Landmark Judgments -Federal Tax Ombudsman
-
Upload
muhammad-munir-qureshi -
Category
Documents
-
view
21 -
download
0
description
Transcript of Landmark Judgments -Federal Tax Ombudsman
-
1
Index
FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN
Judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts
of Pakistan
S.
No
Citation Relevant
Section
(FTO
Ordinance)
Page
01
Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. ITO
NO: CP 788YEAR: 1984 DECIDED ON 07/11/1988
CITATION: DTPSC0147; 60TAX52; 1989PTD485; 1990PTCL755
[The FTO forum offers an effective alternate remedy for
taxpayers against dept'l excess]
2(3)
02
02
CIT v. Media Network and others
NO: WPs 4320 4786 YEAR: 2003 DECIDED ON 28/02/2006
CITATION: DTPSC0270; 94TAX293; 2006PTD2502;
2007PTCL12006PLD787
[AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM - No one to be condemned
unheard]
2(3)
05
03
Eastern Leather Company Ltd. V. Federation of Pakistan
NO: WP 5893 YEAR: 2003 DECIDED ON 28/10/2003
CITATION: DTPHC1659; VOL7/12TF52
[Jurisdiction vested in the President and by implication, the FTO-
is quasi judicial and not administrative The petitioner cannot be condemned unheard]
9
33
04
Suleman Spinning Mills Limited v. IACIT Lahore
NO: WP 20218YEAR: 2002 DECIDED ON 27/02/2003
CITATION: DTPHC1624; 88TAX147; 2003PTD1343;
[ Federal Tax Ombudsman holding action of revenue in non-
recovery of Govt. funds as maladministration, recommended reference to Legal Advisor for prosecution proceedings against
them ]
2(3)
38
05
Farid Ullah Khan v. Federal Tax Ombudsman
NO: ICA 51 YEAR: 2005 DECIDED ON 01/02/2005
CITATION: DTPHC1738; 2005PTD1797;
[Maladministration in the Central Board Revenue or any of its establishment can be taken notice of by Federal Tax Ombudsman]
2(3); 9
46
06
Sahib Jee v. RCIT
NO: WP 11983YEAR: 2005 DECIDED ON 20/03/2009
CITATION: DTPHC2041; 100TAX274; 2009PTD955;
[No extension in time permissible for filing representation before President against FTOs order]
32
48
07
Lone Cold Storage v. Revenue Officer LESCO
NO: WP 7754 YEAR: 2010 DECIDED ON 15/07/2010
CITATION: DTPHC2104; 103TAX5; 2010PTD2502
2011PTCL305;
[Whether order where Court has not been properly assisted and main legal questions have not been raised, deliberated or
2(3)
54
-
2 discussed does not constitute binding precedent -- Held yes]
08 Muhammad Saleem V Federal Tax Ombudsman etc.
No: WP 11545-2012
[The FTO exercises concurrent jurisdiction without restraint in deciding complaints u/s 9 of FTO ord
Maladministration is a condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction by the FTO]
9;14;2(3);29 75
09
10
[When special circumstances exist (such as involvement in bribery and corruption), any delay in filing complaint before FTO stands condoned]. IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT WP No. 1238 OF 2013 1. When invoking jurisdiction u/s 16 of FTO Ordinance, the FTO
exercises powers of a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the High Court is not competent to hear a writ petition challenging FTO's jurisdiction u/s 16. Any such writ must be filed before the Supreme Court. 2. No writ petition lies against a SCN.
10(3)
16
79
82
SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. ITO
NO: CP 788YEAR: 1984 DECIDED ON 07/11/1988
CITATION: DTPSC0147; 60TAX52; 1989PTD485; 1990PTCL755
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 -- Section 65 -- Article 199 --
Writ jurisdiction -- Alternate remedy -- Relief -- Assessee filed appeal before
A.A.C. against the order of additional assessment made by the Income Tax
Officer -- During appeal assessee filed writ petition which was dismissed as
-
3 the petitioner had already availed alternate adequate remedy -- Relief refused
by the High Court -- Whether according to technicalities of procedural nature -
- Held yes --
Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court -- Grant of relief -- Alternate
adequate remedy -- Where a remedy by way of appeal was available, no relief
could be granted to the petitioner under article 199 -- If petitioner was not
allowed any relief by the departmental authorities (despite the observations by
the Supreme Court), it would not mean that the petitioner would have no
immediate remedy at all against the highhandedness of the department --
Petitioner could, among other reliefs, file a complaint and grievane
application before the Federal Ombudsman, who could also provide effective
redres, and provide the alternate effective and adequate remedy to the
petitioner in such cases --
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN}
HAFIZ MUHAMMAD ARIF DAR
v.
INCOME TAX OFFICER
Present: MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH and JAVAID IQBAL, JJ.
Civil Petition No. 788 of 1984, decided on 7-11-1988.
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed
in Writ Petition No. 2382 of 1984, dated 30-5-1984).
Syed Fayyaz Hussain Qadri, Advocate (absent) and S. Abid Nawaz, Advocate-on-
Record, for the Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 7-11-1988.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER
{Order of the Court was passed by MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.}.---Writ Petition
against an Income-tax Assessment by Income Tax Officer was dismissed by the
High Court by the following short order:
``The petitioner is aggrieved with the order of additional
assessment made in pursuance of the provisions of Section 65 of
the Income Tax Ordinance by an Income Tax Officer. He has already
filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. As he
had already availed of the alternate remedy this writ petition is
dismissed in limine.''
-
4 Leave to appeal having been sought, this Court passed interim orders on 23rd
July, 1984, 29th July, 1984, 9th August, 1984, 12th August , 1984, 16th August,
1984, 21st August, 1984, 28th August, 1984 and 29th August, 1984.
They are very instructive in so far as the attitude of respondent department is
concerned.
They are, therefore, reproduced below:--
``23-7-1984: Notice to the A.G. for the 29th of this month
29-7-1984: Adjourned to the 5th of August, 1984, to enable the
petitioner to produce the person from whom he had purchased the
shop which has been made the basis of enhancement of the
assessment.
9-8-1984: Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar petitioner has been
assessed to Rs. 1,93,000 as his income on the ground that he had
enough money to purchase a shop on the Sarwar Road in Lahore
Cantt. and on investigation the relevant Income-tax Inspector
found that the vendors were fictitious persons and that this had
been done to avoid levy of income-tax. I required the
petitioner to produce the vendors namely Muhammad Ashfaq
son of Haji Sardar Muhammad and Muhammad Mushtaq son of
Ibrahim, so as to ascertain whether the finding of the
Income-tax Inspector that the vendors were fictitious, was
correct.
The petitioner has produced both the above-noted vendors whose
identity has been verified through their Identity Cards which bear
their photographs. Prima facie, it appears that the report of
the Income-tax Inspector, is wholly incorrect.
Mr. M.Z. Khalil, Advocate, appeared on behalf of Mr. Muhammad
Ilyas, Standing Counsel for the Income-tax Department to submit
that he (Mr. Ilyas) has left for U.S.A. and the case may therefore
be adjourned to a date after the vacations.
Petitioners counsel, however, submits that in view of the fact
that the allegation against the petitioner has been prima
facie proved to be incorrect, the case may not be adjourned.
Let notice be issued to respondent for the 12th of this
month, who may appear through a counsel engaged by the
Department alongwith the relevant Inspector who had submitted the
report on which action was taken against the petitioner.
No action shall be taken against the petitioner in the
meanwhile. Mr. M.Z. Khalil, Advocate is directed to advise the
respondent of the proceedings before this Court.
12-8-1984 : No one has turned for the respondent. Adjourned to the
16th of this month.
16-8-1984 : The matter was adjourned to be taken up at 1-30 p.m.
Learned counsel for the petitioner is present alongwith the
petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondent is, however,
absent. The case is, therefore, adjourned to 21-8-1984.
-
5
21-8-1984 : An official of the Cantonment Board be ordered to
bring the latest PTI Form pertaining to property No. 326-Sarwar
Road Sadar, Lahore, on the next date of hearing, in order to
enable this Court to ascertain the annual rent at which the said
property is assessed.
To come up on 28-8-1984.
28-8-1984 : Adjourned to tomorrow (29-8-1984) to enable the
Inspector of the Cantonment Board to explain how the value of the
place in question was calculated to be Rs. 1,50,000 when the
monthly rent of the house was Rs. 100 per month.
29-8-1984: On instructions from the I.T.O. the learned
counsel for the respondent submitted that the tax had been levied
according to the value of the property as calculated by the
Cantonment Board. However, I find that the property in question
is assessed by The Cantonment Board at Rs. 100 per month and as
such the value of Rs. 1,50,000 as determined appears to be
excessive and arbitrary. It would have been appropriate if, for
fixing the vaue of the property, the Cantonment Board had followed
the formula of ``10 years rent'', as done by the Wealth Tax Dept.
In this view of the matter the recovery of the tax amount is
stayed till the decision of the main petition.''
It is possible that in view of the aforequoted observations redress might
have already been provided to the petitioner.
One of the conditions for grant of relief in writ jurisdiction of the High
Court is that the petitioner before it should not have any alternative adequate
remedy. In this case, a remedy by way of appeal, as mentioned in the impugned
order, was such remedy. Therefore, it is correct that no relief could be
granted to the petitioner under Article 199 of the Constitution.
But that does not mean that, in case the petitioner has not been allowed any
relief by the departmental authorities (despite the observations by the Supreme
Court) the petitioner would have no immediate remedy at all against the
highhandedness of the department.
Amongst others he can file a complaint and grievance application before the
Federal Ombudsman, who can provide effective redress, in a case like the
present one. That forum has several attributes of a Court in many aspects of
its powers. It can also move in a matter promptly whenever so needed. At the
same time it does not suffer from some of the handicaps, due to the
technicalities of procedural nature, which operate as impediments or thwart
such like action by the Courts. For example the limitation of non-availability
of an alternate remedy in this case for the High Court under Art, 199 of the
Constitution, is not applicable to the said forum. Besides, the same being
quasi-judicial it is also headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court; with similar
powers to punish for contempt. In this context therefore, it can be safely
concluded, that it can provide the alternate effective and adequate remedy to
the petitioner also.
-
6
With the foregoing observations and remarks, leave to appeal is refused in the
circumstances of this case, due to the technical hurdle faced by the petitioner
in the High Court. He may file a complaint before the Ombudsman.
Leave refused.
SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CIT v. Media Network and others
NO: WPs 4320 4786 YEAR: 2003 DECIDED ON 28/02/2006
CITATION: DTPSC0270 ; 94TAX293 ; 2006PTD2502 ; 2007PTCL12006PLD787
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Sections 4A, 55, 59, 59(1A), 59(3),62, 63 --
C.B.R. Circular No. 7 of 2002, dated 15th June, 2002 --
C.B.R. Letter No. 7(7) Self Assessment /2002, dated 17-12-2002 --
Self Assessment Scheme, (2002-2003), paras. 9 and 10 --
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 -- Articles 25, 185 --
Law Procedure Ordinance, 1972 -- Section 3
Words and phrases -- Word ``any'' -- Definition, amplitude and meaning --
Whether word ``any'' according to stroud's Judicial Dictionary exclude
limitations and qualifications and, therefore, ``any order'' would include both
interim as well as final order -- Held yes -- Whether word ``any'' used in
context of section 59 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was word of expansion
indicative of width and amplitude sufficient to bring within scope and ambit of
words it governed and that could possibly be included in them -- Held yes --
Appeal to Supreme Court -- Self Assessment -- Issuance of policy guidelines by
C.B.R. to all Regional Commissioners of Income Tax -- Selection of case for
total audit -- Commissioner of Income Tax -- Selection of cases for total audit
-- Quashment of judgments by High Court -- Appeal against -- Principle of audi
alteram partem -- Canons of natural justice -- Departure -- Validity -- Whether
no prejudice was shown to have been caused for respondents on account of non-
specification of percentage of cases to be selected by C.B.R. through computer
balloting or by Regional Commissioners and as such paragraph 9 and 10 of scheme
could not be said to be ultra vires of provisions of section 59 or any other
provision of ordinance -- Held yes Whether discretion of Regional
Commissioners in selecting cases for total audit was restricted and they could
select only those revenue potential cases where there was evidence, information
or reason to believe that true particulars of income had been suppressed -
Held yes -- Whether objections as to non-publication of guidelines in official
gazette is concerned, there was no statutory obligation on part of C.B.R. to
have published guidelines in official gazette because they were in nature of
administrative instructions meant for internal consumption of Regional
Commissioners issued in aid of carrying out purpose of Self-Assessment Scheme -
- Held yes -- Whether rules of natural justice are not inflexible, they yield
to and change with exigencies of different situations and do not apply in same
-
7 manner to situations which are not alike -- Held yes Whether opportunity of
hearing was not required to be afforded by Commissioners to respondents at
preliminary stage of making proposals for recommendations of their cases to
Regional Commissioners for total audit -- Held yes
Self Assessment Scheme -- Filing of income tax return under the scheme --
Scope -- Assessee was not under statutory obligation to file his return of
total income for any year in terms of provisions of Section 59 of Income Tax
Ordinance, 1979 under Self Assessment Scheme -- Person who otherwise was
required to file a normal return under Section 55 of Income Tax Ordinance,
1979, was given option to file his return under Section 59 of Income Tax
Ordinance, 1979, for its acceptance in accordance with the provisions of Self
Assessment Scheme made by Central Board of Revenue for that year-Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax would then assess, by order in writing, the total
income of the assessee on the basis of such return and determine the tax
payable on the basis of such assessment
Self Assessment Scheme -- Total audit -- Selection of case -- Procedure -- By
non-obstante clause of Section 59(1-A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, it was
provided that Central Board of Revenue or any authority subordinate to it, if
so authorized by Central Board of Revenue could select out of returns, any
cases or class of oases or persons or class of persons howsoever determined for
assessment under Section 62 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and Deputy
Commissioner would proceed to make the assessment under that section or if the
circumstances so warranted, under Section 63 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979,
accordingly -- In such situation, the procedure provided under S.62 or S.63
of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, as the case might be, would be followed by the
Deputy Commissioner
Total audit -- Procedure -- For total audit, under paragraph 9 of Self
Assessment Scheme, (2002-2003), twenty per cent. returns were to be selected,
through computer ballot which might be random or parametric as deemed fit by
Central Board of Revenue or/and by Regional Commissioners of Income Tax on the
recommendations of the Commissioners concerned in the light of guidelines
issued by Central Board of Revenue in that behalf -- Assessing Officer would
make necessary adjustments under Section 59(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979,
if so required, after givinga notice in writing to the assessee and considering
his explanation if any -- Cases selected for total audit would be scrutinized
in detail, under paragraph 10 of Self Assessment Scheme, (2002-2003), including
field audit by departmental officers or by professional auditors
authorized under Section 4-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, by utilizing the
information collected from available sources for determining income of the
taxpayer and tax payable thereon by observing the procedure of paragraphs 9 and
10 of the Scheme -- No limitation or restriction was imposed by Section 59(1-A)
of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, as "any cases or classes of cases or person or
class of persons" could be selected for the purpose of total audit
-
8 Words and phrases -- `Any' -- Connotation -- Word ``any'' has diversity of
meaning and may be employed to indicate ``all'' or ``every'' as well as
``some'' or ``one'' -- Meaning of word ``any'' in a given statute depends upon
the context and subject matter of the statute
Total audit -- Selection of cases -- Non-specification of percentage of cases
to be selected for total audit -- Returns of assessees filed under Self
Assessment Scheme, (2002-2003), were selected for total audit -- Plea raised
by assessees was that Central Board of Revenue did not specify percentage of
cases to be selected for total audit and paragraphs 9 and 10 of Self Assessment
Scheme, (2002-2003), were ultra vires the provisions of Section 59 of Income
Tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Validity -- No exception could be taken to the selection
of cases of assessees in respect of their returns filed under Self Assessment
Scheme,(2002-2003) -- Final selection of case or cases were made by Regional
Commissioners of Income Tax, after affording fair and adequate opportunity of
hearing to assessees, who were issued show cause notices and their replies
to the same were duly considered -- For total audit, under Self Assessment
Scheme, (2002-2003), maximum of 20% of returns filed by assessees could be
selected -- Percentage of selected cases through computer ballot or by Regional
Commissioners of Income Tax was not squarely laid down with precision -- No
prejudice was shown to have been caused to assessees on account of non-
specification of percentage of cases to be selected by Central Board of Revenue
through computer balloting or by Regional Commissioners -- Paragraphs 9 and 10
of the Self Assessment Scheme were not ultra vires the provisions of Section 59
or any other provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979
Selection of cases for total audit -- Policy guidelines -- Scope -- Policy
guidelines were administrative in nature meant for internal consumption of
Income Tax functionaries, which did not create any rights nor did they impose
any obligations -- Such instructions did not take away any vested right of
assessees and did not govern the adjudicatory proceedings of quasi-judicial
nature -- Guidelines were not, in any way, extraneous, irrelevant or unfair to
the object to be achieved by the process of selection of cases for
total audit --
Total audit -- Selection of cases -- Reasonable classification --Non-issuance
of policy guidelines before promulgation of Self Assessment Scheme, (2002-
2003), -- Assessees were aggrieved of their selection of cases for total audit,
by Regional Commissioners of Income Tax -- Such order passed by Income Tax
Authorities, was set aside by High Court -- Plea raised by the authorities was
that policy guidelines had not become invalid for the reason of not having been
issued either before or contemporaneously with the promulgation of Self
Assessment Scheme -- Validity -- Held, there was no requirement of Section 59
of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or any other provision of the Ordinance or rule
for issuance of guidelines either before or along with the Scheme -- Very
object of the provisions of Section 59(1-A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979,
would have been frustrated if income tax payers were informed, before hand, of
the categories of cases or persons which would be selected for total audit --
-
9 If that was done, the possibility of tax evasion under the scheme at the
massive scale could not be ruled out -- Assessees were required to file their
true returns under the Scheme as far as possible -- Previous publication of the
guidelines would have been a hay-day for all the tax evaders as they would be
knowing before hand that their cases were not going to be selected or
scrutinized -- As long as the income tax Authorities acted within the
four corners of Section 59 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and the Self
Assessment Scheme and did not abuse their power or authority, the objection as
to the provisional or/and final selection of cases for total audit was not
sustainable -- Guidelines for selection of cases by Regional Commissioners
would not suffer from any taint of invalidity merely because certain categories
had been identified for total audit based on reasonable classification, which
was not violative of Article 25 of the Constitution -- No requirement of law
existed for issuance of guidelines by Central Board of Revenue, side by side
with the announcement of the Scheme as they were to follow the Scheme after its
announcement and not to precede it -- Judgment passed by High Court was set
aside -- Appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court --
Policy guidelines -- Non-publication in official Gazette -- Effect -- No
statutory obligation on the part of Central Board of Revenue to have published
the guidelines in official Gazette -- Such guidelines were in nature of
administrative instructions meant for internal consumption of Regional
Commissioners issued in aid of carrying out purpose of Self Assessment Scheme -
- Policy guidelines did not enjoy the status of statutory rules, which were
required to be notified through .publication in official Gazette
Notification -- Publication of notification in official Gazette -- Principle --
Held, it all depends on the nature and context of statute whether the
provisions requiring publication of a notification in official gazette would be
construed as directory only or mandatory, so as to invalidate a notification or
instructions on account of non-publication in official Gazette,
Natural justice, principles of -- Preliminary inquiries or investigations
-- Opportunity of hearing-Principles-Rules of natural justice are not
inflexible, which yield to and change with the exigencies of different
situations -- Such rules do not apply in the same manner to situations which
are not alike-Said rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a
legal strait-jacket; these are not immutable but flexible and can be adopted
and modified by the statutes -- Need to act in an emergency may also exclude at
least a prior hearing or where a decision affects so many people that a
hearing would be impracticable -- In some cases there may be collective right
of hearing or to be consulted although not necessarily a hearing in individual
cases -- Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, there is no
mandatory requirement of natural justice that in every case the other side must
be given a notice before preliminary steps are taken -- It might suffice if
reasonable opportunity of hearing is granted to a person before an adverse
action or decision is taken against him -- However, it is not possible to lay
down an absolute rule of universal application governing all situations as to
-
10 the exclusion or otherwise of the audi alteram partem rule during the course of
preliminary inquiries or investigations --
Total audit -- Selection of cases -- Principles of natural justice --
Applicability -- Assessees were aggrieved of non-providing of opportunity of
hearing to them, before finalizing their cases for total audit -- Validity
Opportunity of hearing was not required to be afforded by Commissioners to the
assessees at preliminary stage of making proposals or recommendations of
their cases to Regional Commissioners for total audit -- Before final selection
of cases, the policy guidelines seemed to have been faithfully observed by the
Regional Commissioners of Income Tax, who were required to confront the
assessees with the material, provide them due opportunity of being heard and
communicate them the basis of their proposed selection -- In none of the cases,
any allegation of personal bias, mala fide or other unfair treatment by
Regional Commissioners or other officers of Income Tax Department were
specifically levelled or substantiated by the assessees-No exception could be
taken to the selection of the cases of assessees by Regional
Commissioners made after due process of law --
Direct appeal to Supreme Court -- Non-filing of Intra-Court Appeal --
Principles -- Ordinarily, Supreme Court insists the petitioner or appellant to
avail the remedy of Intra Court Appeal, in the first instance; however, this
is a rule of practice for regulating the exercise of discretion which does not
oust or abridge the Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court -- Supreme
Court, in certain exceptional circumstances can entertain petitions, or as the
case may be, direct appeals even where the remedy of Intra -- Court Appeal
under Section 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, has not been availed by a party
No prejudice caused on account of non-specification of the percentage of cases
to be selected by C.B.R. through computer balloting or by the Regional
Commissioners, paragraphs 9, 10 of the Circular No. 7 of 2002, dated 15th June,
2002 (Self Assessment Scheme for the Assessmenr year 2002-2003) is not ultra
vires the provisions of section 59
The procedure of selection of cases for total audit as provided paragraphs 9
and 10 of the Circular No. 7 of 2002, dated 15th June, 2002 (Self Assessment
Scheme for the Assessment year 2002-2003) was not nullified or whittled down by
the policy guidelines issued vide C.B.R. Letter No. 7(7) S. Asstt/2002, dated
17-12-2002 --
Guidelines issued vide C.B.R. Letter No. 7(7) S. Asstt/2002, dated 17-12-2002
were administrative in nature meant for the internal consumption of the Income
Tax functionaries which did not create any rights nor did they impose any
obligations
-
11 Instructions issued vide C.B.R. Letter No. 7(7) S.Asstt/2002, dated 17-12-2002
had not taken away any vested right of the assessees and would not govern the
adjudicatory proceedings of quasi-judicial in nature
It could not be said that the guidelines issued vide C.B.R. Letter No. 7(7)
S.Asstt/2002, dated 17-12-2002 were, in any way, extraneous irrelevant or
unfair to the object to be achived by the process of selection of cases for
total audit --
Supreme Court in certain exceptional circumstances can entertain petitions, or
as the case may be, direct appeals even where the remedy of Intea-Court appeal
under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 has not been availed by a
party
An assessee was not under any statutory obligation to file his return of total
income for any year in terms of provisions of section 59 --
There was no limitation or restriction imposed by section 59(1-A) of the
Ordinance as ``any cases or classes of cases or person or class of persons''
could be selected for the purpose of total audit --
Issuance of guidelines by C.B.R. were to follow the Self Assessment Scheme
after its announcement and not to precede it
There was no statutory obligation on the part of the C.B.R. to publish the
guidelines in the official Gazette as they were in the nature of administrative
instructions in aid of carrying out the Self-Aassessment Scheme
Opportunity of hearing was not required to be afforded by Commissioners
at preliminary stage of making proposals or recommendations of their
cases to the Regional Commissioners for total audit
Publication of Notification in official Gazette depends on nature and context
of statute
Natural Justice -- The rules of natural justice are not inflexible --
Words and phrases -- ``Any'' -- ``Any order'' -- ``Any law'' --
-----------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX and others
v.
Messrs MEDIA NETWORK and others
Present: IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J., FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR and MIAN
SHAKIRULLAH JAN, JJ
Civil Appeals Nos.233 to 315 of 2004
-
12
On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated
24-9-2003, passed in W.Ps. Nos. 4320, 4786, 5320, 5033, 6786, 4551, 5397, 4648,
4407, 6843, 4055, 7764, 6344, 6827, 6797, 6477, 6883, 5975, 5978, 5973, 7235,
5976, 6641, 6342, 7228, 10328, 5977, 7238, 5317, 4691, 4144, 7026, 4546, 4654,
4651, 4545, 4877, 6523, 4054, 7293, 4861, 4358, 4583, 5396, 4874, 7022, 5318,
5717. 4470, 4699, 4429, 5376, 5461, 4056, 4954, 5368, 4582, 929, 6971, 4862,
4319, 4875, 6230, 4682, 4639, 4476, 6521, 4700, 16879, 16003, 6370, 16079,
12338, 15374, 6490, 4688, 6345, 9016, 6478, 4683, 6343, 5974 and 9015 of 2003)
Civil Appeals Nos.833 to 848 of 2004
-------------------------------------
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX and others
v.
M. YOUSAF ACADEMY QUICK FILL CNG. and others
(On appeal from judgments dated 10-6-2004, 31-3-2004, 4-5-2004, 12-4-2004, 10-
6-2004, 13-11-2003, 19-11-2003, 19-11-2003, 17-11-2003, 29-1-2004, 18-11-2003,
29-1-2004, 24-9-2003, 26-2-2004, 26-2-2004, 17-3-2004, passed by the Lahore
High Court, Lahore in W. Ps. Nos. 11719, 14047, 11306, 15467 of 2002, 15942,
16002, 16000, 16081, 8899, 16197, 12124, 6808, 17875, 17876 of 2003, 618 of
2004 and 17056 of 2005).
Civil Appeals Nos. 1041 to 1046 of 2004
---------------------------------------
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX and others
v.
SADAQAT RAHIM and others
On appeal from judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 10-10-
2003, 10-10-2003, 1-4-2004, 2-4-2004, 24-9-2003, 31-5-2004, 24-9-2003, passed
in W. Ps. Nos. 13516, 13517 of 2003, 3632, 616 of 2004 and 16540 & 9979 of
2003).
Civil Appeals Nos. 1211 to 1214 of 2005
---------------------------------------
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX and others
v.
Messrs Haji MUHAMMAD TANVIR and others
(On appeal from the judgments and orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated
24-9-2003, 5-8-2003, 31-3-2004, 29-6-2005, passed in W.Ps. Nos. 4653/2003,
4721/2003, 66/2004 and W.P. No.11614/2005).
-
13 Civil Appeals Nos. 1641 and 1704 of 2005
----------------------------------------
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX and others
v.
Messrs MIAN COLD STORAGE MEWA MANDI, SIALKOT and others
(On appeal from the judgments and orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated
7-9-2005 and 29-9-2005, in W.Ps. Nos. 11847/2005 and 11948/2005).
Civil Appeals Nos. 233 to 315, 833 to 848, 1041 to 1046 of 2004, 1211 to 1214,
1641 and 1704 of 2005, decided on 28th February, 2006.
Makhdoom Ali Khan, Attorney General for Pakistan, Muhammad Ilyas Khan, Senior
Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Aslam Chatha, Advocate-on-Record, assisted by
Shahid Jamil Khan, Advocate, Khurram M. Hashmi, Advocate and Danish Zuberi for
Appellants.
Shahid Hamid, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 1046
of 2004).
Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos.233, 241,
243, 256, 261, 271, 274, 275, 279, 283, 286, 293, 296, 301, 304 of 2004).
Siraj-ud-Din Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C. As. Nos. 238
of 2004 and 1212 of 2005).
Muhammad Iqbal Hashimi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C. As.
Nos.248 to 251, 256, 259, 303 and 1041 of 2004).
Mian Ashiq Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C. As. Nos.262,
265, 266 to 269, 294, 298, 835, 844 of 2004 and 1214 of 2005).
Muhammad Qamar-uz-Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C. A. No.
263 of 2004).
Muhammad Naeem Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C. As. Nos.
276, 288, 315 of 2004 and 1213 of 2005).
Dr. Ilyas Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C. As. Nos. 841
and 843 of 2004).
M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.As. Nos.248 to 251, 259,
303 of 2004).
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A. No.263 of
2004).
Dates of hearing: 27th and 28th February, 2006.
-
14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.-The Central Board of Revenue (C.B.R.) announced
Self-Assessment Scheme for the assessment year 2002-2003 through Circular No.7
of 2002, dated 15-6-2002 in exercise of powers under section 59 of the Income
Tax Ordinance, No.XXXI of 1979 (since repealed) (hereinafter referred to as the
Ordinance). The last date for filing the returns for non-company cases was
fixed as 30-9-2002 (subsequently extended to 15-10-2002) and for company cases
31-12-2002. Thereafter, the Board issued policy guidelines to all the Regional
Commissioners of Income Tax vide letter, dated 17-12-2002 for selection of
cases for total audit with the direction to finalise the process by 10-1-2003.
By letter, dated 31-1-2003, the C.B.R. informed the Regional Commissioners that
in view of a small number of returns of companies, the holding of ballot for
selection of 20% cases out of each category was not logical. Therefore, they
were directed to select the returns for audit up to 20% at their own level
under para. 9(2)(ii) of the Scheme and the guidelines, dated 17-12-2002.
2. The respondents, who were individual firms and companies limited by shares
filed their returns under the Scheme for the year, 2002-2003, Their cases were
selected by the concerned Regional Commissioners of Income Tax on the
recommendations of Commissioners of the Income Tax after following the
procedure laid down in the scheme and the policy guidelines, dated 17-
12-2002. The respondents felt aggrieved and filed writ petitions in the Lahore
High Court Lahore, which were allowed, by the impugned judgments and the
selection of their cases by the Regional Commissioners of Income Tax was
quashed. Hence, these appeals under Article 185 of the Constitution of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, by leave of the Court.
3. Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, the learned Attorney General for Pakistan submitted
that Self-Assessment Scheme as announced on 15-6-2003 by Circular Letter No.7
and the policy guidelines issued by the Board vide letter, dated 17-12-2003
were not ultra vires any of the provisions of the Constitution and the law.
They were issued in conformity with letter and spirit of section 59 (1-A) of
the Ordinance and section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. There was no
violation of the principles of natural justice. It was further contended that
during the preliminary stage of the process of selection of cases through in-
house mechanism in the light of the scheme and the guidelines, the respondents
were not entitled to any show-cause notice or hearing as no adverse decision
had yet been taken. However, they were issued notices by the Regional
Commissioners before making a final selection. He referred to a Textbook titled
Administrative Law by Sir William Wade Ninth Edition pages 547-548. He also
relied on the cases of R V. Saskatchewan College of Physicians and Surgeons et
al, ex parte Samuel (1966) 58 Dominion Law Reports (D.L.R.) (2nd) 622 at pages
638-640), Parry Jones v. Law Society (1969) 1 Ch Division 1 at pages 8 and 10),
Norwest Hoist Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade (1978) 1 Ch. D 201),
Christopher John Moran v. Lloyd's (1981) 1 Lloyd's Law Reports (Volume-1) 423
-
15 at page 427) and Rees and others v. Crane (1994) 1 All E.R. 833 at P.P. 842-
845), in support of his submission that hearing was not required to be afforded
at preliminary stage of investigation or inquiry when no adverse action was
taken. Under section 59 of the Ordinance, once a case was selected for total
audit, the normal process as contemplated by section 62 was to take place. In
any case, even under the guidelines, dated 17-12-2002 a definite, fair and
reasonable procedure had been provided for to enable an income tax assessees to
place his point of view before the final selection of a case. The discretion of
the Regional Commissioners of the Income Tax and the Commissioner's of Income
Tax had been further curtailed by the C.B.R. through the scheme and the
guidelines.
4. It was further argued that it would have certainly created more
complications including the evasion of income tax if the guidelines were made
known either simultaneously with, or immediately after, the announcement of the
Self-Assessment Scheme. In such a case, all the assessees would have known
before hand as to who were going to be selected or left out. A prior warning
would have produced undesirable results detrimental to the Revenue and the
public interest. The course adopted by the C.B.R. had resulted in minimizing
the evasion of the income tax as everybody could expect that his case might be
scrutinized. If the C.B.R. had Mentified the classes or categories of cases or
persons and laid down guidelines before, the very purpose of provisions of
section 59 of 1979 Ordinance and the Self-Assessment Scheme announced
thereunder would have been defeated. The guidelines issued by the C.B.R. vide
circular letter, dated 17-12-2002 did not contravene the provisions of
section 59(1-A) of the Ordinance or the Self-Assessment Scheme. The guidelines
could not be considered to be an amendment to the Self-Assessment Scheme as
originally announced on 15-6-2002. The Self-Assessment Scheme and the
guidelines issued by letters, dated 17-12-2002 and 22-3-2003 were valid in all
respects.
5. It was next contended by the learned Attorney General that although certain
appeals of the appellants were barred by limitation but the delay ought to be
condoned by this Court for the grounds stated in the applications for
condonation of delay and in view of the law laid down in the cases of Ch.
Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1975 SC 66 (100),
Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC
397) at P. 413), Fazal Ilahi and others v. P.T.C. and others (2001 SCMR 768) at
P. 770) and Sheikh Muhammad Rashid v. Majid Nizami, Editor-in-Chief, The Nation
and Nawa-e-Waqt, Lahore and another (PLD 2002 SC 514) at P.521).
6. It was further argued that in view of the substantial questions of law of
public importance involved in these cases, failure to avail the alternate
remedy of Intra-Court Appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972
was not an absolute bar for invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this
Court. He referred to the case of Province of Punjab through Secretary, Excise
and Taxation, Government of Punjab and others v. Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd.,
Sargodha and others (PLD 2005 SC 988). It was emphasized that mala fide against
-
16 a public functionary was not to be assumed but the same was required to be
proved through positive evidence and material. The case of The Federation of
Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan,
Rawalpindi v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others (PLD 1974 SC 151) was referred.
7. On merits, it was stated by the learned Attorney General that the selection
of the cases of the respondents was made after issuance of show-cause notices
and receipt of the replies of the assessees who were afforded reasonable
opportunity of hearing. The learned Attorney General referred to the case of
Muhammad Asghar and others v. Income Tax Officer and others (1986 PTD
357)(Lahore) in that the selection of cases for scrutiny by Income Tax
Authorities could not be objected to as the assessees were required to file
true income tax returns under the Self-Assessment Scheme. The guidelines laid
down an intelligible criteria with specificity which could not be said to be
capricious or arbitrary. The respondents were disentitled to invoke the
constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by Article 199
of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the presence of
availability of adequate remedies provided by the Income Tax Ordinance.
Reliance was placed on the cases of Al-Ahram Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal (1993 SCMR 29),-Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs,
Customs House, Lahore (1999 SCMR 1881) at P. 1887). It was lastly submitted
that in cases in which notices had not been issued, the same would be issued by
the relevant authorities before making a final selection for proceeding further
in accordance with law.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Shahid Hamid, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, the
learned counsel for the respondent (in Civil Appeal No. 1046/2004) submitted
that the appeal filed by the appellants was hopelessly barred by the time and
no sufficient cause was shown in their application for condonation of delay. He
referred to the cases of Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad and others
(2000 SCMR 367) and Ali Muhammad through Legal Heirs and others v. Chief
Settlement Commissioner and others (2001 SCMR 1822) to impress upon that the
delay in filing an appeal could not be condoned merely because some connected
appeals filed within time were to be heard on merits. It was next contended
that the remedy of Intra-Court Appeal provided by section 3 of the Law Reforms
Ordinance, 1972, against the impugned judgment, passed by a learned Single
Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court had not been invoked by the
appellants in these cases. Therefore, a petition or an appeal before this
Court under Article 185 of the Constitution was not competent in view of the
law laid down by this Court in the case of Imtiaz Ali Malik v. Mst. Surrya
Begum and others (1979 SCMR 22).
9. He further argued that the guidelines issued by the C.B.R. were over-broad
and went beyond the scope of section 59(1-A). They were ex facie discriminatory
in nature and were also capable of arbitrary application. They conferred
uncanalised power on the Regional Commissioners and the Commissioners of Income
Tax to pick and choose. There was no method to ascertain as to how many cases
were to be selected for computer balloting by the C.B.R. or by the Regional
-
17 Commissioners on the recommendations of the Commissioners. An unfettered
discretion had been conferred on them. He pointed out that in the Self-
Assessment Scheme for the year, 1998-99 a provision was made to outsource the
selected cases for audit purpose under sections 4 and 4-A of the Ordinance and
the C.B.R. was required to specify classes/categories of cases for special
audit through a separate circular. However for the assessment years 2002-2003,
the assessees were entrapped through the Self-Assessment Scheme and the
guidelines. The conduct of the C.B.R. was unconscionable, non-transparent and
discriminatory in nature.
10. Mr. Siraj-ud-Din Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court, learned counsel for the
respondents (in C.As. No.238 of 2004 and 1212 of 2005), adopted the arguments
advanced by Mr. Shahid Hamid, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and further stated
that the appeals were also liable to be dismissed on the point of limitation as
no sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay.
11. Mian Ashiq Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the
respondents (in Civil Appeals No.262, 265, 266, 269, 294, 298, 835, 844/2004
and 1214/2005) highlighted the history of the Self-Assessment Scheme in a
chronological order. He submitted that selection of cases through random ballot
as well as by the Regional Commissioners of Income Tax was not only against the
basic concept and purpose of the scheme but the same also suffered from the
vice of uncertainty. Para-9 of the Scheme was not clear as to the exclusion of
cases from the Scheme on the basis of computer balloting and the ratio out of
total of 20% of cases which were to be selected by the Regional Commissioners
of Income Tax. No justification was spelt out by the C.B.R. while issuing the
letter, dated 31st January, 2003 permitting the Regional Commissioners to
select such cases at their own level. A long arm was given to the Revenue
Officers to take advantage of the ambiguity of the Scheme as to'the percentage
to be allocated for computer balloting and Regional Commissioners of Income
Tax. It was argued that the guidelines were required to be issued either before
or at least simultaneously with the announcement of the Scheme so that the
assessees were not kept in dark to. Exercise their option for the Scheme or
otherwise before the period provided under section 59(4) of the Ordinance had
run out. It was very unfair on the part of the C.B.R. to adopt a mechanism of
laying a bobby trap for the assessees. The C.B.R. was not expected to be
secretive in the matter of identifying each category of cases to be selected
for total audit or scrutiny till the last date of submission of returns. It
would have been just and 'fair that the guidelines were made known to the
assessee well in time and not to hold them back for considerable period even
after filing of the returns. It was not the intention of law to give wide
discretion to the C.B.R. to issue the guidelines as contemplated in para.
9(a)(2) of the Scheme at its sweet will whenever it thought fit. It was
further urged that Assessing Officer had no discretion but to make assessment
under section 59(1) of Ordinance, 1979, in accordance with the returns once the
requirements of the Scheme was satisfied. The guidelines, dated 17-12-2002 were
in the nature of a bill of attainder i.e. pains and penalties and the net was
so widened that no taxpayer could feel safe even if all the codal formalities
-
18 were fulfilled. The parameters laid down by the guidelines were exhaustive in
nature as if those were an independent Scheme. The hunt for cases involving
``Revenue Potential'' would give a licence and unbridled discretion to the
Commissioners/Regional Commissioner of Income Tax to pick and choose anyone on
unreasonable grounds. The guidelines could be invoked in a selective manner
without providing any intelligible differentia and the same were hit by the
equality clauses laid down by Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Reliance was placed on the case of Messrs Novitas
International v. Income Tax Officer (Films Circle) and others (1991 PTD 968).
It was lastly submitted that exclusion of cases from benefit of the scheme by
itself amounted to an adverse order which could not be done without affording
adequate opportunity of hearing by the relevant authorities during the process
of selection of cases by the Commissioners and Regional Commissioners of Income
Tax.
12. Mr. M. Naeem Shah, Advocate Supreme Court, learned counsel for the
respondents (in Civil Appeals No.276, 288, 315/2004) submitted that Circular
No.7 of 2002, dated 15-6-2002 and the guidelines, dated 17-12-2002 issued by
the C.B.R. purportedly under section 59 of the Ordinance, 1979, were violative
of Article 4 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. It was
an inalienable right of every citizen to enjoy the protection of law and no
action detrimental to reputation or property of any person could be taken
except in accordance with law. He argued that under the provisions of section
59(1) once a return filed under the Scheme qualified for acceptance, the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax was under an obligation to assess the total income
of the assessee on the basis of such return and to pass an order of
determination of the tax accordingly.
13. Dr. Ilyas Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the
respondents (in Civil Appeals No.841 and 843/2004) submitted that the
guidelines issued by the Board were required to be published in the official
Gazette as required by section 165 of the Ordinance where-under the C.B.R. was
empowered, by notification in the official Gazette, to make rules and prescribe
the manner and the procedure by which the income, profits and gains liable to
tax and the tax payable under the Ordinance, would be determined in the cases
of persons to whom section 59 was applicable. Since the guidelines, dated (?)
therefore, they were not enforceable at law. It was next contended that the
guidelines vested the Income Tax Authorities with the powers of reopening the
cases for total audit in an arbitrary manner and without recording any reasons.
Therefore, those were invalid ineffective for non-compliance of the
requirements of section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, where under
every authority, officer or person making any order or issuing any direction in
exercise of powers conferred by or under any law was required to give reasons
for such an order or direction. The guidelines also ran counter to and
nullified the effect of section 59 ibid and those were an encroachment of
quasi-judicial functions of the Income-tax Authorities. Reliance was placed on
.the case of Messrs H.M. Abdullah v. Income Tax Officer Circle v. Karachi
and 2 others (1993 SCMR 1195) in which it was held that the C.B.R. exercising
-
19 administrative control or supervision could not give any directions or
instructions to the Assessing Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioners,
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the Commissioners of Income Tax vested with
quasi judicial powers. He also made a reference to the case of Messrs Central
Insurance Company and others v. Central Board of Revenue and others (1993 SCMR
1232) wherein it was held that although the C.B.R. had administrative
control over the functionaries discharging their functions under the Ordinance,
but it did not figure in the hierarchy of the forums provided for adjudication
of cases of assessees as to the income-tax. It was further held therein
assessees as to the income-tax. It was further held therein that interpretation
placed by the C.B.R. on a statutory provision could not be treated as a
pronouncement by a forum competent to adjudicate upon such a question judicial
or quasi-judicial. Therefore, it was contended that the C.B.R. could not issue
any directions of the nature which would interfere with the judicial or quasi-
judicial adjudicatory functions entrusted to various functionaries under a
statute.
14. Messrs Muhammad Iqbal Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court, and Shahbaz Butt,
Advocate Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the respondents (in Civil
Appeals No.248-251, 256, 259, 303, 1014/2004) and (Civil Appeals No.233, 241,
243, 256, 261, 271, 274, 275, 279, 283, 286, 293, 296, 301, 304 of 2004)
submitted that the C.B.R. was not empowered to issue guidelines having the
effect of modification of the Scheme already announced by it or to extend the
date for scrutiny of cases for total audit unilaterally.
15. We have heard the learned Attorney General for Pakistan and the learned
counsel for the respondents at length. Section 55 of the Ordinance required the
filing of Income Tax return by every person whose total income or the total
income of any other person in respect of which he was assessable for any income
year exceeded the maximum amount which was not chargeable to tax under the
Ordinance or who had been charged to tax for any of the four income tax years
immediately preceding the said income year. Section 59 of the Ordinance made a
provision for self-assessment of the income tax as under:--
59. Self-assessment: (1) Where the return of total income for any
income year furnished by the assessee (not being a public company
or a company engaged in the business of banking leasing and
modaraba), under section 55 qualifies for acceptance in accordance
with the provisions of a scheme of self assessment made by the
Central Board of Revenue for that year or under any instructions
or orders issued thereunder the (Deputy Commissioner) shall
assess, by an order in writing, the total income of the assessee
on the basis of such return and determine the tax payable on the
basis of such assessment
(Explanation: For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared
that a return of total income furnished under section 55 does
not include a return of total income furnished under section
57)
-
20
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection
(1), the Central Board of Revenue or any authority
subordinate to it if so authorized by the Central Board of Revenue
in this behalf, may in accordance with a scheme referred to in
subsection (1), select out of returns referred to in that
subsection any cases or classes of cases or persons or classes
of persons howsoever determined, for assessment under section 62,
and the (Deputy Commissioner) shall proceed to make the assessment
under that section or, if the circumstances so warrant, under
section 63 accordingly).
(1-B)
(2)
(3) In (assessing the total income and determining the tax
payable under subsection (1)) (Deputy Commissioner) may make such
adjustments as may be necessary, including any adjustment under
sections 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 50, 53 or 54, the rules made under
section 165, the First Schedule and the Third Schedule.
(4) No order under subsection (1) shall be made in any cases after
the thirtieth day of June of the financial year next following the
income year in respect of which a return of total income has been
furnished under section 55:
(Provided that if such order is not passed by such date, the
acknowledgement issued under section 55A in respect of the return
of total income shall be deemed to be the assessment order
and notice of demand referred to in section 85)
16. However, section 59-A of the Ordinance laid down that if the Deputy
Commissioner was satisfied without requiring the presence of the assessee or
the production by him of any evidence that a return furnished under section 55
was correct and complete, he would by an order in writing assess the total
income of the assessee and determine the tax payable on the basis of such
return. It was further provided therein that the provisions of subsection (3)
of section 59 would apply to an assessment and determination under section 59-A
as they applied to an assessment and determination under section 59.
17. The C.B.R. by Circular No.7 of 200*2 (Income Tax), on 15th June, 2002
announced the Self-Assessment Scheme (S.A.S.) for the Assessment year 2002-2003
under section 59 of the Ordinance. Paragraphs 1.1, 9 and 10 thereof are
reproduced below for the sake of convenience:-
1.1 All returns filed by taxpayers, other than those that are
ineligible under para. 7 of this Scheme, shall qualify for
acceptance subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions,
namely:-
-
21
(a) tax has been fully paid under section 54 of the Ordinance and
proof of such payment is attached with the return;
(b) Return of income for the assessment year 2002-2003 has been
filed under section 55 of the Ordinance, within due date as
defined in this Scheme;
(c) Returns of Public Limited companies quoted stock exchange,
where tax payable on the income declared is equal to or more than
the tax payable on the income last declared or assessed, whichever
is higher;
(d) Returns of other Companies where tax payable on the income
declared is higher by ten percent (10%) or more compared to the
tax payable on the income last declared or assessed,
whichever is higher;
(e) Returns of Registered Firms of Professionals not liable to pay
Super Tax under clause (2B) of para (A) of Part-IV of 1st Schedule
to the Ordinance, where the tax computed, under Part-II of the 1st
Schedule to the Ordinance, on income declared is higher by twenty
per cent. (20%) as compared to the similar tax computed on the
income last declared or assessed, whichever is higher; and
(f) Return of Persons not being Companies or Registered Firms of
Professionals, as indicated in sub-paras (c) (d) & (e) above,
where tax payable to income declare is higher by twenty per
cent. (20%) or more as compared to the tax payable on the
income last declared or assessed, whichever is higher;
(9) SELECTION OF CASES FOR AUDIT:
---------------------------------
(a) From amongst the returns filed under the Self-Assessment
Scheme (excluding salary and only property income cases), twenty
per cent. (20%) returns may be selected for total audit in the
following manner:-
(i) through computer ballot which may be random or parametric, as
deemed fit by C.B.R.
(ii) by Regional Commissioners of Income Tax on the
recommendations of Commissioners concerned, in the light of
guidelines issued by the Central Board of Revenue in this behalf.
(b) Returns qualifying for self-assessment shall be expeditiously
processed either manually, or through computer, after the
-
22
selection of cases for total audit. The Assessing Officer shall
make necessary adjustments under section 59(3) of the Ordinance,
if so required, after giving a notice in writing to the assessee
and considering his explanation, if any, These adjustments may
include add-backs on account of:-
(i) expenses claimed which are legally inadmissible;
(ii) any sum(s) deemed to be income under the Ordinance; and
(iii) adding agricultural income to the chargeable income for rate
purposes in terms of Proviso to Clause (1), Part-1 of the Second
Schedule to" the Ordinance.
(10) PROCESSING OF CASES SELECTED FOR AUDIT.
--------------------------------------------
The cases selected for total audit, shall be scrutinized in
detail, including field audit by departmental officers or by
professional auditors authorized under section 4A of the
Ordinance. The investigation and assessment proceedings shall be
monitored and completed under guidance of supervisory officers
within the meaning of section 7 of the Ordinance. Information
collected from available sources shall be utilized for determining
income of the taxpayer and tax payable thereon.
18. The C.B.R. Islamabad vide Letter No.7(7) S. Asstt/2002, dated 17-12-2002
issued policy guidelines to all the Regional Commissioners of Income Tax for
selection of cases for total audit under para-9 (a)(ii) of the Self-Assessment.
Scheme for the assessment year 2002-2003 Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof, being
relevant, read as under:-
``(2) In order to fulfil the above obligation of the Scheme
regarding issuance of the guidelines, it has been decided that the
Resit shall select only those revenue potential cases, where there
is an evidence, information or reasons to believe that the true
particulars of income have been suppressed. Such selection may
be based upon factors including an evident decline in income and
disparity in expenses on utilities vis-a-vis income declared.
Besides, cases of taxpayers acquiring new assets or incurring a
liability of Rs.50,000 or more through a non-institutional loan,
as declared in their wealth statements or where Department is
otherwise in the knowledge of some investments made by them, also
need to be considered for selection, it is felt that sources of
such acquisition/investment require detailed examination. In order
to identify such cases the tax profiles of survey and Registration
may also be consulted.
-
23
(3) Further, the RCsIT may poee recall that last year a number of
taxpayers lodged complaints before he learned Federal Tax
Ombudsman that their cases were selected on frivolous grounds.
This time it must be ensured that selection is based on material
evidences and a fair and just treatment is accorded to all
taxpayers. Before making a final selection, the RCsIT must
confront the assessees, provide them due opportunity of being
heard and must indicate the basis of their proposed selection in
the notices to be communicated to them.
(4) Board would like to further add that powers to set apart cases
for total audit must not be indiscriminately used and be
restricted to only those revenue potential cases where there is a
sound basis. Board desires that the process of selection of cases
for total audit must be finalized by 10th of January, 2003 and
thereafter be favoured with Zone-wise list of cases so selected.
It may be reiterated that selection of cases for total audit must
be carried out in a judicious and transparent manner.''
By another directive, dated 22-3-2003, the C.B.R. extended final date of
selection of non-company cases for total audit up to 31-3-2003 in order to
allow sufficient time to the taxpayers to submit their replies to the show
cause notices to the Regional Commissioners of Income Tax. The same date was
also extended in respect of company cases.
19. A number of issues have been raised by both sides with regard to the
validity and scope ofthe Circular No.7 of 2002, dated 15-6-2002 and policy
guidelines, dated 17-12-2002 of the C.B.R. together with extension in fixing
dates for completion of total audit of cases. An assessee was not under any
statutory obligation to file his return of total income for any year in terms
of provisions of section 59 under the Self-Assessment Scheme. A person who
was otherwise required to file a normal return under section 55 of the
Ordinance was given the option to file his return under section 59 for its
acceptance in accordance with the provisions of self-assessment scheme made by
the C.B.R. for that year, The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax would then
assess, by an order in writing, the total income of the assessee on the basis
of such return and determine the tax payable on the basis of such assessment.
By non-obstante clause of section 59 (1-A) it was provided that the C.B.R. or
any authority subordinate to it if so authorized by the C.B.R. could select out
of returns any cases or class of cases or persons or class of persons howsoever
determined for assessment under section 62 and the Deputy Commissioner would
proceed to make the assessment under that section or if the circumstances so
warranted, under section 63 accordingly. In such a situation, the procedure
provided under section 62 or section 63, as the case might be, would be allowed
by the Deputy Commissioner. Under paragraph 9 of the scheme, 20% returns were
to be selected for total audit through computer ballot which may be random of
parametric as deemed fit by the C.B.R. or and by Regional Commissioners
of Income Tax on the recommendations of the Commissioners concerned in
-
24 the light of the guidelines issued by the C.B.R. in that behalf. The Assessing
Officer would make necessary adjustments under section 59(3) of the Ordinance,
if so required, after giving a notice in writing to the assessee and
considering his explanation C if any. Paragraph 10 of the Scheme further laid
down that the cases selected for total audit would be scrutinized in detail
including field audit by departmental officers or by professional auditors
authorized under section 4-A of the Ordinance by utilizing the information
collected from available sources of determining income of the taxpayer and tax
payable thereon by observing the procedure of paragraph 9 and 10. There was no
limitation or restriction imposed by section 59(1-A) of the Ordinance as "any
cases or classes of cases or person or class of persons" could be selected for
the purpose of total audit.
20. The word `any' used in subsection (1-A) of section 59 of the Ordinance was
not without significance. In the case of Ch. Zahoor Ellahi M.N.A. v. The State
(PLD 1977 SC 273) the import of the word `any' was considered in the context of
section 13(1)(b) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance (XXX of 1971) whereunder
it was provided that.... ``no Court would have authority to revise such order
or sentence..... or to transfer any case from a Special Tribunals.... or have
any jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any proceedings in a Special
Tribunal.'' It was held that word `any' was of very wide amplitude and was
defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as a word which excluded limitations or
qualifications and, therefore, "any order" would include both interim as well
as final orders. Similarly, in N.-W.F.P. v. Muhammad Irshad (PLD 1995 SC 281),
this Court took the view that the expression `any law' was used to enlarge the
amplitude of the term to which it was attached and there seemed to be no reason
why expression 'any law' occurring in Article 8(1) of the Constitution
would be so narrowly construed as to exclude from its purview a regulation
which possessed the efficacy of law in a part of Pakistan. In Inam-ur-Rehman v.
Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 563) (at page 587) it has been stated that
the term 'any' according to the Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) page 86
means "one out of many; an indefinite number; one indiscriminately of
whatsoever kind or quantity. The word "any" has a diversity of meaning and may
be employed to indicate "all" or "every" D as well as "some" or "one" and its
meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of
the statute. In M. Amjad v, Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others (1992 PTD
513), it was held by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh that
the word `any' used in the context of section 59 of the Ordinance was a word of
expansion indicative of width and amplitude sufficient to bring within the
scope and ambit of the words it governed, all that could possibly be included
in them.
21. Therefore, no exception could be taken to the selection of cases of the
respondents in respect of their returns filed under the Self-Assessment Scheme.
It goes without saying that final selection of a case or cases had been made by
the Regional Commissioner of Income Tax after affording fair and adequate
opportunity of hearing to the assessees/respondents who were issued
showcause notices and their replies to the same were duly considered. It may be
-
25 observed that under the scheme a maximum of 20% of the returns filed by the
assessees could be selected for total audit. The percentage of the selected
case? Through computer ballot or by the Regional Commissioners of Income Tax
had not been squarely laid down with precision. However, no prejudice was shown
to have been caused to the respondents on account of the non-specification
of the percentage of cases to be selected by the C.B.R. through computer
balloting or by the Regional Commissioners. In our view, paragraphs 9 and 10 of
the Scheme could not be said to be ultra vires the provisions of section 59 or
any other provision of the Ordinance.
22. As regards the policy guidelines, dated 17-12-2000 issued by the C.B.R. to
the Regional Commissioners of the Income Tax, it seems that discretion of the
Regional Commissioners in selecting the cases for total audit was thereby
restricted. They could select only those revenue potential cases where there
was an evidence, information or reason to believe that the true
particulars of income had been suppressed. Under the Scheme, the number of
selected returns could not exceed the maximum limit of 20%. However, the
Regional Commissioner's were further directed to identify and select the
revenue potential cases only based upon factors including an evident decline in
income and disparity in expenses on utility vis-a-vis income declared. Besides,
cases of taxpayers acquiring new assets or incurring a liability of Rs.50,000
or more through a non-institutional loan, as declared in their wealth
statements or where Department was otherwise in the knowledge of some
investments made by them, could also be considered for selection. If it was
felt that sources of such acquisition/investment required detailed
examination. In order to identify such cases, the tax profiles of Survey and
Registration might also be consulted. The C.B.R. specifically directed that
before making a final selection, the Regional Commissioners of Income Tax must
confront ihe assessees, provide them opportunity of being heard and must
indicate the basis of their proposed selection in the notices to be
communicated to them. These guidelines were administrative in nature meant for
the internal consumption of the Income Tax functionaries which did not create
any rights nor did they impose any obligations. Those instructions had not
taken away any vested right of the assesses and would not govern the
adjudicatory proceedings of quasi-judicial in nature. However, it could not be
said that the guidelines were, in any way, extraneous, irrelevant or unfair to
the object to be achieved by the process of selection of cases for total audit.
In our view, the procedure of selection of cases for total audit as provided by
paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Scheme was not nullified or whittled down by the
policy guidelines, dated 17-12-2002.
23. Now, we have to examine whether the policy guidelines, dated 17-12-2002
were invalid for the reason of not having been issued either before or
contemporaneously with the promulgation of the Self-Assessment Scheme. There
was no requirement of section 59 or any other provision of the Ordinance or
rule for issuance of guidelines either before or along with the Scheme. The
very object of the provisions of section 59(1-A) would have been frustrated if
the income taxpayers were informed, before hand, of the categories of cases or
-
26 persons which would be selected for total audit. If that was done, the
possibility of tax evasion under the scheme at a massive scale could not be
ruled out. The assessees were required to file their true return under the
Scheme as far as possible. The previous publication of the guidelines would
have been a hay-day for all the tax evaders as they would be knowing before
hand that their cases were not going to be selected or scrutinized. As long as
the Income-tax Authorities acted within the for corners of section 59 of the
Ordinance and the Self-Assessment Scheme and did not abuse their power or
authority, the objection as to the provisional or/and final selection of cases
for total audit was not sustainable. The guidelines for the selection of cases
by the Regional Commissioners would not suffer from any taint of invalidity
merely because certain categories had been identified for total audit based on
the reasonable classification which was not violative of Article 25 of the
Constitution. There was no requirement of law for issuance of the
guidelines by the C.B.R. side by side with the announcement of the Scheme as
they were to follow the Scheme after its announcement and not to precede it.
24. The objection of Dr. Ilyas Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, as to non-
publication of guidelines in the Official Gazette also needs to be attended.
There was no statutory obligation on the part of the C.B.R. to have published
the guidelines in the Official Gazette. They were in the nature of
administrative instructions meant for the internal consumption of the Regional
Commissioners issued in aid of carrying out the purposes of Self-
Assessment Scheme. They did not enjoy the status of statutory rules which were
required, by section 165 of the Ordinance, to be notified through publication
in the Official Gazette. Moreover, it all depends on the nature and context of
statute whether the provisions requiring publication of a notification in the
Official Gazette would be construed as directory only or mandatory so as
to invalidate a notification or instructions on account of non-publication in
the Official Gazette. The purpose of publication and the legal effect of non-
publication of a Gazette Notification in the Official Gazette has been examined
by the superior Courts in a number of cases. In Jalal Din v. Natha Ram and
another (AIR 1922 Lahore 474), a learned Division Bench of the High Court
observed that a notification was a method implied for communicating orders,
rules, etc. to the general publ'ic. In Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of
Defence and others v. late Ch. Muhammad Ahsan through legal heirs and others
(1991 SCMR 2180), certain lands had been requisitioned under the Defence of
India Act, 1939 and the owners of the land were paid yearly lease money
thereunder. But the notification of the acquisition/requisition of land had not
been published in the official Gazette. It was observed that depending upon the
circumstances of each case, the mere fact that publication in the official
Gazette was delayed could neither invalidate the notification nor would make
its operation retrospective as such vis-a-vis the date of actual signing
it. It was found that factual acquisition of land had been acted upon for
nearly 50 years and there was an air field in the land for such a long time.
Notice/notification although had been signed and issued to all concerned but
had not been gazetted. In other words, the purpose of the publication in the
ordinary sense was practically served almost contemporaneously when the
-
27 acquisition took place and in fact it was more substantial publication insofar
as the owners were concerned than if it would Lave been in the official
Gazette. Mere fact that publication in the gazette was delayed, could not
invalidate the notification. A somewhat similar view was taken in the case of r
Muhammad Siddiquie v. Market Committee, Tandlianwala (1983 SCMR 785). In the
case of Saghir Ahmed through legal heirs v. Province of Punjab through
Secretary Housing and Physical Planning, Lahore and others (PLD 2005 SC 261), a
housing scheme had been approved and notified by the Government. There was no
stipulation of publication of such an approval in the official Gazette as a
mandatory condition. It was held that the non-publication of the Government's
approval of the scheme in the official gazette would not invalidate the
approval. It was further observed that the official acts performed by public
authorities deserved due regard by the Courts and every possible explanation
for their validity should be explored and the whole gamut of powers in
pursuance of which they acted or performed their function and discharged their
duties should be examined. In Mazur-ul-Haq v. Controlling Authority, Local
Councils, Montgomery and others (PLD 1963 SC 652), the names of the official
members were not notified in the official Gazette as provided by Article 26 of
the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, and section 17 of Municipal Administration
Ordinance, 1960. It was held that unless there be something in the language of
a statute which showed that the person concerned would not commence to hold
office till there was a notification in the Gazette, a provision for a
notification should not be interpreted as a condition precedent to the holding
of an office.
25. The learned counsel for the respondents also took a strong exception to the
preliminary selection of cases for total audit by the Commissioners of Income
Tax without affording prior opportunity of hearing to the assessees. We find
that the C.B.R. through policy guidelines had clearly directed the Regional
Commissioners of Income Tax to ensure that the selection was based on
material evidence and that a fair and just treatment was given to all
taxpayers. Before making final selection, they were required to issue notices
to the assessees indicating therein the basis of their proposed selection, to
confront them with relevant material and provide them due opportunity of being
heard. Therefore, the interests of the taxpayers were adequately safeguarded by
the policy guidelines of the C.B.R. in the process of final selection of their
cases by the Regional Commissioners even though they were not heard by the
Commissioners at an early stage.
26. The rules of natural justice are not inflexible. They yield to and change
with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same
manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid
mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but
flexible. They can be adopted and modified by the Statutes. The need to act in
an emergency may also exclude at least a prior hearing or where a decision
affects so many people that a hearing would be impracticable. In some cases
there may be collective right, of hearing, or to be consulted although not
necessarily a hearing in individual cases. Depending upon the facts and
-
28 circumstances of each case, there is no mandatory requirement of natural
justice that in every case the other side must be given a notice before
preliminary steps are taken. It might suffice if reasonable opportunity of
hearing is granted to a person before an adverse action or decision is taken
against him. However, it is not possible to lay down an absolute rule of
universal application governing all situations as to the exclusion or otherwise
of the audit alteram partem rule during the course of preliminary inquiries or
investigations.
27. The application or otherwise of the principles of natural justice at
preliminary stage of administrative proceedings was examined in various
jurisdictions by way of judicial review. In Pearlberg v. Varty (Inspector
Taxes) (1972) 2 All England Reports 7) the Income-tax Authorities made an
application to the Commissioner under the provisions of section 6(1) of the
Finance Act of 1964 for leave to make assessment on a taxpayer for the years
1946-47 and 1950-51. The permission was granted without giving the taxpayer an
opportunity to be heard. The taxpayer claimed that those assessments were
invalid on the ground that the Commissioner had acted ultra vires in granting
leave without giving him an opportunity of hearing. The House of Lords observed
that the Commissioner was not required to give the taxpayer an opportunity to
be heard as his decision to give leave would not tantamount to any final
determination of the rights of the taxpayer.
28. In the case of Regina v. Saskatchwan College of Physicians and Surgeons
(supra) it was held that the preliminary inquiry committee had no power to
decide whether Dr. Samuels had been guilty of misconduct; it had no power to
affect any of his legal rights in any way whatever; and it had no power to
impose any penalty or obligation upon him. Having no power to adjudicate
anything, it was not, when conducting its investigation, acting in a judicial
or quasi-judicial capacity. In R. v. Church Assembly Legislative Committee
(1972) All England Reports 696) it was observed that the Church Assembly of the
Church of England and its Legislative Committee were bodies that set in motion
in a preliminary way, proposals for legislation, and they did not exercise
judicial functions for determination judicially questions affecting the
rights of subjects. In the case of Parry Jones v. Law Society and others,
(supra), the Court of Appeal took the view that where the only inquiry was as
to whether there was prima facie evidence, natural justice did not require that
the party should be given notice of it. In Norwesi Hoist (supra), the company
had moved the Court for a declaration that the view of the Inspectors to
investigate the affairs and submit report to the department was unlawful and
ultra vires as the information and the material had not been disclosed to the
company. The Court of Appeal held that under section 165(b) of the Companies
Act, 1967, the department had wide discretion to appoint inspector to
investigate and report to it which was exercised at a preliminary stage for the
purpose of good administration and carried with it no implication that there
was any case against the company. Accordingly, the principles of natural
justice were at that stage inapplicable.
-
29 29. In Christopher John Moran (supra), the Court of Appeal observed that it was
no good for the tactician to appeal to the rules of natural justice. They had
no application to a preliminary inquiry of that kind. The inquiry was made with
a view to seeing whether there was a charge to be made. It did not do anything
which adversely affected the man concerned or prejudiced him in any way.
It was simply a preliminary hearing to see if there was going to be a charge.
If there was, there should be a hearing in which an impartial body would look
into the rights and wrongs of the case. In all such cases, all that was
necessary was that those who were holding the preliminary inquiry should be
honest men-acting in good faith doing their best to come to the right decision.
In that case, a Committee had been appointed to investigate dealings of the
plaintif