Washington DC Kellogg Conference Hotel, A Washington DC Hotel
LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013
description
Transcript of LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013
![Page 1: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
The Impact of Taxes and Social Spending on Inequality and Poverty in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico,
Peru and Uruguay: An OverviewNora Lustig
Tulane University; nonresident CGD and IADLASA
Washington, DC, May 31, 2013
![Page 2: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
• Papers form part of Tulane Univ and Inter-American Dialogue’s Commitment to Equity project (CEQ)
• Special issue: Lustig, Pessino and Scott. Editors. Public Finance Review (forthcoming)– Argentina: Nora Lustig and Carola Pessino– Bolivia: George Gray Molina, Wilson Jimenez, Veronica Paz
and Ernesto Yañez– Brazil: Sean Higgins and Claudiney Pereira– Mexico: John Scott– Peru: Miguel Jaramillo– Uruguay: Marisa Bucheli, Nora Lustig, Maximo Rossi and
Florencia Amabile
![Page 4: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Methodology: Standard Incidence Analysis
• Pre-tax/pre-transfer income of unit h, or Ih
• Taxes/transfers programs Ti
• “Allocators” of program i to unit h, or Sih (or the share of tax/program i borne/received by unit h)
• Then, post-tax/post-transfer income of unit h (Yh) is:
Yh = Ih - ∑i TiSih
![Page 5: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5
Standard Fiscal Incidence Analysis• Pre-tax and benefits incomes
• Allocators of taxes and benefits– personal income and consumption taxes– social spending: cash transfers and in-kind transfers (education and
health)– Consumption subsidies
• Post-tax and benefits incomes
• Countries (yr of Survey): Argentina (2009), Bolivia (2007), Brazil (2009), Guatemala (2009), Mexico (2008), Peru (2009), Uruguay (2009), Paraguay (2010)
![Page 6: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6
![Page 7: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7
Results
• Wide variation among countries in:– policy choices (or outcomes of
political processes?)–impact of those choices on income
redistribution and poverty reduction
![Page 8: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
Government size varies greatly in Latin America
• Government spending is around 40 percent of GDP in Argentina and Brazil—similar to that of some European nations with larger welfare states• …while it is only around 20 percent
in Mexico and Peru
![Page 9: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
Budget Size and CompositionPrimary and Social Spending as % of GDP
![Page 10: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10
Redistributive Impact Heterogeneous
• Taxes and transfers reduce inequality by nontrivial amounts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, less so in Mexico, and relatively little in Bolivia and Peru
• Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay start from similar Market Income Gini’s but end in very different places with Final Income
• Brazil has the highest Market Income Gini by several orders of magnitude but ends up with a lower Final Income Gini than Bolivia and Peru
• Although Bolivia has a larger state, it redistributes very little while Uruguay redistributes a great deal
![Page 11: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
REDISTRIBUTIONTracking the Gini coefficient from Market to Final Income
![Page 12: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12
Direct Taxes Progressive but Underutilized
• Personal income tax varies from around five percent of GDP in Uruguay to nearly zero in Bolivia
• In all countries in which they exist, direct taxes are progressive, but because direct taxes are a small percentage of GDP almost everywhere, their redistributive impact is small
![Page 13: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
13
Gini Before and After Direct Taxes
![Page 14: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14
Cash Transfers Powerful Redistributive Mechanism only when Targeted and of
Significant Magnitude• Cash transfers reduce extreme poverty by
more than 60 percent in Uruguay and Argentina…
….but only by 7 percent in Peru, which spends too little on cash transfers to achieve much poverty reduction
![Page 15: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
15
Headcount: Before and After Cash Transfers
![Page 16: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16
Poverty Reduction: Brazil and Mexico
• Brazil and Mexico have similar GDP/capita and although Brazil starts with a significantly higher poverty rate, they have a similar post cash transfers rate
• Brazil has a larger state and spends more than Mexico on cash transfers: coverage among extreme poor in Brazil is over 90% while it is less than 70% in Mx
• Poverty reduction in Brazil could be enhanced with better targeting of cash transfers or by expanding cash transfers that are targeted to the poor
• Poverty reduction in Mexico could be enhanced by expanding cash transfers that are targeted to the poor
![Page 17: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
17
• Bolivia spends five times more in cash transfers than Peru (as a share of GDP) but…
…because funds are not targeted to the poor, the amount of redistribution and poverty reduction has been limited: it is only slightly higher than in Peru
![Page 18: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18
• Peru’s Juntos, although quite effective because of its fine targeting, achieves very limited poverty and inequality reduction because the scale of the program is small: –coverage of extreme poor is below
60 percent and per capita transfer is low (compared to poverty gap)
![Page 19: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19
Coverage of Direct Cash Transfers
Bolivia Brazil Peru0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
87.7%93.3%
57.7%
83.2%
73.1%
41.9%
67.8%
29.2%
15.5%
Poor<2.5 2.5<=Poor<4
Non poor
![Page 20: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
20
“Leakages” of Direct Cash Transfers(Percent going to poor and nonpoor)
Bolivia Brazil Peru0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
25.2%16.8%
46.9%
12.8%
9.7%
24.0%
62.0%
73.5%
29.1%
Non poor2.5<=Poor<4Poor<2.5
![Page 21: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
21
Indirect Taxes and Poverty
• In Brazil and Bolivia, indirect taxes wipe out most of the effect of direct transfers, and poverty is almost the same after as before taxes and cash transfers.
• In contrast, in Mexico, indirect taxes and subsidies reduce poverty further, because exemptions and informality allow the poor to pay little in the form of indirect taxe
![Page 22: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Headcount Ratio Before and After Indirect Taxes
![Page 23: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
23
Public spending on education and health is a powerful equalizer
Net M
ark.
..
Disp
osab
...
Post
-fisc
...
Fina
l In.
..
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.489
0.447
0.369
0.503 0.4930.501
0.441
0.563
0.5430.541
0.450
0.497
0.4880.481
0.437
0.498
0.4940.489
0.4690.478
0.457 0.459
0.396
ArgentinaBoliviaBrazilMexicoPeruUruguay
Gini
![Page 24: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
24
Defining Progressive/Regressive Taxes and Transfers
![Page 25: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
25
ProgressivityKakwani Index for Taxes: Red= regressive
![Page 26: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
26
Direct and Indirect Taxesas % of GDP
![Page 27: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
27
ProgressivityConcentration Coefficients for Transfers
Green= progressive in abs terms
![Page 28: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Reduction in inequality with respect to Market Income Gini coefficient, Social Spending, and
Redistributive Effectiveness
Argentina _x0006_Brazil _x0007_Uruguay _x0006_Mexico _x0007_Bolivia _x0004_Peru0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Disposable Final Social Spending (% GDP) Effectiveness Social Spending
![Page 29: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
29
Fiscal Incidence Indicators: Winners and Losers
Who bears the burden of taxes and receives the benefits from cash transfers? • Fiscal incidence by decile and socio-
economic groups• Impoverishment: Fiscal mobility
matrix• Horizontal equity indicators
![Page 30: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
30
Incidence of Taxes and Cash TransfersNet Change in Income after Direct and Indirect Taxes and Transfers by Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
BoliviaBrazilMexicoPeruUruguay
![Page 31: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
31
![Page 32: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
32
In sum…
• Taxes and transfers reduce inequality and poverty by nontrivial amounts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, less so in Mexico and relatively little in Bolivia and Peru.
• Personal income tax varies from around five percent of GDP in Uruguay to nearly zero in Bolivia.
• In all countries in which they exist, direct taxes are progressive, but because direct taxes are a small percentage of GDP almost everywhere their redistributive impact is small.
![Page 33: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
33
In sum…
• Cash transfers have reduced extreme poverty by more than 60 percent in Uruguay and Argentina but only by seven percent in Peru, which spends too little on cash transfer to achieve much poverty reduction
• Bolivia spends five times more than Peru (as a share of GDP) but because funds are not targeted to the poor, the amount of redistribution and poverty reduction has been limited. It is only slightly higher than Peru.
![Page 34: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
34
In sum…
• In Brazil and Bolivia, indirect taxes wipe out most effect of direct transfers, and poverty is almost the same after as before taxes and cash transfers.
• In contrast, in Mexico poverty after indirect taxes and subsidies is lower because the poor pay little in the form of indirect taxes due to exemptions and informality.
• .Public spending on education and health is more equalizing than cash transfers in all the countries.
![Page 35: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
35
In sum… The largely positive redistributive picture of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay hides some unpleasant facts. • For instance, about 16 percent of Brazilian social spending
goes to tertiary education, mostly benefitting the five percent of the population with incomes above US$50 per day.
• Uruguay, too, allocates subsidies to upper income students. • In Argentina, progressive cash transfers are substantially less
than indirect (and regressive) subsidies to agricultural producers, airlines and other transportation sectors, manufacturing industries, and energy companies. Argentina’s sharp rise of public spending during the 2000s has been increasingly financed by distortionary taxes and unorthodox and unsustainable revenue-raising mechanisms.
![Page 36: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
36
THANK YOU
![Page 37: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
![Page 38: LASA Washington, DC, May 31, 2013](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022081502/568161cc550346895dd1b52d/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
38