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![Page 1: Lance Fortnow Northwestern University. Markets as Computational Devices Aggregate large amount of disparate information by massively parallel devices.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062409/5697bf891a28abf838c8a006/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Lance FortnowNorthwestern University
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Markets as Computational Devices• Aggregate large amount of disparate
information by massively parallel devices into a small number of security prices.
Computationally-Bounded Agents• Agents may not be able to compute the
consequences of their actions. Modeling Phenomenon
• Computational explanations for economic puzzles.
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C D
C (3,3) (0,4)
D (4,0) (1,1)
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C D
C (3,3) (0,4)
D (4,0) (1,1)
Can get cooperation if we have more rounds than states.
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Turing Machine
Advantages• Captures Computation (Church-Turing Thesis)• Universal Simulation
Can take very long time, maybe never halt.
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Hartmanis-Stearns, Edmonds, Cobham• Running time bounded by a polynomial in the
length of the input.• The “P” in P versus NP.
Problems in Applying to Economic Models• No clear notion of input length.• Race condition: Whichever player has the
larger polynomial can simulate the other but not vice versa.
• Hard to predict.
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H T
H (2,1) (1,2)
T (1,2) (2,1)
s states
After s3 rounds theTuring machine willalways win
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Ben-Sasson, Kalai, Kalai
• m, r are integers at least 2• If r is a prime factor of m then
Bob’s payoff is 2 and Alice’s payoff is 1• Otherwise
Alice’s payoff is 2 and Bob’s payoff is 1
m
r
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Computation time in a Turing machine is measure by the number of unit operations.
Discount payoff of Alice of a game by A
tA where tA is the number of steps used by Alice.
Similarly for Bob. For today’s technology: 1-10-12
• A few million computation steps will have a negligible effect on the payoff.
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The following are roughly equivalent• Factoring cannot be solved efficiently on
average over an easily samplable distribution.
• For every c, >0, there is a >0 A = (1- ) B = (1- c) In -equilibrium, Alice receives at least 2-
m
r
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Program Equilibria• Each player is program that has the
program code of the other player.• One Shot Game Folk Theorems
Forecast Testing• Forecasters may require large
computational power to fool testers. Prediction Markets Preference Revelation Loopholes in Laws and Contracts Computational Awareness
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Apply discounted-time idea to computational complexity.
Explain Chess-like games• Create model that where bounded-search
followed by evaluation is close to an equilibrium.
Efficient Market Hypothesis• Do markets efficiently aggregate
information?• Are market prices “indistinguishable” from
aggregate value?• Can a slightly smarter agent consistently
“beat the market”?