Landau - Movement Out of Control

RemarksandReplies

Movement Out of Control

Idan Landau

This article is a comprehensive critique of the reductionist view ofcontrol advocated in recent minimalist studies, most notably Hornstein1999. The core of this view is the claim that obligatory control shouldbe collapsed with raising, and nonobligatory control with pronominalcoreference. I argue that Hornstein’s theory (a) overgenerates nonexist-ing structures and interpretations, (b) fails to derive a wide range ofwell-known raising/control contrasts, and (c) involves unstated stipula-tions belying the appeal to Occam’s razor.

Keywords: control, raising, NP-movement, A-chains, Occam’s razor

1 Introduction

Recent treatments of control within minimalism share the conviction that obligatory control (OC)is to be understood in terms of syntactic movement (Martin 1996, O’Neil 1997, Hornstein 1999).In its most radical form, this conviction amounts to the thesis that OC should be collapsed withraising, both instantiating NP-movement. This is the position advanced by Hornstein (1999). Itis held that strong conceptual considerations, such as simplicity of the grammar and avoidanceof redundancy, argue for eliminating both PRO and the control module from the grammar. Thiscan be done, the thesis goes, without any loss of empirical coverage.

In this article, I take issue with this reductionist view of control. The specific model that Iexamine is the one proposed by Hornstein (1999). The choice is motivated both by the explicitnessof this model and by its radical ambitions. Though the issues that arise can be most sharplydiscerned and addressed by contrasting this model with alternative, more traditional views ofcontrol, most of my critique is applicable to the other proposals mentioned above, insofar as theyreduce OC to movement.

In arguing against Hornstein’s proposal, I will not try to defend any particular theory ofcontrol; rather, my critique will rest upon minimal assumptions that are shared by the majorityof approaches to control, but crucially, not by Hornstein’s. This is feasible precisely because forall their differences, those approaches recognize some fundamental split between raising andcontrol, a split that Hornstein’s theory minimizes to triviality.

I would like to thank Danny Fox, Sabine Iatridou, and two anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions.During work on this article, I was supported by the Kreitman postdoctoral fellowship at Ben Gurion University.

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Linguistic Inquiry, Volume 34, Number 3, Summer 2003471–498� 2003 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

472 REMARKS AND REPLIES

The arguments to follow fall into three categories. First, I will show that Hornstein’s systemovergenerates nonexisting structures and interpretations, most of which must be independentlyblocked. Second, I will show that the claimed empirical benefits of the theory are less thancompelling, and in fact undermine some of its assumptions. And third, I will show that a wideempirical range of raising/control contrasts (unmentioned by Hornstein) makes an overwhelmingcase against the reductionist view. The concluding remarks address some general methodologicalissues that underlie the debate.

2 Hornstein’s Theory

Hornstein develops his theory of control in response to what he perceives to be eliminable inade-quacies in previous accounts, specifically the Government-Binding (GB) and the early minimalist(‘‘null Case’’) theories. Those, he claims, are either unmotivated stipulations or redundant mecha-nisms. In the first category, Hornstein lists (a) the requirement that an argument chain bear exactlyone �-role; (b) the ban on movement to a �-position; (c) the ban on movement to a non-c-commanding position; (d) the view that �-roles are not checkable features; (e) the postulationof the dubious ‘‘null Case.’’ In the second category, he lists (a) the distinction between PRO andtrace—indeed, the very idea that PRO exists; (b) hence, the traditional wisdom that raising andcontrol are substantially different; (c) the ‘‘control module,’’ that is, the part of grammar that isresponsible for the choice of controller in OC and the interpretation of PRO in general.

The theory proposed by Hornstein dispenses with all those assumptions. Instead, it paintsthe following picture. �-roles are features transferred from predicates to DPs, and there is no limiton the number of �-roles a DP can accrue. There is no ‘‘null Case’’; the subject position of theinfinitive is Caseless. Control is nothing more than raising to a �-position. As such, it is subjectto the Minimal Link Condition (MLC). This result is supposed to capture the Minimal DistancePrinciple (MDP), that is, the lack of subject control across an object, at least as a markednessconstraint. Thus, both PRO and the control module are eliminated.

A sample derivation of OC is given in (1) (expanded from Hornstein’s (45)).

(1) a. Mary hopes to win.b. [IP Mary [VP Mary v�hopes [IP Mary to [VP Mary v�win]]]]

The array contains a lexical DP (Mary), embedded and matrix predicates (win and hope, respec-tively), and appropriate functional heads (light v’s, infinitival to, finite I(nfl), etc.). Mary firstmerges with the embedded vP, checking the external �-role of win. It then raises to the embeddedSpec,IP position, checking the EPP feature of to. Next, it raises to the matrix vP, checking (i.e.,receiving) another �-role, this time that of hope. Finally, it raises to the matrix Spec,IP position,where it checks nominative Case and EPP features. All the intermediate steps leave full copiesof the raised DP (Hornstein adopts the minimalist view of traces as copies). The resulting chaincontains two �-roles and one Case. Object control into complements works in a similar fashion.

The second type of OC that Hornstein considers is subject control into an adjunct. A samplederivation is given in (2) (Hornstein’s (41)).

REMARKS AND REPLIES 473

(2) a. John heard Mary without entering the room.b. [IP John [I past [VP/VP[VP John [heard Mary]] [Adjunct without [IP John [I ing

[VP John [entering the room]]]]]]]]

The adjunct is built up first, with John checking the external �-role of enter and then raising toSpec,-ing. In the matrix clause,Marymerges with heard, checking the internal �-role. This phrasethen merges with the adjunct, forming an adjunction structure.1 At this point, John raises fromthe adjunct to the matrix Spec,VP, checking the external �-role of heard, and finally to the matrixSpec,IP, checking nominative Case and EPP features. At LF, Mary raises to the outer Spec,VP(or AgrO) to check accusative Case. Hornstein shows that all alternative derivations from thesame array fail to converge, including object control.

The raising of John from the adjunct targets a position that does not c-command (nor isc-commanded by) the adjunct. This is an instance of sideward movement, allowed by assumption.Mary does not c-command the adjunct either. If the MLC only compares distances between nodesthat stand in a c-command relation to one another, then the raising of John does not violate theMLC (unlike the case of object control into complements, where the MLC is operative). As forthe very possibility of escaping an island, Hornstein refers to Nunes 1995, where such movementsare sanctioned, provided they are sideward movements. I return below to this issue.

Hornstein’s theory of nonobligatory control (NOC) is very simple. Essentially, NOC appliesin all environments where raising is impossible (e.g., from subject gerunds). In such cases, a ‘‘lastresort’’ operation saves the structure by inserting a small pro in the ‘‘controlled’’ position, muchlike the operation of do-support. The presence of pro explains the ‘‘pronominal’’ properties ofNOC.

This suffices as a general overview of Hornstein’s theory. There are more details to be filledin, which I will discuss when considering their empirical consequences.

In evaluating Hornstein’s theory, I will contrast it with what I take to be the ‘‘standard view’’of control. This view consists of the following assumptions:

(3) The standard view of controla. PRO exists, and it is distinct from NP-trace.b. Hence, control involves two argument chains, while raising involves one.c. The control module exists.

The assumptions in (3) are as minimal as one can get. Thus, they are not committed to anyparticular view of PRO (anaphor, pronoun, A variable, etc.)—only to its nonidentity with NP-trace. Nor are they committed to any particular view of the control module—the choice of control-ler and the interpretation of PRO may involve predication, lexical entailments, pragmatic factors,

1 The structure in (2b), Hornstein’s (41), in fact reflects a different derivation from the one Hornstein describes inprose (and in his (40))—namely, one in which the raising of John precedes adjunction. This vagueness is not crucial, asHornstein indicates (footnote 31) that he takes no position on the issue of movement between unconnected subtrees.


and so on—only to the existence of some component of grammar, distinct from the MLC, thatdetermines these properties.

Doubtless, there exist theories of control other than Hornstein’s that deny some of the ingredi-ents in (3) (although, as far as I know, no theory denies all of them). Yet it is safe to say thatthe vast majority of control theories, certainly those situated within the GB tradition, accept thismuch (see, e.g., Chomsky 1981, 1986b, Bresnan 1982, Manzini 1983, Bouchard 1984, Koster1984, Lebeaux 1984, Borer 1989, Clark 1990, Sag and Pollard 1991, Williams 1992, Petter 1998,Landau 2000). As I will argue, nothing more is needed in order to counterpose to Hornstein’stheory, a coherent alternative that is superior over a wide range of empirical phenomena.

3 Internal Problems

Just as Hornstein’s main arguments against the standard view are conceptual, so one may adduceconceptual arguments against Hornstein’s own proposal. Most significantly, Hornstein’s claimthat �-roles are checkable features, on a par with �-features (see also Manzini and Roussou 2000),introduces massive redundancy into the grammar: all thematic information, previously thoughtto be accessed only at the semantic interface, is now mirrored by a system of formal features,accessed throughout the derivation. Moreover, unlike any other morphological feature, the pur-ported �-features are clearly relational. A DP is plural by virtue of bearing a certain feature,regardless of its environment; however, whether it is a theme or an experiencer is entirely contextdependent. Questions of convergence immediately arise. Given that only animate DPs can functionas experiencers, does the feature mismatch in Sincerity fears John result in crashing? If the answeris positive, why do we have a clear sense that this deviance is fundamentally different from thatof *Children fears John? If the answer is negative, what is left of the empirical content of theanalogy between �-features and �-features?2

Nonetheless, I will not pursue this line of conceptual argumentation any further. The reasonsare both methodological and empirical. I discuss my methodological reservations about conceptualarguments in the concluding remarks. Quite independently, there are enough empirical problemsthat should be discussed before conceptual issues are addressed. I realize that this way of prioritiz-ing conceptual and empirical issues shifts the focus of discussion away from Hornstein’s originalintention; yet the proper prioritization too, I submit, should be open to debate.

3.1 Control across Passive

The basic claim of Hornstein’s analysis is that lexical DPs can freely move (A-movement) fromthe subject position of control infinitives, as in standard raising constructions. Thus, both (4a)

2 Aware of these complex issues, Hornstein claims (footnote 17) that verbs are ‘‘grouped by adicity[; in] otherwords, verbs are categorized by their thematic status,’’ giving rise to feature-based paradigms. Notice first that thematiccategorization is not ‘‘other words’’ for adicity: verbs of the same adicity often assign different �-roles, and conversely,the same �-role can be assigned by verbs of different adicity. Even so, it takes more than thematic similarity to justifyverb groupings. What is needed is a demonstration that the obtained grouping is linguistically significant. Thus, onewould need to show that, for example, all verbs that assign a theme role, and only those verbs, participate in somegrammatical process. As far as I know, research in lexical semantics has yielded very few generalizations of this form.


and (4b) involve NP-movement (for convenience, I use the trace notation, although copies areintended).

(4) a. John1 seems [IP t1 to have [VP t1 won the game]].b. John1 [VP t1 hopes [IP t1 to [VP t1 win the game]]].

According to Hornstein, the single difference between (4a) and (4b) is the extra step in the matrixVP of (4b), serving to ‘‘pick’’ the matrix agent �-role. The grammar itself places no restrictionson the number of �-roles a chain can bear.

This system seems to generate, incorrectly, sentences like (5a), with the interpretation (5b)and derivation (5c).

(5) a. *John was hoped to win the game.b. It was hoped that John would win the game.c. John1 was hoped [IP t1 to [VP t1 win the game]].

(5c) is structurally indistinguishable from (4a), namely, simple raising that creates a chain withone �-role. The combination of raising and passivization of the embedded subject is of courseattested in exceptional-Case-marking (ECM) constructions.

(6) a. John was expected to win the game.b. John1 was expected [IP t1 to [VP t1 win the game]].

The question then is this: how can Hornstein’s account rule out (5c) while still allowing (4b) and(6b)? In fact, the problem has been noted by Brody (1999), and Hornstein (2000) offers a solution.The idea is that unlike ECM complements, control complements are CPs, and CPs are phases,blocking extraction. Hornstein writes, ‘‘Assume that some operation, say incorporation, can voidthe CP phase derivationally and say that this is prevented from occurring in passive verbs’’(p. 137). According to Hornstein, there is independent evidence that passives cannot supportincorporated C, as they do not license that-deletion (7b); in that regard, they resemble adjectives(7c).

(7) a. John fervently believes (that) there’s a man here.b. It’s fervently believed ??(that) there’s a man here.c. It’s unlikely ??(that) there’s a man here.

There are several problems with this argument. First, the facts are dubious. There is nogeneral prohibition against that-deletion under passives/adjectives.

(8) I was told/certain (that) Mary would come.

Second, the appeal to ‘‘phase voiding’’ is obscure. Why should this be prevented from occurringunder passive verbs? But suppose not only that the facts were solid, but also that a principledreason were given for the ban on C-incorporation onto passive verbs. These assumptions nullifyHornstein’s analysis, given that control is compatible with passive in other environments.

(9) a. Mary was persuaded to leave.b. Mary1 was persuaded t1 [t1 to leave].


(10) a. It was decided to leave.b. It was pro1 decided [t1 to leave].

(9b) and (10b) are the structures that Hornstein’s account would assign to the personal andimpersonal passives in (9a) and (10a), respectively.3 The alleged ban on C-incorporation intopassives cannot distinguish (5a) from (9a)/(10a). No doubt some modification can fill the gap,but at this point, I think, one should return to the standard account, until a more promisingalternative is offered. To recall, according to that account, movement out of CP must pass throughSpec,CP, which is an A-position, and movement from an A- to an A-position (the target of passive)is impossible (the ban on improper movement). If control involves no movement, then the issueof improper movement does not arise for (9a)/(10a). Only (5a), which has no control source,involves such movement, and is correctly ruled out.

In short, if control is raising, and if DPs can raise across a passive verb, there is no way toexclude control across a passive verb. Hornstein’s (1999) analysis overgenerates such structures,while his (2000) proposal ‘‘solves’’ the problem at the cost of undergenerating other structures.

An anonymous reviewer proposes an alternative implementation of Hornstein’s analysis toavoid these problems. The proposal extends Manzini and Roussou’s (2000) analysis of adjunctcontrol as a parasitic gap configuration to complement control. The infinitive is generated as aVP specifier, the controller is generated as a complement, and verb raising yields the surfaceword order.

(11) [TP John1 tried2 [VP[CP e1 to leave] [V′ t2 t1]]].

In this derivation, e1 and t1 satisfy connectedness and do not c-command each other—the licensingconditions on parasitic gap constructions. (5a) is blocked since it violates connectedness: thereis no matrix extraction to license the gap inside the left branch.

This alternative overcomes one problem at the cost of raising at least five others. First, onewonders why classical A-movement does not license parasitic gaps, whereas the movement tosubject in (11) does. In fact, standard A-movement can license two parasitic gaps simultaneously(12a), yet the A-movement in (11) fails to license a second parasitic gap (12b), suggesting thatthe first gap is also not parasitic.

(12) a. Which report1 did John file [without reading e1] [in order for Mary to copy e1]?b. *John1 tried [[e1 to leave] tV t1] [in order for Mary to look for e1].

Second, the idea that the controller is generated as a deep object is tantamount to the claim thatcontrol verbs are unaccusative—surely incorrect for most control verbs. Furthermore, one wouldhave to posit two distinct thematic mappings for identical verbs: the surface subject would begenerated as a VP complement in John preferred to have dinner first, but as a VP specifier inJohn preferred dinner first. Third, the sequence tried to leave is not a constituent in structure

3 Notice that (10a) is not a case of NOC, but one of OC by an implicit agent.


(11), leaving unexplained familiar VP-hood tests (e.g., Try to leave though John did, he couldnot find his way to the exit).

Fourth, as recognized by the reviewer, connectedness is violated not only in (5a) but alsoin standard grammatical raising constructions (e.g., (6a)), where there is no thematic source forthe raised DP in the matrix clause. A structural distinction between raising and control is thenneeded, which is independent of Hornstein’s analysis. But this is exactly the point I made above;hence, the alternative version offers no advantage over the original one. Fifth, the same logic thatblocks (5a) should block any extraction from the infinitive—a left-branch island—that is notaccompanied by a matrix extraction, clearly a false prediction (13a). Conversely, matrix extrac-tions should be able to license parasitic gaps in the embedded object position as well; after all,this is the canonical gap position in other parasitic gap constructions. This prediction, too, isdisconfirmed: (13b) cannot be interpreted as (13c).

(13) a. Who2 did [TP John1 try [VP[CP e1 to meet t2] [V′ tV t1]]]?b. *Who2 did [TP John1 promise [VP[CP e1 to consult e2] [V′ tV [VP t1 tV t2]]]]?c. Who is the person X such that John promised X to consult X?

Whether the infinitive is in a complement or a specifier position, the raising analysis of controlseems to generate more problems than it solves.4

3.2 Sideward Movement from Complements

A novelty in Hornstein’s theory is the mechanism of sideward movement. The article itself doesnot elaborate on the properties of this mechanism. Long footnotes (32 and 33) hint at the theoryof Nunes (1995), with possible extensions. Obviously, such a powerful mechanism needs to beconsidered with caution; however, the brief comments in Hornstein’s article do not permit suchconsideration. So let us simply grant that grammars employ sideward movements and restrict ourattention to the implications for control theory.

Recall that Hornstein appeals to sideward movement in order to account for OC into adjuncts.Yet nothing in the mechanism of sideward movement itself dictates that it must take place fromadjuncts. An obvious question to ask, then, is whether it takes place from complements. In otherwords, what rules out the following derivations, where the ‘‘controller’’ is embedded inside amatrix DP?

(14) a. *John’s1 friends prefer [t1 to behave himself].b. *We urged John’s1 friends [t1 to talk about himself].c. *People biased against John1 constantly attempt [t1 to incriminate himself].

Hornstein does not address this question. As in the previous section, the problem here is one ofovergeneration. The system allows mechanisms A and B to apply in different environments, but

4 In what follows, I continue to focus on Hornstein’s original proposal, with occasional references to points whereit (dis)agrees with the alternative implementation (11) (see footnotes 5, 7, 12, 15, 20).


oddly we never encounter them in the same environment. Still, nothing in the way they are statedexcludes this possibility. What is needed, then, is an independent principle C, which will constrainthe operation of A and B to just the grammatical cases. Short of that principle, the postulationof either A or B can hardly be called ‘‘explanatory.’’5

3.3 Implicit Controllers

It is well known that controllers may remain implicit (Kimball 1971, Bresnan 1982, Epstein 1984,Williams 1985, 1987, Manzini 1986, Rizzi 1986a, Brody and Manzini 1987, Roeper 1987, Lasnik1988, Chierchia 1989, Clark 1990, Higginbotham 1999, Landau 2000). The question is not whetherimplicit control exists, but how to deal with it. The familiar cases involve implicit passive agentsor implicit goals. For the purposes of the present discussion, I restrict attention to the latter.

Implicit dative control seems to be a universal option, particular languages differing in howpervasive the phenomenon is. Typical examples are the following:

(15) Englisha. John said/shouted (to the visitors) to return later.

Italian (Rizzi 1986a)b. Il generale ha ordinato (ai soldati) di partire.

the general has ordered (to-the soldiers) DI to-leave‘The general ordered (to the soldiers) to leave.’

Hebrewc. Gil himlic (le-Rina) lir’ot rofe.

Gil recommended (to Rina) to-see doctor‘Gil recommended (to-Rina) to see a doctor.’

Although no agreement has been reached concerning the proper analysis of these facts, someimportant insights have been established. Rizzi (1986a) has argued that implicit dative controllersshould be represented in the lexicon (as thematic slots) but not in the syntax; specifically, theyare not small pro’s. The reason for this distinction is that although implicit datives can control,they cannot bind anaphors (in nongeneric contexts).

Hornstein does not discuss implicit control, but it should be clear that Rizzi’s distinctioncannot be maintained in his system. If control is raising, then controllers must be syntacticallyrepresented, because only syntactic entities can be moved. This forces Hornstein to reduce allcases of implicit control to control by pro. Of course, this may well be the case; perhaps Rizzi’s

5 In the adjunct cases, the topmost link in the chain does c-command all the other links. Suppose one were to ruleout (14a–c) by reference to such a condition. This would fail to rule out other examples.

(i) *John1 persuaded friends of t1 [t1 to nominate himself].

(ii) *Who1 did Mary persuade friends of t1 [t1 to nominate himself]?

The alternative analysis in (11) correctly rules out those cases (but not others, to be discussed below), where no matrixmovement licenses the parasitic gap in the infinitive.


binding/control asymmetry can be explained in terms other than the pro/thematic slot distinction.The burden of proof, however, resides with Hornstein.

At any rate, implicit control raises even harder problems for Hornstein’s theory. This isbecause nothing forces the presence of pro in the relevant constructions. Recall that for Hornstein,pro needs no Case (hence its occurrence in NOC infinitives), by virtue of lacking phonetic content.This means that verbs that license dative pro have optional dative Case features. In particular,unlike the accusative feature of hit, which must be checked (explaining *John hit), the dativeCase feature of such verbs can be dropped, so nothing would go wrong if no DP checked it.6

Consider again implicit dative control. Following Hornstein’s analysis, suppose we selectan array without pro, containing �John, said, to, return, later, assorted functional categories�. Wethen construct the derivation in (16a), with the interpretation in (16b).

(16) a. [IP John1 [VP t1 said t1 [IP t1 to [VP t1 return later]]]].b. John said to himself to return later.

In (16a), the chain headed by John bears three �-roles—the agent of return, the goal and agentof said—and one Case, the matrix nominative. Notice that dative Case being an optional featureof said, John need not check that feature (if it had, then presumably it could not check nominativeCase on the matrix I). No principle assumed by Hornstein seems to be violated in this derivation.Yet clearly (16a) does not have the reflexive reading of (16b), so somehow it must be blocked.But how?

In fact, the problem is quite general. Whenever a control verb allows an implicit controller,Hornstein’s theory predicts that reflexive interpretations will be possible. But the opposite is true:a disjoint reference reading is always forced. Thus, the understood matrix goal argument in casesof type (15) is always disjoint from the matrix subject.

(17) a. Hornstein’s prediction: Implicit dative controllers may be bound by the matrix sub-ject.

b. In reality: Implicit dative controllers must be disjoint from the matrix subject.

That (17b) is descriptively correct has been observed by several researchers (Williams 1985,Chomsky 1986b, Brody and Manzini 1987). It seems that with respect to Condition B (and C)of the binding theory, implicit arguments behave like pronouns. More generally, the syntax ofnatural language places heavy restrictions on ‘‘reflexivizing’’ operations. When lexical, they arerestricted to only a few verbs (mostly describing bodily actions; see Reinhart 1997); when syntac-tic, they require some morphological marking (Reinhart and Reuland 1993). Hornstein’s mecha-nism of movement to �-positions is extremely powerful, generating nonexisting reflexive readingsin a variety of cases (in section 4.1, I return to another case of this sort). Specific restrictions,

6 Indeed, this difference in the obligatory/optional status of the Case feature on the verb is invoked by Hornsteinto explain why certain verbs can be reflexive while others cannot (wash vs. see). In section 4.1, I return to this proposal.


then, must be invoked in order to filter out ungrammatical cases. On this issue, as on the precedingone, Hornstein’s article is silent.7

3.4 The Status of the Minimal Distance Principle

Hornstein presents it as a major advantage of his theory that it derives a true generalization aboutthe choice of controller in OC constructions. This generalization, known as the Minimal DistancePrinciple (MDP) since Rosenbaum 1967, states that the DP closest to PRO is the controller. TheMDP correctly predicts subject control in (18a) and object control in (18b), but incorrectly predictsobject control in (18c).

(18) a. John wanted to leave.b. John persuaded Mary to leave.c. John promised Mary to leave.

Essentially, the MDP tradition (Rosenbaum 1967, Bach 1979, Bach and Partee 1980, Larson1991, Manzini and Roussou 2000) offers two ways to handle the promise-type ‘‘exceptions’’:(a) label them as exceptions and downplay their relevance to the core grammar, or (b) constructsophisticated analyses that make those cases ‘‘regular’’ at some hidden level (e.g., Larson’s doubleobject proposal). Hornstein’s proposal belongs to the first category. The regular cases like (18b)follow from the MLC, which substitutes for the MDP. The latter is treated as a markednesscondition, making cases like (18c) highly marked, as evidenced by their late acquisition (Chomsky1969).

The MDP tradition has always been a minority view in generative grammar. Most controlstudies, of all theoretical stripes, firmly deny that OC controllers are picked by distance (Chomsky1981, Manzini 1983, Comrie 1984, Koster 1984, Melvold 1985, Farkas 1988, Sag and Pollard1991, Petter 1998, Wurmbrand 1998, Landau 2000). This is not due to some pressure for ortho-doxy; rather, a careful look at the facts shows that no semantics/pragmatics-free theory of controllerchoice is tenable.

Although cases of type (18c) are not as common as those of type (18b), they are far toosystematic to be dismissed as ‘‘highly marked’’ exceptions. Basically, they consist of twosubgroups: verbs of commitment and verbs of request for permission. The first subgroup containssuch verbs as promise, commit, vow, and threaten; the second subgroup contains such verbs asask, beg, plead, and petition. There is considerable ambiguity with the second group (‘‘controlshift’’), which is sensitive to pragmatic factors (e.g., authority relations). Different languagesexhibit different degrees of freedom in this respect. Finally, verbs like propose also allow subjectcontrol across an object.

7 Notice that the alternative implementation in (11) fares no better on this point. If the infinitive is a VP specifier,both matrix arguments are generated below it. Thus, the gap at the dative position and the gap at the embedded subjectposition satisfy anti-c-command and connectedness. The fact that the higher trace at the matrix agent position c-commandsthe trace at the dative position is of no consequence.


(19) a. We1 vowed to our leader [PRO1 to be loyal].b. The prisoner1 asked the guard [PRO1 to smoke one more cigarette].c. John1 proposed to Mary [PRO1 to help her with the arrangements].

All in all, there is a rich body of research concerning the various factors—semantic, pragmatic,and parametric—that affect the choice of controller (see the literature cited above).8 The issuesare hard, but not impenetrable, and some important insights have emerged. None of those insightsare retained, or even addressed, by analyses such as Hornstein’s, which assign the choice ofcontroller to formal locality conditions. Whatever one makes of the issues involved, ignoringthem is not a viable option. At the very least, it is clear that a theory that does not derive theMDP is, ceteris paribus, better off than one that does.9

3.5 Delimiting the Category of Nonobligatory Control

The class of NOC constructions is defined by Hornstein as the ‘‘elsewhere case’’: whenever OCfails, NOC obtains. OC fails in all and only the environments from which the subject of theinfinitive cannot raise. Hornstein discusses three such environments: sentential subjects, ex-traposed clauses, and interrogative complements. In all these cases, pro is inserted as a last resortoperation.

(20) a. It was believed that [pro shaving] was important.b. It is impossible [pro to win at roulette].c. John told Sam [how pro to hold oneself erect at a royal ball].

The first question to ask is whether Hornstein correctly delimits the class of NOC constructions.My answer will be doubly negative: some NOC constructions are left out, and some OC construc-tions are erroneously included.

An NOC construction that is left out involves initial adjuncts. What makes these instancesof NOC is that the controller is not uniquely determined by sentence grammar. Rather, factorssuch as logophoricity and topicality determine which of the available discourse referents arepossible controllers. Sometimes, there is no syntactic controller (21a) (from Kawasaki 1993);when there is one, it need not be the local subject (21b); it can also be split (21c) (from Bresnan1982). At all times, though, it must be a possible logophoric antecedent (21d–e) (from Williams1992).

8 A summary of the various approaches can be found in Landau 2000:chap. 5. In a recent response to Hornstein1999, Culicover and Jackendoff (2001) document a wealth of semantic nuances in the choice of controller, all of whichare beyond narrow syntactic approaches.

9 In Landau 2000, I attempt to reconcile promise-type cases with locality by appealing to the Principle of MinimalCompliance (Richards 1997). The PMC sanctions a violation of the MLC just in case the offending operation follows alicit operation, and both are triggered by the same ‘‘attractor.’’ Should that idea prove untenable, the fact that my analysisderives the MDP would be a cause for worry, not pride.


(21) a. [After PROarb pitching the tents], darkness fell quickly.b. Mary1 was baffled. [Even after PRO1 revealing her innermost feelings], John re-

mained untouched.c. Mary1 lost track of John2 because, [PRO1,2 having been angry at each other], he

had gone one way and she the other.d. [PRO1 having just arrived in town], the main hotel seemed to Bill1 to be the best

place to stay.e. *[PRO1 having just arrived in town], the main hotel collapsed on Bill1.

This case is particularly damaging to Hornstein’s typology. Recall that Hornstein classifies right-edge adjuncts under OC (e.g., (2)). Movement out of these adjuncts is licensed because it is aninstance of sideward movement. However, movement out of initial adjuncts, as in (21), to somematrix position, would also be sideward movement. Yet no matrix argument, if any exist, is anobligatory controller in (21).

Intuitively, it is clear where the difference lies: the matrix subject c-commands a right-edgeadjunct but not an initial adjunct. The OC/NOC contrast should somehow be keyed to this contrast.But this contrast is of no consequence to Hornstein’s theory. Movement out of right-edge adjunctsdoes not target the surface subject position Spec,IP, but rather the thematic subject positionSpec,vP. The latter, crucially, does not c-command the right-edge adjunct; if it did, the movementwould not be sideward and consequently would not be allowed. In other words, given that thetarget for movement c-commands neither right-edge nor initial adjuncts, Hornstein’s theory hasno way to distinguish them and consequently predicts the latter to fall under OC.

Consider next the inverse case, where OC constructions are misanalyzed as NOC. This isthe case of interrogative complements (20c). Here, Hornstein follows the common wisdom in thecontrol literature, taking the binding of oneself to be diagnostic of NOC.10 In Landau (2000), Ishow that the common wisdom is false and that interrogative complements instantiate partialcontrol, which is a variety of OC. In fact, such complements show all characteristics of OC. Forexample, they do not allow long-distance control, a fact already noted in Mohanan 1985 andChomsky 1986b, from which (22a–b) are taken, respectively.

(22) a. John said that Mary asked [how PRO to feed herself/*himself].b. I thought they wondered [how PRO to feed themselves/*myself].

The controller in these cases must always be included in the reference of PRO. This property ofpartial control is found with the majority of control verbs (e.g., The chair decided to gather duringthe strike). Evidence for this is the disjoint reference effect in (23)—strikingly, even in thepresence of oneself.11

10 The two exceptions I am aware of, where interrogative complements are grouped with OC, are Chomsky andLasnik 1977 and Lebeaux 1984.

11 For an extensive discussion, see Landau 2000:chap. 2. I return in section 5.5 to further implications of partialcontrol for Hornstein’s theory.


(23) a. John1 wondered [who PRO to introduce his1 fiancee/*him1 to].b. John1 asked [how PRO to talk to Mary/*him1 about oneself].

Descriptively, Hornstein’s theory is in no worse position than most control theories, which misana-lyze interrogative complements as cases of NOC. Theoretically, however, it is particularly unsuitedto deal with the facts above. In this theory, islandhood entails NOC. To accommodate interrogativecomplements in the OC class, Hornstein must either deny the islandhood of interrogative comple-ments or abandon the link between islandhood and NOC. The former is not a viable option; thelatter undermines his account of (20a–b).12 Either way, the distribution of NOC constructionsdoes not follow from Hornstein’s theory without additional, as yet unknown machinery.13

3.6 The Interpretation of PRO in Nonobligatory Control

Following earlier proposals (Bouchard 1984), Hornstein claims that the subject of the infinitivein NOC has pronominal interpretation. In fact, it is a pronoun, simply lacking phonetic content.Evidence for this is the flexibility in controller choice, possibility of split control, strict readingsunder ellipsis, and de re interpretation.

These properties are uncontroversial; what is controversial is the conclusion. Thus, what thefacts tell us is that PRO in NOC does not behave like an anaphor. Does it necessarily follow thatit is a pronoun? Hornstein’s conclusion would follow only if there were no other options. In fact,there is a third possibility, one that has been proposed and defended in the past.

The interpretive properties of NOC have been investigated in detail in studies of the so-called super-equi construction (Grinder 1970, Kuno 1975, Lebeaux 1984, Williams 1992, Landau2001). An insight emerging from these studies is the striking parallelism between the distributionof PRO in NOC and picture-NP anaphora. More generally, it has been noted that PRO in NOCbehaves like a logophor, displaying sensitivity to perspective, center of consciousness, and so

12 An anonymous reviewer suggests that the alternative derivation in (11) is compatible with the view that interrogativecomplements fall under OC, on the assumption that ‘‘movement of the control type is not sensitive to wh-islands.’’ Themovement in (11), however, generates a parasitic gap, by the reviewer’s own proposal. That parasitic gaps are subjectto all island constraints is well documented (Chomsky 1986a), and wh-islands are no exception.

(i) ??What did John file without asking how Mary had written?

(ii) What did John file without knowing that Mary had written?

If the reduction of control to parasitic gaps is to be meaningful at all, they should be subject to the same constraints. Thefact that OC traverses wh-islands (with perfect acceptability) therefore casts serious doubt on the analysis in (11).

13 Brody (1999) argues that locality is not exclusive to OC, but constrains NOC as well.

(i) John told Mary [how PRO to teach herself/*himself/(?)oneself].

(ii) John thinks that Mary dislikes [PRO teaching herself/*himself/(?)oneself].

However, as (22)–(23) clearly show, interrogative complements fall under (the partial control class of) OC constructions.The same is true of gerundive complements (iii), as opposed to gerundive subjects (iv).

(iii) *Mary1 dislikes [PRO teaching her1].

(iv) Mary1 thinks that [PRO teaching her1] would be a mistake.

The claim that NOC observes locality was first made by Grinder (1970), who proposed the Intervention Constraint forsuper-equi constructions. However, subsequent research has shown that restrictions on the choice of NOC controllerscannot be stated syntactically and are better understood in terms of logophoricity; see discussion in the next section.


on. Given that logophors are subject to more stringent antecedence conditions than pronouns,they are expected to be more restricted in distribution than the latter. This is indeed the case.

In the following examples, the intended antecedent does not satisfy the semantic/pragmaticconditions on logophoric antecedents. Consequently, PRO is excluded but an overt pronoun isallowed.

(24) a. John sued Mary1 for divorce because it was no longer possible [for her1/*PRO1 tosupport him].

b. John’s1 wife thought that [for him1/*PRO1 to indulge himself in drinking] is inappro-priate.

c. John’s1 friends think it is illegal [for him1/*PRO1 to feed himself]. (Chomsky1986b:125)

d. [His1/*PRO1 having shaved already] shows that Mary arrived more than five minutesafter John1 did. (Lebeaux 1984)

It is hard to tell how to account for these facts in Hornstein’s theory. One possibility might beto posit a null logophor instead of pro. This would weaken the logic of the ‘‘last resort’’ argument,which is supposed to rest on independent evidence for last resort resumptive pro in weak islands(see Hornstein’s footnote 42). At any rate, no account that disregards these well-established factscan be considered complete.14

4 Claimed Benefits

A fair evaluation of a theory should consider not just the cases it neglects, but also those it claimsto be among its positive results. In this section, I will discuss three results that Hornstein presentsas independent benefits of his theory; results that come for free once the ‘‘control-is-raising’’analysis is adopted, but pose nontrivial difficulties to its rivals. I will argue that the first resultis empirically inadequate because of overgeneration, the second is theoretically unsound, and thethird, although valid, is too idiosyncratic and peripheral to warrant any general conclusions.

4.1 Reflexive Verbs

Once PRO is viewed as an NP-trace, and NP-movement is allowed to target �-positions, thepossibility is opened up that ‘‘control’’ applies in other environments, not necessarily infinitivalones. Following suggestions by Howard Lasnik and Alan Munn, Hornstein argues that inherentlyreflexive verbs should be treated this way.

14 In this connection, it is worth pointing out that split antecedents are possible not only in NOC but also with afew OC verbs, contrary to Hornstein’s claim (repeated in Hornstein 2000).

(i) John proposed to Mary [PRO to help each other]. (Koster and May 1982)

(ii) Ich habe ihm angeboten [PRO einander zu helfen]. (Wurmbrand 1998:184)I have him offered PRO each-other to help‘I offered him to help each other.’


(25) a. Mary washed.b. Mary1 washed PRO1.c. [IP Mary1 [past [VP t1 [wash t1]]]].

In this derivation, Mary checks both the internal and external �-roles of wash. Thus, the samemechanism, doubly �-marked chains, accounts for OC and reflexive verbs.15

The question immediately arises how to block this mechanism from applying to any transitiveverb, overgenerating forms like (26a) with the interpretation (26b).

(26) a. Mary saw.b. Mary saw herself.

Hornstein’s solution (footnote 21) appeals to Case theory. Verbs like see must assign accusativeCase. A reflexive derivation of (26a) ‘‘would leave either the accusative Case of saw or thenominative Case of IP unchecked.’’ By contrast, accusative Case is optional on wash; when it issuppressed, a reflexive derivation becomes possible.

But why is it obligatory? Notice that (25a) must be interpreted reflexively, and not as a caseof indefinite object drop. If the Case feature is optional, and pro needs no Case, then Hornstein’saccount permits, incorrectly, a derivation that yields Mary washed pro.

Suppose we somehow overcome this problem. Still, for Hornstein’s account to be nonvac-uous, there must be some independent way to determine whether an accusative Case feature ona verb is obligatory or not—other than the (non)existence of a reflexive entry for that verb.Hornstein spells out none, but the only conceivable way is to check whether the verb allowsindefinite object drop. In the absence of a (phonetically realized) object, accusative Case cannotbe checked. If the sentence is still grammatical, we may conclude that the Case feature on theverb is optional.

Hornstein’s analysis thus makes the following prediction:

(27) If a transitive verb allows object drop, it should license a reflexive reading.

However, (27) is strongly disconfirmed. In appropriate contexts, all the verbs in (28)—a smallsample—may appear without overt objects. Yet none takes on an inherently reflexive meaninglike wash and shave.

(28) John ate/watched/cursed/taught/preached/drew/cleaned.

As noted in section 3.3, the problem runs deeper. It is just not up to syntax to ‘‘reflexivize’’verbs in the manner Hornstein envisions. As Reinhart (1997) shows, inherently reflexive verbslike wash are lexically derived. The process is not productive, explaining both the scarcity ofsuch forms and the crosslinguistic variation in the class of reflexive verbs. Moreover, it is marked

15 The alternative analysis in (11) does not extend to reflexive verbs, as the two gaps stand in a c-command relation,hence neither can be parasitic.


in the morphology (zero in English, but overt in most languages). Syntactic reflexivization, atotally different operation, involves the merging of lexical anaphors. This operation is indeedproductive, as one expects syntax to be. Hornstein conflates the two options, ending up with anunreasonably powerful mechanism, which must be severely constrained by ad hoc stipulations.The approach not only yields wrong results, as in (28), but seems fundamentally misguided.

4.2 De Se Interpretation

The de se/de re contrast emerges in situations where a subject of an attitude verb is misinformedabout his or her own identity. A typical example involves a war hero who suffers from amnesiaand remembers nothing of his wartime experiences. Suppose this person (hereafter, the unfortu-nate) sees a TV program describing his own exploits and is impressed with the courage exhibitedby that person, who he does not know is himself. The unfortunate comes to believe that this herowill get a medal. Under this scenario, (29a) is true but (29b) is false.

(29) a. The unfortunate expects that he will get a medal.b. The unfortunate expects to get a medal.

This situation arises because (29a) can be satisfied by de re beliefs about a certain individual(denoted by the unfortunate), but (29b) can only be satisfied by de se beliefs about the ‘‘self.’’

Hornstein claims that ‘‘the movement analysis also accounts for the required de se interpreta-tion of OC PRO’’ (p. 80). This is so because the control chain in (30a) creates a ‘‘compoundmonadic predicate’’ of the form (30b).

(30) a. John hopes to leave.b. �x.x hopes x leavec. Everyone1 hopes that he1 will leave.

In fact, as Chierchia (1990) and Higginbotham (1992) observe, the mechanism of variable bindingdoes not distinguish de se from de re interpretations. Thus, both (30a), under Hornstein’s account,and (30c), under anyone’s account, contain at LF the �-abstract in (30b) (modulo tense distinc-tions); yet (30c) supports a de re reading, whereas (30a) does not. How to account for the de seinterpretation is an extremely difficult question for semanticists and philosophers. At the moment,Hornstein’s proposal does not seem to contribute to resolving this question.

4.3 Wanna-Contraction

The well-known phenomenon of wanna-contraction distinguishes PRO from wh-traces. PRO, likeNP-trace, does not block contraction, whereas wh-trace does.

(31) a. Who do you want PRO to/wanna see twh?b. *Who do you want twh to/*wanna vanish?c. John’s going tNP to/gonna leave.

‘‘If PRO is a Case-marked expression,’’ Hornstein points out, ‘‘as the theory of null Case proposes,


it should pattern like wh-trace and block contraction. That it behaves like NP-trace argues thatit is more like non-Case-marked NP-trace than like Case-bearing wh-trace’’ (p. 76). This supportsthe reduction of control to raising.

The argument is valid, but of limited interest. First, note that Hornstein is arguing againsta highly theory-internal hypothesis, namely, the null Case proposal.16 For earlier GB analyses,the idea that PRO is Caseless was the norm. But even granting that, the very significance ofwanna-contraction is questionable. After all, despite the extensive literature on this phenomenon(a fact of historical but not necessarily theoretical significance), this is a particular fact about thebehavior of one or two verbs, in one language—hardly a solid basis for general conclusions.

5 Raising versus Control

Rosenbaum’s (1967) discovery that raising and control constructions are fundamentally distinct,although superficially similar, has been a cornerstone of generative grammar for more than threedecades. It is, I believe, a major achievement of the field, on a par with the discovery of theunaccusative/unergative distinction and the NP/DP distinction. Like other true discoveries, it hasthe hallmark of ‘‘unexpected fecundity’’: once it was recognized, more and more facts werediscovered that followed from it. The raising/control contrast has provided insight into manycrosslinguistic phenomena that otherwise would appear unrelated.

Hornstein’s theory does not obliterate the raising/control contrast. Rather, it trivializes itsimport. According to this theory, the single difference between the two constructions is the factthat the raised DP is �-marked once in raising but twice in control. As Hornstein observes, thisis indeed ‘‘a radical departure’’ from the standard view. Therefore, it should be the focus ofempirical testing, designed to decide between the two alternatives.

However, Hornstein’s article sidesteps the whole issue. Except for one fact, there is nomention of the rich literature on the raising/control distinction, no consideration of empiricalconsequences, and no attempt to cope with problematic data. The purpose of this section is tofill in some empirical content (mostly familiar) that is highly pertinent to the debate.

The one contrast between raising and control that Hornstein does cite is the well-knownobservation (due to Rosenbaum) that nonthematic NPs can raise but not control.

(32) a. The shit seems to have hit the fan.b. *The shit expects to hit the fan.c. There seems/*expects to be a man in the garden.

These facts are unproblematic for Hornstein’s theory. In control, the matrix verb has an external�-feature to check. But idiom chunks and expletives cannot check that feature because they cannot

16 Even a proponent of this proposal could maintain that null Case is too ‘‘impoverished’’ to block contraction.


bear the relevant �-role. So the features remain unchecked at LF. Terminology aside, this is thestandard account.17

These examples indicate what kinds of raising/control contrasts are within the reach ofHornstein’s theory, and what kinds are not. Basically, the theory has only one contrastive featureto appeal to: the thematic distinction. This is pretty slim grounds. However, as noted above,generative research has uncovered many systematic differences between the two types of construc-tions; these go far beyond the thematic distinction. We will see that Hornstein’s theory is incapableof dealing with all these facts without additional stipulations.

5.1 Complementizers

That raising and control complements have different ‘‘sizes’’ is an old claim. For various reasons,theoretical as well as empirical, it has been maintained that raising complements are IPs andcontrol complements are CPs. I will focus here on one of the reasons for this claim, which isstated in (33), presumably a universal generalization.

(33) Control complements may be introduced by complementizers; raising complements arenever introduced by complementizers.

Infinitival complementizers have been recorded in many languages: de in French, di in Italian,om in Dutch, att in Swedish, aL in Icelandic, me in Hebrew, for in Belfast English, i in Welsh,and so on. Strikingly, they are found only in control contexts, not raising contexts. Even whensuch a complementizer appears to introduce a raising complement, closer examination reveals acontrol alternant. Consider the following pair in Hebrew:

(34) a. Rina xadla (me-)le’acben et Gil.Rina stopped (from-)to-irritate acc Gil‘Rina stopped irritating Gil.’

17 Hornstein’s theory can also account for Rosenbaum’s second observation, namely, that ‘‘flipping’’ the argumentsin passive preserves truth conditions in raising but not in control.

(i) a. The doctor seemed to have examined John. �b. John seemed to have been examined by the doctor.

(ii) a. The doctor wanted to examine John. �b. John wanted to be examined by the doctor.

The contrast stems from the fact that the distribution of �-roles among arguments is identical in (ia–b) but not in (iia–b).Similarly, Hornstein can explain May’s (1985) observation that raising subjects can be interpreted with narrow scopewith respect to the main predicate, but control subjects cannot.

(iii) a. Someone from New York is likely to win the lottery. (ambiguous)b. Someone from New York is eager to win the lottery. (unambiguous)

For May, the matrix subject in (iiia) may lower at LF to its base position, leaving an uninterpreted (hence deletable) tracebehind. Since the matrix subject in (iiib) does receive a matrix �-role, the trace of lowering may not delete, and it remainsunbound at LF. Hornstein could either translate this story to the copy terminology or require that all �-roles be expressedat LF (with the result that the higher copy in control must be the one feeding interpretation).


b. Ha-muzika ha-ro’eset xadla (*me-)le’acben et Gil.the-music the-noisy stopped (*from-)to-irritate acc Gil‘The loud music stopped irritating Gil.’

In Landau (2002), I show that me- is an infinitival complementizer associated with ‘‘negative’’complements. The verb xadal ‘stop, cease’ belongs to a class of aspectual verbs that are systemati-cally ambiguous between raising and control (Perlmutter 1970). Typically, only animate DPs cancontrol. Notice that the complementizer may appear only when the matrix subject is animate(34a). The inanimacy of the matrix subject in (34b) forces a raising analysis, which in turn rulesout the presence of a complementizer, in accordance with (33).18

Hornstein’s analysis would be hard pressed to make sense of these facts. Why should thepresence of an external �-feature on the matrix verb license a CP projection in the complement?The two facts seem completely unrelated. By contrast, under the standard analysis raising issensibly linked to IP and control to CP: NP-movement cannot traverse CP boundaries (see section3.1). If one denies that control and raising are distinguished in terms of movement, those linksare indeed lost.

5.2 Unaccusative Properties

As the Unaccusative Hypothesis generated new insights into the nature of NP-movement, a pointof intersection with the raising/control distinction became obvious. Raising predicates, which lackan external argument, are unaccusative, whereas control predicates are not.19 Thus, only the formerare expected to pattern with unaccusative verbs vis-a-vis the standard tests for this property. Inthis section, I review two such cases, from French and Italian. The crucial point to notice is whatthe tests do and do not diagnose. These tests are not sensitive to properties of the matrix positionwhere the raisee/controller is found. This is highly problematic for Hornstein’s theory, since thenature of that position (thematic or not) is the single feature in this theory distinguishing controlfrom raising. Rather, the tests diagnose a lower syntactic position, inside the infinitive, linked bya chain relation to the matrix subject. As we will see, no such position is diagnosed in the controlcases, which fail the relevant tests. Conclusion: no chain is formed in control.

5.2.1 En-Cliticization Ruwet (1972) observed that raising verbs permit en-cliticization of thepartitive complement of their surface subject on the embedded verb, whereas control verbs do

18 A similar correlation exists in Italian, where sembrare ‘seem’ and parere ‘appear’ are ambiguous between raisingand (dative) control. As Kayne (1981) notes, only the latter variants allow the complementizer di.

(i) a. Gianni sembra/pare (*di) essere partito.Gianni seems/appears DI to-be left‘Gianni seems/appears to have left.’

b. Mi sembra/pare di aver capito.to-me seems/appears DI to-have understood‘It seems/appears to me that I have understood.’

19 This is an oversimplification. A few nonagentive control verbs (e.g., manage) are unaccusative. The point ofinterest is that no control verb exhibits the NP-movement property of unaccusatives.


not. As is well known, en-cliticization is a diagnostic of NP-movement in French, found withpassive and unaccusative subjects as well.

(35) a. Le directeur du departement semble etre accepte.the head of-the department seems to-be accepted‘The head of the department seems to be accepted.’

b. Le directeur semble en etre accepte.

(36) a. Le directeur du departement espere etre accepte.the head of-the department hopes to-be accepted‘The head of the department hopes to be accepted.’

b. *Le directeur espere en etre accepte.

If the embedded subject position in control complements is an NP-trace, it is a mystery why thistrace cannot be linked to a clausemate en, unlike all other NP-traces. By assumption, traces arecopies with internal structure, so the subject copy can contain the en-copy as a subconstituent.By contrast, PRO being a simplex morpheme, it cannot host an internal copy of the clitic.20

5.2.2 Si-Reflexivization Rizzi (1986b) shows that NP-movement cannot skip a position coin-dexed with the moved NP, a consequence he derives from the Chain Condition and the �-Criterion.Specifically, configurations of the sort [NP1 . . . si1 . . . t1] in Italian, where t1 is the trace of NP1

and si1 is a reflexive clitic, are excluded. This serves as an ‘‘anti-unaccusative’’ test in thislanguage: all contexts that involve NP-movement—passive, impersonal, and unaccusative con-structions—fail this test. Not surprisingly, Rizzi shows that raising and control contrast in theexpected way.

(37) a. *I due candidati1 si1 risultavano [t1 poter vicere].the two candidates to-each-other appeared to-be-able to-win(‘The two candidates appeared to each other to be able to win.’)

b. I due concorrenti1 si1 sono promessi [di PRO1 essere leali].the two competitors to-each-other were promised DI to-be loyal‘The two competitors promised to each other to be loyal.’

For Hornstein, if (37a) violates the MLC, so should (37b). At times, it has been suggested thatthe reflexive clitic si is really an expression of the external argument (rather than the dative), andit is the lack of such argument that rules out (37a). This analysis would indeed do some work

20 Ruwet’s (1972) conclusion is correct, even though his control examples are problematic, involving nonderivedsubjects (which do not allow en-extraction to begin with); the data and judgments in (36) are due to Marie Claude Boivin(personal communication). Some French speakers reject en-extraction out of animate DPs, finding (35b) unacceptable aswell. However, speakers without this restriction report a clear contrast. Notice that the alternative analysis in (11) cannotexplain this contrast either, even with the stipulation that raising infinitivals occupy a different position than controlinfinitivals do. En-extraction can apply to the base matrix position of the controller, prior to (remnant) movement to thesubject position. There is no reason why the parasitic gap in the embedded subject position should not be a complexcopy, identical to the remnant DP (recall that under the alternative analysis, the parasitic gap replacing PRO has all theproperties of a normal NP-trace).


for Hornstein’s theory—but only half the work. Under such an analysis, it would still be the casethat (37b) violates the MLC, this time with (the trace of) si intervening in Spec,VP rather thanin the dative position. Notice that the problem is independent of the assumption that chains containa single �-role—an assumption that Rizzi adopts but Hornstein rejects. Whether si is part of theraising chain or not, it should count as an intervener.

5.3 ‘Each’-Association

Burzio (1981) noted that control ‘‘breaks’’ the association of each with a lower NP, but raisingdoes not ((38a–c) are cited by Chomsky (1981:61)).

(38) a. One interpreter1 each was assigned t1 to the visiting diplomats.b. One interpreter1 each seemed [t1 to have been assigned t1 to the visiting diplomats].c. *One interpreter1 each tried [PRO1 to be assigned t1 to the visiting diplomats].d. *One interpreter1 each said that [he1 had been assigned t1 to the visiting diplomats].

Notice that an NP-trace does not interfere with each-association (38a–b), whereas PRO, just likean overt pronoun, does (38c–d). A raising analysis of control loses this contrast.

It is not obvious that this phenomenon can be handled by the simple constraint on reconstruc-tion (see footnote 17), which Hornstein’s theory might appeal to. This is so because the intendedinterpretation in (38c) is unavailable even when one interpreter has wide scope with respect totried. To see this, consider the slightly different examples in (39).

(39) a. One interpreter1 tried [PRO1 to be assigned t1 to every visiting diplomat].b. *One interpreter1 each tried [PRO1 to be assigned t1 to every visiting diplomat].c. One interpreter1 each seems [t1 to have been assigned t1 to every visiting diplomat].

(39a) has a reading (perhaps not easily accessible) with the scope relations every � one � tried.This means that no reconstruction is needed in order to get wide scope for the embedded universal;Quantifier Raising is sufficient. Therefore, the fact that (39b) is ungrammatical under any reading(including the one observed in (39a)) cannot be due to failure of reconstruction. Thus, the banon reconstruction of control subjects, even if derivable in Hornstein’s system, would not accountfor (39b). By contrast, a simple locality condition on each-association, together with the standardview on control, accounts for the facts. Suppose that each-association is clause bound, so thatthe DP denoting the set over which each distributes, or its copy, must be clausemate to each.This is satisfied in the raising cases (38b)/(39c), but not in the control cases (38c)/(39b)—onlyunder the assumption that the embedded subject in the latter is not a (copy) trace. Without thatassumption, the patterning of control clauses with finite rather than raising clauses remains myste-rious.

5.4 Case Concord

SigurLsson (1991) argues convincingly that PRO in Icelandic bears Case. One particularly inter-esting argument he cites is based on two observations: (a) certain predicates determine quirky


case on their subjects; (b) floating quantifiers agree in case with their subjects. Thus, in controlconstructions, it is possible to detect the Case of PRO by the Case of the floating quantifier.

(40) a. Strakarnir vonast til [aL PRO vanta ekki alla ı skolann].the-boys.NOM hope for to PRO.ACC lack not all.ACC in the-school‘The boys hope not to be all absent from school.’

b. Strakarnir vonast til [aL PRO lei Last ekki ollum ı skola].the-boys.NOM hope for to PRO.DAT to-be bored not all.DAT in school‘The boys hope not to be all bored in school.’

c. Strakarnir vonast til [aL PRO verLa allra getiL ı r+Lnnie].the-boys.NOM hope for to PRO.GEN be all.GEN mentioned in the-speech‘The boys hope to be all mentioned in the speech.’

The assumption that PRO bears Case is necessary in order to explain the case mismatch betweenthe nominative matrix subject and the embedded floating quantifier. It also conforms with thegeneralization that case concord is clause bound. This alone undermines Hornstein’s claim thatthe controlled position is Caseless (being an NP-trace).21

What is more striking, however, is that no case mismatch is observed in raising constructions(data from O’Neil 1997:109, attributed to Hoskuldur Thrainsson).

(41) a. Strakarna virLast [t vanta ekki alla ı skolann].the-boys.ACC seem to-lack not all.ACC in the-school‘The boys seem not to be all absent from school.’

b. Strakunum virLast [t lei Last ekki ollum ı skola].the-boys.DAT seem to-be bored not all.DAT in school‘The boys seem not to be all bored in school.’

c. Strakanna virLast [t verLa allra getiL ı r+Lnnie].the boys.GEN seem to-be all.GEN mentioned in the-speech‘The boys seem to be all mentioned in the speech.’

Here, the quirky case determined by the embedded predicate shows up on the matrix subject.This raising/control contrast makes perfect sense under the standard view. In (40), the matrix andthe embedded subject belong to two distinct A-chains; hence, they bear distinct cases. In (41),the matrix and the embedded subject belong to the same A-chain, which is Case-marked onlyonce. Given that quirky case always overrides structural (nominative) case in morphological spell-out, the former surfaces.

Hornstein’s theory is unable to deal with this contrast. The Icelandic facts furnish such acompelling argument against the reduction of control to raising because they so clearly reflectthe chain structure of the construction. It would hardly make sense to argue that (a) A-chains can

21 That PRO is (dative) Case marked has also been argued for Russian (Comrie 1974, Neidle 1988, Baylin 1995,Babby 1998, Moore and Perlmutter 2000).


be doubly Case-marked; and (b) that option is licensed only when the head of the chain is �-marked. Yet nothing short of these evidently ad hoc assumptions would seem to reconcile thecontrast in (40)–(41) with Hornstein’s theory.22

5.5 Partial Control

The final argument comes from my own work on partial control. In Landau 2000, I discuss aneglected property of control complements, namely, that the reference of PRO need not be ex-hausted by the reference of the controller. Such cases are perfectly natural when the speaker hassome salient group in mind. For example (the notation DP1 . . . PRO1� indicates the partialcontrol reading):

(42) We thought that . . .a. The chair1 preferred [PRO1� to gather at 6].b. Bill1 regretted [PRO1� meeting without a concrete agenda].c. Mary1 wondered [whether PRO1� to apply together for the grant].

When one scans all the types of control infinitives, it turns out that most allow partial controland a few (a much smaller number) do not.23 The reason why partial control has been largelyoverlooked is not that a few control verbs allow it (most do), but rather that this possibilitybecomes apparent only when a singular controller cooccurs with an embedded collective predicate,not a common combination. In Landau 2000, I provide extensive documentation for the cross-linguistic solidity of this phenomenon, as well as a theoretical analysis.

Without further detail, one can already see how damaging the very existence of partial controlis to the thesis ‘‘control is raising.’’ Simply put: there is no partial raising. It is not even clearhow to formulate a rule of NP-movement that would yield a chain with nonidentical copies.24

Indeed, partial readings are not found in raising contexts (43a). This is so even though the semantictype of raising complements—a propositional infinitive—is capable of supporting partial control,as the Italian example (43b) demonstrates.

(43) We thought that . . .a. *The chair appeared to be gathering once a week.b. Il presidente crede di essersi riuniti inutilmente la notte scorsa.

the chair believes DI to-be-SI gathered in-vain the night last‘The chair believes to have gathered in vain last night.’

22 O’Neil (1997), advancing another theory of the ‘‘control is raising’’ variety, invokes assumptions no less exoticto solve this puzzle: for example, the idea that inherent Case is checked by AgrS (supposedly absent in raising complements).The basic issue of a doubly Case-marked chain, however, is left unexplained.

23 Partial control is possible with desiderative, factive, propositional, and interrogative infinitives; exhaustive controlis forced with implicative, modal, and aspectual infinitives. The split is anchored to the infinitival tense (see Landau2000:chap. 2 for discussion).

24 In the same vein, Hornstein’s logical formula (30b) is not suitable to capture the semantics of (42).


Let me stress again that partial control can be neither dismissed as an exotic phenomenon norrelegated to ‘‘marked’’ environments. At the very least, Hornstein’s theory must make room forcases of OC that are not reducible to raising. But if that much is conceded, then the whole projectof eliminating PRO and the control module is voided.25

6 Conclusion

Hornstein terms his article ‘‘an exercise in grammatical downsizing’’ (p. 69). It is worth evaluatinghow successful this ‘‘exercise’’ is. The number of independent empirical problems discussed inmy critique is, on a conservative count, around 13. In the worst case, Hornstein’s theory wouldhave to invoke a specific principle to handle each of these problems, enriching the grammar with13 new principles. In the best case, it would come up with one magic principle to handle all theproblems at once. By ignoring all those empirical issues, Hornstein’s article suggests that histheory approximates the worst case more closely than it does the best. Thus, the claim for‘‘downsizing’’ should be regarded at present as a hope, not an achievement.

I should stress that I do not take Hornstein’s failure to deliver theoretical downsizing as aserious argument against his theory, perhaps on grounds of Occam’s razor. As I understandOccam’s razor, it is a conditional, which says, ‘‘Other things being equal, avoid unnecessaryassumptions (entities, constructs, mechanisms, etc.).’’ Explaining the facts is the principal ingredi-ent in the ‘‘other things’’; that is what was once called ‘‘descriptive adequacy.’’26

Reading Hornstein’s paper, one is struck by the overwhelming weight bestowed on concep-tual arguments: the author repeatedly stresses that certain theoretical moves are motivated (justi-fied, vindicated, etc.) by the fact that they simplify the grammar, eliminate redundancies, avoidunnecessary stipulations, and the like. Virtually nowhere does he claim that they are motivated(justified, vindicated, etc.) because they successfully explain a problematic set of data that previoustheories have failed to accommodate. This lack of concern for empirical adequacy is disturbing.

Thus, I am not suggesting that we reject Hornstein’s analysis of control because it introducesunknown complications and redundancies. As indicated above, the analysis is too impoverishedto warrant such a conclusion—perhaps there is one simple principle that elevates this analysisto a reasonable level of empirical adequacy. My point is that until such a principle is spelled out,and as long as so many empirical issues remain either damaging to or unresolved by the theory,considerations of simplicity and economy are simply premature.

25 The literature contains more raising/control contrasts. Rizzi (1980) observes that impersonal si-passives in Italiancan be embedded under raising but not under control predicates. Hornstein (footnote 35) claims to have developed anaccount of this elsewhere, so I put it aside. Rizzi also observes that control infinitivals can be preposed, but raising onescannot (e.g., To be a winner, John certainly wants/*seems); the same contrast is noted by Chomsky (1981:62) and Jacobson(1992). However, Jacobson observes that many object control verbs strongly resist complement preposing (e.g., persuade,order), and I might add a few subject control verbs as well (e.g., manage, condescend); see also Martin 1996. The wholeissue, I believe, is related to the Case properties of the matrix verb and is orthogonal to the raising/control distinction.Other less than perfect contrasts that Jacobson cites (ellipsis/pronominalization of the infinitive) are also amenable to thistreatment (see Landau 2000:chap. 2).

26 Note that ‘‘explanatory adequacy’’ is not a conceptual constraint but an empirical one, operating on a differentlevel (i.e., the question of language acquisition).


In a revealing passage, Hornstein writes, ‘‘In my view, the theoretical adjustments neededto eliminate the PRO module are methodologically preferable to the theoretical stipulations theyhave replaced. Even if the gains were paltry, the burden of proof would be on those who favormaintaining the restrictions on �-roles, chains, and merger that have been dispensed with’’ (pp.93–94). This statement has the facts wrong and the logic backward. The ‘‘empirical gains’’ ofHornstein’s theory are neither paltry nor nil; they are in fact negative, given the number of truegeneralizations about control that are lost in the theory. As long as this situation persists, the‘‘burden of proof’’ resides with the new theory and not with the old ones.

In this respect, the present critique is quite different from Brody’s (1999) reply to Hornstein1998. Brody is mainly concerned with eliminating movement as a mechanism for chain construc-tion, and he deals with control only tangentially. The thrust of his argument is not the empiricaldeficiencies in Hornstein’s analysis (although he does mention a few) but its redundancy, givencertain assumptions about the interpretive component. In that respect, Brody and Hornstein sharean underlying emphasis on considerations of simplicity and redundancy.27 By contrast, my critiquerejects this methodology, suspending or at least diminishing conceptual considerations, in a searchfor empirical adjudication.

It is important to keep in mind what this debate is about and what it is not about. One thing itis not about is the issue of ‘‘innovative’’ versus ‘‘conservative’’ approaches to scientific progress.Likewise, it is not about the legitimacy of conceptual arguments in science (rather, their properweight). It is also not about the minimalist framework in general, or even the possibility of aminimalist analysis of control; I myself have proposed such an analysis in Landau 2000, albeita nonreductionist one. More narrowly, the debate is not even about specific assumptions, like theidea of movement into �-positions. For all I know, that might be a viable option in the grammar.The debate is about which of two competing sets of assumptions does maximal justice to thefacts of control. The choice may be hard, but never intractable. For all its limitations, the criterionof empirical adequacy is still the best index we have for scientific progress.

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Landau - Movement Out of Control

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