Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement

8/3/2019 Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement

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Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh MovementAuthor(s): M. RashiduzzamanReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Mar., 1972), pp. 185-200Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642872 .

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LEADERSHIP,RGANIZATION,STRATEGIESND TACTICSOF THEBANGLADESHMOVEMENT/ M. Rashiduzzaman

]Ihe armedonflicthichruptednEastBengal EastPakistan) ol-lowing hePakistaniArmy's uppressionf theindependencemovementafterMarch25, 1971,has attracted orld ttention. tthe nitial tage ofthe ivilfighting,ublic ttention asfocused n thethousandsfciviliansreportedilled nd the everalmillion efugees ho,according o foreignpressreports, led o India.' No onereallyknows hecorrect igureboutthese s strict ensorship revailed vernewsfromPakistan.Therewerestoriesfatrocitiesndmassexecutionsublished ll over heworld.Atthelater tage, owever,heworld ressbegan ofocusmore n themiseryndsufferingf-the ugenumber frefugees hohad beenseeking helternIndia.Therefugeessuealso contributedo themountingension etweenIndiaandPakistan,ventuallyeading o a warbetween he wo ountriesnDecember971.The PakistaniGovernmentad sinceMarch25 builtup an elaboratescenarioustifying ilitaryction n East Bengalandpresentingtssteps,asmoderatend restrained.2t has laid theblamealmost ntirelyn theAwamiLeague leader,SheikhMujiburRahman,for his alleged ntransi-gence ndcomplicityn a plot osplit he ountry.t alsoblamed heAwamiLeague"extremists"orkillingmanynon-BengaliesidentsnEastBengalsince hedisturbancestarted nMarch1.Within 2 hoursofthemilitaryaction,thePakistaniGovernmentnnounced hat the ituation ad beenbroughtnder ontrolnd ifewas"fast eturningonormal." eality, ow-ever,wasdifferent.ndependentources f nformationid not upportheclaims f he akistani overnment.'There s no accurate ount f therefugees ho ctually led o ndia.AccordingoIndian laims ndunofficialstimatesublishedntheforeignress, bout enmillionpersonsought efugen ndia afterMarch 5,1971.Anofficialccount f thePakistanGovernmentublishedn Dawn,September, 1971,however,laims hat totalof2,002,623ersonseft heir omes uringunsettledonditions."'Government f Pakistan, WhitePaper on the Crisis of East Pakistan, Islamabad,August,971.

185


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186 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTForallpractical urposes,he ivil trifeook hepatternfguerrilla ar-fare.Afterhemilitaryrackdown as ordered yPresident ahyaKhan,theAwamiLeague declared ompletendependenceor East Bengal on

March 6,callingtBanglaDeshover clandestineadio.Therewasa largedefectionfBengalis nthearmy, ordermilitia ndpolicewhoweremo-bilized ntoa "liberationrmy" alledtheBanglaDeshMuktiBahini.Al-though esistanceaded n Dacca within coupleofdaysafterMarch25,extensiveightingasreportedutside,nd some oftheborder reaswere"liberated" ythe nsurgentsntil hePakistanArmy rove hem ut.Al-though heikhMujiburRahmanwas arrested y thePakistanArmyonMarch26,someofhis lieutenantsled o India and formed BanglaDeshgovernmentn exile.Scores ofAwamiLeague leaderswerereportedlynexileorwent ndergroundorkingor he ndependence ovement.tudentleadersalso wentundergroundnd mobilized upport orthe liberationforces ndresistancegainst hePakistanArmy. everal ntellectualslsoinexileformedrganizationsoextendupportothecauseof nsurgency.All insurgent ovementsreclandestineorobviousreasons nd,there-fore,twasdifficultoget full iewof he rmed truggleor ndependenceinEastBengal.Thepurpose f hispaper s tothrowome ight nthe ead-ership ndorganizationfthe iberationorcesn EastPakistan. t is alsointended ere oanalyze hereportedoals, trategiesndtactics fthe n-surgentsnEastPakistan.LEADERSHIP ANDORGANIZATIONOF THE INSURGENTMOVEMENTEffectiveeaderships themost mportantnputofanyinsurgent ove-ment. here s,however, o yardstick ithwhich omeasure hecharacterofthateadership. hetop eader s expectedodevelop politico-militarydoctrineoguide he uniorofficersndrank ndfilen their ctivities. emust unctions both political ndmilitaryeader.3t is oftenonvenienttohave a charismaticype f eaderat thetopwhocan inspire onfidenceandenthusiasmnothers. rom hisviewpoint,twouldhavebeen dealfortheBengali iberation orces ohavehad a leaderofSheikhMujiburRah-man's taturetthe op.Althoughewasproclaimedobe thePresidentftheBanglaDeshgovernmentnexile, he ntiremovementppeared olackmuch ynamismnhis bsence.It willbe interestingoexamine henature f eadershipwhich mergedsince heoutbreakf nsurgencynMarch.For the akeofourdiscussion,wemay lassifyhepresenteadershipnder wobroad ategories-politicalor civilian ndmilitary. t thetopofthepoliticalor civilian eadership,therewastheBanglaDeshGovernmentn exile (see Table 1). As SheikhMujiburRahmanwas underPakistanGovernment'sustody,yedNazrulIslamwasthe cting residentfthegovernmentnexile.Buttherealforcein the anglaDeshexilegovernmentasTajuddinAhmed,tsPrimeMin-'Andrewcott,nsurgency,hapelHill,1970, . 52.AlsoRaymond . Momboisse,Blueprint fRevolution,llinois,1970.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 187ister.A lifelong wamiLeaguer,he was alwaysrated s the number woman ntheparty fter heikhMujiburRahman.Withonlyoneexception,all membersftheBanglaDeshCabinetwere awyersncluding ajuddinAhmedseeTable1). A soft-spoken,cholarlyndcalmpersonality,ajud-dinAhmedwas reportedo haveturned awkishn earlyMarch1971 andtheyoung adicalsoftheAwamiLeagueralliedbehindhimwhileSheikhMujiburRahmanwas stillnegotiatingtthe onferenceablewith residentYahyaKhan.

THE PATTERNOF LEADERSHIP OF THEBANGLADESH MOVEMENTTABLE 1BANGLADESH GOVERNMENTN EXILEPosition Political Age Education OccupationalBackground BackgroundVicePresident Awami 49-51 University Lawyer(Actingresi- Leaguer graduatedent)BanglaDeshGovt.inexile.PrimeMinister Awami 45-47 University LawyerofBangla Leaguer graduateDeshGovt.nexile.

Foreign-Minis- Awami 52-53 University Lawyerter fBangla Leaguer graduateDeshGovt.nexile.HomeMinister Awami 44-45 University LawyerofBangla Leaguer graduateDeshGovt.nexile.

Ministerf Awami 58-60 University Retired ili-BanglaDesh Leaguer graduate taryfficialGovt.n & awyerexile.C-in-Cf Awami 58-60 University Retired ili-Bangla esh Leaguer graduate taryfficialLiberationArmy.

Source:Newspaper eports, wamiLeague and BanglaDesh publications.(Age hown eresapproximate.)


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188 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTThereal weakness f thegovernmentn exilewas its eaders' nability ounderstandogistical nd othermilitary perations.o meet hisrealneed,thegovernmentoopted ol.Osmani, retiredfficerfthePakistanArmy

andalso a member f theNationalAssemblylectednDecember 970,astheCommandern Chief ftheBanglaDesh LiberationArmy.His mainfunction astomaintainiasonwith ifferentommandersnthefield ndtocoordinatehemilitaryfforts.t appearsthattherewas a divisionofwork etweenol.Osmani nd othersntheCabinet. henewspapereportsindicatedhatTajuddin andotherswerebusymaking peeches,ontactingpeople ndmobilizingnternationalupport hileCol. Osmani ooked ftermilitaryctions. ntheorganizationalctivities ftheBanglaDeshGovern-ment,here ere hree ther rincipalupportiveroups-theAwami eagueelites nexileorunderground,he ntellectualsctive broad ndthe tudentleadersoperativen exileor underground.Ithas beenpossible ogatheromedataon thebackgroundf these er-TABLE 2

AWAMILEAGUE ELITE LEADERSHIP INBANGLADESH MOVEMENT*(32)Position EducationAL1MNA2 20 Universityraduate 29AL Supporter 4 Notknown 1AL MPA8 8 TraditionalslamicEducation 1Political ackground High choolevel 1AL Member 15AL Student eader 14 OccupationAL District eader 3 Teaching 4Business 8Age Medicine 3Notknown 2 Lawyer 920-30 2 Party ork 331-40 17 Journalist 241-50 11 Notknown 3

Source:Newspaper eports, wamiLeague and BanglaDesh publications.1. AL-AwamiLeague.2. MNA-Member fNational ssemblyDecember 970 lection).3. MPA-Member fProvincial ssemblyDecember 970election).*It s alsoprobable hat largenumberfAwami eaguers lectedsMNAsorMPAswho re not ncludednthis ablebutwere utlawedythePakistanGovernmenttotalof 273disqualified) ere ctive n exile or underground.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 189sonnel (see Tables 1-3).4 While the Bangla Desh Cabinet was entirelydominated y awyers,heAwami eague elites peratingn exile ndunder-ground epresentedifferentrofessional roups Table 2). It is also ob-vious from able 2 that hese eaderswereyounger han themembers ftheBangla DeshGovernment.nother ignificantspect s thatnearly alfofthemwere ormereaders fthepro-Awamieague studentrganization-the EastPakistan tudentseague (EPSL) .5Their ctivitieslsoincludedthemobilizationf support n India and influencinghe nternationaln-vironment.ome of themwerereported o have been insideEast Bengalworkingndergroundmong hepeople.Severalof themwere ried y themartialaw court fthePakistanArmy ndsentencedn absentia.

TABLE 3INTELLECTUALAND STUDENT LEADERS OFTHE BANGLADESH MOVEMENTPosition EducationVice-Chancellor 2 PhD (UK) 3Professor 11 BarristerUK) 1Journalist 2 PhD (US & Canada) .5Undergroundtudent M.A. 3

Organizer 10 Graduate 9Graduatetudent 2Political ackground UnderraduatetudentLiberalAcademic 2AL' Sympathizernd OccupationAdviser 10 Professor 12Pro-IslamicakNationalist I HighCourt ustice 1Pro-leftist 1 Journalist 2EPSL2Leader I Law Student 6EP._U3 Leader 1 Student 4Age20-30 1031.40 441-50 751-60 4

1. AL-AwamiLeague2. EPSL-East Pakistan tudenteague3. EPSU-East Pakistantudent nion'Thedatacoveredn Tables1- 3 were aken rom arious ewspapereports,wamiLeaguepublications,nd theBanglaDesh Newsletterublished rom ew YorkandChicago. he exactnumber f AwamiLeagueelites n exile or undergroundouldnotbe determined.s gatheredrom ifferentources,he number aried rombout100 o300.,SeeTable 3.


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190 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTAnother roupof active upportersftheBanglaDeshmovement eretheintellectuals hofled o India,theUnitedKingdom, nd theUnitedStates fterMarch 5 (seeTable3). Those whowere ased n Indiaformed

a Liberation ouncil fBangla DeshIntellectualshocampaignedor heircauseandkept hemselvesn touchwith cademic rganizations.6ts eaderwas Dr. A. R. Mullick, ice-ChancellorfChittagong niversity.notheractive rganizerfthe ntellectualsasDr.Mazharul slam, ProfessorfBengali iteraturenRajshahiUniversity,howasknown s a sympathizerof heAwami eagueand a closeaideto ts eader, heikhMujiburRahman.Someof heBengali cholarswhofled otheUnited ingdomnd theUnitedStates lsoorganizedimilarupport roups mong oreigners.ustice . S.Choudhury,neoftheformer ice-Chancellorsn East Pakistan,was ap-pointed heroving mbassador f theBanglaDesh governmentbroad.7Thestudent rontftheAwamiLeague-East Pakistan tudents' eague(EPSL) appeared obe active nthemovement.ll thetop eadersoftheorganizationere ithernexileorunderground.ostofthe tudenteadersactive n the nsurgentctionswere from heEPSL (see Table 3). Theyalsoappeared o bethe ealtargetsf hePakistaniGovernment.heSpecialSummaryMilitary ourtNo. 1,Dacca, sentencedive ftheEPSL leadersto 14 yearsofrigorousmprisonmentndconfiscationftheir ropertynabsentia.8 ll ofthese eaderswere ccusedofhaving dvocated ecession.AbdurRab,theVice-PresidentfDacca Universitytudents' nionand aleaderoftheEPSL, hadbeenanadvocate fstrongineagainst hemilitarygovernmentnddidnotseriouslyupporthe dea oftheAwamiLeague'sparticipationnthe1970elections nder ll therestrictionsmposed ytheLegalFrameworkrder nnouncedyPresidentahyaKhanas thegeneralguidelineor he utureonstitutionalrder.9It appears hat hepolitical eadership,ftheBanglaDeshmovemente-sidedpredominantlyn therightwingAwamiLeaguewhichwonail over-whelmingictoryn theelections fDecember 970. The leftist arties nEastPakistan, articularlyheCommunistarty ndthepro-Moscow ingoftheNationalAwamiParty, eportedlyupportedheformationfa na-tional iberation ronto carry n thestrugglegainstPakistani roops)buttheAwamiLeague leadership idnot ndicate nydefinitenterestntheformationfsucha front."HowlongtheAwamiLeaguecanretaints

'The Statesman,July , 1971.7Itwas also reported hat groupofgovernmentfficers hofled oIndia afterMarch1971 had been workingn close cooperationwiththe othermajor groupssupportingthe Bangla Desh movementThere was no accurate figurefor such officers ut theMartialLaw authorities sked 13 and 44 Bengali officersf theCentraland provincialCivilService,respectively,o appearbefore hemilitary ourts Dawn, Sept. 2 and Sept.4, 1971). Presumably,heseofficers ereamongthosewhofled o ndia.8PakistanObserver, une29,1971.9SeeM. Rashiduzzaman, ynamics fRegionalism nEast Pakistan,a paper presentedat theColumbiaUniversity ationalSeminaron Pakistan,April1971."0TheTimesof ndia,June27,1971."'Ibid.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 191control ver hemovementemains o be seen.Butso far, hepartyhighcommandetainedts ll-Awamieaguecharacterlthoughhe eftistorcesreportedlyoughtlongsideheAwami eagueguerrillas.herewasa reportthat he eadersrepresentinghe eftwingparties greedto join with heAwamiLeaguers n theconsultativeommitteeorcoordinatingnsurgentactivities.'2t is indeed ifficultoseehowthefundamentaldeological on-flictswithin he iberationmovementan be resolved y suchsuperficialmeans.13Theunderlyingeakness fthe iberation orces ppeared obe theab-sence fgrass oot rganizationsapableof ustaining prolongeduerrillawarfare. he onlyorganization fthiskindreportedobe knownwas theAwami eagueSangram arishad which perated nderground.ts eadersweremainlytudents, wami eague volunteersnd oftenympatheticocalinfluentials.t is notyetknownhowtheir adreswereorganized nd thestructurectually perated. heresistanceetworknthevillages ouldnot,however, ave sustainedtselfwithoutizeablepeasantparticipation.vi-dently,heAwami eaguedidnothaveanypeasant rganizationuch s thatorganizedythe eftist ationalAwamiParty NAP). Either heywillhaveto start uilding heir wnpeasantbase or enterntoan alliancewith heNAPtobuildup a rural etwork.

As an insurgencys a politioo-militaryhenomenon,tcannot urvive ypoliticaleadership lone. t musthave mentofight oth onventionalndguerrilla arfare. he informationvailable bouttheMuktiBahini s stillinadequate, ut t is knownhat hecrucial omponentsftheBengalLib-eration rmywere: a) theEastPakistan iflesEPR), (b) theEastBengalRegimentEBR), and (c) thepolicemenndAnsarswhowereobjectivelyestimatedt about15,000fighting enwhen he nsurgencytartedn lateMarch, 971.ThePakistanGovernment,owever,laimed hat he ombinedfightingtrengthfthe"secessionists"mounted o about180,000armedpersonnel.'4The realhandicaps fthe nsurgentorceswere: nsufficientrms, hort-ageof mmunition,nadequateransportationndpoorornon-existentom-munication.he argestweapons f heresistancermywere hree-inchor-tars nd a fewheavygunscaptured rom hePakistanArmy.Mostofthevolunteersacked dequate raining. nother ealhandicapwasthe hortageof officers.ostoftheofficersftheEPR andEBR werenon-Bengalis.heBengali fficersho oinedthe iberationmovement erefairly oung ndjunior.Thehighest anking engaliofficerseported obe engaged n thebattlewereMajorsandtherestwere ither aptains rLieutenantsrnon-commissionedfficers.Therealdisadvantagemong heBengali nsurgenteadersoperatingn

"BanglaDesh, weeklyews ulletin, ashington,ept. 7, 971."3See lsoMartinWoollacott,BanglaDesh'sOddBedfellows,"heGuardianweek-ly),Sept. 5,1971."The Christian cienceMonitor, une28, 1971.


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192 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTdifferentectorswasthe ack ofadequate ommunication,hichwasindica-tive fpoorcoordinationndbadplanningn the ntireperation. hiswasoneof hefactors hichedtothe ailure f he nsurgentst the nitial tageofthe truggle.aptainGyasuddin houdhury,ho edtheBengaliLibera-tionArmy nRajshahi ectorn earlyApril1971,complainedothepressthat herewashardlyny oordinationetween ifferentnits f hefightingmen.15twasreportedhat heoperatinguerrilla nitsdid notreceive nydirect rders utonly eportedntheir ctions ya runneroheadquartersnearoracross he ndianborder.'6It is alsodoubtful hetherhepoliticaleaders t the opwere nregularcontactwith hefightingommanders. ol. Osmanisenta request o theBengaliresidentsbroad toraisefunds orprocuring owerfulransmittersto improve ommunicationinksbetween he eaders and the liberationforces.'7 he only mportantommunicationystemvailable o the nsur-gentswasthe FreeBangla DeshRadio"which ouldbe usedonly orprop-agandapurposesndnotfor lanningmilitaryperations.nthe bsence fsound ommunicationystems,erious rictions ere ikely oarisebetweenthepoliticaleaders ndmilitaryommanders,wing omutualackoftrustandfaith.Theonly eterrentothe ssertionfan independentosition ythemili-tary ommandersppeared o be theirdependence n theAwamiLeagueleaders or henecessaryogistic ndinternationalupport.twas also be-lieved hatndiacould xerciseeverage ychannelingupportnly hroughthepolitical igh ommand asedonIndiansoil.SincenoneofthemilitaryleadersexceptColonelOsmanihad anypoliticalfollowing,t wouldhavetaken hem considerablemount ftime efore nyoneof-themouldheabletogain uch stature.GOALS, STRATEGIESANDTACTICS

Afterhe nitial eclaration f ndependencever he landestineadioonMarch26, 1971, hefirstublic xposition fan independentndsovereignBanglaDeshcameonApril17,1971from ajuddinAhmed,hePrimeMin-isteroftheBanglaDesh governmentn exile.He said very mphatically,". . . Pakistan s dead andmurderedyGeneralYahya-and independentBanglaDesh s a realityustained ythe ndestructibleillandcourageof75million engaliswho redailynurturingheroots fthis ewnationhoodwith heir lood.Nopower nearth anunmakehisnewnation ndsooneror aterbothbigandsmallpowerswillhavetoaccept t into heworld ra-ternity."'8"The NewAge,April25,1971."The WallStreetJournal, uly 7, 1971."InterviewswithBangla Desh activistsn NewYork."8NewYork Times,March 29, 1971. See the statement ssued by Tajuddin Ahmed,Prime Ministerof Bangla Desh, on April 17, 1971, circulatedby the Bangla DeshDefenceLeague,Chicago.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 193TajuddinAhmed's peech eally ried o establishhat heBengaliswereconstrainedo declarecompletendependenceorEast Pakistanby the"treacheries"nd"brutalities"ommittedyPresident ahyaKhan andhis

"militaryoterie's" nwillingnessoaccept hepeople'sverdict s expressedthroughhe1970election. e also mentionedhe genocide" ommittedythePakistanArmygainst engali ivilians inceMarch25,totallylienat-ing hepeopleagainst he oncept f iving ogethers one nation ndonecountry. hile heformal bjective ftheBanglaDeshgovernmentnexilewasindependenceorEast Pakistan,tsinformalnd unannouncedbjec-tivewasthe cquisition fpolitical owerbytheAwamiLeaguewhichhadbeenoutlawedyPresidentahyaKhan.Those whoareacquaintedwith vents n East Pakistan an verywellre-capitulatehe tages fescalation f heAwami eague'sgoalsandstrategies.Thegrounds f nsurgencytartedarly nMarch 1971as a protestmove-mentwhen residentahyaKhanpostponedheConstituentssembly eet-ingonMarch1.19To theBengalis, hismovewas seen as a conspiracyndthey tronglyrotestedgainst t.Hawksamong heAwamiLeaguers ndthe tudentctivistsegan otalkof ndependencendSheikhMujiburRah-manpromisedomake dramaticnnouncementt a massrally nMarch .Whilethedemands fthemilitants erereaching hepointofno return,SheikhMujiburRahman nnounced ourpre-conditionsorattendinghefuture ationalAssembly-end fmartialaw,withdrawalftroops othebarracks,nquiryntokillings uring urfewime, ndtransferfpower othe lected epresentativesfthepeople.20 his appeared obe an attemptby theAwamiLeague leaderto offsethemilitantriesfor ompletende-pendence.While hemilitaryrackdownameonMarch25, all thesemod-erate ffortsere washed waybyblood"andthecategorical emand orcompletendependencemerged.Foranalytical urposes,wehavetried ouse a modelof the nsurgents'goals, trategicimsandtacticswhich ouldbyno meansbe exhaustive tthis tage.During hefirstwoweeks fthe rmed onflict,twasdifficultoascertainhe trategicims andtactics fthe iberation orces.t appearedtoubenuncoordinatedightnanamateurish anner. he nitial esistance,as reportedntheWesternress,waswith amboo ticks nd a handful fshotgunsndoldrifles. utsideDacca, theBengalis urroundedhe anton-mentsndtried obottle pPakistani oldiers. herewasno clearcut deaaboutthestrategicimsof improvinghemilitaryapabilities nd moremeaningfulse ofpublic upport. he defectingengalisoldierswhopro-vided hemainmilitaryngredientsfthe nsurgencyere tillwithoutnysense fdirection.necommonmethod sedto mprovehemilitarybility

"See the textofPresidentYahya Khan's announcement nMarch1,1971.20Peggy Durdin, "The Political Tidal Wave that StruckEast Pakistan," TheNewYorkTimesMagazine, May 2, 1971, p. 92. See also, Government f Pakistan, WhitePaper on theCrisis n East Pakistan, op. cit., p. 15 and Government fthePeoples Re-publicof Bangla Desh, WhyBangla Desh, 1971.


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194 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTwastosnatch he rmsof thepoliceand bordermilitia.Anotheracticwasto use a largenumber fpeople gainst rmy attalionsndtooverrunhemafter eavycasualties. his tactic fusingthe"humanwave" against hePakistanArmywas of imited alueonly.Oncethefutilityf"roving ebels"fightingconventionalattle gainsta well-equippedndregular rmy ecame lear, heBengali oldiers eganto retreato thevillages ndacross heborder.Around hemiddle fApril1971,Withheregroupingfthose ighting en, heflow frefugees leeingto Indiaandtheformationfan exilegovernment,he nsurgencyntereda new tage. y September971 tappeared hat heBengali iberationorceshad notonlydefined heir ltimateoalbutalsotherelevanttrategicimsandtactical bjectives.2'We havealreadydiscussed heultimate oal andthepossiblevariablesunder t. On thestrengthf the nsurgentctivitiesthusfar, hree roadstrategicimscould be identified:a) to utilize hepeople, b) improve hemilitaryituation,nd (c) influencehe nterna-tional nvironment.The success f guerrilla ardependsargely nthe ntelligenttilizationofthepeople gainst he ounter-insurgentorces. ndoubtedly,heAwamiLeaguewas confidentfpublic upportnEast Pakistan s demonstratednthe 1970 elections. ut public support nd meaningfultilization f thepopulationrenot he ame hing. he relation etween he nsurgentwamiLeaguers nd thepeople n 1971 could not be the same as between hoseseeking otes nDecember 970 andthemasses.The peoplewerefrightenedbythe ounter-insurgentakistanirmed orceswhoutilizedterror actics"against hecivilians. n orderto utilizethepeople againstthePakistanicounterinsurgentorces, heBengali nsurgentssed thefollowing actics:(a) publicized heliberationmovement,b) built theorganization,c)alienated hepeopleagainst hePakistan uthoritiesnd thevery dea ofone Pakistan, d) boycotted ffices, ills and factories, e) enlisted heparticipationf studentsn the iberationmovement,nd (f) organized e-lectiveerror gainst hosewho ooperated ith he uthorities.The "FreeBanglaDesh"radiowas theonly mportant edium f propa-ganda available to theBengali iberation orces. ince its operationwasclandestinend the ignalswereknown obeweak, tseffectivenessn publi-cizing he iberationmovementemainedimited. s theAwami eague hadbeenoutlawed,tsorganizationalctivities ent nderground.ccording oreportsnthepress, hePakistaniArmy ook tringentteps orootout theAwamiLeague in EastBengal.The undergroundwamiLeague SangramParishadcontinued omobilizepublic support n favorof themovement.Occasional eaflets,osters nd even mallmeetingsallinguponthepeople

There had been reports f increasingguerrilla ctivitieswhichwereno longer im-provised nd showedsignsoforganizationaleadership.Far EasternEconomicReview,Sept. 9, 1971,and Bangla Desh Radio Commentary,ept. 29, 1971. Also Bangla DeshRadio Broadcasts, eptember-October,971.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 195tohelpthe auseofthe iberationmovement as thepatternfpublicity.22Thefocalpoint f nsurgentropagandawas theatrocitiesommittedythePakistani rmynorder o turn hepeople gainst hePakistaniGovern-Thent. or all practical urposes, hePakistanArmywas described s anoccupation orceperpetuating colonialrule. The real tacticalobjectivewas to translatehe"Bengalinationalism" f thepeople ntosupportiveaction. oth assive swell s active upportor he nsurgentsasrequired:passive upport n providingnformation,upplies, oncealmentnd care,hiding f mmuniiton,ndorganizingctive upports volunteers,echnicalexpertsndsaboteurs.uchsupportivections he nsurgentsoughtmostlyinrural reas.Theirmainemphasisn theurban reaswastheboycott fschools,olleges, niversities,ffices,ills ndfactories.A tug-of-waretweenhePakistanArmy nd theBengali nsurgentse-veloped s both ideswantedoutilize hepopulationor ompletelyifferentpurposes.WhilethePakistaniGovernmentried o restore ormal ifebyasking heofficialsnd aborers oresumeheir ormalwork,he nsurgentsappealed oandintimidatedhepeople nto tayingwayfrom heir lacesofwork. chools, actoriesndofficeserebombed tseveral laces norderto ntimidatehe eople. nsurgentsirculated arningso ndividual fficersandfactorymanagershreateningrave onsequencesfthey ried o opentheir fficesndfactories.womain argetsnthisrespect eregovernmentofficesnd the ndustrialstablishments.While heAwami eaguewasoutlawedndmilitaryperationsontinuedagainst he iberation orces, groupofBengalipoliticians-hithertonoblivion-and some ndividuals redominantlyrom mongthenon.Ben-galissettled n East Bengal, merged s supportersfPakistan'snationalintegritynd collaboratorsfthePakistaniArmy.The nsurgentseactedsharplyothis yassassinatingomeof he quislings." he eading urposeofthe selective error"was todiscourage eoplefrom ollaborating iththeArmy. ome ofthese ollaborators ereeasily dentifiable.heywereprincipallyhemembersf"peacecommittees"ndRazakars armedvolun-teers)formed ycivilians nderdirectivesrom hePakistaniArmy, re.sumablyor urveillancendinformationboutthe nsurgents.he otherswere he ldMuslim eaguers ndthe ightwingslamistswhowerenclinedto upportheArmy. o definiteigureouldbe obtainedbout henumberof ollaboratorsctually illed, utpiecemeal eportsndicatehat henum-berwasfrom -4,000.Manyoperatingollaboratorsr potential nes re-ceivedternwarningsomend heirways.23 heobjectivewastodemoralizethe ollaboratorsndtoinduce hem odesist rom uturections.As a concessionothepressurethome nd abroadagainst hemilitary

"In order to stop the Bangla Desh propaganda,the Pakistan Armykept printingpresses ndduplicatingmachinesunder trict urveillance.I"One typical xampleof terror acticswas to send a sternwarning nd burial clothestothe:operatingrpotential ollaborator it is customaryhat dead Muslim s coveredbywhite lothes t his burial).


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196 BANG LA DESH MOVEMENTactions fGeneralTikkaKhan, theGovernmentfPakistan ppointedcivilian overnor,r.A.R. Malik, orEast Pakistan nSeptember,1971,whoquicklynstalled ten-memberabinetfortheprovince. resumably,thiswas an interimrrangementorthecivilianadministrationf theprovince ntil y-electionsouldbe heldfor he eatsoftheAwami eaguemembers isqualifiedytheGovernment.he reactionso thisnewmoveoftheGovernmenterequick.On behalf ftheBangla Desh leaders, henew ivilian dministrationfEastPakistanwasdescribeds a "Cabinet fthequislings."The insurgentsent everewarnings o thenewministersandoneofthemwas injuredwhenhiscarwasbombed.Themilitaryapacity f he nsurgentsasnormallyirectedoa numberof argetsnstead f oncentratingnany ingle bjective. heymadesimul-taneous ffortso mprove heir wnmilitaryapacityndtodeny esourcestothecounter-insurgents.or thefirst ewweeks fter hemilitaryrack-downofthePakistanArmy, heBengaliarmedpersonnelwhodefectedothe iberationmovementerenoteffectiveecauseofthe ack of eadershipand equipment. heygave up conventional arfare gainst hePakistanArmy nddispersed nly oregroup. utthemore mportant ilitaryb-jectivewas toenlist ndtrainnewrecruits.t wasreportedhat bout300recruitingentersperatednEastandWestBengal.24

Therewerereports f ambushes fthe PakistanArmy nd theforeignpressnoted steady low f njured oldiers rom heborder nd outlyingposts fthe ountryoDacca City.Buttheoutstandinguccess fthe nsur-gentswasthe lmostotal isruptionfcommunicationnside astPakistan.Fairly eliable eports ad beenreceived hat herailway rainswereunabletooperate eyond 0 to50 miles rom acca City s therailway racks ndbridgeswerebadlydisrupted. he samesituation revailedwith espect omotorwaysonnectingheprincipalowns ndports nEastPakistan. herewerealso reports f shipsbeingsabotaged.Duringthemonsoonmonths,thePakistan rmedforcesweresubstantiallyoggeddown n theurbanareas,althoughheydemonstratedomecapabilitiesn using mprovisedmeans fcommunicationuchas countryoatsandevenbullock arts.TheBanglaDesh iberationorcesouldnotdependolely nthe rms ndammunitionaptured rom hePakistaniArmy,nd itwas an opensecretthat he eal ogisticupportftheBengralinsurgentsasprovided y ndia.India alsoprovidedherebelswith henecessaryanctuariesndbasesforoperations.heBengali oliticaleaders, eachersndstudentsnexilemadeevery fforto win hediplomatics wellas material upport fIndia andotherountries.In order o influencehe nternationalnvironment,hemaineffort ftheBanglaDeshGovernmentasto obtaindiplomaticecognition.ajud-dinAhmed, hePrimeMinister ftheBangla Desh Governmentn exile

24BanglaDesh Newsletter,July 1, 1971. It was reportedthat India trainedarmedguerrillas n 30 differententers n orderto carry ut an offensiven East Pakistan. TheTimes,London,June , 1971.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 197appealed:"It is, therefore,n the nterestsfpolitics s much s humanityfor hebigpowers oputtheir ullpressure n GeneralYahyatocage hiskillers ndbring hem acktoWestPakistan.... We nowappealto thenations f heworld or ecognitionndassistance,othmaterialndmoral,inour truggleornationhood."25ne of thefirstteps oinfluencehe n-ternationalpinionwasto take ver hePakistani iplomaticmission nCal-cutta.tsChief, Bengali, eclared llegiance o thegovernmentfBanglaDesh in exileand convertedt intothefirst iplomaticmissionof "FreeBanglaDesh."SeveralBengalidiplomatsostednIndia,Europe ndNorthAmerica lso defectedo theBanglaDeshmovement,hich ttractedheattentionfthe nternationalress.2'3ySeptember971,BanglaDeshMis-sionsweresetup in NorthAmerica, ngland, nd severalotherparts ofEurope.Anotherdvantageousacticwastogainfavorable ublicitybroadanddamage heprestigefYahya'sgovernment.hiswasachievedwith elativeease as the nternationalresswas alreadynclined osupportheBengaliswho had long-standingnd well-knownrievances gainst thePakistaniGovernmentortheeconomic isparitynd otherkindsof injusticesuf-fered yEast Pakistan.Whenthemilitaryrackdownwas rdered ythecentral overnmentn March1971 theworldpressalmost pontaneouslyturned gainstthePakistanigovernment.he reports ublishedn news-papers ikeTheNewYorkTimes,TheLondonTimes, ndTheWashingtonPosttended obe very ritical fthePakistaniArmy ndstronglyecom-mended hewithdrawalfeconomic nd militaryid to Yahya'sgovern-ment.In order orousetheconscience ftheworld, he nternationalressfo-cused ontheatrocitiesommittedy the PakistanArmy n civilians, ar.ticularlyuring hefirst ewweeksof the nsurgency.tthe ater tage, twasthe ufferingfthe everalmillion efugeesn Indiawhich ainedwidepublicity.WhilethePakistaniArmywas claiming o have restored rderthroughoutheprovince,heguerrillas ere uccessfullynockingutpowersuppliesndblowing pcommunicationinks, aining ublicitybroadanddisprovinghese laims.To gainpublicitybroad, he nsurgentslso used"selectiveerror"gainst ertain oreignationals.Thecontributionf relativelymall engali opulationnNorth mericaandGreat ritainnkeepingpthemorale fthe esistance asalsoremark-able.Theyorganized rotestsnd appealed othegovernmentsf their e-spectiveountriesfdomicilefortheredress fBengaligrievances. heygatheredheirmeagerresources o sendmoney nd othermaterials s atokenftheirupport. hey lsosupportedhe xpenses ftheBanglaDesh

2"TajuddinAhmed'sstatement,p. cit.Also Subash C. Kashyap, (ed.), Bangla Desh:Background nd Perspectives,New Delhi, 1971, pp. 56-60.Also Bangla Desh RadioBroadcasts.26Itwas reported hat95 Bengali diplomats broad declared their upportofBanglaDesh governmentn exile.Bangla Desh, a weeklynewsbulletin,Washington, eptember17,1971.


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198 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTemissarieswho had beentouring ifferentarts oftheworld n order ogathernternationalupportor hemovement.As the nsurgencylearly ook thepattern f guerrillawarfaren thecontext fgrowing ensions etweenndia and Pakistanfollowing phe-nomenal ushofrefugeesrom ast Bengal,the nternationalommunitybegantaking hemattermoreseriously. he governmentsf theUnitedStates,GreatBritain, nd theSovietUnionappealedto Pakistan omakepolitical ccommodations ith he lected epresentativesntheEastWing,tind othPakistan nd India were skedto use restraint.resident ahyaKhan, nhisJune 8, 1971statement,romised constitutionndrestora-tion fcivilian ulewithinhenext hree o fourmonths.he Awami eaguewould ontinue obe banned s a political rganization,owever,lthoughindividual wami eague egislators howerenot guilty" f"subversive"and "criminal" ctionswouldbe allowed oretain heiregislative eats.27TheAwami eaguedescribedhese roposals s utterlyegative. amruzza-man, heHomeMinister ftheBanglaDesh governmentn exile,sharplyretortedysaying:"The self-imposedictator fPakistandoesnotrepre-sentBanglaDesh,nor has he any right o talk ofanypolitical ettlementwith hepeopleofBanglaDesh.His threat odeclare he eatsoftheAwamiLeaguemembers ftheNationalAssembly s vacantwas ridiculous. ..Thepeople ofBanglaDeshwillnever ccept constitutionrom foreignsource."28n order o demonstrateheirrejection fYahya Khan's pro-posals, he nsurgentslso stepped p their ctivitiesn Dacca, ChittagongandComilla. hespokesmen or he ndianGovernmentlsodenouncedhePakistanGovernment'sroposals s absolutelynadequate.SOMECONCLUSIONS

During he pringndearly ummer f1971, twaswidely peculatednthe ndianpress hat heonlypathopento theGovernmentfIndiawas a-war, ith view ocapturing pieceofterritorynEastPakistanwhere heexiledBanglaDeshGovernmentouldbe established,ivingta de ureandde facto tatus.29he PakistaniGovernmentad,however,eplied ysayingthat twoulddeclare totalwaragainstndiaifany uch ttempt asmade.BothndiaandPakistan lsosaid that nsuch war heywouldnotbe alone,implyinghatRussiaandChinawouldbe supportinghe wocountries,e-spectively.30

"7SeefulltextofPresidentYahya Khan's addresson June28, 1971,PakistanAffairs,Special Issue,June30, 1971.Later,thegovernmentnnounced hat88 of the116AwamiLeague members f theNationalAssembly nd 94 of 288 AwamiLeaguers in the EastPakistan egislature lected n December 1970wouldbe allowedtoretain heir eats andtherestweredisqualified nlessthey learedthemselves fspecific harges gainstthem.MorningNews,Aug. 20,1971.'.8The ikha,theweeklynews bulletinpublishedbytheBangla Desh DefenceLeague,NewYork,July15,1971."'The Times,London,July 3, 1971."0OnAugust9, 1971, ndia signeda friendshipreatywithSovietRussia, presumablytoconsolidateherposition gainstPakistan.New YorkTimes,August10, 1971.


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M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 199Othersxpectedhat he ontinued uerrillansurgencyould ventually-compel hePakistanArmy o withdraw rom astBengalundernternalswell s internationalconomic ressures.twould edifficultorWestPakis--

tan osustain majorwareffortnEastBengalfor longperiod.Therewas-also speculationhatthecrippled conomywould evoke social unrestnWestPakistan nd thatwouldmeana muchgreater ressure n theArmyas itwouldhavetokeeppeace inbothwingsofthecountry,eparated ymore han1000milesofforeign ndhostile erritory.eanwhile,nterna-tionalpressure n themilitary overnmentouldalso mount.Economicsanctionsgainst hemilitaryuntabytheaid-givingountries ouldalsoincrease nderpressure fpublicopinion,whichhad beenrousedbythenewsofatrocitiesommittedpontheBengali ivilians.Under hecircum-stances, conomic onstraints ould ntensifynd render urther ilitaryoperationsnthe astunbearable.It was evident romheeventshat heArmywas notprepared omakeconcessionsotheAwamiLeagueas a political arty.Norwasthemilitaryinclined omake ny ubstantialoncessionfpower othepoliticians. heremight aveemerged constitutiononcedingivilian uletothosepoliticalelements howould ccept akistan s onepolitical ntity,utthemilitary'cover"wouldhavecontinuednorder ocurb he eparatists.Itwasalsobelievedhat na prolongednsurgency,eadership ouldpassfromhehands f heAwami eague nto hehandsofradical lements.heAwami eague eaders, twasargued,were redominantlyiddle lasspro-fessionalswho werenotcapable of leadingan armedstruggle. heirde-pendence nIndiamightlsohavediscreditedhemnEastBengalbecausetheywouldhavebeendepicteds tools f ndia n tsalleged ffortoabsorbEastPakistan.Theyoungerlementsfthe nsurgenteaderswouldneverhavebeencontentwith BanglaDesh freedfromWestPakistanonlytobecomedependentn India. In all probability,herefore,prolongedn-

surgency ould ikely avepassed nto hehandsofmoredynamiceftists,though hetherfa pro-Moscowrpro-Pekingarietyemained ncertain.Thecontextf heBanglaDeshmovementhanged ualitativelyhen hewarbetweenndia and Pakistan n December 971 emerged s thefinalarbiternthe iberationtrugglefEastBengal. twasclear hat heprestigeof heBanglaDeshMukti ahini ufferedecisivelyecauseofthe pectacu-larmilitaryictoryf ndia armed orces. lsoas a result fthis, heBen-gali iberationmovement astransformednto n internationalonflicte-tweenndiaandPakistan. hesupportftheRussians or he mergencefBanglaDeshas a prospectivelient tate f ndia antagonizedheChinese,andthefuturefthenascenttatemaybe deeply roubled ya clandestineSino-Sovietonflict.Having eturnedoBanglaDesh, heikhMujiburRahman elt onstrainedtoseek speedywithdrawalf ndia troops, or twasunlikelyhe ndianarmywouldendear tself or ong to thepeople of Bangla Desh. More-over, heikhMujiburRahmanwouldnotlike to be seen as an "Indian


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200 BANGLA DESH MOVEMENTstooge"for hismight ivegrounds oboth hepro-Chineseeftistss wellas thepro-Pakistanightwingersnwhich obuildoppositiongainsthim.It sbelieved hat here s a considerableroportionfradicalforcesmongtheBengaliguerrillas hohadbeenarmed ndtrainedn IndiasinceApril1971 andwhowouldnot urrenderheir rms tthe all ofAwamiLeagueleaders.Althoughherightistsre ndisarray,he apacity fcertain anati-,calMusllimroups annot e discountedn limitednsurrectionsndcom-mnunaliots gainstheHindus andsecularMuslims) nthenameof slam.TheproblemsheikhMujiburRahmanfaceswill ndeedbe formidable.

M.RASHIDUZZAMANs an AssociaterofessorfPolitical cience, accaUniversity,and is currently isiting eniorFellow, SouthernAsian Institute, olumbiaUniversity,New YorkCity.

Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement

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Transcript of Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement