Last Time: Gunpowder Rev (GPR)

Intro of new tech/weapons

Effects on battlefield, military organizations, and larger political/social order of European societies

Universally recognized as a “rev” ignited and driven by new tech/weapons

The Napoleonic Revolution

• Term used to describe the military changes resulting from the French Rev (1789) and Napoleon’s reforms

• Differs from other revolutions in having no real technological component at all – was a revolution brought about by social and political change

Today and Next Time

• Nature of war, militaries and politics in decades before FR

• Course of the FR

• The social/political changes/legacies of FR and its impact on politics, military and warfare

Before the FR: Political Order

• Europe increasingly populated by the larger territorial states created by GR

• Within states, power concentrated in the hands of the central monarch

• Elitist (not mass) political systems based on absolutist monarchism and doctrine of the divine right of kings

Before the FR: Military Organizations

• Creation of standing armies after GPR

• Typical size 50-80,000 (could go as high as 300,000 for major powers in wartime)

• Officer corps composed largely of the nobility and upper classes (based on social status more than merit and competence)

• Mercenary armies (not conscripted)

Military Organizations (cont.)

• Mercenary (paid) not same as volunteer• Many of soldiers are foreigners – citizenship was

not required for service• Frederick the Great (Prussia) had a rule that 2/3

infantry composed of foreigners• Eve of FR 40% of French Army was not French• Example of the Hessians (soldiers of King of

Hesse) hired out to GB in Amer Rev War

Military Organizations (cont.)

• Motivation of most soldiers not loyalty or patriotism – money, escape, booze

• Did not pay or give rum rations….have problems

• Maintain order and preventing desertion were constant problems

• Maintain by constant supervision, control and extremely harsh discipline

Military Organizations (cont.)

• Duke of Wellington: “People talk of their enlisting from their fine military feeling – no such thing. Some of our men enlist from having bastard children – some for minor offences – many more for drink.”

• “We have in the service the scum of the earth as common soldiers”

• Some exaggeration reflecting aristocratic prejudice, but also few grains of truth

War before the FR

• On the battlefield

• Very regimented, almost stylized combat learned via endless drills (not suggest is was pleasant for those involved…quite deadly in fact)

• Was in large part because officers did not trust soldiers – need to carefully control, supervise

• Rigidity, controlmania, lack of initiative

War Before FR (cont.)

• Wars tended to be relatively limited affairs – in level destruction, cost, aims

• Monarchs fought over things, not ideas (did not disagree about much)

• Wars reflected dynastic conflicts – not national conflicts

Obstacles to expansion of armies or goals of wars

• Why armies small, why wars limited

• Economic

• Logistical

• Socio-political

Economic Limits

• Standing armies were expensive – paid, trained, fed, housed, equipped….different from armies of pre-gunpowder era

• Weapons (e.g., muskets) hand made – not cheap mass production yet

Logistical Obstacles to Expansion

• Transportation: people and supplies still got around in same manner as ancient Rome – foot and horseback – slow, cumbersome and expensive (army of 80,000 might need 40,000 horses)

• Armies could not “live off the land” – fear of desertion

Logistical Obstacles (cont.)

Transportation obstacles were technological in nature

Communications obstacles

• Very large armies would need to await tech changes in means of trans and communication

Socio-political Obstacles

• Probably most important

• Societies were elitist absolutist monarchies – little sense of connection and loyalty between people and rulers – rules could only make limited demands on people (no conscription) and people willing to make few sacrifices

Social-Political Obstacles (cont.)

• The political order provided limits to levels of social mobilization

• “subjects” v. “citizens”

• This is where FR would start to change things

The French Revolution

• Revolution (1789)

• Est of the Republic (1792)

• Levee en Masse (1793) – national mobilization – the “Nation in Arms”

• Rise of Napoleon (1799)

• Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815)

FR and modern/popular nationalism

• Lasting significance of FR: creation of sense of loyalty/obligation/identity between people and gov/rulers

• Govs could expect – and people will to make – sacrifices on behalf of the state/gov

Alters social-political equation

• Most obvious result is allows for national mobilization on a massive scale

• 300,000 pre-Revolution• 750,000 men in 1794• 2,000,000 + men between 1803-1815• Largest armies the world had ever seen• Less obvious than size was motivation –

loyalty, patriotism (effect not only ability to get, but what can do with them once in) – citizenship not required for service

Creation of citizen army, a nation in arms

• Dramatic increase in the sheer scale of war

• Mid-1700s battle with 80,000 troops would have been extremely large

• Battle of Leipzig (1813) involved 500,000 troops (French, Austrian, Prussian, Russian, Swedish)

• Diff in degree so great diff in kind

Nations at War

• Not just scale, but also difference in kind – war increasingly viewed as conflict between entire nations

• Wars takes on ideological tone after FR in Napoleonic expansion

Napoleon builds on FR

• These social-political changes set stage for Napoleonic reforms in military organization and warfare

• Built on the social-political foundation of the FR – may reforms would not have been possible without

Organizational Reform

• Many I do not want to focus on – e.g., the organizations of forces into divisions and corps

• Increasing professionalization of the officer corps – no longer refuge for aristocratic privilege – promotion based on merit and competence

Organizational Reform (cont.)

• Before FR about 85% officers from aristocracy – by 1800 3%

• Social elitist basis of military organizations eroded further by FR and Napoleon

• Military become a meritocracy, not an aristocracy

On the battlefield

• An army of loyal citizen soldiers provided new options

• Some logistic problems solved by “living off the land” – made possible because of loyalty (still problems of transport and communication – sometimes too big for their own good)

On the battlefield (cont.)

• Without the needs for constant supervision (i.e., controlmania) you has much more tactical flexibility

• Greater dispersion• Greater independence• Greater flexibility

• Move away from rigid/regimented style of battle

Other obstacles remain

• Before FR armies small, wars limited, and fighting regimented

• FR removed the political/social obstacles to the expansion of war

• Tech and logistical obstacles would need to wait for the IR….to which we will turn our attention next time