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INTRODUCTION On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Yolanda swept across the central region of the Philippines, killing thousands and displacing over 4 million more. Almost 30,000 houses were destroyed1 in Tacloban alone, which was devastated by a 6m high storm surge.

In 2014, the city government decided to resettle the most ‘at risk’ coastal areas to Tacloban North, a new development located c. 15km to the north of the existing city centre. Tacloban North will eventually incorporate housing, city and state institutions, parks, and commercial, industrial and agricultural zones. To date, little has been completed beyond a mixture of transitional and permanent housing. As of September this year, a total of 839 permanent houses had been built, out of a target of 14,6312.

Learning from Tacloban was a 3-day workshop bringing together experts from local and national government, IOs, NGOs and the private sector to reflect on the reconstruction process to date. Participants include those with first-hand experience of reconstruction here in Tacloban and development practitioners from around the globe. The first day was spent visiting five communities in Tacloban, each at different stages in the resettlement process or following different strategies: an inner-city informal settlement facing relocation, the bunkhouses (high density inner-city transitional housing), transitional shelters and permanent housing within the relocation area, and finally a self-built resettlement village.

The following two days featured presentations and discussions on the reconstruction of Tacloban and the Tacloban North resettlement project in particular. The discussion sessions focused on the following key themes: • The relocation strategy; • The need for an integrated resettlement action plan taking into account livelihoods, infrastructure and services as well as housing; • Permanent housing design and strategies; • The importance of community engagement and the value of taking an incremental and adaptable approach to housing and development; • The on-going effect of trauma and the importance of maintaining community cohesion; • The role of the private sector in post-disaster reconstruction.

If there is one key lesson that can be learnt from this workshop, it is the importance of not compromising the long-term development by rushing into far-reaching decisions during the relief phase. Many of the problems identified during the site visits, from the squalor of the bunkhouses to the lack of an integrated relocation plan, stem directly from a lack of foresight and coordination. Further to this it was emphasised that relief should work towards long-term development goals. It is a sobering fact that such calamities will occur with increasing frequency in the years ahead. This workshop embodied the inter-disciplinary approach that is essential to meet the many and complex challenges of post-disaster reconstruction. Our hope is that by drawing lessons from Tacloban, we can be part of improving future efforts to mitigate and recover from natural disasters. Alongside this report, we will publish a document suggesting possible research activities to address just some of the many remaining questions. In this way, we hope to keep learning from Tacloban over the next 5-10 years. In order to do this, we have set up a webpage – www.learningfromtacloban.org – which will act as a common forum for the participants to share information with each other and to keep the conversation moving forward.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!“Planning for Recovery and Resettlement in Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan” – M. Kammerbauer and D. Mateo-Babiano, 2 http://tacloban.gov.ph/shelter/

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TIMELINE

!3 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/typhoon-haiyan-survivors-tacloban-philippines 4 http://www.mb.com.ph/6-months-after-yolanda-52000-tacloban-families-still-living-in-tents/ 5 Shelter Cluster minutes 03 June 2014 https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/140603%20Tacloban%20City%20Shelter%20Cluster%20Minutes.pdf 6 http://politics.com.ph/a-year-after-yolanda-tacloban-families-still-live-in-tents/ 7 http://rp1.abs-cbnnews.com/video/nation/regions/11/05/14/why-families-still-live-tents-tacloban 8 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/691910/survivors-in-tacloban-tents-to-be-moved 9 Tacloban City Housing Updates as of 18 September. http://tacloban.gov.ph/shelter/

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map

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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS 7 MAJOR THEMES EMERGED DURING DISCUSSIONS:

RESETTLEMENT & TACLOBAN NORTH LIVELIHOODS COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PERMANENT HOUSING DESIGN & STRATEGIES COMMUNITY COHESION TRAUMA THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

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RESETTLEMENT AND TACLOBAN NORTH

The site visits made clear that there is a long way to go before Tacloban North becomes anything more than a number of isolated housing developments. The following day, Mariya Lagman from the City Housing and Development Office, presented the masterplan for Tacloban North and the progress to date. Representatives from the City Livelihoods cluster presented the city government’s plans for providing employment in the area. From the visits and the presentations, it was clear that two main problems facing Tacloban North right now are lack of water and lack of livelihoods. However, further issues will emerge once these are resolved; for example, sanitation or community cohesion. These issues highlighted the need for an integrated resettlement action plan. At the moment there is an impression that problems are being addressed one by one as and when they arrive. In short, there is a lack of foresight. For example, the lack of water in Tacloban North was known even before Yolanda but only now, two years into the relocation process, is it being actively addressed. This has an immediate knock on effect in that businesses will not move to Tacloban North until there is available water. The key reason cited by City Hall to explain this lack of integration was the difficulty of coordinating the various actors, especially between the city and national government agencies, during the immediate post-Yolanda rush. Our visit to Anibong, a community that has rebuilt itself with little or no external support and which in many ways seems to have better prospects than the other communities we visited (see Site Visits), shows the value of waiting for a good solution over rushing into a bad one. Providing transitional housing in situ, as eventually happened in San Jose in late 2014, would be preferable to relocating people to areas with no infrastructure, services or livelihood opportunities. This may not be possible if the site itself presents an imminent hazard. However, this can be mitigated with proper disaster planning, as was shown by the successful evacuation of at risk areas of Tacloban before Typhoon Hagupit/Ruby in December 2014.

The importance of not rushing and of having an integrated strategy is easy to say now, two years on, but whose role should it have been to apply the brakes in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda? In June 201410 , the Shelter Cluster pressed the City Government on the decision to relocate and the need to integrate housing with water supply, sanitation, transportation and livelihoods, etc. The City provided assurances that this was in hand, though with hindsight this was clearly not the case. Could the IOs and NGOs have demanded more evidence of this integrated strategy as a prerequisite to moving beyond immediate relief and working towards the relocation? The masterplan was developed largely around the land already owned by the City Government and the National Housing Authority. This has led to it being somewhat fragmented and there were questions as to whether the plan makes best use of assets such as the new University of the Philippines campus. Another aspect of the masterplan that was questioned was the extent to which the residential zones were residential only: no space has been left for livelihoods within the permanent housing developments. This is despite the widespread tendency in Tacloban for people to combine their business and their home. This is discussed in more detail in Livelihoods and Housing Design and Strategies.

______________ 10 Shelter Cluster minutes 03 June 2014 https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/140603%20Tacloban%20City%20Shelter%20Cluster%20Minutes.pdf

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Prior to livelihoods and water, the main problem facing the construction of Tacloban North was lack of suitable land to build on as the City was unable to expropriate land. As well as delaying the construction of Tacloban North, this has affected the design of the masterplan and complicated the provision of services and infrastructure. This led to the question of whether legislation should be more flexible in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster, for example to facilitate the expropriation of land. However, there are risks to this approach; for example, a relaxation of urban planning requirements could lead to people being housed in permanent bunkhouse-style slums. Finally, there was very little understanding of what the plan is for the areas where people are being relocated from, in particular San Jose and Anibong. This is an important question for the city as a whole, in particular for businesses, who need to be able to make long-term plans. It is also a crucial issue for people who are being forced to relocate, as it affects trust. ! Conclusions and Recommendations: Infrastructure, services and livelihoods must be integrated into the resettlement strategy; they cannot be treated as secondary to housing. It is frequently stated that relocation is a last resort. To this we would add that there should be no relocation without an integrated strategy for infrastructure & livelihoods; providing transitional housing in situ is preferable to relocating people to areas with no infrastructure, services or livelihood opportunities. The relief phase should work towards long-term development goals. Key to achieving this is not to allow the pressure of the relief phase to compromise far-reaching development decisions. The ill-conceived 'far-reaching' development decision by NHA and the City Government to relocate San Jose residents to Tacloban North, a proposal in place prior to Yolanda, and its rushed implementation have compromised the relief efforts in the aftermath of Yolanda. We recommend that more development professionals be employed during the relief phase to provide a long-term focus. This could perhaps be promoted by instituting it within the Cluster system. The development of Tacloban North is still in its very early stages, yet much has changed since the masterplan was drawn. We would encourage the Tacloban City Government to take this opportunity to revisit the masterplan, perhaps commissioning an expert review. When the Tacloban North masterplan was presented and being discussed we heard very little mention of the private sector. We would further encourage the City Government to actively involve the private sector in this review. The City Government’s plans for the areas vacated by relocation should be published more widely, and people and businesses should be invited to contribute to this discussion.

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LIVELIHOODS

Together with the absence of water, the lack of livelihoods is the key issue facing Tacloban North. The two are clearly connected, in that businesses cannot be expected to move to Tacloban North until there is water. They are also connected in that they are both products of a lack of an integrated resettlement action plan.

At the workshop, the City presented two very different approaches to tackling the livelihoods problem. The first is a 12ha zone in Tacloban North set aside for agriculture and agri-tourism. While there is much to recommend in this plan, we note that there was little mention of the private sector in either the presentation or the strategy document.

The second approach was direct employment of displaced people by City Hall in ‘revenue raising’ roles (e.g. traffic enforcement). Many of the participants questioned the long term sustainability of this approach and asked whether the jobs offered include training and/or accreditation, so that if they do prove to be short term, people will at least be better placed to find further employment. It is perhaps worth noting that this policy is being implemented in the run up to the mayoral and national elections

Alongside these schemes, various NGOs, City Hall and state agencies are running training programmes. One participant described an interesting initiative that they had previously been involved with at GOAL, in which they helped skilled construction workers to negotiate and manage construction contracts. In doing so, they aimed to help people either to expand their businesses or to transition from employee to employer. There was concern among the attendees that the permanent housing does not provide the space or the flexibility for households to run businesses from home. The site visits made clear how important this is for lower income families in Tacloban, who cannot necessarily count on regular employment and who don’t have access to other facilities. These businesses are often informal affairs without business permits, however, so the City Government may be keen to discourage this.!

Lack of livelihoods is not just an issue in Tacloban North however. This was especially the case at the bunkhouses. Here the key issues were the upheaval of displacement, lack of space for livelihoods within the home, limited access to electricity and, above all, lack of capital.

Conclusions and Recommendations: We would recommend that the City Government review the livelihoods strategy with local businesses, especially within the tourism industry given the reliance on agri-tourism, and their representative bodies such as the Leyte Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Any direct employment should include training and/or accreditation so that, if these schemes do prove to be short term, people will at least be better placed to find further employment. We would like to see more organisations following the example set by the Red Cross in providing training and support for people to set up and run their own businesses. There should be more space and flexibility in the permanent housing for livelihoods. Lack of capital is also a major problem. Making it easier for people to get access to capital might enable them to take more control of their lives, rather than waiting for training or jobs to be provided.

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permanent housing design and strategies

During the site visits, we saw a wide range of housing types, from self-built informal housing made from salvaged materials to timber transitional houses to reinforced concrete and masonry permanent houses. We also saw a number of more experimental options, such as the Butterfly House that can be folded up and packed away in the event of a typhoon (see Site Visits: Brigham Estate). It was clear from the site visits that the bunkhouses are inadequate: too small and too poorly made, with no community space and with toilets that were broken and kitchens located too far away to be useful. The explanation for this was that there was not enough coordination and oversight during the immediate post-Yolanda rush leading to the Department of Public works and Highways (DPWH), the contractor, making changes to the agreed designs. DPWH admit that modifications were made to the specification due to limited resources, but claim that they were not made aware of the DSWD requirement to meet international humanitarian standards11. These faults may have been acceptable if the bunkhouses had only been occupied for six months as planned, but not two years on from Yolanda. Of the transitional housing sites we visited, Cali was clearly the most successful. All of the attendees commented on how beautiful and clean this site was compared to the bunkhouses and what care the community appeared to take in maintaining it. The site was much more spacious than both the bunkhouses and the transitional housing later seen at New Kawayan, with occasional plots left vacant to provide informal community spaces.! Beyond the site visits, the discussion focused mainly on the concrete and masonry permanent houses. A number of concerns were raised: that they are expensive and inflexible, with limited scope for expansion or adaptation; that they do not provide space for livelihoods; that they give a false impression of safety so that people may not evacuate during future typhoons; and that they don’t reflect the traditional housing designs in the area or the way that the beneficiaries live.

Many of these issues stem from a lack of community consultation or involvement. At most, the communities are presented with a choice of which housing project to move to, as at Cali, though this was not universal. We spoke to one family in Anibong who, despite the unsafe location and the trauma from Yolanda and their lack of tenure, preferred to stay on the coast because the permanent houses on offer were too small for them and could not accommodate their turo-turo ‘café’ (i.e. their livelihood). Mariya Lagman from the City Housing and Development Office stated that they wanted to prevent the permanent housing developments from looking like a slum. However, other participants suggested that it is exactly this absence of space for livelihoods which is most likely to lead to them becoming slums.

_____________________ 11 http://www.interaksyon.com/article/80251/dpwh-chief-admits-deviations-in-construction-method-materials-used-for-yolanda-bunkhouses

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Another factor in the design of the permanent houses is the difficulty in getting permits and the new, post-Yolanda wind load requirements. However, this is based on a very rigid understanding of what is a permanent house. The majority of houses for lower income families in Leyte and Samar are either timber or a combination of a concrete core with timber extensions. This begs the question: Why are these types of houses not being built in Tacloban North? Both would be cheaper than the permanent houses being built and would provide much greater flexibility, making it more likely that the house will meet the beneficiaries’ needs. There is also a risk that the concrete and masonry houses will give people a false impression of safety, such that people may choose not to evacuate during future typhoons. Aaron Budd from SvN and Jaya Kananke from Sevanatha both presented incremental housing schemes, in which the beneficiaries are provided with a basic core house. Families can extend or adapt this according to their needs, while the core provides structural robustness against typhoons and earthquakes. IOM presented an alternative, the timber house, based on the design of the Transitional Shelters we saw at Cali but with a larger footprint and a stronger, more durable structural frame12 and, if possible, fully serviced. As well as being easily extended or adapted by the community, these options are often cheaper.!.

Conclusions and Recommendations: There was consensus among the attendees that there should be less experimentation in housing design, fewer ‘out there’ wacky solutions, such as the Butterfly House. Post-disaster communities shouldn’t be treated as guinea pigs for new gimmicks that are not rooted in what the community wants or connected to how they live their lives. The bunkhouses are too small and too densely packed. This is due to a lack of coordination and oversight caused by the rush of the relief phase, and their continued use well beyond their intended design life. In hindsight, the design and construction brief should have taken into consideration a potential duration of stay of 2–3 years. Families need to be able to adapt their housing to meet their needs. This could be achieved by pursuing incremental housing strategies with families given a choice of plot size. Perhaps more important than the house design, though, is the site plan and giving the community and even individual families a say on issues such as plot size and location, site density and provision of social infrastructure. However, care needs to be taken over this consultation. It is true that, if simply asked “what do you need/want” type questions, people will generally choose concrete and masonry houses without thought to what effect this might have on the project as a whole. For the consultation to be meaningful, people should be engaged in balancing the key criteria, such as cost per unit and plot size against the total budget and available land.

_________ 12 Transitional Shelter: A 4.2m x 6.1m footprint with six 4”x4" cocolumber posts Timber House: A 5.3m x 7.3m footprint with twelve 5"x5"high-grade cocolumber posts

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COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

The importance of genuine community engagement came up at every stage during the workshop. The site visits emphasised the need to understand people and communities. Many of the problems that we saw can be traced back, at least in part, to a lack of community engagement. For example, the negativity we met at the New Kawayan Transitional Houses clearly derived from a sense, perhaps unjustified, among the community that they were neither in control of their own lives and nor were they being listened to by the city government. Roger Cabiles from KALAHI CIDSS, Jaya Kananke from Sevanatha, and Aaron Budd from SvN all presented different models of working directly with communities, what the benefits are, and the difficulties they have experienced. Roger emphasised that the basis of community engagement is that the community knows best what they need. Our job, whether we are working in local or state or non-governmental agencies, is to help them articulate this and to encourage them to take responsibility. Beyond targeting aid at actual needs, one benefit of empowering the community in this way is they are encouraged to ask questions and demand more of authority, leading to greater transparency.

Jaya showed what can be achieved when communities take the lead, from being responsible for finding and buying the land for a post-disaster resettlement project themselves to developing their own slum upgrading scheme incorporating space for a river embankment demanded by the city authorities.

Large developers can be sceptical of this ‘bottom up’ approach and may question whether it is feasible for somewhere like Tacloban North where thousands of homes are being built in minimal time, where any delay will keep families in bunkhouses, T-shelters or in ‘at risk’ slums for longer. Roger was honest about the difficulties that KALAHI CIDSS has had with project delays and mentioned that the engineers can view the extended community engagement as an unwelcome distraction. In short, is community choice and input to the design and decision making process a luxury that can only be afforded in small NGO-run projects with generous timescales? A look at the National Housing Authority (NHA) and Habitat for Humanity housing developments in Tacloban North might imply that these organisations at least believe this to be the case.

Aaron, who has worked on large relocation projects with private sector clients and tight timeframes, albeit driven by commercial, not humanitarian, considerations, countered this opinion. By building a structured framework for community engagement, SvN are able to transfer decision making responsibility to the beneficiaries without risking delays or cost increases. In one example, each family was assigned a total household budget and invited to create the package of plot size, house type (from ‘core’ to complete) and services that best met their needs. Key to this system is the incremental, adaptable approach also stressed by Jaya.

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Finally, Mikel Larraza from Catholic Relief Services (CRS) presented their plans for working in Anibong. CRS carried out extensive consultation with the community in Anibong on whether to relocate and to where, with the community making the final choice. The project is still in its early stages but CRS intend to empower the community to take a leading role in the project. We look forward to hearing more from CRS on this project over the next few years and hope that they will be able to benefit from the Learning from Tacloban network.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Genuine community engagement is crucial. The community knows best what they need and should be empowered to take control of their own lives. Key to this is connecting communities to local government, balancing the needs of both, and taking an incremental, adaptable approach. The speed of project delivery is important; moving too fast can mean communities feel excluded or railroaded into approving decisions, while delays or slow progress can cause them to lose faith in the project. The ‘bottom up’ approach espoused by Jaya of empowering a community and connecting them to local government is very relevant to the lower income areas of Tacloban that are not being resettled, such as Sagkahan. Models such as that espoused by Aaron, whereby households are allowed to create a package that suits them best from a matrix of options, might be suitable for the permanent housing developments. We would encourage organisations such as the NHA and Habitat for Humanity to trial this approach.

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COMMUNITY COHESION In his presentation on community engagement and his professional experiences in Sri Lanka, including working on the reconstruction following the 2004 tsunami, Jaya Kananke from Sevanatha stated that a community has five livelihood assets:

• Natural: The land and physical environment • Physical: Infrastructure, services and other man-made entities • Human: Skills, knowledge, etc. • Financial: Savings and other liquid assets • Social: The community structure and networks. These take time to build up and are the

means by which communities become more than the sum of their parts.

In any resettlement project, the Natural and Physical resources of a community will necessarily change, while the Human and Financial assets need not be affected. However there is a risk that, in moving a community, the Social assets of that community will be lost or damaged. This risk is greatly increased when communities are moved twice or fragmented. The families at the bunkhouses and New Kawayan were clearly the least happy of all that we met on Day 1. Much of this can be explained by other factors, such as the physical condition and lack of space at the bunkhouses and the lack of jobs in New Kawayan, but part of it must also be ascribed to the social upheaval these communities have experienced. The bunkhouses in particular showed the negative effects of damaging the social fabric in this way, with drug and safety problems being cited as a problem here. We were told by City Hall that the intention with the bunkhouses had been to keep communities together but that this proved too difficult in the post-Yolanda rush. At New Kawayan, the allocation of permanent housing (including, crucially, the timing of when people move) was done by raffle. This is done to avoid conflict and in this regard it is a reasonable measure, but we wonder whether the communities might be trusted to organise the process themselves.

At Cali, families have been allowed to choose between four permanent housing sites nearby. As well as allowing them to weigh up the relative merits of the different sites themselves (e.g. house design and site planning, the proximity to the city centre, etc.), this will allow them to move in groups, keeping their family and other social networks intact.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Avoid moving families twice. If relocation and transitional housing are necessary then the transitional housing should be either built in situ or as close as possible to the permanent housing, provided that the physical and social infrastructure is either in place or on its way (c.f. the lack of jobs and absence of water in Tacloban North). Equally as important is to avoid mixing or breaking up communities. People should be given a greater say in the relocation process. For example, giving families the choice of which permanent housing development to move to, as at Cali, enables them to better maintain their family and social networks.

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TRAUMA Typhoon Yolanda was the strongest storm ever to make landfall. As well as being battered by 300kph winds, the coastal areas of Tacloban were obliterated by a 5-6m high storm surge. Something which the site visits made very clear was the extent to which trauma from Yolanda is still active. Families in Anibong spoke of how their children cry whenever there are strong winds or heavy rain, neither of which is uncommon in the Philippines. As well as being an important consideration in itself - and there is clearly a need for extensive counselling - this has a strong influence on the willingness of people to relocate. The Learning from Tacloban workshop took place just after the 2nd anniversary of Yolanda. Mariya Lagman from City Hall stated that before the anniversary, people were reluctant to move to Tacloban North because of the lack of livelihoods and infrastructure but the anniversary changed this. This raises an interesting counterpoint to the argument made elsewhere in this document that things should have been less rushed, that people can wait and it is better to do things slowly and well than quickly and badly. Alternatively, what can be done to mitigate or reduce trauma if people do stay in situ? Anibong is a slum and the conditions are unhygienic and hazardous, but having seen the ability of the community there to rebuild with minimal assistance, perhaps in the future money could be diverted from off-site transitional housing to shelter kits or in situ transitional housing, plus improved sanitation and counselling. The effect of this trauma was also manifest at the micro level, sometimes in surprising ways. For instance, part of what the Cali residents liked about the traditional ‘nipa hut’ design of their T-shelters was that the thatch roof, unlike corrugated tin, did not make a lot of noise when it rained.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Trauma from Typhoon Yolanda is still very active and there is a clear need for counselling. Perhaps the best way for people to overcome the trauma of a disaster like Yolanda is by building back their lives. We can facilitate this by allowing families to take an active role in the reconstruction process, helping them to take control of their future. The micro-level manifestations of trauma are impossible to predict. This underlines the benefit of engaging the community in the decision making process, even down to design level, as they know their situation better than anyone.

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THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR The 2014 conference on Humanitarian Response to Urban Crises, organised by the UK Department for International Development (DfID), emphasised that the post-crisis response requires a depth and breadth of technical and specialist expertise that simply cannot be covered by those on the ground. The private sector has this capacity and has the desire to contribute, but there is a disconnect between the private and humanitarian sectors that has meant this potential is not tapped. This was illustrated clearly when no-one around the table was able to provide an example of the private sector providing significant technical support in the reconstruction on Tacloban (excluding contractors). That the private sector wants to help is shown by the important contribution of logistic companies to the immediate relief effort and clean up13. Jeremy Foster of Ramboll UK put forward the following reasons for why it can be difficult to harness the potential of the private sector in the immediate post-disaster phase: a lack of coordination; an inability on the part of IOs and NGOs to accurately define the problem or to produce clear terms of reference, without which private sector firms cannot deploy; commercial considerations and the ability for firms to take staff, especially more senior staff, off commercial projects.

In the UK engineering sector, Ramboll, ARUP, CHMM and Elliot Wood, together with RedR and supported by DfID and Lloyds of London, have drafted the Ready to Respond framework to tackle these problems. Part of this is the establishment of a hub of private sector firms that will engage directly with the major humanitarian sector players (e.g. DfID, RedR, DEC, etc.). Key to this will be having an established contractual framework in place between the two groups so that contractual and liability issues will not prevent the rapid deployment of technical staff to where they are needed. Jeremy proposed that rather than trying to determine themselves what technical support is needed, the NGOs should define the problem and allow the private sector to determine what skills are required. At present, there are no systems in place to facilitate this. An alternative ‘crowd sourcing’ mechanism for tapping the potential of the private sector was mentioned, whereby photographs of damaged buildings are uploaded online and professionals from all over the world can contribute their opinion. However, it is not clear how the issue of liability is resolved in this model. Stephanie Gilles, founder of the Emergency Architects chapter of the United Architects of the Philippines, spoke about the work they are doing in a range of areas, from field assessments to design review support for foreign agencies to preparedness and resiliency workshops. Stephanie stressed that sustainable disaster resilient design should be the new standard and the importance of instituting this within the architectural and engineering education.

Conclusions and Recommendations: The private sector is a huge potential resource for post-disaster relief and reconstruction and it is willing to contribute more. However, the contractual frameworks and working relationships need to be in place before the disaster if this resource is to be tapped. It is easy to understand the difficulty of involving the private sector during the rush of the relief phase if the structures for doing so are not in place beforehand. Tacloban has now moved beyond this phase and private sector is being more widely employed, for example as contractors or on a technical design level. However, as mentioned above, we would suggest involving the private sector more in the strategy and development of Tacloban North, particularly with regards to livelihoods.

_________________________ 13 See for example: http://www.interaksyon.com/business/74980/aid-aplenty-but-how-to-move-the-goods-cargo-movers-offer-to-ship-relief-to-yolanda-victims www.portcalls.com/ictsi-takes-over-tacloban-port-operations

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions:

• Infrastructure, services and livelihoods must be integrated into the resettlement strategy;

they cannot be treated as secondary to housing. There should be no relocation without an integrated resettlement action plan;

• The relief phase should work towards long term development goals. Key to achieving this is not to allow the pressure of the relief phase to compromise far-reaching development decisions;

• Transitional housing should be located either where the community is from, or where they are being permanently resettled. The bunkhouses show the damage that can be caused by breaking up communities and housing people somewhere that is neither long-term nor familiar. If there is no integrated strategy for delivering infrastructure, livelihoods and services alongside the housing in the relocation zone then the transitional housing should be in the community’s original location provided that this location doesn’t present an imminent hazard in itself;

• Genuine community engagement is crucial. The community knows best what they need and should be empowered to take control of their own lives;

• Innovative/experimental housing ‘solutions’ should not be imposed on communities from outside;

• There is the potential for the private sector to contribute much more to post-disaster relief and reconstruction but the structures and partnerships needed to achieve this must be in place before the disaster.

Recommendations for organisations still working in Tacloban:

• For the City Government to revisit the Tacloban North masterplan, perhaps commissioning

an external review. This would include reviewing the livelihoods strategy with representatives from the private sector;

• To reconsider the design of the permanent housing, in particular providing more choice as to plot size, location, house design, etc., as well as more flexibility for people to expand or adapt their house;

• To pursue more incremental housing options, in which the beneficiaries are provided with a basic core house which they can then extend or adapt to their needs, or timber houses in place of the concrete and masonry permanent housing currently being built;

• To engage the communities in the planning and design of the permanent housing sites they are relocating to;

• To provide more livelihood schemes based on market analysis in which people are given training and support in setting up and running their own businesses;

• To make it easier for people to access capital for starting or expanding businesses. Lack of capital was cited as the primary barrier to developing a business by people at the bunkhouses;

• To provide trauma counselling to people living in the ‘at risk’ coastal areas; • For the City Government, in consultation with the community, the Department of Public

Works and Highways, Catholic Relief Services and other organisations working in the area to develop a clear strategy for what happens to Anibong once families start relocating and when/if the coastal embankment is built;

• For the City Government to publish their plans for the other areas vacated by relocation, and for the city as a whole, and to invite local people, businesses and organisations to take part in this discussion.

________________ 14 Extrapolated from the group discussions by the organisers. The views espoused here do not necessarily represent the views of all attendees or of their organisations.

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SITE VISITS

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Located just to the north of the City Harbour and Market area, Anibong is sandwiched between a small mountain ridge and the sea, straddling the main road. This means that it is at risk both from landslides and tsunamis / storm surges. Anibong was totally devastated by the Yolanda storm surge with just a handful of buildings surviving. For these reasons, Anibong has been designated a ‘no build zone’ and the residents are scheduled for relocation. Despite this, Anibong - a lower priority area than San Jose, which bore the brunt of the storm surge - had substantially rebuilt without outside assistance within six months of Yolanda. The pressure to relocate is set to increase however as the Department of Public Works and Highways plans to build a 4m embankment straight through the community. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) have been working in Anibong since 2014, including providing cash grants directly to families to help them relocate. This support has now ended and they are in the early stages of implementing a community-led relocation project, which hopes to move up to 1000 families to a new site in a safe location, several kilometres to the north of Anibong.

Notable observations:

• Very poor sanitation, with children swimming and fishing in the sea around drop toilets.

• Waste management is an issue in the area and garbage is burned on site daily. However, CRS implemented several collection points in the whole district.

• We met one family who took the CRS grant but did not relocate. Instead, they were able to use the CRS cash grant to make an agreement with a host family in a safe area, whereby they would evacuate to that family’s house in the event of a typhoon. They spent the rest of the money on expanding their own house.

• The same family, who own a sari-sari store and turo-turo café and who lived in a large two-storey timber house, said that they were reluctant to move to Tacloban North as they had heard that the houses were very small. They also cited livelihoods as a reason why they were reluctant to relocate.

• Another family successfully relocated from Anibong with help from CRS but return each day as their kids still attend school there

• We met two families who had tried to avail of the CRS cash grant but were unable to find available plots/houses

• Many families were keen to relocate, citing safety and trauma from Yolanda, with children crying every time there is heavy rain or strong winds.

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The National Housing Authority Bunkhouses are located on the Tacloban ‘bypass’ close to both downtown Tacloban and Palo. The original residents came from the nearby Astrodome (Brgy 61) and San Jose areas. They are expected to move to Tacloban North, a 30-45 minute drive away. There are 17 blocks. Each block consists of either 12 or 24 houses, depending on the size of the household. The smaller units have a plan area of approximately 15m2 and accommodate a family of up to five members. These 17 buildings house families drawn from 23 different barangays. The households within one building are represented by a Building Leader. The site visit began with Jose Dabuet Jr. from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), giving a brief background of the bunkhouses. 14 of the 17 building leaders, their IDP leader, and their designated adviser from City Housing were also present. A short Q&A session followed before the participants split into groups and were given tours by the building leaders.

Notable observations:

• Residents said finding work was their key concern, with lack of capital being the main issue. For instance, one of the building leaders had previously made and sold “Filipino delicacies” but now could not afford the equipment to restart. The limited access to electricity at the bunkhouses was also a major factor, preventing people from using refrigerators, power tools, etc.

• Residents complained that their houses were too small (each building was divided into twice as many houses as originally planned) and too hot, with no insulation below the CGI roof and no cross ventilation.

• Cooking counters had been provided behind the final block but were not used as they were “too far away”. Instead, people made small fires on their doorsteps. This is clearly a fire risk, though there had been no fire outbreaks yet. The IOM delegates explained that the buildings should have been more widely separated, with cooking and wash counters between each row.

• Conversely, residents complained that the toilets were too close to the buildings. • IOM explained that the primary reason for these design errors or changes was due to

poor coordination in the very early, rushed phase of emergency rebuilding. • Many of the toilets couldn’t be used as they were full. These were previously emptied by the

NGOs but City Hall is now responsible. Furthermore, many of the lamps had failed and had not been replaced, making the toilets unsafe to use.!

• Many households had made small extensions to their house. These were previously not allowed but happened after the Camp Manager left.

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Cali Transitional Housing is located in Cabalawan, just to the North of the San Juanico Bridge turn-off but south of the main Tacloban North development. There are 117 households at Cali, all of whom used to live in Barangay 88, San Jose. They transferred to Cali in December 2014 and are due to transfer to the neighbouring permanent housing in early 2016. Participants were welcomed by the community of Cali with a boodle-fight lunch. This was suggested by the IDP leader herself, as a way to underline the camaraderie and sincerity of sharing food with others and eating with one’s bare hands. The set-up (rows of tables with different food mixed and served on top of a banana leaf) provided a relaxed opportunity for the participants to interact with the women and children of Cali. There was a noticeable absence of men in Cali as they were at work. After the feast, five mothers volunteered to guide the participants in groups and around the site. Notable observations:

• All of the attendees commented on how beautiful and clean this site was

compared to the bunkhouses and what care the community appeared to take in maintaining it. For example every house was decorated with flowers and many had flourishing vegetable patches alongside. Every Friday the community clear out the drainage channels.

• The site was more spacious than both the bunkhouses and the transitional housing later seen at New Kawayan. The attendees from IOM explained that they had left vacant lots to provide informal community spaces.

• Attendees and residents alike complimented the ‘native style’ timber housing. • Residents were not consulted in the design of their permanent housing but were

given a choice between four nearby sites. • Availability of water was mentioned as a major problem.

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10 minutes’ drive north of the San Juanico Bridge turn off, New Kawayan is the site of the Eastern Visayas Regional Growth Center and can be considered to be the centre of Tacloban North. This location was chosen as the new city centre as the City already owned land here and had a pre-existing vision for the area. There are 254 transitional households at New Kawayan split between four sites. All of these households are originally from Barangay 88. This was the only site where we saw significant negativity from the community. When we arrived a group of approximately 20 women were waiting to address their grievances to us. These included:

• A lack of jobs, especially for women (there were so few men present as many of the men are employed on construction sites in the area).

• They complained about both a lack of training and economic opportunity. The mothers joked that with no jobs and no electricity at night all they could do was “make babies, make babies!”

• The attendee from DSWD contradicted this, saying the DSWD, City Hall and IEDA Relief had provided livelihood trainings.

• The community were doubtful that things would improve when they move into the permanent homes. Rather, there situation would be “just the same.”

• Communication with City Hall was clearly an issue. Their IDP leader would make representations to City Hall but they claimed that they saw no action / got no response. Asked when they would be moving to the permanent housing (some families from the adjacent T-shelter site had moved just the week before) they said that there was no schedule.

• The final source of complaint was lack of water, as at Cali.

Villa Diana is a permanent housing development being built alongside the transitional housing. As of 18 September, 120 of the 409 planned homes had been completed!15, each costing around PhP 290,000 16 (approx. $6,100). It is separated from the transitional houses by a muddy field with a small creek running through the centre, which the community cross via a wooden plank. Two mothers from the transitional houses asked to come along. This would be the first time that they would be seeing the houses they are waiting to move into. In sharp contrast to the transitional houses next door, the atmosphere at Villa Diana was very positive, with lots of children playing in the streets and the mothers happy to show off their new homes. However, very few families had moved in so the site was mostly empty. The experience of the transitional shelters, where the people who met us with a list of complaints were the same ones who were originally very happy with their transitional houses when they moved from relief tents just over a year ago, suggests that this joy may be short lived.

_________________ 15 http://tacloban.gov.ph/shelter/ 16 http://www.haiyan.tacloban.gov.ph/module/details.php?categ=192! !

VILLA DIANA PERMANENT HOUSES

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Returning to Tacloban, we made a brief stop at Brigham Estate. We hadn’t arranged to meet the community here so this was purely a ‘visual’ site visit. Many of the different housing typologies being used in the rebuilding of Tacloban are present here, with the obvious exception of row houses which are not possible here as there is little or no coordination between lots. This gives Brigham the appearance of an architectural playground, with there even being a prefabrication yard for solid concrete houses. Minimal effort appeared to have been made at either forming a community, site planning, or provision of basic infrastructure. One typology that attracted particular consternation among the participants was the butterfly house, which is designed to be folded up in the event of a typhoon. Attendees queried what residents were supposed to do with their belongings in this event and what scope there was for personalisation and adaptation. The owner of one butterfly house even said that, as they had withstood Typhoon Ruby, there would be no need to pack up the house for another Yolanda, which undermines its basic premise. Participants commented on the lack of coordination across the site. The estate managers appear to have done very little beyond providing the site plan and have allowed many of the houses to completely fill their site, with roofs over-sailing adjacent lots.

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!Attendees ! Mariya Lagman & Ted Jopson, Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office Aileen Quimbo, Tacloban City Livelihoods Cluster

The Tacloban North master plan is the product of a collaborative effort by various City Departments working under the direction of the Tacloban North Cluster. The Cluster is led by the City Housing and Community Development Office (CHCDO) and includes representatives from the following Departments: - City Mayor's Office - City Architects Office - City Engineers Office - City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office - City Environment and Natural Resources Office - City General Services Office - City Planning and Development Office - Department of Education - Livelihood Cluster - City Social Welfare Visit!www.tacloban.gov.ph!!

Jose Dabuet Jr., DSWD

The Department of Social Welfare and Development is the ’primary agency’ of the Philippine Government responsible for the protection of the social welfare rights of Filipinos and to promote social development. They are mandated to develop, implement, and coordinate social protection and poverty-reduction solutions for and with the poor, vulnerable, and disadvantaged.

Visit www.dswd.gov.ph

K. A. Jayaratne, SEVANATHA

Sevanatha was established in the year of 1989 as a local NGO in Colombo Sri Lanka. It was founded by a group of grassroots human settlement activists, led by Mr. K. A. Jayaratne, Urban Planner, to assist urban poor communicates to improve their shelter and livelihoods. Since 1989 SEVANATHA has been engaged in operational activities in Colombo and a number of other major cities in Sri Lanka. Considering the sustainability of ongoing projects of SEVANATHA, it has created two Private limited Companies: the Community Livelihood Action Facility Network, managing the community housing support program, and Micro Enrich Compost (Pvt.) Ltd., managing the Urban Solid Waste Management projects handled by SEVANATHA.

Visit www.sevanatha.org.lk

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Mikel Larraza, CRS

Since 1945, Catholic Relief Services has been supporting the Philippines and providing Filipino communities long-term development aid through its various programs ranging from emergency response and recovery to disaster preparedness, agro-enterprise and peacebuilding. CRS’s post-Haiyan response is, to date, the largest example of CRS’s emergency response and recovery efforts. Within three months of the typhoon, CRS, in collaboration with Caritas, was able to provide 40,000 families or 200,000 people with emergency shelter, clean water and sanitation.

Visit www.crs.org

Megan Genat, Rechel Domasig & Glenn Evangelista, IOM

Established in 1951, the International Organization for Migration is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field of migration and works closely with governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental partners. With 157 member states, a further 10 states holding observer status and offices in over 100 countries, IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all. It does so by providing services and advice to both governments and migrants.

IOM had staff on the ground within 48 hours of Typhoon Haiyan making landfall. In the days and months that followed, the agency took a lead in tracking displacement, building up a reliable and real-time picture of the most urgent challenges, and responding to the most acute shelter, protection and health-related needs.

Visit www.iom.int

Aaron Budd, SvN

SvN is a team of architects, planners, community developers and urban designers immersed in the practical art and science of building resilient communities. They engage with the dynamic social, economic and environmental forces that define and govern the places where we work.

This involves studying local histories, anticipating emerging economies, identifying social and environmental risks and opportunities, and planning and designing in response to rapid growth and change. They work in partnership with public and private clients and stakeholders to create visionary ideas, and find ways to render them viable.

Over the past forty years, the team has helped to shape the built environment around the world. They’ve revitalized industrial waterfronts, developed many new forms of affordable housing, designed resilient neighborhoods, and promoted the economic development of both rural and urban regions.

Visit www.svn-ap.com

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Sudarshan Khadka & Pierre Go, LVL PARTNERS

Leandro V. Locsin Partners is the current incarnation of an unbroken and continuing architectural practice founded in 1955 by Leandro. V. Locsin, Philippine National Artist for Architecture. The firm is credited with having helped shape Manila’s skyline and architectural landscapes. With a staff that includes 40 dedicated architects and designers, the firm continues to immerse itself in the design traditions of the Philippines and Asia along with key developments in design theory, sustainability, and contemporary technology.

Visit www.locsinarchitecture.com

Roger Cabiles, KALAHI-CIDSS

KALAHI CIDSS stands for Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan - Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services. It is a merging of two acronyms: KALAHI, which is the national government’s present poverty reduction framework program; and CIDSS, the government’s previous poverty alleviation project. Funded by the World Bank and implemented by DSWD, the Project uses the community-driven development (CDD) approach. CDD recognizes local communities as not just recipients but as partners in local development by giving them control over decisions and resources. Region VIII (Samar & Leyte) is the region with the largest number of KALAHI CIDSS project nationwide.

Visit www.ncddp.dswd.gov.ph

Stephanie Gilles, UAP – Emergency Architects

Stephanie is the Chairman of the United Architects of the Philippines – Emergency Architects (UAP-EA), founded shortly after Typhoon Yolanda. The purpose of UAP-EA is respond to the challenge of assisting communities towards rebuilding in a sustainable manner following natural or man-made disasters. UAP believes that architects, in collaboration with other built environment professionals, can provide the necessary help to communities in mitigating the effects disasters through proper planning and design, and sensitively managing the process of rebuilding. Visit www.uap-ea.blogspot.co.uk

Leeanne Marshall, Colin Price, and Mark Mauro Victorio, IFRC, IFRC Philippines & Philippines Red Cross

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world's largest humanitarian network that reaches 150 million people in 189 National Societies through the work of over 17 million volunteers. IFRC works with the national societies during and after disasters and health emergencies to meet the needs and improve the lives of vulnerable people. By ‘saving lives and changing minds’ the IFRC aims to reduce vulnerabilities, strengthen resilience and foster a culture of peace around the world.

In the first year since Yolanda the Philippine Red Cross and IFRC built or repaired 35,000 homes and provided livelihood grants to 29,000 households. Visit www.ifrc.org

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Jeremy Foster, Ramboll UK

Jeremy Foster is a Director at Ramboll UK, where he is responsible for all their development and charitable work. In 2015 Jeremy led a team of seismic experts to Nepal to carry out structural assessments of hospitals damaged in the earthquake. Together with ARUP, C2HMM and Elliott Wood, Ramboll are developing the Ready to Respond framework with RedR, supported by DfID and Lloyds of London.

Ramboll is a leading engineering, design and consultancy company founded in Denmark in 1945. With more than 300 offices in 35 countries they emphasise local experience combined with a global knowledge-base. Ramboll provides multidisciplinary solutions that serve businesses, governments and communities around the world.

Jago Boase, Ramboll UK and WORKSHOP architecture (WSa) Alex Furunes, WORKSHOP architecture

Jago is a structural engineer at Ramboll UK and has been based in Tacloban since July 2014. Together with Alex Furunes he is leading the design and reconstruction of Streetlight Tacloban.

Visit www.ramboll.co.uk Contact: ejboase@gmail.com

Alex Furunes is a founder of WSa, a non-profit collective of architects and designers that believes in collaboration, learning by doing, and cultivating a deep understanding of place. Alex has been engaged in Tacloban since 2010.

Visit www.wrkshp.org Contact: alexfurunes@gmail.com

Erlend Johannesen, CEO and Founder, Streetlight Tacloban

Streetlight is an orphanage and school organisation in Tacloban. It comprises an orphanage, a study and development centre, and a small clinic. It provides education and basic medical care to the children at the orphanage and in the neighbouring communities. Streetlight focuses on the street children of Tacloban and their families. It runs Residential, Education, Health, Counselling, Art & Sport programmes and street-based programmes.

Visit www.streetlight.org

HOSTS