Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in...

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Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers
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Transcript of Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in...

Page 1: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton

Mergers

Page 2: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Page 3: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Other Issues

• Predatory Pricing

• Refusal to Deal

• Tie-in

• Mergers

• Cartels

Page 4: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

The Economics of Mergers

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Page 5: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

The Economics of Mergers

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If firms A and B merge, they can

create a monopoly. Thus mergers are of interest to anti-trust economists

and lawyers.

Page 6: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

The Economics of Mergers

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If firms A and B merge, they can create a monopoly. Thus mergers are of interest to anti-trust economists and lawyers.

Mergers can also promote economic

efficiency.

Page 7: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

The Economics of Mergers

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If firms A and B merge, they can create a monopoly. Thus mergers are of interest to anti-trust economists and lawyers.

Mergers can also promote economic

efficiency.

Initially courts adopted the “big is bad” rule and looked askance at most

monopolies. Modern economic theory argues

that there can be economic advantages to

a merger.

Page 8: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Two Types of Mergers

• Horizontal Mergers

• Vertical Mergers

Page 9: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Horizontal Mergers

• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.

Page 10: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Horizontal Mergers

• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.– Bank A has a huge back office function to clear

checks. It can just as easily handle another 500,000 customers.

Page 11: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Horizontal Mergers

• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.

• The right size can change over time

Page 12: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Horizontal Mergers

• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.

• The right size can change over time– McDonald and Douglas aircraft corporations

initially merged to compete with Boeing. – Boeing and McDonald-Douglas merge to

compete with AirBus.

Page 13: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Vertical Mergers

• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.

Page 14: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Vertical Mergers

• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.

• Two firms merge to integrate their production.

Page 15: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Vertical Mergers

• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.

• Two firms merge to integrate their production. Seed and

Fertilizer Companies

Grain Farms

Cereal Companies

Page 16: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Vertical Mergers

• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.

• Two firms merge to integrate their production. Seed and

Fertilizer Companies

Grain Farms

Cereal Companies

Page 17: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Vertical Mergers

• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.

• Two firms merge to integrate their production. Seed and

Fertilizer Companies

Grain Farms

Cereal CompaniesBasic Theorem: you cannot

create monopoly power by a vertical integration. If one industry is monopolized, it

does not increase its monopoly power by vertical

integration into a competitive industry.

Page 18: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Reasons for Vertical Integration

• Economies of Scope

– A bank that now sells insurance can have one salesman selling both products to the same person.

Page 19: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

Reasons for Vertical Integration

• Economies of Scope– A bank that now sells insurance can have

one salesman selling both products to the same person.

• Economies of Control– A gas company that buys a pipeline does

not have to worry about negotiations with the pipeline company.

Page 20: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

American vs. European Theory

• Most large mergers require approval from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Monopolies Commission of the European Union.

Page 21: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

American vs. European Theory

• Most large mergers require approval from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Monopolies Commission of the European Union.

• US: Is consumer and producer surplus created? If so, approve merger.

Page 22: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

American vs. European Theory

• Most large mergers require approval from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Monopolies Commission of the European Union.

• EU test: does this reduce competition? That is, the number of firms selling a product.

Page 23: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

General Electric/Allied Signal

• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.

Page 24: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

General Electric/Allied Signal

• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.

• EU saw loss of competition. GE would be buying more from Allied Signal and less from other companies.

Page 25: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

General Electric/Allied Signal

• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.

• EU Saw loss of competition. GE would be buying more from Allied Signal and less from other companies.

US approved merger, EU did not,

and merger died.

Page 26: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

General Electric/Allied Signal

• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.

• EU Saw loss of competition. GE would be buying more from Allied Signal and less from other companies.

US approved merger, EU did not,

and merger died.

Who was right?

Page 27: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Mergers. Other Issues Predatory Pricing Refusal to Deal Tie-in Mergers Cartels.

Mergers

End

©2004 Charles W. Upton