Learning Lessons from the Past Power System Blackouts and using Advanced System Technologies to prevent future ones

Presented by:

Bharat Bhargava

Consulting Engineer

Advanced Power System Technologies, Inc.

Copyright © 2016 Advanced Power System Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved

1

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

Project Objectives

Review of some Past Blackouts

November 9/10, 1965 – Northeast US

August 10, 1996 - WECC – Western US

August 14, 2003 – Northeast US and Canada

November 4, 2006 – Europe

September 8, 2011 – WECC – SDGE, CFE and IID

July 30/31, 2012 – Northern, Eastern and Northeastern India

Steps we can take to avoid the next big one

Application of New Technologies – SPMS

2

3

Power System Blackouts

Power System Blackouts

though rare but do occur

result in massive dislocation of services

can be a threat to life

result in excessive economic losses

should be prevented as much as possible

If they occur, the power should be restored as soon as possible

can be and should be avoided / reduced by using New Advanced Technologies

4

TABLE I Impact and Restoration Times of some Power Grid Blackouts(1)

Date Area Load lost Number of Restoration MW People Affected Time (Hours) Remarks 11/9/1965 North America 20,000+ 30 M 13 7/13/1977 US- NY 6,000 9 M 13 12/22/1982` US (California) 12,350 2 M 07/2-3, 1996 US-NW 11,850 7.5 M 13 8/10/1996 US- Western 28,000 15 M 9 6/25/1998 US - NW 950 0.15 M 19 3/11/1999 Brazil 90 M 8/14/2003 NE America 61,800 50 M 48+ 9/13/2003 Italy 57 M 9+ 9/13/2003 Sweden +Denmark 5 M 5 11/4/2006 Europe (2) 15,000 5 M 2 11/10/2009 Brazil, Paraguay 17,000 80 M 7 2/4/2011 Brazil 53 M 8 9/11/2011 US -SD 4,300 5 M 12 7/30/2012 India 300+ M 12 Est. 7/31/2012 India 660 M 12 Est.

(1) Some of this information has been extracted from EPRI documents (2) Europe islanded into three islands and controlled the frequency decay in the low frequency island by automatic under-frequency load shedding (3) The blackouts shown in yellow have been discussed in this report

5

Major Power System Blackouts in Last Fifty Years

Some of the major Blackouts

Northeast US – November 9/10, 1965

Western US (WECC) – August 10, 1996

Northeast US / Canada – August 14, 2003

Europe – November 4, 2006

San Diego / CFE / IID (WECC) – September 8, 2011

Northern India - July 30, 2012

Northern, Eastern and Northeastern India – July 31, 2012

Northeastern US/Canada – (2003) was longest – over 48 hours

Northern, Eastern and Northeastern blackouts in India (2012) impacted most people – over 600 million

6

Eastern Interconnection Blackout November 9/10, 1965

Northeast US Disturbance – November 9/10, 1965

First Major wide area System Blackout Complete report submitted to President on December 6,

1965 Restoration helped by a gas turbine in New York area The entire system was restored within nine hours New York restored in less than two hours

7

From: “REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ON THE POWER FAILURE IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES AND THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO ON NOVEMBER 9-10, 1965”

Power System Blackouts – November 9/10, 1965

8

• Caused by overloading of lines out of Niagara and some faulty relay settings

• Some areas restored within fifteen minutes

• A gas turbine in New York area enabled power restoration very fast

• Total time taken to restore power about 9 hours

From: “REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ON THE POWER FAILURE IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES AND THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO ON NOVEMBER 9-10, 1965”

9

Western Electric Coordinating Council Disturbance

August 10, 1996

WECC System Disturbance – August 10, 1996

Highly stressed system conditions and hot weather Transmission lines overload and sag into trees and trip one after

the other in Pacific Northwest As the lines trip, system weakens but Operators do not have wide

area situational awareness and system stress information Generators are over stressed and trip sequentially System continues to see increase in stress but operators can not

monitor and hence no corrective action is taken Large power swings occur between Northwest and Southwest

leading to system separation System splits into multiple islands

10

11

WECC August 10, 1996 Event

As a result of this disturbance, the WECC system split in to four islands with major loads being dropped in Arizona and California TOTAL WECC System IMPACTS

Load lost: 30,489 MW

Generation lost: 27,269 MW

Customers affected: 7.49 million

Outage time: Up to 9 hours

Growing power oscillations seen at California - Oregon border at Malin substation on August 10, 1996

4000

4200

4400

4600

0 20 40 60 80

TimeinSeconds

ObservedCOIPower(DittmerControl Center)

12

August 10, 1996 - COI Power Oscillations at Malin [Source: BPA]

Growing power oscillations seen at California - Oregon border at Malin substation on August 10, 1996

13

August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Malin 500kV Voltage [Source: BPA]

Oscillations growth increases when a capacitor bank is switched in Malin substation to provide voltage support

Growing oscillations seen on 500 kV busses at various substations

14

August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Malin 500kV Voltage [Simulations]

A very closely matched simulation conducted by WECC Modeling and Validation Group

Switching capacitor bank at Malin causes oscillations to grow faster both in reality and in simulations

Growing oscillations seen on 500 kV busses at various substations – Simulations

15

• Maximum voltage amplitude oscillations occur at Malin substation

August 10, 1996 Oscillation in 500 kV bus voltages at Malin and other susbtations [Simulations]

Estimating damping from the above recorded chart

1. It is easy to calculate damping, if the oscillations are of single mode 2. Plot the x and y points, must ensure to include the max and min for each cycle.

Minimum two points per cycle 3. Calculate the amplitude of each cycle and the time when the peaks occur 4. Determine the number of cycles (n) and the start (T1) and the end time (T2). 5. Calculate the frequency of oscillations f = Cycles/Time = n/(T2-T1) 6. Calculate A2/A1 ratio for each cycle. If A2 is larger than A1, the oscillations are

growing and if A2 is less than A1, the oscillations are damping 7. Take natural log of each ratio A2/A1 8. Calculate the average of natural logs, that is (ln1+ln2+ln3+ln4+ln5)/5 for five cycles.

This is the average damping constant (z). If the oscillations are damped this average will be negative, but if the oscillations are growing it will be positive. This constant is known as “Damping Ratio” that is damping per cycle.

9. The “Damping Constant” is the damping per second and can be calculated by multiplying Damping Ratio (z) by frequency that is a = z * f

16

Estimating growth rate of oscillations before and after capacitor switching

17

August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Malin 500kV Voltage [Source: BPA]

Estimating growth rate of oscillations before and after capacitor switching

18

August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Estimated Malin 500kV Voltage

Notice the increased growth of oscillations after a capacitor bank is switched in Malin area

495

500

505

510

515

520

525

530

535

540

545

550

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

ki lo Vol t s

Time in seconds

Analysis of Growing power oscillations seen at California - Oregon border at Malin substation on August 10, 1996

19

1. Notice the increase in growth of oscillations after a capacitor bank is switched in Malin area

2. System is already unstable, but switching capacitor made it worse

Time Voltage Cycle Frequency Amplitude A2/A1 Ratio z a Average Remarks

Seconds kV Numbe

r f A ln(A2/A1) f*z Damping

1 531 1 0.24324

3 522 0.24324 9

5 530 2 0.24324 8

7 520 0.24324 10 1.1111 0.1054 0.0256

9 530 3 0.24324 10 1.2500 0.2231 0.0543 Before

12 519 0.24324 11 1.1000 0.0953 0.0232 0.0295 Capacitor

14 530 4 0.24324 11 1.1000 0.0953 0.0232 switching

16 518 0.24324 12 1.0909 0.0870 0.0212

18 538 5 0.24324 20 1.8182 0.5978 0.1454

20 527 0.24324 11 0.9167 -0.0870 -0.0212

22 537 6 0.24324 10 0.5000 -0.6931 -0.1686

24 524 0.24324 13 1.1818 0.1671 0.0406

26 538 7 0.24324 14 1.4000 0.3365 0.0818

28 518 0.24324 20 1.5385 0.4308 0.1048 After

31 540 8 0.24324 22 1.5714 0.4520 0.1099 0.0962 Capacitor

33 512 0.24324 28 1.4000 0.3365 0.0818 switching

35 543 9 0.24324 31 1.4091 0.3429 0.0834

37 498 0.24324 45 1.6071 0.4745 0.1154

Oscillation Growth before and after Capacitor Switching in Malin area (From Excel sheet using analysis results)

X = A.e-at Sin(wt-q), where A1 = 10 Ac = 525 a= +0.0259 & +0.075 = 1.57 f= 0.25 Hz q= 0 t = Time in seconds

20

400

450

500

550

600

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Seconds

kV

21

Eastern Interconnection US/Canada Blackout

August 14, 2003

Western System (WECC) US Disturbance

- August 10, 1996

What can we learn Disturbance caused by increasing stress and lack of voltage support

at critical (Malin & Captain Jack) substations Increased stress resulted in reduced system damping and growing

oscillations Cross tripping islanding scheme was put back into service Models were inaccurate in predicting system behavior Considerable efforts spent by WECC Modeling and Validation group

helped in improving simulations and matching actual performance and the modelled performance

Wide area monitoring using SPMS could have alerted the operators of the increasing stress 22

Northeast US/Canada blackout of August 14, 2003.

23

Northeast US-Canada System Disturbance - August 14, 2003

Hot weather and highly stressed system conditions Transmission lines overload and sag into trees and trip one after the

other in Michigan and Ohio System stress continues to increase and the system weakens but

operators do not have wide area situational awareness Generators are over stressed and trip sequentially System continues to see increase in stress but no corrective action is

taken Large power swings occur between Midwest and Eastern US and

Canada System separates resulting in blacking out part of Northeast and

New York

24

Northeast US-Canada System Disturbance - August 14, 2003

25

Date/ Time of Occurrence August 14, 2003; 16.11 Impacted Area North Eastern US and Canada Number of People Impacted 50 Million Load Lost 61.8 GW Hours for Restoration 48 + Estimated cost $ 50 Billion

Generation, Demand, and Interregional Power Flows on August 14 at 15:05 EDT

(From NERC Report)

26

At 4:13 PM – Cascading Sequence Essentially Complete (From NERC Report)

27

Area Affected by the Blackout (From NERC Report)

28

Growing angle separation between Cleveland and West Michigan

29

Point of no return

From NASPI RAPIR Report

Area hit by August 14, 2003 blackout

30

Some lessons we can learn from the blackouts/restoration efforts

New York (2003) restoration challenges Restoration took about 48 hours Hydro units at Pumped Storage Gilboa Power Plant were available within 20 minutes, but power could not be restored for three hours because of voltage mismatch at a substation PJM/NY system could not be reclosed because of voltage mismatch and delayed restoration effort Step by step procedure for system restoration could have helped. Wide Area Monitoring & Control Technology such as Synchronized Phasor Measurement Systems could have helped in avoiding cascading and in restoration

31

Gilboa Hydro Power Plant in New York State (From NERC Report)

32

33

European System Blackout November 4, 2006

European System Disturbance – November 4, 2006

Highly stressed system conditions because of heavy wind generation in Northeast and heavy winter load in Southwest Europe

Two major 400 kV lines opened for a planned outage Opening the lines resulted in overloading and overstressing the

transmission system (Increased Wide Area System stress) Corrective action resulted in stressing the system more separating the

System into three islands System disturbance controlled by dropping approximately 15000 MW

load thru Under Frequency relays Large amount of wind generation is dropped to control frequency System normalized in about two hours

34

November 4, 2006 European disturbance Frequency Plot for three islanded areas

35 Source : UCTE

Map showing three islands of the European system (From UTCE Reports)

36

Multiple Trials for Synchronizing three island

37

San Diego Gas & Electric, IID and CFE System Blackout on September 8, 2011

38

39

San Diego - WECC System Disturbance September 8, 2011

San Diego system imports power on two major import paths Hassyampa – N. Gila- Imperial Valley – Miguel 500 kV South of SONGS – Five 230 kV lines (Path 44) Power also flows thru the underlying 220/115/92 kV system from

Devers bus to IID and Western Administration – Lower Colorado SDG & E has established individual path ratings

Hassyampa – N. Gila – 2200 MW Path 44 south of SONGS – 1800 MW

SDG & E monitors these thru the EMS / SCADA system SDGE may have been operating beyond safe operational limit

40

San Diego - WECC Disturbance September 8, 2011 – Sequence of Events

Heavily loaded and stressed system conditions and hot weather (115 degrees in IID)

Safe operation and (N-1) criteria requires that loss of a path should not result in exceeding the normal rating of other paths.

RTCA are generally employed to ensure that the system is operating with in safe operating region

The Hassyampa – N. Gila line tripped at 15:26 hrs while carrying 1394 MW load due to an operational error

Loss of this line resulted in increase of power flow on Path 44 from 1302 MW to 2386 MW which exceeded the path 44 rating of 2200 MW.

This indicates that SDGE was operating beyond the safe operational limit

41

San Diego - WECC Disturbance September 8, 2011 – Sequence of Events - 2

IID flows also increased from 90 MW to 240 MW and resulted in overloading the IID transformers which tripped and increased power flow on path 44 to 2600 MW

No action was taken by SDG&E, Cal ISO or WECC to reduce loading on path 44 after H-NG line trip

Increased Loading on path 44 also resulted in low voltages in CFE area and tripping of generating units in CFE system which increased loading on path 44 above 3200 MW (15:32:385)

Path 44 has relay settings at SCE end that isolate the SDGE, IID & CFE system if the current exceeds 8000 amps or 3186 MVA

Power flows continued to stay above 3200 MW and resulted in separation at SONGS.

42

Power flow on path 44 after Hassyampa – N. Gila line (from FERC/NERC Report)

Source: NERC Phase Angle Report – May, 2016

43

Power flows to SDG&E, CFE and IID before the N. Gila-Hassyampa line trip

SDGE CFE IID

APS/SRP

Devers busses 90 MW (239 MW)

N.Gila

SCE 1800 MW (30 deg.)

1302 MW Path 44 (2200 MW) Relay operation set at 3186 MW

1397 MW (20 deg. ) (1800 MW)

SONGS

SDG & E / CFE

Arizona

44

Power flows to SDG&E, CFE and IID after the N.Gila -Hassyampa line trip

SDGE CFE IID

APS/SRP

SCE 2000 MW (30 deg.)

2386 MW On Path 44 (2200 MW) Relay operation set at 3186 MW

- 400 MW (20 deg. ) (1800 MW)

Devers busses 184 MW (239 MW)

SONGS N.Gila

SDG & E / CFE

Arizona

Power flows /Current on Path 44

Before line trip

After line trip

45

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000

1

2

3

4

5

Normal

Rating

Trip level setting

Path 44 Current

E v e n t S e q u e n c e

Power flow in MW

0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800 3200 3600 4000

Power / Current on Path 44

46

Recommendations and “Lessons learnt” from San Diego Blackout that occurred on September 8, 2011

A Wide Area Monitoring System could have warned SDGE operators to take appropriate action with large angle separation and heavy

power flow from north on Path 44.

Better Coordination with neighbouring Utility (SCE) for Relay settings

is necessary

Advanced analysis of operating conditions (RTCA) could have alerted

operators

that they are operating in an unsafe operating zone

Large angle difference across the breaker will block the re-closure

Inadequate information on restoration issues, however, the system

was restored within twelve hours

North Indian Blackouts of July 30 / 31, 2012

47

48

Indian Blackout – July 30, 2012

Disturbance occurred at 02:33:00 on July 30, 2012 High loading in Northern Region

load of 38226 MW Generation of 32640 MW Imports of 5836 MW – mostly from the Western Region

Several 400 kV lines out of service because of Planned outages (10) Unscheduled outages (5) Voltage control (6)

Western – Northern grid connected on Bina-Gwalior-Agra 400 kV line – line loaded to 1355 MW (2.2 SIL) Three 230 kV lines

49

Generation, Imports/Exports in Indian Regional Grids before Blackout

A

Northern

Region

Western

Region

Eastern

Region

32636 MW

+5686 MW

33024 MW

- 6229 MW

12452 MW

- 239 MW

North Eastern

Region

535 MW

1367 MW

- 53 MW

Total Load : 79479 NW

B

C

50

Indian Blackout – July 30, 2012

Amount of Load lost – 38,200 MW (Estimated)

Areas impacted

Northern region

People Impacted – 300 + million

Estimated cost – $ 6 Billion

Time to restore power – 12 - 18 hours

Ties lost – A & B – NR separated from WR and ER

Separation initiated by tripping of Bina-Agra circuit on Zone 3

51

Northern India Grid and Regional Interconnections Effected Area Northern Region – July 30, 2012

Source: Indian Blackout

Investigation Report dated

August 16, 2012

Indian Regional Blackout – July 30, 2012 Frequency Profile in Northern Region

52

53

Indian Blackout – July 30, 2012

Increased loading on Bina-Gwalior-Agra caused tripping of this line on Zone 3, the other line was out of service

Tripping of Bina-Gwalior-Agra line resulted in tripping all 230 kV WR-NR lines separating WR and NR

Separation of WR-NR resulted in tripping of all Ties between ER and NR

NR left with a deficit of 5686 MW ( 18 % generation deficiency in NR Resulted in rapid frequency decline and NR blackout Power restored in 18-24 hours

54

Power Flows in Indian Regional Grids at the time of Blackout

A

Northern

Region

Western

Region

Eastern

Region

32636 MW

+ 5686 MW

33024 MW

12452 MW

North Eastern

Region

5686 MW

535 MW

1367 MW

53 MW

Total Load :79,479 MW Load Lost: 38,000 MW Ties Lost: A and B

B

C

55

Indian Blackout – July 31, 2012

Occurred in after-noon about 1:20 Hours, shortly after the first one, while the system was still being put together

Amount of Load lost – 48600 MW Areas impacted

Northern region Eastern Region North Eastern region

People Impacted – 680 + million Estimated cost – $ 10 Billion (Estimated) Time to restore power – 12 - 18 hours (Estimated) Ties lost – A & C separating NR, ER and NER regions from WR

56

Indian Blackout – July 31, 2012

Increased loading on Bina-Gwalior-Agra again caused tripping of this line on Zone 3, the other line was out of service

Tripping of Bina-Gwalior-Agra line resulted in tripping all 230 kV WR-NR lines separating WR and NR

Separation of WR-NR resulted in tripping of all Ties between ER and NR

NR left with a deficit of 5686 MW ( 18 % generation deficiency in NR

Resulted in rapid frequency decline and NR blackout Power restored in 18-24 hours

57

Northern India Blackout Effected Areas – July 31, 2012 (From Indian Blackout Investigation Report )

58

Generation, Imports/Exports in Indian Regional Grids before July 31, 2012 Blackout

A

Northern

Region

Western

Region

Eastern

Region

29884 MW

+4016MW

32612 MW

- 6240 MW

13524 MW

- 345 MW

North Eastern

Region

1014 MW

+212

212 MW

Total Load : 76934 NW

B

C

59

Generation, Imports/Exports in Indian Regional Grids after July 31, 2012 Blackout

A

Northern

Region

Western

Region

Eastern

Region

29884 MW

+4016MW

32612 MW

- 6240 MW

13524 MW

- 345 MW

North Eastern

Region

1014 MW

+212 212 MW

Total Load : 76934 NW Load Lost : 48000 MW Ties Lost : A & C

B

C

Indian Regional Blackout – July 31, 2012 Frequency Profile in Northern Region

60

61

Indian Blackout Investigation Report

Very comprehensive Investigation report – details all sequence of events, system configurations

All facts and figures are provided – making it easy to review and comment Suggests steps that may be taken to improve situation and prevent future blackouts Original reports blamed the states of withdrawing too much power, but indicates that the system had several lines out resulting in reduced inter-region transfer capability Simulations may be improved for better analysis

62

Steps Suggested to avoid Blackouts

Better Wide Area Visualization using SPMS Internal External – at least adjoining areas/critical areas of Grid should be

observable ES and EMS in operation Establishing Limits on power flows Use of RTCA Use of Synchronized Phasor Measurement technology

Angle measurements and other metrics Withstand loss of ties and maintain frequency within the acceptable band

Monitoring Impedance relays zone encroachment`

63

Common causes between the SDG&E and Indian Blackouts - 1

Both Systems have two major inter-connections Hassyampa-North Gila & SCE SONGS Path 44 WR and ER

Safe operation requires that loss of one interconnection should not result in exceeding the rating of the other path

Readjustment necessary after loss of one tie Both systems were clearly operating beyond safe limits No SOL established or being monitored based on the system conditions No adjustments of loading for line outages Excessive imports compared to local area generation

Load 4400 MW, imports of 2698 MW (No possibility of survival when both ties are lost ) Load of 38322 imports of 5686 – loss of tie-line would result in a frequency decline of about 16 % No frequency control by UFLS

64

Common causes between the SDG&E and Indian Blackouts - 2

No Situational Awareness, EMS or RTCA in operation Relay setting resulting in system separation

Zone 3 relay settings in India Path 44 overload setting at SONGS

No system stress monitoring (Angle separation) No previous analysis to define safe operating regions

Power flows (Path 44 ) Angle differences (Bina-Gwalior)

No use of advanced technologies for real time dynamics monitoring

• Need for Wide Area Monitoring System - We just can’t afford wide

area blackouts - We need to operate the power systems efficiently and economically - We now have tools available that can help us manage the grid better – Synchronized Phasor Measurement Technology

65

A state of the art high-speed grid monitoring system which measures and compares voltages, currents and phase angles between different electric system points simultaneously* and let’s you know “what the heck is happening to the power system”

*All Measurements taken at the same precise time

What is “Synchronized Phasor Measurement Technology (SPMT)”

66

Synchronized Phasor Measurement System Technology

References (1 & 2): 1. “Use of Synchronized Phasor measurement System for Enhancing AC-DC Power System Transmission Reliability and Capability” by John Ballance, Bharat

Bhargava and G. D. Rodriguez, Southern California Edison Co., United States of America presented at the CIGRE General Meeting Session, 2004, Paris, France

2. “Dawn of the Grid Synchronization” by Damir Novosel, Vahid Madani, Bharat Bhargava, Khoi Vu and Jim Cole published in IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, January/February, 2008, pages 49-60

67

What is SPM Technology?

Measures positive sequence time stamp voltage and currents at different locations

Information is transmitted and collected at a central location

Information can be received and processed within six cycles

Operators can view following system information Wide Area visibility

Wide and Local Area System Stress

Static and Dynamic stresses

Voltage support at critical locations

System dynamics

Frequency excursions

Oscillations and their damping

Zone encroachment

68

69

Synchronized Phasor Measurement System (SPMS) Capabilities

SPMS Technology has been identified as the key Technology for avoiding blackouts in

the February 2, 2006 DOE report to US House and Senate

can provide synchronized event recording during disturbances at multiple points

can monitor system dynamics in real-time

can enable instantaneous assessment of system performance and stability (Situational Awareness)

can assist in avoiding major system disturbances

can enable quicker restoration of systems after major system disturbances

SCE Situational Awareness & Analysis Center (From 2008-2010)

70

71

Synchronized Phasor Measurement System (SPMS) Capabilities

SPMS can

Enable increased power transfers on existing paths

Potentially enable determination of available transmission capacity in “real time”

monitor:

Static/dynamic phase angle limits (system stress)

Comparing phase angle measurements with bench marked cases and keeping adequate dynamic margin

Modal oscillation frequencies and damping

Voltage support at critical locations when operating at large phase angles separations

Event reconstruction and model validation

Invented by Dr. Arun Phadke, Jim Thorp and Mark Adamiak

during 1978-82

Applied in Western US during 1992-2012 thru an EPRI project

Southern California Edison 1995-2016

Bonneville Power Administration 1992-2016

PGE and others 1992-2016

American Electric Power 1982 - 2016

Eastern Interconnection, PJM, NYPA, Others

India – Major thrust after 2012 Blackouts

Major rollouts in China, Russia, England, Europe, Mexico etc.

Synchronized Phasor Measurement System Technology

Historical background and World Wide Usage / application

Large Investments have been made and extensive research has been conducted

Technology is fully matured for application

72

Historical Background and Worldwide Implementation

Technology is fully matured for application

Has been implemented at several locations in US

WECC / Peak Reliability

Eastern Interconnection – PJM, NY ISO, ISO-NE, MISO ,

Southern Co. , Entergy, Dominion, Duke etc.

ERCOT (Texas)

Some of the above organizations are mostly looking at their own

system and not taking advantage of wide area applications, which

is a must for successful application

North American Synchro Phasor Initiative (NASPI)

organization in US is trying to advance the applications

73

Can we avoid the next Big One ?

For successful Technology Application, we need to see the

entire “Operational Control Area”

Data interchange is essential to understand Complex System Dynamics

May need a organization for a specific Control area such as

WECC / Peak Reliability

Eastern Interconnection – PJM, NY ISO, ISO-NE, MISO

ERCOT

India has an Organization dealing with entire system – POSOC

The individual organizations need to be aware of things

happening in other area and should have access to information

74

Are we Prepared to avoid the next Big One ?

For successful Technology Application, we need to

Have “Excellent Data Quality” with 99.9999 percent reliability

Have minimum latency and have data available in less

then six cycles for processing

Train operators to be able to accept and use the technology

Develop faster and efficient processing programs

Understand what we need to monitor and at what locations

Understand and analyze weak spots of the power systems

Develop simulated Events for Training

The list is long and will continue to grow on and on

Although, we have taken some “Baby Steps”, the challenges

are many, many more

75

Are we Prepared to avoid the next Big One ?

Thanks, for questions, please email to : Bharat@advancedpstinc.com

76