived that they are playingagainst a human partner in a trust game when they are actuallyplaying against a computer.
In the baseline manipulation subjects played against other subjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 13 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
One experiment by political economists on deception.
Jamison, Karlan, and Schechter (2008) examine the e¤ects ofdeceptive identities on future performance in other experiments
In the experiment some subjects are deceived that they are playingagainst a human partner in a trust game when they are actuallyplaying against a computer.
In the baseline manipulation subjects played against other subjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 13 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
One experiment by political economists on deception.
Jamison, Karlan, and Schechter (2008) examine the e¤ects ofdeceptive identities on future performance in other experiments
In the experiment some subjects are deceived that they are playingagainst a human partner in a trust game when they are actuallyplaying against a computer.
In the baseline manipulation subjects played against other subjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 13 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
One experiment by political economists on deception.
Jamison, Karlan, and Schechter (2008) examine the e¤ects ofdeceptive identities on future performance in other experiments
In the experiment some subjects are deceived that they are playingagainst a human partner in a trust game when they are actuallyplaying against a computer.
In the baseline manipulation subjects played against other subjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 13 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The researchers were careful to make the computer choices close tothose chosen by the human subjects so that the only di¤erencebetween the subjects deceived and those not deceived was deception.
They then revealed to the deceived subjects that they had beendeceived.
Two to three weeks later, both the deceived and undeceived subjectswere recruited for a second experiment involving other well knowngames and choice situations.
They found some minor e¤ects of deception on the likelihood thatsubjects chose to return for the second session and on their behaviorin the second session.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 14 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The researchers were careful to make the computer choices close tothose chosen by the human subjects so that the only di¤erencebetween the subjects deceived and those not deceived was deception.
They then revealed to the deceived subjects that they had beendeceived.
Two to three weeks later, both the deceived and undeceived subjectswere recruited for a second experiment involving other well knowngames and choice situations.
They found some minor e¤ects of deception on the likelihood thatsubjects chose to return for the second session and on their behaviorin the second session.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 14 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The researchers were careful to make the computer choices close tothose chosen by the human subjects so that the only di¤erencebetween the subjects deceived and those not deceived was deception.
They then revealed to the deceived subjects that they had beendeceived.
Two to three weeks later, both the deceived and undeceived subjectswere recruited for a second experiment involving other well knowngames and choice situations.
They found some minor e¤ects of deception on the likelihood thatsubjects chose to return for the second session and on their behaviorin the second session.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 14 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
The researchers were careful to make the computer choices close tothose chosen by the human subjects so that the only di¤erencebetween the subjects deceived and those not deceived was deception.
They then revealed to the deceived subjects that they had beendeceived.
Two to three weeks later, both the deceived and undeceived subjectswere recruited for a second experiment involving other well knowngames and choice situations.
They found some minor e¤ects of deception on the likelihood thatsubjects chose to return for the second session and on their behaviorin the second session.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 14 / 19
Does Deception Change the Behavior of Subjects in FutureExperiments?
Jamison et al�s study does not clear up the controversy over whetherdeception matters or not since the e¤ects they found, although real,were weak. They note (page 486):
We have discussed these results with both psychologists andeconomists and are struck by their reactions: both see the dataas supporting their priors! .. We fully understand that althoughwe do �nd clear di¤erences in behavior, they are subject tointerpretation as to their economic (or psychological)importance, as well as to further re�nement regarding theirmagnitude and generalizability. The irony is that further studyof how deception in�uences behavior, both in the laboratory andin the real world, requires relaxing the no-deception rule.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 15 / 19
Removing Harmful E¤ects of Deception
De�nition (Debrie�ng)Revealing deceptive practices to subjects after an experiment is completed(dehoaxing) and attempting to remove any undersirable consequences ofthe experiment (desensitizing).
Disagreement over whether debrie�ng successfully removes subjectspeci�c harmful e¤ects.
Does not help with some of the methodological concerns.
Some researchers argue that debrie�ng is desirable ethicallyindependent of whether it works to remove harmful e¤ects ofdeception, see Miller, Gluck, and Wendler (2008).
That is, debrie�ng is seen as a chance to rectify the unethical orimmoral act of deception by the researcher.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 16 / 19
Removing Harmful E¤ects of Deception
De�nition (Debrie�ng)Revealing deceptive practices to subjects after an experiment is completed(dehoaxing) and attempting to remove any undersirable consequences ofthe experiment (desensitizing).
Disagreement over whether debrie�ng successfully removes subjectspeci�c harmful e¤ects.
Does not help with some of the methodological concerns.
Some researchers argue that debrie�ng is desirable ethicallyindependent of whether it works to remove harmful e¤ects ofdeception, see Miller, Gluck, and Wendler (2008).
That is, debrie�ng is seen as a chance to rectify the unethical orimmoral act of deception by the researcher.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 16 / 19
Removing Harmful E¤ects of Deception
De�nition (Debrie�ng)Revealing deceptive practices to subjects after an experiment is completed(dehoaxing) and attempting to remove any undersirable consequences ofthe experiment (desensitizing).
Disagreement over whether debrie�ng successfully removes subjectspeci�c harmful e¤ects.
Does not help with some of the methodological concerns.
Some researchers argue that debrie�ng is desirable ethicallyindependent of whether it works to remove harmful e¤ects ofdeception, see Miller, Gluck, and Wendler (2008).
That is, debrie�ng is seen as a chance to rectify the unethical orimmoral act of deception by the researcher.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 16 / 19
Removing Harmful E¤ects of Deception
De�nition (Debrie�ng)Revealing deceptive practices to subjects after an experiment is completed(dehoaxing) and attempting to remove any undersirable consequences ofthe experiment (desensitizing).
Disagreement over whether debrie�ng successfully removes subjectspeci�c harmful e¤ects.
Does not help with some of the methodological concerns.
Some researchers argue that debrie�ng is desirable ethicallyindependent of whether it works to remove harmful e¤ects ofdeception, see Miller, Gluck, and Wendler (2008).
That is, debrie�ng is seen as a chance to rectify the unethical orimmoral act of deception by the researcher.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 16 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Most political scientists who use deception do so because they see itas the only way to address the research question of interest.Scharlemann et al contend (page 628-9):
In our experiment, control requires that subjects be presentedwith paired sets of faces. A single face is presented in twoversions: one smiling, and one unsmiling. Without this controlwe cannot be certain whether our result is due to a smile, or dueto some other di¤erence between any two di¤erent faces. Thisled us to control the facial expressions by setting them ahead oftime.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 17 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Is this the only way Scharlemann et al could have conducted theexperiment?
Eckel and Wilson (2006b), conducted a later experiment that looks atbeauty & e¤ect on behavior without using deceptionSubjects participated in ten separate trust games in which in eachgame they were shown the face of the other player.However, only one of the faces shown was actually a subject in theexperiment, the other faces were from photos that theexperimentalists had taken previously from a di¤erent experiment.Subjects knew that only one photo was real, but did not know whichone.Hence, Eckel & Wilson were able to show the same photos to subjectsboth smiling and unsmiling, as in Scharlemann et al, but not engagein deception.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 18 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Is this the only way Scharlemann et al could have conducted theexperiment?Eckel and Wilson (2006b), conducted a later experiment that looks atbeauty & e¤ect on behavior without using deception
Subjects participated in ten separate trust games in which in eachgame they were shown the face of the other player.However, only one of the faces shown was actually a subject in theexperiment, the other faces were from photos that theexperimentalists had taken previously from a di¤erent experiment.Subjects knew that only one photo was real, but did not know whichone.Hence, Eckel & Wilson were able to show the same photos to subjectsboth smiling and unsmiling, as in Scharlemann et al, but not engagein deception.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 18 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Is this the only way Scharlemann et al could have conducted theexperiment?Eckel and Wilson (2006b), conducted a later experiment that looks atbeauty & e¤ect on behavior without using deceptionSubjects participated in ten separate trust games in which in eachgame they were shown the face of the other player.
However, only one of the faces shown was actually a subject in theexperiment, the other faces were from photos that theexperimentalists had taken previously from a di¤erent experiment.Subjects knew that only one photo was real, but did not know whichone.Hence, Eckel & Wilson were able to show the same photos to subjectsboth smiling and unsmiling, as in Scharlemann et al, but not engagein deception.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 18 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Is this the only way Scharlemann et al could have conducted theexperiment?Eckel and Wilson (2006b), conducted a later experiment that looks atbeauty & e¤ect on behavior without using deceptionSubjects participated in ten separate trust games in which in eachgame they were shown the face of the other player.However, only one of the faces shown was actually a subject in theexperiment, the other faces were from photos that theexperimentalists had taken previously from a di¤erent experiment.
Subjects knew that only one photo was real, but did not know whichone.Hence, Eckel & Wilson were able to show the same photos to subjectsboth smiling and unsmiling, as in Scharlemann et al, but not engagein deception.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 18 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Is this the only way Scharlemann et al could have conducted theexperiment?Eckel and Wilson (2006b), conducted a later experiment that looks atbeauty & e¤ect on behavior without using deceptionSubjects participated in ten separate trust games in which in eachgame they were shown the face of the other player.However, only one of the faces shown was actually a subject in theexperiment, the other faces were from photos that theexperimentalists had taken previously from a di¤erent experiment.Subjects knew that only one photo was real, but did not know whichone.
Hence, Eckel & Wilson were able to show the same photos to subjectsboth smiling and unsmiling, as in Scharlemann et al, but not engagein deception.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 18 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
Is this the only way Scharlemann et al could have conducted theexperiment?Eckel and Wilson (2006b), conducted a later experiment that looks atbeauty & e¤ect on behavior without using deceptionSubjects participated in ten separate trust games in which in eachgame they were shown the face of the other player.However, only one of the faces shown was actually a subject in theexperiment, the other faces were from photos that theexperimentalists had taken previously from a di¤erent experiment.Subjects knew that only one photo was real, but did not know whichone.Hence, Eckel & Wilson were able to show the same photos to subjectsboth smiling and unsmiling, as in Scharlemann et al, but not engagein deception.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 18 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
The method used by Eckel and Wilson to avoid deception is a versionof that �rst proposed by Bardsley (2000) which he labeled theConditional Information Lottery or CIL design.
In CIL the subject participates in a full set of tasks, but some arehypothetical.
Subjects are not told which tasks are �real� or not.
Subjects are then paid only for the real tasks.
The lottery is involved in determining in which period or roundsubjects experience the real task and subjects are told the likelihoodof a task being real (the percentage of real tasks they face).
Then at the end of the experiment the real tasks are revealed to thesubjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 19 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
The method used by Eckel and Wilson to avoid deception is a versionof that �rst proposed by Bardsley (2000) which he labeled theConditional Information Lottery or CIL design.
In CIL the subject participates in a full set of tasks, but some arehypothetical.
Subjects are not told which tasks are �real� or not.
Subjects are then paid only for the real tasks.
The lottery is involved in determining in which period or roundsubjects experience the real task and subjects are told the likelihoodof a task being real (the percentage of real tasks they face).
Then at the end of the experiment the real tasks are revealed to thesubjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 19 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
The method used by Eckel and Wilson to avoid deception is a versionof that �rst proposed by Bardsley (2000) which he labeled theConditional Information Lottery or CIL design.
In CIL the subject participates in a full set of tasks, but some arehypothetical.
Subjects are not told which tasks are �real� or not.
Subjects are then paid only for the real tasks.
The lottery is involved in determining in which period or roundsubjects experience the real task and subjects are told the likelihoodof a task being real (the percentage of real tasks they face).
Then at the end of the experiment the real tasks are revealed to thesubjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 19 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
The method used by Eckel and Wilson to avoid deception is a versionof that �rst proposed by Bardsley (2000) which he labeled theConditional Information Lottery or CIL design.
In CIL the subject participates in a full set of tasks, but some arehypothetical.
Subjects are not told which tasks are �real� or not.
Subjects are then paid only for the real tasks.
The lottery is involved in determining in which period or roundsubjects experience the real task and subjects are told the likelihoodof a task being real (the percentage of real tasks they face).
Then at the end of the experiment the real tasks are revealed to thesubjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 19 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
The method used by Eckel and Wilson to avoid deception is a versionof that �rst proposed by Bardsley (2000) which he labeled theConditional Information Lottery or CIL design.
In CIL the subject participates in a full set of tasks, but some arehypothetical.
Subjects are not told which tasks are �real� or not.
Subjects are then paid only for the real tasks.
The lottery is involved in determining in which period or roundsubjects experience the real task and subjects are told the likelihoodof a task being real (the percentage of real tasks they face).
Then at the end of the experiment the real tasks are revealed to thesubjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 19 / 19
The Conditional Information Lottery Procedure & AvoidingDeception
The method used by Eckel and Wilson to avoid deception is a versionof that �rst proposed by Bardsley (2000) which he labeled theConditional Information Lottery or CIL design.
In CIL the subject participates in a full set of tasks, but some arehypothetical.
Subjects are not told which tasks are �real� or not.
Subjects are then paid only for the real tasks.
The lottery is involved in determining in which period or roundsubjects experience the real task and subjects are told the likelihoodof a task being real (the percentage of real tasks they face).
Then at the end of the experiment the real tasks are revealed to thesubjects.
R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 11 EPS Lectures 19 / 19
