30 James L HyZand

Suppose one began w i t h the d i s - v a l u e of p a t e r n a l i s t i c d i r e c t i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y . One c o u l d then c o n s t r u c t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f democracy based on the premise t h a t i t i s on t h e whole b e t t e r t h a t people ge t what they have themselves decided t h a t they p r e f e r , whether the preference be want-based or m o r a l l y grounded. vanishes, s ince m a j o r i t a r i a n procedures - do guarantee t h a t what a m a j o r i t y vo tes f o r i t p r e f e r s .

l i n e w i t h a c e n t r a l t r a d i t i o n o f democrat ic theory we beg in by i d e n t i f y i n g democracy w i t h t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y embodies maximal p o l i t i c a l i e q u a l i t y , p r o s p e c t i v e l y and r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , over p o l i t i c a l outcomes. Fo l low ing L i v e l y (1975) i t can be f a i r l y r e a d i l y shown t h a t under such c r i t e r i a , i f and when an issue has t o be s e t t l e d by v o t i n g , a s imp le m a j o r i t a r i a n procedure i s more i n accord w i t h the maximising of p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y than any o f the a l t e r n a t i v e s . This p laces m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m i n a manageable perspec t ive . democracy need n o t be d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m , t h e b a s i c argument w i l l be concerned w i t h a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f an equal , i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y embodied, d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c o n t r o l over p o l i t i c a l outcomes. Such an argument might be cons t ruc ted on a quasi-Rawlsian b a s i s . B r i e f l y , equal shares o f p o l i t i c a l power cou ld be shown t o be acceptable t o a l l ( o r t o anyone taken a t random), save to those who wish t o a r r o - gate themselves the power t o c o n t r o l o thers .

An impor tant aspect of t h i s type o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h a t i t i s n o t based on an at tempt t o demonstrate the a b s t r a c t va lue ( d e f i n e d e i t h e r by t h e f e l i c i f i c c a l c u l u s o r some a p p r o p r i a t e ' m o r a l ' p r i n c i p l e ) o f a m a j o r i t y g e t t i n g what i t wants, or what i t b e l i e v e s m o r a l l y r i g h t , or even what i t p r e f e r s . I t i s n o t c la imed t h a t even i n the long run i t i s somehow u n q u a l i f i a b l y b e t t e r t h a t more r a t h e r than less g e t what they want, b e l i e v e t o be m o r a l l y r i g h t , o r p r e f e r . Rather, i t i s argued t h a t t o anyone, save those w i t h a vested i n t e r e s t i n the r e s t r i c t i o n o f power, an equal d i s - t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power i s d e s i r a b l e . M a j o r i t a r i a n i s m e n t e r s o n l y as an i n s t i - t u t i o n a l consequence, and perhaps n o t a w h o l l y d e s i r e d one, o f p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y . Consequently, the a l l e g e d c o n t r a d i c t i o n never g e t s o f f t h e ground.

The a l l e g e d impasse

More impor tan t ly , the problem can be approached i n a w h o l l y d i f f e r e n t manner. I n

An argument i n favour o f

References L i v e l y , J. (1975), Democracy (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press) .

Mor r iss , P. (1981), 'Another C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e Theory o f M a j o r i t a r i a n Democracy', P o l i t i c s , V o l . ~ 1, No. 2, November pp.3-4.

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LABOUR'S WOMEN CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MART I N HOLLAND

I n h i s response t o E l i z a b e t h V a l l a n c e ' s a r t i c l e (1981) concern ing t h e e l e c t o r a l per- mance o f women, Davtd Denver Labour s e l e c t i o n conferences a r e p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t women candidates. t h a t a more r e l i a b l e t e s t f o r sexual b i a s i n s e l e c t i o n s would be t o analyse the sex o f a p p l i c a n t s and t h e i r r e l a t i v e success r a t e s through t h e s e l e c t i o n process. T h i s no te based on the responses o f 385 a s p i r i n g Labour Members o f t h e European Par l iament (MEPs) at tempts t o t e s t t h i s a s s e r t i o n .

lhe d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s t o the European Par l iament i n 1979 c rea ted a r a r e o p p o r t u n i t y t o study a complete r e c r u i t m e n t process u n f e t t e r e d by e x i s t i n g incumbents. The selec- t i o n machinery adopted by the Labour Par ty m i r r o r e d t h a t used fo r domestic s e l e c t i o n s , the o n l y d i f f e r e n c e be ing t h a t a m u l t i - c o n s t i t u e n c y body, t h e European S e l e c t i o n Organ isa t ion (ESO) was superimposed upon the e x i s t i n g Const i tuency Labour P a r t y (CLP) branch and ward s t r u c t u r e s .

(1982) argues t h a t t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t de legates t o He suggests

The t h r e e - t i e r e d p a t h t o candidacy was as f o l l o w s :

Labour's Women Candidates for the European Parliament 31

a s p i r i n g candidates had t o secure nominat ion f rom a branch, ward o r a f f i l i a t e d body e n t i t l e d t o nominate. A l l such nominat ions were forwarded t o the CLP l e v e l where the Execu t i ve Committee decided whether t o submit one, two or t h r e e names t o the ESO who i n t u r n s e l e c t e d a s h o r t - l i s t t o appear be fo re a de lega te s e l e c t i o n conference (see Diagram 1 ) .

Diagram 1 : EUROPEAN SELECTION ORGANIZATION (ESO) NOMINATION STRUCTURE

Branches, wards, a f f i l i a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s e n t i t l e d t o nominate

per CLP V A L I D A T I O N

E . S . O .

Execu t i ve Committee s h o r t - l i s t s ; f u l l ESO can amend and s e l e c t s by e l i m i n a t i o n b a l l o t

E N D 0 R S E M E N . T

max: o f one nominat ion each

min:6, max: 13 CLPs per E SO

What evidence was the re , i f any, o f p r e j u d i c e based on sex a t t h e v a r i o u s stages o f e l e c t i o n ?

Table 1 : SUCCESS RATES FOR LABOUR WOMEN CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Stages o f s e l e c t i o n

f a i l e d t o g a i n a nomina t ion gained a CLP nominat ion r e j e c t e d by t h e ESO s h o r t - 1 i s t e d by ESO s e l e c t e d as candidates l o s e r s i n June 1979 E l e c t i o n winners i n June 1979 E l e c t i o n

%

85.3 92.6 93.0 92.4 89.7 93.4 76.5

N - Male Fema 1 e - n n %

30 14.7 324 7 . 4

80 7 .0 244 7 . 6

70 1 0 . 3 57 6.6 13 23.5

5 35 26 350

6 86 20 264

3 78 4 61 4 17

Table 1 i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t h u r d l e f o r female asp r a n t s was i n s e c u r i n g i n i t i a l back ing a t t h e l o c a l ward nominat ion l e v e l . 14 .7 pe r cen t o f a s p i r a n t s who f a i l e d t o secure t h e necessary CLP nomina t ion were women, b u t i f nominated, women were j u s t as l i k e l y t o be s h o r t - l i s t e d (7.6 pe r c e n t ) as they were t o be r e j e c t e d (7.0 per c e n t ) by t h e ESO. What i s more, t h e percentage o f w men a c t u a l l y increased t o 10.3 per cen t f o r s e l e c t e d candidates and t o 23.5 f o r e l e c t e d IIEPs. A l though t h e percentages o f female a s p i r a n t s were i n d e f e n s i b l y sma l l , t h e r e was no evidence t h a t women were disadvantaged once they were w i t h i n t h e s e l e c t i o n process, a l t hough t h e r e was some ev idence t o suggest t h a t i t was more d i f f i c u l t f o r them t o g a i n a CLP nomi na t ion.

Cas t l es (1981) has suggested t h a t e l i t e s e l e c t o r a t e s , be ing more d i s tanced f r o m t h e e l e c t o r a t e , than f o r example a CLP, can w i t h g r e a t e r s a f e t y favour female

32 Martin HQ Z land

3 9 3 ) cooperate

On the o ther hand, i t i s probably unsurpr is ing t h a t a r e l a t i v e l y h igh propor t ion of se lec to rs i n marginal seats be l ieved f e m i n i n i t y t o be an advantage. Selectors there may be on the look-out f o r the grea ter impact they t h i n k a woman candidate may make w i t h her s c a r c i t y va lue and p o t e n t i a l l y d i sconcer t i ng e f f e c t on the oppos i t i on (one th inks here o f Helene Hayman being run against Enoch Powell o r Margaret Jackson against Dick Taverne). I t i s a l so probably the case tha t , as women do not o f t e n ge t picked f o r the safe seats (unbiased Labour se lec tors chose women f o r on l y seven o f the 209 Labour safe seats i n 1979) they are a v a i l a b l e i n g rea ter numbers and h igh q u a l i t y f o r the marginals and se lec tors know t h i s .

095

D r . Denver's d i r e c t enqui ry t o se lec to rs as t o whether , o ther th ings being equal (my emphasis)CLP's should se lec t more women candidates' looked bland enough t o a t t r a c t a l o t o f support. t h a t (and 57% i n Labour seats) sa id no, which hard ly seems a v i n d i c a t i o n o f the non- d i sc r im ina t i on thes is .

t ha t i s , they do no t come forward and i f they d i d , they 'would stand every chance o f being se lec ted ' . Without going i n t o the d i f f u s e and c i r c u l a r reasons f o r women pre- sent ing themselves as candidates i n r e l a t i v e l y much smal ler numbers than men, there are some d i f f i c u l t i e s i m p l i c i t i n t h i s b e l i e f ( f o r which, dare I say, D r . Denver produces no d i r e c t evidence). l i s t s seems t o bear l i t t l e d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the numbers o f women chosen as can- d idates, and indeed o f the numbers se lected, there i s l i t t l e d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the numbers e lected. I n i t i a l l y , t h i s i s l a r g e l y because n e i t h e r Labour nor Tory pa r t y headquarters can a t the moment i n s i s t on const i tuency p a r t i e s s h o r t - l i s t i n g o r even consider ing women, o r indeed any candidates, on the c e n t r a l l i s t s (al though a quota system i s now w r i t t e n i n t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the SDP). considered they are most ly se lected f o r the hopeless o r a t best marginal seats and m i n o r i t y p a r t i e s . I n 1979, f o r example, the Ecology p a r t y - w i t h no successful candidates - ran 15% women w h i l e the winning Tory pa r t y , ran on ly 4%, choosing o n l y one woman i n a l l t h e i r near ly 200 safe seats. Thus a man's chance o f e l e c t i o n once selected, was about 1:3 - a woman's, about 1 : l O . Overa l l , i n 1979, more women stood than ever before f o r t h e i r worst r e t u r n i n near ly t h i r t y years.

i n the House o f Commons and w h i l e I t h i n k nobody would quar re l w i t h D r . Denver's statement tha t ' t h e under-representat ion o f women i s no t i n any simple sense the ' f a u l t ' o f l oca l se lec t i on committees', s t i l l they must take t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the o v e r a l l process, i nvo l v ing soc ia l a t t i t u d e s , p a r t y o rgan isa t ion , se lec t i on proce- dures and u l t i m a t e l y the e l e c t o r a l system i t s e l f , a l l o f which r e s u l t s i n the v i r t u a l exc lus ion o f women from na t iona l p o l i t i c s .

Yet even w i t h the h i n t , i m p l i c i t i n the c e t e r i s par ibus, they were no t committing themselves t o revo lu t i ona ry change, 40% o f the se lec tors

F i n a l l y D r . Denver puts forward h i s own theory o f why women do no t get chosen:

For example, the number o f women on pa r t y candidate

Again, when women a re

More women on l i s t s o r even being se lected has no t meant p rogress ive ly more women

References Denver, D. (1982), 'Are Labour Selectors Pre jud iced aga ins t Women Candidates?', P o l i t i c s , Vo1.2, No. 1, A p r i l pp.36-38.

Vallance, E. (1981), 'Women Candidates and E lec to ra l Preference ' , P o l i t i c s , Vol . 1, No. 2, November pp.27-31.

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Erratum

The t a b l e on p.32 o f the a r t i c l e by l a i n Mclean ( ' T i t f o r T a t ' and E t h i c a l Computers' P o l i t i c s , Vol . 2, No. 1 pp.31-35) was i n c o r r e c t l y p r i n ted , i t should read:

F m B c cooperate , de fec t - L defect 5,0 I 1,1