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Transcript of Law & Legal Institutions Civil Law Legislatively enacted Inquisitorial process Common Law Based on...
Law & Legal Institutions Civil Law
Legislatively enacted Inquisitorial process
Common Law Based on social norms and precedent Adversarial process Use of juries
State Courts Trial courts: “entry level” courts Appellate courts Supreme courts
Federal Courts 94 districts 13 appellate districts US Supreme Court
Law & Legal Institutions
Federal Jurisdiction:• Federal questions• Cases to which US is a party• Diversity cases
Parties Plaintiff Defendant
Burden of Proof Civil cases: preponderance of evidence Criminal cases: beyond a reasonable doubt
Verdict/Judgment Appellate decisions
Affirm Reverse Remand
Nature of a Legal Dispute
Evolution of Common Law Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60 (1809)
Contributory negligence Davies v. Mann, 10 M&W 545 (1842)
Last clear chance doctrine Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889)
Can a murderer inherit from the person whom he murdered?
Property Law Legal framework for allocating resources
and distributing wealth Economic Goal: efficient resource allocation
Economic Theory of Property Bargaining theory (game theory) Public goods theory Externalities theory
4 Questions1. What things may be privately owned? 2. How are ownership rights established?3. What can owners do with their property?4. How are property rights protected?
Orbitcom, Inc., spent $125 million designing, launching, and maintaining a satellite for the transmission of business data between Europe and the US. The satellite is positioned in a geosynchronous orbit 25 miles above the Atlantic Ocean. Recently a natural resource-monitoring satellite belonging to the Windsong Corp. has strayed so close to Orbitcom’s satellite that the company’s transmissions have become unreliable. As a result, Orbitcom has lost customers and has sued Windsong for trespassing on Orbitcom’s right to its geosynchronous orbit.
Example 2 (p75)
Economics of Bargaining Peter owns a horse which he claims is worth $9,000 to
keep, and Mary covets the horse and decides she is willing to pay $11,000 for it. Mary has $15,000 inheritance income. Non-cooperative outcome: no trade Cooperative outcome: trade at mutually agreed price
Value of Cooperative Outcome = [10,000] + [11,000 + 5,000] = $26,000
Value of Non-cooperative Outcome = $9000 + $15,000 = $24,000
(threat values)
Reasonable sale price = $10,000
Cooperative Surplus = $2,000
Aunt Linda and the Nudist
Rifle River
Aunt Linda Nudist
Judge rules in favor of Aunt Linda
Judge rules in favor of Nudist
Fence comes down
Fence comes down(Linda pays Nudist)
2 rulings
$1500 $1000$1250
A Theorem and a Corollary
Coase TheoremIf transactions costs are low enough, then private bargaining will result in an efficient use of resources, regardless of the legal assignment of property rights.
CorollaryWhen transactions costs are high enough to prevent bargaining, the efficient use of resources will depend on how property rights are assigned.
Search costsNegotiation costsEnforcement costs
Lubricate or Allocate? Normative Coase Theorem
Structure the law so as to remove impediments to private agreements
Normative Hobbes Theorem Structure the law so as to minimize the harm
caused by failures in private agreements
Prior appropriation: “first in time, first in right”Water rights in western USHomesteading Act
Lawmaker tradeoff: IC = information cost of the court in
determining who values a right the most TC = transaction costs of private bargaining
Efficient courts would follow this rule: If IC < TC allocate legal right to the party
who values it the most If TC < IC strictly follow precedent
Lubricate or Allocate?
How are property rights protected? Remedies for violations:
Damages (legal) compensatory money payment “backward-looking”
Injunctions (equitable) an order to perform or refrain from an action “forward-looking”
Torts or contracts
Property
FlexMag v. Neighbors
FlexMag
No Wall Wall
No Insulation
Insulation
Neighbors
2000, 500 2000, 700
1600, 7001600, 800
FlexMag has D.S.: No InsulationNeighbors don’t have D.S.
FlexMag v. NeighborsNon-Cooperative
OutcomeCooperative
Outcome
FlexMag Neighbors Surplus FlexMag Neighbors
1. Polluter’s Rights 2000 700 0 2000 700
2. Neighbors’ right to damages
1700 800 200 1800 900
3. Neighbors’ right to injunction
1600 800 300 1750 950
Normative Hobbes: only rule 1 is efficient
Coase Theorem: choice of rule doesn’t matter
Calabresi and Melamed (1972) If TC are low, then injunctions are efficient
For private bads If TC are high, then damages are efficient
For public bads
What can be privately owned? Private goods: rival and excludable Public goods: non-rival and non-excludable
Conclusion: Private goods should be privately owned Public goods should be publicly owned
Free rider problem
What Can Be Privately Owned? Information Economics
How is information different from other goods? It’s (usually) a public good
Under-provision remedies Government supply or subsidy Charitable contribution Trade secrets protection (contract law) Intellectual property law
Patents Copyrights Trademarks Weather Forecasting?
Patent Law Legal monopoly rights for 20 years
Non-obvious Practical utility Not commercialized 1 year prior to application
Number of Patents Issued per year in US
Suppose that an investment of $100,000 in research yields a pioneering invention that has no commercial value. A subsequent investment of $50,000 in development yields an improvement to the pioneering invention that has commercial value of $1 million. An efficient patent law would grant the patent to:
1 2 3 4 5
a) The pioneerb) The developerc) Equal rights to bothd) Neither of them
Broad: encourages fast, duplicative fundamental research
Narrow: encourages slower, complementary developmental research
R&D is a “joint product” Unified R&D efforts? What would Coase say?
Patent Law: Breadth
Little stand-alone value
Large stand-alone value
Tradeoff: innovation v. dissemination
Patent Law: Duration
duration
$
MB
MC
D*
One size fits all?
Germany: petty patents
Orphan drugs Prizes?
Business methods?
Copyright Prevents unauthorized copying of the
products of expressive activity Breadth
Fair use Sony Betamax case: “time-shifting” vs “archiving”
Duration Life of artist + 70 years
Why limit duration? Tracing costs exist
Why has duration increased? Copying costs have fallen
Is resale of art the same as reproduction of art?
France requires a resale royalty be paid to original artist (or heirs)
California requires resale royalty by paid to artist (while living)
“Droit de suite”
Pt = $ 1,000Pt+n = $10,000
Trademarks Signal of product quality Duration of TM left to owner
Tradenames that have become generic?
Anti-commons? Common property is subject to the
“tragedy of the commons” Corrective: assign private property rights
Excessive ownership rights Leads to under-use
DNA patents and the public domain?
Open source computing
Privatize when cost of administering boundaries is less than cost of congestion
When should unowned resources become owned?
How are Property Rights Established? Fugitive Property
First possession: property doesn’t belong to anyone until someone extracts it
Tied ownership: fugitive property is tied to something else that is easier to establish
How are Property Rights Established? Fugitive Property
First possession: property doesn’t belong to anyone until someone extracts it
Simple to administer Encourages inefficient pre-emptive investments
Tied ownership: fugitive property is tied to something else that is easier to establish
Costly to administer Encourages efficient use of resource
What can be done to prove ownership? Paper titles for cars Deeds for property Branding Livery of seisin
Stolen goods? US: thief can not give good title
Buyers bear risk of verification Europe: thief can give good title
Original owners bear risk of verification
Liability should fall on those who can bear the risk at lowest cost