Lary Larson Amicus Brief

8/9/2019 Lary Larson Amicus Brief

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Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574================================================================

In The

Supreme ourt of the United States

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., Petitioners,v.

RICHARD HODGES, Director,Ohio Department of Health, et al.,

Respondents.--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

VALERIA TANCO, et al., Petitioners,

v.

BILL HASLAM, Governor of Tennessee, et al.,

Respondents.--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

APRIL DEBOER, et al., Petitioners,

v.

RICK SNYDER, Governor of Michigan, et al., Respondents.

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

GREGORY BOURKE, et al., Petitioners,

v.

STEVE BESHEAR, Governor of Kentucky, et al., Respondents.

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United StatesCourt Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE LARY S. LARSONIN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

SEAN J. COLETTI, Counsel of RecordHOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT

H ANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC

428 Park AvenueIdaho Falls, Idaho 83402(208) [email protected]

================================================================COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

mailto:[email protected]:///reader/full/WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COMmailto:[email protected]:///reader/full/WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM


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ii

TABLEOFCONTENTS–Continued

Page

B. ThereisnoFundamentalRighttoEn- joytheReputationalValueofMarriageSeparate from all its Legal and Eco-

nomicAdvantages.................................. 20

C. PromotingthePublicWelfarebyDefend-ingtheValuesofTraditionalMarriageand Sexual Morality is a LegitimateStateInterest......................................... 24

D. LimitingMarriagetoOppositeSexCou-plesPromotestheValuesofTraditionalMarriageandSexualMorality.............. 33

IV. States with “Everything but Marriage”

Laws Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment by Refusing to Recognize theMaritalStatusofSameSexCouplesMar-riedinOtherStates..................................... 38

Conclusion............................................................... 39


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iii

TABLEOFAUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERALC ASES

Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810,93S.Ct.37,34

L.Ed.2d65(1972)..............................................10,13 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct.

2841,92L.Ed.2d140(1986)...................................29

Brown v. Board of Education,347U.S.483,74S.Ct.686,98L.Ed.2d873(1954)......................36,37

Carey v. Population Services Int’l,431U.S.678,97S.Ct.2010,52L.Ed.2d675(1977).....................28

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,62S.Ct.766,86L.Ed.1031(1942)...................26,27

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct.1029,31L.Ed.2d349(1972)...................................28

Griswald v. Connecticut,381U.S.479,85S.Ct.1678,14L.Ed.2d510(1965).......................22,25,28

Hollingsworth v. Perry,570U.S.___,133S.Ct.2652,186L.Ed.2d768(2013).................................13

Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 265, 190L.Ed.2d138(2014)..................................................20

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct.2472,156L.Ed.2d508(2003).........19,23,29,30,33

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct.1817,18L.Ed.2d1010(1967)...........................................37

Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Hu-man Services,682F.3d1(1stCir.2012)................13


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iv

TABLEOFAUTHORITIES–Continued

Page

Meyer v. Nebraska,262U.S.390,43S.Ct.625,67L.Ed.1042(1923).........................................20,28

Miller v. California,413U.S.15,93S.Ct.2607,37L.Ed.2d419(1965).......................................28,32

Nevada v. Hall,440U.S.410,99S.Ct.1182,59L.Ed.2d416(1929)..................................................39

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct.149,82L.Ed.288(1937).........................................22

Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,413U.S.49,93S.Ct.2628,37L.Ed.2d446(1973)..........................27

Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565(1878).......................................................................25

Perry v. Brown, 671F.3d1052(9thCir.2012),vacated on jurisdictional grounds, Hollingsworthv. Perry, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186L.Ed.2d768(2013).......................................... passim

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45S.Ct.571,69L.Ed.1070(1925)..............................28

Poe v. Ullman, 367U.S.497,81S.Ct.1752,6L.Ed.2d989(1961)............................................24,25

Powell v. Alabama,287U.S.45,53S.Ct.55,77

L.Ed.158(1932)......................................................22

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35L.Ed.2d147(1973)..................................................28

Romer v. Evans,517U.S.620,116S.Ct.1620,134L.Ed.2d855(1996)...........................................29


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v


Page

Roth v. U.S. ( Alberts v. California), 354 U.S.476,77S.Ct.1304,1L.Ed.2d1498(1957).......26,27

SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories,740F.3d471(9thCir.2014)....18,19,20

United States v. Windsor,133S.Ct.2675, 186L.Ed.2d808(2013).......................................... passim

Zablocki v. Redhail,434U.S.374,98S.Ct.673,54L.Ed.2d618(1978).......................................21,25

STATEC ASES

Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d185(1971)................................................................11

In re Marriage Cases,183P.3d384(Cal.2008)....9,14

Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908 A.2d 196(2006).................................................................11,12

CONSTITUTIONALANDSTATUTORY PROVISIONS

1U.S.C.§7..........................................13,15,16,17,19

Cal.Fam.Code§297(a)..............................................14

Cal.Fam.Code§308.5..........................................14,15

U.S.Constitution,art.IV,section1...........................38

U.S.Constitution,amend.XIV.......................... passim


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Page

OTHERA UTHORITIES

Gaylin, Book Review,77YaleL.J.579,592594

(1968).......................................................................28Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-

teenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L.Rev. 981, at10421043................................................................31

NationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,7700EastFirstPlace, Denver,CO80230.Onlineat http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices /civilunionsanddomesticpartnershipstatutes.aspx........................................................................3,4

ProCon.org ,233WilshireBlvd.,Suite200,Santa

Monica,CA.Onlineathttp://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857..............3

Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 928929(1978).......................................................................31

http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-serviceshttp:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon/http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-serviceshttp:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon/


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1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Amicus, Lary S. Larson, is a practicing lawyer

and anactive participant in localand statepolitics.

His interestin filing thisbriefstemsfroma compel-

ling desire to contribute something helpful to this

importantnationaldebate.Asaformerordainedmin-isterandapastcandidatefortheIdahoLegislature,

he took a sincere interest in the issue of samesex

marriage and wrote extensively on that subject. He

continues to believe that his insights on this issue

willbehelpfultotheCourt.

-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Therearefivestatesthatarenotpartiestothiscasebutthathaveauniqueinterestinitsoutcome.

Theyarestatesthat,priortoUnited States v. Wind-

sor,133S.Ct.2675,186L.Ed.2d808(2013),adopted

civil union or domestic partnership statutes giving

samesex couples “everything but marriage,” but

denying them its special reputational value. After

Windsor their samesex marriage prohibitions were

declaredunconstitutional.

1

By a letter on file with the Clerk, all Petitioners have jointlyconsentedtothefilingofthisBrief.AllRespondentsfiled

ablanketconsenttothefilingofallamicusbriefs.Pursuantto

SupremeCourtRule37.6,nocounselforanypartyauthoredthis

briefinwholeorinpart;nocounselorpartymadeanymonetary

contributionintendedtofundthepreparationorsubmissionof

thisbrief;andnootherpersonotherthanAmicusandhiscoun-

selmadeanysuchmonetarycontribution.


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2

Thereputationalvalueofmarriageisapersonal

interestseparateanddistinctfromallotherlegalin-

cidents of marriage. It means having the State ap-

proveandcondoneacouple’ssexualrelationshipand

lifestyle.Whenthereputationalvalueofmarriageis

correctlyunderstoodinthatmanner,itprovesnottobea fundamental right. Rather, States with “every-

thingbutmarriage”lawsmaydenysamesexcouples

therighttomarryifthatpolicypromotesalegitimate

stateinterest.

Thepromotionofmoralvalues insocietyisa le-

gitimate State interest, and the traditional institu-

tion of marriage has been a powerful force in that

effort. But it is reasonable to believe that allowing

samesexcouplestomarrywouldlessentheeffective-ness of marriage as a means of promoting moral

values.

Therefore, if a State adopts an “everything but

marriage” law that gives samesex couples all other

benefits of marriage, the Fourteenth Amendment

does not require the State to allow such couples to

marry.

-

ARGUMENT

I. Introduction.

AsofFebruary19,2015,samesexmarriagehad

beenlegalizedin37states–in26byjudicialdecree,


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in8bylegislativeaction,and in3bypopularvote.2

Samesexmarriageprohibitions(eitherbystatuteor

by constitution) were still in place in 13 states, al-

thoughin7ofthosethelawsbanningsamesexmar-

riagehadbeenstruckdownbyjudicialdecisionsthat

arestillunderappeal.3

While the national debate over this issue has

usually treated samesex marriage as an “allor-

nothing” proposition, 15 states took a different ap-

proach.Theychosetorecognizelegallythecommitted

relationships of samesex couples by adopting civil

unionordomesticpartnershiplawsthatformallyle-

gitimizesamesexrelationshipswithoutcallingthem

“married.”4

Inten of thosestates, the domesticpartnershiporcivilunionlawsactuallygavesamesexcouplesthe

identicallegalandeconomicbenefitsaffordedtomar-

riedcouples.5Thoselawswereeuphemisticallycalled

“everythingbutmarriage”laws.

2ProCon.org ,233WilshireBlvd.,Suite200,SantaMonica,

CA. Online at http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?

resourceID=004857.3

Ibid.4Colorado,Hawaii,Illinois,NewJersey,California,Maine,

Nevada,Oregon,Washington,Wisconsin,Connecticut,Delaware,

NewHampshire,RhodeIsland,andVermont.5

Colorado, New Jersey, California, Nevada, Oregon,

Hawaii, Washington, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode

Island. National Conference of State Legislatures, 7700 East

First Place, Denver, CO 80230, Online at http://www.ncsl.org /

(Continuedonfollowingpage)

http:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.phphttp:///reader/full/http://www.ncsl.orghttp:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.phphttp:///reader/full/http://www.ncsl.org


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Underan “everythingbut marriage” regime,al-

thoughsamesexcouplesenjoyallthesametangible

advantages that married couples enjoy, they lack

theuniquesocietalveneration(i.e.,the“reputational

value”) that the status of traditional marriage con-

fers. Whether such couples in an “everything butmarriage” state have a constitutional right to enjoy

that reputational value is the narrow focus of this

amicusbrief.

Inall15statesthatpassedcivilunionordomes-

ticpartnershipstatutes,samesexmarriagehassub-

sequentlybeenlegalizedeitherbystatuteorbycourt

ruling.6Ofthe10thathad“everythingbutmarriage”

statutes,samesexmarriagewaslegalizedbyjudicial

decreein5ofthem:Colorado,NewJersey,California,

Nevada, and Oregon (where almost 19% of the na-

tionalpopulationresides).Thosedecisionsallbecame

final between June 28, 2013, and October, 2014,

following the Supreme Court’s decision in United

States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808

(2013).

Although none of the states whose laws are at

issue in this case are orwere “everything but mar-

riage” states,thedecisionin thiscase,like thedeci-

sion inWindsor,willmost likely beseen assettlingthe question whether the Fourteenth Amendment

research/humanservices/civilunionsanddomesticpartnership

statutes.aspx.6

NationalConferenceof StateLegislatures, 7700 EastFirst

Place,Denver,CO80230. Ibid.


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allowsastatetoenactan“everythingbutmarriage”

law but still prohibit samesex marriage, per se.

Affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision would an-

swer that question in the affirmative. Reversing it

entirelywouldnodoubtbeinterpretedasprecluding

thatopportunity.

That is meaningful to the five abovementioned

states where “everything but marriage” laws were

democratically adopted but judicially revoked. With

anappropriateoutcomeinthiscase,thosestates,as

well as many others, would have a renewed oppor-

tunity to democratically enact “everything but mar-

riage”lawsforthebenefitofsamesexcouples,while

atthesametimepreservingthetraditionaldefinition

of“marriage”foraslongastheybelievethatdoingsopromotesthepublicwelfare.Thekeyistoresolvethe

currentcontroversyinawaythatcomportswiththe

Constitutionandleavesthatdooropen.

Tothatend,wesubmitthefollowingpartialan-

swers to the questions posed by the Court in this

case:

(1) Ifastate’slawsallowasamesexcoupletoenterintoalegalunionbywhichtheyenjoythesamelegalandeconomicrightsthat married couples enjoy, then theFourteenthAmendmentdoesnotrequirethat state to issue them a marriage li-cense.

(2) Ifastate’slawsallowasamesexcouplelawfullymarriedinanotherstatetoen-

joy the same legal and economic rights


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that other married couples enjoy, thentheFourteenthAmendmentdoesnotre-quire that state to recognize them asmarried.

We limit our argument to those narrow propo-

sitions, recognizing that there will be many otherpartieswhothoroughlyandexpertlycoverthebroad-

erissuesraisedbythiscase.

II. In States with “Everything but Marriage”

Laws, the Issue is Whether the States May

Deny SameSex Couples the Reputational

Value of Marriage.

A. There are Constitutionally Significant

Differences Between the Legal Inci-dents of Marriage and its Reputational

Value.

Inthesamesexmarriagedebate,how theques-

tionispresentedcanmakeallthedifference.Forex-

ample, “Shall marriage continue to be defined as a

committed unionbetweenone man and one woman,

orshallithenceforthincludesamesexcouples?”The

query itself implies that the right to marry is an

indivisible,allornothingconcept.

Intruth,“the”righttomarryisacombinationof

many related but separable rights, privileges, and

benefits.Stateswithcivilunionordomesticpartner-

ship laws, and some courts, have drawn a line be-

tween the legal and economic privileges of married


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couplesononehand,andtheintangible,reputational

valueofmarriageontheother.

Manyofthelegalandeconomicadvantagesinci-

dentaltomarriagehavebeencreatedforthepurpose

ofencouragingtheformationofstrongfamilies.They

include special treatment for married couples in con-

nectionwith adoptions,entitlementprograms, eviden-

tiary privileges, guardianships, insurance programs,

probateproceedings,propertyrights,retirementpro-

gramsandtaxes,tonameonlyafew.

Butthelegalandeconomicincidentsofmarriage

caneasilybeconferredonunmarriedcouplesaswell

forthesamepurpose–tosupportlongterm,commit-

ted, loving relationships.When a State permits un-

marriedcouplestosolemnizetheirmutuallongtermcommitments in ways other than marriage, it has

essentiallybifurcatedtherightofmarriage,separat-

ingitspracticalincidentsfromitsreputationalvalue.

It has separated the “rights of marriage” from the

“righttomarry.”

Forexample,inCalifornia,Proposition8sought

toaccomplishthatbifurcationbyamendingthestate

constitution:

“Proposition 8 worked a singular andlimited change to the California Constitu-tion:itstrippedsamesexcouplesoftherighttohavetheircommittedrelationshipsrecog-nized by the State with the designation of‘marriage,’ which the state constitution hadpreviouslyguaranteedthem,whileleavingin


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placealloftheirotherrightsandresponsibil-itiesaspartners–rightsandresponsibilitiesthatareidenticaltothoseofmarriedspousesandformanintegralpartofthemarriagere-lationship.***

“The official, cherished status of ‘mar-riage’ is distinct from the incidents of mar-riage, such as those listed in the CaliforniaFamilyCode.”

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076, 1078 (9th Cir.

2012),vacated on jurisdictional grounds, Hollingsworth

v. Perry,570U.S.___,133S.Ct.2652(2013).

The traditionalinstitutionofmarriagecarries a

universally understood symbolism that has little to

do with its legal and economic incidents. Grantinga marriage license to a couple bestows an honor on

them.Itrecognizesthattheyareeligibletoestablish

ahomeandafamily,andtobringchildrenintoit.It

assures them that they may engage in sexual rela-

tionswithoutthemoralopprobriumthatsocialnorms

attachtoextramaritalsex.Itcommunicatestothem

society’s approval of their relationship and their

conduct.Itcondonestheirlifestyleasappropriateand

consistentwithgoodmorals.

Without the designation of “marriage,” all the

otherlegalandeconomicincidentsofmarriagedonot

carrythesamereputationalvalue. “Theincidentsof

marriage,standingalone,donot,however,conveythe

same governmental and societal recognition as does

thedesignationof‘marriage’itself.” Id.,at10781079.


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Thepowerful symbolismin traditional marriage

hasbeen one oftheprimaryincentives for samesex

marriage litigation. In Perry v. Brown, supra, the

NinthCircuitCourtofAppealsobservedthat,“‘mar-

riage’ signifies the unique recognition that society

gives to harmonious, loyal, enduring, and intimaterelationships.” Id.,at1078.“Itistheprincipalmanner

inwhichtheStateattachesrespectanddignitytothe

highest formofa committed relationship and tothe

individuals who have entered into it.” Id., at 1079.

“[W]eemphasizetheextraordinarysignificanceofthe

officialdesignationof‘marriage’.Thatdesignationis

importantbecause‘marriage’isthenamethatsociety

givestothe relationship thatmattersmostbetween

twoadults.” Id.,at1078.The designation “married”

symbolizes“statelegitimizationandsocietalrecogni-tionoftheircommittedrelationships.” Id.,at1063.

Domestic partnerships andcivil unions by com-

parisondonotsatisfy“allofthepersonalanddignity

intereststhathavetraditionallyinformedtherightto

marry....” Id., at 1066. “‘[P]roviding only a novel,

alternative institution for samesex couples’ consti-

tuted ‘an officialstatement that the family relation-

shipofsamesexcouplesisnotofcomparablestature

orequaldignitytothefamilyrelationshipofoppositesex couples.’” Id., at 1067 (quoting In re Marriage

Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008)). “[D]omestic

partnershipslackthesocialmeaningassociatedwith

marriage.” Id.,at1075(quotingthelowercourt).Do-

mestic partnership“stigmatizes samesexcouples as

havingrelationships inferiortothoseofoppositesex


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couples” ( Id.,n.4). “[T]here isa significant symbolic

disparity between domestic partnership and mar-

riage. It is the designation of ‘marriage’ itself that

expressesvalidation,bythestateandthecommunity,

andthatservesasasymbol,likeaweddingceremony

or a wedding ring, of something profoundly impor-tant.” Id.,at1078.

A samesex couple’s interest in the reputational

value of marriage is therefore of a much different

natureandofamuchdifferentdegreeofimportance

than their interest in the legal and economic inci-

dentsofmarriage.Thesameistruefromtheperspec-

tiveofthestate,althoughfordifferentreasons.Those

significant differences in nature, importance, and

perspective mean that the Fourteenth Amendmentmust have a different impact on a state’s power to

denysamesexcouplesthestatusofmarriagethanit

hasonthestate’spowertodenythemthelegaland

economic privileges of marriage. Courts that have

overturnedsamesexmarriagebanswithoutconsider-

ing the meaningful differences between those two

separateaspectsoftherightto marryhave“thrown

outthebabywiththebathwater.”

B. A Bifurcated Approach to MarriageRights is Evident in the Development of

Marriage Jurisprudence over the Last

Four Decades.

IntheU.S.SupremeCourt’sinitialforayintothis

subject, Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810,93S.Ct.37,34


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L.Ed.2d65(1972), the Court left standingaMinne-

sota Supreme Court decision that upheld a state

statutedefining“marriage” asaunionbetweenper-

sonsoftheoppositesex.Theappellants’onlyconten-

tionwas that the rejectionoftheirapplicationfor a

marriagelicensepatentlydeniedthemafundamentalright, deprived them of property or liberty without

dueprocess,anddeniedthemequalprotection. Baker

v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).

Therewasnocontentionin Bakerthattheprohibition

againstsamesexmarriagedeprivedsamesexcouples

ofanylegaloreconomicbenefitsthatwereenjoyedby

oppositesexcouples.

The Supreme Court’s decision that that case

presentedno substantial federal questioncan there-forebereadasconfirmationthat,at leastwhenthe

legal and economic benefits of marriage are not at

issue, the state is free to determine whether ornot

the reputational valueofmarriagewill bebestowed

on samesex couples. It appears to accommodate a

bifurcatedapproachtoanalyzingthosetwoseparate

aspectsoftherighttomarry.

Agoodearlyexampleofastatecourtapplyinga

bifurcated approach to marriage rights is Lewis v.

Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908A.2d 196 (2006). In that

case,theNewJerseySupremeCourtheldthestate’s

banonsamesexmarriagetobeunconstitutional(un-

der the New Jersey state constitution) insofar as it

denied the legaland economic incidents ofmarriage

tosamesexcouples.However, the Courtdid not re-

jectthestate’srighttodenythestatusofmarriageto


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samesexcouples.Ratherthanorderingcountyclerks

to begin issuing marriage licenses to samesex cou-

ples,thecourtgavethelegislature180daystoadopt

acivilunionstatutegivingsamesexcouplestheiden-

ticallegalandeconomicbenefitsasmarriedcouples.

OnthefailureoftheStatetodoso,thesamesexmar-riagebanwouldbestrickenin toto.Thus,theCourt

recognized that the state had the power to deny

samesexcouplesthereputationalvalueofmarriage,

but not the legalandeconomicbenefitsof marriage.

TheCourtexplained:

“Thelegalbattleinthiscasehasbeenwagedover one overarching issue – the right tomarry.Acivilmarriagelicenseentitlesthosewedded to avast arrayof economicandso-

cial benefits and privileges – the rights ofmarriage.Plaintiffshavepursuedthesingu-lar goal of obtaining the right to marry,knowing that, if successful, the rights ofmarriage automatically follow. We do nothave to take that allornothing approach.Weperceiveplaintiffs’equalprotectionclaimtohavetwocomponents:whethercommittedsamesexcoupleshaveaconstitutionalrightto the benefits and privileges afforded tomarried heterosexual couples, and, if so,

whethertheyhavetheconstitutionalrighttohave their ‘permanent committed relation-ship’recognizedbythenameofmarriage.”

188N.J.415,433.

TheCourtconcludedthatequalprotectionunder

the New Jersey constitution required that samesex


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couples be given the opportunity to enjoy all of the

legalandeconomicincidentsofmarriage,butnotnec-

essarilythestatusofmarriage.

The bifurcated perspective of marriage is also

evidentin Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and

Human Services,682F.3d1(1stCir.2012).There,the

First Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether

Section3oftheDefenseofMarriageAct(“DOMA”),1

U.S.C.§7,violatedeithertheEqualProtectionClause

oftheFourteenthAmendmentorthefederalismprin-

ciplesoftheTenthAmendment.

TheCourtreliedon Baker v. Nelsontoholdthat

samesex couples have no constitutional right to

marry,perse.However,whenitfocusedonthelegal

and economic burdens imposed by DOMA on samesexcouples,andthelackofpracticaljustificationfor

DOMA on the part of the federal government, the

Court found that DOMA imposed an impermissible

burden in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Thus, the Court’s treatment of the incidents of mar-

riagewasconstitutionallydifferentthanitstreatment

ofthestatusandreputationalvalueofmarriage.

The same approach is found in Perry v. Brown,

671F.3d1052(9thCir.2012)whichbecamethecom-panioncasetoWindsorunderthename Hollingsworth v.

Perry, 570 U.S. ___, 133S.Ct.2652,186 L.Ed.2d768

(2013).Althoughtheappealin Perrywasdismissedon

jurisdictional grounds and thedecision was vacated,

the Ninth Circuit’s observations regarding the dual

natureofmarriagerightsarestillpersuasive.


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To give them context, California adopted a Do-

mesticPartnershipActin1999,7whichwasan“every-

thing butmarriage”law. Thenin2000,Californians

passed an initiative, Proposition 22,8 which specif-

ically denied marital status to samesex couples. In

early 2008, Proposition 22 was struck down by theCaliforniaSupremeCourt.( In re Marriage Cases,183

P.3d 384 (Cal.2008)). However, that same year, the

votersrespondedbypassingProposition8,amending

theCaliforniaConstitutionitselftoprohibitsamesex

marriage.InMay2009,Proposition8waschallenged

in Federal District Court on the basis of the Four-

teenthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.TheDis-

trictCourtruledthattherewasinsufficientreasonto

justifydenyingsamesexcouplestherighttomarry.

Onappeal,athreejudgepaneloftheNinthCircuit

CourtofAppeals affirmed the District Court.9 How-

ever, itnarrowly limited its decision to the unusual

situationinCalifornia,wheresamesexcoupleswere

firstdeniedtherighttomarry(Proposition22),then

granted the right to marry ( In re Marriage Cases,

supra),thendeprivedofthatrightagain(Proposition

8). Throughout those transitions, samesex couples

had all the practical rights of oppositesex married

couples. The only thing affected by the seesawing

7Cal.Fam.Code§297(a).

8Cal.Fam.Code§308.5.

9 Perry v. Brown, 671F.3d1052(9thCir.2012), vacated on

jurisdictional grounds, Hollingsworth v. Perry,570U.S.___,133

S.Ct.2652(2013).


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politics was their right to enjoy the reputational

valueofmarriage,perse.

“AllthatProposition8accomplishedwastotakeawayfromsamesexcouplestherighttobegrantedmarriagelicensesandthusle-

gally to use the designation of ‘marriage,’which symbolizes state legitimization andsocietalrecognitionof theircommitted rela-tionships.”

671F.3d1052,1063.

In effect, the Court concluded that when the

CaliforniaSupremeCourtstruckdownProposition22

in2008 because therewas nosufficient justification

todenysamesexcouplestherighttomarry,theState

essentially abandoned whatever argument it mightotherwisehavehadtojustifytheenactmentofPropo-

sition 8. The Court emphasized that it was not de-

ciding the questionwhetherCalifornia,or anyother

state, could ever prohibit samesex marriage, but

rather only whether “Proposition 8’s elimination of

the rights of samesex couples to marry ... ” was

constitutional. Id., at 1064. (Emphasis in original.)

TheCourt’sreasoningwasentirelydependentonthe

unique character of the reputational value of mar-

riage, distinct from the nature of its practical inci-dents–abifurcatedapproachtotheissue.

InUnited States v. Windsor,133S.Ct.2675,186

L.Ed.2d808(2013),thatsamedistinctionwasdrawn

from a slightlydifferent perspective. There, the Su-

premeCourtdeclaredSection3ofDOMAunconstitu-

tional as an abuse of federal power under the Fifth


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16

Amendment. But its reasoning was the same as in

Perry v. Brown.Whereasin Perry v. Brownthesame

sexmarriageban(Proposition8)wasrevokedbecause

Californiahadpreviouslydecidedthatsamesexcou-

pleswereentitledtomarry,inWindsorthesamesex

marriageban (Section3 ofDOMA)was revoked be-causeNewYorkhadpreviouslydecidedthatsamesex

coupleswereentitledtomarry.

More importantly, the Windsor decision was to-

tallydependentonthefactthattheStateofNewYork

hadchosen,inafreeanddemocraticprocessthrough

itslawfullyelectedrepresentatives,todignifyanden-

noblesamesexrelationshipsbypermittingsuchcou-

ples to enter into statesanctioned marriages. That

was the public policy ofthe StateofNewYork, and

the Court’s decision confirmed New York’s exclusive

righttoexercisethatpower.Indeed, itwasthe very

voluntarinessofNewYork’sdecisiontopermitsame

sexmarriagesthatimpartedthoserelationshipswith

honor, dignity, and legitimization equal to that of

oppositesexmarriedcouples.TheCourtexplained:

“The avowed purpose and practicaleffect ofthe law here in question are to impose adisadvantage, a separate status, and so astigma upon all who enter into samesexmarriages made lawful bythe unquestionedauthority of the States.

“The history of DOMA’s enactment andits own text demonstrate that interferencewith the equal dignity of samesex mar-riages, a dignity conferred by the States inthe exercise of their sovereign power, was


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17

morethananincidentaleffectofthefederalstatute. It was its essence.” Id., at 2693.(Emphasisadded.)

“TheState’s powerindefiningthemari-tal relation is of central relevance in this

case quite apart from principles of federal-ism. Here, the State’s decision to give thisclassofpersonstherighttomarryconferreduponthemadignityandstatusofimmenseimport.When the State used its historic and

essential authority to define the marital rela-tion in this way, its role and its power inmaking the decision enhanced the recogni-tion, dignity, and protection of the class intheir own community.DOMA,becauseofitsreach and extent, departs from this history

and tradition ofreliance on state law to define marriage....” Id., at 2692. (Emphasisadded.)

“The congressional goal was ‘to put athumbon the scales and influence a state’sdecisionastohowtoshapeitsownmarriagelaws.’...ThatraisesamostseriousquestionundertheConstitution’s FifthAmendment.”

Id.,at2693.

ThesepassagesindicatethattheCourtconsiders

the definition of marriage, or in other words the

question of who is allowed to marry, to be a matter

reservedtotheStates,andthatit istheState’s free

exerciseofthatpowerthatendowstheinstitutionof

marriage with its unique reputational value. If the

Constitution forces States togrant samesexcouples

the status of marriage so that they can enjoy its


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18

reputationalvalue,thenthepresenceoffederalcom-

pulsion negates and emasculates the very societal

recognitionandhonorthatsamesexcouplesaretry-

ingtoachieve.

III. States with “Everything but Marriage” Laws

Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment

by Denying SameSex Couples the Reputa-

tional Value of Marriage.

A. The Fourteenth Amendment Requires a

Heightened Level of Scrutiny for Laws

Discriminating on the Basis of Sexual

Orientation.

Alawdenyingsamesexcouplesthereputational

valueofmarriagediscriminatesagainstthemonthebasis of their sexual orientation. Whether such dis-

crimination isprohibited bythe FourteenthAmend-

ment depends on what level of scrutiny must be

appliedbytheCourt.Onthatquestion,weagreewith

thereasoningoftheNinthCircuitCourtofAppealsin

SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laborato-

ries,740F.3d471(9thCir.2014).

In that case, the court considered whether it is

constitutionallypermissibletoperemptorilystrikepo-tential jurors from a jury panel based solely upon

theirsexualorientation.BasedonWindsor,thecourt

held that it is not. In doing so, the court examined

Windsor to determine what it says about the level

of scrutiny required by the Fourteenth Amendment

when considering discrimination based on sexual


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19

orientation. The court concluded that Windsor re-

quiresaheightenedlevelofscrutiny,demandingthat

the government establish that the discriminatory

legislationwasmotivatedbyalegitimatestateinter-

est.Thecourtstated:

“Windsor, of course, did not expresslyannounce the level of scrutiny itapplied tothe equal protection claim at issue in thatcase,butanexpressdeclarationisnotneces-sary.... When the Supreme Court has re-frained from identifying its method ofanalysis, we have analyzed the SupremeCourt precedent ‘by considering what theCourtactuallydid,ratherthanbydissectingisolated pieces of text.’ (Citation omitted)”740F.3d471,480.

The court then proceeded to observe that the

analysisinWindsordidnotmeettheusualstandards

ofarationalbasisreview.Itdidnotconsiderpossible

rationalesforDOMA.Itappearedtorequirea“legit-

imate state interest” to justify the harm caused by

DOMA.Anditrelieduponseveralprecedents,mostof

which required a heightened level of scrutiny. The

courtconcluded:

[W]e conclude that Windsor compels thesameresultwithrespecttoequalprotectionthat Lawrence compelled with respect tosubstantive due process: Windsor review isnotrationalbasisreview.Initswordsanditsdeed,Windsorestablishedalevelofscrutinyfor classifications based on sexual orien-tation that is unquestionably higher than


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20

rationalbasisreview.Inotherwords,Wind- sorrequiresthatheightenedscrutinybeap-plied to equal protection claims involvingsexualorientation.740F.3d471,481.

TheFourteenthAmendmentthereforerequiresa

heightenedlevelofscrutinyinthiscase.Discrimina-tionagainstsamesexcouplesintheenjoymentofthe

reputational value of marriage is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment unless it promotes a legiti-

matestateinterest.

B. There is no Fundamental Right to En-

joy the Reputational Value of Marriage

Separate from all its Legal and Economic

Advantages.

Beforeproceeding,weshouldrebuttheargument

that the right to enjoy the reputational value of

marriage is a fundamental right and therefore the

strictscrutinytestshouldapply.

Cases that have found a fundamental right in

marriagehavegenerallyfocusedonthelegalandeco-

nomic benefits that are appurtenant to marriage.

Those benefits include such things as the right “to

chooseone’sspouse,todecidewhethertoconceiveor

adopta child, topubliclyproclaimanenduringcom-

mitment to remain together through thick and

thin....” ( Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1212-

1213(10thCir.2014),cert. denied,135S.Ct.265,190

L.Ed.2d138(2014); Meyer v. Nebraska,262U.S.390,

43S.Ct.625,67L.Ed.1042(1923)).


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21

Collectively, those privileges may indeed consti-

tuteafundamentalrightunderthelaw.Butaspre-

viouslydiscussed, marriageper se isnot a sine qua

nonforthebenefitsthatmarriageentails.Thechar-

acteristicsthatgivemarriageitspracticalvalueand

make it a fundamental right can all be conferreduponsamesexcouplesthroughcivilunionordomes-

tic partnership statutes without granting them the

reputationalvalueofmarriage,perse.

Thereforetheissueisasfollows:Isthereafun-

damental right to enjoy the reputational value of

marriageonthepartofsamesexcoupleswhoalready

enjoylegalandeconomicbenefitsidenticaltothoseof

marriedcouplesinallotherrespects?

There is not. Not all privileges associated withthestatusofmarriageenjoythesameconstitutional

protection. “By reaffirming the fundamental charac-

teroftherighttomarry,wedonotmeantosuggest

that every state regulation which relates in any

waytotheincidentsoforprerequisitesformarriage

must be subjected to vigorous scrutiny.” Zablocki v.

Redhail,434U.S.374,386,98S.Ct.673,54L.Ed.2d

618 (1978). “[I]t is fair to say that there is a right

of marital and familial privacy which places some

substantive limits on the regulatorypowerofgovern-

ment.Butthecourthasyettoholdthatallregulations

touching upon marriage implicate a ‘fundamental

right’ triggeringthemostexacting judicialscrutiny.”

Id.,at397(Powell,J.,concurringinthejudgment).


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22

The reputational value of marriage consists of

having the State condone, honor, and dignify one’s

sexualconductandlifestyle.Forsamesexcouples,it

would mean having the State publicly acknowledge

thathomosexualbehaviorsandlifestylesarenormal

and consistent with conventional community stan-dards.Isthatafundamentalright?

Thelistof“fundamentalrights”isveryselect.In

Griswald v. Connecticut,381U.S.479,85S.Ct.1678,

14L.Ed.2d510(1965),theCourtstated:“Theinquiry

iswhetherarightinvolvedisofsuchacharacterthat

it cannot be denied without violating those ‘funda-

mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at

thebaseofallourcivilandpoliticalinstitutions....’”

85 S.Ct. at 16861687, quoting Powell v. Alabama,287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).

When considering whether an asserted right is a

fundamental right, thecourtmustconsiderwhether

the right is one of those fundamental rights and

liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the

nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty

norjusticewouldexistwithoutit. Palko v. Connecti-

cut,302U.S.319,58S.Ct.149,82L.Ed.288(1937).

Among the recognized fundamental rights are

those rights which were considered “natural rights”

by the founding fathers, including life, liberty, the

pursuitofhappiness,thefreedomsofreligion,assem-

bly, and association, and the right to ownership of

property.Alsoincludedarethoserightswhichhaveas

theirsource,andareguaranteedby,stateorFederal


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23

constitutions,such asfreedom ofspeech, freedomof

the press, and the rightto beararms.Finally,those

rightsarefundamentalwhicharenecessarilyimplied

bytheexistenceofotherconstitutionalrights,suchas

therightofprivacy.

The most obvious difference between those fun-

damental rights and the alleged right to have the

state approve or dignify one’s spousal choices or

sexual preferencesis that fundamental rights relate

totheautonomyofpersonstomaketheirownchoices

withoutundueinterferencefromthestate.Thestate’s

responsetotheexerciseoffundamentalrightsshould

bebenignindifference.Ontheotherhand,thealleged

right asserted by samesex couples is one that de-

mands specific action onthe part of the state– the

adoptionofapublic policy placingthe state’s impri-matur of approval on the couple’s relationship, con-

duct,orlifestyle.

TheState’srefusaltoofficiallyapproveaspecific

personallifestylethatitshouldotherwisetreatwith

benign indifference (e.g., asrequiredby Lawrence v.

Texas,539U.S.558,123S.Ct.2472,156L.Ed.2d508

(2003),)can hardly becharacterized asviolating the

“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which

lie at the base of all our civil and political in-stitutions.”Norisarighttoobtainsuchapprovalso

“deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition”

thatitsrefusalwouldthreatentheexistenceofjustice

orliberty.

Byanalogy,thefreedomsofspeech,religion,and

privacydonot includea fundamentalrightto insist


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24

that the State officially and publicly approve what-

everonechoosestosay,believe,ordointheprivacyof

one’s home.Similarly, the right to select a mate, to

makelongtermandlasting commitmentsofmutual

loveandsupport,toformahouseholdandestablisha

family, and to bear and raise children, does not in-cludetherighttoinsistthatthestateovertlyapprove

one’schoicesinthatregard.Nocitizenhastheright

topreemptthestate’sfreeexerciseofitspolicepower

by insisting onpersonal endorsements of their indi-

vidualbehaviorsandlifestylechoices.

Consequently,thereputationalvalueofmarriage

doesnotmeetthetestofafundamentalright.States

with “everything but marriage” laws may therefore

refusetoletsamesexcouplesmarryifthatpolicy issupportedbyalegitimatestateinterest.

C. Promoting the Public Welfare by Defend-

ing the Values of Traditional Marriage

and Sexual Morality is a Legitimate

State Interest.

Until the last halfcentury or so, our societal

normsheldthatsexualrelationsoutside thebounds

ofa marriage, including homosexual relations, were

immoralandindecentandthereforewithinthepolice

poweroftheStatestoprohibitintheinterestofpub-

licwelfare.AsstatedbyJusticeHarlaninhisdissent

in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6

L.Ed.2d989(1961):


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25

“[T]he very inclusion of the category ofmoralityamongstateconcernsindicatesthatsocietyisnotlimitedinitsobjectsonlytothephysical wellbeing of the community, buthas traditionally concerned itself with themoral soundness of its people as well....

Thelaws... forbiddingadultery,fornicationandhomosexualpracticeswhichexpressthenegativeoftheproposition,confiningsexual-ity to lawful marriage, form a pattern sodeeplypressedintothesubstanceofourso-cial life that any constitutional doctrine inthisareamustbuilduponthatbasis.”

367U.S.497,545546.

Seealso, Griswald v. Connecticutt,381U.S.479,85

S.Ct.1678,14L.Ed.2d510(1965),Goldberg,J.,con-curring,381 U.S.479,498499; Pennoyer v. Neff ,95

U.S.714, 24L.Ed.565 (1878),quotedin Zablocki v.

Redhail,434U.S.374,399,98S.Ct.673,54L.Ed.2d

618(1978).

Society’sinterestinsexualmoralityismorethan

asectarianobsession.Sexualmoresarepracticaland

utilitarian,andvaluabletosocietyinmanyways.For

evidenceofthat,itsufficestopointtothesocietalgoal

ofreducingtheincidenceofoutofwedlockbirths.Itis

reasonabletobelievethatchildrenbornoutofwedlock

are much less likely toenjoythe samebenefits that

areprovidedbyafamilywhereamotherandfather

fulfill their traditional roles. Further, the statistical

frequency of childrenborn outofwedlock isdirectly

relatedtotheprevalenceofextramaritalsexualrela-

tions.Thatphenomenon,inturn,isdirectlyrelatedto


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26

how seriously a society treats sexual morality as a

culturalexpectation.

The promotion of sexual morality as a social

norm and a proper object of government actionhas

beenmanifestinotherareasofthelaw.Forexample,

thejurisprudencesurroundingobscenityandpornog-

raphyinstructsusthattheStatemayregulatesexual

expression ordepictions ofsexual conduct according

tocommunitystandardsforthepurposeofpromoting

goodmorals,particularlywherethesexualexpression

or conduct is in public view or where undesirable

expressions or conduct are represented as being of-

ficiallysanctioned.“[A]nybenefitthatmaybederived

from [lewd and obscene utterances] is clearly out-

weighedbythesocialinterestinorderandmorality.”

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315U.S.568,572,62

S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). In Roth v. U.S.

( Alberts v. California),354U.S.476,77S.Ct.1304,1

L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), Justice Harlan, in his concur-

ringopinionin Alberts,stated:

“[I]tisnotirrational,inourpresentstateofknowledge,toconsiderthatpornographycaninduce a type of sexual conduct which aStatemaydeemobnoxioustothemoralfab-

ric of society. In fact, the very division ofopiniononthesubjectcounselsustorespectthechoicemadebytheState....

“The State can reasonably draw the infer-ence that over a long period of time the in-discriminatedisseminationofmaterials,theessential character of which is to degrade


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27

sex, will have an eroding effect on moralstandards.”

354U.S.476,501502.

Seealso, Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,413U.S.49,

93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), where theCourtheld that “there arelegitimatestate interests

atstakeinstemmingthe tideofcommercializedob-

scenity....Theseincludetheinterestofthepublicin

the quality of life and the totalcommunity environ-

ment,thetoneofcommerceinthegreatcitycenters,

and,possibly,thepublicsafetyitself.”Thecourtrea-

sonedthateventhough “there areno scientificdata

whichconclusivelydemonstratethat exposure toob-

scenematerialadversely affects men and womenor

theirsociety”and“noconclusiveproofofaconnectionbetween antisocial behavior and obscene material,”

the legislature of Georgia “could quite reasonably

determinethatsuchaconnectiondoesormightexist”

and “could legitimately act on such a conclusion to

protect ‘the social interest in order and morality.’”

413U.S.49,5763,quoting Roth v. U.S.,354U.S.at

485, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.

568,572(1942).

The interest of the State inrefusingtopublicly

condoneconductthatisdetrimentaltopublicwelfare

canbeevengreaterthantheState’sinterestinreg-

ulatingtheconductitself.

“[Psychiatrists] made a distinction betweenthereadingofpornography,asunlikelytobeper se harmful, and the permitting of the


35/47


36/47

29

S.Ct.2010,52L.Ed.2d675(1977); Bowers v. Hardwick,

478U.S.186,106S.Ct.2841,92L.Ed.2d140(1986).

Incourseoftime,two cases illuminatedthe ex-

panding freedom of samesex couples: Romer v.

Evans,517U.S.620,116S.Ct.1620,134L.Ed.2d855

(1996)and Lawrence v. Texas,539U.S.558,123S.Ct.

2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). However, neither of

thosedecisionsquestionedwhetherthepromotionof

sexualmoralityisalegitimategovernmentinterest.

In Lawrence,theCourtoverturnedaTexasstat-

ute that made certain sexual conduct between two

personsofthesamesexacrime.However,theCourt

recognized that although States cannot classify pri-

vate, consensual, homosexual acts as crimes, same

sex relationships may stillnot be entitled to formallegalrecognition.

“[F]or centuries there have been powerfulvoices to condemn homosexual conduct asimmoral.Thecondemnationhasbeenshapedbyreligiousbeliefs,conceptionsofrightandacceptablebehavior,andrespectforthetra-ditional family.... These considerations donotanswerthe questionbeforeus,however.The issue is whether the majority may usethepoweroftheStatetoenforcetheseviewsonthewholesocietythroughoperationofthecriminallaw.”

Id., at571.

Most importantly, the Court was careful to dis-

claimanyintentionthatitsdecisionwouldcastdoubt

uponthepoweroftheStatestoprotectthetraditional


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30

institutionofmarriage.Inthemajorityopinion,Jus-

tice Kennedy distinguished this decision from other

circumstances:

“The present case does not involve mi-nors.... It does not involve public conduct

or prostitution. It does not involve whetherthegovernmentmustgiveformalrecognitiontoanyrelationshipthathomosexualpersonsseektoenter.” Id.,at578.

JusticeSandraDayO’Connor, inherconcurring

opinion,alsoemphasizedthatpoint:

“Thatthislawasappliedtoprivate,consen-sual conduct is unconstitutional under theEqualProtectionClausedoesnotmeanthat

other laws distinguishing between hetero-sexualsandhomosexualswouldsimilarlyfailunderrationalbasisreview.Texascannotas-sertanylegitimatestateinteresthere,suchasnationalsecurityorpreservingthe tradi-tional institution of marriage. Unlike themoraldisapprovalofsamesexrelations–theassertedstateinterestinthiscase–otherrea-sonsexisttopromotetheinstitutionofmar-riage beyond mere moral disapproval of anexcludedgroup.” Id.,at585.

Casesdecidedover the last130 yearshave con-

sistentlyaffirmedthatthepromotionofsexualmoral-

ityisalegitimatestateinterest,andthatthereisa

secular morality that is central to the fabric of our

society totally apart from religious notions. As ob-

servedbyProf.LaurenceTribe:“Ithasbeenproposed

thatrestrictionsonthewoman’sdecisiontoterminate


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31

a pregnancy are unconstitutional when they reflect

merelyamoral,asopposedtoaninstrumentalorutil-

itarian,justification.Butallnormativejudgmentsare

rooted in moral premises....” Tribe, American Con-

stitutional Law, 928929 (1978). “For what is the

Constitution itself, if not a collection of ‘[enduring]valuejudgmentsofthemajority,’ interpretedandap-

pliedbythecourtssoastobe‘thevehicleforprotect-

ingminoritiesfromthe[momentary]valuejudgments

ofthemajority’?TheentirebodyoftheConstitution,

amendmentsand all, isa series of judgments byan

extraordinarymajoritythatlimitthepoweroffuture

politicalmajorities.”Lupu,Untangling the Strands of

the Fourteenth Amendment, 77Mich. L.Rev. 981, at

10421043.

Inotherwords,moralityisconcernedwithjudg-ing between right and wrong. The state is right

fullyconcernedabout the practical impactsofmoral

choices on society, particularly in regard to sexual

conduct. Good behaviors, choices, and lifestyles in

regardtosexualconductcanleadtotheimprovement

ofhumanity,andtothebettermentofallpeople.

Samesexcouplesclaimthatthestatecannotrely

uponmoralvalues todenythemthe righttomarry.

Buttheirownargumentcontradictstheirclaim.They

contendthatsamesexmarriagebansarenothingbut

avaluejudgmentabouthomosexuality.Butthevery

reason why they demand the right to marry is

because they want that value judgment made, and

they want it made in their favor. Marriage implies

moral approval by society, and that is what they

pursue – moralapproval,acceptance,normalization,


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32

andlegitimizationoftheirlifestyleandconduct.The

stigma they suffer if they are denied the right to

marryisthe stigma ofnot having theirrelationship

viewedasmorallyacceptable.

“Approval”requirestheexerciseofjudgmentand

discretion.Andjudgmentsarebaseduponconsidera-

tions of right and wrong, good and bad, which by

definition are moral comparisons. Official state ap-

provaloffamilialorsexualrelationshipscanonlybe

baseduponmoralvaluesofsomekind.

Consequently, to win their argument, samesex

coupleshavetoembraceone orthe otheroftwo po-

sitions.OnepositionwouldbetoadmitthattheState

doeshavethepowertoconsidersecularmoralvalues

in defining marriage, in which case secular moralvaluesexistandarealegitimatestateinterest.Based

onthatpremise,theissuebecomeswhethertheharm

that would be inflicted on society by the State’s

official approval and condoning of homosexuality is

somehowoutweighedbytheharmthatsamesexcou-

ples would suffer if such approval were withheld.

That judgmentis the State’stomake.(See Miller v.

California,413U.S.15,93S.Ct.2607,37L.Ed.2d419

(1965).)

Or, their only other viable argument would bethatthetraditionalinstitutionofmarriagehasnoth-

ing to do with morality, moral approval, or moral

values. If that is the case, then there is no moral

advantageorreputationalvaluetobegainedbybeing

married. In states with “everything but marriage”

laws,samesexmarriagebanswouldbesupportedby


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33

no legitimate state interest, but would also deny

samesexcouplesnothingofvalue.

Ifbysome reasoning that latter result prevails,

thenwewillhavecometotheconclusionthattradi-

tional marriage means nothing morally, in spite of

hundreds,ifnotthousandsofyearsoftradition;and

thetraditionalinstitutionofmarriageasweknowit,

asanhonoredmoralstatus,willbedead.

Therefore, to summarize the impact of all the

jurisprudence leading up through Lawrence,Amicus

submits that although samesex couples cannot be

criminally punished for homosexual acts, defending

thevaluesoftraditionalmarriageandsexualmoral-

ityisstillalegitimatestateinterest.AStatemaystill

deny samesex couples the right to enter into thestatusofmarriageifthatpolicypromotestheState’s

valuesoftraditionalmarriageandsexualmorality.

D. Limiting Marriage to OppositeSex Cou-

ples Promotes the Values of Traditional

Marriage and Sexual Morality.

The narrow question addressed by Amicus is

whetheraStatethatalreadyhasan“everythingbut

marriage”lawisrequiredbytheConstitutiontocon-done homosexuality by giving samesex couples li-

cense to marry. That makes the central issue not

whether a private act between two citizens can be

prohibited, as in Lawrence, but rather whether a

publicactoftheStatecanbecompelled.


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34

Thepracticalsocietalimplicationsofgivingsame

sexmarriagestheofficialsanctionofpublicpolicyare

vastly more significant than the societal impact of

onecouple’sconsensualsexualconductintheprivacy

of their bedroom. Amicus submits that a State’s of-

ficialapprovalofsamesexmarriageswouldsubstan-tiallyundermineitslegitimateinterestinpromoting

thebenefitsoftraditionalmarriageandsexualmoral-

ity.

Those benefits are apparent from our cultural

experience. From experience, it is reasonable to be-

lieve that the institution of traditionalheterosexual

marriage is critical to society. Through heterosexual

marriage,societyregeneratesitselfbytheprocreation

ofchildreninanenvironmentwherechildrenofbothsexeshavegenderappropriaterolemodelstoprepare

themfor life.Extramaritalsex isreasonablyconsid-

ered irresponsible and inappropriate and is almost

universally discouraged byordered societiesbecause

itisreasonablyunderstoodtoincreasethelikelihood

ofchildrenbeingborn without the benefit ofsuch a

longtermnurturingenvironment.

Traditionalmarriage iswellunderstoodasasym-

bol ofsociety’sapprovalandacceptanceofacouple’s

sexual relations. Within marriage, couples enjoy in-

timate sexual relations without the stigma, disap-

proval, and often punishment that would otherwise

accompanyimmoral,illicitsexualrelations.Theideal

of marriage therefore promotes the virtues of self

control, discipline, responsibility, and accountability

among couples who are preparing to assume the


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35

obligations of marriage and parenthood, thereby re-

ducingtheincidenceofunwantedunwedmotherhood.

Homosexual relationships, on the other hand,

canreasonablybeviewedasapotentialimpediment

to the purposes sought to beachieved by the tradi-

tional institution of marriage. Homosexual relation-

ships can reasonably be perceived as violating the

cultural convention against sexual relations outside

of a traditional marriage. They can reasonably be

perceived as being less likely to result in the pro-

creation of children by the persons involved. Even

when samesexcouples dohave children, theirrela-

tionship can reasonably be perceived as being less

likely toprovide childrenofbothsexeswithgender

appropriaterolemodels.Furthermore,a Statecouldreasonablyconclude

that public approval and acceptance of homosexual

relationships, in spite of those drawbacks, will con-

tributetoanatmosphereorcultureofgeneralsexual

freedom and promiscuity, including heterosexual re-

lationships,therebyincreasingtheprevalenceofun-

wantedoutofwedlockbirths.

It could well be argued that private consensual

sexualconductshouldbeofnoconcernwhatsoevertothe government. But when we take the sexual cus-

toms of entire populations of people in our society,

theircombinedimpactisnoticeableandmeasurable.

Inthatway,sexualmoralityitselfhaspracticalsocial

valuetotallyasidefromitsreligioussignificance.


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Theactofthestateindenyingsamesexcouples

thereputationalvalueofmarriagecannotbeviewed

inisolationofthestate’soverallapproachtosamesex

marriage. Ina state thatadoptsan“everythingbut

marriage”law, thatoverallapproach includesgiving

samesex couples “everything else” that would en-courage and support the creation of longterm,com-

mitted, loving family relationships. That approach

seekstoprotectthegoodmoralsofsocietywhilestill

treatingsamesexcouplesequallyforallotherpracti-

calpurposes,whereanynegativeimpactofsamesex

relationshipsonsocialnormsmaybelesspredictable.

For those reasons, a State can reasonably con-

clude that it should place a higher value on tradi-

tional marriage and sexual morality than on otherforms ofcommittedrelationships.Forcing aState to

officially condone samesexrelationships in a highly

prominentandconspicuousway,i.e.,byissuingmar-

riage licenses to samesex couples – placing the

State’s imprimatur of approval on the couple’s rela-

tionship – would work in direct opposition to that

policy.

Amicusrecognizestheinevitablecomparisonsbe-

tweenthisargumentandtheargumentofthesegre-

gationists in Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S.

483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.2d 873 (1954). In states

that adopt, or have adopted, “everything but mar-

riage” laws, this argument looks very much like

“separate but equal.” But there are compelling dis-

tinctionsbetweenthiscaseand Brown.


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In Brown the issue was, all other things being

equal, does the Fourteenth Amendment allow the

Statestoprovidetwoseparateeducationsystemsfor

thetwoseparateraces?347U.S.483,492.Inruling

thatitdoesnot,theCourtemphasizedtheintangible

differences between the two races’ experiences inschool, as opposed to the tangible similarities. The

Court found that separating school children based

solelyontheirrace“generatesafeelingofinferiority

astotheirstatus inthe community thatmay affect

theirheartsandmindsinawayunlikelyevertobe

undone.... The impact is greater when it has the

sanctionofthelaw....” Id.,at494.“Separateeduca-

tionalfacilitiesareinherentlyunequal.” Id.,at495.

Thiscaseisdistinguishablefrom Brown,forthreereasons. First, in Brown, there was no legitimate

stateinterestadvancedinfavorofthesegregationof

schools, as there is here. Second, as in the case of

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18

L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), race played the crucial role in

Brown, demonstrating that the discriminatory law

was simply invidious under the doctrine of strict

scrutiny.Thatisnotthecasehere.Third,therewas

nocontentionin Brownthatthestigmaofinferiority

sufferedbyblackchildrenforcedtoattendsegregatedschools was the result of anything but their segre-

gation.Thatisnotthecasehere.

Specifically, in Brown,theCourthadthebenefit

ofacenturyofblackexperienceinsegregatedschools.

The causal connection between segregation and a


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feelingofinferiorityamongblackchildrenwasunde-

niable.

Inthiscase,however,theexperienceofsamesex

familiesislesswelldocumented.Achildofasamesex

couple may be stigmatized more by the unusual

appearanceofhaving“twofathers”or“twomothers”

thanbywhatevertheirlegalstatushappenstobe.As

fortheparentsthemselves,thedisadvantageofbeing

deniedthereputationalvalueofmarriageisnotsuf-

ficient tooverride the State’s power tocontrolwhat

lifestylesand behaviors itdoesordoesnot condone,

asisthoroughlydiscussedabove.

IV. States with “Everything but Marriage” Laws

Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendmentby Refusing to Recognize the Marital Sta-

tus of SameSex Couples Married in Other

States.

Although the legal principles that apply under

theFullFaithandCreditClause10

aredifferentthan

undertheFourteenthAmendment,theoutcomeshould

bethesame.Instatesthathave“everythingbutmar-

riage”laws,theFourteenthAmendmentdoesnotre-

quire the State to recognize the married status of

couplesmarried inotherstates ifit doesnot permit

samesexmarriageswithininitsownborders.

10U.S.Constitution,art.IV,section1.


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InWindsor,itwasfoundthatbecauseofthepri-

macy of State law regarding the definition of mar-

riage, the Federal government could not refuse to

recognize the marital status of New Yorkmarried

samesexcouples.However,whenthe issuebecomes

whetheraStatemustrecognizethemarriedstatusofsamesexcouplesmarriedinotherStates,thereisno

rankorprecedencebetweenthepoliciesofoneState

andthepoliciesoftheother. Nevada v. Hall,440U.S.

410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1929). If New

York has a strong public policy in favor of samesex

marriage, thenwhywouldIdaho’sstrong publicpol-

icy against samesexmarriage(assuming Idahohad

an“everythingbut marriage” civilunionstatute)be

entitledtoanylessrespect,constitutionally?Thereis

no constitutionally valid reason why the decision ofNewYork to allow samesex marriages would be of

anygreaterconstitutionalstrengththanthedecision

ofIdahonottoalloworrecognizethem,aslongasthe

New Yorkmarried couple was not deprived of any

other legaloreconomic rights,privileges orbenefits

thatmarriedcouplesinIdahoenjoy.

-

CONCLUSIONEachStateshouldhavetheopportunitytoevalu-

ate whether, in its own communities, the growing

spiritoftoleranceandequalityjustifiesanevolution

in their societalviewsof morality. The Constitution

should not deprive the States (at least those that

haveadoptedorwilladopt“everythingbutmarriage”


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laws) of the power to decide whether or not to em-

brace samesex relationships by clothing them with

thegarmentsofmarriageandallthesymbolicsignifi-

cancethatentails.

ThedecisionoftheSixthCircuitCourtofAppeals

should be affirmed.At the worst, the Court should

declare that if a state allows a samesex couple to

enter into a legal union that entitles them to the

identicallysamelegalandeconomicrights,privileges,

and benefits that married couples enjoy, then the

FourteenthAmendmentdoesnotrequirethatstateto

issuethemamarriagelicense.

Respectfullysubmitted,

SEANJ.COLETTI,Counsel of Record

HOPKINSRODENCROCKETTH ANSEN&HOOPES,PLLC

428ParkAvenueIdahoFalls,Idaho83402(208)[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

Lary Larson Amicus Brief

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