Internal Document

Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes

Learning from UNICEF’s Experiences of Water Well Drilling

2nd Edition

November 2009

Dr Kerstin Danert

Skat, Switzerland

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To date over 70 people have contributed specifically to the production of this document through interviews and group discussions. They should be appreciated for their frankness and encouragement as UNICEF embarks on the challenging journey to develop, disseminate and ultimately adopt the Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes.

Six individuals require particular mention, for without them this report would not be what it is today. Rupert Talbot has unfailingly given his support, shared his experiences and wisdom and provided detailed comments on draft reports. With a sharp sense of humour Peter Wurzel pointed out pertinent issues. Mohamed El-Fatih scrutinised the first draft, pointed out contradictions and omissions and provided a reality check on a number of issues. Ray Rowles must be credited for his keen observations. Paul Edwards provided an extremely thorough critique of the final draft. And I extend a particular thanks to Raj Kumar Daw, who pointed out some gaps in the first edition of this report, particularly with respect to the role of NGOs in India.

And of course, this document has drawn on the efforts in the field and in offices of others who have struggled to improve practices, influence policies and reduce drilling costs for the last 30 years.

Please allow me to also appreciate the Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) Cost-Effective Boreholes Flagship working group for their inputs before and during this assignment.

Thank you!

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper reviews experiences from the history of UNICEF’s involvement in water well drilling and draws out lessons on how to improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Borehole provision. It has built on the work of numerous professionals within UNICEF, who have been committed to improving the cost-effectiveness of water well provision over the years. The author undertook interviews and held group discussions with over 70 stakeholders and reviewed numerous UNICEF reports as well as the Supply Division procurement database.

UNICEF operates in a highly decentralised manner and is more akin to a confederation of organisations than one organisation as a whole. Country programmes comprise cooperation between UNICEF and the host Government and are not dictated by headquarters. Country programme offices are responsible for raising considerable amounts of their own funds. UNICEF country programme design, reporting and accountability are more to the donor than to UNICEF headquarters.

The main phases of UNICEF WES work can be categorised as demonstration (1946 to 1967); development (1968 to 1980); clarification (1980 – 1992); decline (1993 – 1999). The author refers to the period from 2000 onwards as an early renaissance period. Today UNICEF WES (now known as WASH) finds itself in transition: building on its past, having lost momentum, human capacity and some of its institutional memory and re-establishing itself as a key player in the sector. UNICEF WES expenditure has increased from less than US$ 2 million per year in the 1940s to 1960s, to over US$ 300 million in 2008.

UNICEF was one of the pioneers of borehole drilling for rural water supplies in India, commencing in response to the 1966/67 drought in Bihar. Over 25 years, Government drilling programmes were supported by UNICEF, as private sector rig manufacture and drilling capability grew. UNICEF India set the benchmark for what could be achieved. Unfortunately what was a low cost solution for India ($700 to $1,500 per well) became a high cost solution for sub-Saharan Africa ($3,000 to $30,000 per well).

The India success has been attributed to a combination of political will; continuous support by external support agencies; a strong industrial base; skilled human resources; the involvement of the private sector; an extensive programme of work; informed technical choice; good logistical control; standardisation; good communications and infrastructure; as well as effective monitoring and evaluation. However, many of the ingredients of India’s success are barely there or completely absent in sub-Saharan Africa.

Over the years, UNICEF has produced several guidelines, toolkits and handbooks – some of which provide pertinent information with respect to cost effective water well drilling. Unfortunately, these do not seem to be well used by UNICEF WES staff.

This short study confirmed the interest among UNICEF stakeholders in working according to a code of practice for cost-effective boreholes (COP). Interviewees responded very positively to the concept, noting that a protocol which is independent of personalities is much required in the organisation. There are a number of practices of particular concern. The technology selection process, whereby drilled boreholes are often considered as the first choice, is not always appropriate and could be improved. UNICEF’s response to emergencies can result in the procurement of drilling equipment which may not even be deployed. Groundwater resource issues are not always taken fully into consideration and the long term sustainability of water supplies is not always fully considered when supporting the provision of new sources.

In the past, there was considerable emphasis on the procurement of drilling equipment for UNICEF and Government programmes. From 1999 to 2007, over US$ 23 million was spent on procuring drilling equipment through Copenhagen alone. Evidence from Nigeria and India suggest that the productivity of Government and UNICEF owned equipment is low. There is no full inventory of drilling rigs owned, or supplied by UNICEF. Data on rig productivity is not readily available.

UNICEF Country reports reviewed provide information about the number of people served, but do not always include the technologies used. Detailed records and analysis of UNICEF’s work are not systematically collated in one place but rather tend to remain at country level. It is difficult to determine the inputs and outputs, and therefore determine value for money of UNICEF support to the sector.

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It is anticipated that UNICEF will continue to play a key role in supporting the provision of rural water supplies. Water well drilling is one of the key policy areas that UNICEF needs to support in a highly professional manner. However, monitoring and control mechanisms within the organisation seem to be lacking; programme development is at country level and reporting is primarily to donors. There are currently relatively few incentives to ensure that wells are drilled cost-effectively and reported on in a transparent manner. The COP could raise the level of professionalism by setting out clear procedures to be followed as well as defining minimum standards and clear reporting requirements.

Guidance material with respect to rural water supplies already exists within UNICEF but appears to be little referenced by staff and sometimes not known of. The COP therefore needs to be championed within the organisation, and requires a solid roll-out strategy as well as strong reporting mechanisms.

The study recommends the following for the successful and development of the COP:

1. Determine the location, number and type of UNICEF-owned and UNICEF-supplies rigs in the past 7 years. Undertake an analysis their productivity where data is available.

2. Establish a process whereby procurement of drilling equipment is cleared by UNICEF headquarters or an expert panel.

3. Determine the extent to which existing guidelines are used by country staff and why (or why not).

4. Consider introducing a mandatory system for documenting technology selection decisions which takes the full range of water supply options into consideration.

5. The Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes should include guidance on: rig management system; drilling rig technology; data and hydrogeological mapping; procurement and contract management; payment; and supervision and quality assurance.

6. Develop clear and transparent reporting mechanisms which include a simple set of indicators that all countries report on with respect to borehole drilling.

7. Develop a plan for the roll-out of the COP, and establish mechanisms to support UNICEF offices to introduce it and establish monitoring systems.

In addition, it is recommended that UNICEF considers developing a code of practice or strategy for operation and maintenance of improved water supplies, and groundwater resources management.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 1

2 CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................................................... 1

3 WET, WES AND WASH ....................................................................................................................................... 2

3.1 CHANGING PHASES WITHIN UNICEF ............................................................................................................................ 2 3.2 THE INDIA INFLUENCE................................................................................................................................................. 3 3.3 FINANCE .................................................................................................................................................................. 5 3.4 HUMAN RESOURCES .................................................................................................................................................. 6

4 EXISTING GUIDELINES, TOOLKITS AND HANDBOOKS ......................................................................................... 6

4.1 UNICEF WATER HANDBOOK (1999) ........................................................................................................................... 6 4.2 UNICEF AQUAPLUS GUIDELINES.................................................................................................................................. 9 4.3 NATIONAL (UNICEF) GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................................ 9 4.4 UNICEF WATER QUALITY HANDBOOK .......................................................................................................................... 9

5 UNICEFS APPROACHES TO WATER SUPPLY ........................................................................................................ 9

5.1 THE TECHNOLOGY SELECTION PROCESS ......................................................................................................................... 9 5.2 EMERGENCIES ......................................................................................................................................................... 10 5.3 GROUNDWATER WATER RESOURCES AND CHEMICAL WATER QUALITY .............................................................................. 11 5.4 SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER SUPPLIES .......................................................................................................................... 11

6 UNICEF-SUPPORT OF BOREHOLE DRILLING ...................................................................................................... 12

6.1 RIG PRODUCTIVITY .................................................................................................................................................. 12 6.2 RIG TECHNOLOGY .................................................................................................................................................... 14 6.3 DATA AND HYDROGEOLOGICAL MAPPING .................................................................................................................... 15 6.4 PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................ 15 6.5 PAYMENT .............................................................................................................................................................. 16 6.6 SUPERVISION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE ...................................................................................................................... 16 6.7 SUPPORTING THE PRIVATE SECTOR ............................................................................................................................. 17

7 REPORTING AND TRANSPARENCY ................................................................................................................... 17

7.1 INTERNAL AUDIT, MONITORING AND EVALUATION ........................................................................................................ 17 7.2 UNICEF GLOBAL WASH REPORT ............................................................................................................................... 18 7.3 UNICEF COUNTRY OFFICE REPORTS ........................................................................................................................... 18 7.4 SYNTHESIS OF INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY ......................................................................................................... 18

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 20

9 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 21

ANNEX 1 NIGERIA ..................................................................................................................................................... 24

ANNEX 2 SUDAN ....................................................................................................................................................... 25

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FIGURES, TABLES AND BOXES

FIGURE 1 WATER PIPES PROCURED BY UNICEF FOR TSUNAMI RELIEF IN INDONESIA ........................................................ 2 FIGURE 2 UNICEF WES EXPENDITURE 1990 TO 2008 ............................................................................................... 6 FIGURE 3 THREE DRILLING RIGS - PURCHASED BY UNICEF FOR TSUNAMI RELIEF IN INDONESIA - WAIT TO BE DEPLOYED ...... 10 FIGURE 4 UNSAFE INDIA MARK II INSTALLATION ....................................................................................................... 11

TABLE 1 EXAMPLES OF RIG PRODUCTIVITY RATES ......................................................................................................................... 13 TABLE 2 UNICEF SUPPLY DIVISION (COPENHAGEN) PROCUREMENT OF DRILLING EQUIPMENT (1999 TO 2007) .................................... 14 TABLE 3 EXAMPLES OF POOR DRILLING SUPERVISION ................................................................................................................... 16 TABLE 4 UNICEF WES WATER SUPPLY ACHIEVEMENTS (SOURCES: UNICEF, 2006B; 2007B; 2008C AND UNICEF, 2006G; 2007D AND

2008D) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19

BOX 1 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF HANDPUMPS IN THE 1980S .................................................................................................. 4 BOX 2 TECHNICAL & LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO IMPROVE COST-EFFECTIVENESS (UNICEF, 1999) ................................................ 8 BOX 3 PROBLEMS SUSTAINING HANDPUMPS .............................................................................................................................. 12 BOX 4 CHALLENGES FACED BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS .................................................................................................................. 17

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1 Introduction

UNICEF is a key player in the Water and Sanitation Sector, operating in about 100 countries around the globe. This paper reviews experiences from the history of UNICEF’s involvement in water well drilling from which it draws out lessons on how to improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Borehole provision.

The paper draws on The WET History 1946 to 1986 by Martin Beyer (1986), which was part of the UNICEF history project, and WATER a matter of life and health by Maggie Black and Rupert Talbot (2005). Preparation of the paper was carried out under the umbrella of the Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) as part of its Cost-Effective Boreholes (CEB) flagship. This flagship aim is that policies are adopted and practices followed which bring about cost-effective borehole provision in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper thus also draws upon key analytical work undertaken by the flagship of over the last five years.

Preparation of this paper involved a desk review of UNICEF country reports, country assessments, evaluations and “notes for the record” from a limited number of countries1. Interviews were held with over 70 key informants (including UNICEF headquarters and supply division staff as well as current and former WES staff from country programmes) 2. In addition, a short field visit was undertaken in Nigeria in March 2008, and a number of interviews were held with key stakeholders in Uganda. The UNICEF Supply Division procurement database (1999 to 2007 data) was also reviewed.

Please note that in order to maintain confidentiality, the sources of certain quotations and opinions are not given in this paper.

2 Context

UNICEF contributes to the realisation of children’s rights to survival and development including reducing the morbidity and mortality of women and children. It is against this background that UNICEF offices around the world support the improvement of water and sanitation services through various programmes and projects. Water well drilling is one of the technical options for improving water supply that UNICEF supports.

UNICEF operates in a highly decentralised manner and is more akin to a confederation of organisations than one organisation as a whole. Country programmes comprise cooperation between UNICEF and the host Government and are not dictated by headquarters. UNICEF country offices enjoy considerable autonomy whilst guided by the broader organisational strategies such as the medium-term strategic plan. “Partnerships are a central feature of UNICEF’s efforts” and are with governments, intergovernmental organizations, international financial organisations, non-governmental organisations and academic institutions, (UNICEF, 2006a).

Emergency programmes are a key part of UNICEF’s work (and funding base). UNICEF often begins (or recommences) involvement in the water and sanitation sector in response to an emergency (eg India, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Darfur, and more recently the tsunami affected countries). Over time the programme moves away from emergency and into recovery and development interventions.

Although country offices receive base funding from headquarters as regular resources (Figure 2), they need to supplement this revenue with funds sourced within the country, from the region, or from other UNICEF offices including headquarters. The host government usually has influence on the content of the country programme. UNICEF country programme design, reporting and accountability tend to be to the donor. Accountability to UNICEF headquarters is weak. It has been suggested that these reporting mechanisms, coupled with lack of adherence to clear guidelines regarding acceptable practices sometimes foster too much freedom. As one interviewee explained “Some donors have a moral obligation to fund UNICEF…and in some cases fund anything”.

1 Sudan, India, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Ethiopia (see reference list)

2 The author used her professional judgement to select individuals from among the relevant stakeholder groups

(National and local Government, UNICEF current and former staff, NGOs, private contractors, consultants, donors).

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The type of support that UNICEF provides for the drilling of water wells has changed over time and varies considerably: from large comprehensive WASH programmes to limited but targeted interventions. The question of how to bring about cost-effective service delivery, and cost-effective water wells in particular, is not new. Since the late 1960s numerous sector professionals have been involved in making improvements on the ground, discussing key issues, writing papers and memos, and challenging senior management regarding particular policies and practices within UNICEF. The development of a code of practice for cost-effective boreholes builds on this work.

Interviewees responded very positively to the concept of a code of practice for cost effective boreholes. There were four particularly pertinent responses by interviewees which should be mentioned:

UNICEF needs a protocol for decision-making that is strong and independent of personalities3.

UNICEF needs to follow a written policy and systematic procedure regarding which circumstances to procure rigs and other items.

We *UNICEF+ need to sort out what appears to some people as “random drilling of boreholes”.

Country representatives require clear guidelines for drilling programmes, with examples.

3 WET, WES and WASH

3.1 Changing Phases within UNICEF

Over the years, UNICEF has changed the name and abbreviation for its work in the sector from Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation (WET) to Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) to Water and Environmental Sanitation (also WES) to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). This document uses WASH and WES depending on the context.

Beyer (1987) refers to three main phases of the UNICEF’s water and sanitation work:

1. 1946 to 1967 – Demonstration projects.

2. 1968 to 1980 – Development of technologies, targets and policies.

3. 1980 to 1986 – Clarification of objectives and links with primary health care (PHC) and the child survival and development revolution (CSDR).

Given that Beyer published in 1987, it would be fair to say that the third phase continued up to the early 1990s, roughly corresponding with the end of the International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IWSSD). The period 1967 through to the mid 1980’s witnessed the growth of the UNICEF WES programme in India, which raised access to safe water supplies through water well drilling in particular (section 3.2).

The IWSSD contributed towards a shift from a project approach to that of countrywide programmes. However, elements of demonstration, and project approaches in opposed to programmes still continue up

3 Note that 2004 report on UNICEF Strengths and Weaknesses (UNICEF, 2004a) refers to personal preferences of

agency managers in determining how multilateral [World Bank, Regional Development Bank, WHO and UNICEF] organisations operate in the field.

Figure 1 Water Pipes Procured by UNICEF for Tsunami Relief in Indonesia

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to today. The progression of the IWSSD witnessed a gradual shift in emphasis in UNICEF WES from hardware to software (Talbot, 2008). The earlier technological focus, with its emphasis on water well drilling and handpumps in particular, gave way to a focus on “…maximizing health and other benefits from water through … integration of water supply with sanitation, health and education programmes, and striving for long term self-sufficiency through the empowerment of communities to manage their own water supply schemes” UNICEF (1999).

Several stakeholders (eg Baumann, Loveless and Talbot, 2006) refer to the late 1990s as a period of decline of WES within UNICEF. There were procurement scandals related to water-related supplies and the discovery of arsenic in drinking water in Bangladesh (provided with UNICEF support). These further dampened an already declining interest in WES, which UNICEF management no longer perceived as a relevant to UNICEF’s broader agenda, and in which donor interest had also declined. UNICEF was focusing much more on rapid, high impact results such as immunisation and oral rehydration as well as child protection, HIV/AIDS and the education of girls. This shift transformed itself into reduced interest in funding of water well drilling programmes. Thus water supply, and drill rigs specifically, were no longer centre stage in UNICEF’s development agenda.

Following an audit in 1996, new procurement procedures and control mechanisms were introduced into UNICEF. Although necessary, they reduced, deterred or eliminated valuable communication between country/field offices, supply division and the manufacturer on issues such as specifications, conditions of use, after sales service, training and warranties. Feedback from the recipient directly to the manufacturer for product improvement was seriously frowned upon while the alternative routing via supply division in Copenhagen was cumbersome (Talbot, 2008). With the exception of Iraq and DPR Korea, there were few drilling rig purchases within UNICEF by the late 1990s.

From about 2003 onwards, UNICEF Country Offices once again started to procure drilling equipment for UNICEF programmes and in response to emergencies. Unfortunately the competence in UNICEF with respect to water supply, and the skills required for running borehole drilling programmes in particularly are no longer as they were in the past (Talbot, 2008).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with clear targets for water and sanitation, coupled with the new WASH strategy and commitment to establish WASH programmes in 63 countries and a significant increase in WASH expenditure suggest a fifth phase, which I shall refer to as an early renaissance of WASH within UNICEF. The decision by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) that UNICEF would be the cluster lead for emergencies has further fuelled this change. Today UNICEF WASH finds itself in transition: building on its past, having lost momentum, human capacity and some of its institutional memory and re-establishing itself as a key player in the sector.

3.2 The India Influence

The UNICEF India programme, work undertaken by a sizeable number of NGOs as well as the Indian Government was highly successful in raising access to safe water supplies through water well drilling (Jaitley and Daw, 1995). This success influenced thinking and practices within UNICEF and beyond.

Up to the mid 1960s cable tool rigs were the only machines used for water well drilling in India. Although they were inexpensive to purchase and operate, they were slow in hard rock, typically penetrating about one meter per day (Black and Talbot, 2005). The Scottish missionary John MacLeod is credited with changing this when he saw the potential of the down-the-hole hammer (DTH) drilling technology whilst on leave in England (Jaitley and Daw, 1995). This insight, coupled with financial support from the British charities Oxfam and Water on Want, ushered the Halcro-Tiger drilling machines into India in 1965. They were originally to provide irrigation water for farmers. Over the following years a sizeable number of NGOs adopted the DTH drilling technology, in particular to drill for drinking water supplies.

The 1966/67 Bihar drought and famine triggered a step change in UNICEF’s involvement from small-scale humanitarianism to a major development input, and catalysed UNICEF’s involvement in water well drilling for rural water supplies in India (Black and Talbot, 2005). Concerns about dropping water tables led to the decision to develop water sources in hard rock terrains and UNICEF assisted in the procurement of fast, up-

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to-date hard rock drilling equipment. From 1969, a total of 125 down-the-hole-hammer (DTH) drilling rigs were introduced by UNICEF. The rigs, with support trucks and spares were delivered to various states in the early 1970s and used to drill to depths of 60m (although the early rigs had the capacity to drill to 200m). Conventional cable tool rigs were also sought for particular areas. In order to prevent a monopoly of supply, rigs were procured from Atlas Copco (Sweden), Halco (UK) and Ingersoll Rand (USA) all of which also had a manufacturing base in India (Black and Talbot, 2005).

The official commitment to rural drinking water supplies in India which was established in the 1970s emphasised ‘safe’ domestic water supplies. This was driven by the link between ‘unsafe’ water supplies and epidemic disease. It led to an almost exclusive focus on the exploitation of groundwater by drilled boreholes and installed with handpumps. However, the 1974 evaluation of the UNICEF-assisted programme revealed that 75% of handpumps on the new boreholes were not working, which spawned the development of more suitable handpump technology (Black and Talbot, 2005), as summarised in Box 1.

Box 1 Design and Development of Handpumps in the 1980s

The 1980s witnessed considerable innovation and development with respect to handpump design and ultimately led to the Village Level Operation and Maintenance (VLOM) concept, pioneered by Saul Arlosoroff with his UNDP-World Bank team. The India Mark II handpump was developed through a partnership between the Indian organisations MERADO, Richardson and Crudas, and UNICEF. The project was based on the mutual understanding that India needed an improved handpump and that all parties would work towards this goal. It was clear, that once the research work was finished, the design would be put in the public domain.

The India Mark II faced problems due to inadequate corrosion resistance and was difficult to maintain and repair. This drove David Grey and John Chilton in Malawi to experiment with alternatives which led to the development of the Afridev pump as part of the UNDP-World Bank handpump project. The India Mark III, which followed in the heels of the India Mark II was in many respects a response to the Afridev pump.

When the new drilling technology was introduced into India, the emphasis on private sector participation was not as prominent as it is in development thinking today. Initially a number of NGOs and UNICEF owned drilling equipment. UNICEF rigs were later donated to the Government. UNICEF remained heavily involved in the management of these rigs and the purchase of spares. UNICEF India’s development model focused on building the capacity of State Government Water Boards and public health engineering departments with drilling equipment, maintenance workshops and training. Although there was little direct attention given to private drillers, it was hoped that local rig manufacture and private sector drilling would take off (Black and Talbot, 2005). In contrast, the development of handpump technology was done in partnership with the private sector from the outset.

Over the years drilling technology was copied locally. The extent of Government funding for borehole drilling for domestic water and the market for agricultural and industrial wells helped the private drilling market to accelerate. It has been estimated that by the late 1980s some 70 - 80% of wells were drilled by the private sector (Ali, 2008; Talbot, 2008). In contrast, state-owned equipment was ageing and operating costs had climbed significantly (Black and Talbot, 2005). Private contractors responded quickly and efficiently to the 1987 drought, and in some cases output was three times higher than that of Government (Black and Talbot, 2005). In 1992, UNICEF essentially withdrew from supporting drilling activities in India, having assisted in pioneering, developing, assuring quality and monitoring for 25 years.

The revolution in handpump design and their availability through the private sector in India (Box 1) were instrumental for improving domestic water supplies. Meanwhile, small submersible pumps and cheap energy, coupled with relatively low drilling costs spawned a massive growth in the private installation of water wells for agriculture. Unfortunately, the extensive uptake of the drilling and pumping technology for irrigation, coupled with lack of regulation has resulted in declining groundwater levels in many parts of India (Nigam, Gujja, Bandyopadhyay and Talbot, 1996). Although borehole drilling was a leap forward in terms of increasing access to ’safe’ domestic water supplies, it has also had unintended consequences on groundwater resources.

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In his presentation at the International Groundwater Conference in Addis Ababa, Talbot (2004) made it clear that the Indian “borehole revolution” was successful due to:

The combination of hard-rock drilling technology and India Mark II handpump.

And the key ingredients of:

political will;

continuous support by external support agencies;

a strong industrial base;

skilled human resources;

the involvement of the private sector;

an extensive programme of work;

informed technical choice;

good logistical control;

standardisation;

good communications and infrastructure;

Effective monitoring and evaluation.

In many ways, the India experience set the benchmark for UNICEF of what could be achieved with respect to borehole drilling. Unfortunately, what was a low cost solution for India (US $700 to $1,500 per water well) became a high cost solution for sub-Saharan Africa ($3,000 to $30,000 per water well).

This marked difference has many causes. Firstly, sub-Saharan Africa does entirely not sit on crystalline rock but rather on a variety of formations with different drilling requirements. Secondly whereas the India costs reflect wells installed with handpumps, the higher-end costs in sub-Saharan Africa include deeper wells with motorised pumps. Finally, and of critical importance is the fact that many of the ingredients key for success in India (listed above) are not in place in sub-Saharan African countries. Extensive and predictable work programmes, continuous external support and investment in human resources have been strikingly absent in the water sector of many sub-Saharan African countries for a long time. Involvement of the private sector is also relatively recent in many countries, while infrastructure is very often poor. With the exceptions of Nigeria and South Africa, the industrial base is also relatively low. Put in simple terms, to date, the India model has not transferred to sub-Saharan Africa as hoped.

3.3 Finance

Between 1946 and 1967, UNICEF spent less than US$ 2 million per year on WES activities (Beyer, 1987). Expenditure had increased to US$ 50 million by 1980. The years 1982 to 1984 saw an annual spend of about US$ 70 million, which reduced to US$ 58 million in 1985 (Beyer, 1985). Between 1985 and 1989, the average annual WES expenditure was US$ 68 million.

Figure 2 shows UNICEF WES expenditure between 1990 and 2006. Following a peak in 1993, WES expenditure dropped significantly up to 1999. This corresponds with the period that has been termed the decline of WES in UNICEF. Regular Resources (i.e. UNICEF WASH core budget) remained fairly steady at an average of US$ 33 million between 1990 and 2006, rising to just over US$ 50 million in 2007 and 2008. The increase in expenditure from 2003 to 2006 is primarily due to the significant increase in Emergency Resources, with Other Resources (i.e. funds from Donor partners) also rising significantly in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, for the first time, UNICEF WES expenditure was over US$ 300 million.

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Figure 2 UNICEF WES Expenditure 1990 to 2008

In 2007 and 2008, WES expenditure comprised 10% and 11% of total UNICEF expenditure respectively (Source: Data provided by UNICEF WES New York in May 2009).

3.4 Human Resources

During the period of the decline of WES in UNICEF (see 3.1), the organisation lost substantial skills in water well drilling and its management. UNICEF is well known for recruiting some of the best in-country staff for its WES programmes. However, some interviewees for this study were concerned about weaknesses in UNICEF WES staff capacity with respect to borehole drilling programmes and procurement of handpump supplies. It was also pointed out that since WES is part of the Child Survival and Development Department, WES staff may be supervised by professionals who are not familiar with WES.

In addition, several informants raised concerns about the lack of systematic orientation of new UNICEF WES staff. According to UNICEF Headquarters, orientation of WES staff is an area that they are currently seeking to address. The year 2007 saw a the launch of a global mapping survey of UNICEF staff, with screening tools developed to assess external candidates and generic job profiles updated. In 2008, WASH professional staff comprised 375 people (UNICEF, 2008a).

4 Existing Guidelines, Toolkits and Handbooks

UNICEF WES has produced a number of guidelines, toolkits and handbooks, which are summarised in this chapter. They are a valuable resource and contain excellent information. However, not all staff members know about these publications and some of them do not appear to have been widely circulated.

4.1 UNICEF Water Handbook (1999)

The UNICEF (1999) publication entitled Towards Better Programming – A Water Handbook is a practical guide for implementing the (1995) WES operational strategies. It comprises five chapters:

(1) Water and Sustainable Development;

(2) Community Participation and Management;

(3) Cost and Cost Effectiveness;

(4) Water Technologies and

(5) Maintenance of Water Supply Systems.

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Chapter 3 - Cost and Cost Effectiveness provides guidance on technical and logistical considerations to improve cost-effectiveness (Box 2). On the whole, the guidance given is good although issues of verticality, casing and casing installation as well development are not included. It refers to the use of private sector contractors and even states that it may be necessary to support the private sector through incentives for a limited period. The handbook refers to the importance of an attractive market size for investment and mentions the importance of capacity building of government for effective monitoring and supervision of contractors. In an earlier draft of the handbook (in 1998), there was an additional chapter, entitled Reducing Drilling Costs which was not included in the final version.

Chapter 4 - Water Technologies - sets out design options, constraints and choices. It favours the selection of groundwater abstraction with a handpump installed in small-diameter well. System design options are grouped into single point, standpipes and household connections. Problems of over-abstraction of groundwater from agriculture and industry are mentioned. Protected springs are also mentioned and rainwater collection is given as a solution particularly where they are no other options. Surface water is considered as almost always polluted, and household water treatment is not mentioned at all.

Chapter 5 - Maintenance of Water Supply Systems - states that the most common institutional arrangement for operation and maintenance is the three-tier system involving handpump caretakers, pump mechanics and more highly trained mechanics. Although the handbook points out the need for modifications, few alternatives are given. At five pages, this key chapter is very brief and lacks discussion of community follow-up or retraining. It reflects common practices at the time the manual was written.

Although the 1999 handbook has not been replaced, several interviewees question whether it is used, and it was certainly not referred to in Nigeria or Uganda. It has been suggested that although the handbook was circulated within UNICEF, it was not properly introduced to staff.

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Box 2 Technical & Logistical Considerations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness (UNICEF, 1999)

Even when considering only one technical option, that of the water well handpump, a variety of cost-saving measures can be applied. The largest single cost item in the handpump option, and one which acts as a constraint to expansion, is the drilling operation and drilling success rate. Correct choice of drilling equipment, drilling area, and drilling rig movement can reduce overall costs. Selection of the right equipment depends on the geological conditions and anticipated drilling depths. Proper surveys prior to drilling can contribute significantly to cost reduction. For example, in Nigeria the failure rate in the government programme, due to inadequate surveys, has been particularly high with a number of boreholes running dry after a short period of time. Since drilling costs are the single major component of cost, actions to optimize the use of surveys, rig movement and monitoring can have a major impact. Experience suggests that improvements can be made in the purely technical and engineering aspects for lowering costs of a water well with handpump. Some key factors are:

Yield of the well - The target yield in water well design should be only that required by the handpump to be installed, which is usually in the range 750 to 1,000 litres an hour. Taking additional measures to increase the yield to, say, 2,000 litres an hour "just in case," is unnecessary and often costly. This practice can become a major drain on resources, especially in projects drilling large numbers of water wells.

Diameter and depth of the well - Doubling the diameter of a well, or increasing its depth will substantially increase the costs. In most situations, the diameter of the well is the sole function of the handpump to be installed (100mm to 125mm diameter water well is sufficient for most handpumps). The depth range of the wells should be defined by scientific investigations and proper surveys in accordance with the design yield.

Equipment selection - Commonly there is an over-specification of equipment required for drilling "just in case" it is needed. Large equipment not only requires greater capital investment but also means higher running costs, as seen from the example of Ethiopia in the table below.

Big Rigs vs. Small Rigs

Rig Type Capital Cost (US$)

Daily Depreciation (over 7 years, US$)

Consumables per metre (US$)

Fuel per Hour Cost (US$)

Big Rigs 700,000 274 81 57

Small Rigs 520,000 204 43 23

Equipment selection should be based on the diameter of the wells to be drilled, the average depth to be drilled, the geological formation to be drilled and the accessibility of the drilling sites. For wider coverage smaller rigs should be used with larger rigs for drilling in certain areas only.

Standardization - Non-standardization of drilling equipment, materials and handpump models increases the spare parts requirements, increasing operation cost. The successful expansion of the rural water supply programme in India, for example, was due to a great extent to the use of one type of handpump, the India Mark II. The production of hardware, the design of maintenance systems, and the spare parts procurement and distribution systems were all built around this one pump, simplifying and improving the cost effectiveness of the programme.

Logistics - The timely availability of materials, particularly imported items, can also help reduce costs. If economies of scale are to be realized and drilling costs reduced, there should be sufficient advance planning and lead time for obtaining the supplies. In one large long-running UNICEF-supported drilling programme, spare parts are ordered eight to ten months in advance. Developing countries also need to be provided some form of "certainty" of financial support from donors to enable proper logistical planning. If financial support for programmes is cut or reduced mid-stream, the costs of rural water supply increases considerably. Idle rigs, due to poor logistics, add significantly to costs. There are numerous examples of rigs which are technically capable of drilling 100 wells a year producing only 5 or Reducing rig downtime, efficient back-up service, operating a shift system so that water wells are completed without stopping, and planning rig movements based on logistical and not political considerations can also reduce costs.

Productivity - Low productivity with high systems costs adds to the unit cost of a water point. There is often a case for building an incentive system for local staff to increase output. This will have to be carefully designed to fit in the institutional and wage structure in cases where the water supply is provided by government teams so that it does not conflict with the sustainability of the overall government programme.

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4.2 UNICEF Aquaplus Guidelines

In 2008, UNICEF Headquarters circulated a CD to UNICEF WES staff with resource materials entitled Aquaplus. It comprises 5 chapters: introduction, water quality, reconnaissance, groundwater and surface water. The guidelines do not appear to have been widely distributed or extensively used.

4.3 National (UNICEF) Guidelines

UNICEF has been involved in the preparation of WES guidelines and manuals in many countries for a long time. Examples include the Extension Workers Manual for Uganda, Drilling Standards in India and the production of 14 guidelines on the construction of water and sanitation facilities in Southern Sudan (UNICEF, 2007b).

It is unfortunate that many of these manuals appear to remain in country. An example is the WES Manual for Southern Sudan, which is considered to be a key document, and of potential use to other countries. However, one needs to travel to Lokichokio in Northern Kenya to obtain a hard copy. Few manuals from country programmes are currently available through the UNICEF Intranet, and there seem to be no procedures for ensuring that hard or even soft copies are sent to Programme Division. Lack of systematic sharing within UNICEF is likely to lead to a duplication of effort and undermines one of UNICEF’s potential strengths given its global reach.

Questions have been raised by interviewees regarding UNICEF’s in-house capacity in some countries to assure the quality of the numerous guidelines produced by country programmes.

4.4 UNICEF Water Quality Handbook

UNICEF has recently finalised a new water quality handbook for field staff and partners (UNICEF, 2008b) which has been circulated to all WES staff.

5 UNICEFs Approaches to Water Supply

5.1 The Technology Selection Process

UNICEF has a history of supporting the drilling of boreholes, which is often the first choice technology for a programme. Given the relatively high cost of a borehole source, particularly when compared to improving a traditional well or protecting a spring, there is a need to question whether the apparent preference for it is justified. Interviewees cited five main reasons for preferring boreholes:

Firstly, in many countries, there is a commonly held view that a drilled water-well fitted with a handpump provides a safer supply than any other source.

Secondly, many stakeholders think that boreholes can be uniformly applied.

Thirdly, appreciation, or detailed knowledge of alternatives, such as upgrading traditional wells or rainwater harvesting can be lacking. There appears to be a lack of attention to what households are already doing themselves, and how these can be built upon, or how they affect attitudes to new facilities.

Fourthly, boreholes are seen as a way of providing water sources quickly.

Finally, UNICEF may simply follow the existing, and well entrenched technology of preference of its partners, which is often the borehole.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the speed of the programme to drill wells for rapidly returning refugees was taken as the most important criteria in technology selection. Drilling of boreholes was intended to tap groundwater at greater depths in areas that cannot be served with hand dug wells. However, boreholes in fact were being drilled in areas that could be served by hand dug wells, and in some cases already were (Keast, 2002). In Nigeria boreholes have for long been considered to be the first choice technology, despite the country’s long history of using hand dug wells.

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There has been a strong emphasis on borehole drilling in Southern Sudan, despite the fact that almost half of the country is practically covered by water for half the year and that there many springs, which would be relatively cheap to protect. Chawla (2003) states that between 1999 and 2002 UNICEF stepped up borehole drilling in Southern Sudan, which included better management of drilling rigs and contracting the private sector. However, Chawla (2003) points out that drilling boreholes is incredibly expensive, and that cheaper alternatives need to be created.

Within UNICEF there appears to be a need for greater consideration of other water supply options alongside drilled boreholes as part of a clear and rational process for technology selection. In order to avoid providing an inappropriate water supply for a particular location, the decision of whether to drill a borehole, improve a traditional well or consider some other option needs to be made systematically, and on a case by case basis. The alternative is running programmes in which the number of boreholes to be drilled is defined and locations are sought, rather than finding suitable solutions for rural dwellers. The former is more likely to lead to top-down decision-making rather than a more responsive approach. It also has negative implications on cost and long-term viability of the supply.

5.2 Emergencies

Ensuring access to safe water supplies is one of the key aims of UNICEF’s Core Commitments to Children (CCC). When a sudden disaster strikes, the first concern is to reach the affected people as quickly as possible. As stated in section 5.1, borehole drilling is considered as a mechanism to rapidly provide safe water. However, it does not always work out so well.

Two examples are the emergency response to the 2004 Tsunami in which drilling rigs were procured by UNICEF. In Sri Lanka, the Tsunami funding enabled the Government to revamp its aging fleet of drilling equipment but the rigs were purchased without any inclusion of after sales service or training. The long term funding and technical obligations to operate and maintain the equipment seem not to have been adequately considered by the Government or UNICEF (Baumann, Loveless and Talbot, 2006).

In the case of Indonesia, four rigs were ordered and three arrived, some ten months later (Figure 3). The rigs were supposed to drill 250 boreholes in unspecified locations but were actually not used for 18 months, and later only to a limited extent. Their relevance to the programme is now under question (Booth, 2008). It should be noted that the total UNICEF funds allocated to WASH component of Tsunami response was US$ 66 million, of which half was earmarked for supplies and equipment.

Baumann, Loveless and Talbot (2006) point out that in Sri Lanka and Indonesia no fully-fledged WASH programmes were in place at the time of the 2004 Tsunami. Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRPs) were not in place either. Turnover of the rapidly deployed staff was very high, with a lack of time spent on analysis of the situation. These problems, coupled with a lack of checks and balances within UNICEF clearly affected the decision-making process, leading to expenditure of over US$ 1.7 million on drilling equipment that has been highly underutilised.

These examples illustrate the realities of operating under pressure to deliver results and how easy it was to procure drilling equipment within UNICEF without a long term plan in place. Drilling equipment has an expected lifespan of about ten years, and it is thus very questionable as to whether it should be purchased as a short-term emergency solution. Decisions taken in the emergency phase have implications on later work.

Figure 3 Three Drilling Rigs - Purchased by UNICEF for Tsunami Relief in Indonesia - Wait to be Deployed

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5.3 Groundwater Water Resources and Chemical Water Quality

Rupert Talbot (2008) eloquently cites the example of India where water coverage targets were made, but have “backslid” considerably due to a lack of consideration of water quality and declining groundwater levels as well as to inadequate focus on operation and maintenance issues. Black and Tabot (2005) highlight the plight of domestic water users in several parts of India, where UNICEF was directly involved in improving access to groundwater for over 20 years. Faced with competition for resources from agriculture and industry, countless boreholes have been abandoned, as they are no longer deep enough.

India is not an isolated case, working for UNICEF, Salone (2004) raised concerns about the sustainability of groundwater resources in Darfur, which is now being monitored. Consideration of groundwater resources should not be overlooked.

Chemical water quality is another environmental issue that needs to be considered at an early stage. Fluoride, arsenic and iron in groundwater can render it unfit, or undesirable for human consumption. Nitrate contamination is a problem which is still being uncovered and better understood. In the past UNICEF, has been more concerned with water supply than water quality issues. However, increasingly the organisation is involved in arsenic mitigation work, water safety planning and water quality surveillance and mapping (UNICEF, 2007c). For example, in 2007 UNICEF India undertook a critical review of its role with respect to water resource management in consultation with Government and other partners (UNICEF, 2008b).

Given the importance of chemical water quality to the suitability and sustainability of drilled water wells, it is important that it is properly considered when planning to support borehole drilling programmes.

5.4 Sustainability of Water Supplies

Although groundwater supplies will continue to be a major source of improved water supplies for rural populations in the developing world, it is becoming increasingly apparent that boreholes fitted with handpumps are no panacea. I have already mentioned the backsliding with respect to coverage in India as pumps went out of service (see section 5.3). The Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) estimates that about one third of handpumps in Africa are not working at any given time. Breakdown rates in some countries are actually be much worse than this (Harvey, 2007).

Figure 4 Unsafe India Mark II Installation

The 1980s witnessed UNICEF engineering professionals focus on ‘technical sustainability’. There was a lack of concern regarding the social or economic acceptability of the installed water supply facilities (Black and Talbot, 2005). Examining more recent experiences, it is clear that the political pressure to provide new water points is high, as is the desire to show results quickly. Examples from Liberia, North and Southern Sudan and Nigeria illustrate that this is not necessarily cost-effective in the long term (Box 3).

If improved water points cannot be sustained for their expected lifetime (about 8 years for a pump and 20 years for a borehole), then investments have clearly been wasted. There appears to be a growing consensus that breakdown of improved water points is heavily influenced by a combination of four problems:

(i) Top down approach of supplying boreholes fitted with handpumps.

(ii) Poor quality construction in the first place.

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(iii) Insufficient investment in operation and maintenance compared to new construction.

(iv) Lack of spare parts and skills to maintain the facilities.

(v) Poor management by the users, which is often linked to inadequate training and lack of follow-up support.

Box 3 Problems Sustaining Handpumps

In the post-war transition period in Liberia, UNICEF supported the construction of hand dug wells installed with handpumps for schools (from 2004 to 2006). A rapid assessment (Keast, 2005) found that 38% of the 22 schools visited did not have a working water point and a further 24% did not work all year round

4. Some wells had been

drilled too shallow, others had poorly installed handpumps, handpumps theft and lack of maintenance. Of particular concern was the lack of handpump tools and spares and complete lack of training regarding pump maintenance and repair. The programme moved at a high pace, and did not give due concern to the engagement with water users, or maintenance. In parallel, UNICEF was supporting a national handpump maintenance programme, but progress was extremely slow.

UNICEF’s work in North Sudan has included the construction and rehabilitation of water sources, in combination with training of Government staff and water users in management, as well as O&M. However UNICEF (2006b) states that in North Sudan: “there was inadequate technical and managerial capacity at the state and locality levels for the construction, supervision, monitoring and quality assurance of facilities”. This does not bode well for quality of works or sustainability. However, the ECHO-funded evaluation of WES emergency response in the Blue Nile, Utility and Upper Nile States indicated that facilities funded in 2004 and 2005 were still functioning well. It is not clear whether this is still the case today.

In Southern Sudan, poor access to communities has been a major constraint. UNICEF (2006b) states that this has lead to high borehole costs. Rigs and consumables (including gravel pack and cement) have been flown in to drilling sites. Access to spare parts and maintenance of handpumps installed in such isolated places is highly questionable.

In the case of Nigeria, Keast (2007) cites handpump breakdown rates as typically above 50% and often much higher. He continues to point out that poor sustainability is due to a top-down approach to rural water supplies in Government programmes, poor initial quality of boreholes and handpump installations as well as the lack of a viable maintenance system and spare parts supply chain. By 2005, key Government stakeholders in Nigeria had recognised the problem of high breakdown rates (Keast, 2005). In 2007, UNICEF Nigeria was undertaking considerable efforts to institute Village Level Operation and Management (so-called VLOM). They report that the functionality of water points in focus communities of: Kwara State has improved from 53% to 98%; Zamfara State is reporting 100% (up from 38% in 2006) and in Kebbi State, the functionality of boreholes improved from 12.3% to 88% UNICEF (2006e).

There is recognition within UNICEF of the importance of sustainability of water supplies, which the 2007 WASH report noted as a key challenge for 2008 and beyond (UNICEF, 2007c). Further, the new Dutch-funded programmes in East and Southern Africa use the sustainability of outcomes as the primary determinant of success (UNICEF, 2006f). However, it will take time for this to be fully translated into clear policies and procedures with respect to operation and maintenance. Some UNICEF country programmes still appear to be providing improved water supplies where spares are scant, or completely absent, and where there is no clear system for providing follow-up support to communities.

In order to ensure that boreholes are cost-effective, the long term functionality of the facilities needs to be taken very seriously before wells are even drilled.

6 UNICEF-Support of Borehole Drilling

6.1 Rig Productivity

Over the course of its 25-year involvement in India (1967 to 1992), UNICEF supplied 330 drilling rigs, at a total cost (at the time of purchase) of US$ 33 million (UNICEF, 2000). By the end of this time, the Government was in a position to fund and manage its own rural drinking water programme (Black and

4 Note that this was not a statistical sample of the 1,100 schools in the programme. They were sampled from 5 out of

15 counties and were relatively easy to access from Monrovia.

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Talbot, 2005). Nowadays, most drilling is undertaken by the private sector. Despite this, UNICEF India actually procured over US$ 310,000 worth of drilling related items from 1999 to 2007.

In order to be cost-effective, a mechanised drilling rig should complete at least 100 water wells in a given year. In reality, production rates are often considerably lower than this, leading to higher amortization costs and therefore higher drilling costs. Table 1 shows relatively low rig productivity machines were operated by UNICEF directly, through the Government, or hired out to NGOs.

Table 1 Examples of Rig Productivity Rates

Institution/Location/Time Frame (Reference) Rig Productivity

RWASSA-UNICEF/Nigeria/1990 to 2000 (Wurzel, 2001) 33 boreholes/rig/year (fleet average)

RWASSA-UNICEF /Nigeria/2000 (Wurzel, 2001) 10 boreholes (TH-10 fleet)

Private sector/India/1990’s ((Wurzel, 2001) ~150 boreholes/rig/year

UNICEF/Southern Sudan/2006-2007 (anon) ~10 boreholes/rig/year

Although there were high levels of expenditure recently on drilling equipment, spares and consumables over the last eight years in Sudan (US$ 6,850,000) and Ethiopia (US$ 5,100,000) there is no available analysis of rig productivity. In Nigeria, a Rig Information Management System (RIMS) was established in 1995 (data included from 1989 onwards) and enabled Wurzel (2001) to generate the data presented in Table 1. A similar management tool in India to measure performance against a set target of borehole numbers5 and meters drilled, and monitored the distance travelled by each rig. Analysis of the data in this system was instrumental in showing the irrelevance of investing in higher-capacity drilling machines (Black and Talbot, 2005). It is not clear whether such systems exist and are utilised in Sudan and Ethiopia, or other countries.

At one time, UNICEF was the largest purchaser of water well drilling rigs globally, and the UNICEF fleet of equipment set performance and quality standards (Talbot, 2008). Now, Government owned drilling rigs are renowned for their low productivity rates and poor maintenance. In Nigeria for example, by 2001, more than half the UNICEF/Government of Nigeria drilling fleet, estimated to have cost between US$ 5 to 7 million was no longer operational due to lack of use for long periods, lack of State funds, as well as the “natural aging process”, with rigs ranging from 6 to 17 years old (Wurzel, 2001). Three new rigs were procured by UNICEF Nigeria in 2000/2001 at a cost of US$ 827,863 (Annex 1). Since then no new drilling rigs and only a very limited number of spares have been procured for Nigeria through UNICEF. In Uganda, there has been a similar shift with private sector drilling preferred over government ownership.

It is frequently argued that public-owned rigs are necessary for emergencies or use in inaccessible areas. However the reality is that public-owned drilling equipment is frequently diverted to undertake drilling for local elites or politicians. Wurzel (2001) points out that it was common for underpaid drill crews to drill private boreholes in Nigeria.

Despite the arguments against Governments or UNICEF owning rigs, UNICEF supplied over US$23 million worth of drilling equipment (rigs, compressors, trucks, spares and consumables) to the public sector and UNICEF between 1999 and 2007 (Table 2)6. To take a rather cynical quote from one of the interviewees: “There is nothing quite like buying a drilling rig when you have extra cash [to spend in a programme]” (anon). Further details for expenditure on drilling equipment in Sudan and Nigeria are given in Annex 1 and 2. In North Sudan, poor absorptive, technical and managerial capacities by national and local governments are cited as reasons for not achieving planed results (UNICEF, 2006b; UNICEF 2007b). Despite this, UNICEF has procured considerable drilling equipment and consumables for Government from 2004 up to 2008.

5 In the case of the ‘new generation’ hydraulic operated rigs, the target was 150 boreholes per rig per year.

6 The Procurement Services Programme in UNICEF has also been used by Governments to purchase drilling related

items over years. The extent of this has not been explicitly documented.

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Table 2 UNICEF Supply Division (Copenhagen) Procurement of Drilling Equipment (1999 to 2007)7

Consignee Country Name Expenditure (US$) Consignee Country Name Expenditure (US$)

Sudan 6,849,073 Central African Republic 109,723

Iraq 5,820,318 Dem. Rep. of Congo 80,026

Ethiopia 5,408,798 Afghanistan 60,619

Sri Lanka 1,000,926 Djibouti 50,994

Nigeria 827,863 Lao, People's Dem. Rep 32,081

Angola 594,854 Pakistan 22,908

Ghana 432,666 Chad 21,861

Kenya 424,396 Madagascar 21,189

Indonesia 402,178 Mali 15,610

India 313,803 Equatorial Guinea 10,140

Nicaragua 237,334 Burkina Faso 8,773

Myanmar 157,458 Cote D'Ivoire 6,220

United Rep. of Tanzania 135,068 Maldives 3,975

Sierra Leone 122,674 Niger 3,530

Liberia 122,317

Grand Total 23,297,375

UNICEF originally owned and managed a drilling fleet in Southern Sudan (dates not clear), with the justification that there was no Government and that private sector capacity was inefficient. Later, as the emphasis shifted to the private sector, UNICEF opted for an approach whereby contractors were paid for the successful completion of ten boreholes.

UNICEF appears to still own drilling rigs in a number of countries (including Liberia and Indonesia as well as southern Sudan), but a full inventory is not available from the organisation.

6.2 Rig Technology

Oversized rigs raise the cost of borehole drilling considerably and concerns regarding over-specified drilling equipment are not new. Black and Talbot (2005) refer to the purchase of drills “of extraordinary capacity for drilling at speed”, which were too unwieldy and over-equipped in India in the late 1970s8. Wurzel (2001) found that the mean drilling depth for a fleet of Ingersoll-Rand TH-10s used in Nigeria from 1990 to 2000 was 33 meters despite the fact that these rigs are designed to drill to 180 meters. Keast (2002) refers to the use of inappropriate drilling rigs used in UNICEF’s work in Sierra Leone, and that the equipment cannot reach many of the sites located by UNICEF and its partners.

Smaller rotary, or percussion rigs are often able to drill drill more efficiently than large rigs and can reach more locations, particularly where road networks are poor (Keast, 2002). Smaller, mechanised, all terrain rigs at lower cost are now available on the international market and can drill wells at a significantly lower cost. However, UNICEF WASH staff are not fully aware of the guidance that has already been issued to encourage the use of smaller drill rigs.

Hand drilled, or manually drilled wells are an option in specific environments (soft formation and shallow groundwater). UNICEF Chad has supported manual drilling since for a number of years. Since 2004, UNICEF Niger has been piloting manually drilled wells for domestic use. UNICEF Nigeria undertook a study

7 Note: Figures extracted from approx 18,000 rows of WES Procurement data. Analysis was undertaken by the author of this paper

by examining supplier names and short text. Note that geophysical equipment is not included in the analysis. 8 A case in point is the 30 ton CP 700 rig with the capability of drilling to 300m that drilled hundreds of 60m holes over many years –

a situation that could be compared to using a sledgehammer for brass tacks.

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of manual drilling, which revealed that it is widely practiced in the country (an estimated 30,000 wells) but that one state Government contracts hand drillers (Adekile and Olabode, 2008).

Since late 2008, UNICEF Headquarters have been supporting the mapping of hand drilling potential, and are also working with partners to try and raise the profile of manual drilling among stakeholders.

6.3 Data and Hydrogeological Mapping

A good knowledge of national, and more localised hydrogeology is a major asset to improving the cost-effective of water well drilling. In the case of the UNICEF India programme, drill logs were fairly rudimentary comprising depth, diameter, yield and casing installed: “…the sheer volume of output was such that a more sophisticated well log was not viable and probably not needed [250,000 handpumps were installed per year at one point]. One soon built up a picture of depths to drill and yields in a given area” (Talbot, 2008).

Inadequate attention to the collection and collation of data from drilling is simply a lost opportunity. In terms of good practice, UNICEF Southern Sudan has been involved with establishing a drilling database although it is not clear how effectively it is being maintained now that it has been handed over to Government. It would be useful for UNICEF to link their partners to other organisations (such as the International Association of Hydrogeologists) with expertise on data and hydrogeological mapping.

6.4 Procurement and Contract Management

UNICEF has no standard contracting practices between countries, there is limited capacity for contract management and UNICEF systems are not idea for construction type contracts. One programme officer explained that in order to contract a drilling company, terms of reference, rather than a bill of quantities had to be included in the UNICEF financial system, PROMS. In some countries, UNICEF contracts lack penalty clauses and damages, or they are not enforced and contractors are not held to account. UNICEF Supply Division in Copenhagen is in the process of developing guidelines on construction.

UNICEF country offices lack guidance regarding preparation of drilling contracts. Each country office is responsible for developing contracts with Government, or for UNICEF direct use. Clearly contracts need to fit to the national (or even State) scenarios. However given that national standard contracts can be weak, this is an area that requires careful attention.

The extent to which country programmes support lump sum contracts, or payment according to bills of quantities for drilling is not clear. Currently UNICEF Uganda (contracting directly) pays lump sum contracts, whereas UNICEF Nigeria (contracting through State Government) pays according to a bill of quantities, but does not pay for dry wells (which appear to be a contradiction). Payment for water well drilling according to a bill of quantities can be difficult. One problem is that in the case of short term funding (often emergency funding), there are concerns that funds will remain unspent at the end of the funding period, or that they will be overspent. Apparently full expenditure of funds is a management indicator within UNICEF, and under-expenditure will thus reflect poorly on the country office. As funds tend to be programme or project specific, overspending is not an option.

Clearly there is some debate regarding the most suitable contracting approach for particular conditions. Guidance as to the pros and cons of these different approaches may enable UNICEF staff and its partners to take informed decisions in this area.

Two good examples of good practices with respect to UNICEF’s experience of drilling procurement and contract management are as follows:

In order to deal with the disparate drilling prices, align tender processes and try to reduce costs, the major donors in Chad (including UNICEF) issued their tenders together.

UNICEF Nigeria have supported and tried to strengthen the Government’s Due Process for contract award, oversight and certification including pre-qualification, call for tenders, tender evaluation and award. Since 2007 all UNICEF funded drilling activities in Nigeria are contracted out (by Government) to the private sector.

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6.5 Payment

Delays in payment of contractors for completed works (under UNICEF supported programmes) were raised as an issue in Uganda and Nigeria. In Uganda, some delays were for a couple of years and the reasons could not be fully clarified. In Nigeria, the problems were shorter in duration, and related to lack of counterpart funding by Government. Due to the fact that drilling is a highly capitalised business, and that many companies do not much cash flow, long delays in payment can be devastating for a contractor. This is an issue that should not be overlooked.

6.6 Supervision and Quality Assurance

Drilling, whether through the public, NGO or private sector requires adequate supervision. “Drillers can bamboozle you… too many supervisors are straight out of university. Supervisors need to be trained in the field so that they understand what they are doing” Ray Rowles (2008). Within the professional drilling industry it is widely recognised that ideally, a supervising hydrogeologist should be on site full time. However, due to financial constraints and priorities, this level of supervision is hard to find in many countries.

In the case of the UNICEF India programme, the sheer scale of the intervention meant that it was difficult to focus on quality work. Quality was a trade off for performance in terms of numbers. At the peak of UNICEF’s engagement, a team of 10 people was undertaking supervision. Table 3 provides more recent cases where drilling supervision has been completely lacking, or poor in UNICEF supported WES programmes. A typical challenges of drilling supervision is that the supervisor is often “in the pocket” of the contractor, i.e. dependent on him for transport, and even food and accommodation. Concerns over lack of drilling supervision expertise in sub-Saharan Africa have are raised by Danert et al (2009). Inadequate skills in drilling supervision by UNICEF or its partner organisation will have a bearing on the success of UNICEF drilling programmes. This is therefore a key area that needs to be considered.

Table 3 Examples of Poor Drilling Supervision

Country (year) Drilling Supervision and Consequences

Sierra Leone (2002)

“WES section recommended that a national hydrogeologist be hired to supervise a drilling contract…no consultant was hired”. The contract specified a borehole log would be submitted to UNICEF before casing for approval. As there was no supervisory staff travelling with the drill crew, some boreholes collapsed while waiting for approval. Field visits to 25 out of 30 boreholes drilled under the UNICEF Sierra Leone drilling programme in 2002 found that 40% were completely or partially out of service despite the fact that most of them were less than 6 months old. It was concluded that the drilling company had not fulfilled the terms of its contract

9 and “does not appear

to have the capacity to do so in the future” (Keast, 2002).

Southern Sudan (2006/7)

Supervision of borehole drilling in Southern Sudan has been difficult due to poor roads and insecurity (UNICEF, 2006b). The Government (former SPLA), who had apparently received some training, undertook supervision of borehole drilling in Southern Sudan. However, this was clearly no substitution for skilled hydrogeologists. The supervisors were subsequently expected to construct the platforms.

Sudan (Darfur) 2004

“Drilling technique is poor… design of borehole is poor: no gravel pack, no development… pump test [sic] does not follow any particular procedure” (Salome, 2004). Statement refers to the NWC/WES water well drilling.

Uganda (2008) Informants in Uganda have raised concerns about the contract management and supervision procedures currently utilised by UNICEF in Northern Uganda. Part of the problem is that supervision is supposed to be undertaken by district government, who lack time and do not have the required supervision skills. UNICEF relies on verifying that works were completed after construction.

9 Inspection revealed the following: improper grouting and sealing on some boreholes, despite its specification in the contract;

others yielded suspended solids in the water, probably due to poor borehole development, poor/no gravel pack and/or broken screens; visible signs of non-vertically and dry boreholes. Poor installation of the Kardia pumps resulted in cylinder failure, short pumping strokes, reduced pumping efficiency. There was even a case of the pump not being installed directly over the borehole. Pump aprons with no slope, raised edges or drains had been installed. This, combined with unsealed boreholes raised the risk of contamination considerably. The apron design however, had not been specified in the contract.

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6.7 Supporting the Private Sector

The extent of private sector capacity in the borehole-drilling sector varies. Some countries have more national expertise, while others are still heavily reliant on foreign companies. The private sector should not only survive, but also flourish, which can be a challenge. Box 4 summarises some of the key problems faced by private drilling contractors in particular. Note that these challenges are not pertinent to UNICEF programmes, but rather to the sector as a whole and have a significant bearing on how UNICEF programmes can work well.

Box 4 Challenges faced by private contractors

Setting up in business can be extremely difficult. There are many examples of people with the skills, but not the finances to invest. There are challenges with the banking sector (short repayment times and high interest rates) across the sub-Saharan Africa in particular and difficulties of showing sufficient collateral to obtain credit (Danert et al, 2009).

Studies by RWSN and others have raised the issue of lack of skilled personnel (drillers, supervisors, technicians) in the public and private sector in many sub-Saharan African countries (including Ethiopia). Unfortunately, this is part of a wider global trend, which sees reduced emphasis on practical skills development and apprenticeships eg “Some people coming into UNICEF have never been on a construction site”.

Importation of equipment and spares can be difficult if contractors do not have foreign connections. Regulation on number of employees and equipment is demanding in some countries and lacking in others. Equipment productivity is also a problem for private drillers thanks to use of old equipment, and the challenges of obtaining spares. Maintenance and repair of equipment can be difficult, and necessary skills are often lacking. Obtaining steady and regular work is essential to enable capital-intensive drilling enterprises to remain in business, and be cost-effective. Despite this, contractors generally have to tender for work every year, and too many different projects or local authorities. Only one documented case of a drilling concession, running over several years has been found in the literature (Danert et al, 2009).

The capability and availability of skilled personnel (professionals and technicians) is an issue for both the public and private sector. Many drillers, supervisors and technical staff were originally working for Government and trained within projects. Given the shift in emphasis to decentralised service delivery by the private sector, there are serious questions regarding adequate opportunities for training and skills development. Networking, collaboration and lobbying are recognised as important mechanisms to professionalize organisations and bring about policy shifts (Danert et al, 2009).

Despite the increased emphasis on private sector drilling, the UNICEF literature has very few examples of how it has supported private contractors. There are key questions regarding the most effective ways that UNICEF could enable private contractors to flourish. It may be that UNICEF chooses not to become involved in such work, but it must be recognised that a robust and competitive national drilling industry is in the interest of UNICEF and its partners.

7 Reporting and Transparency

7.1 Internal Audit, Monitoring and Evaluation

UNICEF’s Internal Audit, Monitoring and Evaluation have been strengthened over the years, while accounting and control systems have been improved (UNICEF, 2004a). UNICEF (2004a) notes that UNIECF is “still striving to achieve a meaningful link between resources and results and to submit results-based budgets”. UNICEF is in the process of testing management indicators at country level, and is undertaking training in results-based management.

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7.2 UNICEF Global Wash Report

Since 2006, UNICEF programme division has produced a global WASH report. The 2007 report (UNICEF, 2007c) states that “14.9 million people benefited from UNICEF direct support to the construction or rehabilitation of water supply schemes, 5.5 million through development programmes and 9.4 million through emergency programmes”; that it “equipped more than 12,500 schools with water and/or sanitation facilities, benefiting an estimated 3.6 million children” and that it “reached 9.4 million people through direct support for WASH in emergencies around the world”.

The above figures are based on country-level service standards, which vary from place to place. The service level assumptions are not given in the report. Further, the report acknowledges that the level of UNICEF financial contribution to a particular programme varies, and notes that UNICEF country offices determine which facilities are considered to be directly supported by UNICEF in the figures reported above. There is no distinction between facilities rehabilitated and those newly built.

The 2007 UNICEF WASH report (UNICEF, 2007c) lists the top ten countries by WASH expenditure (which accounted for 54% of total UNICEF WASH expenditure). The report notes that US$ 31.7 million was spent in Sudan. Expenditure figures for 2006, 2007 and 2008 are given for the top ten countries in the 2008 UNICEF WASH report (UNICEF, 2008a).

7.3 UNICEF Country Office Reports

UNICEF Country Office Annual Reports are intended for internal use only. The reports for Sudan and Ethiopia (each with over US$ 5 million expenditure on drilling equipment and materials from 1999 to 2007) provide information on the number of people that have been provided with safe water supplies (Table 4). However, it is not always clear whether these are new, or rehabilitated sources, or even which type of source has been provided. Assumptions made regarding the number of water users per source (service criteria) are not given.

In terms of drilling equipment and materials, the following information is provided for Sudan:

2006 - 1 new drilling rig for Kordofan State and supplies for the rig;

2007 - 2 rigs commissioned (Nyala) and 2 rigs under procurement;

2008 – 1 new rig for South Kordofan State.

In the case of the Ethiopia reports, UNICEF (2008d) states that “the extensive use of UNICEF supplied drilling rigs has helped to keep costs down, although this may have created barriers and obstructed entry of private drillers into the market” and adds that the MoUs with government which guide the “use of UNICEF supplied drilling rigs are now being revised to reduce this negative impact.”

As stated in section 6.1, in both the Sudan and Ethiopian cases, the Country Office Reports do not provide information on rig productivity, despite the fact that there has been significant expenditure on drilling equipment and materials before and during the reporting period.

7.4 Synthesis of Information and Transparency

It is currently not possible to obtain a clear picture of inputs, in terms of finance and human resources versus outputs in terms of specified water supply infrastructure from the aforementioned reports. It is not clear whether this information is available in project reports to particular donors, or embedded within other national monitoring reports. However such information is not generally available on the UNICEF intranet.

Detailed records and analysis of UNICEF’s work are not systematically collated in one place but rather tend to remain at country level. This renders detailed analysis for thematic work, such as borehole drilling expenditure or rig productivity, extremely challenging. Data and information on cost-effective borehole provision under UNICEF programmes is not readily available and is fragmented. It thus cannot readily be analysed or rendered transparent.

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Table 4 UNICEF WES Water Supply Achievements (Sources: UNICEF, 2006b; 2007b; 2008c and UNICEF, 2006g; 2007d and 2008d)

Achievements North Sudan Southern Sudan Ethiopia

2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008

Access to New or Rehabilitated Safe Drinking Water Sources (No. of People)

New 89,500 (S)

10

202,750 (D)11

395,390 (E)12

91,115 (S)

45,000 (E)

558,500 95,000

Rehabilitated/Re-established 145,000 (S)

511,850 (D)

408,340 (E)

96,660 (S)

60,000 (E)

494,750 450,000

New or Rehabilitated 45,750 (G) 13

314,000 263,000 1,703,08014

160,639 660,000

New Water Supply Infrastructure (No)

Handpumps 220 (S)

28 (G)

Not specified

100 (E)

785 168

Not specified

Not specified

Not specified

Not specified

Motorised schemes 14 (S) 77

Mini water yards 10 (E)

Water treatment plant 1

Springs - 2

Water (supply) schemes 323 (D) 638

Rehabilitated Water Supply Infrastructure (No)

Not specified

Not specified

Handpumps 400 (S)

155 (G) 826

Not specified

Not specified

Motorised schemes 9 (S) 41

Water (supply) schemes 811 (D); Not specified 900 1,141

10 Safe Drinking Water Programme 11 Emergency WES in Darfur 12 Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) 13 Guinea Worm eradication project 14

This figure also includes the provision of water to 101,708 people through water tankering and 80,750 through on-site treatment.

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8 Conclusions and Recommendations

There is every reason to believe that the recent rise in prominence of WASH within UNICEF will continue into the future and that UNICEF will play an increasing role in supporting the provision of rural water supplies in many countries. The high profile of UNICEF internationally, as well its significant influence in the water and sanitation sector in many countries, make it extremely important for the organisation to be following state-of-the-art, professional policies at global level, while still maintaining its firm commitment to partnership at local level. Water well drilling is one of the key areas that UNICEF needs to support in a highly professional manner.

However, with no control mechanisms in place within UNICEF to regularly monitor and scrutinise practices implemented by the UNICEF country offices with respect to borehole drilling, there is plenty of scope for freedom. UNICEF in-country partner partly depend on UNICEF for funding, tend to have weak monitoring capacity and are thus ill-placed to scrutinise country level activities. These realities, coupled with the nature of programme development (at country level), reporting (primarily to donors) as well as fragmented data, means that there are currently relatively few incentives to ensure that wells are drilled cost-effectively and reported on.

There are examples of good practices regarding borehole drilling within UNICEF. However, for many years critical issues with respect to cost-effective borehole provision have been neglected. A Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes (COP), if properly introduced and adhered to could significantly improve this. It is envisaged that the COP would raise the level of professionalism by setting out clear procedures to be followed as well as defining minimum standards and clear reporting requirements for UNICEF country offices, programme division and supply division.

Guidance material with respect to rural water supplies, including cost-effective boreholes, already exists within UNICEF. Although some of the material has now dated (the UNICEF Water Handbook for example needs to be updated), much of the content still remains highly relevant to UNICEF and its partners. Unfortunately, guidance materials appear to be little referenced by staff, and, in many cases, are not even known about. This rings alarm bells when considering the value of a COP. It clearly need to be championed within the organisation, and requires a solid roll-out strategy as well as strong reporting mechanisms to be of any value to UNICEF and its partners.

Based on this study, there are a number of recommendations for the development and successful adoption of a COP:

1. Determine the location, number and type of UNICEF-owned and UNICEF-supplies rigs in the past 7 years. Undertake an analysis their productivity where data is available.

2. Establish a process whereby procurement of drilling equipment is cleared by UNICEF headquarters or an expert panel.

3. Determine the extent to which existing guidelines are used by country staff and why (or why not).

4. Consider introducing a mandatory system for documenting technology selection decisions which takes the full range of water supply options into consideration.

5. The Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes should include guidance on: rig management system; drilling rig technology; data and hydrogeological mapping; procurement and contract management; payment; and supervision and quality assurance.

6. Develop clear and transparent reporting mechanisms which include a simple set of indicators that all countries report on with respect to borehole drilling.

7. Develop a plan for the roll-out of the COP, and establish mechanisms to support UNICEF offices to introduce it and establish monitoring systems.

In addition, it is recommended that UNICEF considers developing a code of practice or strategy for operation and maintenance of improved water supplies, and groundwater resources management.

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9 References

Adekile and Olabode, 2008. Hand Drilling in Nigeria: Why Kill and Ant with a Sledgehammer? RWSN Field Note.

Baumann, E, Loveless, J and Talbot, R. 2006. Technical Assessment of Emergency Water and Sanitation Supply Assistance. Unpublished report, SKAT_Consulting, St Gallen, Switzerland.

Beyer M. 1986. The WET History 1946 to 1986. UNICEF, New York

Black, M and Talbot, R. 2005. WATER A matter of life and health. Oxford University Press.

Chawla, N. 2003. The Children Cannot Wait – UNICEF in Southern Sudan 1999 – 2002. UNICEF, Sudan (Date of 2003 has been estimated as date of publication was not given)

Danert, K. Carter, RC, Adekile, D, MacDonald, A and Baumann E. 2009. Cost-Effective Boreholes in sub-Saharan Africa. Paper Presented at the 34th WEDC International Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2008.

Harvey, P. 2007. Handpump data for selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa [online] Available from World Wide Web on http://www.rwsn.ch/documentation_bkp/skatdocumentation.2009-03-09.7304634330

Jaitley and Daw, 1995. Contribution of Voluntary Organisations in Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes in India. Paper presented at the Coordination Meeting at Barbados (September 29 to October 1, 1995).

Keast, G. 2002. Assessment of UNICEF Sierra Leone Drilling Programme (as implemented by the Salmarcon/Kosera drilling company). Unpublished Report.

Keast, G. 2005. Assessment of the UNICEF Liberia School WASH Programme. Unpublished Report.

Keast, G. 2007. The Way Forward for UNICEF WASH in Nigeria: Programme Recommendations. Extracts from an unpublished report.

Nigam A, Gujja B, Bandyopadhyay J and Talbot R. 1996. Fresh Water for India’s Children and Nature. UNICEF and World Wildlife Fund (WWF).

Rowles. 2008. Personal Communication with Ray Rowles, February 2008.

Salone, G. L. 2004. Decision Maker Guideline on Sustainable Policy for Groundwater. WES UNICEF Sudan Country Office. December 2004.

Tabot R. 2004. Presentation at the International Groundwater Conference, Addis Ababa, 25-27 May 2004.

Talbot, R. 2008. In Pursuit of the MDGs: The Need for a Water Well Drilling Strategy. Internal UNICEF Discussion Note.

Talbot, R. 2008. Personal Communication with Rupert Talbot, April 2008.

UNICEF 1999. Towards Better Programming – A Water Handbook, Water, Environment and Sanitation Technical Guidelines Series – No. 2. United Nations Children’s Fund Programme Division.

UNICEF. 2000. Learning from Experience: Evaluation of UNICEF’s Water and Environmental Sanitation Programme in India, 1966-98. Evaluation Office, New York.

UNICEF. 2002a. Sudan Country Office Annual Report 2002. Covering GoS areas. UNICEF Report For Internal Use Only

UNICEF. 2004a. UNICEF’s Strengths and Weaknesses. UNICEF Evaluation Working Paper, September 2004.

UNICEF. 2006a. 1946 to 2006 Sixty Years for Children. United Nations Children’s Fund.

UNICEF. 2006b. Sudan Annual Report 2006 (Internal Use Only)

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UNICEF. 2006c. Long Term Agreement between UNICEF and Private Contractor. UNICEF Southern Sudan. 2006

UNICEF. 2006d. UNICEF water, sanitation and hygiene strategies for 2006-2015. United Nations Economic and Social Council.

UNICEF. 2006f. UNICEF Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Annual Report 2006. UNICEF.

UNICEF. 2006g. Ethiopia Annual Report 2007 (Internal Use Only)

UNICEF. 2007b. Sudan Annual Report 2007 (Internal Use Only)

UNICEF. 2007c. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Annual Report 2007. WES Section, Programme Division, UNICEF New York.

UNICEF. 2007d. Ethiopia Annual Report 2007 (Internal Use Only)

UNICEF. 2008a. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Annual Report 2008. WES Section, Programme Division, UNICEF New York (Draft Report).

UNICEF. 2008b. UNICEF Handbook on Water Quality. WES Section, Programme Division, UNICEF New York.

UNICEF. 2008c. Sudan Annual Report 2008 (Internal Use Only)

UNICEF. 2008d. Ethiopia Annual Report 2008 (Internal Use Only)

UNICEF. 2006e. ANNUAL REPORT C FIELD WASH PROGRAMME 2006 COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2002 – 2006. UNICEF Nigeria.

Wurzel, P. 2001. Drilling Rigs in Nigeria-UNICEF and a Rational Procurement Policy – an argument for greater focus on manual drills and procurement of smaller, less expensive, more manoeverable mechanised rigs. Unpublished report.

10 Related Materials

Adekile, D. 2007. The Drilling Environment and Establishing a Drillers Association. Cost-Effective Boreholes in Nigeria Series No. 1. Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN).

Baumann E. Ball P. and Alebachew B. 2005. Rationalization of Drilling Operations in Tanzania. Review of the Borehole Drilling Sector in Tanzania. Consultancy report of World Bank.

Baumann E and Erpf K. 2005. Rural Water Supply Technology Options Handpumps, Mechanised Pumps and Surface Water, RWSN/SKAT

Carter, R. 2006. Ten-step Guide Towards Cost-effective Boreholes Case study of drilling costs in Ethiopia, RWSN/WSP Field Note.

Danert, K. 2008b. Reflections from Field Visit to UNICEF Nigeria in March 2008. Unpublished report for UNICEF/RWSN.

Doyen, J. 2003. A comparative Study on Water Well Drilling Costs in Kenya. Unpublished Report. Research commissioned by UNDP- Water and Sanitation Programme of the World Bank

UN. 2005. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, United Nations.

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24

Annex 1 Nigeria

Table A1 summarises drilling related procurement by UNICEF Nigeria through Supply Division in Copenhagen from 1999 to 2007, which amounts to US$1,333,000. Notably there has been no procurement of drilling related items since 2002.

Table A1. UNICEF Nigeria Drilling Procurement via UNICEF Copenhagen (1999 - 2007)

Year Items Amount (US$)

2000 Ingersoll-Rand TH-10. All Hydraulic tophead drive drill (DTH, air foam and mud rotary drilling). Drilling tools and accessories for IR TH-10 rig; Functional Test; Fast moving spares for rig and compressor.

Two Tata trucks for mounting IR TH-10 rig.

IR VHP-825 compressor.

307,595

2001 Ingersoll-Rand TH-10 All Hydraulic tophead drive drilling rig (DTH, air foam and mud rotary drilling); Drilling tools and accessories for IR TH-10 rig; Fast moving and standard service parts for 3 years;

Two Tata trucks for mounting IR TH-10 rig; Fast moving spares for trucks for 6 months.

IR VHP-825 S/W compressor; Spare Parts for IR VHP-825 Compressor.

307,595

2001 Ingersoll-Rand TH-5 All Hydraulic tophead drive drilling rig (DTH, air foam and mud rotary drilling); Drilling tools and accessories for IR TH-5 rig; Fast moving and standard service parts for 3 years; Other tools and accessories; Functional Test.

Two Tata trucks for mounting IR TH-10 rig; Fast moving spares for trucks for 6 months.

IR VHP-600 S/W compressor; Spare Parts for IR HP 600 Compressor.

204,344

2001 Four DHH Drill Bits 1,597

2002 Drill Pipe (89mm OD) 6,723

Total 827,863

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Annex 2 Sudan

In Sudan UNICEF’s key strategies for contributing to the MDGs include rehabilitation, maintenance and construction of water and sanitation facilities (UNICEF, 2007b).

Operation Lifeline Sudan has undertaken relief activities on a regular basis in Southern Sudan since 1989. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2002 triggered the return of many IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin in Southern Sudan, thus increasing demands for improved water supplies in rural areas. The Medium Term Strategic Plan for Sudan (2002 – 2005) included programmes to deliver water, sanitation and hygiene-related services to 2 million people, representing and increase of 15%. The programme also aimed to increase access to safe water in accessible Guinea worm affected communities from 49% to 100%.

Chawla (2003) states that between 1999 and 2002 UNICEF stepped up borehole drilling in Southern Sudan through better management of drilling rigs; contracting the private sector; rehabilitating old water sources (100’s, 90% by locally trained water maintenance workers by 2000) and training community members to operate and maintain water points. She points out that drilling boreholes is incredibly expensive and that cheaper alternatives need to be created.

UNICEF (2002a) mentions ageing equipment, especially drilling rigs, and the need for strengthened local capacity, which were discussed with the National Water Corporation (NWC). NWC agreed to use “the revolving fund” for procurement of drilling rigs and local capacity building and funds were allocated for two new rigs, handpumps and vehicles. Table A2 shows that from 2004, UNICEF Sudan significantly increased expenditure on drilling equipment, spares and consumables with the purchase of three new drilling rigs in 2004, five in 2005, one in 2006 two in 2007. Note that UNICEF Southern Sudan also owned 3 x PAT 301’s and 1 x PAT 401, which were managed by Sudanese and Kenyan drilling teams.

Table A2. UNICEF Sudan Drilling Procurement via UNICEF Copenhagen (1999 - 2007)15

Year Items Amount (US$)

Total WES Resources

16

1999 Spare parts and replacements ($45,925), bentonite ($19,500), foam ($1,087) 66,512

2000 Spare parts and replacements 70,154

2001 Spare parts and replacements ($73,150), drilling foam ($2,926) 76,076

2002 Spare parts, hydraulic pump and motor ($96,593), bentonite ($12,398), foam ($5,284)

114,274

2003 Spares and replacements, hydraulic pump and motor ($119,573), bentonite, ($66,370), foam ($70,678), grease ($20,705).

277,327

2004 2 x Ingersoll Rand TH-10 Drill Rigs (each with compressor; mud pumps, 2 Tata trucks; fast moving parts for rig, compressor, mud pump, trucks; and commissioning) (2 x $360,800)

1 x Ingersoll Rand TH-10 Drill Rigs (each with compressor; mud pumps, 2 Tata trucks; fast moving parts for rig, compressor, mud pump, trucks; and commissioning) (1 x $346,504)

1 x 20 bar Compressor ($87,677)

Spare parts and replacements, hydraulic pump and motor ($194,641)

1 x borehole inspection kit ($24,750)

Grease ($34,190), Bentonite ($16,626), Polymer ($5,837)

1,447,530

2005 3 x Ingersoll Rand TH-5 Version II Drill Rigs (with compressor, spares, mud pump – but not all part of same purchase order) (3 x $370,034)

1 x Dando Watertec 5 drill rig with compressor (1 x $475,095)

1 x Dando Watertec 2 drill rig with compressor (1 x $301,507)

2,178,951

15

Source: Data extracted from UNICEF Supply Division Copenhagen SAP Database. 16

RR, OR and EOR

26

Spare parts and replacements ($308,500)

Bentonite ($1,747)

2006 Training, commissioning spares (part of Watertec Dando order in 2005) ($44,197)

1 x Dando Watertect 5 light rotary drilling rig with truck, training and commissioning ($562,462)

Spare parts, replacements and accessories ($147,200)

Bentonite ($35,025), foam ($32,511)

821,394

North Sudan 27,037,096

17

Southern Sudan:

11,413,766

2007 1 x Dando Watertect 6 light rotary drilling rig with truck, compressor

accessories and testing and commissioning ($628,613)

1 x Dando Watertect 6 light rotary drilling rig with truck, compressor, mud

pump, training and commissioning ($777,718)

Spare parts and replacements ($181,816)

Bentonite ($148,917), Foam ($59,790)

1,796,854

Total 6,833,367

Despite the fact that chemical foam and bio-degradable mud are preferred to bentonite and other non-degradable mud in water well drilling, considerable amount of bentonite are still being imported into Sudan.

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UNICEF (2006b)