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Whether second wife of person who died inaccident can claim compensation?

Therefore, in the instant case, on facts it isestablished that the deceased was livingwith the second wife; and the second wifeand children were depending solely on theincome of the deceased. Having regard tothe provisions contained in Section 168 ofthe 1988 Act, it cannot be said that thesecond wife is not entitled to anymaintenance or that she has to be excludedfrom the compensation payable by theTribunal. Therefore, we are of the viewhaving regard to the intention of thelegislature as reflected in Section 168 of the 1988 Act, where it is a legal representativeof the deceased and not a legal heir, who is entitled to maintain a petition and when thedefinition of the term 'legal representative' includes intermeddler, the second wife, asshe would be intermeddling with the estate of the deceased by virtue of the fact that shewas living with him at the time of his death would be entitled to maintain a petition. Shealso would be entitled to compensation, as a dependant, as she was dependingon him for her living and sustained loss on account of his death. At the same timethe first wife, who had been living separately, for whatever reason and even if she wasnot dependent on the deceased, would be entitled to compensation, as a legallywedded wife and also as a person entitled to the estate of the deceased. Similarly, thedaughter of the second wife, though illegitimate, by virtue of Section 16(1) of HinduMarriage Act, is to be treated as legitimate child. She would be entitled to a share in theestate of the father as class-I heir and the petition filed by her can neither be dismissednor she can be denied the compensation. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we areof the view that in the facts of this case, the order passed by the Tribunal holding thatthe petition filed by the second wife is not maintainable is not correct and therefore, ithas to be set aside. The second wife, as dependent on the deceased and anintermeddler of his estate and who has sustained loss is entitled to compensation alongwith the first wife and her own daughter. Therefore all of them are entitled tocompensation. Equivalent Citation: 2015(1) AKR 168, 2015(1)KCCR353,AIR 2015(NOC)687 KARIN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)MFA Nos. 24051 and 24165/2012 and MFA No. 24186/2012 (MV)

Decided On: 25.02.2014Appellants: LalitaVs.Respondent: M.R. Sunilkumar and Ors.Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

1. These three appeals are preferred against a common order passed by the claimsTribunal. Therefore, they are taken up for consideration together.2. MVC No. 102/2008 is filed by Smt. Lalitha, for compensation claiming to be the firstwife of the deceased Rudragouda Patil; MVC No. 73/2009 is also filed for compensationby Pushpa and Neethi, claiming to be the wife and daughter of deceased RudragoudaPatil. Both these petitions were clubbed with another petition, where claim for injury wasmade, common evidence was recorded and impugned order came to be passed,dismissing the petition filed by Pushpa and Neethi and MFA No. 24186 of 2012 is filedagainst the said dismissal order. In MVC No. 102/2008, while awarding compensation toLalitha, a finding was recorded that Pushpa, the third respondent therein is not the wifeof Rudragouda Patil and therefore, she is not entitled to any compensation. Therefore,Smt. Pushpa has preferred MFA No. 24051/2012. Smt. Lalitha, who claims to be thefirst wife, has also preferred MFA No. 24165/2012 seeking enhancement ofcompensation. As such these three appeals are taken together for consideration anddisposed of by a common order.3. Rudragouda Patil was working as Regional Manager with Omni-Lens Pvt. Ltd., andwas drawing handsome salary of Rs. 15,000/- per month plus other perquisites. He wasalso running paying guest home and was earning Rs. 35,000/-. That apart, he was alsoearning Rs. 2,00,000/- from agriculture. In all the deceased was earning more than Rs.9,00,000/-. On the fateful day that is 6.09.2007 he had gone to bring milk on his Active-Honda vehicle and when he was near Big Bazar, Bangalore at about 6:30 a.m., a TataSumo bearing No. KA-13/A-2969 driven in a rash and negligent manner by its drivercame and dashed against him and also one pedestrian. Due to the impact, he wasdragged for more than 25 to 35 feet and sustained severe head injuries and otherinjuries all over the body. Immediately he was taken to nearby Shekar Hospital, fromwhere he was taken to Nimhans Hospital in Bangalore, where it was advised that heshould be taken to Sagar Apollo Hospital in Bangalore. Accordingly he was admitted asan inpatient from 16.09.2007 to 30.11.2007 in Sagar Apollo Hospital; more than tenmajor operations were conducted under general anesthesia. The claimants claim thatthey have spent about Rs. 20,00,000/-. In spite of best efforts and best treatment,Rudragouda Patil succumbed to the injuries on 30.11.2007; his body was taken toVictoria Hospital for postmortem and thereafter funeral ceremony was conducted inBangalore.4. Smt. Pushpa claiming to be the wife and Neethi, her daughter originally preferred aclaim petition in MVC No. 9087/2007 on the file of the MACT, Bangalore. Smt. Lalithaclaiming to be the first wife preferred a claim petition in MVC No. 102/2008 on the file of

the MACT, Hubli claiming compensation of Rs. 90,00,000/-. On coming to know of thefiling of the petition by Pushpa and Neethi, Smt. Lalitha moved this Court in Civil PetitionNo. 506/2008 and got the petition on the file of MACT, Bangalore transferred to theTribunal at Hubli. That is how both these petitions were clubbed together and a commontrial was conducted before the Tribunal at Hubli.5. After service of notice, respondents entered appearance. The owner of the vehicle inquestion remained ex parte. It is only the insurance company which filed the statementof objections contending that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligentdriving of the deceased and, therefore, it was not liable to pay any compensation.However, it did not dispute the accident and the insurance coverage to the vehicle inquestion.6. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues inMVC No. 102/2008 and M.V.C. No. 73/2009.

"ISSUES IN MVC No. 102/20081. Whether the petitioner proves that her husband by name Rudragoudadied in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 16.09.2007 at about6.30 a.m. on east end ring road near Big Bazaar, Bangalore, on accountof the rash and negligent driving of the Tata Sumo bearing registrationNo. KA-13/2969 by its driver?2. Whether the respondent No. 2 proves that accident was due to thenegligent riding of the deceased himself?3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation? If yes, what is thequantum and from which of the respondents?4. What order or award?""Issues IN MVC No. 73/20091. Whether the petitioners prove that Rudragouda Rayanagouda Patildied in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 16.09.2007 at about6.30 a.m. on east end ring road near Big Bazaar, Bangalore, on accountof the rash and negligent driving of the Tata Sumo bearing registrationNo. KA-13/2969 by its driver?2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation? If yes, what isthe quantum and from which of the respondents?3. What order or award?"

7. The claimants in both the claim petitions were examined. Smt. Lalitha was examinedas P.W. 1, Smt. Pushpa R. Patil, was examined as P.W. 4 and five other witnesses werealso examined. They, in all, produced 94 documents marked as Exs. P.1 to P.94. Onbehalf of the respondents, no evidence was adduced.8. The Tribunal, on consideration of the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence onrecord, held that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the

driver of the Tata Sumo vehicle bearing registration No. KA-13/2969 and thus, theclaimants had established actionable negligence. Thereafter, it held that Smt. Lalitha,the claimant in M.V.C. Nos. 102 of 2008, who is the legally wedded wife of RudragowdaR. Patil, had not established her claim regarding damage to the vehicle. It held thatRudragowda R. Patil was employed. He had filed income-tax returns immediately priorto his death. His income was taken as Rs. 1,20,000/- per annum, 50% of the saidamount was deducted towards his personal expenses, his age was taken as 52 years,applying the multiplier of 13, the Tribunal held that the claimant was entitled to a sum ofRs. 7,80,000/- under the head 'loss of dependency'. Thereafter, it also awarded a sumof Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of consortium', Rs. 1,000/- towards transportation of deadbody and Rs. 10,000/-, towards funeral expenses a sum of Rs. 26,000/-. Thus, in allunder conventional heads, it awarded a sum of Rs. 8,06,000/- with interest at 6% perannum.9. Insofar as the claim petition filed by Smt. Pushpa R. Patil is concerned, the Tribunaldismissed the same on the ground that she being the 2nd wife, was not entitled in law tomaintain a petition nor to any compensation. However, the Tribunal did not go into thequestion of the claim of the daughter of the deceased through Smt. Pushpa Patil.10. Aggrieved by the said judgment and award passed by the Tribunal, Smt. Lalitha haspreferred M.F.A. No. 24165/2012 seeking enhancement of compensation, while Smt.Pushpa Patil and Neethi Patil have preferred M.F.A. No. 24051/2012 challenging theorder of dismissal of their claim petition and claiming compensation. However, theinsurance company has accepted the award.11. In M.F.A. No. 24165/2012, the learned counsel appearing for Smt. Lalitha contendedthat Smt. Lalitha being the first wife and when a declaration to that effect has beengiven by a competent Civil Court, as per Exs. P.30 and 31, she is entitled to entirecompensation. Smt. Pushpa Patil is not the legally wedded wife. Even if she isconstrued as the second wife, her marriage is void in law and she cannot put forth anyclaim. The Tribunal has not properly appreciated the evidence on record. Though theincome was taken as Rs. 1,20,000/-, it erred in deducting 50% and even the amountawarded under the conventional heads is on the lower side and, therefore, he submitsthat a case for enhancement is made out.12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants-Smt. Pushpa Patil and Neethi Patilsubmits that Smt. Pushpa Patil is not a party to the proceedings between Smt. Lalithaand the deceased and, therefore, the said decree does not bind them. Smt. PushpaPatil is the wife of the deceased, she lived with the deceased from the date of marriagetill his death; Neethi Patil is born to them and, therefore, it is she who has suffered losson account of death of the deceased. Smt. Lalitha never lived with the deceased, shewas not dependent on him and, therefore, the Tribunal erred in denying thecompensation to Pushpa Patil and awarding compensation to Smt. Lalitha. At any rate,Smt. Neethi Patil being the daughter, even if she is an illegitimate child, is entitled notonly to maintain a claim petition, but also for compensation as Class-I heir. The Tribunalcommitted a serious error in deducting 50% towards personal expenses of the

deceased and it ought to have deducted only 1/3rd. The Tribunal erred in taking the ageof the deceased as 52 years as against 49 and therefore, the multiplier applied is alsoincorrect. They are also entitled to future prospects at 30% of the total income and theamount paid under the conventional heads is inadequate. Therefore, he prays that thefinding of the Tribunal be set aside, the entire compensation be paid to Smt. PushpaPatil and Neethi Patil and the compensation be enhanced.13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the insurance company submitted that theaward passed by the Tribunal is just and proper and no case for interference is madeout.14. In the light of the aforesaid facts and rival contentions, the points that arise for ourconsideration are as under:

"(i) Is Smt. Lalitha, the 1st wife of the deceased, entitled to compensationthough she was not living with the deceased from the date of marriage tillhis death?(ii) Whether Smt. Pushpa Patil, even if she is considered as the secondwife, is entitled to maintain a claim petition under Section 166 of theMotor Vehicles Act and entitled to compensation?(iii) Whether Neethi Patil, the daughter of the deceased through Smt.Pushpa Patil, is entitled to maintain the claim petition and tocompensation?(iv) Whether a case for enhancement of compensation is made out?(v) What order?"

15. The material on record discloses that Smt. Lalitha filed a suit against the deceasedin O.S. No. 306/1981 for a declaration that she was the legally wedded wife and forconsequential injunction restraining the deceased from marrying any other personduring the subsistence of marriage. The deceased had filed written statementcontesting the matter. Issue No. 2 in the said suit was whether the plaintiff proves thatshe is the legally wedded wife of defendant No. 1. Issue No. 3 in the said suit waswhether she proves that defendant No. 1 is contemplating a second marriage. Both theparties adduced evidence. By a detailed order, the learned Principal Munsiff, Dharwad,answered the said issues holding that the plaintiff had proved that there was a validmarriage and the defendant was attempting to marry on 02.11.1981 in RajanahalliDharmashala at Davanagere. However no decree of injunction was granted. It appearsthat the deceased preferred an appeal in R.A. No. 69/1989 against the said judgmentand decree and the said appeal came to be dismissed for non-prosecution on21.07.1985.16. In the evidence before the Tribunal in the present case, Smt. Lalitha had deposedthat after marriage with the deceased, their family did not accept her and therefore, shehad to go back to her brother's place at Hubli and was living there. Smt. Lalitha had not

produced any other material to show that she lived with her husband after the marriagetill the date of the accident for nearly 25 long years.17. In view of the fact that a competent Civil Court has declared that Lalitha as the wifeof the deceased, she is the legally wedded wife of the deceased. At the same time, theevidence on record, i.e., Exs. P.23, 66 and 67, show that the deceased married Smt.Pushpa on 2nd November 1981 at Rajanahalli Dharmashala, Davanagere. In fact, in theplaint filed by Smt. Lalitha, she has mentioned the very same date and the choultry andshe wanted that marriage to be prevented. Ex. P.74 is the photograph taken at the timeof marriage between the deceased and Smt. Pushpa. Ex. P.81 is the birth certificate ofSmt. Neethi showing her birth on 20.08.1987 at JJM Hospital, Davanagere, to thedeceased and Smt. Pushpa. She was admitted to St. Paul's English School and Ex.P.79 is the study certificate issued by the said school, dated 23.05.2003, which showsthat she studied from 1st to 8th standard from the year 1993-94 to 2000-01 in ICSE. Ex.P.80 is the school leaving certificate which shows the name of the deceased as thefather; Ex. P.83 is the voter's identity card of Neethi Patil issued by the ElectionCommission of India. Ex. P.84 is the identity card of Pushpa R. Patil issued by theElection Commission of India. Ex. P.82 is the pass book issued by Canara Bank infavour of Smt. Pushpa Patil and the deceased jointly.18. P.W. 6-Neela R. Patil, the sister of the deceased, has spoken about the marriage ofthe deceased with Pushpa, the birth of child and their living together. On the death ofthe deceased, the dead body was handed over to Pushpa, who made preparations forhis burial and Ex. P.64 is the receipt issued by Bangalore Mahanagara Palike in thisbehalf. Ex. P.65 is the acknowledgment by Smt. Pushpa R. Patil for having received thedead body. She has collected the death certificate from the Registrar of Birth and Death,as per Ex. P.63. She was the one who was attending to the deceased when he was aninpatient in the hospital for more than two months. This clearly shows that the deceasedhad married Smt. Pushpa and Neethi Patil was born to them; they were all livingtogether at the premises No. 2019, South End "E" Cross, 9th Block, JayanagarBangalore-560009.19. The Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that Smt. Pushpa R. Patil, having beenmarried during the subsistence of the marriage between the deceased and Lalitha, thesaid marriage was void and therefore, as a second wife, she was not entitled to claimany compensation.20. Smt. Lalitha, after marriage was not living with her husband for more than 25 years.She was not dependent on the deceased. At the same time, though Pushpa R. Patil isthe second wife she lived with the deceased for more than 26 years and gave birth to achild. It is to be noticed here that it is Smt. Pushpa who has produced the medicalrecords. In fact, the Medical Superintendent of the Sagar Apollo Hospital is alsoexamined and he has also produced documents. A careful scrutiny of those documentsshows that the total medical expenses incurred is more than 12 Lakhs whereas only asum of Rs. 4,96,000/- is acknowledged by the hospital. The said amount has been paidby Smt. Pushpa R. Patil. There is nothing to show that Smt. Lalitha was ever present

near her husband after the accident till his death in the hospital.21. In this context, it is necessary to look into the statutory provisions on the point.Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter for short referred to as "theAct") deals with the application for compensation. It reads as under:

"166. Application for compensation. - (1) An application for compensationarising out of an accident of the nature specified in subsection (1) ofsection 165 may be made -

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or(b) by the owner of the property; or(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all orany of the legal representatives of the deceased; or(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured orall or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, asthe case may be:

"Provided that where all the legalrepresentatives of the deceased have notjoined in any such application forcompensation, the application shall bemade on behalf of or for the benefit of allthe legal representatives of the deceasedand the legal representatives who have notso joined, shall be impleaded asrespondents to the application."

22. A perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that where death has resultedfrom the accident, an application for compensation may be made by all or any of thelegal representatives of the deceased. The word 'legal representative' is not definedunder the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, recourse is to be taken to the term 'legalrepresentative' defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is defined under Section2(11) of the Code and reads as under:

"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in thesubject or context-XXX XXX XXX11. "Legal representative" means a person who in law represents the

estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddleswith the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in arepresentative character the person on whom the estate devolves on thedeath of the party so suing or sued;"

23. Therefore, who is a 'legal representative' is now clearly provided for in the aforesaiddefinition. They are:

"(a) a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person;(b) any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased;(c) where a party sues or is sued in a representative character theperson on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suingor sued."

24. The words "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" have beeninserted with a view to enable anomalies being avoided in cases where a strictadherence to the definitions contained in the code would involve such anomalies. Theeffect of such words like "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" isthat though a definition may be exhaustive, the word defined pointing out to a certainthing, yet it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in differentsections. The court has always to look to the context, the collocation and the subject ofsuch words relating to such matters and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyedby the use of word.25. Right of heirship is not involved in determining as to who is or is not a legalrepresentative. Though ordinarily all legal heirs are also legal representatives, theconverse is not true. It is also held that the legal representative, for the purpose of oneproceeding in a suit is not necessarily the same as for another proceeding in the samesuit and the court must determine who the legal representative is for the proceedings.Thus, the expression "legal representative" is inclusive in character and its scope is verywide. Executors, administrators, reversioners, Hindu coparceners, assignees, legateesunder a will etc have been held to be the legal representatives.26. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Megjibhai Khimji Vira and Another v.Chaturbhai Taljabhai and Others reported in [MANU/GJ/0080/1977 : AIR 1977 GUJ195], dealing with the question who is a 'legal representative' for the purpose of accidentclaims under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, has held as under:--

"11-A. There cannot be any gainsaying that the 1939 Act makesprovision for the constitution of the Claims Tribunal to provide a cheapand speedy mode of enforcing liability arising out of the use of motor

vehicles. It is a benevolent legislation which calls for liberal and broadinterpretation so that the real purpose underlying the enactment ofSs. 110 to 110-F is achieved and full effect is given to the legislativeintent. It is well settled that if while interpreting a welfare legislation anyprovision of the Act is capable of two constructions, that constructionshould be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act and is morebeneficial to the class in whose interest the law has been made. Thecontention that the group of Ss. 110 to 110-F merely lays down theprocedure and powers of the Tribunal and do not deal with liability at all,in other words, they are merely adjectival or procedural in nature, doesnot seem to be wholly correct. The first para, of S. 1A of the 1855 Act, nodoubt, has the effect of nullifying the principle contained in the maxim'actio personalis moritur cum persona'. The second para, of that sectionmerely provides that every action or suit shall be brought for the benefitof the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose deathshall have been so caused. The 1939 Act makes an inroad in so far asthe second para, of S. 1A of the 1855 Act is concerned, in that S. 110-A thereof provides that an application for compensation arising out of anaccident of the nature specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 110, may be madewhere the death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legalrepresentatives of the deceased. The proviso says that if all the legalrepresentatives of the deceased do not join in the application, theapplication shall be made "on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legalrepresentatives of the deceased". It is, therefore, clear on a plain readingof S. 110-A of the 1939 Act that the right to apply for compensationwhere death has resulted from the accident, is conferred on all the legalrepresentatives of the deceased. If para. 2 of S. 1A of the 1855 Act is asubstantive provision, as was contended before us by Mr. Majmudar wefail to understand why C1 (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 110-A, which confers aright on the legal representatives of the deceased to claim compensation,cannot be termed to be a substantive provision the 1939 Act isundoubtedly a special legislation dealing with accidents arising out of theuse of motor vehicles. According to the cardinal rule of construction, aparticular or special rule must control or cut down the general rule(Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0083/1955 : AIR1955 SC 661). We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that Clause (b)of sub-s. (1) of Section 110-A of the 1939 Act is a substantive provisionwhich confers a right on all the legal representatives of the deceasedvictim of a tortious act to claim compensation from the wrong-doer, andbeing a special provision dealing with accidents arising out of the use ofmotor vehicles, it has the effect of overriding para. 2 of S. 1A of the 1855Act."

27. This view of the Gujarat High Court has been affirmed by the Apex Court in the caseof Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhaiand Another reported in MANU/SC/0469/1987 : AIR 1987 SC 1690, where it is held asunder:

"9. Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 110-A of the Actprovide that an application for compensation arising out of an accidentmay be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any ofthe legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent dulyauthorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. Theproviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all thelegal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any suchapplication for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf ofor for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and thelegal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded asrespondents to the application. The expression 'legal representative' hasnot been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 defines 'legal representative' as a person who in law represents theestate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddleswith the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in arepresentative character the person on whom the estate devolves on thedeath of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, interms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to bestated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understoodalmost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil'Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in lawrepresents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom theestate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section(1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legalrepresentatives of the deceased to make an application forcompensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceasedon account of a motor vehicle accident and clause (c) of that sub-sectionauthorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legalrepresentatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section(1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. Itprovides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf ofor for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased.Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an applicationfor compensation may be made by the legal representatives of thedeceased or their agent and (ii) that such application shall be made onbehalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the

persons or person who can make an application for compensation andthe persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thusindicated in Section 110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substituteto the extent indicated above for the provisions of Section 1A of the FatalAccidents Act, 1855 which provides that "every such action or suit shallbe for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of theperson whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought byand in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of theperson deceased." While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides thatsuch suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child ofthe deceased, Section 110-A(1) of the Act says that the application shallbe made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of thedeceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily bea wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from Section 110-B ofthe Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an awarddetermining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be justand specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall bepaid. This provision takes the place of the third paragraph of Section 1Aof the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every such action,the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to theloss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom andfor whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whosebenefit such an application can be made and the manner in which thecompensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons forwhose benefit the application is made are dealt with by Section 110-A and Section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of theAct do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in so faras motor vehicles accidents are concerned. These provisions are notmerely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of theparties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in everyway new" the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to filean application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicleaccident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot behedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act,1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and newremedies.11. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is inconsonance with the principles of justice, equity and good consciencehaving regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legalrepresentative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to amotor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of

compensation and that is provided by sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act.These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts thatevery injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles AccidentsTribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just asprovided in section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or personsto whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of thecompensation payable and its apportionment as required bysection HOB of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whosebenefit an application may be filed under section 110-A of the Act have tobe done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We shouldremember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' childrenand some times foster children live together and they are dependentupon the bread-winner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed onaccount of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny themcompensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act,1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified bythe provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out ofmotor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the decision inMegjibhai Khimji Vira and another v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai and others,[MANU/GJ/0080/1977 : AIR 1977 GUJ 195] (supra) and hold that thebrother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled tomaintain a petition under section 110-A of the Act if he is a legalrepresentative of the deceased.13. Before concluding we may add that although the Act was extensivelymodified after the receipt of the report of the Law Commission,Parliament did not choose to amend section 110-A of the Act by definingthe expression 'legal representatives' in relation to claims under ChapterVIII of the Act as 'the spouse, parent and children of the deceased' asrecommended by the Law Commission. The Law Commission hadobserved in its 85th report that it would be appropriate to assign to theexpression 'legal representative' the same meaning as had been given tothe expression 'representative' for the purposes of the Fatal AccidentsAct, 1855 and that would effectively carry-out the purpose of socialjustice underlying Chapter VIII of the Act, to which the Fatal AccidentsAct, 1855 was the nearest approximation. This recommendation wasmade after referring to the divergent views expressed by the variousHigh Courts on the meaning of the expression 'legal representatives' insection 110-A of the Act. The fact that Parliament declined to take anyaction on the recommendation of the Law Commission of India suggeststhat Parliament intended that the expression 'legal representatives' insection 110-A of the Act should he given a wider meaning and it shouldnot he confined to the spouse, parent and children of the deceased."

(Underlining by us)

28. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel andAnother v. United India Insurance and Another, reported in [MANU/SC/0061/2014 :(2014) 3 SCC 394] after referring to Section 166 of the 1988 Act held as under:--

"9. The Act does not define the term "legal representative" but theTribunal has noted in its judgment and order that clause (C) of Rule 2 ofthe Mizoram Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1988, defines theterm "legal representative" as having the same meaning as assigned to itin clause (11) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which isas follows:

"Section 2(11) 'Legal representative' means a person whoin law represents the estate of a deceased person andincludes any person who intermeddles with the estate ofthe deceased and where a party sues or is sued in arepresentative character the person on whom the estatedevolves on the death of the party so suing or sued."

10. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that in case of death of aperson in a motor vehicle accident, right is available to a legalrepresentative of the deceased or the agent of the legal representative tolodge a claim for compensation under the provisions of the Act. Theissue as to who is a legal representative or its agent is basically an issueof fact and may be decided one way or the other dependent upon thefacts of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is undeniable that aperson claiming to be a legal representative has the locus to maintain anapplication for compensation under Section 166 of the Act, either directlyor through any agent, subject to result of a dispute raised by the otherside on this issue.11. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company tried to persuade us thatsince the term "legal representative" has not been defined under the Act,the provision of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, should betaken as guiding principle and the claim should be confined only for thebenefit of wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whosedeath has been caused by the accident. In this context, he citedjudgment of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road TransportCorporation, Ahmedabad v. Raman Bhai Prabhatbhai & Anr. in that case,

covered by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, the claimant was a brother ofa deceased killed in a motor vehicle accident. The Court rejected thecontention of the appellant that since the term "legal representative" isnot defined under the Motor Vehicles Act, the right of filing the claimshould be controlled by the provisions of Fatal Accident Act. It wasspecifically held that Motor Vehicles Act creates new and enlarged rightfor filing an application for compensation and such right cannot behedged in by the limitations on an action under the Fatal Accidents Act.13. From the aforesaid quoted extract it is evident that only if there is ajustification in consonance with principles of justice, equity and goodconscience, a dependant of the deceased may be denied right to claimcompensation. Hence, we find no merit in the submission advanced onbehalf of the respondent-Insurance Company that the claim petition isnot maintainable because of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act.17. A perusal of the judgment and order of the Tribunal discloses thatalthough issue No. 1 was not pressed and hence decided in favour of theclaimants/Appellants, while considering the quantum of compensation forthe claimants the Tribunal adopted a very cautious approach and frameda question for itself as to what should be the criterion for assessingcompensation in such case where the deceased was a Roman Catholicand joined the church services after denouncing his family, and as suchhaving no actual dependants or earning? For answering this issue theTribunal relied not only upon judgments of American and English Courtsbut also upon Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even areligious order or organization may suffer considerable loss due to deathof a voluntary worker. The Tribunal also went on to decide who should beentitled for compensation as legal representative of the deceased and forthat purpose it relied upon the Full Bench judgment of Patna High Courtreported in MANU/BH/0024/1987 : AIR 1987 Pat. 239, which held thatthe term 'legal representative' is wide enough to include even"intermeddlers" with the estate of a deceased. The Tribunal also referredto some Indian judgments in which it was held that successors to thetrusteeship and trust property are legal representatives within themeaning of Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure."

29. Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that "every such action or suitshall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the personwhose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of theexecutor, administrator or representative of the person deceased. The Law Commissionhad observed in its 85th report that it would be appropriate to assign to the expressionlegal representative' in the Act, the same meaning as had been given to the expression

'representative' for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and that wouldeffectively carry-out the purpose of social justice underlying Chapter VIII of the Act, towhich the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was the nearest approximation. Thisrecommendation was made after referring to the divergent views expressed by thevarious High Courts on the meaning of the expression 'legal representatives' insection 110-A of the Act. The fact that Parliament declined to take any action on therecommendation of the Law Commission of India suggests that Parliament intendedthat the expression 'legal representatives' in section 110-A of the Act should be given awider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse, parent and children of thedeceased.30. The expression legal representative' as defined in Section 2(11) of the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal, but ithas to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almostin the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. The issue as towho is a legal representative or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may bedecided one way or the other dependent upon the facts of a particular case. As is clearfrom opening words of Section 2, the meaning to be assigned to the word legalrepresentative' is what is mentioned in Section 2(11) of the CPC provided there isnothing repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore, even the word legalrepresentative' as defined in Section 2(11) in the context of a claim petition underSection 166 of the Act has to be construed liberally keeping in mind that it is a beneficialpiece of legislation as well as a social legislation. The whole object of the saidlegislation and in particular the said provision is that, every legal representative whosuffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should havea remedy for realization of compensation that is provided for by Section110A to 11 of the1939 Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law that is, everyinjury must have a remedy. When a bread winner of the family is killed on account of amotor vehicle accident, all persons who are dependant upon the bread winner areentitled to compensation. That is why the words mentioned in the Fatal Accidents Act,i.e., wife, husband, parent and child, are conspicuously missing in the Motor VehiclesAct. The Parliament advisedly, consciously has not adopted the said provision. Theperson, who is dependant on the bread winner of the family who died in a motorvehicles accident is also entitled to compensation. That in essence is the principles ofLaw of Torts.31. It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject tothe qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them. It maybe that even where the definition is exhaustive, in as much as, the word defined is saidto mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a some what differentmeaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. That iswhy all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words namely "unlessthere is anything repugnant in the subject or context". Therefore, in finding out themeaning of the word "legal representative" in section 166 of the Act, the meaning to be

ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But, this is not inflexible andthere may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from onaccount of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will begiving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely "unless there isanything repugnant in the subject or context". In view of this qualification, the Court hasnot only to look at the words but also look at the context, the collocation and the objectof such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to beconveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances.32. Therefore, the Apex Court in Montford's case held that, only if there is a justificationin consonance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience, a dependant ofthe deceased may be denied right to claim compensation. Otherwise all dependants ofthe deceased are entitled to claim compensation. If we keep in mind the object behindthe Motor Vehicles Act, the principles of Torts, it is clear that a dependant on the breadwinner who died in a motor vehicle accident falls within the definition of legalrepresentative' and is entitled to claim compensation. In other words, in the context ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, the word legal representative' includes a dependant of thedeceased. That is why in Section 166 of the 1988 Act a provision is made for filing anapplication for compensation by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased.The proviso provides that, where all the legal representatives of the deceased have notjoined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalfof or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legalrepresentatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to theapplication. The legislature has advisedly not used the word legal heir' to whomcompensation shall be paid.33. In this context it is necessary to have a look at Section 168 of the 1988 Act dealingwith awards of Claim Tribunals which reads as under:--

"168. Award of the Claims Tribunal. - (1) On receipt of an application forcompensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, aftergiving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties(including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry intothe claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to theprovisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount ofcompensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person orpersons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the awardthe Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by theinsurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by allor any of them, as the case may be:"

34. A careful reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that on receipt ofapplication for compensation made under Section 166 of 1988 Act, the Claims Tribunal

shall give notice of the application to the insurer. After giving the parties, including theinsurer, an opportunity of being heard, hold an enquiry into the claim or each of theclaims and make an award determining the amount of compensation, that appears to bejust. After such determination, the section provides that the Tribunal has to apply itsmind and specify the person or persons to whom the compensation should be paid andnot the parties to whom the compensation is payable. A person may have the right tomaintain a petition, he may move the Tribunal for determination of the compensationpayable. But the compensation is to be paid to a person, who has suffered on accountof the loss of dependency or any other count. A legal heir is entitled to succeed to theestate of the deceased, but not automatically entitled to compensation paid under thehead of loss of dependency. To be entitled to compensation under the head of loss ofdependency, the condition precedent is he or she must be dependent on the deceasedfor his or her living. In deciding the person or persons to whom the compensation ispayable, certainly, the Tribunal has to take into consideration the aspect of loss ofdependency. It is in that context, the definition of legal representatives, which is aninclusive one, assumes importance. A person, who is not a legal heir but a person, whowas dependent on the deceased at the time of accident, is the person, who suffers losson account of the accident and consequential death and therefore would be the personentitled to compensation. But such person need not be a legal heir. Therefore, thelegislature has cautiously used the word "the person or persons" and not the parties.35. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect therights of the parties. The right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 wasnew in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new. Similarly,the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application forcompensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlargedone. This new right cannot be hedged in by any of the limitations of an action under theFatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies andnew remedies. We should remember that in an Indian family, it is not only the wife,children and parents live together, the brothers, sisters, brothers children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependant upon the bread winner of thefamily. If the bread winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is nojustification to deny them compensation on the ground that they are not legal heirs.Therefore, while awarding compensation under the Act, the test should be ofdependency upon the bread winner of the family and not necessarily the bloodrelationship or family relationship. A legal representative in a given case need notnecessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. He or she need not be a legal heir. Alllegal heirs are legal representatives. But, all legal representatives are not legal heirs.36. From the foregoing discussions it is clear that, under the Act a legal representativeincludes a legal heir of the deceased, a dependant of the deceased as well as a personwho represents the estate of the deceased and a person who intermeddles with theestate of the deceased. Viewed from that angle and keeping in mind the object withwhich the legislation is passed, coupled with the hard realities of life that in most of the

cases, the first wife might have been deserted by the husband and while living with thesecond wife and children, if he dies in an accident, it is those persons, who aredependent on his earnings for their living and, who suffer on account of the accidentwould be entitled to the compensation payable. Though the second marriage ifrecognized in any form, would defeat the very object of the Hindu Marriage Actprohibiting bigamy and indirectly it may encourage bigamy, the Courts cannot lose sightof the hard realities of life. It is a question of survival of a human being. It is in the natureof a human right. An illegitimate child born to a second wife during the subsistence ofthe first marriage is conferred all the rights of a legitimate child in the property of theparents. In other words, an illegitimate child is a legal heir, i.e., Class I legal heir underthe Hindu Succession Act. However, the mother of such illegitimate child who is a ClassI heir is not a legal heir. A child born to a wife who is not a legal heir has been conferredthe status of a legal heir. It is because the second marriage is void ab initio. The wife ofsuch marriage is not entitled to any right in the estate of her husband. It is the generallaw. Nonetheless second wife is a member of the family of the husband. If the husbandis living with her and the children are born to her, she is dependant on her husband. TheParliament taking note of the recent trends in the Indian Society where there is newtendency to have live in relationship has extended a helping hand to a woman who hassuch live in relationship. She is neither a first wife nor she is a second wife. She is notmarried to him at all. But she lives with him as a wife.37. The Parliament has enacted the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005. The said Act covers those women who are or have been in a relationship with theabuser where both parties have lived together in a shared household and are related byconsanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption.Therefore, Section 2(f) of the Act of 2005 defines 'domestic relationship' as under:--

"2(f) 'Domestic Relationship' means a relationship between two personswho live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a sharedhousehold, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or througha relationship in the nature of marriage, or adoption or are familymembers living together as a joint family".(underlining by us)

38. The word 'aggrieved person' has been defined under Section 2(a) as under:--

"2(a) 'Aggrieved person' means any woman who is, or has been, in adomestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have beensubjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent."

39. Section 20 of the Act of 2005 provides for monetary reliefs to such aggrievedpersons which may include but not limited to the loss of earnings, the medicalexpenses, loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property from thecontrol of the aggrieved person and the maintenance for the aggrieved person as wellas her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order ofmaintenance under Section 125 of CPC or any other law for the time being in force.40. Therefore, the Parliament taking note of the new situations and new dangers hasprovided new strategies and new remedies. The Parliament has now conferred benefitssuch as right of maintenance, right of residence, etc., to a person other than a legallywedded wife. A woman living in a shared household through a relationship in the natureof marriage is entitled to all the monetary relief as mentioned in Section 20 of the Act of2005. Can it be said when a person who is not legally married to the deceased isentitled to maintenance and other monetary benefits during his life time, such a womanis not entitled to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, on the death of theperson with whom she was living during his life time and on whom she was dependantduring his life time and who was maintaining her. He was the bread winner. She wascompletely dependant on his earning and he was looking after all her needs and if hedies in a motor vehicle accident, in law as his legal representative is she not entitled tocompensation? Can such a person who had a right during his lifetime for maintenancebe denied the compensation payable on account of his death? Therefore, the definitionof a legal representative cannot be confined only to the legal heirs. It has to beenlarged, liberally construed, and all persons who are dependant on the deceased forthe living should also be entitled to compensation payable on account of his death. Thechange in the social set up, the progress of law in that direction and principles of justice,equity and good conscience have to be kept in mind while interpreting the definition ofthe word "legal representative" in the context of Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, in thecontext of Motor Vehicles Act, even a wife whose marriage is void, if she was living withher husband as his family member and was dependant on his earning for her living isentitled to compensation as a "legal representative". A second wife is not entitled to anycompensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, as the said marriage is void. But, if shewas dependent on the deceased, she is entitled to compensation as a "dependent" andnot as a second wife.41. It was contended that, in two judgments of this Court, two Division Benches haveheld that a second wife whose marriage is void is not entitled to compensation and,therefore, if this Court is not agreeing with the said view, the matter should be referredto a larger Bench. In support of their contention, reliance is placed on the judgment inthe case of Parvathamma and Etc v. C. Subramanyam and Others reported inMANU/KA/0458/2000 : AIR 2000 KAR 309, where it is held as under:--

"15..................The principle laid down there would be applicable to theclaim petition filed by the legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles

Act as well. The question which required to be determined under both theActs is as to who is entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased.The subsequent marriage being void, the second wife would not beentitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased under the HinduSuccession Act and therefore could not be termed as legalrepresentative representing the estate of the deceased. Claim petitionsfor grant of compensation would not be maintainable under Section166(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act on their behalf"

42. As is clear from the aforesaid judgment, the Division Benches relied on thejudgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar andOthers reported in MANU/SC/0043/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 735, where it was held asunder:--

"15. Rameshwari Devi has raised two principal objections : (1) marriagebetween Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal has not been proved, meaningthereby that there is no witness to the actual performance of themarriage in accordance with the religious ceremonies required for a validHindu marriage and (2) without a civil court having pronounced upon themarriage between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal in accordance withHindu rights, it cannot be held that the children of Yogmaya Devi with hermarriage with Narain Lal would he legitimate under Section 16 of theHindu Marriage Act First objection we have discussed above and there isnothing said by Rameshwari Devi to rebut the presumption in favour ofmarriage duly performed between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal. On thesecond objection, it is correct that no civil court has pronounced if therewas a marriage between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal in accordancewith Hindu rites. That would, however, not debar the State Governmentfrom making an inquiry about the existence of such a marriage and acton that in order to grant pensionary and other benefits to the children ofYogmaya Devi. On this aspect we have already adverted to above. Afterthe death of Narain Lal, inquiry was made by the State Government as towhich of the wives of Narain Lal was his legal wife. This was on the basisof claims filed by Rameshwari Devi. Inquiry was quite detailed one andthere are in fact two witnesses examined during the course of inquirybeing (1) Sant Prasad Sharma, teacher, DAV High School, Danapur and(2) Sri Basukinath Sharma, Shahpur Maner who testified to the marriagebetween Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal having witnessed the same. Thatboth Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi were living as husband and wife andfour sons were born to Yogmaya Devi from this wedlock has also beentestified during the course of inquiry by Chandra Shekhar Singh, Rtd.

District Judge, Bhagalpur, Smt. (Dr.) Aran Prasad, Sheohar, Smt. S.N.Sinha, w/o Sri S.N. Sinha, ADM and others. Other documentary evidencewere also collected which showed Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal wereliving as husband and wife. Further, the sons of the marriage betweenYogmaya Devi and Narain Lal were shown in records as sons of NarainLal."

43. The question therein was, when a Hindu male dies intestate, who is entitled to thefamily pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity payments which are governed by therelevant Rules. In that context it was held that, a second wife is not entitled to thosebenefits as the marriage was in contravention of clause (i) of Section 5 of the HinduMarriage Act whereas the children born to her are legitimate children under Section 16of the Hindu Marriage Act and are entitled to those benefits. It was not rendered in thecontext of Motor Vehicles Act. The Division Bench did not notice the judgment of theSupreme Court in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case which is directly on the point as towho is the legal representative that is entitled to compensation under the Motor VehiclesAct nor it went into the question as to who is a legal representative under Section 2(11)of the CPC.44. The other judgment on which reliance was placed is in the case of Annappa Naika &Anr. v. Chand Basha & Ors. reported in MANU/KA/0592/2009 : 2010(1) AIR Kar 289where it is held as under:

"8........................... As per the law laid down by the Apex Court and thisCourt in hosts of judgment, 5th respondent who is the second wife of thedeceased is not legally entitled to any compensation on account of thedeath of her husband deceased Sri Lokyanaika. Therefore, we deem it fitto modify the judgment and award passed by the Claims Tribunal in sofar as it relates to awarding a sum of Rs. 64,000/- in favour of 5threspondent holding that the 5th respondent being the second wife of thedeceased is not legally entitled to any compensation and the appellants-1 and 2 and respondents-4, 6 and 7 are equally entitled for the amountwhich has been awarded in her favour."

45. In that case they proceeded on the assumption that, as per the law laid down by theApex Court and this Court in host of judgments, a second wife is not legally entitled toany compensation on account of the death of the husband. No judgment of the ApexCourt nor any judgment of this Court is cited. No law is laid down in that case. On thecontrary they were only following the judgment of the Apex Court and this Court, forwhich no reference is made. The only judgment of the Apex Court under the MotorVehicles case is the one set out above which does not lay down any such proposition of

law. The definition of the term legal representative as defined under Section 2(11) of theCode is also not noticed. However, in a later judgment, a Division Bench of this Court inthe case of Shantawa v. The Managing Director, NWKRTC, Belgaum Division andOthers reported in MANU/KA/2168/2012 : ILR 2012 KAR 5899, has held as under:

"5...............The grant of compensation under Motor Vehicle Accident isthe discretion of the Court and the Court need not necessarily he guidedby the Rules under the Personal Law of Succession. There is no materialbefore the Court to suggest whether the marriage of the appellant withthe deceased was conscious bigamous marriage. The law under theDomestic Violence Act also recognizes grant of maintenance for awoman who was in live-in-relationship. In that context, denial of share inthe compensation to the appellant does not appeal to be sound andproper. The appellant, first wife, children and mother of the deceased areall entitled to equal share in the compensation awarded and entitled tointerest at 6% p.a. on the enhanced compensation."

46. In the judgments of Parvathamma and Annappa Naika referred to supra, they didnot notice the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramanbhai Prabhatbhainor the definition of 'legal representative' as contained in Section 2(11) of the Code. Theaforesaid two judgments of this Court were delivered without reference to the judgmentof the Apex Court in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai where the word 'legal representative' wasinterpreted. They have also not taken note of the statutory provision contained inSection 2(11) of the CPC. Moreover, subsequently, the Apex Court in the aforesaidMontford Brothers' case, has affirmed the judgment in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's caseand has categorically held that the right of filing the claim petition under the MotorVehicles Act should not be controlled by the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act whichconfines claim petition only to the benefit of wife, husband and parent and child. It isheld that a dependant of the deceased should not be denied the right to claimcompensation without any justification in consonance with the principles of justice,equity and good conscience. The law is fairly settled. That apart the Parliament hasenacted Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, giving a right to awoman who is not married as per the requirement of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 andwho is living together with a man in a shared house hold through a relationship in thenature of marriage. This law was not there when the judgment in Parvathamma's casewas delivered. In Annappa Naika's case this law was not noticed. There is a perceptiblechange in the law which is brought about to protect a woman. The definition of legalrepresentative includes a wife and not a second wife whose marriage is void. But asecond wife, who is dependent on the deceased, also becomes a legal representativeunder the Act, who is entitled to compensation payable on account of the death of the

deceased. The question whether a second wife in her capacity as a "dependent", wouldfall within the definition of the word legal representative used in the Section 166 of theAct, was not considered in the said two judgments. We are not holding any thingcontrary to the said decision. We agree with the said statement of law that the secondwife, whose marriage is void is not entitled to compensation. But, if the second wife is"dependant" on the deceased for her living, then the legal position would be different. Asa "dependant" on the deceased, she would be entitled to compensation under the Actas held by the judgments of the Apex Court referred to supra. This aspect has not beenconsidered in the aforesaid two judgments. Therefore, it is not necessary to refer thisappeal to a larger Bench.47. In the judgment of Montford Brothers' case, the Apex Court categorically holds that,only if there is a justification in consonance with principles of justice, equity and goodconscience, a dependant of the deceased may be denied right to claim compensation.Therefore, a dependent of the deceased is entitled to compensation. It is purely aquestion of fact. We have to find out in the instant case whether the second wife is thedependant and whether principles of justice, equity and good conscience excludes herto claim compensation.48. The admitted evidence on record shows that Smt. Lalitha was the first wife of thedeceased. He married Pushpa on 2.11.1981 in Rajanahalli Dharmashala atDavanagere. The first wife was living separately from the deceased even prior to themarriage of Pushpa because as she belonged to a different caste. The family of thedeceased did not allow her to join him as she belonged to a different caste namelyBrahmin. Therefore, from 2.11.1981 till the date of accident, i.e., 16.9.2007, more than25 years Pushpa lived with the deceased as his second wife. She gave birth to a childMs. Neethi on 20.8.1987 at JJM Hospital, Davanagere. The child was admitted to St.Paul's English School where she studied from I to VIII standard from 1993-94 to 2000-01 in ICSE. The deceased met with an accident on 16.9.2007. It is Smt. Pushpa whoadmitted him to the Sagar Apollo Hospital, Bangalore. He was an inpatient in theHospital from 16.9.2007 till his death on 30.11.2007. The evidence on record shows that10 major operations were conducted under general anesthesia. In spite of the same hesuccumbed to the injuries on 30.11.2007. His body was taken to Victoria Hospital forpost mortem. Thereafter, his body was handed over to Smt. Pushpa. It is Smt. Pushpawho buried him as per Ex. P64, the receipt issued by the Bangalore Mahanagara Palikein this behalf. Therefore, Pushpa was residing with the deceased for more than 25years. It is she who admitted him to the hospital. She was by his side for 2 1/2 monthsin the hospital. It is she who took the dead body and buried him and performed theobsequies ceremonies. The total medical bill runs to Rs. 12,00,000/-. The evidence onrecord shows that she has paid Rs. 4,96,000/-. Now, the question is, is Smt. Pushpa atotal stranger? Does she have no right to claim compensation? Was she not a memberof the family of the deceased? Is she not a mother of the daughter of the deceased whois entitled to compensation? In the facts of this case, it would be cruel to deny Smt.Pushpa her legitimate share in the compensation payable on account of the death of the

deceased. She was dependant on the deceased. As such she is the legalrepresentative of the deceased. To be called a legal representative', it is not necessarythat a person should have some interest or right in the estate of the deceased. Anintermeddler having right or interest in the estate of the deceased would fall within thedefinition of legal representative, as it is an inclusive definition. Seen from that angle, ifa second wife though her marriage is void, is living with her husband for more than 20 to25 years, given birth to a child and is in possession of all his belongings on the date ofdeath of the deceased, she would fall within the definition of intermeddler and, as anintermeddler, also she would be a legal representative and therefore can maintain apetition for compensation.49. Even a wife who is not dependent on the husband, who is living separately from herhusband is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 166 of the MV Act, because sheas a legally wedded wife succeeds to the estate of the deceased. Even otherwise,during the subsistence of the marriage, if a wife is living separately, she is entitled tomaintenance and, therefore, she is entitled to maintain a claim petition and she isentitled to compensation because of the legal right flowing from the subsistence of avalid marriage. In other words, though she is not actually dependent on the deceasedon the date of his death, she has a right of maintenance. In law; she as the legallywedded wife, not only can maintain a petition, but also is entitled for compensation.50. Therefore, in the instant case, on facts it is established that the deceased was livingwith the second wife; and the second wife and children were depending solely on theincome of the deceased. Having regard to the provisions contained in Section 168 ofthe 1988 Act, it cannot be said that the second wife is not entitled to any maintenance orthat she has to be excluded from the compensation payable by the Tribunal. Therefore,we are of the view having regard to the intention of the legislature as reflected inSection 168 of the 1988 Act, where it is a legal representative of the deceased and not alegal heir, who is entitled to maintain a petition and when the definition of the term 'legalrepresentative' includes intermeddler, the second wife, as she would be intermeddlingwith the estate of the deceased by virtue of the fact that she was living with him at thetime of his death would be entitled to maintain a petition. She also would be entitled tocompensation, as a dependant, as she was depending on him for her living andsustained loss on account of his death. At the same time the first wife, who had beenliving separately, for whatever reason and even if she was not dependent on thedeceased, would be entitled to compensation, as a legally wedded wife and also as aperson entitled to the estate of the deceased. Similarly, the daughter of the second wife,though illegitimate, by virtue of Section 16(1) of Hindu Marriage Act, is to be treated aslegitimate child. She would be entitled to a share in the estate of the father as class-Iheir and the petition filed by her can neither be dismissed nor she can be denied thecompensation. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that in thefacts of this case, the order passed by the Tribunal holding that the petition filed by thesecond wife is not maintainable is not correct and therefore, it has to be set aside. Thesecond wife, as dependent on the deceased and an intermeddler of his estate and who

has sustained loss is entitled to compensation along with the first wife and her owndaughter. Therefore all of them are entitled to compensation. We therefore have to firstdetermine the amount of compensation payable and then specify the person or personsto whom compensation is payable and then specify the amount payable to suchpersons out of the compensation so determined.51. In this case, the material on record discloses that the Tribunal has taken Rs.1,20,000/- as annual income of the deceased and deducted 50% towards personalexpenses of the deceased, which is patently incorrect. Since the deceased left behindthree persons, the proper deduction towards his personal expenses would be 1/3rd andthe multiplier to be adopted is 13. Therefore, the total compensation payable under thehead loss of dependency would be Rs. 10,40,000/-. Out of the said amount a sum ofRs. 3,50,000/- is payable to the first wife, Rs. 3,50,000/- is payable to the daughter andRs. 3,40,000/- is payable to the second wife.52. The evidence on record shows that the second wife has spent Rs. 4,90,000/-towards medical expenses at Sagar Apollo Hospital and therefore, she is exclusivelyentitled to the said amount. The Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towardsloss of consortium to the first wife, even though she was not living with her husband formore than 25 years. As such it is not justified. It is the second wife who would beentitled to Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of consortium. The first wife would be entitled toRs. 10,000/- towards loss of estate, which has not been awarded at all.53. A sum of Rs. 1,000/- is awarded towards transportation of dead body and Rs.10,000/- towards obsequies ceremonies and for burial. That amount is to be paid to thesecond wife, as she took the body and buried her husband, as is clear from thedocumentary evidence on record. The daughter too would be entitled to Rs. 10,000/-towards loss of love and affection.54. To sum up, the claimants would be entitled to the following amounts:

55. Thus, the total amount of compensation payable by the Insurance Company to theclaimants is in a sum of Rs. 15,76,000/-. The said amount shall carry interest at the rateof 6% p.a. from the date of filing the petition till the date of payment.56. We, therefore, pass the following order:

ORDER"(i) The appeals are partly allowed.(ii) The claimants in both the petitions together are entitled to a sum ofRs. 15,76,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of filingpetition till the date of payment.(iii) The said amount is apportioned in the following manner:

(iv) A sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- shall be deposited in the Nationalized Bank,in the name of each of them and the balance amount shall be paid tothem. However each of them would be entitled to draw periodical interestfrom such deposit. The said deposit be initially for a period of 5 years.(v) No costs."

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