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Landmark judgment of Supreme court on appreciation ofevidence of expert witness

PW 3-Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted the postmortem made a statement in cross examination that therewas more probability of death being caused by accidentalfire as there was no smell of kerosene oil from the body ofthe deceased and that the fire had started from the lowerparts of the body towards upper parts is equally without anymerit.Such statement of an expert witness without beingbased on any specialized knowledge cannot be accepted.

The opinion of expert witness on technical aspects hasrelevance but the opinion has to be based upon specializedknowledge and the data on which it is based has to be foundacceptable by the Court.In Madan Gopal Kakkadversus Naval Dubey.1, it was observed as under :34. A medical witness called in as an expert toassist the Court is not a witness of fact and theevidence given by the medical officer is really ofan advisory character given on the basis of thesymptoms found on examination. The expertwitness is expected to put before the Court allmaterials inclusive of the data which induced himto come to the conclusion and enlighten the Courton the technical aspect of the case by explainingthe terms of science so that the Court although,not an expert may form its own judgment on thosematerials after giving due regard to the expertsopinion because once the experts opinion isaccepted, it is not the opinion of the medicalofficer but of the Court.35. Nariman, J. in Queen v. Ahmed Ally.2, whileexpressing his view on medical evidence hasobserved as follows:The evidence of a medical man or otherskilled witnesses, however, eminent, as towhat he thinks may or may not have takenplace under particular combination ofcircumstances, however, confidently, he mayspeak, is ordinarily a matter of mere opinion.REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1366 OF 2010SULTAN SINGH

VERSUSSTATE OF HARYANA

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.Citation; 2015(1) Crimes 59 SC

This appeal has been preferred against the convictionand sentence of the appellant under Sections 304-B and498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short the IPC). UnderSection 304-B IPC, the appellant has been sentenced toundergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years while underSection 498A, IPC he has been sentenced to undergorigorous imprisonment for three years, apart from sentenceof fine.2.The appellant was married to the deceased LavjeetKaur on 27th February, 1990.On 17th June, 1994, PW 4-Gurmeet Singh lodged First Information Report to the effectthat Lavjeet Kaur was burnt to death by the appellant and1Page 1his mother.It was further stated that she was harassed fordowry soon before her death. Apart from other demands ofdowry, it was stated that 5-6 days before the death, theappellant visited the parental house of the deceased andmade a demand of Rs.30,000/- for purchase of land.Sincethe said demand was not met, he left the house underprotest.On the fateful day, when he (PW-4) visited thehouse of the appellant he found that the appellants motherpoured oil from a can on the deceased and the appellantignited the fire. He came to his parents and thereafter hewent to the Civil Hospital where he learnt that the accusedwas referred to the PGI Chandigarh but she died on the way.3.On the basis of this First Information Report, theinvestigation was conducted by PW 6-ASI, Madan Pal Singhand after investigation, the appellant and his mother (whohas been acquitted by the High Court) were sent up for trial.4.TheprosecutionexaminedPW4-GurmeetSingh,brother of the deceased, PW 5-Ujjagar Singh, father of thedeceased, apart from evidence of Investigating Officer andthe Medical Officer and other evidence.5.The appellant denied the allegations and took the plea

that the deceased caught fire accidentally while working on2Page 2a stove.He had gone to the school near their house forgiving his photo for the Identity Card for voting purpose.When he learnt about the accident, he immediately tookLavjeet Kaur to the hospital.6.The trial Court held that though the version of PW 4-Gurmeet Singh and PW 5-Ujjagar Singh that they had seenthe appellant setting the deceased on fire was not reliable,their reversion of demand of dowry soon before the deathcould not be rejected.Since her death was within sevenyears of marriage, demand of dowry was proved and thedeath was under the circumstances other than normal,presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Actcould be raised.Sections 498-AThus, the commission of offences underand 304-B, IPC was proved. It washeld that story of bursting of stove was not reliable.Therelevant discussion in this regard, is as follows :From the sworn testimony of PWs Gurmeet Singhand Ujjagar Singh discussed above it has becomevery clear that deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur wassubjected to cruelty or harassment by the accusedpersons for the demand of dowry right from thebeginning of her marriage till death. Even soonbefore her death she was subjected to cruelty bythe accused persons when father of the deceasedcould not pay a sum of Rs.30,000/- to accusedSultan Singh 5/6 days prior to the death ofdeceased. Deceased was married with accused3Page 3Sultan Singh on 27.2.1990 and she died on17.6.1994 on account of burn injuries at thematrimonial home. The fact that the deceaseddied on account of burn injuries is well provedfrom the medical evidence consisting of thestatements of Dr. S.K. Gupta who medico-legallyexamined the deceased immediately on arrival atCivil Hospital Ambala Cantt., and also of Dr.Gajinder Yadav PW-3 who conducted the postmortem examination of the dead body ofdeceased. The deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur agedabout 22 years had suffered 70% burn injuries anddied on account of the same. Thus, it has beenwell established that the death of deceased Smt.Lavjeet Kaur was caused by burns and she died

unnatural death. It has also been established thatshe died within a period of seven years of hermarriage. As already discussed by me that it hasalso been established that the deceased was alsosubjected to cruelty by the accused persons forthe demand of dowry soon before her death. Thusin view of the provisions contained in Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act it can very well bepresumed that the accused persons have causeddowry death.Since the deceased Lavjeet Kaurwas at the house of the accused and therefore nowit is for the accused persons to explain how shedied an unnatural death within a period of about 4-12 years of her marriage.The explanation furnished by the accused personswith respect to the death of Smt. Lavjeet Kaur inthe form of their defence version to the effect thatthe deceased died just by mere accident as shecaught fire on account of bursting of stove whenshe was cooking meals cannot be accepted. Theinvestigating officer ASI Madan Pal took intopossession a plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling keroseneoil and half burnt Gadda from inside the room ofthe house. If Smt. Lavjeet Kaur had been caughtfire while working on the stove I fail to understandas to how the Gadda lying in the bed room of thehouse would have caught fire. Secondly if thestove would have burst the same must have beenfound lying at the place of occurrence, but thesame was not available to the Investigating Officerwhen he visited the spot. It clearly negatives thedefence version that Smt. Lavjeet Kaur caught fireon account of bursting of stove. The argument of4Page 4the learned defence counsel to the effect that PWGurmeet Singh has deposed that he had seen theaccused setting Smt. Lavjeet Kaur on fire bysprinkling kerosene oil upon her in the court yardof the house does not effect the prosecution casein any way, because I have already observed inthe earlier part of the judgment that the depositionof PW Gurmeet Singh so far as he has given aneye version account cannot be believed thattherefore the story of the court yard put forwardby him automatically goes. However, the factremains that the Investigating Officer found thehalf burnt Gadda Ex.P-2 and the plastic can Ex.P-1smelling kerosene inside the bed room of thehouse. Thus, the non-availability of the burststove on the spot itself speaks that the defenceversion is nothing but is simply made up story and

cannot be believed.The medical evidence as pointed out by thelearned defence counsel also does not help theaccused persons in any way. It has been deposedby Dr. Gajinder Yadav that there were deep burnson legs and chest of the deceased. It has come inthe statements of both the medical officers thatthe deceased suffered 70% burn injuries and diedas a result thereof. It has been categoricallystated by Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted thepost-mortem examination that the deceased diedon account of burn injuries which were sufficient tocause death in the ordinary course of nature. I failto understand as to what help the accused couldtake from the statements of the medical officersby pointing out that the Medical Officers havedeposed that there was no smell of kerosene fromthe body and clothes of the deceased. If it was sothen it also smashes the defence version, becauseif the deceased had caught fire by bursting ofstove then also there must be smell of kerosene oilon her clothes. In my view, the smell of kerosenemight have evaporated in between the time ofoccurrence till the post mortem examinationbecause the occurrence had taken place on17.6.1994 at about noon time, whereas the postmortem examination was conducted on 18.6.1994.Further, the deceased was unconscious when shewas admitted in the hospital and therefore, it isnot known how the deceased could tell Dr. S.K.5Page 5Gupta that she had caught fire while working on astove. Another person from whom Dr. S.K. Guptaderived this information was one Amar Nath aprivate Medical practitioner, who accompanied thedeceased to the hospital. However, Shri AmarNath was not produced in defence to ascertainwhether he had told this fact to the Medical Officerand if so how he acquired the said knowledgewhether from the deceased or otherwise.Moreover, in the ruka Ex.PC sent by Dr. S.K. Guptato the police there is no mentioning of the burstingof stove, nor it has been mentioned as to how helearnt that the deceased caught fire while workingon a stove. It has simply been mentioned that thedeceased was alleged to have sustained burns70% while working on a stove. The word burstingis missing in this ruka, whereas, it was so stated byDr. S.K. Gupta when he appeared in the witnessbox. If the story of bursting of stove came to hisknowledge it is not known why he omitted tomention this fact in his ruka Ex. PC sent to the

police. Taking into consideration all the facts andcircumstances I am of the definite view that thestatement of Dr. S.K. Gupta to the effect that therewas the history of burns allegedly sustained by thedeceased due to bursting of stove while cookingfood is not legally sound because neither AmarNath was produced, nor deceased could speakanything before her death.7.The appellant preferred an appeal.The High Courtupheld the conviction of the appellant while acquitting hismother Mohinder Kaur, the co-accused, of the charge underSection 304-B, IPC but upheld her conviction under Section498A, IPC. It was observed that the allegation of demand ofdowry soon before the death was only against the appellantand not against his mother. Rejecting the defence plea ofaccidental burning, the High Court observed as under :6Page 6The accused or their persons might haveaccompanied Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital. Theaccused are naturally interested to savethemselves from legal punishment and such as thesaid history might have been given by them orAmar Nath to save the accused. PW-2 Dr. S.K.Gupta has no personal knowledge about theoccurrence and has stated that there was historyof burns sustained by Lavjeet Kaur due to burstingof stove while cooking food. So, that history wasgiven by the accused or Amar Nath, accompanyingthe injured to the hospital.One another circumstance which militates againstthe case of the accused is that the police found theblood sustained Gadda in the room where theoccurrence is stated to have taken place and notin the kitchen, as per stand of the accused. Thatfact belied the stand of accused.The statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that history wasgiven by the patient does not appeal to reason.The deceased was having 70% burn injuries and assuch she was not in a position to narrate theoccurrence. The police had no reason to changethe place of occurrence from the kitchen to theroom as shown in the rough site plan. There weresingeing of the skull hair of Lavjeet Kaur besideshaving burn injuries on the chest and lower part ofthe body. The fact of bursting of stove and givingthe case history by Lavjeet Kaur is not mentionedby Dr. S.K. Gupta in the record. The doctor is notsupposed to orally know all the facts. It seemsthat Dr. S.K. Gupta has stated that the history ofthe case was given by the patient simply to favour

the accused, moreso when there is nothing in thisregard on the record. So, no reliance can beplaced on the statement made by Dr. S.K. Gupta,in this regard.PW-3 Dr. Gajinder Yadav, has stated that therewas probability of the deceased receiving burninjuries by accidental fire but he has not stated itwith confidence that in all probability, the deathcould be accidental, in the present case. Thatdoctor has not seen the other circumstantialevidence at the spot before arriving at theconclusion. So, the learned trial Court has rightlyheld that Lavjeet Kaur, deceased, has died due to7Page 7unnatural injuries and not by accidental burninjuries.8.We have heard learned counsel for the parties andperused the evidence on the record.9.The main question raised for our consideration iswhether the evidence of demand of dowry soon before thedeath was reliable and whether it was a case of accidentaldeath as pleaded by the defence. The presumption underSection 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is attracted only incase of suicidal or homicidal death and not in case of anaccidental death.10.We are unable to accept the submissions advanced onbehalf of the appellant.11.The brother and father of the deceased have madecategorical allegation of demand of dowry which confirmedalmost upto the date of death. Even though version of PW 4,brother of the deceased, and PW 5, father of the deceased,may be exaggerated to the extent of saying that they sawthe accused and his mother causing burn injuries, there is noreason to disbelieve their version with regard to demand ofdowry.It is true that in case of accidental deathpresumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act8Page 8is not available but there is no reason to hold that in thepresent case, the burn injuries were by accident.12.Apart from the following reasons given by the trialCourt and the High Court, namely;(i) The Investigating Officer found the plastic can (Exhibit P-1) smelling kerosene oil and a half burnt mattress (Exhibit P-2);(ii) The burst stove was not found at the place of

occurrence as stated by the Investigating Officer;(iii) The deceased suffered 70% burn injuries which washeld to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinarycourse of injury, there are other reasons to reject theplea of accident;there are other reasons to support the findings.12.While in the case of homicidal death, if the victim iscaught unaware, a person may not be able to make anyeffort to save himself/herself and in case of suicidal burninjuries a person may take all precautions not to savehimself/herself, in case of accidental burn injuries, victimmakes all possible efforts to save himself/herself which mayleave evidence to show that the death was accidental. Sucha person may raise alarm and try to escape.TheInvestigating Officer visiting the scene of occurrence cannotice the available evidence by recreating the scene. In thepresent case, there are no probabilities to support thedefencepleaofaccident,particularlywhenrelations9Page 9betweenthedeceasedandtheappellantwerenotharmonious.13.Thus,takingofpleabytheaccusedtosavehimself/herself is not enough. The contention in the presentcase that PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta mentioned the history of burndue to bursting of stove was given by the patient and oneAmar Nath who accompanied her is without any merit.Inthe same statement the said witness states that the victim

was unfit to make a statement.Amar Nath, who is said tohave given this information, has not been examined by thedefence. Statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that Amar Nath gavethis information is hearsay.Moreover, PW 2-Dr. S.K. Guptahas been examined as an expert witness to give his opinionabout the health condition of the patient based on hisexpertise. He is not a witness of fact. Similarly, contentionthatPW 3-Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted the postmortem made a statement in cross examination that therewas more probability of death being caused by accidentalfire as there was no smell of kerosene oil from the body ofthe deceased and that the fire had started from the lowerparts of the body towards upper parts is equally without anymerit.Such statement of an expert witness without beingbased on any specialized knowledge cannot be accepted.

The opinion of expert witness on technical aspects hasrelevance but the opinion has to be based upon specializedknowledge and the data on which it is based has to be foundacceptable by the Court.In Madan Gopal Kakkadversus Naval Dubey.1, it was observed as under :34. A medical witness called in as an expert toassist the Court is not a witness of fact and theevidence given by the medical officer is really ofan advisory character given on the basis of thesymptoms found on examination. The expertwitness is expected to put before the Court allmaterials inclusive of the data which induced himto come to the conclusion and enlighten the Courton the technical aspect of the case by explainingthe terms of science so that the Court although,not an expert may form its own judgment on thosematerials after giving due regard to the expertsopinion because once the experts opinion isaccepted, it is not the opinion of the medicalofficer but of the Court.35. Nariman, J. in Queen v. Ahmed Ally.2, whileexpressing his view on medical evidence hasobserved as follows:The evidence of a medical man or otherskilled witnesses, however, eminent, as towhat he thinks may or may not have takenplace under particular combination ofcircumstances, however, confidently, he mayspeak, is ordinarily a matter of mere opinion.14.We may also note that the presumption under Section113B of the Indian Evidence Act has been enacted to checkthe menace of the dowry deaths and in appreciating the

evidence, the social background of the legislation cannot be12(1992) 3 SCC 204(1998) 3 SCC 309

ignored. In Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana.3, it wasobserved:11. It is true, as argued by learned counsel forthe appellants, that in criminal jurisprudencebenefit of doubt is extendable to the accused. Butthat benefit of doubt would arise in the context ofthe application of penal law, and in the facts andcircumstances of a case. The concept of benefit ofdoubt has an important role to play but within theconfines of the stringency of laws. Since the causeof death of a married woman was to occur not innormal circumstances but as a dowry death, forwhich the evidence was not so easily available, asit is mostly confined within the four walls of ahouse, namely the husbands house, where alllikely accused reside. Hence the aforesaidamendments brought in the concept of deemeddowry death by the husband or the relatives, asthe case may be. This deeming clause has a role toplay and cannot be taken lightly and ignored toshield an accused, otherwise the very purpose ofthe amendment will be lost. Of course, theprosecution has to prove the ultimate essentialingredients beyond all reasonable doubt afterraising the initial presumption of deemed dowrydeath.12. Explanation to Section 304-B refers to dowryas having the same meaning as in Section 2 ofthe 1961 Act, the question is: what is theperiphery of the dowry as defined therein? Theargument is, there has to be an agreement at thetime of the marriage in view of the words agreedto be given occurring therein, and in the absenceof any such evidence it would not constitute to bea dowry. It is noticeable, as this definition byamendment includes not only the period beforeand at the marriage but also the periodsubsequent to the marriage.13. When words in a statute are referable to morethan one meaning, the established rule ofconstruction is found in Heydons case1 alsoapproved by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.311 WR Cr. 25

v. State of Bihar2 AIR at p. 674. The rule is toconsider four aspects while construing an Act:(a) what was the law prior to the law which is

sought to be interpreted;(b) what was the mischief or defect for whichnew law is made;(c) what is the remedy the law now provides;and(d) what is the reason of the remedy.14. The Court must adopt that construction which,suppresses the mischief and advances theremedy.15. Applying this principle, it is clear that theearlier law was not sufficient to check dowrydeaths hence aforesaid stringent provisions werebrought in, so that persons committing suchinhuman crimes on married women should notescape, as evidence of a direct nature is notreadily available except of the circumstantial kind.Hence it is that interpretation which suppressesthe mischief, subserves the objective andadvances the remedy, which would be acceptable.The objective is that men committing such crimesshould not escape punishment. Hence stringentprovisions were brought in by shifting the burdenonto the accused by bringing in the deemedclause. As aforesaid, the definition of dowry wasamended with effect from 19-11-1986, to includethe period even after the marriage.16. The offence alleged against the appellants isunder Section 304-B IPC which makes demand ofdowryitselfpunishable.Demandneitherconceives nor would conceive of any agreement. Iffor convicting any offender, agreement for dowry isto be proved, hardly any offenders would comeunder the clutches of law. When Section 304-Brefers to demand of dowry, it refers to thedemand of property or valuable security asreferred to in the definition of dowry under the1961 Act. It was argued on behalf of the appellantsthat mere demand of scooter or fridge would notbe a demand for dowry. We find from the evidenceon record that within a few days after themarriage, the deceased was tortured, maltreated1Page 13and harassed for not bringing the aforesaid articlesin marriage. Hence the demand is in connectionwith marriage. The argument that there is nodemand of dowry, in the present case, has noforce. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides,circumstantial evidence plays an important role

and inferences can be drawn on the basis of suchevidence. That could be either direct or indirect. Itis significant that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, wasalso amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, underwhich it is an offence to demand dowry directly orindirectly from the parents or other relatives orguardian of a bride. The word agreementreferred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on thefacts and circumstances of each case. Theinterpretation that the appellant seeks, thatconviction can only be if there is agreement fordowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary tothe mandate and object of the Act. Dowrydefinition is to be interpreted with the otherprovisions of the Act including Section 3, whichrefers to giving or taking dowry and Section 4which deals with penalty for demanding dowry,under the 1961 Act and the Indian Penal Code. Thismakes it clear that even demand of dowry on otheringredients being satisfied is punishable. This leadsto the inference, when persistent demands for TVand scooter are made from the bride aftermarriage or from her parents, it would constituteto be in connection with the marriage and it wouldbe a case of demand of dowry within the meaningof Section 304-B IPC. It is not always necessarythat there be any agreement for dowry.Again in Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi.4, itwas observed as under :8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowrydeath, reads as follows:304-B. Dowry death.(1) Where the death of awoman is caused by any burns or bodily injury oroccurs otherwise than under normal circumstanceswithin seven years of her marriage and it is shownthat soon before her death she was subjected tocruelty or harassment by her husband or any4(2003) 8 SCC 80

relative of her husband for, or in connection with,any demand for dowry, such death shall be calleddowry death, and such husband or relative shallbe deemed to have caused her death.Explanation.For the purpose of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same meaning as inSection 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of1961).(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall bepunished with imprisonment for a term which shallnot be less than seven years but which mayextend to imprisonment for life.The provision has application when death of awoman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise than under normal circumstanceswithin seven years of her marriage and it is shownthat soon before her death she was subjected tocruelty or harassment by her husband or anyrelatives of her husband for, or in connection withany demand for dowry. In order to attractapplication of Section 304-B IPC, the essentialingredients are as follows:(i) The death of a woman should be caused byburns or bodily injury or otherwise than under anormal circumstance.(ii) Such a death should have occurred withinseven years of her marriage.(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty orharassment by her husband or any relative of herhusband.(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for orin connection with demand of dowry.(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to havebeen meted out to the woman soon before herdeath.Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevantfor the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC andSection 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted asnoted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat theincreasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-Breads as follows:113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.Whenthe question is whether a person has committedthe dowry death of a woman and it is shown thatsoon before her death such woman had beensubjected by such person to cruelty or harassmentfor, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,1Page 15the Court shall presume that such person hadcaused the dowry death.Explanation.For the purposes of this section,dowry death shall have the same meaning as inSection 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of1860).The necessity for insertion of the two provisionshas been amply analysed by the Law Commissionof India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 onDowry Deaths and Law Reform. Keeping in viewthe impediment in the pre-existing law in securingevidence to prove dowry-related deaths, thelegislature thought it wise to insert a provisionrelating to presumption of dowry death on proof ofcertain essentials. It is in this background thatpresumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act hasbeen inserted. As per the definition of dowry

death in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in thepresumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act,one of the essential ingredients, amongst others,in both the provisions is that the womanconcerned must have been soon before herdeath subjected to cruelty or harassment for orin connection with the demand of dowry.Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumptionof law. On proof of the essentials mentionedtherein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raisea presumption that the accused caused the dowrydeath. The presumption shall be raised only onproof of the following essentials:(1) The question before the court must bewhether the accused has committed the dowrydeath of the woman. (This means that thepresumption can be raised only if the accused isbeing tried for the offence under Section 304-BIPC.)(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty orharassment by her husband or his relatives.(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or inconnection with any demand for dowry.(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon beforeher death.9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of theEvidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows thatthere must be material to show that soon beforeher death the victim was subjected to cruelty orharassment. The prosecution has to rule out the

possibility of a natural or accidental death so as tobring it within the purview of death occurringotherwise than in normal circumstances. Theexpression soon before is very relevant whereSection 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section304-B IPC are pressed into service. Theprosecution is obliged to show that soon before theoccurrence there was cruelty or harassment andonly in that case presumption operates. Evidencein that regard has to be led by the prosecution.Soon before is a relative term and it woulddepend upon the circumstances of each case andno straitjacket formula can be laid down as to whatwould constitute a period of soon before theoccurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate anyfixed period, and that brings in the importance of aproximity test both for the proof of an offence ofdowry death as well as for raising a presumptionunder Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Theexpression soon before her death used in thesubstantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-Bof the Evidence Act is present with the idea ofproximity test. No definite period has been

indicated and the expression soon before is notdefined. A reference to the expression soonbefore used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of theEvidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a courtmay presume that a man who is in the possessionof goods soon after the theft, is either the thief orhas received the goods knowing them to be stolen,unless he can account for their possession. Thedetermination of the period which can come withinthe term soon before is left to be determined bythecourts,dependinguponfactsandcircumstances of each case. Suffice, however, toindicate that the expression soon before wouldnormally imply that the interval should not bemuch between the cruelty or harassmentconcerned and the death in question. There mustbe existence of a proximate and live link betweenthe effect of cruelty based on dowry demand andthe death concerned. If the alleged incident ofcruelty is remote in time and has become staleenough not to disturb the mental equilibrium ofthe woman concerned, it would be of noconsequence.

15.Having regard to the entirety of material, we do notfind any ground to interfere with the concurrent findingrecorded by the courts below that it was not a case ofaccidental death but a death taking place in circumstancesother than normal.Thus, the presumption under Section113B of the Indian Evidence Act has been rightly invokedand the offence against the appellant has been proved.There is no tangible circumstance to rebut the presumption.17.For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in thisappeal. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant who is onbail is directed to surrender to custody to undergo theremaining sentence...........................................J.[ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]NEW DELHISeptember 26, 2014...........................................J.[ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

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Landmark judgment of Supreme court on appreciation of evidence of expert witness