Lead Plaintiff's Objection to Dynegy Chapter 11 Plan

7/31/2019 Lead Plaintiff's Objection to Dynegy Chapter 11 Plan

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27164/208/24/2012 21341717.5

LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC

1251 Avenue of the Americas, 18th FloorNew York, New York 10020

(212) 262-6700 (Telephone)

(212) 262-7402 (Facsimile)

Michael S. Etkin, Esq. (ME 0570)John K. Sherwood, Esq. (JS 2453)

and65 Livingston Avenue

Roseland, New Jersey 07068

(973) 597-2500 (Telephone)(973) 597-2481 (Facsimile)

Bankruptcy Counsel for Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class

LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP

Nicholas I. Poritt, Esq.1101 30th

Street, N.W. Suite 115Washington, DC 20007

(202) 524-4293

Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:

DYNEGY HOLDINGS, LLC, et al.,

Debtor.

Chapter 11

Case No. 11-38111 (CGM)

In re:

DYNEGY, Inc.,

Debtor.

Chapter 11

Case No. 12-36728 (CGM)

LEAD PLAINTIFFS OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF THE DEBTORS JOINT

CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Stephen Lucas, Lead Plaintiff (the Lead Plaintiff) in the securities class action entitled

Charles Silsby, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Carl C. Icahn,

11-38111-cgm Doc 955 Filed 08/24/12 Entered 08/24/12 16:15:52 Main DocumentPg 1 of 26


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Dynegy Inc., Robert C. Flexon, and Clint Freeland, Case No. 12-cv-02307 (JGK) (the

Securities Litigation), pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (the District Court), filed on behalf of all persons (the Putative Class) who

purchased or otherwise acquired securities of Dynegy, Inc. (Dynegy or the Debtor)1

between September 2, 2011 and March 9, 2012, inclusive (the Class Period), alleging

violations of Sections 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and 20(a) of the Securities

Exchange Act (the Securities Laws), by the Debtor and certain current and former officers,

directors and shareholders of the Debtor, hereby submits this objection (the Objection), on his

own behalf and on behalf of the Putative Class, to Debtors Joint Chapter 11 Plan of

Reorganization for Dynegy Holdings, LLC and Dynegy Inc. [Doc. No. 28, Exhibit 1] (the Plan)

and states the following:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. The non-debtor release and related injunctive provisions in the Plan are nothingmore than a backdoor attempt to sabotage the Securities Litigation now pending before Judge

Koeltl in the District Court. Given the distribution scheme under the Plan, the Securities

Litigation is the only source available to the Putative Class to recover their losses based upon the

conduct of Dynegy and the beneficiaries of these gratuitous non-debtor releases. A little more

than a month ago, Lead Plaintiff was formally recognized by the District Court as the

representative of the interests of the Putative Class. In this capacity, Lead Plaintiff will opt out

of the release provisions contained in the Plan on behalf of himself and all members of the

Putative Class. Such an opt-out will have no impact whatsoever on confirmation of the Plan and

will preserve all of the claims of the Putative Class in the Securities Litigation.

1Capitalized terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Plan or Disclosure Statement unless defined

otherwise herein.



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2. Unfortunately, it may not be that simple (although it should be). Based onpositions taken by the Debtor and certain defendants in the Securities Litigation (all represented

by the same law firm), Lead Plaintiff expects that the Debtor will argue that unless a class

member, who may or may not be a current shareholder, has filed an individual opt out election as

part of the Plan solicitation process, he, she or it will be subject to the release and injunction

provisions contained in the Plan. This is despite the fact that such class members are receiving

nothing for their claims, are not entitled to vote, and likely are complete strangers to this chapter

11 proceeding. Because this position, if sustained, will have a serious negative impact on the

claims of the Putative Class in the Securities Litigation, Lead Plaintiff must vehemently object to

confirmation in an effort to protect the defrauded class members that he has been charged to

represent.

3. Thus, Lead Plaintiff submits in the first instance that the Bankruptcy Court shouldfind that the opt out election filed by Lead Plaintiff as the official representative of the Putative

Class is effective to preserve the claims of the class (as ultimately determined by the District

Court) against all non-debtor parties, including Dynegys directors, officers and shareholders.

Alternatively, Lead Plaintiff opposes the non-debtor release and injunction provisions of the Plan

because they are fundamentally inappropriate and unlawful. As set forth in more detail below,

the Plans non-debtor release provisions are perhaps the most aggressive and unjustified ever

presented to a bankruptcy court for approval. Some of the most remarkable features of the

release and injunctive provisions requested by Dynegy are set forth below.

The Released Parties are providing no consideration in exchange for thereleases.

The granting of the releases is not a necessary condition to confirmation of thePlan or necessary for the reorganization generally. In other words, all of



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Dynegys stakeholders could opt-out of the release provisions or the Court

could strike the illegal release provisions and the Plan would still be

confirmable.

The parties granting the releases to non-debtors under the Plan are notreceiving any distribution under the Plan. Thus, they are deemed to reject the

Plan and have not been provided with ballots to vote to accept or reject the

Plan. The granting of a third party release by a party who is not entitled to

vote on the Plan is unprecedented.

It is highly likely that many members of the Putative Class are formershareholders of Dynegy and did not receive any notice of the proposed

releases and injunctions. Yet, those class members, if the Debtor has its way,

would still be bound and enjoined by the Plans broad releases and injunction.

There is no penalty or downside for any equity interest or claim holder thatopts out of the release and no upside for a party that grants a release.

4. Based on the above factors, the question is obvious Why would any reasonable,well-informed person knowingly grant the releases set forth in the Plan? There is no logical

answer to this question because the reality is that the non-debtor release provisions under the

Plan are a trap for the many passive investors in Dynegy who received the massive solicitation

package (among other meaningless notices) and did not take the considerable time and effort, or

spend money to hire counsel (in a case where they are getting no distribution), to figure out that

by not sending an opt out election, they may be deemed to have released parties other than

Dynegy. No bankruptcy court has ever found such a release to be consensual or even close to

appropriate given the clear standards for such extraordinary relief in this Circuit. This Court

should not be the first to do so.



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5. Finally, Dynegy has obtained permission from this Court to pay for and preservenumerous insurance policies, including over thirty (30) policies that are described as Directors

& Officers insurance policies. [Docket No. 81]. There is no reason why the claims asserted in

the Securities Litigation should not be permitted to proceed against Dynegy and the Non-Debtor

Defendants given the extent of the available insurance coverage for the claims asserted in the

Securities Litigation. The claims against Dynegy can be limited to that available insurance.

BACKGROUND

The Securities Litigation

6. On March 28, 2012, the Securities Litigation was filed in the District Court,alleging violations of the Securities Laws by the Debtor and certain current and former officers,

directors and shareholders (the Non-Debtor Defendants). A copy of the Complaint in the

Securities Litigation is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

7. The Securities Litigation is a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of purchasers ofDynegy equity securities based upon their losses due to the actions of Dynegy, its officers,

directors, and shareholders in violation of the Securities Laws.

8. On May 29, 2012, Lead Plaintiff and other plaintiffs filed motions for theappointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel and to consolidate the various related actions in

the District Court.

9. On July 9, 2012, pursuant to the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(a), the DistrictCourt entered an order staying the litigation solely as it relates to Dynegy. The Securities

Litigation is proceeding as against the Non-Debtor Defendants. (See Exhibit B).

10. Pursuant to the Private Securities Reform Litigation Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(3) (the PSLRA), discovery in the Securities Litigation is stayed until motions to



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dismiss are decided. On July 13, 2012, the District Court entered an order appointing Stephen

Lucas as Lead Plaintiff and Levi & Korsinsky LLP as Lead Counsel. A copy of the order is

attached hereto as Exhibit C (the Lead Plaintiff Order). A consolidated and amended class

action complaint is due to be filed within thirty (30) days from the Effective Date of the Plan.

The Chapter 11 Case

11. On November 7, 2011, Dynegy Holdings, LLC (Dynegy Holdings), togetherwith other subsidiaries, filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11. Those cases are

being jointly administered under Case No. 11-38111 (CGM).

12. On December 16, 2011, the Court entered an order authorizing the appointment ofan independent examiner to investigate allegations of fraud and fraudulent transfers between

Dynegy Holdings, Dynegy and other subsidiaries. [Case No 11-38111, Docket No 276].

13. On March 9, 2012, the Examiner issued a detailed report setting forth his findings,including his determination related to fraudulent transfers between Dynegy and certain of its

subsidiaries prior to the filing of the Dynegy Holdings petition. [Case No 11-38111, Docket No.

490].

14. In an effort to resolve the allegations and the causes of actions set forth in theExaminers report, several parties entered into a settlement agreement (the Settlement

Agreement) on May 30, 2011. Of course, Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class were not parties

to the Settlement Agreement or any negotiations relating thereto.

15. On July 3, 2012 (the Petition Date), Dynegy filed a voluntary petition for reliefunder Chapter 11 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code).

16. Simultaneously therewith, the Debtor filed a motion seeking entry of an orderapproving the Disclosure Statement related to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for

Dynegy Holdings, LLC and Dynegy, Inc. [Docket No. 28, Exhibit 2] (the Disclosure



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Statement) and granting the authority to solicit votes in connection with the Plan that was filed

in the Dynegy Holdings case as modified. [Docket No. 3].

17. On July 10, 2012, the Court entered an order, inter alia, approving the DisclosureStatement and scheduling a hearing on confirmation of the Plan for September 5, 2012 (the

Confirmation Hearing). [Docket No. 21].

OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION

18. As a threshold matter, section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code grants LeadPlaintiff, as a party in interest, the right to be heard in this chapter 11 case. See 11 U.S.C.

1109(b) (A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors committee, an equity

security holders committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may

raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter). Section 1109 has

been consistently read broadly in order to allow anyone who has a legally protected interest that

could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding to assert that interest with respect to any issue

to which it pertains. In re Quigley Co., Inc., 391 B.R. 695, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). In

addition to being a party in interest in this case, Lead Plaintiff is also the party that the [District]

court determines to be the most capable of adequately representing the interest of class

members pursuant to the PSLRA 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).

19. Accordingly, on behalf of itself and the Putative Class, Lead Plaintiff objects toconfirmation of the Plan on the following grounds:

(a) Lead Plaintiffs and the Putative Class claims should be carved out of thePlans third-party release and injunction provisions because Lead Plaintiff

and the Putative Class have elected to opt-out of the release and injunction

provisions;



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(b) the Plans third-party release and injunction provisions are overly broad,improper and unauthorized because they fail to come close to satisfying

the necessary legal requirements mandated by the Second Circuit for such

extraordinary relief; and

(c) the Plan should preserve Lead Plaintiffs right to proceed with its claimsagainst Dynegy to the extent of available insurance coverage, as well as

the right to obtain discovery in the Securities Litigation.

20. Lead Plaintiff believes that by virtue of the foregoing infirmities, unless the Planand/or the Confirmation Order are modified as set forth herein, the Plan should not be confirmed.

A. The Plan Should Carve Out the Claims of Lead Plaintiff and the PutativeClass From the Non-Debtor Release and Injunction Provisions Because Lead

Plaintiff has Opted Out on Behalf of the Putative Class.

21. Pursuant to the PSLRA 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i), the District Court appointed StephenLucas as Lead Plaintiff because he was determined to be the most capable of adequately

representing the interest of class members. See PSLRA 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i); see also Lead

Plaintiff Order. Thus, the District Court designated Lead Plaintiff to be the official

representative and the spokesperson for all members of the Putative Class. See Lead Plaintiff

Order 4 (listing duties of Lead Plaintiff including all other matters concerning the prosecution

or resolution of the Action). Thus, because the release and injunction provisions directly impact

the claims in the Action, electing to opt-out of these releases is a fundamental responsibility of

Lead Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court should find that the opt-out election filed by Lead Plaintiff

on behalf of all members of the Putative Class is effective to preserve the claims of the class (as

ultimately determined by the District Court) against all non-debtor parties, including Dynegys

directors, officers and shareholders. As a result, the claims of Lead Plaintiff and the Putative

Class should not be subject to the Plan release and injunction provisions (notwithstanding that



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such provisions are illegal and improper in any event (see section B infra)). The Court should

carve out the claims of Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class from the release and injunction

provisions in the Plan.

B. Regardless of the Opt-Out Election, the Plans Releases and Injunctions areImproper and Unlawful.

(a) The proposed releases and injunctions are not authorized under theapplicable legal standards and requirements.

22. The Plan includes a broad spectrum of releases and related injunctions whichimproperly release and enjoin claims by third-parties against non-debtors. Plan, Art. VIII,

Section 8.20. If allowed to stand, these provisions could have the practical effect of severely

diluting or putting an end to the Securities Litigation before Judge Koeltl even has a chance to

rule on the merits of the claims or certify the class. Specifically, the Plan provides:

Subject to the occurrence of the Effective Date, for good and valuable

consideration, any holder of a Claim or Equity Interest that is impaired orunimpaired under the Plan shall be presumed conclusively to have released the

Released Parties from any Cause of Action based on the same subject matter as

such Claim against or Equity Interest in the Surviving Entity; provided, however,

that nothing in this Section shall be construed to release any party fromintentional fraud, willful misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal conduct as

determined by a Final Order or to release any party from any Claim or Cause of

Action which any Person who is a party to the GasCo Credit Facility or theCoalCo Credit Facility, or their successors and assigns, may have in respect of the

GasCo Credit Facility or the CoalCo Credit Facility, or to release Dynegy

Roseton, Dynegy Danskammer, DNE, or Hudson Power from any Claim or Causeof Action arising from or in connection with the Lease Documents; provided,

further, however, that the releases provided in this Section 8.20 shall not apply to

any holder of a Claim or Equity Interest (other than any party to the Plan Support

Agreement, except as otherwise provided therein) that elects to opt out of such

releases by making such election on its timely submitted ballot (to the extent itreceives a ballot) or in a written notice submitted to the Solicitation Agent on or

before the Plan Objection Deadline.

Plan, Art. VIII, Section 8.20.



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23. The Plan further imposes a permanent injunction on all persons who have been,are, or may be holders of Claims against or Equity Interests in the Surviving Entity. Such

persons shall be permanently enjoined from taking any of the following actions including,

commencing, conducting or continuing in any manner, directly or indirectly, any suit, action or

other proceeding ofany kind. Plan, Art. XV, Section 15.25 (emphasis added).

24. Certain Plan definitions reflect the broad scope of the Plan releases andinjunction. For example, Released Party includes (a) DH, Dynegy, the Surviving Entity, and

each of their Affiliates, (b) the Consenting Senior Noteholders, (c) the Consenting Subordinated

Noteholders, (d) the Consenting Lease Certificate Holders, (e) the Lease Trustee, (f) Franklin,

(g) the PSEG Entities, (h) the Indenture Trustees; (i) the members of the Creditors Committee

(solely in their capacity as such), [and their respective] (j) present and former directors, officers,

managers, equity holders, agents, successors, assigns, attorneys, accountants, consultants,

investment bankers, bankruptcy and restructuring advisors, financial advisors, and each of their

affiliate [ ] and (k) any Person claimed to be liable derivatively through any of the foregoing.

Plan, Page 64 (emphasis added).

25. By referencing any action, suit or proceeding occurring pre-petition without anylimitation, the Plan injunction would apply to Lead Plaintiffs claims and the claims of the

Putative Class in the Securities Litigation and any discovery anticipated in the case. No

justification for such extraordinary relief and inappropriate protection in favor of the Non-Debtor

Defendants is provided by the Debtor. Essentially, the Non-Debtor Defendants, who as a

practical matter are orchestrating the confirmation of the Plan, are seeking to obtain the benefit



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of a bankruptcy discharge through a permanent injunction, without ever subjecting themselves to

the requirements and obligations of bankruptcy supervision.2

26. The Bankruptcy Code only authorizes a release and injunction of claims against anon-debtor in one very narrow circumstance, which is certainly not applicable here. See 11

U.S.C. 526(g) (establishing specific procedures and conditions for resolving asbestos ligation

claims against a debtor, including creating a trust to satisfy potential future claims). Therefore,

to the extent any of Lead Plaintiffs claims in the Securities Litigation may be subject to the

Plans injunction and/or release provisions, those provisions are clearly not authorized by any

provision of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, certain courts refuse to grant non-debtor releases

altogether. See Maxitile, Inc v. Sun (In re Maxitile, Inc.), 237 Fed.Appx 274, 276 (9th Cir.

2007);Resorts International, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th

Cir. 1995); Feld v. Zale Corporation (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995); and

Landscaping Diversified Property II v. First National Bank and Trust CO. of Tulsa (In re

Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990). Other courts only grant

such releases in rare circumstances and are very reluctant to grant the benefits of a bankruptcy

discharge to non-debtors. See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel

Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992); Class Five Nevada Claimants

v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 657 (6th Cir. 2002); Gillman v.

Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000).

27. The Second Circuit in Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v. Metromedia FiberNetwork, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2005), held

that a non-debtor release should not be approved absent truly unusual circumstances which

2It is worth noting that violations of federal securities laws are non-dischargeable in personal bankruptcy

proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19)(A). Thus, the Non-Debtor Defendants are seeking to obtain something

that not even the Bankruptcy Code offers.



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render the release terms important to success of the plan. Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 143. The

court inMetromedia explained the reluctance of courts to grant non-debtor releases based upon

two considerations. First, the only explicit authorization in the Code for nondebtor releases is

11 U.S.C. 524(g), which authorizes releases in asbestos cases and the Second Circuit found

that section 105(a) [of the Bankruptcy Code] does not allow the bankruptcy court to create

substantive rights that are not otherwise available under applicable law. Id. at 142. Second, a

nondebtor release is a device that lends itself to abuse because it essentially operate[s] as a

bankruptcy discharge arranged without a filing and without safeguards of the Code.Id.

28.

Metromedia held that in order to obtain approval of a non-debtor release, the

debtor must demonstrate and establish that the release, and accompanying injunction, play an

important part in the debtors reorganization plan and stated it is clear that such a release is

proper only in rare cases. Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 141. However, the mere fact of financial

contribution by a non-debtor cannot be enough to trigger the right to a Metromedia/Drexel

release of non-debtor claims. Cartalemi v. Karta Corp. (In re Karta Corp.), 342 B.R. 45, 55

(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (also explaining that every multi-debtor corporate bankruptcy can come up

with some aspect of its situation that seems to it, and to its creditors, to be unique.); see also

Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 211 (holding that a debtor must satisfy its burden of proof and

establish through specific factual findings that non-debtor third-party releases are fair and

necessary). Rather, a debtor must demonstrate and establish that the release was itselfimportant

to the plan which is what Drexel Burnham at a minimum requires. Metromedia, 416 F.3d at

143 (emphasis in original).

29. As a threshold question, the Court must determine whether or not it even hasjurisdiction to approve the Plan release and injunction provisions as they relate to claims against



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non-debtors by third parties. The Third Circuit in Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214 n. 12,

has expressed its concern that the Bankruptcy Court apparently never examined its jurisdiction

to release and permanently enjoin [the third partys] claims against non-debtors. While certain

matters between non-debtor third parties affecting the debtor and the bankruptcy case may be

within the subject matter of the Court, it is not without limits and the Court cannot simply

presume it has jurisdiction in a bankruptcy case to permanently enjoin [non-debtor claims]. Id.

Similarly, the Second Circuit noted that it would be inappropriate for the bankruptcy court to

enjoin claims brought against a third-party non-debtor solely on the basis of that third-partys

financial contribution to a debtors estate. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52, 66 (2d

Cir. 2008) (Manville 2008). If that were possible a debtor could create subject matter

jurisdiction over any non-debtor third-party by structuring a plan in such a way that it depended

upon third-party contributions. Id. See also,Johns-Manville Corp. v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co.

(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 600 F.3d 135, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (Manville 2010) (A

bankruptcy court only has jurisdiction to enjoin third-party non-debtor claims that directly affect

the res of the bankruptcy estate);In re Dreier LLP, 429 B.R. 112, 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)

(before the bankruptcy court decides whether the proponent of a plan settlement injunction has

demonstrated the unusual circumstances mandated byMetromedia, it must first decide whether

it has subject matter jurisdiction underManville.).

30. The Supreme Court made it clear in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) thatbankruptcy courts have limited jurisdictional powers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157. A bankruptcy

court may only hear and enter final judgments in all core proceedings arising under title 11, or

arising in a case under title 11. Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2603. The proposed non-debtor releases and

injunctions contained in the Plan impact claims between non-debtors based upon federal



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securities law, not the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the Court does not even possess the requisite

jurisdiction to grant the proposed non-debtor releases and injunctions.

31. Here, the non-debtor releases should not be approved even if this Court finds thatit has the power to grant the release and issue the accompanying injunction requested by Dynegy.

Judge Koeltl in Kenton County Bondholders Committee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Delta Air

Liens Inc.), 374 B.R. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affirmed this Courts decision to grant non-debtor

releases because it found the following factors to be dispositive under theMetromedia standard:

the releases were extremely narrow in scope, the releases were necessary to prevent relitigation

of the same issues that were already resolved by a settlement agreement amongst the parties; and

in exchange for the releases, the released parties granted the debtors estate valuable

consideration that was important to the restructuring. See Kenton County Bondholders

Committee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Delta Air Liens Inc.), 374 B.R. 516, 526 (S.D.N.Y.

2007), affd sub nom. Ad Hoc Committee of Kenton County Bondholders v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

309 F.Appx 455 (2nd

Cir. 2009).

32. None of those factors are present here. The releases are certainly not narrowlytailored. The underlying matters in the Securities Litigation have not been resolved or the

subject of any settlement agreement. Also, there is no corresponding consideration being

provided in exchange for the releases. Indeed, holders of Securities Litigation claims are not

even entitled to vote on the Plan. Any questionable value that the Released Parties afforded to

the Debtor, if it even exists, was not in consideration for the proposed release of the claims in the

Securities Litigation. The Debtor makes the sweeping statements, applicable in every chapter 11

case, that the Released Parties afforded value to the estates and aided in the reorganization

process including playing an integral role in reaching the Settlement Agreement and



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formulating the Plan. See Disclosure Statement at 144. The Debtor provides no details with

respect to the identity of these individuals, or the nature of their integral contributions. More

importantly, any value and benefit provided by these unnamed individuals was part of their

normal job functions for which they received their agreed upon compensation. That is

insufficient to justify and warrant the proposed third-party releases in the Plan. See In re

Washington Mutual, 442 B.R. 314, 354 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (holding that value provided by

officers and directors pursuant to their ordinary employment is not considered contribution and

is insufficient to warrant releases).

33.

The court in Metromedia also noted that some courts have approved non-debtor

releases where the enjoined claims were channeled to a settlement fund rather than being

extinguished or where the plan otherwise provides for full payment of the enjoined claims. See

Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 142, see also In re Chemtura, 439 B.R. 561, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2010). Here, neither of those factors is present. The Debtor is seeking to completely preclude

and prevent any recovery by the Putative Class on account of the Securities Litigation; and the

Putative Class is not receiving any distribution at all under the Plan on account of the claims in

the Securities Litigation.

34. Specifically referencing the Second Circuits precedent, including DrexelBurnham, the Third Circuit noted that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld plans

of reorganization containing releases and permanent injunction of widespread claims against co-

liable parties but those plans also provided consideration to parties who would be enjoined from

suing non-debtors. Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 212. Here, no consideration is being

provided to class members that are being enjoined from pursuing their claims against the

Released Parties. The Debtor argues that creditors would benefit from the releases by virtue of



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their ability to share in the distributable value preserved by the Settlement Agreement. See

Disclosure Statement at 144. However, the Debtor fails to disclose that many of the creditors

who may be deemed to have granted the releases, including all class members, are not obtaining

any distribution pursuant to the Settlement Agreement or the Plan. While the Settlement

Agreement potentially provides for some distribution to current shareholders of Dynegy, none of

the distribution is earmarked for class members on account of their Securities Litigation claims.

In other words, if by chance, certain members of the class would be obtaining some distribution

by virtue of the Settlement Agreement, that distribution would be on account of their status as

equity holders, not on account of their claims as defrauded investors.

35. The Debtor also argues that the non-debtor releases are important to thereorganization, because it is possible that many of the Released Parties would have rights of

indemnification against Reorganized Dynegy. Disclosure Statement at 144. However, the

Debtor is making a gratuitous assumption regarding the potential indemnity claims. Any

indemnification claim by one of the Non-Debtor Defendants based upon the Securities Litigation

would constitute a subordinated prepetition claim under 11 U.S.C 510(b), entitled to no

distribution under the Plan. Thus, any potential indemnity claims by the Non-Debtor Defendants

cannot serve as a basis to justify the necessity and importance of granting the Plans third-party

releases. Moreover, the Debtor cannot bootstrap itself into that specious argument by apparently

assuming these indemnification obligations under the Plan where there is no justification for

such assumptions other than creating an obligation where none exists. How can the Debtor

possibly square such an unnecessary gift to its directors and officers with the Debtors fiduciary

obligations to its shareholders and/or creditors? Clearly, this is simply another example of the



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Non-Debtor Defendants control over the plan process for their own personal benefit and to the

detriment of the Putative Class and other stakeholders.

36. It is also noteworthy that these indemnity claims would be substantially (if notfully) covered by the Debtors more than thirty (30) Directors & Officers insurance policies

available to provide coverage for precisely the claims asserted in the Securities Litigation. In

addition, any such indemnification claims are subordinated general unsecured claims as set forth

above, and, given the status of the Securities Litigation, are unliquidated and contingent claims

subject to expungement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 502(e)(1)(B).

37.

The Debtor further notes that the overall Settlement Agreement requires releases

by and for the Settlement Parties. See Disclosure Statement at 144. This statement is

incomplete, misleading and wrong. First, the Settlement Parties do not include the Debtors

officers, directors and shareholders. Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 2(a)(vi) of the Plan

Support Agreement, the non-debtor release provisions in the Plan are only requested to the

extent permitted by applicable law. Thus, if this Court determines, as we believe it should, that

the release and injunction provisions are unlawful, there will be no impact on the Settlement

Agreement or the Plan. Also, because Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class were not parties to

the Settlement Agreement, it is absurd to suggest that their rights and claims can be bargained

away by, among others, the Non-Debtor Defendants and their representatives.

38. The Plan can certainly be confirmed without the aforesaid offending Planprovisions. The third-party releases are neither a condition to the Effective Date nor a condition

to confirmation of the Plan. Whether 1% of creditors and interest holders opt-out or 100% of

creditors and interest holders opt-out, the Plan can still be confirmed. If the Court strikes the



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improper non-debtor releases and injunctions, it would not have any negative impact at all on the

Debtor, the Plan or the reorganization process.

39. Therefore, at the very least, Lead Plaintiff requests that the following languageshould be included in the Plan or the Confirmation Order:

Nothing in the Plan or in any order confirming the Plan shall or is

intended to (i) affect, release, enjoin or impact in any way the

prosecution of the claims asserted, or to be asserted, against anyNon-Debtor Defendants or any non-Debtor in the Securities

Litigation, or (ii) preclude the Lead Plaintiff and/or the Putative

Class from seeking discovery from any party, the Debtor or the

Reorganized Dynegy in the Securities Litigation.

(b) The Opt-Out provision in the Plan is an illusory gimmick that doesnot equate to, or prove, consent to the release and injunctive

provisions.

40. The Plan provides that the Released Parties shall be conclusively presumed tohave been released of any and all claims, unless stakeholders, like Lead Plaintiff, do not

affirmatively opt-out of the release provision. Even creditors who are not entitled to vote on

the Plan, and receive no distribution under the Plan, must independently and affirmatively opt-

out to preserve their rights against non-debtor third-parties. See Plan, Art. VIII, Section 8.20.

41. As mentioned earlier, the Plan proposes improper and illegal non-debtor releasesand injunctions. The burden should not be on the Debtors creditors or other stakeholders to opt-

out of a provision that is illegal and not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, leaving

aside the issue whether the third-party releases are permissible at all, the burden is on the Debtor

to affirmatively obtain informed consent from the impacted creditors and interest holders (such

as through a ballot filed in support of the Plan) to authorize the releases of claims against the

Non-Debtor Defendants. While obtaining informed consent and approval may be a permissible



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method to obtain third-party releases, the traps and gimmicks employed by the Debtor here do

not equate to knowing and voluntary releases.

42. The Seventh Circuit in In re Specialty Equipment Companies, Inc., 3 F.3d 1043,1047 (7

thCir 1993), found that courts would only permit releases that are consensual and non-

coercive to be in accord with the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code. Unlike the injunction created

by the discharge of a debt, a consensual release does not inevitably bind individual creditors. It

binds only those creditors voting in favor of the plan of reorganization. See also Metromedia,

416 F.3d at 142 (noting that nondebtor releases may also be tolerated if the affected creditors

consent.); Washington Mutual, 442 B.R at 352 (any such release must be based on consent of

the releasing party (by contract or the mechanism of voting in favor of the plan)). Here, the

releases are not memorialized in a ballot expressing approval of the Plan and accepting the terms

therein. Rather, the Putative Class is deemed to reject the Plan because they are not receiving

any distribution and are not even being provided the opportunity to vote. Creditors cannot be

bound by a Plan that they did not vote to accept because silence is not sufficient to constitute

consent to the releases. See Specialty Equipment, 3 F.3d at 1047; In re Spansion, Inc., 426 B.R.

114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (holding that a third-party release against objecting shareholders who

are not receiving any distribution is invalid); In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 368 B.R.

140, 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (upholding the releases and exculpation with respect to

anyone who voted in favor of the plan but not beyond those creditors); In re Coram Healthcare

Corp., 315 B.R. 321, 336 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); In re Zenith Electronics Corp., 241 B.R. 92,

111 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Arrowmill Developments Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 505 (Bankr. D.

N.J. 1997) (citing a line of cases that hold non-debtor releases are only binding on those creditors

who actually provide their consent).



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43. In the context of confirmation, the bankruptcy court in Washington Mutualexplicitly discussed an opt-out mechanism utilized by the Debtors regarding non-debtor releases.

See Washington Mutual, 442 B.R. at 355. The court in Washington Mutual held that the opt out

mechanism is not sufficient to support the third party releases anyway, particularly with respect

to parties who do not return a ballot (or are not entitled to vote in the first place). Failing to

return a ballot is not a sufficient manifestation of consent to a third party release Id. (relying on

In re Zenith Electronics Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999)). Thus, the opt-out

provision in the Plan is inadequate to deem the non-debtor releases as consensual. Judge

Walraths analysis in Washington Mutual is on all fours with the circumstances here and is

equally compelling.

44. Additionally, because there is no penalty for any creditor who decides to opt-out(See Transcript of July 9, 2012 hearing at page 57) (excerpts from the transcript are attached

hereto as Exhibit D), a creditor who elects to opt-out of the release provision and one who

elects not to opt-out are treated exactly the same under the Plan. There is no logical reason for

any rational, well-informed creditor not to opt-out and preserve any potential recovery from

pending litigation against non-debtor parties. The only explanation is that the Debtor structured

the Plan with the opt-out clause as a ploy to sabotage pending litigation and to protect the Non-

Debtor Defendants from claims by victims of their violations of the Securities Laws, such as the

Putative Class. This is especially true when one considers the burden on a non-voting creditor

receiving no distribution to even locate the opt-out provision in the Disclosure Statement and the

massive solicitation package (like finding a needle in a haystack). What makes the opt-out

provision even more egregious is that neither the shareholders of Dynegy, and therefore potential

members of the Putative Class, nor Securities Litigation claimants, are even receiving a ballot to



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cast their vote on the proposed Plan. Indeed, class members who arent current shareholders did

not, upon information and belief, even receive a solicitation package. Rather, the Debtor places

the burden on the stakeholders, to review the entire solicitation package (if they received one)

and then create their own document to opt-out of the release, a process that is unprecedented,

unreasonable and draconian. The opt-out mechanism is no more than a trap for the unwary, not a

basis to find informed consent on the part of stakeholders.

45. The only creditor who would elect not to opt-out is a creditor who did not see orunderstand the opt-out provision. Such a release can not constitute an informed, voluntary and

knowing release of the Non-Debtor Defendants. To constitute a valid and enforceable release

under New York law, the release must be clear and unambiguous on its face and must be made

knowingly and voluntarily. Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir.

1998). Here, there is no proof that any creditor who did not opt-out, did so knowingly or

voluntarily with regard to their rights against non-debtor third-parties.

46. Furthermore, any possible reliance by the Debtor and the Creditors Committee atthe July 9, 2012 hearing on Metromedia for the proposition that an opt-out provision is a

proper mechanism to grant a non-debtor release, see Transcript of July 9, 2012 hearing at page

62 (Exhibit D), is completely misplaced. Metromedia does not discuss whether an opt-out

provision is sufficient to deem a third-party release consensual and to bind those creditors who

failed to opt-out. Rather, Metromedia focuses solely on whether non-debtor releases are

authorized under the Bankruptcy Code. See Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 141 (the only argument

we consider is that these releases were unauthorized by the Bankruptcy Code). Similarly, none

of the cases relied on by the Debtor in the Disclosure Statement in the Standards Applicable to

Releases section address an opt-out provision. See Disclosure Statement at 144. The Debtor



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has provided no case law that stands for the proposition that granting creditors an opt-out right

under the circumstances of this case is an appropriate method to obtain non-debtor releases and

would be sufficient to deem these releases consensual, especially where, as here, the impacted

stakeholder does not even have the right to vote on the Plan. Rather, Judge Walrath was right in

Washington Mutual when she unequivocally invalidated, as a confirmation matter, the opt-out

mechanism for approval of non-debtor releases. See Washington Mutual, 442 B.R. at 355.

47. The Debtors failure to provide adequate notice to all creditors and stakeholdersthat would be impacted and whose claims would be enjoined by the Plans release and injunctive

provisions, is another reason to ignore the opt-out mechanism. While the Debtor acknowledged

in its schedules that the Putative Class is a contingent creditor, the Debtor failed, upon

information and belief, to provide notice of any of its pleadings, including the Bar Date motion

and Disclosure Statement, to all parties who would be impacted by the Plans proposed

(improper) releases and injunctions. In the Securities Litigation, anyone who purchased Dynegy

stock during the Class Period is a potential member of the Putative Class, whether or not they

still hold the Dynegy stock. However, the Debtors provided notice only to those shareholders

who held stock as of the Petition Date, five months afterthe Class Period closed. Thus, not all of

the Putative Class members were provided with notice of their right to opt-out of the release

provision, because many purchased stock during the Class Period but sold the stock prior to the

Petition Date. By way of limited example, Litespeed Management, LLC currently owns 26% of

the common shares of Dynegy. See Docket No. 65. However, all of those shares were

purchased, upon information and belief, after the close of the Class Period. See Docket No. 91,

Page 2. Thus, at least26% of the shares potentially purchased by class members during the class

period are no longer owned by class members who thus received no notice of the bankruptcy



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proceedings. It would be inequitable and unjust to hold creditors accountable for failing to take

action that they did not know about due to the Debtors failure to provide proper notice. This

blatantly violates due process and would certainly not constitute a knowing, voluntary and

consensual release.

48. The Debtor may attempt to argue that this opt-out mechanism was resolved for allpurposes prior to the Confirmation Hearing, and that Lead Plaintiff is foreclosed from objecting

to the opt-out provision. That argument is a non-starter. At the July 9, 2012 hearing, counsel for

Dynegy repeatedly declared and confirmed that objections to the opt-out provisions are

appropriate and preserved for the confirmation hearing. See Transcript of July 9, 2012 hearing at

56-58 (Exhibit D) (whether or not non-debtor releases can be granted under applicable law is a

confirmation objection); (whether or not [the opt-out mechanism] works as a confirmation

matter is a preserved objection); (if they disagree they can object to [to the opt-out mechanism]

at confirmation); (that non-debtor releases are not appropriate or that opt-outs arent

appropriate [is] really a confirmation objection). Therefore, similar to Washington Mutual, the

Confirmation Hearing is the appropriate time for the Court to decide whether the opt-out

provision forms a basis for the approval of the patently illegal third-party releases.

C. Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class Must be Entitled to Proceed with TheirClaims Against the Debtors to the Extent of Available Insurance Coverage,

Irrespective of any Injunctions or Distribution under the Plan.

49. The Debtors maintain liability insurance policies in favor of their directors andofficers (the D&O Policies) for claims asserted in the Securities Litigation, as well as, upon

information and belief, for claims against the Debtors directly for violations of federal securities

laws. See Order Authorizing Continuation of Prepetition Insurance Policies in the Ordinary

Course of Business [Docket No. 81] (listing over thirty (30) Director & Officer insurance



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policies that the Debtor has been authorized to keep intact).3

Lead Plaintiff maintains that the

Putative Class is entitled to look to the proceeds of such insurance for payment in connection

with the claims of Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class and may, at the very least, pursue any

claims against the Debtors to the extent of such available insurance post-confirmation. Because

Lead Plaintiff likely does not have a direct action against the D&O insurance carriers under the

D&O Policies and applicable law, the proceeds of the D&O Policies may only be accessed

through the pursuit of the claims asserted in the Securities Litigation. Accordingly, the Plan

should not impact the rights of Lead Plaintiff or the Putative Class to pursue their claims against

the Debtors (outside of this chapter 11 case) to the extent of available proceeds of the D&O

Policies. Allowing the Securities Litigation to proceed against the Debtor solely to the extent of

available coverage under the D&O Policies would not have any negative impact or consequence

on the Debtor or Reorganized Dynegy.

50. It should be noted that by granting broad third party releases in the Plan, or bypreventing Lead Plaintiff from proceeding against Dynegy to the extent of the D&O Policies, the

Debtor would be providing the insurance carriers a windfall at the expense of the Putative Class.

The insurance carriers and the Debtor entered into the D&O Policies as arms-length agreements.

The D&O Policies were intended to provide the Debtor and the Non-Debtor Defendants with

protection in precisely this type of scenario. The Debtor likely paid a substantial sum of money

in premiums in order to have insurance coverage of this type for the claims asserted in the

Securities Litigation and even requested explicit Court authority to maintain these policies. There

is no justification provided as to why the insurance carriers should receive a windfall and

unexpected bonus at the expense of the Putative Class.

3Lead Plaintiff has served a very narrow and tailored document request on the Debtor, seeking, in part, copies of all

of the D&O Policies. Lead Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this objection based upon any information

contained in any such documents when produced.



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51. Therefore, the Plan and any Order confirming the Plan should provide that:Nothing in the Plan, or in any Order confirming the Plan, shall

preclude the Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class from pursuing

their claims in the Securities Litigation against the Debtor to the

extent of available insurance coverage and proceeds. The Claimsof the Lead Plaintiff and the Putative Class against the Debtor, to

the extent of available insurance, are preserved and not dischargedor enjoined by the Plan.

CONCLUSION

52. Based upon the foregoing, Lead Plaintiff respectfully requests that unless the Planis modified as set forth herein and/or the Confirmation Order includes the foregoing suggested

language, or language substantially similar thereto, an Order should be entered (i) denying

confirmation of the Plan and (ii) granting such other and further relief as the court deems just and

proper.

Dated: August 24, 2012

New York, New York.

LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC

/s/ Michael S. Etkin

LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PCMichael S. Etkin, Esq. (ME 0570)

John K. Sherwood, Esq. (JS 2453)1251 Avenue of the Americas, 18th Floor

New York, New York 10020


and

65 Livingston Avenue

Roseland, New Jersey 07068




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Bankruptcy Counsel to Lead Plaintiff

and the Putative Class

and

LEVI & KORSINSKY LLPNicholas I. Poritt, Esq.

1101 30th

Street, N.W. Suite 115Washington, DC 20007

(202) 524-4293

Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiff and the

Putative Class



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Case 1:12-cv-02307-JGK Document 1 Filed 03/28/12 Page 1 of 2011-38111-cgm Doc 955-1 Filed 08/24/12 Entered 08/24/12 16:15:52 Exhibit APg 2 of 21


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Exhibit B

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Exhibit C

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Exhibit D

11-38111-cgm Doc 955-4 Filed 08/24/12 Entered 08/24/12 16:15:52 Exhibit DPg 1 of 8


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1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

3 Case No. 11-38111(CGM)

4 Adv. Case No. 12-36728(CGM)

5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

6 In the Matter of:

7

8 DYNEGY HOLDINGS, LLC,

9

10 Debtors.

11

12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

13

14 United States Bankruptcy Court

15 One Bowling Green

16 New York, NY 10004

17

18 July 9, 2012

19 1:02 p.m.

20

21

22 B E F O R E :

23 HON CECELIA G. MORRIS

24 U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

25

Page 1

VERITEXT REPORTING COMPANY

212-267-6868 www.veritext.com 516-608-24



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1 easy as possible for people to opt out. We give them a

2 package and say opt out of the release, for no penalty, this

3 is not a coercive release or anything else, but they do

4 actually have to come forward and say we want a release,

5 that is consistent with applicable law.

6 What we need to do now is get approved by the

7 Court just the mechanism we're going to send it out to them

8 and they are going to have to respond. Whether or not that

9 works as a confirmation matter is a preserved objection.

10 We fully recognize that under Second Circuit law

11 there is a lot of learning on non-debtor releases now --

12 THE COURT: Right. Right.

13 MR. SHORE: -- and debtor releases and consensual

14 and non-consensual one. We believe from a plan mechanic

15 standpoint that's fine, if they disagree they can object to

16 it at confirmation, but from a solicitation perspective you

17 have to do something in order to tell people that this is a

18 opt-out provision.

19 All we're saying is what is here under applicable

20 law is sufficient to let people know that if they want out

21 of a release they need to let the company know.

22 Now if they want it in bold we can do it in bold.

23 That's the kind of objection that can be heard now to this

24 provision, but not that non-debtor releases are not

25 appropriate or that opt outs aren't appropriate, because

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1 that's really a confirmation objection.

2 We just need to establish that when we get to

3 confirmation that we did what we were supposed to do to let

4 you know that your claims are at risk and if you didn't opt

5 out you were going to be having a release imposed.

6 THE COURT: Do you have anything you would wish to

7 -- I mean, I'll even give you a preliminary. I would like

8 some law, but I'm leaning toward the negative notice. You

9 have the ability that Mr. Shore put out.

10 What would you like to change on this if I do do

11 that in such a way as you think it's a better notice of

12 disclosure? Disclosure, not plan, disclosure.

13 MR. SHERWOOD: Well, I think at this stage of the

14 game I'd ask the Court to consider not negative notice but

15 an actual opt into the release.

16 This is a plan where the shareholders of DI are

17 not getting any consideration. They've going to get a large

18 pile of paper, at least under the plan they're not getting

19 under consideration -- any consideration, although under the

20 settlement agreement that they're getting one percent plus

21 warrants, but it is a -- it's a lot of analysis.

22 There are between 11- and 12,000 current

23 shareholders, and I don't know how many former shareholders

24 who was also be in the class. So we're talking tens of

25 thousand of -- some people hold in street name and they have

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1 DH?

2 And secondly is the issue about mechanically is

3 the opt in or the opt out what -- can that -- which one of

4 those should you approve as part of the disclosure statement

5 order?

6 I think it's -- if we can do the second one first.

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 MR. PREIS: On the mechanic I think Mr. Shore was

9 correct. I mean there's precedent for allowing the opt out

10 in this circuit, but I think it's actually more

11 interesting --

12 THE COURT: Can you name one? I just want to

13 know.

14 MR. PREIS: I'll leave it to --

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's Metro Media.

16 THE COURT: Okay.

17 MR. PREIS: Yeah. But I think it's more actually

18 interesting that what you're hearing is the shareholder

19 saying, well, we need more -- people are going to need more

20 time with the disclosure statement once they get it and once

21 they can vote or decide to opt out they need more time to

22 figure that out whether they want to opt out or not. And

23 that's exactly the mechanic we built in, right?

24 Instead of shortening the period of solicitation

25 to 28 days, which is the statutory requirement, we've made

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1 THE COURT: And we will allow you to be heard on

2 those merits if you find them.

3 MR. SHERWOOD: Thank you.

4 MR. SHORE: All right --

5 THE COURT: After you talk to Mr. Case --

6 Mr. Whatever you name is.

7 MR. SHERWOOD: Shore.

8 THE COURT: Shore.

9 MR. SHORE: All right. We have three things left.

10 I can go through the administrative -- the case management

11 order if you want now, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Okay, good, thank you.

13 MR. SHORE: Okay.

14 (Pause)

15 THE COURT: I -- there's a part of me that would

16 like to give you a quick written decision, but I don't have

17 enough information to give you a written decision on the

18 opt-out clause. I mean I am relying on what you said about

19 what Judge Carey had said in that Delta case.

20 MR. SHERWOOD: That wasn't in opt out.

21 THE COURT: That wasn't your opt out, that was

22 your cause, right? Okay.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Metro Media.

24 THE COURT: Metro Media. Thank you.

25 MR. SHORE: All right. So this is going to be a

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1 C E R T I F I C A T I O N

2

3 I, Dawn South, certify that the foregoing transcript is a

4 true and accurate record of the proceedings.

5

6

7

8

9 AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D-408

10

11 Veritext

12 200 Old Country Road

13 Suite 580

14 Mineola, NY 11501

15

16 Date: July 11, 2012

17

18

19

20

21

22

Page 97

Dawn SouthDigitally signed by Dawn South

DN: cn=Dawn South, o=Veritext,

ou, [email protected],

c=US

Date: 2012.07.11 16:22:35 -04'00'


Lead Plaintiff's Objection to Dynegy Chapter 11 Plan

Documents

Transcript of Lead Plaintiff's Objection to Dynegy Chapter 11 Plan