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Leading Change

Why Transformation Efforts Fail

by John P. Kotter

Reprint 95204

Leading Change

Why Transformation Efforts Fail

by John P. Kotter

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 1

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Over the past decade, I have watched morethan 100 companies try to remake themselvesinto significantly better competitors. Theyhave included large organizations (Ford) andsmall ones (Landmark Communications),companies based in the United States (Gen-eral Motors) and elsewhere (British Airways),corporations that were on their knees (EasternAirlines), and companies that were earninggood money (Bristol-Myers Squibb). These ef-forts have gone under many banners: totalquality management, reengineering, right siz-ing, restructuring, cultural change, and turn-around. But, in almost every case, the basicgoal has been the same: to make fundamentalchanges in how business is conducted in orderto help cope with a new, more challengingmarket environment.

A few of these corporate change effortshave been very successful. A few have beenutter failures. Most fall somewhere in be-tween, with a distinct tilt toward the lowerend of the scale. The lessons that can bedrawn are interesting and will probably be

relevant to even more organizations in the in-creasingly competitive business environmentof the coming decade.

The most general lesson to be learned fromthe more successful cases is that the changeprocess goes through a series of phases that, intotal, usually require a considerable length oftime. Skipping steps creates only the illusion ofspeed and never produces a satisfying result. Asecond very general lesson is that critical mis-takes in any of the phases can have a devastat-ing impact, slowing momentum and negatinghard-won gains. Perhaps because we have rela-tively little experience in renewing organiza-tions, even very capable people often make atleast one big error.

Error #1: Not Establishing a Great Enough Sense of Urgency

Most successful change efforts begin whensome individuals or some groups start to lookhard at a company’s competitive situation,market position, technological trends, and fi-nancial performance. They focus on the po-

Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 2

John P. Kotter

is the Konosuke Mat-sushita Professor of Leadership (retired) at Harvard Business School in Boston. He is the author of 15 books, including

The Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How People Change Their Organi-zations, John P. Kotter on What Lead-ers Really Do,

and

Leading Change

. He has published six articles in HBR, including “What Leaders Really Do” and “What Effective General Managers Really Do.”

tential revenue drop when an importantpatent expires, the five-year trend in decliningmargins in a core business, or an emergingmarket that everyone seems to be ignoring.They then find ways to communicate this in-formation broadly and dramatically, especiallywith respect to crises, potential crises, or greatopportunities that are very timely. This firststep is essential because just getting a transfor-mation program started requires the aggres-sive cooperation of many individuals. Withoutmotivation, people won’t help and the effortgoes nowhere.

Compared with other steps in the changeprocess, phase one can sound easy. It is not.Well over 50% of the companies I havewatched fail in this first phase. What are thereasons for that failure? Sometimes executivesunderestimate how hard it can be to drive peo-ple out of their comfort zones. Sometimes theygrossly overestimate how successful they havealready been in increasing urgency. Sometimesthey lack patience: “Enough with the prelimi-naries; let’s get on with it.” In many cases, exec-utives become paralyzed by the downside pos-sibilities. They worry that employees withseniority will become defensive, that moralewill drop, that events will spin out of control,that short-term business results will be jeopar-dized, that the stock will sink, and that theywill be blamed for creating a crisis.

A paralyzed senior management oftencomes from having too many managers andnot enough leaders. Management’s mandate isto minimize risk and to keep the current sys-tem operating. Change, by definition, requirescreating a new system, which in turn alwaysdemands leadership. Phase one in a renewalprocess typically goes nowhere until enoughreal leaders are promoted or hired into senior-level jobs.

Transformations often begin, and beginwell, when an organization has a new headwho is a good leader and who sees the need fora major change. If the renewal target is the en-tire company, the CEO is key. If change isneeded in a division, the division general man-ager is key. When these individuals are not newleaders, great leaders, or change champions,phase one can be a huge challenge.

Bad business results are both a blessing anda curse in the first phase. On the positive side,losing money does catch people’s attention.But it also gives less maneuvering room. With

good business results, the opposite is true: con-vincing people of the need for change is muchharder, but you have more resources to helpmake changes.

But whether the starting point is good per-formance or bad, in the more successful cases Ihave witnessed, an individual or a group al-ways facilitates a frank discussion of poten-tially unpleasant facts: about new competition,shrinking margins, decreasing market share,flat earnings, a lack of revenue growth, orother relevant indices of a declining competi-tive position. Because there seems to be an al-most universal human tendency to shoot thebearer of bad news, especially if the head ofthe organization is not a change champion, ex-ecutives in these companies often rely on out-siders to bring unwanted information. WallStreet analysts, customers, and consultants canall be helpful in this regard. The purpose of allthis activity, in the words of one former CEO ofa large European company, is “to make the sta-tus quo seem more dangerous than launchinginto the unknown.”

In a few of the most successful cases, agroup has manufactured a crisis. One CEO de-liberately engineered the largest accountingloss in the company’s history, creating hugepressures from Wall Street in the process. Onedivision president commissioned first-ever cus-tomer-satisfaction surveys, knowing full wellthat the results would be terrible. He thenmade these findings public. On the surface,such moves can look unduly risky. But there isalso risk in playing it too safe: when the ur-gency rate is not pumped up enough, the trans-formation process cannot succeed and thelong-term future of the organization is put injeopardy.

When is the urgency rate high enough?From what I have seen, the answer is whenabout 75% of a company’s management is hon-estly convinced that business-as-usual is totallyunacceptable. Anything less can produce veryserious problems later on in the process.

Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful Enough Guiding Coalition

Major renewal programs often start with justone or two people. In cases of successful trans-formation efforts, the leadership coalitiongrows and grows over time. But wheneversome minimum mass is not achieved early inthe effort, nothing much worthwhile happens.

Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 3

Eight Steps to Transforming Your Organization

Establishing a Sense of Urgency■ Examining market and competitive realities■ Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities

Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition■ Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort■ Encouraging the group to work together as a team

Creating a Vision■ Creating a vision to help direct the change effort■ Developing strategies for achieving that vision

Communicating the Vision■ Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies■ Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition

Empowering Others to Act on the Vision■ Getting rid of obstacles to change■ Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision■ Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions

Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins■ Planning for visible performance improvements■ Creating those improvements■ Recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements

Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More Change■ Using increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit the vision■ Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can implement the vision■ Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents

Institutionalizing New Approaches■ Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success■ Developing the means to ensure leadership development and succession

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Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 4

It is often said that major change is impossi-ble unless the head of the organization is anactive supporter. What I am talking about goesfar beyond that. In successful transformations,the chairman or president or division generalmanager, plus another 5 or 15 or 50 people,come together and develop a shared commit-ment to excellent performance through re-newal. In my experience, this group never in-cludes all of the company’s most seniorexecutives because some people just won’t buyin, at least not at first. But in the most success-ful cases, the coalition is always pretty power-ful—in terms of titles, information and exper-tise, reputations and relationships.

In both small and large organizations, a suc-cessful guiding team may consist of only threeto five people during the first year of a renewaleffort. But in big companies, the coalitionneeds to grow to the 20 to 50 range beforemuch progress can be made in phase three andbeyond. Senior managers always form the coreof the group. But sometimes you find boardmembers, a representative from a key cus-tomer, or even a powerful union leader.

Because the guiding coalition includesmembers who are not part of senior manage-ment, it tends to operate outside of the normalhierarchy by definition. This can be awkward,but it is clearly necessary. If the existing hierar-chy were working well, there would be noneed for a major transformation. But since thecurrent system is not working, reform gener-ally demands activity outside of formal bound-aries, expectations, and protocol.

A high sense of urgency within the manage-rial ranks helps enormously in putting a guid-ing coalition together. But more is usually re-quired. Someone needs to get these peopletogether, help them develop a shared assess-ment of their company’s problems and oppor-tunities, and create a minimum level of trustand communication. Off-site retreats, for twoor three days, are one popular vehicle for ac-complishing this task. I have seen many groupsof 5 to 35 executives attend a series of these re-treats over a period of months.

Companies that fail in phase two usuallyunderestimate the difficulties of producingchange and thus the importance of a power-ful guiding coalition. Sometimes they have nohistory of teamwork at the top and thereforeundervalue the importance of this type of co-alition. Sometimes they expect the team to be

led by a staff executive from human re-sources, quality, or strategic planning insteadof a key line manager. No matter how capableor dedicated the staff head, groups withoutstrong line leadership never achieve thepower that is required.

Efforts that don’t have a powerful enoughguiding coalition can make apparent progressfor a while. But, sooner or later, the oppositiongathers itself together and stops the change.

Error #3: Lacking a Vision

In every successful transformation effort that Ihave seen, the guiding coalition develops apicture of the future that is relatively easy tocommunicate and appeals to customers, stock-holders, and employees. A vision always goesbeyond the numbers that are typically foundin five-year plans. A vision says something thathelps clarify the direction in which an organi-zation needs to move. Sometimes the firstdraft comes mostly from a single individual. Itis usually a bit blurry, at least initially. Butafter the coalition works at it for 3 or 5 or even12 months, something much better emergesthrough their tough analytical thinking and alittle dreaming. Eventually, a strategy forachieving that vision is also developed.

In one midsize European company, the firstpass at a vision contained two-thirds of thebasic ideas that were in the final product. Theconcept of global reach was in the initial ver-sion from the beginning. So was the idea of be-coming preeminent in certain businesses. Butone central idea in the final version—gettingout of low value-added activities—came onlyafter a series of discussions over a period ofseveral months.

Without a sensible vision, a transformationeffort can easily dissolve into a list of confus-ing and incompatible projects that can takethe organization in the wrong direction or no-where at all. Without a sound vision, the re-engineering project in the accounting depart-ment, the new 360degree performanceappraisal from the human resources depart-ment, the plant’s quality program, the cul-tural change project in the sales force will notadd up in a meaningful way.

In failed transformations, you often findplenty of plans and directives and programs,but no vision. In one case, a company gaveout four-inch-thick notebooks describing itschange effort. In mind-numbing detail, the

One chief executive

officer deliberately

engineered the largest

accounting loss in the

history of the company.

Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 5

books spelled out procedures, goals, meth-ods, and deadlines. But nowhere was there aclear and compelling statement of where allthis was leading. Not surprisingly, most ofthe employees with whom I talked were ei-ther confused or alienated. The big, thickbooks did not rally them together or inspirechange. In fact, they probably had just theopposite effect.

In a few of the less successful cases that Ihave seen, management had a sense of direc-tion, but it was too complicated or blurry to beuseful. Recently, I asked an executive in a mid-size company to describe his vision and re-ceived in return a barely comprehensible 30-minute lecture. Buried in his answer were thebasic elements of a sound vision. But they wereburied—deeply.

A useful rule of thumb: if you can’t commu-nicate the vision to someone in five minutes orless and get a reaction that signifies both un-derstanding and interest, you are not yet donewith this phase of the transformation process

Error #4: Undercommunicating the Vision by a Factor of Ten

I’ve seen three patterns with respect to com-munication, all very common. In the first, agroup actually does develop a pretty goodtransformation vision and then proceeds tocommunicate it by holding a single meeting orsending out a single communication. Havingused about .0001% of the yearly intracompanycommunication, the group is startled that fewpeople seem to understand the new approach.In the second pattern, the head of the organi-zation spends a considerable amount of timemaking speeches to employee groups, butmost people still don’t get it (not surprising,since vision captures only .0005% of the totalyearly communication). In the third pattern,much more effort goes into newsletters andspeeches, but some very visible senior execu-tives still behave in ways that are antitheticalto the vision. The net result is that cynicismamong the troops goes up, while belief in thecommunication goes down.

Transformation is impossible unless hun-dreds or thousands of people are willing tohelp, often to the point of making short-termsacrifices. Employees will not make sacrifices,even if they are unhappy with the status quo,unless they believe that useful change is possi-ble. Without credible communication, and a

lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops arenever captured.

This fourth phase is particularly challengingif the short-term sacrifices include job losses.Gaining understanding and support is toughwhen downsizing is a part of the vision. Forthis reason, successful visions usually includenew growth possibilities and the commitmentto treat fairly anyone who is laid off.

Executives who communicate well incorpo-rate messages into their hour-by-hour activi-ties. In a routine discussion about a businessproblem, they talk about how proposed solu-tions fit (or don’t fit) into the bigger picture. Ina regular performance appraisal, they talkabout how the employee’s behavior helps orundermines the vision. In a review of a divi-sion’s quarterly performance, they talk notonly about the numbers but also about howthe division’s executives are contributing to thetransformation. In a routine Q&A with em-ployees at a company facility, they tie their an-swers back to renewal goals.

In more successful transformation efforts,executives use all existing communicationchannels to broadcast the vision. They turnboring and unread company newsletters intolively articles about the vision. They take ritu-alistic and tedious quarterly managementmeetings and turn them into exciting discus-sions of the transformation. They throw outmuch of the company’s generic managementeducation and replace it with courses thatfocus on business problems and the new vi-sion. The guiding principle is simple: use everypossible channel, especially those that arebeing wasted on nonessential information.

Perhaps even more important, most of theexecutives I have known in successful cases ofmajor change learn to “walk the talk.” Theyconsciously attempt to become a living symbolof the new corporate culture. This is often noteasy. A 60-year-old plant manager who hasspent precious little time over 40 years think-ing about customers will not suddenly behavein a customer-oriented way. But I have wit-nessed just such a person change, and change agreat deal. In that case, a high level of urgencyhelped. The fact that the man was a part of theguiding coalition and the vision-creation teamalso helped. So did all the communication,which kept reminding him of the desired be-havior, and all the feedback from his peers andsubordinates, which helped him see when he

A vision says something

that clarifies the

direction in which an

organization needs to

move.

Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 6

was not engaging in that behavior.Communication comes in both words and

deeds, and the latter are often the most power-ful form. Nothing undermines change morethan behavior by important individuals that isinconsistent with their words.

Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to the New Vision

Successful transformations begin to involvelarge numbers of people as the processprogresses. Employees are emboldened to trynew approaches, to develop new ideas, and toprovide leadership. The only constraint is thatthe actions fit within the broad parameters ofthe overall vision. The more people involved,the better the outcome.

To some degree, a guiding coalition empow-ers others to take action simply by successfullycommunicating the new direction. But com-munication is never sufficient by itself. Re-newal also requires the removal of obstacles.Too often, an employee understands the newvision and wants to help make it happen. Butan elephant appears to be blocking the path.In some cases, the elephant is in the per-son’shead, and the challenge is to convince the indi-vidual that no external obstacle exists. But inmost cases, the blockers are very real.

Sometimes the obstacle is the organiza-tional structure: narrow job categories can seri-ously undermine efforts to increase productiv-ity or make it very difficult even to think aboutcustomers. Sometimes compensation or per-formance-appraisal systems make peoplechoose between the new vision and their ownself-interest. Perhaps worst of all are bosseswho refuse to change and who make demandsthat are inconsistent with the overall effort.

One company began its transformationprocess with much publicity and actuallymade good progress through the fourthphase. Then the change effort ground to ahalt because the officer in charge of the com-pany’s largest division was allowed to under-mine most of the new initiatives. He paid lipservice to the process but did not change hisbehavior or encourage his managers tochange. He did not reward the unconven-tional ideas called for in the vision. He al-lowed human resource systems to remain in-tact even when they were clearly inconsistentwith the new ideals. I think the officer’s mo-tives were complex. To some degree, he did

not believe the company needed majorchange. To some degree, he felt personallythreatened by all the change. To some degree,he was afraid that he could not produce bothchange and the expected operating profit. Butdespite the fact that they backed the renewaleffort, the other officers did virtually nothingto stop the one blocker. Again, the reasonswere complex. The company had no historyof confronting problems like this. Some peo-ple were afraid of the officer. The CEO wasconcerned that he might lose a talented exec-utive. The net result was disastrous. Lowerlevel managers concluded that senior man-agement had lied to them about their com-mitment to renewal, cynicism grew, and thewhole effort collapsed.

In the first half of a transformation, no orga-nization has the momentum, power, or time toget rid of all obstacles. But the big ones mustbe confronted and removed. If the blocker is aperson, it is important that he or she betreated fairly and in a way that is consistentwith the new vision. But action is essential,both to empower others and to maintain thecredibility of the change effort as a whole.

Error #6: Not Systematically Planning For and Creating Short-Term Wins

Real transformation takes time, and a renewaleffort risks losing momentum if there are noshort-term goals to meet and celebrate. Mostpeople won’t go on the long march unless theysee compelling evidence within 12 to 24months that the journey is producing ex-pected results. Without short-term wins, toomany people give up or actively join the ranksof those people who have been resistingchange.

One to two years into a successful transfor-mation effort, you find quality beginning to goup on certain indices or the decline in net in-come stopping. You find some successful newproduct introductions or an upward shift inmarket share. You find an impressive produc-tivity improvement or a statistically higher cus-tomer-satisfaction rating. But whatever thecase, the win is unambiguous. The result is notjust a judgment call that can be discounted bythose opposing change.

Creating short-term wins is different fromhoping for short-term wins. The latter is pas-sive, the former active. In a successful trans-

Worst of all are bosses

who refuse to change and

who make demands that

are inconsistent with the

overall effort.

Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 7

formation, managers actively look for ways toobtain clear performance improvements, es-tablish goals in the yearly planning system,achieve the objectives, and reward the peopleinvolved with recognition, promotions, andeven money. For example, the guiding coali-tion at a U.S. manufacturing company pro-duced a highly visible and successful newproduct introduction about 20 months afterthe start of its renewal effort. The new prod-uct was selected about six months into the ef-fort because it met multiple criteria: it couldbe designed and launched in a relatively shortperiod; it could be handled by a small team ofpeople who were devoted to the new vision; ithad upside potential; and the new product-de-velopment team could operate outside the es-tablished departmental structure withoutpractical problems. Little was left to chance,and the win boosted the credibility of the re-newal process.

Managers often complain about beingforced to produce short-term wins, but I’vefound that pressure can be a useful element ina change effort. When it becomes clear to peo-ple that major change will take a long time, ur-gency levels can drop. Commitments to pro-duce short-term wins help keep the urgencylevel up and force detailed analytical thinkingthat can clarify or revise visions.

Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon

After a few years of hard work, managers maybe tempted to declare victory with the firstclear performance improvement. While cele-brating a win is fine, declaring the war woncan be catastrophic. Until changes sink deeplyinto a company’s culture, a process that cantake five to ten years, new approaches are frag-ile and subject to regression.

In the recent past, I have watched a dozenchange efforts operate under the reengineer-ing theme. In all but two cases, victory was de-clared and the expensive consultants were paidand thanked when the first major project wascompleted after two to three years. Within twomore years, the useful changes that had beenintroduced slowly disappeared. In two of theten cases, it’s hard to find any trace of the re-engineering work today.

Over the past 20 years, I’ve seen the samesort of thing happen to huge quality projects,organizational development efforts, and more.Typically, the problems start early in the pro-

cess: the urgency level is not intense enough,the guiding coalition is not powerful enough,and the vision is not clear enough. But it is thepremature victory celebration that kills mo-mentum. And then the powerful forces associ-ated with tradition take over.

Ironically, it is often a combination ofchange initiators and change resistors thatcreates the premature victory celebration. Intheir enthusiasm over a clear sign of progress,the initiators go overboard. They are thenjoined by resistors, who are quick to spot anyopportunity to stop change. After the celebra-tion is over, the resistors point to the victoryas a sign that the war has been won and thetroops should be sent home. Weary troopsallow themselves to be convinced that theywon. Once home, the foot soldiers are reluc-tant to climb back on the ships. Soon thereaf-ter, change comes to a halt, and traditioncreeps back in.

Instead of declaring victory, leaders of suc-cessful efforts use the credibility afforded byshort-term wins to tackle even bigger prob-lems. They go after systems and structures thatare not consistent with the transformation vi-sion and have not been confronted before.They pay great attention to who is promoted,who is hired, and how people are developed.They include new reengineering projects thatare even bigger in scope than the initial ones.They understand that renewal efforts take notmonths but years. In fact, in one of the mostsuccessful transformations that I have everseen, we quantified the amount of change thatoccurred each year over a seven-year period.On a scale of one (low) to ten (high), year onereceived a two, year two a four, year three athree, year four a seven, year five an eight, yearsix a four, and year seven a two. The peak camein year five, fully 36 months after the first setof visible wins.

Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes in the Corporation’s Culture

In the final analysis, change sticks when it be-comes “the way we do things around here,”when it seeps into the bloodstream of the cor-porate body. Until new behaviors are rooted insocial norms and shared values, they are sub-ject to degradation as soon as the pressure forchange is removed.

Two factors are particularly important ininstitutionalizing change in corporate culture.

Leading Change

harvard business review • march–april 1995 page 8

The first is a conscious attempt to show peo-ple how the new approaches, behaviors, andattitudes have helped improve performance.When people are left on their own to makethe connections, they sometimes create veryinaccurate links. For example, because resultsimproved while charismatic Harry was boss,the troops link his mostly idiosyncratic stylewith those results instead of seeing how theirown improved customer service and produc-tivity were instrumental. Helping people seethe right connections requires communica-tion. Indeed, one company was relentless, andit paid off enormously. Time was spent atevery major management meeting to discusswhy performance was increasing. The com-pany newspaper ran article after article show-ing how changes had boosted earnings.

The second factor is taking sufficient timeto make sure that the next generation of topmanagement really does personify the newapproach. If the requirements for promotiondon’t change, renewal rarely lasts. One badsuccession decision at the top of an organiza-tion can undermine a decade of hard work.Poor succession decisions are possible whenboards of directors are not an integral part ofthe renewal effort. In at least three instances Ihave seen, the champion for change was theretiring executive, and although his successor

was not a resistor, he was not a change cham-pion. Because the boards did not understandthe transformations in any detail, they couldnot see that their choices were not good fits.The retiring executive in one case tried unsuc-cessfully to talk his board into a less seasonedcandidate who better personified the transfor-mation. In the other two cases, the CEOs didnot resist the boards’ choices, because theyfelt the transformation could not be undoneby their successors. They were wrong. Withintwo years, signs of renewal began to disap-pear at both companies.

• • •

There are still more mistakes that people make,but these eight are the big ones. I realize that ina short article everything is made to sound a bittoo simplistic. In reality, even successful changeefforts are messy and full of surprises. But justas a relatively simple vision is needed to guidepeople through a major change, so a vision ofthe change process can reduce the error rate.And fewer errors can spell the difference be-tween success and failure.

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