SALVADOR H. LAURELvs.RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents. G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990FACTS: The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm. On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code. The respondents rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated by the Philippine Government.HELD: No. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion. The property is classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion happens inly if property is withdrawn from public use, through an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.The  Roppongi  property  was  acquired  together  with  the  other  properties through reparation agreements. They  were  assigned  to  the  government sector and that the Roppongi property was  specifically  designated  under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.  It  is  of  public  dominion  unless  it  is  convincingly  shown  that  the  property has become patrimonial.  The respondents have failed to do so. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.    Its  ownership  is  a  special  collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not  to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is  intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.  

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRSG.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land. Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended. On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for further dialogue. ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question. HELD: No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

NOTES: ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN [G.R. No. 63528. September 9, 1996]

FACTS: Atok Big Wedge Company and Tuktuktan Saingan are both claiming ownership over subject land situated in the barrio of Lucnab, Itogon, Benguet. Atok Big Wedge Mining Company contended that the said parcel of land was being registered in the office of Mining Recorder in 1921 and 1931 pursuant to Philippine Bill of 1902. It is about sixteen years before TUKTUKAN declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965. They also showed the payment of annual assessment fees for the said land since 1931. They also claim that it is a mineral land. Tuktukan who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camotes, casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present; that he has been paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony, he submitted tax declarations both dated March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said parcel of land is a mineral land or an agricultural land.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the Tuktukan because he has proven that he had in possession of the said land in a concept of an owner, continuously, open and uninterrupted for a period of more than 30 years. He had improved also almost 90% of the said parcel of land. He also had paid tax declaration of the said land since 1948 up to present. SC also said that payment of annual assessment fee is not enough proof. There must be an annual performance of labor or undertaking of improvements in the mine. When an ocular survey was made, it was evident that there was no improvements being made in the said land and there is any sign of mining had happened in the land.

FELIPA S. LARAGAN, INDEPENDENCIO SIBBALUCA, AURORA C. SIBBALUCA, and ZENAIDA S. VALDEZvs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORO LEAÑO, TOMAS LEAÑO, FRANCISCO LEAÑO, and CONSOLACION LEAÑOG.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

FACTS: Felipa Laragan, Independencio Sibbaluca, Aurora Sibbaluca, and Zenaida Valdez filed an application with the CFI of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela. The applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession thereof for more than 34 years. Solicitor General filed a written opposition alleging that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land be declared public land. On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application for registration. They claimed that they are the owners of the southern part of the land and that they have been in possession for more than 30 years.The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Laragan. CA affirmed the decision but declared the southern part as public land.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners can register the subject land.

HELD: No. The application for registration, filed with the lower court, was for the confirmation of an imperfect title. The law applicable is Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.It is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the

absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. It would appear, however, that the possession and occupation of the land by the spouses Anastacio and Lucresia Sibbaluca are tainted with bad faith so that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.

NOTES: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by way or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

BERNARDO CARABOT, JUAN BANQUILES, LEONIDA V. ENDIAPE, LEON VILLANUEVA, OLIMPIA L. BANQUILES, FELISA BANQUILES, SEBASTIAN VILLANUEVA AND JUAN BANDAYRILvs.THE Hon. COURT OF APPEALS, (FIRST DIVISION), SAMUEL PIMENTEL in his own behalf and in behalf of the minors, ALEXANDER MANUEL, JR., ALMABELLA and CLARIBEL all surnamed, PIMENTEL, NATIVIDAD RIOFLORIDO, assisted by her husband GREGORIO DINGLASANG.R. No. L-50622-23 November 10, 1986

FACTS: Samuel Pimentel and his children, as plaintiffs, alleged that they are the pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of land in Bo. Tala, San Narciso, Quezon. The Pimentels claimed that during the lifetime of Estrella Ribargoso, she placed as tenants on portions of the land the herein petitioners and that, after the death of Estrella, the Carabots and the Villanuevas asserted interest adverse to the Pimentels. The Pimentels prayed that the Carabots and the Villanuevas "be compelled to disclose the facts on which they base their claims" and be declared to have no title to or interest of any kind in the property.Natividad Rioflorido assisted by her husband Gregorio Dinglasan, claimed ownership of a "portion of the land in Bo. Tala, San Narciso, Quezon. She alleged that the herein petitioners, "who have been hired as tenants on the land have been

illegally occupying for more than one year now several portions of the said property, pretending or assuming to be public land applicants." Ribargoso prayed that she be declared the lawful owner of the property and that her possession over the occupied portions be restored.In both cases, the herein petitioners, as defendants, asserted that they have never been tenants of the private respondents, that they occupied the land as their homesteads and that they have already applied for patents under the Public Land Law.The trial court ruled that the homestead and free patent titles of the petitioners are null and void. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land occupied by the petitioners and titled in their names as a result of homestead and/or free patents were already private property.

HELD: No. The parcels of land are not private property. It appears, then, that the titles of Dona Agripina Paguia were secured pursuant to the provisions of the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884. There was no proof regarding the validity of the Titulo de Composition con El Estado, granting that the existence of such documents has been proven by the certification of the Registrador de Titulos. SC has already ruled that "In order that natural boundaries of land may be accepted for the purpose of varying the extent of the land included in a deed of conveyance the evidence as to such natural boundaries must be clear and convincing. Petitioners failed to do so. In this regard the Supreme Court has ruled that:All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial; for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. Furthermore, as previously stated, there is no sufficient proof to show that what was described in the Spanish titles was precisely the same land in dispute.

Dela Merced vs CA

FACTS: In a complaint filed in the CFI, Ezequiel Santos and his wife claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956.

Defendants resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by OCT No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.

Mamerta, a legitimate daughter of Juan, was allowed to intervene and make common cause with the defendants.

The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs. While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer

had authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE:Whether or not those orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued.

HELD: Yes. In cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished.

A decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land.

The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.

SC has here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.