Ld Brief 2014 March April

8/10/2019 Ld Brief 2014 March April

1/118

Foundation BriefsAdvanced Level March/April Brief

Resolved: Placing political conditions on

humanitarian aid to foreign countries is

unjust


2/118

March/April 2014 Table of

Contents

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 2 of 11#


3/118


Contents

Table of ContentsTable of Contents......................................................................................................................................................

Table of Contents......................................................................................................................................................

The Structure of a Foundation Brief......................................................................................................................

Definitions..................................................................................................................................................................

Definitions..................................................................................................................................................................Unconditional vs. Conditional Aid. BG.........................................................................................................

Definition of Humanitarian Aid TF...............................................................................................................

Status Quo is of Humanitarian Aid as Includin !olitical Conditions TF.....................................................

Definition of Humanitarian Aid to Include Disaster "elief TF....................................................................

Distinction from Develo#mental Aid TF......................................................................................................

Definition of conditional aid and the t$#es of #olicies included. CFS.........................................................

%lanations of the different t$#es of conditional aid. CFS.........................................................................

Definition of Aid De#endence. ABB.............................................................................................................

To#ic Anal$sis...........................................................................................................................................................

To#ic Anal$sis...........................................................................................................................................................

Defend 'our Source..................................................................................................................................................

Defend 'our Source..................................................................................................................................................

Authors...................................................................................................................................................................

(rani)ations.........................................................................................................................................................

Aff %vidence.............................................................................................................................................................

Aff %vidence.............................................................................................................................................................

General...................................................................................................................................................................

The international consensus is that conditionalit$ should not be a##lied to humanitarian action. CFS........

Im#artial Aid Better..............................................................................................................................................

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $ of 11#


4/118


5/118


Contents

Studies sho* that conditional aid is hihl$ unsuccessful, #articularl$ in Africa. CFS.................................

Conditional aid is the reason that Africa has a *ea2 domestic econom$ and #oor #olicies. CFS................

Israel5!alestine:Ga)a Stri#................................................................................................................................

Conditional aid sent to !alestine focused on #olitics and *as unsuccessful because it inored the realeconomic #roblems. CFS..............................................................................................................................

Conditional aid has reatl$ contributed to the structural issues of the !alestinian Authorit$. CFS........... ...

!olitical aid creates a s$stem of de#endenc$ and lon5term overnment instabilit$. CFS...........................

Short5term interventions *ould *or2 best *ith aid to the Ga)a Stri#. CFS.................................................

The international aid to the Ga)a Stri# is ver$ #olitical and has been accused of su##ortin the Israelioccu#ation. CFS............................................................................................................................................

Conditional aid has actuall$ sustained the Israel5!alestine conflict. CFS.....................................................

; additional *arrants to *h$ Ga)a Stri# aid has causes more conflict. CFS................................................

Ga)a Stri# aid has caused the Ga)ans to become ver$ de#endent on the humanitarian assistance. CFS.....

Conditions on aid to !alestine o##ress !alestinians. BG..............................................................................

3ant........................................................................................................................................................................

!olitical conditions treat other humans as sim#l$ means to an end. !+G....................................................

3ant-s Humanitarianism TF..........................................................................................................................

Deontolo$.............................................................................................................................................................

Humanitarian Aid fails Deontolo$ 6 +ot for the "iht !ur#oses TF.........................................................

9estern Dominance..............................................................................................................................................

!olitical Humanitarian Aid funds 9estern !olic$ Aendas TF.....................................................................

United States aid has an un0ustified militar$ aenda. !+G..........................................................................

The use of humanitarian aid *ith #olitical conditions is seen as im#erialist and threatens the safet$ of aid*or2ers. CFS.................................................................................................................................................

Table Sho*in (verreliance on Aid in !arts of Africa. ABB.......................................................................+eo5Colonialism...................................................................................................................................................

Conditional aid fuels de#endenc$ on *estern states in such a *a$ that it #romotes neo5colonialism. BG.........................................................................................................................................................................

9hen *e attach conditions of ood overnance to aid, this attem#ts to force *estern vie*s onto othercountries. BG................................................................................................................................................

foundationbriefs.co !a"e % of 11#


6/118


Contents

Conditions about ood overnance and democrac$ are attem#ts of the *est to increase control overother countries. BG.......................................................................................................................................

Conditioned aid has forced African countries to #ander to the 9est or let their citi)ens starve 6 this shiftsthe blame of colonialism to Africa and normali)es lobal in0ustice. BG.....................................................

Sovereint$.............................................................................................................................................................

!oliticall$ Aided Governments 1ose Sovereint$ TF..................................................................................

Inde#endence 3e$ to Humanitarian Aid TF.................................................................................................

+eutralit$ 3e$ to Humanitarian Aid TF.......................................................................................................

Humanit$ Used as


7/118


Contents

Humanitarian Aid is Crucial TF....................................................................................................................

8ust Combine !olitical and Social Aendas TF..........................................................................................

Unrestrained aid e&acerbated the situation in "*anda, Sudan, and 1iberia. !+G........................................

States (nl$ Have (bliations to Their (*n Citi)ens..........................................................................................

Governments onl$ have obliations to their o*n citi)ens. BG.....................................................................

9hen overnments do ive aid the$ must condition it to #rotect the freedom, *ellbein, and interests oftheir o*n citi)ens. Conditioned aid can be used to #romote a state-s o*n #olitical interests. BG...............

Aid in conflict situations is inherentl$ a #olitical tool. !+G.........................................................................

8ultilateral action is much more effective than unilateral action. !+G.......................................................


8/118


Contents

Conditional aid is 0ustified under the riht conditions. !+G.........................................................................

The #ractice of Smart Aid/ is an e&am#le of 0ustified conditional aid. !+G..............................................

Aid fails *ithout #ro#er administration. !+G..............................................................................................

Abilit$ to Attach Conditions Incentivi)es +G(s. ABB................................................................................

Un0ust to Forcibl$ Se#arate Aid and Intervention. ABB..............................................................................

Government Intervention 1eads to 1ess +on5Government Aid. ABB.........................................................

9omen-s "ihts Situation sho*s need to Chane Culture in man$ Cases. ABB.........................................

Secondar$ "ihts/ are


9/118


Contents

Fundraisin.............................................................................................................................................................

A#olitical Fundraisin more Successful TF.................................................................................................

Can-t Default to a AFF 8indset TF......................................................................................................................

Aff Counters..............................................................................................................................................................

Aff Counters..............................................................................................................................................................

A=> Conditional Aid Solves for Corru#t "eimes.................................................................................................

Conditional aid does not solve ?@@ for corru#t reimes. BG.....................................................................

A= Interovernmental (rani)ations Solve Self5Interest Arument.....................................................................

+ational Self5Interest is !resent %ven in


10/118

March/April 2014 )efinitions

The *tructure of a Foundation Brief

Topic Anal+sis

This is a eneral reflection on the resolution. It *ill #rovide to $ou an im#ression of the to#ic at hand,challenes $ou *ill face *hile debatin, and a #icture of *here *e see the debate headed.

Frae,or-

(ften times, the most im#ortant #art of the debate is to actuall$ *in before the debate beins. 9ith this

section, *e *ill set $ou u# for such a feat. 9ith uni4ue anal$sis on ho* to la$ the conditions for victor$, $ou*ill be uaranteed to bein battle alread$ *ith an advantae.

*trate"+ *ections

Foundation Briefs is committed to ma2in sure $ou understand the evidence #rovided to $ou. 9e *ill neversim#l$ thro* 4uotes at $ou and ho#e $ou can understand *hat *e are tr$in to im#l$. That is *here theStrate$ Section comes in. At the beinnin of all ma0or sections i.e. the section in the brief reardin al5Qaeda there *ill a##ear a small section of oriinal Foundation Briefs anal$sis to tell $ou ho* *e see theevidence bein used, *hat rhetoric *ill #lease the 0ude and *hich counteraruments to be #re#ared for.

Im#ortant note> 9eb#aes and online articles that are lon and continuous *ill al*a$s be cited as #ae one ?



11/118


DenitionsUnconditional vs. Conditional Aid. BG.

Cesi Cruz and Christina Schneider. (2012) The (Unintended) Electoral Effects of Foreign

Aid Projects.

Conditional aid refers to aid that is tied to a specic use such as buildin" a school or pursuin" an

infrastructure proect. nconditional aid is not tied to a specic use and usuall+ coes in for of bud"et

support.Unconditional aid #rovides the overnment *ith more e&ibilit$. Althouh overnments should useunconditional aid to consolidate their budet and to s#end the resources to #romote economic ro*th in the

most effective *a$, donors have almost no inuence on ho* the mone$ is s#ent once it is disbursed to the

reci#ient.??

Definition of Humanitarian Aid !

Global Humanitarian Assistance (2014).

EHumanitarian assistance- is aid and action desined to save lives, alleviate sufferin and maintain and #rotect

human dinit$ durin and in the aftermath of emerencies. The characteristics that mar2 it out from other forms

of forein assistance and develo#ment aid are that> It is intended to be overned b$ the #rinci#les of humanit$,neutralit$, im#artialit$ and inde#endence. It is intended to be short5term in nature and #rovide for activities in

the immediate aftermath of a disaster. In #ractice it is often difficult to sa$ *here Edurin and in the immediate

aftermath of emerencies- ends and other t$#es of assistance bein, es#eciall$ in situations of #roloned

vulnerabilit$. Traditional res#onses to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to cateorise as such, are those that

fall under the aeis of Eemerenc$ res#onse-> 8aterial relief assistance and services shelter, *ater, medicines

etc. %merenc$ food aid short5term distribution and su##lementar$ feedin #rorammes "elief coordination,

#rotection and su##ort services coordination, loistics and communications. But humanitarian assistance can

also include reconstruction and rehabilitation re#airin #re5e&istin infrastructure as o##osed to loner5term

activities desined to im#rove the level of infrastructure and disaster #revention and #re#aredness disaster ris2

reduction D"", earl$ *arnin s$stems, continenc$ stoc2s and #lannin. Under the (ranisation for%conomic Coo#eration and Develo#ment (%CD Develo#ment Assistance Committee DAC re#ortin

criteria, humanitarian assistance has ver$ clear cut5off #oints 6 for e&am#le, Edisaster #re#aredness- e&cludes

loner5term *or2 such as #revention of floods or conflicts. E"econstruction relief and rehabilitation- includes

re#airin #re5e&istin infrastructure but e&cludes loner5term activities desined to im#rove the level of

infrastructure. Humanitarian assistance is iven b$ overnments, individuals, +G(s, multilateral oranisations,



12/118


domestic oranisations and #rivate com#anies. Some differentiate their humanitarian assistance from

develo#ment or other forein assistance, but the$ dra* the line in different #laces and accordin to differentcriteria. 9e re#ort *hat others themselves re#ort as Ehumanitarian- assistance but tr$ to consistentl$ label and

source this.

)efinition that can be used on both sides for fair debate. Cut parts as needed.

"tatus #uo is of Humanitarian Aid as $ncluding Political Conditions !

BMJ, 2002. Separating Humanitarian Aid from Politics. British Medical Journal 324.


13/118


*ith strictl$ humanitarian motives/, as accordin to the United +ations General Assembl$ "esolution KN:?O=.

%fforts of im#artialit$ have commonl$ been #ursued in order to 2ee# focus on the afflicted #art$ rather than onforein and domestic #olitical aenda. This is a #oint of distinction from develo#mental aid. Humanitarian aid is

also uni4ue in its a##lication because it is t$#icall$ an immediate res#onse aimed at relievin sufferin in a

narro* time frame. 1on5term ob0ectives, *hich include rebuildin of infrastructure and alleviatin #overt$, are

rarel$ underta2en.

!aves ,a+ for >:7 ar"uent that pendin" political conditions on disaster relief is ta-in" advanta"e of

countries in a ,ea- state.

Distinction from Developmental Aid !

Diego, Nicholas (2010). The General Ineffectiveness of Foreign Aid: A Look at Poverty

Reduction.

)evelopental aid differs radicall+ fro huanitarian aid in that it has iense political roots and

focuses on lon"ter econoic and social developent. 8odern institutions of develo#mental aid can be

traced bac2 to the culmination of 9orld 9ar II *ith the creation of the 9orld Ban2 in ?KK and the 8arshall

!lan in ?K. Durin this #eriod, bilateralN develo#mental aid *as commonl$ used b$ the United States to

combat the s#read of communism and the influence of the USS" in the third *orld. Similar #olitical

motivations have remained #revalent *ell into the =?st centur$ dra*in 4uestion to the true intentions of

develo#mental aid donors. In an effort to subvert these #olitical motives, international orani)ations such as the

United +ations Develo#ment !roramme U+D! have emered to #rovide multilateral aid. P Des#ite ood

intentions, these orani)ations have become #laued b$ the ver$ same #roblem that affects bilateral aid> eneral

ineffectiveness. (ver the last five decades, 9estern nations have s#ent over =.; trillion dollars on forein aid

and have virtuall$ nothin to sho* for itO. This bes the 4uestion, *h$ have bilateral and multilateral aid efforts

failed in findin a solution to *orld #overt$

)iscards cards referrin" to developental aid.

Definition of conditional aid and the t%pes of policies included. C!"

Qarmout, Tamer. Beland, Daniel. (2012) The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza

Strip

Understandins of conditionalit$ have chaned over time. Classic conditionalit$, on the one hand, *as an

eression of the donor-s strateic and:or economic interest in addition to claims:conditions to ensure that the

aid *ould be channeled to achieve stated oals./; Conditionalit$ in the modern sense, on the other hand, is a set

of strateies em#lo$ed b$ donors to sti#ulate #olitical and:or economic chanes from the reci#ient that

other*ise ma$ not have been iven a #riorit$.K Thus, in the modern sense, there are t*o forms of conditionalit$>

economic and #olitical. %conomic conditionalit$, *hich *as introduced b$ the 9orld Ban2 and the International

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 1$ of 11#


14/118


8onetar$ Fund, tied economic aid to the im#lementation of s#ecific economic #olicies re4uired b$ the donors,

*hereas #olitical conditionalit$ usuall$ lin2s donor aid to the reci#ient-s im#lementin #rorams in such areasas democrati)ation and ood overnance. Althouh both t$#es of conditionalit$ are a##lied to assistance to

!alestine, this article focuses on #oliticall$ conditioned aid directed at b$#assin, isolatin, and *ea2enin the

Hamas administration in Ga)a.

&'planations of the different t%pes of conditional aid. C!"

Leader, Nicholas. Macrae, Joanna. (200) Terms of Engagement: Conditions and

Conditionality in Humanitarian Action

A number of s#ea2ers attem#ted to introduce reater clarit$ to an often unclear sub0ect. A distinction *as made

bet*een the conditions that need to e&ist in order for humanitarian *or2 to be #rinci#led and effective, and

conditionalit$ im#osed to brin these conditions about. (ne s#ea2er made a distinction bet*een im#licit

humanitarian conditionalit$, in other *ords humanitarians onl$ *or2in *here conditions *ere acce#table, and

elicit #olitical conditionalit$, i.e. donors im#osin #olitical demands on bellierents see Section =. Another

s#ea2er identified Eethical conditionall$-, or *ithdra*in *hen the Enet im#act- of aid *as harmful, Eleal

conditionalit$-, or conditionalit$ *ith the ob0ective of enforcin com#liance *ith international la*, and

E#olitical conditionalit$-, *hich *as to do *ith a donor-s forein #olic$ oals see Section P.

Definition of Aid Dependence. ABB

Brautigam, Deborah. (2004) Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan

Africa. Economic Development and Cultural Change.

Those *ho *rite about forein aid tend to avoid definin aid de#endence concretel$, but the im#lication is

almost invariabl$ that aid de#endence is a #roblematic condition caused b$, but not s$non$mous *ith, lare

transfers of aid. "oer "iddell, for e&am#le, has called aid de#endence that #rocess b$ *hich the continued

#rovision of aid appears to be a-in" no si"nificant contribution to the achieveent of selfsustainin"

developent.?"ehman Sobhan, *ritin in Banladesh, calls aid de#endence a state of mind, *here aid

reci#ients lose their ca#acit$ to thin2 for themselves and thereb$ relin4uish?=

control./ This article defines aiddependence as a situation in ,hich a "overnent is unable to perfor an+ of the core functions of

"overnent such as the aintenance of e@istin" infrastructure or the deliver+ of basic public services

,ithout forei"n aid fundin" and e@pertise provided in the for of technical assistance or proects. This

characteri)es man$ countries in Africa toda$, *here, as a team of African researchers chared not lon ao,

man$ overnments have develo#ed a co)$ accommodation *ith de#endenc$./



15/118


Determinin *hether #lacin conditions on aid ma2es aid de#endence more or less li2el$ *ill be central to

debates on this to#ic.

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 1% of 11#


16/118

March/April 2014 Topic

Anal+sis

Topic AnalysisThis to#ic is easil$ one of the better to#ics of the season. 9ith #lent$ of round on both sides as *ell as the#ossibilit$ for diverse aruments, #re#aration and critical thin2in *ill be #aramount. 9ith that, a cou#le ofthouhts on the resolution from the affirmative #oint of vie*>

The affirmative has com#ellin aruments that are both em#irical and theoretical. First, reardin the em#iricalaruments, stron evidence e&ists to suest that conditional aid often fails to achieve the established oals, is

#redicated u#on im#ractical conditions or leads to serious #roblems *ith the aid and aid relations. %vidence forall of these em#irical aruments is #rovided in this brief and the ood affirmative team *ill *ant to be *ellversed in all of the #otential issues. Indeed, combinin these aruments into one im#actful em#irical contentioncould be a stron #lace to start $our case.

(n the theoretical side of thins 3ant should #rovide a solid foundation as conditional humanitarian aid seemsto call the cateorical im#erative into 4uestion. Similarl$, more theoretical aruments rounded in #olitics andreal5*orld issues/ such as neo5colonialism, sovereint$ and deontolo$ should offer fertile affirmative round.As such, the o#timal affirmative strate$ #robabl$ s$nthesi)es one or more of these abstract aruments *ith theaforementioned em#irical contentions. This *ould une4uivocall$ have the neative #la$in catch5u# from theet5o.

(n the neative side of thins $ou *ill definitel$ be fihtin an u#hill battle. Ho*ever, $ou too have am#leround for reat arumentation. To bein, the neative *ill #robabl$ *ant to dis#el the notion that aidre#resents some form of obliation. 8an$ 0udes ma$ hold this #reconceived notion and $ou should eect tosee it from #re#ared affirmatives. If $ou allo* the 0ude to believe that aid is an obliation not an o#tion, $ou*ill alread$ be at a lare disadvantae *hen it comes to debatin *hat aid should loo2 li2e.

In terms of more constructive aruments, there is em#irical evidence that #oints to the value of conditional aid0ust as there is evidence to the contrar$. Gettin this out there 4uic2l$ and effectivel$ *ill be critical. Benefitsinclude reduced corru#tion, democrati)in effects and more #rofound im#acts for those tareted b$ the aid.From a theoretical stand#oint, the neative is at a sliht disadvantae but conce#ts such as the social contractand libertarianism should be hel#ful. For e&am#le, establishin that states have an obliation onl$ to their o*nciti)ens as a result of the social contract can lead to fruitful aruments about *hat aid-s oal is. Under this

frame*or2, the oal of ivin aid must be to ma2e the donatin countr$-s o*n #o#ulation safer or better off orthere is no 0ustification for aid under the social contract. If $ou can #rove that conditional aid achieves thoseoals better than blindl$ donatin mone$, $ou *ill have a ood shot at ta2in home the ballot.

9ith that, ood luc2R


17/118

March/April 2014 )efend our

*ource

Defend Your Source

Authors1aetitia Atlani 6 !rofessor of Anthro#olo$ at the Universit$ of !aris and Chief Technical Advisor for the U+.

8ohammed Haneef Atmar 5 !roramme 8anaer, +or*eian Church Aid Afhanistan !roramme.

Daniel Beland 6 Canada "esearch Chair in !ublic !olic$ at the


18/118


*ource

1ois Fieldin 6 !hD and !rofessor at Universit$ of Detroit 8erc$ 1a*.

Fiona Fo& 6 British relief service s#ecialist.

Su)anne Fran2s 6 !rofessor of !olitics and International "elations, Cit$ Universit$ of 1ondon.

Alan Ge*irth> !rofessor of !hiloso#h$ at Universit$ of Chicao.

Carol Graham> A senior fello* and the Charles "obinson Chair at the Broo2ins Institution, a Collee !ar2#rofessor at the School of !ublic !olic$ at the Universit$ of 8ar$land, a research fello* at the Institute for theStud$ of 1abor IA, and the author of numerous boo2s, #a#ers and edited volume cha#ters.

Gerald Helman> "etired from the Forein Service, *as U.S. ambassador to the United +ations in Geneva andde#ut$ to the under5secretar$ of state for #olitical affairs.

Saro0


19/118


*ource

Thomas !oe> A German #hiloso#her and the Director of the Global A visitin scholar in the Carneie %ndo*ment-s South Asia !roram. A visitin #rofessor atColumbia Universit$, *ith a 0oint a##ointment in the School of International !ublic Affairs and 8%SAAS, theDe#artment of the 8iddle %astern, South Asian, and African Studies.

3r"aniDationsBritish 8edical The GHA program works to provide objective, inde#endent, riorous data and

anal$sis around humanitarian financin and related aid flo*s and has develo#ed detailed and robustmethodoloies for calculatin the true value of humanitarian assistance that under#ins all of our *or2.

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 1( of 11#
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_access_(publishing)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_reviewhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_reviewhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Healthcare_journalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Healthcare_journalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_access_(publishing)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_reviewhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Healthcare_journal


20/118


*ource

International Crisis Grou# 5 International anti5conflict, non5#rofit, non5overnmental orani)ation, active inaround fift$ countries.



21/118

A Evidence



22/118

March/April 2014 AffE 7eneral

7eneralhe international consensus is that conditionalit% should not (e applied to humanitarian

action. C!"



There *as ho*ever, consensus that conditionalit$ should not be a##lied to humanitarian actionV that it is bothethicall$ and #racticall$ ina##ro#riate. %thicall$ it runs counter to the ver$ nature of humanitarianism.!racticall$ it is unli2el$ to have much im#act on bellierents an$*a$, o*in to the small role that aid #la$s intheir decision5ma2in. Ho*ever, there *as also consensus that there are re$ areas that need careful treatment.For e&am#le there is a subtle difference bet*een *ithdra*in because conditions are no loner riht forhumanitarian action, and settin demands or conditions on the authorities for re5startin *or2. The latter canresult in, in effect, Ehandin over the 2e$s- for restartin *or2 to the bellierents. A second re$ area is a resultof the blurrin of humanitarian and #olitical boundaries, *here the e&am#le of demandin e4ual access on thebasis of ender for instance could be seen as #olitical or humanitarian. There is also an unclear boundar$bet*een humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and develo#ment, *here #olitical conditionalit$ is more acce#table9hatever the form of conditionalit$, it *as #ointed out that those *ho im#ose it should be accountable for itsconse4uences.



23/118

March/April 2014 AffE

partial Aid Better

partial Aid Better$mpartial aid )ould increase the cooperation of states receiving aid and (enefit the glo(al

communit%. C!"



All donors #resent re5affirmed that need, i.e. im#artialit$, should be the sole criteria for fundin, but acce#ted

that there *as in realit$ #olitical #ressure on resource allocation. It *as arued that donors are not 0ust

che4ueboo2s and that the$ too should be bound b$ an active concern for #rinci#les and should not fund if the$consider *or2 to be ineffective and un#rinci#led. But it *as also em#hasised that donors should res#ect the

inde#endence of aencies as this is a 2e$ element of the humanitarian s$stem in that it enables them to res#ond

to need alone, free from #olitical #ressure. It *as also arued that the humanitarian idea *as in fact 4uite fraile

and that its lon5term survival re4uires that donor overnments do not attem#t to use it for short5term #olitical

oals. It *as suested that one *a$ of ensurin this *as to reinforce leislation in donor countries re4uirin

humanitarian fundin to be im#artial. It *as also suested that donors revie* the eerience of bodies such as

the Afhanistan Su##ort Grou# ASG and the Somali Aid Coordination Bod$ SACB *hich have develo#ed

in an ad hoc *a$. It *as also suested that adherence to humanitarian criteria be included in the DAC #rocess.

In addition, it *as suested that donors and forein #olic$ actors needed to understand humanitarian #rinci#les

better, and that humanitarian aencies had a role to #la$ in #ointin out the humanitarian conse4uences ofcertain courses of action.



24/118

March/April 2014 AffE >e"ative

pact on Gecipient Countr+

>e"ative pact on Gecipient Countr+Aid should help countries achieve political independence* not serve host nation+s agenda.

P,G

Recchia, Stefano. (2009) Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How Much External

Interference Can Be Justified?

At the #olitical level, liberalism in its various uises has al*a$s been concerned *ith freein individuals from

t$rann$ b$ #rovidin them *ith consent5based #olitical institutions. Ho*ever, leadin liberal internationalists

such as Immanuel 3ant, the forein #olic$ of all states, and of liberal states in #articular, should hel# *ar5torn

societies to develo# ne*, inclusive self5overnment structures *ithout im#osin an$ lon5term #olitical

solutions from the outside.

-Paternalistic aid is not justified according to /oc0e and 1ant. P,G

Recchia, Stefano. (2009) Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How Much External

Interference Can Be Justified?

%nlihtenment liberals such as


25/118


pact on Gecipient Countr+

Conditional aid actuall% harms recipient nation. P,G

Shah, Anup. (2012) Foreign Aid for Development Assistance.

As a condition for aid mone$, man$ donors a##l$ conditions that tie the reci#ient to #urchase #roducts onl$

from that donor. In a *a$ this miht seem fair and balanced/, because the donor ets somethin out of the

relationshi# as *ell, but on the other hand, for the #oorer countr$, it can mean #recious resources are used

bu$in more eensive o#tions, *hich could other*ise have been used in other situations. Furthermore, the

reci#ient then has less control and decision5ma2in on ho* aid mone$ is s#ent. In addition the ver$ nations that

t$#icall$ #romote free5mar2ets and less overnment involvement in trade, commerce, etc., ensure some notion

of *elfare for some of their industries. I!S noted that aid tied *ith conditions cut the value of aid to reci#ient

countries b$ some =5K@ #ercent, because it oblies them to #urchase uncom#etitivel$ #riced im#orts from the

richer nations. I!S *as citin a U+ %conomic Council for Africa stud$ *hich also noted that 0ust four countries

+or*a$, Denmar2, the +etherlands and the United 3indom *ere brea2in a*a$ from the idea of tied aid/

*ith more than @ #ercent of their aid untied/.



26/118


pact on Aid

>e"ative pacts 3n Aid and Aid GelationsPolitical conditions decrease 2ualit% of aid. P,G


"ecent increases Lin forein aidM do not tell the *hole truth about rich countries- enerosit$, or the lac2 of it.

8easured as a #ro#ortion of ross national income G+I, aid las far behind the @.P #ercent taret the United

+ations set ; $ears ao. 8oreover, develo#ment assistance is often of dubious 4ualit$. In man$ cases, Aid is

#rimaril$ desined to serve the strateic and economic interests of the donor countriesV (r Laid is #rimaril$

desinedM to benefit #o*erful domestic interest rou#sV Aid s$stems based on the interests of donors instead ofthe needs of reci#ients- ma2e develo#ment assistance inefficientV Too little aid reaches countries that most

des#eratel$ need itV and, All too often, aid is *asted on over#riced oods and services from donor countries.

Political conditions mean that nations )ho need it most do not receive aid. P,G


In =@?=, the (%CD noted an almost ; decline in aid over =@?@-s aid J the first decline in a *hile. Althouh

this decline *as eected at some #oint because of the financial #roblems in most *ealth$ nations, those same

#roblems are ri##lin to the #oorest nations, so a dro# in aid inorin unhealth$ reliance on it for the momentis sinificant for them. It *ould also not be sur#risin if aid declines or sta$s stanant for a *hile, as thins li2e

lobal financial #roblems not onl$ ta2e a *hile to ri##le throuh, but of course ta2e a *hile to overcome.

Durin recent $ears, some develo#in countries have been advancin thin2 China, India, Bra)il, etc. So if

there *as declinin aid due to man$ no loner needin it then that *ould be understandable. Ho*ever, as the

data sho*s, *hether it has been recent $ears, or throuhout the histor$ of DAC aid, the #oorest countries have

received onl$ a 4uarter of all aid. %ven durin recent increases in aid, these allocations did not chane.

Political conditions encourage aid relations )ith corrupt leaders and states. C!"

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Smith, Alastair. (2009) A Political Economy of Aid

The second 4uestion focuses attention on the corru#t uses to *hich aid mone$ is often #ut. The theor$ suests

that these corru#t uses b$ small5coalition, autocratic leaders, are an essential, if not necessaril$ conscious, #art

of the decision b$ donors to ive aid, as *ell as bein in the more obvious interest of corru#t leaders in

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 2& of 11#


27/118


pact on Aid

receivin aid. 1are5coalition donors de#end on effective #olic$ im#lementation for their #olitical survival.The$ find it easier to #urchase #olic$ concessions from small5coalition leaders *ho rel$ on cron$ism and

corru#tion as those leaders can best afford to sacrifice their o*n societ$s #ublic5oods5oriented #olicies to sta$

in #o*er.

he amount of need does not affect the amount of aid from political donors. C!"


Humanitarian need, as indicated b$ life eectanc$, does not seem to motivate the decision to ive aid b$ either

the United States or other (%CD members. +either does it substantiall$ affect the amount of aid iven. Donorsive aid to lare, eora#hicall$ #ro&imate states, es#eciall$ those *ith *hom the$ maintain trade relations or

*hose securit$ alinments ma$ be u# for rabs. The neediest do not receive the mostV rather, those *hose #olic$

com#liance can be #urchased at an affordable #rice a##arentl$ are offered aid and aree to ta2e it.

-Phantom Aid is not justified. P,G


This $ear *e estimate that X;P billionJrouhl$ half of lobal aidJis #hantom aid/, that is, it is not

enuinel$ available to #oor countries to fiht #overt$.W +o*here is the challene of increasin real aid as ashare of overall aid reater than in the case of technical assistance. At least one 4uarter of donor budetsJsome

X? billion in =@@KJis s#ent in this *a$> on consultants, research and trainin. This is des#ite a ro*in bod$

of evidenceJmuch of it #roduced b$ donors themselves and datin bac2 to the ?N@sJthat technical assistance

is often over#riced and ineffective, and in the *orst cases destro$s rather than builds the ca#acit$ of the #oorest

countries.W Althouh this ineffectiveness is an o#en secret *ithin the develo#ment communit$, donors

continue to insist on lare technical assistance com#onents in most #ro0ects and #rorammes the$ fund. The$

continue to use technical assistance as a soft/ lever to #olice and direct the #olic$ aendas of develo#in

countr$ overnments, or to create o*nershi# of the 2inds of reforms donors deem suitable. Donor funded

advisers have even been brouht in to draft su##osedl$ countr$ o*ned/ #overt$ reduction strateies./

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 2' of 11#


28/118


Conditions neffective

Conditions neffectivePolitical conditions are ineffective )hen placed (% ,G3s. P,G

Chong, Daniel (2002) UNTAC in Cambodia: A New Model for Humanitarian Aid in

Failed States?

A distinction should be made bet*een the conditions #ut on aid from lare donor institutions, such as the 9orld

Ban2 and I8F, and the #ros#ect of +G(s attachin conditions to their aid. International financial institutions

invariabl$ attach strins to their loans, ranin from timel$ re#a$ment, to mar2et reforms, to democrati)ation.

These actors are relativel$ *ell co5ordinated com#ared to +G(s, and can e&ercise a lare amount of leveraeover reci#ient overnments. To the e&tent that these lare donors can be #ersuaded to attach #eace conditions to

their assistance rather than or at least in addition to structural ad0ustment conditions, it should im#rove the

im#act of aid on conflict. Unfortunatel$, even these donors face self5im#osed ideoloical, #olitical, and #ractical

constraints that #revent them from e&ercisin effective conditionalit$ see Bo$ce, this volume. 3n the other

hand >73s "enerall+ have less levera"e are insufficientl+ coordinated and ta-e ore responsibilit+ for

protectin" the ost vulnerable populations in a conflict. Therefore attachin" conditions to their aid is

ore probleatic. Harious approaches have been eplo+edfor details, see Bo$ce, this volume. n all

cases conditionalit+ ,ould have the dual "oals of atteptin" to pressure ,arrin" factions to end the

conflict and allo,in" food and edical supplies to reach vulnerable populations ,ithout obstruction

Barber 1(('< Lund 1(('< !render"ast 1((&. 3f course the proble ,ith this approach is that

threatenin" to use the 5stic-6 the ,ithdra,al of aid often eans ris-in" the lives of thousands of non

stop cobatants cau"ht in the iddle of the ,ar Done. For an+ huanitarian or"aniDations andated

to save as an+ lives as possible this option is sipl+ not acceptable< it is tradin" shortter disaster for

lon"ter potential Bo$ce, this volume. Moreover ,hen an aid or"aniDation uses threats or strict

conditions in its ne"otiations ,ith ,arrin" parties it a+ cause the belli"erents to distrust the

ipartialit+ of the or"aniDation6s otives and a+ sour relations bet,een the or"aniDation and the

parties Anderson 1(((. :ven if aid or"aniDations tr+ to a-e huanitarian aid conditional on a peace

a"reeent or a Code of Conduct the+ a+ still have difficulties ,ith proper ipleentation. 3ne part+

to a conflict a+ actuall+ ,ant aid to be pulled out eliinatin" the levera"e that aid or"aniDations thin-

the+ have Lund 1(('. 3r soe of the ,arrin" parties a+ be unable to copl+ ,ith the conditions set

b+ aid or"aniDations for e@aple ,hen basic state institutions are not functionin" renderin"

conditionalit+ probleatic.

"tudies sho) that political conditions do not increase effectiveness. P,G

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 2# of 11#


29/118



Crawford, Gordon (1997) Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues ofEffectiveness and Consistency

The main findin, ho*ever, from this evaluation of the im#act of donor restrictive measures is their failure to

contribute to #olitical chane in ?O out of = countr$ cases N= #er cent. Ho* is this lac2 of effectiveness to be

accounted for "easons can be elored alon t*o dimensions. (ne #ro#osition is the relativel$ #artial and

*ea2 nature of the measures im#osed b$ the donors. The other is the relative strenth of the reci#ient countr$

overnment to resist the #rivations involved. (f course, man$ countr$ cases *ill be elained b$ a combination

of the t*o dimensions.

A stud% of U" (ilateral aid data sho)s conditional aid does not focus on advancing societal

)ell4(eing. C!"


9e develo# and test im#lications of a ne* model derived from Bueno de 8es4uita and colleaues selectorate

theor$ of #olitical com#etition. Bueno de 8es4uita and colleaues s#eculated about the e4uilibrium conditions

associated *ith forein aid but offered no formal model of the #rocess and onl$ limited tests of their

con0ectures. Bueno de 8es4uita and Smith modeled the #olitical incentives for donor leaders to offer aid and

for reci#ient leaders to acce#t it, but the$ did not include the #ros#ect of barainin over the si)e of

concessions.?@ The$ tested their models #redictions usin U.S. bilateral aid data. The model here enerali)esBueno de 8es4uita and Smiths earlier model b$ allo*in nations to barain over the si)e of #olic$

concessions. This ne*, more eneral model leads to ne* im#lications that are tested here usin bilateral aid

flo*s from all (%CD donors. As *e shall summari)e belo*, the literature suests that the United States is

motivated to ive aid for different reasons than other states. 1oo2in across the (%CD, our anal$sis finds no

such difference. Ie find that in all nations aid transfers occur accordin" to the political survival interests

of donor and recipient "overnent leaders as identified b+ the theor+. Gecipient and donor leaders see-

substantive policies and resource allocations that protect their hold on po,er. To the e@tent that such

policies and allocations are copatible ,ith "ood econoic or social perforance the+ ,ill a-e social

,elfare enhancin" J"oodJ decisions. et such instances are coincidental. f faced ,ith a contradiction

bet,een actions that enhance their o,n political ,elfare and actions that advance societal ,ellbein"

donor and recipient leaders ,ill select those policies that benefit theselves.

he amount of aid given )hen there are political conditions is (ased on political survival and



30/118



not )hat )ould (e successful. C!"


The results indicate that the amount of aid iven and to *hom it is iven are both consistent *ith the decisions

eected from #olitical leaders *ho are motivated to enhance their #olitical survival. As such, at least #art of aid

ivin a##ears to be driven b$ institutionall$ induced considerations in reci#ient and donor nations. Thus, the

ans*er to the first 4uestion #osed above is that the riht amount of aid is iven for the #ur#oses that motivate

donors and reci#ients, even if this is subo#timal from the #ers#ective of alleviatin #overt$.

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $0 of 11#


31/118


:pirical :@aples

:pirical :@aplesPolitici5ed Humanitarian Aid Bad 6 "%ria Proves !

Curtis, Devon (2001). Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension.

Humanitarian Policy Group.

*-uric!rodanovic sho,s that the political conditionalit+ of Iestern aid polic+ in the Bal-ans led to

distinctions bet,een vulnerable "roups that did not correspond to their level of need and that created

patterns of inclusion and e@clusion. *oe donor "overnents sa, huanitarian assistance to *erbia as

bein" opposed to their forei"n polic+ interests.The$ feared that aid *ould be re5channelled into the hands ofthe overnment. S2uric5!rodanovic arues that, for man$ 9estern donors, es#eciall$ +AT( members,

humanitarian aid *as seen as su##ortin the lonevit$ of the 8ilosevic reime, and as counter5#roductive to

their decision to intervene in 3osovo. 9estern overnments had difficult$ se#aratin the notion of humanitarian

assistance from the #olitical situation, *hen the ma0orit$ of the #o#ulation in Serbia seemed to be su##ortin

the 8ilosevic overnment. %ven *hen humanitarian aid *as delivered to Serbia, there *ere e&am#les of

inclusion and e&clusion. For instance, there *as a differentiation bet*een #eo#le *ho had been dis#laced from

3osovo in ? and =@@@, and #eo#le *ho had been dis#laced bet*een ?= and ?N, even thouh man$ lived

in ver$ similar conditions, often in the same refuee cam#s. 1i2e*ise, S2uric5!rodanovic sho*s that, b$ the

second half of =@@@, some urban areas in central Serbia received lare amounts of humanitarian assistance,

*hile other more remote areas that *ere mainl$ controlled b$ the reime suffered a severe lac2 of aid. Adistinction *as also made bet*een dis#laced and non5dis#laced #eo#le, contributin to the alienation of

internall$ dis#laced #ersons and refuees in local communities in Serbia, and causin tensions to rise. This has

led Serbs to see humanitarian aid aencies as tools of 9estern overnments, rather than as neutral or im#artial

actors. S2uric5!rodanovic believes that the #oliticisation of humanitarian assistance and the e&clusion resultin

from it has had a neative effect on the lives of vulnerable rou#s in Serbia, and has devalued the currenc$ of

humanitarianism in the e$es of Serbs.

:vidence in this section can be used for the AFF.

Politici5ed Humanitarian Aid Bad 6 1osovo Proves !



Accordin" to Iood,ard >AT36s 5huanitarian6 intervention on behalf of the Albanian population of

Kosovo in Marchune 1((( represents the final collapse of the divide bet,een huanitarianis and

politics ,ith the "eneral consensus that 3peration Allied Force ,as re"rettable but that there ,as no



32/118


33/118


:pirical :@aples

as a forein5#olic$ instrument to isolate the Taliban. The humanitarian #rinci#les of humanit$, im#artialit$,neutralit$ and inde#endence are secondar$ to forein5#olic$ interests, and are abandoned *hen the$ conflict

*ith them. 9hile Afhanistan received the hihest #er ca#ita aid in its histor$ durin the Cold 9ar,

humanitarian budets *ere cut dramaticall$ after the "ussian *ithdra*al in ?OO6O, des#ite continued human

sufferin. 9hile donors ma$ have leitimate forein5#olic$ concerns reardin the Taliban, arues Atmar,

subordinatin humanitarian #rinci#les to other #olitical ob0ectives has resulted in the loss of Afhan lives. For

instance, Atmar states that, if humanitarian aid aencies *ere able to receive unconditional humanitarian

resources and allo*ed to *or2 *ith the #ublic health authorities, the$ ma$ be able to save the lives of childrenV

one out of four children die before five $ears of ae, and O,@@@ die each $ear from diarrhea. n response to the

discriinator+ policies and practices of the Taliban donors and soe aid a"encies have iposed punitive

conditionalities includin" on securit+ "ender e;ualit+ and developent/capacit+buildin". The net

ipact has been the restriction of the ri"ht to huanitarian assistance and the inabilit+ of the

international assistance counit+ to ade;uatel+ address short ter lifesavin" needs. Accordin" to

Atar the iron+ is that donors continue to use punitive conditionalities even thou"h the+ have not

produced the desired political and social chan"es and have had ne"ative huanitarian conse;uences.

:pirical e@aple ,ith Af"hanistan.

Politici5ed Humanitarian Aid Bad 6 Afghanistan Proves !

Atmar, Mohammed (2001). Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for

Afghans. Politics & Humanitarian Aid; Debates, Dilemmas & Dissension

Conference.

Currentl$, domestic and forein #olic$ concerns over terrorism, drus, outflo* of refuees and #rotection of

*omen-s rihts at rhetorical level trier a res#onse from the *est *hich is characteri)ed b$ a #arado&ical

mi&ture of strateic *ithdra*al, containment and sinle5issue aression. n political ters instead of

eplo+in" a coprehensive polic+ of resolvin" the ultila+ered conflict of Af"hanistan ,hich is part of

a re"ional conflict s+ste threatenin" peace and stabilit+ in the re"ion the po,erful states dele"ate peacea-in" responsibilit+ to >. t is ho,ever transparentl+ obvious that nothin" of value is li-el+ to coe

out fro the > efforts Male+ 1((# ,ithout a reasonable level of ,estern coitent and support

both political and econoic. et the sae po,ers underine the peace a-in" efforts of the > b+

iposin" sanctions ,ith a onesided ars ebar"o. This *ill not onl$ #rolon the *ar and its disastrous

conse4uences for Afhans *ho alread$ reel under the continued effects of the crisis over the #ast t*o decades,

but *ill also undermine U+-s role as an im#artial #eace ma2er.

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $$ of 11#


34/118


:pirical :@aples

During R)andan Genocide* conditional aid e'acer(ated human rights a(uses. P,G

Boyce, James (2002) Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and

Constraints

8an$ donors are reluctant to ac2no*lede the #olitical im#acts of their aid. This is es#eciall$ true of the

international financial institutions IFIs, *here diverent vie*s amon member overnments often ma2e

#olitical issues #articularl$ controversial. The Articles of Areement of the 9orld Ban2, for e&am#le, s#ecif$

that the Ban2 shall ma2e loans Y*ith due attention to considerations of econom$ and efficienc$ and *ithout

reard to #olitical or other non5economic influences or considerations. 'et, aid inevitabl$ has #olitical im#acts.

Aid does not flo* to countries in the abstract, but rather to s#ecific rou#s and individuals *ithin a countr$. In

so doin, it affects balances of #o*er. Consider, for e&am#le, the im#act of aid to "*anda in the $ears

#recedin the ?K enocide. From the late ?O@s to the earl$ ?@s, the annual flo* of aid to the "*andan

overnment rose b$ @ #er cent, not*ithstandin the reime-s com#licit$ in incitin violence b$ Hutu

e&tremists aainst the Tutsi minorit$. YIn so doin, !eter Uvin ?O> =;P observes, Ythe aid s$stem sent a

messae . . . and it essentiall$ said that, on the level of #ractice and not discourse, the aid s$stem did not care

undul$ about #olitical and social trends in the countr$, not even if the$ involved overnment5s#onsored racist

attac2s aainst Tutsi-.



35/118


:pirical :@aples

Politici5ed of Aid 7iolates the !our enants of Humanitarianism !



The nternational Coittee of the Ged Cross CGC has an ethical frae,or- -no,n as its

fundaental principles or principles of huanitarian action. These principles universalit+

ipartialit+ independence and neutralit+ define and deliit the huanitarian space ,ithin ,hich the

CGC operates. These Ged Cross principles have had a profound ipact on ,ider huan itarianis.

Iithin huanitarian a"encies there has been a"reeent on the 5huanitarian iperative6 the idea

that huan sufferin" necessitates a response.There is also *ide areement on the #rinci#les of im#artialit$and universalit$. The #rinci#les of neutralit$ and inde#endence have also been borro*ed b$ other humanitarian

aencies, althouh more e4uivocall$, and b$ fe*er oranisations.Accordin to !as4uier, the ne* form of

#oliticisation of humanitarian aid ma$ challene all four of these #rinci#les. Universalit$ and im#artialit$ im#l$

that humanitarian action should reach all conflict victims, no matter *here the$ are, or *hich side the$ su##ort.

Im#artialit$ means that humanitarian res#onse should be uided b$ need alone, and that there should be no

distinction bet*een Eood- and Ebad- beneficiaries. et b+ subordinatin" huanitarian obectives to political

and strate"ic ones soe victis a+ be seen as ore deservin" than others and ipartialit+ is fore"one.

For instance, S2uric5!rodanovic sho*s that the level of humanitarian res#onse in Serbia in the second half of

? *as much lo*er than in Albania and 8acedonia. In 8ontenero, humanitarian aid *as also more than

abundant. These differences did not corres#ond to different levels of need. S2uric5!rodanovic arues that fe*donors *ere *illin to fund humanitarian assistance in Serbia, and fe* international +G(s *ere *illin to face

the difficulties of *or2in there, and therefore chose the more #rominent and E#oliticall$ correct- 3osovo,

8acedonia, Albania and 8ontenero.

Moral ar"uent for the AFF. !oliticiDed huanitarian aid is not huanitarian.

8%anmar onl% desires aid that is nonpolitical. P,G

International Crisis Group, (2002) Myanmar - The Politics of Humanitarian Aid.

In the earl$ ?@s, the overnment5in5e&ile, the +ational Coalition Government of Burma +CGUB, called for

a total aid bo$cott. It *as adamant that no international aid oranisations, includin U+ aencies, should be in8$anmar. Their #resence, it arued, merel$ served to leitimise an illeitimate reime, *as mani#ulated b$ the

overnment for #olitical #ur#oses, and thus *as unable to hel# intended beneficiaries. The$ should focus

instead on hel#in 8$anmar refuees in neihbourin countries and develo#in cross5 border #rorams in areas

outside overnment control.??

This #osition *as embraced b$ e&ile rou#s and #ro5democrac$ activists around

the *orld, *ho have accused 6 and in some cases still accuse 6 aid oranisations *or2in in 8$anmar of not

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $% of 11#


36/118


:pirical :@aples

understandin Ethe real situation- in the countr$.Some have even arued, some*hat contradictoril$, that aid

*ould undermine the #eo#le-s thirst for freedom and thus #ost#one Ethe revolution- that *ould usher in a ne*

era of democrac$. The +1D in 8$anmar has souht to outline a more nuanced #osition, *hich re0ects aid to the

overnment but su##orts aid to the #eo#le. Soon after her release from house arrest in ? International aid aencies have

an obliation to *or2 in close coo#eration or consultation *ith the elected +1D leadershi#. = Aid should be

delivered to the riht #eo#le in the riht *a$-. In later intervie*s, the influential +obel laureate has eanded

on this theme, aruin that the +1D is not aainst aid as lon as it is not channelled throuh overnment

structures, is #ro#erl$ monitored, and distributed e4uall$ to all those in need, irres#ective of their #olitical

vie*s.

Conditionalit% )as counterproductive in Haiti. P,G

Buss, Terry (2006) Why Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed

Conditionalit$ in the Haitian case ma$ have been counter#roductive, confrontational, or misuidedJtimin,

#olitical feasibilit$, cultural barriersJthereb$ increasin aid ineffectiveness CIDA, =@@K.The 9orld Ban2

concluded>Wthe Ban2 has been unable to leveraeJconditionalit$, dela$ed #roram:#ro0ect fundin, overall

levels of fundinJin su##ort of the im#lementation of im#ortant reforms, #articularl$ in overnance and #ublic

sector manaement and in sound economic #oliciesV #olitical #ressures of other sta2eholders and the frailit$ of

the *hole situation *ere sim#l$ too reat to allo* the Ban2 to o#erate as it *ould have in a more normal

settin/ =@@K, #. N5P. Canadians o#ined that> Haiti e&em#lifies some of the neative conse4uences ofconditionalit$ for both reci#ient and donor. ?K to ?P *as mar2ed b$ donor5driven reform aendas and

conditionalit$5based financin in Haiti. "esults from this #eriod are unsur#risin. Donor5driven aendas

contributed to #oor commitment and ineffective im#lementation on the #art of the overnment of Haiti and to

frustration and Haiti fatiue for the donor communit$. This in turn contributed to the *ithdra*al of some donor

aencies. Follo*in the =@@@ dis#uted elections, strict conditionalit$ *as im#osed to #romote trans#arenc$ of

overnance, solid macroeconomic #olicies, and fiscal res#onsibilit$. (nce aain, it is hihl$ 4uestionable ho*

constructive this set of conditionalit$ *as iven that the s$stem did not reformW/ CIDA, =@@K, #. ??.

Politics are responsi(le for the failed humanitarian aid during the Darfur crisis. 9ithoutpolitical conditions it could have (een successful. C!"

Bridges, KM (2010). Between Aid and politics: Diagnosing the Challenge of

Humanitarian Advocacy in Politically Complex Environments-the Case of Darfur,

Sudan

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $& of 11#


37/118


38/118


:pirical :@aples

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $# of 11#


39/118


:pirical :@aples

srael!alestine/7aDa *trip

Conditional aid sent to Palestine focused on politics and )as unsuccessful (ecause it ignored

the real economic pro(lems. C!"


Strip

In anal$)in the role of donor assistance in the !alestinian5Israeli conflict, it is essential to e&amine t*o

im#ortant issues. The first issue is aid-s #olitical aenda, and the second is the conte&t of assistance-s #lanninand deliver$. In the !alestinian conte&t, 3halil +a2leh has arued that, since the beinnin of the #eace #rocess,

the aid aenda has been hihl$ #olitical and associated *ith donor ob0ectives and #references. Thus, the

#olitical ob0ectives of each donor *ere al*a$s reflected in the timin and nature of aid. Conditional aid to the

!A *as also intimatel$ tied to #roress in the #eace #rocess and, in man$ cases, it *as to achieve s#ecific

#olitical oals instead of aimed #rimaril$ at solvin concrete social and economic #roblems.??

Conditional aid has greatl% contri(uted to the structural issues of the Palestinian Authorit%.

C!"


Strip

8oreover, the continuous setbac2s in the #eace #rocess and their neative securit$ and economic conse4uences

have, on man$ occasions, contributed to shiftin the focus of the aid aenda. Under the (slo accords,?= Israel

2e#t its control over land, *ater, labor, and ca#ital, as *ell as borders. Accordin to Sara "o$, closure #olicies

have created severe restrictions on movement bet*een the Ga)a Stri# and the 9est Ban2 and have turned the

latter into a bal2ani)ed area *here reions are se#arated from one another b$ securit$ chec2#oints.?; B$ =@@P,

follo*in $ears of massive donor financin, "o$ indicates, such #olicies contributed materiall$ to s$stemic,

#robabl$ irreversible structural missha#es in the !alestinian Authorit$. It has more than doubled financial

assistance to the !alestinians since =@@@, $et is loc2ed into #olicies that are brinin about the ver$

humanitarian crisis it see2s to alleviate, *hile eneratin lon5term de#endence on e&ternal fundin./?K (verall,

as this 4uotation suests, international aid to !alestine is controversial in its #olitics and #roblematic in its

effects.

Political aid creates a s%stem of dependenc% and long4term government insta(ilit%. C!"

foundationbriefs.co !a"e $( of 11#


40/118


:pirical :@aples

Qarmout, Tamer. Beland, Daniel. (2012) The Politics of International Aid to the GazaStrip

8aha "e)e4, a !alestinian #rofessional *ith e&tensive *or2 eerience *ith Save the Children and the United

+ations Children-s Fund U+IC%F in Ga)a, arues that channelin funds throuh international aid aencies

and civil5societ$ institutions has hel#ed #er#etuate the humanitarian crisis b$ su##ortin an aid industr$ in

*hich civil5societ$ institutions ta2e over the res#onsibilities of the nearl$ d$sfunctional overnment, rather than

hel#in the overnment meet the needs of its #eo#le in times of crisis. %ssentiall$, this scenario limits the

overnment-s autonom$, leadin to lon5term instabilit$. In doin so, it also inores larer communit$ needs.=@

"hort4term interventions )ould )or0 (est )ith aid to the Ga5a "trip. C!"


Strip

(verall, the donor communit$ #referred to fund short5term humanitarian interventions that lac2 sustainabilit$

and reinforce the Ga)a Stri#-s economic de#endenc$. This #olic$ *as aimed at #reventin a humanitarian crisis

in the Ga)a Stri# *hile, simultaneousl$, #reventin the Hamas overnment from achievin an$ tanible

#roress on the social and economic fronts.

Aid interventions ,ith political conditions are "enerall+ lon" ter. The 7aDa *trip ,ould be better off,ith shortter eer"enc+? aid.

he international aid to the Ga5a "trip is ver% political and has (een accused of supporting

the $sraeli occupation. C!"


Strip

Since the Hamas ta2eover of the Ga)a Stri# and the Israeli bloc2ade over Ga)a *hich follo*ed, aid #olicies in

the Hamas5controlled Ga)a Stri# have been heavil$ influenced b$ #olitics. The decision b$ the internationalcommunit$ and the Quartet to bo$cott the Hamas overnment acted as the mainframe for aid interventions in

the Ga)a Stri#. In the aftermath of the Israeli attac2 on Ga)a in =@@O6, the members of the Quartet, *ho

re#resent the main international #olitical #la$ers in the #eace #rocess and the donor communit$ at lare, have

been accused of steadil$ su##ortin the Israeli occu#ation and turnin a blind e$e to *hat


41/118


:pirical :@aples

Conditional aid has actuall% sustained the $srael4Palestine conflict. C!"


Strip

(verall, donor #olicies in the Hamas5run Ga)a Stri# have been sha#ed b$ the #olitical stand of the international

communit$ and bodies such as the Quartet to*ard Hamas. These #olicies have not been neutral and have not

#la$ed a constructive role in resolvin the !alestine5Israel conflict and enablin !alestinians to achieve their

#olitical, social, and economic as#irations. Instead, these #olicies have #la$ed a role in sustainin the Israel5

!alestine conflict and the Israeli occu#ation *hile fuelin the !alestinian internal s#lit b$ ta2in sides.

additional )arrants to )h% Ga5a "trip aid has causes more conflict. C!"


Strip

In the Hamas5run Ga)a Stri#, the conduct of aid #olicies under the Israeli bloc2ade has e&acerbated the

#olitical, social, and economic #roblems and challenes facin !alestinians. First, aid assistance has been used

to undermine Hamas-s role in the Stri# b$ su##ortin and sustainin the !alestinian #resident-s decision to

#revent !A #ublic servants from re#ortin to dut$. Such decisions have had ver$ neative conse4uences,

includin the deterioration of #ublic services and the eansion of Hamas-s ideoloical influence throuh itscontrol of such 2e$ #ublic sectors as education. Second, donor #olicies have #olitici)ed the #resumabl$ neutral

role of international aid aencies in the Ga)a Stri# throuh im#osin man$ restrictions on their o#erations,

includin the no5contact #olic$. B$ encourain Hamas to taret them, this #olic$ has also created difficult

*or2in conditions for man$ local orani)ations #artnerin *ith international actors. Third, to a lare e&tent,

donor #olicies have failed to res#ond to the recover$ and develo#ment needs of the Ga)a residents in the

aftermath of the =@@O Israeli *ar and in the ne* conte&t created b$ the tunnel econom$.

Ga5a "trip aid has caused the Ga5ans to (ecome ver% dependent on the humanitarian

assistance. C!"

Qarmout, Tamer. Beland, Daniel. (2012) The Politics of International Aid to the GazaStrip

Finall$, donor #olicies have failed to challene the Israeli bloc2ade of the Ga)a Stri#. The Israeli bloc2ade is

sustained because of the international communit$-s decision to deliver, throuh its donor rou#s, assistance aid

in a hihl$ constrained environment. This debilitatin economic environment has made Ga)ans increasinl$

de#endent on humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, Hamas has manaed to survive the economic sanctions and



42/118


43/118


:pirical :@aples

and the convenience of donor capitals.The international communit$, #articularl$ the main humanitariandonor overnments, must understand that their a##roach of #rovidin lare sums of mone$ *ithout callin forthe end of the bloc2ade and occu#ation is not the best *a$ to hel# the !alestinians 6 in realit$, it allo*s the#rotraction of the humanitarian crisis. The current #eriod is critical. Donors need to bac2 the aencies the$ fund*ith a real commitment to buildin a !alestinian state, somethin the$ all aree to. The absence of a solution*ill lead to more violence, a dee#er humanitarian crisis and further instabilit$, none of *hich *ill benefit the!alestinians or the Israelis.



44/118

March/April 2014 AffE Kant

KantPolitical conditions treat other humans as simpl% means to an end. P,G

Johnson, Robert (2008) Kants Moral Philosophy

8ost #hiloso#hers *ho find 3ants vie*s attractive find them so because of the Humanit$ formulation of the

CI. This formulation states that ,e should never act in such a ,a+ that ,e treat =uanit+ ,hether in

ourselves or in others as a eans onl+ but al,a+s as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducin" the

idea of respect? for persons for ,hatever it is that is essential to our =uanit+. Kant ,as clearl+ ri"ht

that this and the other forulations brin" the C 5closer to intuition6 than the niversal La, forula.

ntuitivel+ there sees soethin" ,ron" ,ith treatin" huan bein"s as ere instruents ,ith no valuebe+ond this. But this ver+ intuitiveness can also invite isunderstandin"s. First, the Humanit$ formula does

not rule out usin #eo#le as means to our ends. Clearl$ this *ould be an absurd demand, since *e do this all the

time. Indeed, it is hard to imaine an$ life that is reconi)abl$ human *ithout the use of others in #ursuit of our

oals. The food *e eat, the clothes *e *ear, the chairs *e sit on and the com#uters *e t$#e at are otten onl$

b$ *a$ of talents and abilities that have been develo#ed throuh the e&ercise of the *ills of man$ #eo#le. 9hat

the Humanit$ formula rules out is enain in this #ervasive use of Humanit$ in such a *a$ that *e treat it as a

mere means to our ends. Thus, the difference bet*een a horse and a ta&i driver is not that *e ma$ use one but

not the other as a means of trans#ortation. Unli2e a horse, the ta&i drivers Humanit$ must at the same time be

treated as an end in itself. Second,it is not huan bein"s per se but the 5=uanit+6 in huan bein"s that

,e ust treat as an end in itself. 3ur 5=uanit+6 is that collection of features that a-e us distinctivel+

huan and these include capacities to en"a"e in selfdirected rational behavior and to adopt and pursue

our o,n ends and an+ other capacities necessaril+ connected ,ith these. Thus, su##osin that the ta&i

driver has freel$ e&ercised his rational ca#acities in #ursuin his line of *or2, *e ma2e #ermissible use of these

ca#acities as a means *hen *e behave in a *a$ that he could, *hen e&ercisin his rational ca#acities, consent

to J for instance, b$ #a$in an areed on #rice.

1ant+s Humanitarianism !

Slim, Hugo. Not Philanthropy but Rights. Centre for Development and EmergencyPractice.

In his famous %ssa$ on !er#etual !eace in ?P, the reat German #hiloso#her Immanuel 3ant, reflected on

*h$ a state should sho* hos#italit$ to refuees and straners. In doin so, he seemed to voice a certain

im#atience *ith a #articular 2ind of humanitarian thin2in> J3ur concern is not ,ith philanthrop+ but ri"ht

and in this conte@t the ri"ht of an alien not to be treated as an ene+ upon arrival in another9s



45/118

March/April 2014 AffE Kant

countr+...the ri"ht to visit to associate belon"s to all b+ virtue of their coon o,nership of the earth9s

surface.?3ant, ?P, #??O. 3ant-s humanitarian #hiloso#h$ is one of e4ualit$, rihts and duties. !hilanthro#$as a rather eneralised moral #ro0ect is not sufficient unless it rooted in a considered #olitical #hiloso#h$ and

connected to some *ider #olitical frame*or2 of rihts and duties. 9ritin more than fift$ $ears after 3ant in

?OKO, t*o $oun German radicals, 3arl 8ar& and Frederich %nels made a stinin criti4ue of *hat the$ sa*

as the reactionar$, #alliative and self5servin nature of a certain t$#e of charitable endeavor.

Base card for Kant ar"uent.



46/118


)eontolo"+

CruD

Humanitarian Aid fails Deontolog% 6 ,ot for the Right Purposes !

Atmar, Mohammed (2001). Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for

Afghans. Politics & Humanitarian Aid; Debates, Dilemmas & Dissension

Conference.

3ver +ears of crisis in Af"hanistan the principle of ipartialit+ of huanitarianis has s+steaticall+fallen victi to political considerations of donor states. n other ,ords political e@pedience of the donor

states has deterined the purpose e@tent and t+pe of 5huanitarian response6 rather than huan needs

alone.Durin the Cold 9ar #eriod, Afhanistan received the hihest #er ca#ita aid in its histor$ in a most

un#rinci#led manner. The United States alone #rovided militar$ and humanitarian aid *orth over USXN@@

million #er annum after ?ON Girardet, et al ?O>??O. Accordin to inde#endent studies, donors *ere

#re#ared to acce#t u# to K@ *astae Goodhand, et al, ?V and some others arue that onl$ =@5;@ of the

humanitarian aid reached its intended beneficiaries and the rest *ent astra$ mostl$ feedin *ar efforts

Girardet, et al, ?O>??. 9hile human needs *ere e4uall$ dire in the communist5held and resistance

controlled areas of the countr$, the 9est *as #re#ared to #rovide aid onl$ to the latter. Humanitarian aid *as

thus mandated to #la$ a com#lementar$ role as #art of the *ider Cold 9ar #olitics to Ema2e the "ussians bleed-

US official cited in Girardet, et al, ?O>?=@. 9ith the *ithdra*al of the "ed Arm$ and des#ite the continued

human sufferin, the ra#id fall in humanitarian budets made it obvious that it *as not the #liht of the Afhans

that mattered.

Moral ar"uent for the AFF.

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 4& of 11#


47/118

March/April 2014 AffE Iestern

)oinance

Iestern )oinancePolitical Humanitarian Aid funds 9estern Polic% Agendas !

Fox, Fiona (2001). New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st

Century? Overseas Development Institute 24(4).

In a *orld in *hich man$ of the old institutions, includin nation5states, have lost their leitimac$, 9estern

+G(s and overnments find themselves definin a ne* universal set of moral values. )evelopental relief

and the ne, huan ri"hts huanitarianis are all based on Iestern oral values ,hich are necessaril+

posited in opposition to the barbaris of conflicts in the Third Iorld. *everal coentators havepointed out that this a+ have as uch to do ,ith the Iest6s search for le"itiac+ in the postcold ,ar

,orld as it has ,ith resolvin" Third Iorld conflicts. Certainl$ the lanuae of Ton$ Blair and Bill Clinton

durin the 3osovo crisis reflected their belief that this *as about more than hel#in one rou# of refuees.

8ichael Inatieff #oints to this> 8oreover *hen #olic$ *as driven b$ moral motives it *as often driven b$

narcissism. 9e intervened not onl$ to save others, but to save ourselves, or rather an imae of ourselves as

defenders of universal decencies ?O. A move from savin lives to*ards #romotin #articular #olitical

solutions carries the ris2 of +G(s #rovidin a humanitarian mas2 for a ne* era of forein interference. The US

overnment-s resistance to sinin the ne* International Criminal Court is a 0ust one reminder that the ne*

universal human rihts culture is understood b$ man$ as somethin created in the 9est for use aainst the less5

civilised nations of the *orld. Some aid *or2ers are conscious that urin the 9est to intervene in the Third9orld to uarantee human rihts and allo* access to relief, ma$ #ut a humanitarian loss on the forein

adventures of the *orld-s most #o*erful countries. Save the Children-s !eter Ha*2ins believes that some

#oliticians 4uite o#enl$ sa* the conflict in eastern aire as a E*a$ in- to a #art of Africa formerl$ the #reserve

of France. And it is *orth notin that 9estern officials no* run Bosnia, 3osovo and %ast Timor. Ironicall$,

8SF-s Bernard 3ouchner, one of the founders of ne* humanitarianism is the same Bernard 3ouchner *ho until

recentl$ ran 3osovo on behalf of the international communit$.

Iestern A"enda ar"uent for the AFF.

United "tates aid has an unjustified militar% agenda. P,G


I!S noted that recent US aid has ta2en on militaristic anles as *ell, follo*in similar #atterns to aid durin the

cold *ar. The *ar on terrorism is also havin an effect as to *hat aid oes *here and ho* much is s#ent. For

e&am#le>

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 4' of 11#


48/118


)oinance

5Credits for forein militaries to bu$ US *ea#ons and e4ui#ment *ould increase b$ some P@@ million dollarsto nearl$ five billion dollars, the hihest total in *ell over a decade./ This is also an e&am#le of aid benefitin

the donorR

5The total forein aid #ro#osal W amounts to a mere five #ercent of *hat Bush is re4uestin for the !entaon

ne&t $ear./

5Bush-s forein5aid #lan Lfor =@@M actuall$ mar2s an increase over =@@K levels, althouh much of the

additional mone$ is elained b$ reater s#endin on securit$ for US embassies and #ersonnel overseas./

5As in #revious $ears, Israel and %$#t are the biest bilateral reci#ients under the re4uest, accountin for

nearl$ five billion dollars in aid bet*een them. (f the nearl$ three billion dollars earmar2ed for Israel, most is

for militar$ credits./

This militaristic aid *ill come larel$ at the eense of humanitarian and develo#ment assistance./

he use of humanitarian aid )ith political conditions is seen as imperialist and threatens the

safet% of aid )or0ers. C!"

Bridges, KM (2010). Between Aid and politics: Diagnosing the Challenge of

Humanitarian Advocacy in Politically Complex Environments-the Case of Darfur,

Sudan9here increased #olitical enaement is a direct contributor to risin insecurit$ amon aid *or2ers, its

underta2in needs to be seriousl$ considered. !ost5:?? this is more #ertinent than ever as aencies are

increasinl$ #erceived to be instruments of 9estern state di#lomac$.=KIf aencies ultimatel$ choose to

abandon neutralit$, then the$ cannot eect immunit$ of Ehumanitarian s#ace-.=If the$ are Eunsure- of their

o*n neutralit$ then it is hardl$ li2el$ that those #art$ to the conflict *ill be an$ clearer.

a(le "ho)ing 3verreliance on Aid in Parts of Africa. ABB

Brautigam, Deborah. (2004) Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan

Africa. Economic Development and Cultural Change.

foundationbriefs.co !a"e 4# of 11#
http://www.tandfonline.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2010.541084#EN0024http://www.tandfonline.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2010.541084#EN0024http://www.tandfonline.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2010.541084#EN0025http://www.tandfonline.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2010.541084#EN0024http://www.tandfonline.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2010.541084#EN0025


49/118


)oinance

It follo*s that countries t$in their aid to #olitical conditions *ill have a reat deal of dominance overovernments of the #oorer countries that the$ are donatin to because the$ are so heavil$ reliant on outsidemone$ to fund overnment s#endin.



50/118

March/April 2014 AffE >eo

Colonialis

>eoColonialisConditional aid fuels dependenc% on )estern states in such a )a% that it promotes neo4

colonialism. BG.

Tinashe Nyatoro. (2008) The History of Foreign Aid Dependency: Challenges for

Africa.

Forei"n aid has done ore daa"e to African countries. t has led to a situation ,here African countries

have failed to set their o,n pace and direction of developent free of e@ternal interference since

developent plans for developin" countries are dra,n thousands of iles a,a+ in the corridors of the

MF and Iorld Ban-. This article further noted that developed countries vie, aid as soethin" to bebartered ,ith. Thus the Iest e@chan"es aid for political or ideolo"ical support or uses aid to influence

strate"ic decisions and stren"thenin" allies.The African state has no autonom$ to control and direct nationalca#ital and even increase its barainin #osition *ith res#ect to forein ca#ital. In the liht of this, postcolonialAfrican developent has been th,arted b+ e@ternal pressure actin" a"ainst internal values and

traditions. n short aid has led to the recolonisation of Africa throu"h the strin"s attached to it. Forei"n

aid is a tool of statecraft used b+ the "overnent providin" it to encoura"e or re,ard politicall+ desirable

behaviour on the part of the "overnent receivin" it.It is an instrument of coercion and a tool for thee&ercise of #o*er *ith little relevance to the lives of the reci#ients. 8ore so, the #attern of bilateral aiddistribution is elained b$ donor interests rather than the reci#ient interests. "ealisin the failure of aid toAfrican countries, this article recommends the follo*in> There is need to re#udiate all forms of forein aid,e&cludin disaster relief assistance. The #ostcolonial state is desined to serve forein interests thus the stateshould be reca#tured and restructured to serve African interests. For the above t*o recommendations to ta2e#lace, there is the need for an e&it strate$ from aid de#endence that re4uires a drastic move both in the mindsetand in the develo#ment strate$ of countries de#endent on aid. There is a need for a dee#er and directinvolvement of #eo#le in their o*n develo#ment. This re4uires a radical and fundamental restructurin of theinstitutional aid architecture at the lobal level.

9hen )e attach conditions of good governance to aid* this attempts to force )estern vie)s

onto other countries. BG.

Anna Chyzhkova (2011) Unit 3: Neo-Liberalism and Governance: Good and GoodEnough Governance.

B$ ?@-s, after the end of the Cold 9ar, in the conte&t of the demise of communism and ro*in #ro5

democratic movements, the USA *ere sho*in to the *orld the direction of Ethe onl$ #ossible- #ath to a reater

4ualit$ and freedom, namel$ democratic neo5liberalism Grie et al., =@@P. At the same time, the deocratic

neoliberalis proponents financial institutions and aid donors ,ere pointin" to the direction of ,hat did

foundationbriefs.co !a"e %0 of 11#


51/118

March/April 2014 AffE >eo

Colonialis

not allo, the structural adustent to ,or- out the ,a+ it should have durin" the #06s the ;ualit+ of"overnance.*o the ne, theor+ ,as born nael+ the ;ualit+ of "overnance as the condition for

developent. Qualit$ of overnance, *ith the variet$ of meanins attributed b$ different international actors to

the conce#t of ood overnance democrac$ and #rotection of human rihts, sound administration and efficient

manaement, became a ne* condition for aid disbursement. !olitical condition for aid becae a rival to the

econoic condition. As #er 9orld Ban2> nderl+in" the litan+ of Africa6s developent probles is a

crisis of "overnance. B+ 5"overnance6 is eant the e@ercise of political po,er to ana"e a nation6s affair /

The 9orld Ban2, cited in 1eft*ich, =@@@. 7ood "overnance proponents tried to shape the *outh to the

Ld Brief 2014 March April

Documents

Transcript of Ld Brief 2014 March April